Owen Abbott

The Self and Morality in Mead: The Problems with the I and the Me
Abstract
This article aims to interrogate George Herbert Meads account of the Self. While
recognising that Meads work provides an invaluable contribution to theories of the self, it is
argued here that a number of the theoretical underpinnings employed by Mead hold back his
theories. It is maintained that this restricts Meads conceptualisation of the I and the me.
Furthermore, his theoretical basis led to a number of shortcomings in his attempts to unify his
theories of the self with his theories of ethics.
Introduction
The conceptual clarity produced by George Herbert Mead means that his body of work
should be considered as foundational for studying the self. More than this, his efforts to
describe a link between ethics and self surely means that any study into the relationship
between morality and self-identity would be at a loss if it failed to give substantial regard to
his ideas. As such, this essay will begin by outlining the contribution that Mead made to
understanding the self. This will be followed by a critical investigation into some of Meads
most fundamental concepts and their consequences for his theories of ethics.
The polemic offered here will be based on four key points. Firstly, Mead behaviourist
approach led him to conceptualise meaning as only arising in the exchange of gestures
between an individual and the other1. Secondly, Mead explicitly emphasised that he gives
precedence to structure over agency in explaining individual social action2. It will be argued
that this point fails to accurately account for the self in general. But as well as this, it also
affects many of Meads specific conceptualisations. This leads us to the third point of
criticism. Due to Meads emphasis on structure, the concepts of the I and the me leave
little room for agency. While Mead occasionally highlighted individual differences in
choice3, it becomes clear that these instances were little more than token efforts. As will be
explained, this seems to be because the behaviourist and structure-driven nature of Meads
thought led him to ignore the relevance of individual identity construction in the processes of
1

Gould, 2009
Mead 1967/1934
3
Mead, 1925
2

the self. The self is conceptualised in terms of the I, which is reactive in behaviourist terms,
and the me, which is made up of the generalised attitudes of others within an individuals
society. While it is not doubted that both these elements are of great significance to the self, it
is maintained that they do not leave room for an individual to act in terms of who they see
themselves to be that is, Meads concepts cannot facilitate the importance of identity to
understanding the relationship between the individual and society. This feeds into the fourth
aspect of the polemic. Again, as a result of his theoretical foundations, Meads ethical
theories frequently offer a short-sighted extension of Kantian rationality, while also failing to
accurately describe how ethical principles in a society become significant to individual
morality.
Mead does make many important contributions to understanding the self and ethics. But, to
remedy his inability to precisely describe the relationship between the two, it is necessary to
add a conceptualisation of moral identity construction through the process of structuration. Of
course, an essay of this length will be not be long enough to undertake this task in full.
However, the final section of this paper will offer a brief indication of how such a theory may
be assembled.
An Outline of Meads Theories of the Self
To provide a linear account of Meads theories, it makes sense to begin where he begins in
Mind, Self, and Society. His most basic premise is this: the self develops in relation to the
social. That is, ...selves are essentially social products, products or phenomena of the social
side of human experience4. Of course, Mead emphasised that this is underlined by
physiological mechanisms. However, the self is not reducible to the physiological functioning
of the organism. The self is not there at birth, but instead develops through the individuals
relation to social experience.
This claim is fairly uncontroversial, but it is Meads analysis of how this process occurs
which makes his work stand out. For Mead, the self is characterised by reflexivity, meaning
that the self is a self when it is capable of being both a subject and an object for itself5.
Becoming an object for oneself inherently requires social interaction. This is because it is
necessary for the individual to absorb the attitudes of others about herself before she can

4
5

Mead, 1967/1934:1
Ibid

reflect on her self as an object6. Mead explicitly states that it is only through the verbal
gesture that this process can occur, because it is language which allows us to refer to
ourselves in terms of the attitudes of others7. The full development of the self occurs through
two stages. Firstly, the individual must take on other individuals attitudes towards himself.
Secondly, he must take on the generalised attitudes towards social issues of the social group
of which he is part. The first stage is integral to being able to relate to oneself as an object.
The second aspect is an essential facet of a fully developed self, because, for Mead, a fully
developed self exists in relation to other selves within their milieu.
The self is therefore able to take on the attitudes of the generalised other towards social
behaviour8. Mead uses the example of property ownership to illustrate this point. As a self in
contemporary Western society, we typically absorb the general attitude that property can be
owned and, consequently, should not be stolen. The attitude of the generalised other can thus
extend into the notion that stealing other peoples property is generally wrong. Part of having
a fully developed self is being able to reflect on such generalised attitudes when reflecting
upon ones conduct. This occurs through the concepts that Mead refers to as the I and the
me9.
The I is the aspect of the human being which acts in response to the other, whereas the
me is constituted by the organised set of attitudes of the others that have been taken on in
the development of the self. The individual reacts towards the attitudes of others through the
I10. The I is pre-reflexive, meaning that it provides the immediate response towards
others. This means that the individual can often act in a way which the me may call into
question11. The me reflects on the actions of the I in relation the attitudes of others. In
this sense, the I remains elusive, because we can never fully understand why we act in
certain ways. We can only reflect upon such actions, by which point it has become absorbed
into the reflexive memory of interpreting behaviour that constitutes the me 12. What we
have in Meads theory is a triadic conversation in which the me engages with the I in
relation to the attitudes of others. And it is through this mechanism ...that the whole social
process is thus brought back into the experience of the individuals involved in it; it is by such
6

Mead, 1925
Mead, 1967/1934: 39
8
Mead, 1967/1934: 161
9
Mead, 1967/1934: 174-175
10
Mead, 1967/1934; Mead, 1925; Gould, 2009; Hjorkoer and Willert, 2013
11
Hjorkoer and Willert, 2013
12
Mead, 1967/1934
7

means, which enable the individual to take the attitude of the other towards himself, that the
individual is able consciously to adjust himself to that process...13.
Problems with Meads Theory, Part 1 Behaviourism
The process of the development of the self, just described, is not yet complete. This is
because we have not yet touched on the significance which Mead attributed to behaviourism.
He argued that if we are to understand how we become a self by taking on the attitudes of
others, we need to understand how such attitudes are absorbed by the individual. Mead
emphasised the role played by gestures and meanings in this process. Taking on the attitudes
of others requires the individual to understand the meaning that the others gestures carry14.
This point seems to be perfectly reasonable until we look deeper into how Mead describes
meaning. He argues that:
Meaning arises and lies within the field of the relation between the gesture of a given human
organism and the subsequent behaviour of this organism as indicated to another human
organism by that gesture15.
So for Mead, meaning emerges in the threefold relationship of the gesture to another, the
others response to that gesture, and the subsequent social act. Thus, taking on the attitude of
the other requires that we engage with the other in a conversation of gestures, through which
the meaning of their attitude arises. If, as Mead suggests, it is through gestures that meaning
arises, then it is through these gestures that the attitudes of the other are taken on by the
individual. This entails the process of the I acting and responding, followed by the me
reflecting upon this response of the I in relation to the others gestures, as described above.
Here then, is how Mead explained the development of the self in behaviourist terms. But his
theory begs the question: does meaning really emerge through the exchange of gestures?
Gould16 answers that this is far from being the case, because meanings, held within a culture,
have to precede the individual in such a way that they mediate the individuals practice,
rather than emerging out of that practice. Gould offers the example of hand shaking. We
generally know that if a new acquaintance extends their hand in a particular situation, then we
respond by shaking the hand. For Mead, it is in the gesture and the response that meaning
13

Mead, 1967/1934: 134

Mead, 1967/1934
15
Mead, 1967/1934:75-76
16
Gould, 2009
14

arises. But, Gould suggests, what if the person extending their hand used it as a ploy to
distract or coerce the recipient in order to rob them? Here, it becomes obvious that meaning
preceded the exchange of gestures, because the robber was aware of the meaning attached to
a person to extending their hand, which enabled the robber to exploit this situation.
It is perhaps an overstatement to suggest that Mead thought that meaning arose entirely
through the exchange of gestures, without any sort of meaning preceding the particular
situation. However, Meads emphasis on behaviourism does lead his work to read as though
meaning only arises through specific interaction. It seems much more likely that, as fully
developed adults, we learnt what certain things mean for us, and we carry these meanings
into certain situations. The social interaction with an other then allows us to reflexively
engage with the meanings in relation to our self. Take this example. A young individual is
sympathetic to left-wing causes, although she is yet to actively participate. She enters into a
conversation with a new acquaintance, who bemoans and vilifies those on the left who do not
actively engage with more radical Marxism. These were general comments, which were not
aimed directly at our first individual the second knew nothing of the firsts lack of
participation. Nonetheless, the first individual takes on the attitudes of the other and
reflexively engages with her self and her position in left wing politics. As Meads theory
reads, this would occur through an exchange of gestures, in which the meaning of the
seconds attitudes arose. Yet, it would not be possible for the reflexivity of the first to occur
as it did unless she had some prior conception of left-right politics, activism, and Marxism.
The meanings of such things could not have entirely emerged from a series of throw-away
comments by a newly acquainted other. As Daanen and Sammut17 point out, Meads theory
lacks a coherent account of how certain meanings can exist between people without
exchanging gestures in every situation.
Indeed, many authors, for example Burger and Luckman18, Gadamer19, Giddens20, have all
highlighted how some theoretical understanding of the world is necessary to coherent social
interaction. Without these theoretical underpinnings, we would be completely unintelligible
to ourselves and to others. We can only take on the attitudes of others in the process of
becoming a self insofar as these attitudes are generally intelligible to us. And for these

17

Daanen and Sammut, 2012

Burger and Luckman, 1966
19
Gadamer, 1975
20
Giddens, 1979
18

attitudes to be intelligible to us as individuals, they must carry some sort of meaning which is
generally held within our society21. To be sure, Mead makes this point himself when he
argues that we take on generalised notions of right and wrong from our society22. If this is the
case, then we have to assume that such attitudes have a meaning which is carried into the
specific exchange of gestures, rather than emerging from them. The overall point is this: if
meaning did not precede a specific interaction, then we would not be able to interpret the
attitude of the other which Mead claims is so integral to the development of the self.

Problems with Meads Theory, Part 2 Explaining the Parts in Terms of the Whole
Mead makes himself perfectly clear as to which side of the structure-agency debate he falls
on. According to him ...an individual can be understood only in terms of the behaviour of
the whole social group of which he is a member...23. He stresses that it is necessary to
explain individual conduct through the conduct of the society of which he is part. For social
psychology, the whole (society) is prior to the part (the individual), not the part to the whole;
and the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the parts24. Mead
leaves us in no doubts about his position. However, it must be asked whether his position is a
sound.
Of course, the structure-agency debate has endured long after Mead, and there is still huge
variation between different social scientists regarding the best position to take in the debate.
As this essay predominantly focuses on how Meads theoretical foundations affected his
conceptualisations, I will not offer an extensive investigation into the vast body propositions
and rebuttals which make up the structure-agency literature today. Instead, I will briefly
address the general problem that Mead causes for himself by attempting to describe the self
from the position that the part should be explained in terms of the whole. From here, I will
move on to its specific consequences for his work in the following sections.
Taking the position that the part can only be explained in terms of the whole seems to be an
odd way of approaching the self. By making such a claim, Mead is inherently arguing that the
role played by individual agency is minimal compared to the role played by social structure.
21

Burger and Luckman, 1966

Mead, 1925
23
Mead, 1967/1934: 6
24
Mead, 1967/1934:7
22

In the case of the self, this means that if we are to explain an individual self, then we need to
explain the society and its structures of which he is part. Now this point is perfectly
reasonable part of understanding an individuals self must of course be a consideration of
the social system in which that self is formed. However, Mead pushes us beyond this. The
sentence ...the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the parts25
suggests that to explain each individual self (part) we need only explain the whole.
This implies that agency is of little relevance to the self, which hardly seems to be the case.
By Meads definition, the self is reflexive, in the sense that it can be an object for oneself
once we have taken on the attitudes of others towards ourselves. It is via this point that Mead
describes the part (the self) as being explained by the whole. But it seems unlikely that we
could understand the self as being reflexive without at least some sort of agency. Even if we
take Meads point that we need to become an object for ourselves by taking on the attitudes
of others, surely engaging with oneself reflexively requires agency. Reflexivity is not passive.
We engage with ourselves in relation to others, and in relation to whom we see ourselves as
being, and what we want to achieve26. As Mead highlights himself, we modulate our actions
according to this reflexivity, we reflect on previous actions through it, and we think about
how we could act differently in the future because of it. This being the case, it becomes clear
that agency is necessary to reflexivity, because reflexivity both entails and yields conscious
action on the part of the individual, even if this action is mediated by the social structures of
which he is part (as a structuration approach would maintain27).
In short, it seems unlikely that the whole can fully describe the part when relating to the
individualised reflexive experience of the self. While our reflexivity inevitably draws upon
our social experience, the nature of reflexivity also allows for individualised reflection on
who we are and who we want to be, which do not have to occur entirely in relation to the
social whole if this was the case, it is hard to imagine a world of individual differences.
Mead28 loosely makes this point himself when he says that each individual comprises
multitudes of differences, which arise out of differences in experience and preference. That
Mead highlights this, if only in passing, should have indicated that the self cannot be entirely
explained in terms of the whole. However, as with his behaviourism, Mead seems to have

25

Ibid
Hjorkoer and Willert, 2013
27
Giddens, 1984
28
Mead, 1925
26

concreted his feet in the theoretical foundations of the whole explains the part, which leads
to a certain incommensurable vein running throughout his work.
Problems with Meads Theory, Part 3 The Concepts of the I and the Me
This previous point becomes particularly clear in Meads conceptualisation of the I and the
me. Because his structure-led theoretical foundations, Mead leaves little room for agency in
his conceptualisations. Agency can be understood as simply having the ability to act and the
ability to have acted differently to how one did29. The ability to have acted differently to how
one actually did is significant to a definition of agency because it implies a certain facility for
the agent to actively engage with her actions. If there was no such facility, then we would
only be able to understand action as entirely determined by structure or unconsciously led by
the physiological organism.
However, it seems that Meads theory of the I and the me function precisely along such an
understanding of action. As has been described above, the I is the pre-reflexive response of
the individual organism to the other30. As such, the I is often described as acting in ways
which are unpredictable to the individuals self31. The I acts and the me, which is
constituted by the generalised attitudes of others, responds to that action reflexively.
It is here that the general inadequacies of Meads behaviourism and his argument that the
whole explains the part combine and translate into his specific theoretical applications.
According to his theory, we act through the I with little engagement on the part of the agent.
We simply act in behaviourist terms, and then the me reflects upon this action in relation to
the attitudes of the social whole. But general day-to-day experience tells us that this is not an
accurate account of how we act in the world. As Gould32 points out, it seems likely that we
can think of occasions where we have contemplated the likely scenarios of a situation, and
decided how to act before we enter into the situation. Such a circumstance exemplifies how
the engagement with the me can pre-empt the response of the I. This point leads us on to
what I think is the most significant shortcoming of Meads theory: it ignores the role played
by self-narrative and identity.

29

Giddens, 1979
Mead, 1967/1934
31
Mead, 1967/1934; Gould, 2009; Hjorkoer and Willert, 2013
32
Gould, 2009
30

I do not disagree with Mead the I and the me are integral facets of the self, and much
action does occur in the terms Mead described. However, his theory overlooks the
significance of who the individual sees herself as being, and who she wants to be. This
individual self-narrative is the essential aspect of self-identity33. This being the case, our selfnarrative has a hugely significant role to play in both the processes of the self and future
action. It guides how we reflexively engage with ourselves, and in turn informs how we aim
to conduct ourselves in the future. Of course, in line with Meads argument, we may reflect
upon ourselves and our actions in light of the unpredictable action of the I, perhaps looking
back on our actions with shame as we realise through the me that we did not act in a way
which represents who we see ourselves as being. But equally, as Gould points out, future
actions can be considered beforehand, particularly in relation to ones self-narrative.
To give an example, I, as a pacifist, have considered my views on the use of violence in
relation to my self-narrative, and I have come to the conclusion that the use of violence is not
becoming of who I want to be the identity that I want to maintain is that of a pacifist. As
such, I have decided not to use violence under any circumstances. Of course, a time may
come where the I acts unpredictably and I break my vow, in which case I am likely to
respond shamefully through the me. However, this does necessarily change the fact that I
have applied my agency in reflexively considering what kind of person I would like to be,
and I have made a moral choice in relation to that view of myself, and this view to who I
would like to continue to be has affected my behaviour and my subsequent choices as an
agent in such a way that I have not used violence since this aspect of my self-narrative began
to emerge. This relationship is something that Meads I and me does not seem to be able
to facilitate. This is because his behaviourist and structure-led theoretical foundations negates
the possibility of his concepts from considering how agents can construct a self-narrative
around who they see themselves as being, and allow their action to be affected according to
this self-narrative, rather than simply responding in behaviourist terms and reflecting on this
response in relation the social whole.
Problems with Meads Theory, Part 4 Meads Theory of Ethics
In order to get to grips with the shortcomings of Meads ethical theory, let us begin with a
quote from The Philosophical Basis of Ethics:

33

MacIntyre, 1985

Within the field of ethics... the moral individual and his world cannot consistently be
presented as lying inside another moral field. The growth of moral consciousness must be
coterminous within that of the moral situation.34
The point that Mead is making here is important the individual moral consciousness
emerges in relation to the moral structures of the social settings in which he exists and
develops. Yet, he criticises the notion that each individuals moral consciousness is entirely
determined by her society, and hints at individual differences which allow for individual
variations in moral ideals35. In this sense, Mead fits in with pragmatist approaches to ethics.
However, Mead fails to accurately account for how the individual moral consciousness
relates to the society in which it develops. This is due, again, to the inadequacies of his
theoretical underpinnings.
This becomes obvious in his references to Kant. Meads theory of the I and the me led
him to conceptualise moral consciousness as emerging in relation to the views of the
generalised other, which leaves no room for agentive reflexivity of ones self-narrative. So
when Mead refers to Kant, he argues that: The universality of judgement, upon which Kant
places so much stress, is a universality that arises from the fact that we take the attitude of the
entire community, of all rational beings.36 There is something archaic about this sentence. In
what society would we consider an entire community to be formed of rational beings? And
why would it be assumed that all individuals would accept a particular rational attitude?
Would some people not be suspicious of universal and rational moral attitudes?
Yet, Mead continues to make a number of Kantian assertions about the nature of morality
which surely emerge out of his misguided assumption that only the me and the I are of
relevance to the self. He claims that the categorical imperative stands because we invariably
judge our actions through the claim that anyone in our situation would have acted as we did
in that particular situation37. This example challenges his point. Imagine an individual who
morally disagrees with the practices of supermarkets, and thus occasionally steals from them
in a minute act of protest. We cannot say that this individual would say that every person in
the same position would act the same, because that person would probably be aware that most
people do not steal from supermarkets, even if they do think that they are immoral
34

Mead, 1908
Mead, 1925
36
Mead, 1967/1934: 379
37
Mead, 1967/1934
35

institutions. Instead, the individual is acting in relation to her self-narrative view of who she
is as a moral person, and what she sees as acceptable moral action in relation to her selfnarrative. She is not acting according to the generalised view of the other, quite the contrary.
Similarly, Mead claims that, in moral terms, It is a practical impossibility to act in one way
and to expect others to act in another way towards you38. For example, an individual cannot
treat another dishonestly and expect honesty in return. But this does not necessarily seem to
be how morality has to work. A person may have been treated dishonestly, but decided that it
is not right to respond with further dishonesty, according to their moral identity. Or perhaps a
student of Emmanuel Levinas has constructed a self-narrative around the notion that morality
is at its most pure when it is asymmetric39. It thus cannot be assumed that members of a
society tacitly absorb a tit-for-tat rationality approach to moral judgements. Rather, we have
to assume a more complex relation of self-identity, which draws upon ethical structures
within ones society, but which is not delimited by these structures.
We can see from these examples that Meads typology of the I and the me led him to
make the kind of deterministic claims that the quote used at the top of this section would
suggest he is against. His theoretical framework led him to be unable to accurately explain
how there can be general ethical structures in a society, while also being distinct variations in
individual morality. What he ends up with is a rationalist explanation of why ethics can often
be seen to be fairly uniform, without any concrete interpretation of how individual agency is
embroiled in the processes of moral consciousness.
Concluding Remarks Can Meads Theories Still be Useful to Contemporary Ethical
Theory?
I am in no doubt that much of the theoretical framework established by Mead can be used to
inform contemporary theories of ethics and morality. In particular, Meads conceptualisations
of the I and the me are integral to understanding the self. However, while it seems that
Mead wanted to extend his theories of the self into explaining ethics within a society, the
shortcomings of the conceptualisations of the I and the me mean that he was not
successful on this front. His mission of explaining the relationship between the individual self
and society is a commendable one, which likely holds the key to understanding how ethics

38
39

Mead, 1967/1934: 381

Levinas, 1989

and morality function and are reproduced within a society. But if this task is to be completed,
then an understanding of self-identity needs to be added. But this cannot be any tired
interpretation of identity. Only a theory of self-identity which gives accurate credence to the
role played by structure and agency in the process of constructing ones identity can be used
to account for the relationship between the ethical structures of a society and the individuals
moral identity.
I suggest, in incredibly brief terms here, that it is necessary for the theory of structuration 40 to
be applied to the construction of identity if we are to understand how a moral identity is
formed. If we take identity to refer to the process of constructing ones self-narrative41, then it
is clear that identity requires the individual agent to draw upon the structures of their society
in this process. If this was not the case, then the self-narrative that one is constructing would
be utterly unintelligible to others, which, as Meads work highlights, would be contrary to the
formation of the self. But this is not to say the individuals are passive in their identity
construction, particularly in contemporary Western society. The process of identity
construction is rich with agency because the individual selectively engages with the particular
structures which she feels are relevant to the identity that she wishes to construct. And, to
drive home the importance of structuration, as she draws upon these particular structures, she
is also reproducing their relevance to constructing the specific kind of identity that she is
forming.
It is surely through this same process that a moral identity is formed. The ethical structures of
a society are drawn upon by the agent and utilised in the construction of ones self-narrative
of what is right and what is wrong. This process is neatly demonstrated in the opening
interviews of the classic work Habits of the Heart42. As has been indicated throughout this
paper, agency has a lot more relevance to the reflexive nature of the self than Meads theory
allows for. By adding the notion of a self-identity formed through the process of
structuration, we can begin to understand how the ethical structures of a society are taken on
and interpreted by individuals through their reflexive engagement with who they see
themselves as being as moral people, that is, in relation to the continuous construction of their
moral identity.

40

Giddens, 1979; Giddens, 1984

Bauman, 2008
42
Bellah, et al, 1996
41

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