ATTY. OSCAR L.

EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN

VISAYAS, REGIONAL OFFICE (NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant, v. ATTY.
SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the gravest misconduct and deserves
the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. (respondent) of
San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an inexistent decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in
Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented
by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney
Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by
Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.1
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for a copy of the decision in Special
Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter
of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special
Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided
Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner
was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching a
machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.4
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified
court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the situation.5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation in writing to the NBI,
triggering the investigation of the falsification.6
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4, 2005,7 wherein he stated that it was
the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of
the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the respondent were
substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated March 20, 2005.8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. The NBI also issued
subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter appeared and gave his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the
investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article 171, 1
and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced
against the respondent.11 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially endorsed the
recommendation to the Office of the Bar Confidant.12

Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,13 whereby he denied any participation in the
falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirleys petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he
had given advice on the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy
Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision;14 that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to
him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold
up in an investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in
Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs.
Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator Herminio
Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making
the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondents counter-affidavit as his comment, and referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, found
the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the purported
decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of
presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the
petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner;18 and that the
respondent had received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions thusly:
Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the
issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard
to believe. In the first place, if the decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the
authentic decision on file in Judge Penuelas branch except for the names and dates? Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly,
respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he
should have made this known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought. Finally, there is
no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this incident.19
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 2007,20 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with
modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by suspending the respondent from the practice
of law for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-70921 denying the respondents motion
for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the
Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondents comment/opposition as his appeal by petition for review; (2)
to consider the complainants reply as his comment on the petition for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the
complainants comment within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case within 15
days from notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a
court decision in consideration of a sum of money.
The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he had had no hand in the
falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to
the shady characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo
had a history of employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondents denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the falsified decision are not
persuasive. Dy Quioyos categorical declaration on the respondents personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by
nature was positive evidence, was not overcome by the respondents blanket denial, which by nature was negative evidence.23 Also,
the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not command credence. It is worthy to note,

too, that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only after the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had
required him to comment.24 The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than an afterthought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her deceased husband had
been instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of
the wife was rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as
proof of authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an
almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of
the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers
should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyers disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act
that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this
country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He
thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that may in any way or degree
lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand
of discipline on those among them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorneys Oath for
them to:
x x x support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; xxx do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct [themselves as lawyers]
according to the best of [their] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients x x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court extends
only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyers
Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross
misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the
principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the
Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or private
capacity.28 The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty
of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him
effective upon receipt of this decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
from the Roll of Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated against ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts of the country, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8000

August 5, 2014

CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated August 30, 2008 filed by complainant Chamelyn A. Agot (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and
the lawyer's oath for misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to account for and return her money despite several demands.
The Facts
In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her best friends wedding on December
9, 2007 at the United States of America. To facilitate the issuance of her United States (US) visa, complainant sought the services
of respondent who represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on November 17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of
Legal Services (Contract),2 whereby respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant visa in
complainants favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration therefor, complainant paid respondent the amount of
P350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook to pay the balance of P350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa.3 The parties
likewise stipulated that should complainants visa application be denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of the
interview and/or for records of criminal conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to
return the said downpayment.4 However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the agreed period. Worse,
complainant was not even scheduled for interview in the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the downpayment was not
heeded, complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against respondent.5
In his Comment6 dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his failure to comply with his obligation under the Contract
was due to the false pretenses of a certain Rico Pineda (Pineda), who he had believed to be a consul for the US Embassy and to
whom he delivered the amount given by the complainant. Respondent elaborated that he had a business relationship with Pineda
on the matter of facilitating the issuance of US visas to his friends and family, including himself. He happened to disclose this to a
certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred his friend, the complainant, whose previous US visa application had been denied,
resulting in the execution of the Contract. Respondent claimed that Pineda reneged on his commitments and could no longer be
located but, nonetheless, assumed the responsibility to return the said amount to complainant.7 To buttress his claims, respondent
attached pictures supposedly of his friends and family with Pineda as well as electronic mail messages (e-mails) purportedly
coming from the latter.8
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner
found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for a period
of four (4) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same would invite a stiffer penalty.10
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself as an
immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainants downpayment
of P350,000.00. The Investigating Commissioner did not lend credence to respondents defense anent his purported transactions
with Pineda considering that the latters identity was not proven and in light of respondents self-serving evidence, i.e.,
photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of any probative value.11
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the aforesaid report
and recommendation with the modification increasing the period of suspension to six (6) months and ordering respondent to
return the amount of P350,000.0012 to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, with legal interest from the date
of demand.13
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Courts Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBPs findings, subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing.14 In this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LANDAND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which resulted to complainant seeking his
assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal
services. In truth, however, respondent has no specialization in immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a
purported US consul, who supposedly processes US visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to prove Pinedas
identity considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-serving and thus, as correctly observed by the
Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any probative value and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly,
respondents deception is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw
that makes him unfit to practice law.15
Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under the Contract, which is to facilitate and
secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
CPR, to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 A lawyer
shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence, and to attend to such clients cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyers
neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable,17 as in this case.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount of
P350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith.
18 The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client.19 Thus, a lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of
his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics.20
Anent the proper penalty for respondents acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their clients
affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latters money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of
one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money
given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz,22 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to
return the amount his client gave him for his legal services which he never performed. In this case, not only did respondent fail to

facilitate the issuance of complainants US visa and return her money, he likewise committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting
himself as an immigration lawyer, resulting in undue prejudice to his client. Under these circumstances, a graver penalty should be
imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to increase the period of suspension from the
practice of law of respondent from six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, to two (2) years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return the amount of P350,000.00 he received from
complainant as downpayment. It is well to note that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only
revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this
rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature - for instance, when the claim involves moneys
received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement."23 Hence, since respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof
to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and
16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.1wphi1
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the legal fees he received from the latter in
the amount of P350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing
directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them
to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

PILAR IBANA-ANDRADE and CLARE SINFOROSA ANDRADE-CASILIHAN, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is an administrative case filed against Atty. Eva Paita-Moya by Pilar Ibana-Andrade and Clare Sinforosa Andrade-Casilihan.
On 7 December 2009, this Court, through the First Division, issued a Resolution1 referring the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from the receipt of records.
After the proceedings, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court on 18 November 2013 its Notice
of Resolution,2 alongside the Records of the case. The IBP Board of Governors also passed a Resolution3 on 13 February 2013
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation4 of the Investigating Commissioner for this case.
The Report and Recommendation summarizes the facts of this case as follows:
Here is complainants version. On October 3, 2007, complainant Pilar Andrade, stockholder and Treasurer of Mabini College Inc.
filed Civil Case No. 7617 for Injunction, Mandamus and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte
when she was illegally suspended by Luz Ibana-Garcia, Marcel Lukban and respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya. In the said case then
pending before the Honorable Executive Judge Arniel Dating, respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya appeared as counsel for all
respondents.
Complainant Clare Sinforosa I. Andrade-Casilihan likewise filed an illegal dismissal case against Mabini College Inc. and now
pending before the Honorable Court of Appeals. In the said labor case, respondent stood as counsel for Mabini College, Inc. and
co-respondent Luz I. Garcia and Marcel Lukban.
In another illegal dismissal case filed by Alven Bernardo I. Andrade on September 28, 2005 currently pending before the Court of
Appeals, respondent acted as counsel for Mabini College, Inc. Luz I. Garcia and Marcel Lukban.
After the aforementioned cases were filed, complainants had found out that on June 27, 2008, the Honorable Supreme Court
promulgated a resolution in the case entitled Wilson Cham versus Atty. Eva Paita-Moya docketed as A.C. No. 7484 suspending
respondent from the practice of law for one month.
Complainants were surprised. They later got a copy of the Office of the Bar Confidants certification confirming that until date
(apparently May 6, 2009, the dare [sic] OR No. 0304748 was issued) respondents suspension order has not yet been lifted.
On June 2, 2009, complainants were able to obtain a copy of the Supreme Court Circular No. 51-2009 informing all courts that
respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one month and said suspension was received by respondent on June 15,
2008.
However, despite of the subject June 27, 2009 Resolution on July 15, 2008 and despite knowledge of her suspension from the
practice of law, the said resolution having been further posted in the website of the Supreme Court and is available in CD Asias
Lex Libris, respondent continued to practice law in wilful disobedience of the Supreme Courts suspension order in A.C. No. 7494.
In fact from June 27, 2008 until May 2009, respondent filed the following papers and pleadings as counsel in Civil Case No. 7617,
to wit:
Comment to Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated July 15, 2008.
Motion to Admit Answer which was undated but submitted on November 12, 2008.
An undated Comments/Opposition to the Petitioners Formal Offer of Evidence in Support of the Application for Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction which was received by petitioners counsel on November 26, 2008.Motion to Admit Amended
Motion for Reconsideration dated February 9, 2009 which was received by petitioners counsel on February 12, 2009.
Motion for Reconsideration dated January 23, 2009.

Motion to File Position Paper dated April 13, 2009; and

Pre-Trial Brief for Respondents dated May 13, 2009.
Also in connection with complainant Casahilans Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, respondent never withdrew her
appearance. The same is true in the case of Alven Bernardo Andrade. Respondent never withdrew her appearance therein.
Likewise and notwithstanding such suspension, respondent continued to practice law and respondent clients in other cases before
the four (4) branches of the Regional Trial Court in Daet, Camarines Norte. Supporting this truthful assertion are the following:
CERTIFICATION dated May 29, 2009 issued by Atty. Michael Angelo S. Rieo, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 38, Regional Trial
Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.
CERTIFICATION dated November 24, 2009 issued by Atty. Elaine Gay R. Belen, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 39, Regional
Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.
CERTIFICATION dated November 19, 2009 issued by Mr. Eddie E. Balonzo, Acting Clerk of Court, Branch 40, Regional Trial
Court, Daet, Camarines Norte; and
CERTIFICATION dated November 5, 2009 issued by Mr. Chito B. Pacao, OIC/Legal Researcher II, Branch 41, Regional Trial
Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.
And per the November 5, 2009 letter of Atty. Michael Mortimer G. Pajarillo, Chapter President, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Camarines Norte Chapter, Daet, Camarines Norte, respondent "xxx Atty. Eva Paita-Moya has not complied with the order of the
Supreme Court relative to her suspension from the practice of law from June 27, 2008 up to the present.5
Respondents version, as stated in the Report,6 is that she started serving the suspension order on 20 May 2009. This was also her
position in her Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings7 dated 30 September 2010. She likewise alleged therein that she
had filed with the Supreme Court in December 2009 an Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Suspension with the Supreme Court,
which was unresolved as of the date of her Manifestation.8 Additionally, she argued that the resolution of the initial administrative
case docketed as A.M. No. 7464 was material to her position in this particular case.9
The issue in this case falls solely on the question of whether Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, that is, the
practice of law despite the clear language of this Courts suspension order.
The Report and Recommendation recommended that Respondent be found liable. We adopt the same, with modification.
The suspension order was received by Respondent on July 15, 2008.10 Despite this, she continued to practice law in various cases,
as shown by the pleadings she filed and the certifications noted by the Report.11 In fact, she continued receiving various fees for
her services throughout the duration of her suspension.12
It is important to note that her defense consists of an admission that she was indeed suspended, and allegedly served her
suspension.13 She claimed that she never received the resolution that had allegedly suspended her.14 By logical inference
therefore, her sole defense is ignorance of the resolution that suspended her.
However, the records of this very Court belie her statements. Office of the Court Administrator Circular No. 51-2009 stated the
following:
For your information and guidance, quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the Third Division dated 27
June 2008, in Administrative Case No. 7494 entitled, "Wilson Cham vs. Atty. Eva Paita-Moya", to wit:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and hereby SUSPENDED for one month from the
practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt
with more severely.
On 15 July 2008, Atty. Moya received the said resolution as per Registry Return Receipt No. 2320. (Emphases supplied)15
Moreover, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued a Certification dated 8 May 2009 that the suspension of Atty. Paita-Moya in A.C.
No. 7494 had not yet been lifted.16

We had laid down guidelines in Maniago v. De Dios,

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed in the matter of the
lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing
the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within
which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office
of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during
the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts
where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more
severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.17
This case is not without precedent.18 Previously, we had already stated the standard for discipline upon erring lawyers who
continue practicing despite being suspended by the Court, viz: Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat, this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law for six months for
practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of suspension.1wphi1 We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for
holding his position as Regional Director despite lack of authority to practice law.19
The Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent from the active practice of law for six ( 6) months with stem
warning that any similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.20 In light of this and the jurisprudence already
cited, we adopt the recommendation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA is found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months from her one (1)
month suspension, totaling seven (7) months from service of this resolution, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to
respondent's record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Paita-Moya is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, to determine the reckoning point
when her suspension shall take effect.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA, Respondents.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano (complainant) against respondent Atty.
Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty.
Carmencita Bautista Lozada3 suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Office of the
Bar Confidant, for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for reconsideration.5
However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07 entitled Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al., where
complainant was one of the respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her
husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June
12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels,6 as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and cross-examination of the witnesses during the
trial proceedings.7
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended from the practice of law constitutes
willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years.
On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on the complaint against him.8
In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances and her desire to
defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her
appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her husband
and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has
no choice but to give him legal assistance.10
On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.11
In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
terms of her suspension from the practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of
Atty. Lozada.
On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for
three (3) months.
RULING
We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.

Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this Court orders a lawyer suspended from
the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension.13
Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession"
or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.14
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is,
in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts,
conducting direct and cross-examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would disclose that
such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007 were done within the period of her
two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then
appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared
for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007,
or within the two (2)-year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she represented her husband, she is still
serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or
clarification from the Court if she can represent her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire to defend her husband
whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of the
court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that
amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse.
Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not
representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.
Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga,16 citing Molina v. Atty. Magat,17
where this Court suspended further respondents from the practice of law for six (6) months for practicing their profession despite
this court's previous order of suspension, we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada for representing her husband as
counsel despite lack of authority to practice law.
Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to
preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring
lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle.
The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end
desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of violating Section 27,19 Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to
respondents record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, so that we can determine the
reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed by complainant
Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
The Facts
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint2 for damages against his own brother, Marcelo O.
Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together with other defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando stated
the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07/09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893/Issued on March 10, 2008."4
Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have already reflected
payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa5
against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had
been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he
charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: "x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his
unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pretrial stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you], x x x daig mo nga mismong
abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel7 in the complaint
for damages, which stated that Maximino "x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner
not befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of professional fees and
questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss
x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement,8 both of which he sent to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the
instant complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509 and 192210, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award
of damages.
In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission of the third MCLE compliance is
not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made
upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that
the allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and were
uttered in good faith.12
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded to unjust vexation13
and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust vexation, consisting
in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x
x."14
IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case against
Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to
disclose the required information would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant any administrative
liability on the part of Orlando, considering that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who are brothers, was done
privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor intended to be published and known by third persons.
In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino moved
for reconsideration17 which was however denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with modification deleting the warning.

Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on certioranri.19

The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality.20 It is a special
privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their clients and the society such that a lawyer has the
duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in the profession.21 Consequently, a
lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow
lawyers.22
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is
the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the
legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum.23 In
Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in
a letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of
insulting language to describe the opposing counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession.25
In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual communications considering that
they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages
were clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's
insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his
colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in
the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and
disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions such that a lawyer's words
and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility
and uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their
conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely
relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been more circumspect in his words, being
fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to
interfere and insult Maximino to his client.
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes unprofessional conduct which
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.27 While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.28 The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party. Considering the
circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino to his client.29
With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure to disclose the required
information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for

disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from
the records.30
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the
entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with
his professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO, Complainant,

- versus ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 7241
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506]
Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 17, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint1 dated June 6, 2005 filed by Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure to perform
his duty as a notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights over their property.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the registered owner of a parcel of land
with improvements, consisting of 126 square meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View Executive
Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of
donation2 allegedly executed by her husband in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof
also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly personally appeared before respondent on
July 30, 2003, despite the fact that complainants husband died on July 29, 2003.3
Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. 259001 on
March 28, 20054 and issued a new TCT No. 292515 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was
not only violative of her and her children's rights but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty and candor is
unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.
In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of donation executed by the donor, Atty. Linco,
in favor of his son, Alexander David T. Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo.
Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon
(Algodon), to see him at his residence located at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent was then
informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with him.
Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly, but was articulate and in full control of his
faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent claimed
that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence along with the witnesses.
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a document, he did not bring his notarial
book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at
their convenience so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same.

On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office and informed him that Atty. Linco had
passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was then asked to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have
consented as he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject deed of donation, which was
actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.
During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established that indeed the deed of donation was
presented to respondent on July 8, 2003.7 Respondent, likewise, admitted that while he was not the one who prepared the deed of
donation, he, however, performed the notarization of the deed of donation only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died.8
On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation,9 the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found
respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor appeared before him and signed the deed of
donation on July 8, 2003, it was just ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty.
Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent should know that the parties who signed the deed of donation on July 8,
2003, binds only the signatories to the deed and it was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation was
notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement portion of the said deed of donation where
respondent acknowledged that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before me is false. This act of respondent is also violative
of the Attorney's Oath to obey the laws and do no falsehood.
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and that
his notarial commission be revoked and he be disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years.
On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.11
On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated
April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2008-678 dated December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for
reconsideration and affirming the assailed resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant to file her comment.12
In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything new in his motion for reconsideration that
would warrant the reversal of the recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial Law and is
unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public; thus, should be sanctioned for his infractions.
On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration, the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court, recommended that the instant complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication.
RULING
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.
There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that Atty. Linco was already dead when
respondent notarized the deed of donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a
day before he notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent notarized the document after the lapse of more than
20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the
time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with the notarization of the deed of
donation.
However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a colleague.
The fact that respondent previously appeared before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of donation,
considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document was notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of
donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty.
Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a
false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
sacrosanct.14 Respondent should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.15
Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance attached to the act of notarization. Notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document; thus, making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed
by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.16
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.17 Hence, again, a
notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of
his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties, being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.18 Respondent's failure to
perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of the donation
but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore, be held liable for his acts, not only as a notary public
but also as a lawyer.
In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a notary public, the revocation of his notarial
commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the
practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same penalty.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent
ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two
years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of
this Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all
over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G.
Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or
Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while
respondents first marriage was subsisting.1
In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to file a Comment, which he did
on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record.4
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a Notice5 setting the mandatory conference
of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and
respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.6
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent filed his verified Position
Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August 2005.8
Complainants Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial consultant to assist the latter on
technical and financial matters in the latters numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts.
Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to P 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by
the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged that, from
February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were
working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to the amount of P 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by
the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant
appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the fees he believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section 27 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and
Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his
allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed by
respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having
married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent,
contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on
28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.13
Respondents Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not an employee of his law firm
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder.15
Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting

in the latters dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there was
no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He
proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his law firm had an agreement
with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that
the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the case such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in
court. To support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005
entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by
Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of the said company.19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi
and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent did not
specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts.21 To the said Motion, he attached the
certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage
Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of
the three marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took place between
respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.23 The second marriage contract was between respondent
and Ma. Rowena G. Pion, and it took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987.24 The
third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September
1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry for civil
status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that the
document was not marked during the mandatory conference or submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was
supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed
against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further informed the Commission
that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bian, Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271.28 In both petitions, he
claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and
allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were
purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007.29
While complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not attend the hearing,30 respondent manifested his willingness
to attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two
Petitions he had filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be bearing his
name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two (2) Informations filed with the
RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32 The first criminal case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia
Pion while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged
respondent with having committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with
Pilar Lozano was still subsisting.34 Each of the Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional
liberty as accused in the criminal cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding, the Commission denied his
Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTCLaguna.
Thus, the Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.36
IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and

Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.37 The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of
certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the
proper courts since it was only empowered to determine respondents administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to
prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule
on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be
reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated.39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to
prove through documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latters
first marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred,
and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the Commission should have suspended the
disbarment proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts
bearing his name as having entered into those contracts with other women. He further contends that the evidence proffered by
complainant to establish that the latter committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus,
respondent moved for the reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative
proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage
Contracts.43
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated 15
April 2008 recommending respondents disbarment.44
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the formers share in the fees, if proven to be true is
based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.0245 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the
Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the
allegations, respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the
respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients
secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that
complainants allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this
matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services through various business entities.
Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were
owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latters legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed
to point out the specific provision that was breached.

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to
advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated
Rule 2.0347 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is
of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This
inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the
lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer,
would be regarded as the practice of law.48
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a
financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically
for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter clearly states that, should the
prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would render legal services related to the formers loan obligation with a
bank. This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as President
of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical
considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is
confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, we affirm the
recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate this allegation, complainant
submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter
objected to the introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case had been
submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them.52 We are not persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue
membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this
case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a
lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from
this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases,
is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.1wphi1 For the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof.54 In this case, complainant
submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latters first marriage was still
subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount
to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two other
marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna one in Bian and the other
in Calamba to declare the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void.55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity or impugned the
genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the formers marriages to

two other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a
member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining
to the birth, marriage and death of a person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much
evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any competent
evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage
Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third
marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code.
Respondents regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of
marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code
provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still
subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,56 we held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack
of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for
their continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers
professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply
and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so.
Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The
administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of
intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery
of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.