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Spanish, rested with the recognition of sovereignty over the vast stretch of
nine hundred islands that comprise the Sulu Archipelago.17 The Sultan
agreed, nominally, to fly the Spanish flag, recognize Spanish government,
and abstain from making treaties with other foreign nationsin other words,
to cede all the trappings of independent sovereignty.18 However, these
arrangements soon came undone, following the tradition of numerous other
discarded treaties; periodic raiding continued, Spanish counterattacks
ensued, and warfare obstructed the imposition of effective Spanish rule.19
Though they enjoyed more success in Mindanao, the Spanish encountered
similar difficulties there and never were able to consolidate ruling power
through local government.20 This begs the question: why did these Muslim
regions remain so obdurate in the face of foreign aggression while the
Visayan Islands and Luzon acquiesced to Spanish rule three hundred years
earlier? And what import did the renewed effort at imperialist conquest in the
late nineteenth century have for Manila-based nationalism and the
recalcitrant Muslim lands of Mindanao and Sulu?
The notion of a solidifying Recent scholarship has debunked the traditional
"Moro" identity was largely explanation for resistance in Mindanao and Sulu:
an artifact of Spanish Islam. James Warren's Muslim Rulers and Rebels
merchants and sailors, and James Warren's The Sulu Zone conclusively
whose own experience with demonstrate that some sense of trans-local
Islamic "Moors" in Europe Islamic identity or solidarity in the face of
predisposed them to Spanish incursions did not unify this area.
viewing the inhabitants of Although there did exist a shared adherence to
Mindanao and Sulu as one Islam, the variegated cultures, languages, clan
devilish and war-like whole. groupings, and ethnicities of the area hardly
cohered into anything resembling a common
people. In the lowland Cotabato region of
Mindanao alone, three cultural groupings
organized around different languages competed for dominance,21 and a
highland/lowland division further distanced the island's inhabitants from one
another.22 Moreover, the Spanish sometimes managed to peel off sultanates
in Mindanao as allies against the more powerful entity based in Sulu.23 The
notion of a solidifying "Moro" identity was largely an artifact of Spanish
merchants and sailors, whose own experience with Islamic "Moors" in Europe
predisposed them to viewing the inhabitants of Mindanao and Sulu as one
devilish and war-like whole.24 This perception thus stemmed more from
Spanish biases than the reality on the ground.
The absence of a common "Moro Zone," however, should not lull historians
into the belief that Mindanao and Sulu occupied a position in the Southeast
Asian world comparable to that of the Visayans and Luzon. As James Warren
shows in Sulu Zone and Iranun and Balangingi, eighteenth and nineteenth
century phenomena in the global economy propelled the ascendance of the
Jolo Tausugs and the Iranun, forging a new economic and cultural unit as the
What implications would this strengthening of frontiers entail for the colonial
entity known as the Philippines ? Though the Spanish continued to confront
intense resistance and the extent of their true dominion in Mindanao and
Sulu is doubtful,31 Spain did ratchet up its attempts to incorporate the
region into the Filipino "juridical" entity and the Filipino "geo-body." With the
introduction of the "Government of Mindanao" in
The Sultan's decision to
1860, Spanish authorities for the first time
spurn Filipino nationalists
imbued their nominal sway over the region with
like Aguinaldo in favor of
a legal gloss, telegraphing their sovereignty to
Bates thereby prefigured
would-be competitors.32 Beyond this innovative
the intricate and often
political form, Spain also launched the
bitter triangular
unprecedented endeavor of mapping their
relationships between
Muslim holdings. In a 1909 article, the Director
colonial authorities, Manila
of the American Bureau of Mines in Manila,
politicos, and Muslim datu
William Du Pre Smith, cited a magnetic survey
that would develop under
by Jesuit geographers in Mindanao as one of the
United States rule.
most significant cartographic enterprises
undertaken by the Spanish in the Philippines.33
Although Smith does not mention a year, this
presumably would have had to occur after the
Spanish first sent Jesuits to Mindanao in 1859.34 Moreover, Smith also
discusses the mapping of a remote Sulu Sea Island, Cagayan Sulu, by the
crew of the British ship Marchesa in 1883.35 While the Spanish did not
conduct this expedition, the British often cooperated with the Iberian nation
at this time and supplied valuable technical expertise. Content with
dominating the Filipino economy, the British generally found it expedient to
pass off the hassles and costs of governance to a third rate power.36 It is
thus not unreasonable to assume that the Marchesa enjoyed the blessings of
Spanish authorities. In sum then, this burst of cartographic and juridical
activity illustrates how Spain hoped to paper over the deficiencies of its rule
and attach Mindanao and Sulu to the Filipino colonial polity.
On the eve of American conquest in 1899, the status of the "Moro" territories
vis--vis the Philippines remained fluid. In one sense, rebellions and
resistance afflicted Spanish efforts to assert its dominance, and Mindanao
and Sulu remained largely beyond the ambit of Manila, Madrid, or any other
colonial center. As in centuries past, Iberian assertions of sovereignty
seemed devoid of substance. In another sense though, the circumstances of
"high imperialism" effectively diminished the threat posed by the Sulu
Sultanate, and the period witnessed new Spanish campaigns to map the
region, literally and figuratively, onto the colony. Thus, relations between the
Filipino center and the "Moro" periphery would remain susceptible to the
policies of the next imperial overlord: the United States.
A Purely Civil Government is Quite Impossible:"37
American Military Rule, 1899-1914
In the throes of bitter and ultimately futile battle against the Americans, one
of the leading protagonists of the Filipino independence movement, Emilio
Aguinaldo, initiated correspondence with the Sultan of Sulu. In a letter dated
January 18, 1899, Aguinaldo wrote to assure his, "great and powerful brother,
the Sultan of Jolo," that the new Philippine Republic would "respect
absolutely the beliefs and traditions of each island in order to establish on
solid bases the bonds of fraternal unity demanded by our mutual
interests."38 Aguinaldo concluded by guaranteeing the Sultan "the highest
assurance of friendship, consideration, and esteem."39 These entreaties
went unrequited. Instead, the Sultan opted to negotiate with Brigadier
General John Bates of the United States Army. Arriving in the Sulu capital of
Jolo in July 1899, Bates concluded a treaty vouchsafing that the "rights and
dignities of His Highness the Sultan and his datos shall be fully respected"
and promising the protection of religious freedom in return for a recognition
of American sovereignty.40 While many of Bates' colleagues criticized the
deal for being unduly lenient and conferring too much legitimacy on "The
Government of Sulu," it did succeed in cementing ties between leaders of the
Sulu aristocracy and the American military establishment.41 The Sultan's
decision to spurn Filipino nationalists like Aguinaldo in favor of Bates thereby
prefigured the intricate and often bitter triangular relationships between
colonial authorities, Manila politicos, and Muslim datu that would develop
under United States rule.
With the Bates Treaty of 1899 and the arrival of American troops in Mindanao
as well as Sulu by 1900, American troops and administrators found
themselves charged with the supervision of a vast, mysterious stretch of real
estate. Writing in 1931, Governor General Leonard Wood's biographer,
Hermann Hagedorn, depicted these lands in ominously menacing terms:
In tropic waters, a vast, green crab stretches out an irritated claw after a
school of minnows skipping out in the direction of Borneo. The crab is the
island of Mindanao, the minnows are the Sulu Archipelago. Southward along
the menacing claw the steamer bears the new governor.
On the left is a jagged shore rising three thousand feet or more to a dark
ridge with forests.42
While academics should not overstate the pervasiveness of this island "Heart
of Darkness" view, they should not discount it either. By inheriting these
southern "Moro Provinces," the United States needed to grapple with an
enormous and lightly populated area that comprised over half the territory of
their new archipelagic possessions and was four times larger than any other
Filipino province.43 Confronted with the unknown, it seems likely that
American arrivals would resort to preconceived frameworks for making sense
of the indigenous inhabitants. And the colonizers' new systems of
classification suggested they did just that.
Figure 1: Map of the Philippines, from 1909 article written by Director of the
Manila Bureau of Mines, "Geographical Work in the Philippines " 66
A Philippine independent government can govern the Moros at least as well
as the United States is governing them today, if not better. The Moros are
kept under subjection through the American army, and the actual contingent
of United States troops in the territory inhabited by the said Moros is not
more than 7,000. There is no doubt that the Philippine independent
government could support a standing army of at least 30,000 men and could
place in Mindanao one-third of this force to keep order among the Moros; but
the Filipinos believe that this government of the Moros will meet with more
sympathy on the part of the Moros.67
Manuel Quezon, "The Right of the Philippines to Independence,"
Beyond the efficacy of a hypothetical military
force, Quezon also invoked the imperative of
restoring a common system of law, observing
that with regard to the issue of suffrage, "the
Christian and non-Christian Filipinos alike, would
stand on the same footing in the right of
franchise. The laws on the subject would be
general in character."68 Elsewhere, Gregorio
Araneta, an ally of Quezon's in the legislature
and a member of the Committee dealing with
finance and justice, stated in much more punctilious terms the same
imperative; namely, that uniform laws and standards of procedures should
obtain for all the provinces:
If, therefore, the legislature of the Island of Negros was not empowered to
repeal laws promulgated by the military governor of these islands, from
whom it received its power, and the Commission may not confer upon the
legislative council of the Moro Province greater powers than those conferred
upon the legislature of the Island of Negros, it is plain that the Commission
has no power to delegate to the Moro Province the right to amend or repeal
the laws of the Commission.69
In other words, Araneta, Quezon, and others hoped to eliminate the legal
exceptionality of Mindanao and Sulu and thereby definitively impose the writ
of the Manila Legislature over those territories. By doing so, they could reestablish a consistent set of laws for the entirety of the Philippines and
preserve the colony's sheen of juridical integrity.
One Last Hurrah for the Moro Province:
The Bacon Bill of 1926
As the Filipino legislature and Manila politicos exerted greater influence in
the evolving colonial polity between 1907 and 1914, the distinct legal,
political, and social position of the Moro Province became increasingly
untenable. It posed too much of an affront to the ambitions of Filipino elites,
and it offered too visible a symbol of how the nascent Filipino nation was not
yet truly a nation. Agitation on the part of the Filipinos, in conjunction with
transition in American leadership from the Republican to Democrat soon
precipitated a dramatic shift of policy. In 1914, the new United States
Governor General, Woodrow Wilson's appointee, Francis Burton Harrison,
oversaw the dismantling of the Moro Province military regime, the
establishment of a normalized Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and the
general incorporation of the region into the regular legal framework of the
Filipino nation.70 The Second Organic Act of 1916 codified this change,
placing Mindanao and Sulu for the first time under the jurisdiction of the
newly reorganized bicameral Filipino Congress.
Moreover, a number of de facto trends reinforced this de jure process of
integration. Christian Filipinos inundated the Moro Province in part to staff
the bureaucratic positions that proliferated in the region after 1914 and in
part to take advantage of multiplying economic and agricultural
opportunities.71 The incipient armed resistance to the Americans, though
brought under manageable control by the 1909, waned even more. But most
significant of all was the evolving role of the datu. Some of the datu, or the
Muslim leaders in Mindanao and Sulu who Jeremy Beckett depicted as "one
entitled to rule on account of his descent,"72 for the first time fell under the
spoke of how the Bacon Bill would "dismember the Philippine nation," and
"destroy our unity."80 But more than any quotation, a picture inset from the
June 19th issue of the Philippine Free Press evokes the sense of violence that
many Filipinos believed the Bacon Bill would wreak on the Filipino "geo-body"
and juridical form. (See Figure 2) With Mindanao present in its normal place
on the Filipino map, but ominously blacked out, the illustration conveys the
perceived wound that separation would inflict on the Filipino nation. Such
images, as Thongchai discussed, can prove central to the idea of the nation
and the mobilization of national sentiment. Maps like this then undoubtedly
played a role in arousing the public to action.
The Bacon Bill, which amounted to the last hurrah of separatist sentiment in
Mindanao and Sulu during the colonial, or for that matter, pre-World War II
period, went down to defeat through the combined efforts of Manila
politicians and their considerable number of allies in Washington. The bill's
demise, finally, spelled the end of the United States' attachment to a distinct
" Moro Province."81 Relations between Filipino nationalist bosses and local
datu stabilized and ran a fairly harmonious course through the 1930s and the
creation of the Commonwealth in 1935.82 This stability would endure
straight through World War II, and the immediate post-war Republic faced its
most pressing challenges not from Muslims, but from Communist Huk
insurrectionists. But beneath this placid surface, the dispute over the Bacon
Bill and the history of American rule more generally left some problematic
legacies in its wake. The widespread datu embrace of what Abinales termed
the American "restoration" embittered many Filipino nationalists and elicited
a widespread sense of betrayal.83 Moreover, it set a precedent for keeping
Muslims and Christians apart. These realities would remain a part of
Mindanao and Sulu and return to haunt the Philippines after World War II.
impulses in the state system of the Southeast Asian world. And it should be
recognized as such.
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------------------1 Jacob G. Schurman, "The Philippines," The Yale Law Journal 9:5 (March
1900), 217.
2 Carmi A. Thompson, "Are the Filipinos Ready for Independence," Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 131:Sp. Supplement
(May 1927), 3.
3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and
Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso Books, 1991), 6.
4 For the barangay see Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and
Society in the Philippines (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publications,
2005), 27.
5 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist:
The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," World Politics 35, no. 1 (Oct.
1982), 3.
6 See Ibid., 4-6, 12-14.
7 Ibid., 7.
8 Ibid., 13.
9 Ibid., 17.
10 Ibid., 18.
11 It should be noted that the sometimes contradictory norm of selfdetermination also emerged during this time.
12 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a
Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 17.
13 Ibid., 17.
14 "Territory Issue Snags Government, MILF Peace Talks," The Gulf Times,
May 6, 2006, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?
cu_no=2&item_no=85113&version= 1&template_id=45&parent_id=25
50 Barrows, 681.
51 Gowing, 72
52 Ibid., 73.
53 Abinales, 18.
54 Gowing, 74.
55 Michael Cullinane, Illustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American
Rule, 1898-1908 ( Quezon City : Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003),
150.
56 See Abinales and Amoroso, 119-23: Military presence is not mentioned as
an important component of state-building here
57 Abinales, 19-20.
58 Ibid., 21.
59 Ibid., 21
60 Ibid., 17.
61 Cullinane, 314.
62 Quote from Abinales, 17.
63 Ibid., 30.
64 Manuel Quezon, "The Right of the Philippines to Independence," The
Filipino People 1, no. 2 (Oct. 1912), 1-5.
65 See Cullinane, 323: here there is discussion of the self-aggrandizing
tendencies of Quezon.
66 Smith, 531
67 Quezon, 5.
68 Ibid., 5.
69 United States Bureau of Insular Affairs, Journal of the Philippine
Commission Being a Special Section of the Second Philippine Legislature
(Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1911), 772.
70 Abinales, 31.
71 Ibid., 33.
72 Jeremy Beckett, "Political Families and Family Politics among the Muslim
Maguindanaon of Cotabata," An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the
Philippines, ed. Alfred W. McCoy (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Center for
Southeast Asia Studies, 1982), 398.
73 Patricio N. Abinales, "From Orang Besar to Colonial Big Man: Datu Piang of
Cotabato and the American Colonial State," Lives at the Margins: Biography
of Filipinos Obscure, Ordinary, and Heroic, ed. Alfred W. McCoy ( Madison :
University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asia Studies, 2003), 210-11.
74 Howard T. Fry, "The Bacon Bill of 1926: New Light on an Exercise in
Divide-and-Rule," Philippine Studies 26 (1978), 259-60.
75 Fry, 257.
76 Ibid, 261.
77 See Abinales, Making Mindanao, 41-42 and Fry, 272.
78 " 'We Are at War'-Roxas," Philippine Free Press, July 3, 1926, 26.
79 Ibid., 26.
80 "New Separation Bill Shakes Political Heavens," Philippine Free Press, June
19, 1926, 36.
81 Abinales, 42-43.
82 Aruna Gopinath, The Tutelary Democrat (Quezon City: New Day
Publishers, 1987), 96-7.
83 Abinales, 58.
84 Ibid., 36.
Bibliography
Abinales, Patricio. "From Orang Besar to Colonial Big Man: Datu Piang of
Cotabatu and the American Colonial State." Lives at the Margins: Biographies
of Filipinos Obscure, Ordinary, and Heroic, ed. Alfred W. McCoy.
Madison:Center for Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin,
2000. 193-228.