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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to articulate the central issues and controversies
that currently dominate the study of the relationship between language and
brain and, as a result, we will attempt to fundamentally redefine the way lan
guage is viewed by the neurosciences by recasting traditional linguistic defini
tions of human language. In order to achieve these goals, we will take into
account (1) important aspects of neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neuro
functionality, (2) the role of imaging technologies (especially PET and fMRI)
in formulating specific questions for testing hypotheses about language and
the brain, including what these technologies can and cannot do, and (3) a dis
cussion of the myths about the neurological representations of human lan
guage. Our conclusions will take into account evidence on aphasias and
medial temporal lobe (MTL) damage that directly affects the way we under
stand the relationship between language, brain, and memory.
Keywords: language; imaging studies; MTL (medial temporal lobe); H. M.;
neurolinguistics; cognitive linguistics
... there is now good evidence that the classical
speech-related regions are not anatomically or
functionally homogeneous. Furthermore, modern
work has identified areas outside of the classical
regions that are implicated in language processing.
Poeppel and Hickok (2004: 5)
The time has come for the field of theoretical linguistics to reinsert itself into
the study of human language and the brain. While there are now strong voices
arguing for the importance of including linguistics into the field of brain and
language, the subfield of neurolinguistics has predominately remained a field
Semiotica 1841/4 (2011), 1132
DOI 10.1515/semi.2011.020
00371998/11/01840011
Walter de Gruyter
12 E. Andrews
that studies language-based pathologies, most often forms of aphasia (Ahlsn
2006: 35).1 The purpose of this paper is to articulate the central issues and
controversies that currently dominate the study of the relationship between
language and brain and, as a result, we will attempt to fundamentally redefine
the way language is viewed by the neurosciences by recasting traditional linguistic definitions of human language. In order to achieve these goals, we will
take into account (1) important aspects of neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and
neurofunctionality, (2) the role of imaging technologies (especially PET and
fMRI) in formulating specific questions for testing hypotheses about language
and the brain, including what these technologies can and cannot do, and (3) a
discussion of the myths about the neurological representations of human language. Our conclusions will take into account evidence on aphasias and medial
temporal lobe (MTL) damage that directly affects the way we understand the
relationship between language, brain, and memory.
14 E. Andrews
Table 1. Posited language processing areas of brain
Source
Brain areas
Fabbro (1999)
Lieberman (2006)
work and offer a fresh take on some of Wernickes contributions that have
often been ignored (2004: 24). Stowe, Haverkort, and Zwarts (2004: 1003
1006) include an excellent discussion on the problems of how production and
comprehension have been defined in the classical model.
What is perhaps more disturbing is the absence in most neuroscience texts
concerning the importance of subcortical areas of the brain in language processing. The works of Fabbro, Lieberman, and Poeppel and Hickok represent
an important departure from the general trend. In each of these works, a number of subcortical areas and areas outside of Brodmanns areas 45 and 22 are
identified that are important to features of language processing. Table 1 gives
some of the more salient subcortical areas for study.
Poeppel and Hickok (2004: 10) make a special point to emphasize the importance of often ignored right-hemispheric areas (noting that these areas
havebeen treated as the ugly step-hemisphere in brain-language models) in
studies of language and brain, and note the general consensus concerning the
role of the right temporal lobes in speech perception.
A secondary problem related to neuroscience definitions of language arises
due to a conflation of the terms language and speech. The term language
is used synonymously with the term speech, and in some instances, the term
16 E. Andrews
stimulation, specifically stimulation of the caudate head and the anterior nuclei
of the thalamus, which might induce involuntary production of speech (Fabbro
1999: 83).
This window into the brain is quite restricted and truly invasive, and is only
available for patients, very often epileptics, requiring surgical procedures to
prevent seizures. One could argue that the epileptic brain is organized in a
fundamentally distinct way from the non-epileptic brain, but it is more likely
that the evidence of motor speech production areas, which varies somewhat
from brain to brain as stated above, remains true for the population at large.
4. Imaging technologies and their role in studying language and brain
It would be impossible to do justice to the important and broad topic of imaging technologies and their application in language and brain research in a short
article; however, it is possible to outline the defining principles of these technologies in order to not only demonstrate the importance of imaging technologies to the study of language and brain, but also provide a basis for determining
how best they might be applied. Below is a list of the more important technologies for monitoring the functioning brain, including a short definition and
whether the procedure is invasive or not. (For detailed description of these
technologies, see Huettel, Song, and McCarthy 2004; Kandel, Schwartz, and
Jessel 1991; Cabeza and Kingstone 2001.)
EEG (electroencephalography): electrodes are placed on the scalp to monitor changes in electrical activity of large groupings (called ensembles) of
neurons (can be invasive). Significant electrical stimulus responses called
ERPs (event related potentials) are electrical changes in the brain that are
associated with sensory or cognitive events.
PET (Positron Emission Tomography): invasive insertion of radioactive
tracer into the bloodstream to monitor neurological processes.
fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging): noninvasive measurement
consisting of anatomical and functional measurements; very noisy with
horizontal placement of subject from head to lower body into the scanner
tube; any movements can create artifacts in the resulting scans, which may
hinder analysis.
MEG (magnetoencephalography): noninvasive measurement of small
changes in magnetic fields related to neuronal electrical activity, little to no
noise, subject is in upright sitting position; spatial and temporal resolution
are generally good.
TMS (Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation): causes temporary localized interruption of neurological function by placing a electromagnetic coil near
different points of the scalp.
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EEG and/or MEG yield better temporal resolutions, being techniques
more directly coupled to neuronal activity (Buckner and Logan 2001: 30),
than fMRI or PET;
while fMRI is easier and cheaper than PET, it is also more sensitive to
artifacts that may obscure the function under study, i.e., any kind of motion that occurs during the scan (including head movement, eye movement,
even breathing). (This point becomes especially relevant for any sort of
fMRI study of human speech; see Buckner and Logan 2001: 30.);
the images generated are not as useful as the scanner approaches the front
of the head/eye area or the back of the head area/base of skull;
a smoothing process is often applied in fMRI analysis (the application of
spatial filters are often introduced into the experiment, sometimes as a preprocessing step [e.g. Gaussian filter]) (Huettel, Song, McCarthy 2004: 196,
277279). Different smoothing procedures may yield different results.
The point of this discussion is not to discourage the use of PET and fMRI,but
rather to strengthen the appropriate usage of these technologies in languagebased experiments. Unless the limitations of the technology are clearly articulated, it becomes impossible to develop more robust experimental design,
which will directly impact the validity and broad applicability of the experimental results achieved. One of the most serious issues in using imaging technologies for language study is the design of the experiments and the repeatability of the results. Poeppel (1996: 317351) brilliantly demonstrates the
contradictions and complications that arise when comparing the results of
PET-based research for phonological analysis by focusing on a set of studies
that target the left perisylvian cortex. His conclusions call for more restraint in
claiming a strong relationship between language function and a specific brain
region. Ultimately, many of the existing language studies using PET and fMRI
reveal a lack of understanding of fundamental linguistic principles and are
often disconnected from mainstream linguistic theory. In the following section,
we will review some of the major assumptions often behind hypotheses driving
imaging-based experiments and cognitive research on human language.
5. Major trends in the study of language and brain
If one were to summarize the ideological assumptions behind a large portion of
the research on brain and language conducted in the past fifty years, the list
would include at least three major questions:
1. the role of innateness and learning in human language;
2. the degree of autonomy of language centers in the brain;
3. the definition and importance of critical periods.
If we attempt to recast this debate in terms of the fundamentals of synaptogenesis and dendritic growth in the human brain, which are processes that occur
throughout the life cycle, it becomes clear that, as linguists, we cannot continue
to repeat poorly articulated generalizations about the brains inability to acquire one or more languages after a certain age. The neurological evidence
does not support the Lenneberg hypothesis on critical periods for language.
The field of linguistics must follow Danesis lead and pursue more empirically
valid means of constructing hypotheses upon which future experimental
studies of language and brain are based.
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7. How do humans learn language?
The linguistic community has been very active in the controversy of viewing
human language, at one extreme, as a hard-wired, innate instinct or as something that is acquired in the cultural context, on the other. It is not my purpose
to review the enormous literature on this question, but it is important to note
that while the tension of innateness and learning is a problem that is wellknown in the linguistic community, the details of this debate are not as wellknown within the neuroscience community. Many neuroscientists refer to linguistic research that may or may not be controversial within mainstream
linguistics; for the most part, the neuroscience community would not be invested in one side or the other. Kandel, Song, and McCarthy (1991: 842845)
and Dowling (2004: 5766) are good examples of this phenomenon, where
they basically restate what they believe to be the standard theory, which is in
favor of significant innateness components to human language. As we come to
better understand how neurons communicate with one another as individual
cells and as neuronal ensembles, we move farther away from hypotheses that
support a strong innateness component for human language. Since language is
not the focal point of most neuroscience research, the degree of neurological
proclivity facilitating language in humans is not a major concern. Rather, it is
the issue concerning the existence of autonomous language centers in the brain
that continues to be the most problematic for neuroscientists.
The attempt to fit human language into localized neurological areas is one of
the most controversial aspects of the study of language and brain today. It is
also the one, as we have seen in the list of imaging technologies above, in
which the most headway is being made in terms of redirecting the discourse
away from the traditional areas in the frontal and temporal lobes toward subcortical regions (cf. Poeppel and Hickok 2004; Hickok and Poeppel 2004;
Lieberman 2006: 130213; Shalom and Poeppel 2008).
A corollary of the predilection for localization hypotheses is seen in those
analyses that use a modularity approach to the study of language and the brain.
Such modularity-based approaches attempt to model language function in the
brain into separate and autonomous regions such as phonology, morphology,
syntax, semantics, etc. The cognitive linguistics movement, as we will discuss
below, has been opposed to such characterizations of human language in the
brain and has argued strongly in favor of a connectionist approach to the study
of language and brain.7
9. Exploring the boundaries of cognitive linguistics and neurolinguistics
The past thirty years have shown a significant shift in subdisciplines within the
field of linguistic theory, and one of the more interesting groups to emerge is
the cognitive linguistics group. Cognitive Linguistics (CL) is a very broadlybased international group of scholars who generally avoid making strong
claims about what the brain is actually doing; rather, they focus on developing
cognitive representations for linguistic facts that are the most relevant for
human language; that is, CL is interested in developing robust explanatory
models of cognition and language. These models, as metasystems, come in
several varieties, including Lakoffs Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs), sche
mas (including image- and event-schemas), basic categories, prototypes, and
many others (Palmer 1996: 5579).
As is evident from the discussion above, CL, unlike contemporary neuro
linguistics, is not predominately a medical field that is preoccupied with understanding and analyzing language-based pathologies (including language
impairment in disease, trauma, brain lesions, and dementia, communication
disorders, aphasia, recovery from aphasia, etc.). The linguists who affiliate
22 E. Andrews
themselves with CL (or who are perceived to be affiliated) to one degree or
another include some of the more interesting theoretical linguists in the field
today (such as Langacker, Wierzbicka, Searle, Lakoff, Johnson, Rosch, Fillmore, Palmer, Gibbs, etc). In comparison, the field of neurolinguistics generally does not include researchers who are primarily affiliated with the field of
linguistics. An example of the status quo in the field of neurolinguistics can be
found in considering the disciplinary affiliations of the authors of Handbook of
Neurolinguistics (Stemmer and Whitaker [eds.] 1999); of a list of seventy-two
scholars, only two of them (Paradis and Jarema) are in departments of linguistics. As is immediately apparent, the scholarly make-up and the goals of the
two fields are extraordinarily different. Perhaps it is the applied aspects of neurolinguistics that have made it seem less interesting to theoretical linguists in
the past. However, with the growing importance of imaging technologies in the
study of language and brain, it becomes imperative that there is more direct
input from linguists.
One of the important contributions of cognitive linguistics to the study of
language and brain is its emphasis on combining cognitive theory-based
models with reliable data sets of linguistic forms; these data sets are both pragmatically and semantically viable within their corresponding languages, speech
communities, and communities of practice. CL is interested in the study of not
only imagery, but also perception (visual and nonvisual) and, as a result, posits
forms of functional equivalence between imagery and perception in some
cases (Palmer 1996: 49). Such a position is complementary to research in the
neurosciences on mental imagery, where distinctions such as viewer-oriented
and object-oriented mental representations are important (especially in Kosslyn
1980, 1994) and add clarity to CL research on imagery and perception.
10.Medial temporal lobe damage and language acquisition,
maintenance and loss
The case of H. M. changed the way neuroscientists talked about memory. After
his surgery at the age of twenty-seven in 1953, which was to free him from his
grand mal epileptic seizures that began after a head injury as a teenager, it became clear that medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures, including the hippocampus, are important for the making of memory. There is hardly a textbook
on memory that does not touch on this important moment in the history of
understanding the anatomy of human memory. Given H. M.s severe anterograde amnesia following surgery, one of the many questions that arose included
how the surgery might affect his language abilities. Corkins research on H. M.
over the past four decades (1965, 1973, 1984, 2002; Corkin et al., 1997) has
made a tremendous contribution to the study of human memory. In 2001, I was
24 E. Andrews
data collection will only serve to make the analyses and conclusions stemming
from neurolinguistic research more robust.
When one combines all of the longitudinal research done on H. M.s language ability, it is not possible to claim that MTL structures are vital for maintenance of language comprehension and production, even when the period of
time is as significant as fifty years. The degree to which MTL structures may
or may not play a role in language acquisition is not addressed by research on
H. M. and remains unrevealed. Clearly, H. M. does not exhibit normal acquisition patterns post-surgery. The fact that he has any lexical acquisition at all is
what was unexpected. In short, the evidence from H. M. does not argue for or
against localization of language function in the brain. Rather, this case study
demonstrates that removal of MTL structures did not cause deterioration of
language ability.
11. Redefining human language
It is probably no exaggeration to claim that Saussures doctrine of the arbi
trariness of the binary sign (signifi [concept]/signifiant [acoustic image]) and
his distinction between langue and parole have impacted modern linguistic
thought more than any other notions carried over from the nineteenth century.
One might argue that it was a tacit belief in the arbitrariness of the linguistic
sign that led to the generative movements preoccupation with the distinction
between surface and deep structures. And it was most certainly a rejection of
this doctrine that brought together various groups of semioticians, semanticists, scholars of cross-cultural pragmatics, and, most recently, cognitive linguists. One of the major ways that the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign has
been challenged is through the study of metaphor and metonymy, and iconicity
in morphology and syntax.
Binary relations (not only binary signs) dominated a number of linguistic
theoretical paradigms, whether they be pairs like langue and parole, compe
tence and performance, or even the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes. Ultimately, it turns out that the notion of binarism is too weak to explain these
broad linguistic phenomena, regardless of the names attributed to them.10 But
Saussure was more nuanced that he is often remembered for. In fact, his contribution of the importance of viewpoint in creating the linguistic object is potentially profound, especially when the linguistic object is defined as a relation
(and not as a thing; Saussure 1959: 67, 111113).
In order for the field of neurolinguistics to move forward in a robust way, it
is necessary to revisit the fundamental assumptions behind our definitions of
human language. I would begin this reevaluation of the field by suggesting the
principles below be included in any linguistic definition of human language.
26 E. Andrews
18. since multilingualism is more common than monolingualism across the
worlds languages, it is important to conduct research that includes both
types of language users (and bi- and multilingual speakers are not considered to be non-normative);
19. different stages of language acquisition, maintenance and loss occur both
concurrently and discretely throughout the life of individual speakers.
In order to fully expose the assumptions given in our proposal outlined above
for redefining human language, it may be useful to revisit some of the common
beliefs about language that are probably not accurate based on what we now
know of the functioning human brain. First of all, we can no longer treat the
various forms of language (speech, comprehension, reading, writing, creating
meaning for self and others) as if they are represented in the same way neurologically. Clearly, the term language refers to a variety of neurological functions that serve as the basis for a wide range of actions and behaviors; it is the
cultural context that serves to categorize these activities as appropriate and
viable.
Second, the hypothesis of the poverty of stimulus is as underspecified and
impoverished as the classical (Broca/Wernicke) model of brain and language.The hypothesis itself is based on the fallacy that there are ideal native
speakers of a language; in fact, there are no ideal speakers, only better and
worse speakers, and cultural institutions, including formal education, play a
major role in setting baselines and goals for pronunciation norms, grammar,
lexicon, literacy, and appropriate discourse. Once we abandon the false notion
of the ideal native speaker, we are obliged to be more empirically rigorous in
identifying the proficiency levels of subjects used in our linguistic studies, including, but not restricted to, imaging studies. One of the reasons that most of
the studies done on multilinguals produce results that are difficult or impossible to repeat is due to the lack of information about the level of language ability
of the participating subjects. This is a problem that can be easily solved and
should become part of the baseline requirements in future studies. Paradis
work (Paradis and Libben 1987; Paradis 2004) is a wonderful (and unique)
example of strides that are being made in this area for aphasics; the same
While we recognize that the published data on aphasics is only a subset of the
entire group of cases and thus, by definition, incomplete, Fabbros observations are still significant and perhaps set a new beginning point from which to
begin positing hypotheses about the relationship between one or more languages in the individual human brain, which would include high degrees
of variability in those relationships (see also Ojemann and Whitaker 1978;
Ojemann 1989, 1991; Calvin and Ojemann 1994; Creutzfeldt, Ojemann, and
Lettich 1989; Fabbro 1999: 111187). While many of these case studies include descriptive information about the languages of each patient, they do
not include any empirically-verifiable information on actual proficiency. As
28 E. Andrews
entioned above, this information needs to become part of the baseline
m
information for future studies for both pathological and non-pathological language abilities.
These data as presented by Fabbro would not surprise scholars like Rosenfield, who claim that not only are there no fixed symbols anywhere in the
brain (1988: 128), but who also argues that perception, recognition, and memory are not separate processes ... but an integral procedure (1988: 135136).
In his discussion covering a large cross-section of case studies of aphasia, including components of agraphia and anomia, Rosenfield suggests the following explanations:
It is the idea of catalogued information that is a mistake, however. It fails to relate the
derived image to the environmental sources of that image and hence to its context; and
it fails to take account of the fact that naming, too, is context-sensitive. It is the inability
to establish contexts, not the loss of any memory images or words, that is the reason
patients have difficulties naming things ... It is not different representations but different procedures that incorporate our varied experiences ... (Rosenfield 1988: 142143,
my emphasis)
... memory is not an exact repetition of an image in ones brain, but a recategorization.
Recategorizations occur when the connections between the neuronal groups in different
maps are temporarily strengthened. Recategorization of objects or events depends on
motion as well as sensation ... (Rosenfield 1988: 196)
I have attempted in this article to bring to the fore the central issues involved
in developing a robust neurolinguistic research agenda that can benefit from
the significant contributions available through the discipline of linguistics. In
strengthening the intellectual ties between theoretical linguistics and neuro
linguistics, both disciplines will achieve richer insights into more sophisticated
approaches to developing robust hypotheses and empirical, testable models of
the acquisition, maintenance and loss of language in the functioning brain.
Notes
1. We are treating the field of neurolinguistics as distinct from the larger field of cognitive neuroscience. Both fields are interested in the question of language and brain, but neurolinguistics (a term that took root in the 1960s according to Ahlsn [2006: 3]) has been focused on
language breakdown that occurs due to brain damage or pathology. Stowe et al. (2004: 998)
note that the first imaging studies of normal healthy volunteers was published in 1989.
2. Principles of Neuroscience by Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessel (1991) is an excellent and thorough medically-oriented course on the brain. A shorter, but excellent introduction to the
brain, The Great Brain Debate: Nature or Nurture?, by J. E. Dowling (2004) is very accessible for linguists with less of a science background. Essentially all of George Ojemanns
work is very important, especially for linguists interested in multilinguals and multilingualism
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
(see, e.g., Corina et al., 2010). Also Fabbros The Neurolinguistics of Bilingualism (1999) is
an important book for anyone interested in neurolinguistics.
In most works, neurobiologists will characterize different types of cortical cells based on
their cell body shape, namely, (1) pyramidal (neurons) and (2) nonpyramidal (which includes
glial cells). Neurons may also be called neural cells or pyramidal cells, and they exist in a
number of varieties, including unipolar, pseudo-unipolar, bipolar, and three types of multi
polar cells. Neurons may also be classified based on function: afferent/sensory neurons,
motor neurons, and interneurons. The four morphological regions of the neuron are: (1) the
cell body, (2) dendrites, (3) the axon and (4) presynaptic terminals (Kandel, Schwartz, and
Jessel 1991: 1922). Glial cells, which surround the neurons and outnumber them up between ten to fifty times, are divided into two major subtypes (macroglia and microglia) and
include a variety of classes within these subtypes (Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessel 1991: 22
23).
The struggle to understand the interaction of plasticity and specificity in the human brain,
especially as it is realized through synaptic connections has resulted in very different opinions throughout the neuroscience community. For some examples of varying viewpoints, see
Dowling (2004), Huttenlocher (2002), Gazzaniga (1998), and Shepherd (2004). Since the
late 1990s, the neuroscience community has recognized that there is modest generation of
new neurons in the human brain, especially in hippocampal regions, but the amount of new
neuronal generation is thought to be quite restricted, especially when compared to normal
rates of cell apoptosis (cell death) that occurs throughout the life cycle. For an example of an
early study on neuronal genesis in the adult brain, see Gould et al. (1999: 548552).
While Calvin and Ojemann (1994) introduce Broca and Wernicke as important language
areas, they also note that damage only to the traditional Brocas area is not sufficient to produce Brocas aphasia (1994: 44, 54). See also Grodzinsky and Amunts recent book devoted
to a history of study of Brocas area (2006).
It is important to note that there are neurolinguists who are attempting to reconcile the data
of aphasia recovery of multilinguals with the standard theories of memory. In particular,
Paradis and Fabbro have used Squires distinctions of different types of memory to explain
recovery patterns of aphasics such that the recovery is not based on neuroanatomical explanations, but neurofunctional models (Paradis 2004: 119151; Fabbro 1999: 7576, 120).
Cognitive linguistics was not the first movement to view linguistic levels in a less modular
way. Jakobson (1985 [1956], 1987 [1957], 1985 [1967], 1985 [1969], 1971) and contemporary semiotic theorists have always been strong supporters of a view of linguistic levels
(phonology, morphophonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, etc.) as relatively autono
mous categories with fluid and permeable boundaries.
When H. M. began talking about the Challenger space craft, he called it a big submarine
(Skotko, Andrews, Einstein 2005: 410). While his narrative seemed to be about the Titanic,
he unexpectedly made reference to astronaut and when asked about gender, stated that she
was a woman.
References to H. M. are abundant in published research on memory; not all of them are
completely accurate. Dowling (2004: 9495) talks about H. M.s short-term memory window, which he claims is only between twenty and thirty seconds long. In fact, our evaluation
of H. M.s discourse shows that the window is significantly longer, even in instances where
we changed the topic of the conversation.
Given the significant role that binary relations has played in linguistic thought, the movement
away from binary signs to more complex sign units is a complicated one that requires a fundamental reevaluation of how meaning is realized in the functioning linguistic sign. This
problem has been central in much of my own work (cf. Andrews 1990, 1994, 1996a, 1996b,
2003; Andrews and Krenmayr 2007).
30 E. Andrews
11. I have used the expression language is not a neurological monolith in my courses for many
years. However, it has recently come to my attention that Poeppel and Hickok also use a
similar formulation: ... linguistic domains are themselves not monolith, but have rich internal structure with numerous subcomponents and computational requirements (2004: 5).
12. The use of these terms comes from David Savans definition of C. S. Peirces immediate
object (1980: 257; see also Andrews 1994: 16).
13. Lieberman (2006: 8) makes the point that some forms of lexical, syntactic, and vocal ability
were probably features already present in the common ancestors of humans and chimpanzees.
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Edna Andrews (b. 1958) is a professor at Duke University <eda@duke.edu>. Her research interests include neurolinguistics and the semiotics of culture. Her publications include Markedness
theory: The union of asymmetry and semiosis in language (1990); The semantics of suffixation in
Russian (1996); Russian: A grammar of contemporary Russian (2001); and Conversations with
Lotman: Cultural semiotics in language, literature, and cognition (2003).