G.R. Nos.

135695-96

October 12, 2000

(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the

commission of the offense of rape upon
her; and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant.

(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and

exemplary damages under Article 2219
in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of
the New Civil Code for the pain and
moral shock suffered by her and for the
commission of the crime of rape with
one qualifying aggravating
circumstance; and

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of
incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice.

c) To pay the costs.

II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -

On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed

with the Mandaue City Prosecutors Office two separate complaints for
incestuous rape. The first complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No.
DU-6186, alleged:

a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG

guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of death;

That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of

Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant
MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the said offended party against the latters will.

b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann

Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the
offense of rape upon her; and

CONTRARY TO LAW.1
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles
2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain
and moral shock suffered by her and for the
commission of the crime of rape with one
qualifying aggravating circumstance; and

The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:

That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of
Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant
MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the said offended party against the latters will.

(3) To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.4

CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded
"Not Guilty" to the charges.
The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
Appellants defense was bare denial. He claimed that private
complainant had fabricated the rape charges against him since he and
his daughter, "had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded her for
going out whenever he was not at home."3
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is
hereby rendered, to wit:
I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann
Tundag the following amounts:

In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainants

version of what accused did to her.
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the
merits clearly shows that private complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a 13
year old girl who does not know how to read and write and has an IQ
of 76% which is a very low general mental ability and was living with
her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue City.
xxx
That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, she
was in the house together with her father. But before she went to
sleep, her father was already lying down on the mat while herself (sic)
just lied down at his head side which was not necessarily beside him.
However, when she was already sleeping, she noticed that her father
who was already undressed was beside her and was embracing her.
Then, he undressed her which she resisted but her father used a knife
and told her that he would kill her if she shouts and after that, he
inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell
anyone. In effect, his penis penetrated her genital, which made her
vagina bleed and was very painful.
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina,
her father was all the time asking by saying (sic) : Does it feel good?
And at the same time, he was laughing and further, told her that a
woman who does not marry can never enter heaven and he got angry
with her when she contradicted his statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was
humping over her, she felt intense pain that she cried and told him to

pull it out but did not accede and in fact, said: Why will I pull it out
when it feels so good(?)
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that
she could not go to heaven if she did not get married, her father just
stayed there and continued smoking while she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing
the dishes while her father was just smoking and squatting. That after
she finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to sleep when her
father embraced her and since she does not like what he did to her,
she placed a stool between them but he just brushed it aside and laid
down with her and was able to take her womanhood again by using a
very sharp knife which he was holding and was pointing it at the right
side of her neck which made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her fathers
place and went to her neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and
told her what had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to report
the matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the
policemen, she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where she was
examined and after her medical examination, she was brought back by
the police and was investigated by them."5
Appellants claim that the complainants charges were manufactured
did not impress the trial court, which found him twice guilty of rape.
Now before us, appellant assails his double conviction, simply
contending that:6
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT
ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF
REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME.

this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed at first
hand the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in
a better position to form an accurate impression and
conclusion.14 Absent any showing that certain facts of value have
clearly been overlooked, which if considered could affect the result of
the case, or that the trial courts finding are clearly arbitrary, the
conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected and the
judgment rendered affirmed.15
Moreover, we note here that private complainants testimony is
corroborated by medical findings that lacerations were present in her
hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie Acebes upon the
private complainant yielded the following results:
Genitalia: grossly female
Pubic Hairs: scanty
Labia Majora: coaptated
Labia Minora: -doFourchette: U-shaped
Vestibule: pinkish
Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 oclock
position(s).
Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease
Vagina:

Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place.
He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch
repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home
tired and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that evening. On November 7,
1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was
impossible for him to have raped his daughter because when the
incidents allegedly transpired, "he went to work and naturally, being
exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such wrongdoings."7
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges
the Court to affirm the trial courts decision, with the recommendation
that the award of damages and indemnity ex delicto be modified to
conform to prevailing jurisprudence.

Walls: pinkish
Ruganities: prominent
Uterus: small
Cervix: closed
Discharges: Mucoid, minimal
Smears:

Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime and

the irreversibility of the penalty of death imposed in each of these
cases before us, the Court leaves no stone unturned in its review of
the records, including the evidence presented by both the prosecution
and the defense. Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty of guilt.8 But here we find no room to disturb the trial courts
judgment concerning appellants guilt, because his defense is utterly
untenable.
Appellants defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It
hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in a trial
involving his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private
complainant who testified on affirmative matters,9 such defense is not
only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which
becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the
victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor.10 Indeed, we find
that private complainant was unequivocal in charging appellant with
ravishing her. The victims account of the rapes complained of was
straightforward, detailed, and consistent.11Her testimony never
wavered even after it had been explained to her that her father could
be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court.12
In a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility is the single
most important issue.13 The determination of the credibility of
witnesses is primarily the function of the trial court. The rationale for

Conclusions: sperm identification (-)

Gram staining of vaginal disc.16
Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in
the complainants private parts meant a history of sexual congress on
her part.17 According to her, the lacerations may have been caused by
the entry of an erect male organ into complainants genitals. The
examining physician likewise pointed out that previous coitus may be
inferred from complainants U-shaped fourchette since the fourchette
of a female who has not yet experienced sexual intercourse is Vshaped.18 While Dr. Acebes conceded under cross-examination, that
the existence of the datum "U-shape(d) fourchette does not
conclusively and absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or
contact because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other
things,"19 nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations tends
to support private complainants claim that she was raped by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges
against him because she had quarreled with him after he had
castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the prosecution did
not rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or misunderstanding with

private complainant. He urges us to consider the charges filed against

him as the result of his frequent castigation of her delinquent
behavior.20
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the
charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature
that a daughters accusation must be taken seriously. It goes against
human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag
herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the
truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.21 More so, where
her charges could mean the death of her own father, as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have
committed the crimes imputed to him considering that he and his wife
had ten children to attend to and care for. This argument, however, is
impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged from his wife, and
private complainant was the only child who lived with him.22 As pointed
out by the Solicitor General, appellant was thus "free to do as he
wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his daughter."23
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some
psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor his
defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her testimony
that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the
consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father,
as shown by the following testimony of the victim on crossexamination:
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found guilty,
your father will be sentenced to death?
A : Yes.
Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?
A (Witness nodding.)
xxx
Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases
against your father and in case your father would be found guilty, two
death sentences will be imposed against him?
A: Yes.
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?
A: I want this to proceed.24

COURT TO WITNESS
Q: When were you born?
A: I do not know.
Q: You do not know your birthday?
A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.
COURT: Proceed.
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your
Honor, may we just request for judicial notice that the victim here is
below 18 years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may
properly take and act on without proof because they already know
them.31 Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be
mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take
judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution
and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take
discretionary judicial notice of facts SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions.
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed
that the scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily isolated or
secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape
can and has been committed in places where people congregate, e.g.
inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with
five (5) people inside, or even in the same room which the victim is
sharing with the accuseds sister.32

Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him

correct?

The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred
modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which
blemish her honor and virtue.33

Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of

R.A. No. 7659,25 penalizes rape of a minor daughter by her father as
qualified rape26 and a heinous crime. In proving such felony, the
prosecution must allege and prove the elements of rape: (1) sexual
congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or without her consent 27and in
order to warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the additional
elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the
rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim. 28

On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable

demonstration pertain to fields of professional and scientific
knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,34 the trial court took
judicial notice of the clinical records of the attending physicians
concerning the birth of twin baby boys as "premature" since one of the
alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.

In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender
was the victims father.29 But the victims age was not properly and
sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she
was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted
that she did not know exactly when she was born because her mother
did not tell her. She further said that her birth certificate was likewise
with her mother. In her own words, the victim testified - 30

As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their

judicial functions, an example would be facts which are ascertainable
from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices
were received by a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or
discretionary judicial notice, the court can take judicial notice of a fact
pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court which requires that -

SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the
court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on
its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite
the defense counsels admission, thereof acceding to the prosecutions
motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters
such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial
notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by
the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof,
upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other
documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was
below 12 and we found that the rape committed was statutory rape.
The mother testified that her daughter was born on October 26, 1974,
and so was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on February 12,
1984. Although no birth certificate was presented because the victims
birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate was
duly presented. Hence, we ruled that the mothers testimony coupled
with the presentation of the baptismal certificate was sufficient to
establish that the victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that
appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, and not statutory rape,
because of failure of the prosecution to prove the minority of the victim,
who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape.1wphi1 The
prosecution failed to present either the birth or baptismal certificate of
the victim. Also there was no showing that the said documents were
lost or destroyed to justify their non-presentation. We held that
testimony of the victim and her aunt were hearsay, and that it was not
correct for the trial court to judge the age of the victim by her
appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for
independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from testimonial
evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,35 we
stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof of the
age of the victim, even though it is not contested by the defense. The
minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and
clearness as the crime itself. In People v. Cula,36 we reiterated that it is
the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the
victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify
the imposition of the death penalty. Since the record of the case was
bereft of any independent evidence thereon, such as the victims duly
certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private
complainants age, appellant could not be convicted of rape in its
qualified form. In People v. Veloso,37 the victim was alleged to have
been only 9 years of age at the time of the rape. It held that the trial
court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the
victims age other than through the testimony of her father and herself.
Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we
reiterate here what the Court has held in Javier without any dissent,
that the failure to sufficiently establish victims age by independent
proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the
words of Melo, J., "independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim
becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the
case falls under the qualifying circumstances" for the imposition of the
death penalty set by the law.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is
therefore governed by the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty
for the crime of simple rape or rape in its unqualified form under Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659,
is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was committed on November
7, 1997, after the effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape

Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997. The penalty for
rape in its unqualified form remains the same.
As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for
each count of rape as civil indemnity. However, the award of another
P50,000.00 as "moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in
relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code" for each count is
imprecise. In rape cases, the prevailing jurisprudence permits the
award of moral damages without need for pleading or proof as to the
basis thereof.38 Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape.
The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a
different basis and for a different amount. Appellant being the father of
the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find that the alternative
circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an
aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence, we find an award
of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 proper. Note that
generally, in rape cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that
relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659
and 8353. The father-daughter relationship has been treated by
Congress in the nature of a special circumstance which makes the
imposition of the death penalty mandatory.39 However, in this case, the
special qualifying circumstance of relationship was proved but not the
minority of the victim, taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory
death sentence. Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance in this instance so that exemplary damages
are called for. In rapes committed by fathers on their own daughters,
exemplary damages may be imposed to deter other fathers with
perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing
their own daughters.40
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos. DU-6186 and DU-6203, is
hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is found guilty
of two (2) counts of simple rape; and for each count, sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, YnaresSantiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 170604

September 2, 2013

HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, PETITIONERS,

vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE,
REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO ALVAREZ, JR.,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written
document are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title
based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that
purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best
Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from
presenting evidence other than the original document.
The Case
This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated
on August 18, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
judgment rendered on November 5, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 35, in Manila in Civil Case No. 96-78481 entitled Heirs
of Maximo S Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev.
Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo
Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City
of Manila dismissing the respondents action for quieting of title.2
Antecedents
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita
Prodon,3 the respondents averred as the plaintiffs that their parents,
the late spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the
registered owners of that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 84797 of the Register of Deeds of Manila; that their
parents had been in possession of the property during their lifetime;
that upon their parents deaths, they had continued the possession of
the property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon; that
they could not locate the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but
the original copy of TCT No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds
of Manila was intact; that the original copy contained an entry stating
that the property had been sold to defendant Prodon subject to the
right of repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously done by
Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the
property did not exist. Consequently, they prayed that the entry be
cancelled, and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.
The entry sought to be cancelled reads:
ENTRY NO. 3816/T-84797 SALE W/ RIGHT TO REPURCHASE IN
FAVOR OF: MARGARITA PRODON, SINGLE, FOR THE SUM
OF P120,000.00, THE HEREIN REGISTERED OWNER RESERVING
FOR HIMSELF THE RIGHTS TO REPURCHASE SAID PROPERTY
FOR THE SAME AMOUNT WITHIN THE PERIOD OF SIX MONTH
(sic) FROM EXECUTION THEREOF. OTHER CONDITION SET
FORTH IN (DOC. NO. 321, PAGE 66, BOOK NO. VIII OF LISEO A.
RAZON, NOT.PUB. OF MANILA)
DATE OF INSTRUMENT SEPT. 9, 1975
DATE OF INSCRIPTION SEPT. 10, 1975,
AT 3:42 P.M.4
In her answer,5 Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
executed on September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to
repurchase; that the deed had been registered with the Register of
Deeds and duly annotated on the title; that the late Maximo Alvarez,
Sr. had been granted six months from September 9, 1975 within which
to repurchase the property; and that she had then become the

absolute owner of the property due to its non-repurchase within the

given 6-month period.
During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that
the copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found
in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On November 5, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment,6 finding untenable
the plaintiffs contention that the deed of sale with right to repurchase
did not exist. It opined that although the deed itself could not be
presented as evidence in court, its contents could nevertheless be
proved by secondary evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its execution or existence and of
the cause of its unavailability being without bad faith. It found that the
defendant had established the execution and existence of the deed, to
wit:
In the case under consideration, the execution and existence of the
disputed deed of sale with right to repurchase accomplished by the late
Maximo Alvarez in favor of defendant Margarita Prodon has been
adequately established by reliable and trustworthy evidences (sic).
Defendant Prodon swore that on September 9, 1975 she purchased
the land covered by TCT No. 84747 (Exhibit 1) from its registered
owners Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave (TSN, Aug. 1,
1997, pp.5-7); that the deed of sale with right to repurchase was drawn
and prepared by Notary Public Eliseo Razon (Ibid., p. 9); and that on
September 10, 1975, she registered the document in the Register of
Deeds of Manila (Ibid., pp.18-19).
The testimony of Margarita Prodon has been confirmed by the Notarial
Register of Notary Public Eliseo Razon dated September 10, 1975
(Exhibit 2), and by the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of
Manila (Exhibit 4).
Page 66 of Exhibit 2 discloses, among others, the following entries, to
wit: "No. 321; Nature of Instrument: Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase; Name of Persons: Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina
Alvarez (ack.); Date and Month: 9 Sept." (Exhibit 2-a).
Exhibit 4, on the other hand, also reveals the following data, to wit:
Number of Entry: 3816; Month, Day and Year: Sept. 10, 1975; Hour
and Minute: 3:42 p.m.; Nature of Contract: Sale with Right to
Repurchase; Executed by: Maximo S. Alvarez; In favor: Margarita
Prodon; Date of Document: 9-9-75; Contract value: 120,000. (Exhibit
4-a). Under these premises the Court entertains no doubt about the
execution and existence of the controverted deed of sale with right to
repurchase.7
The RTC rejected the plaintiffs submission that the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. could not have executed the deed of sale with right to
repurchase because of illness and poor eyesight from cataract. It held
that there was no proof that the illness had rendered him bedridden
and immobile; and that his poor eyesight could be corrected by
wearing lenses.
The RTC concluded that the original copy of the deed of sale with right
to repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts had been exerted
to produce it before the court. It believed Jose Camilons testimony that
he had handed the original to one Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he
could not anymore retrieve such original from Atty. Lacanilao because
the latter had meanwhile suffered from a heart ailment and had been
recuperating.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the respondents assigned the following errors, namely:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DUE
EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF

SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE HAS BEEN DULY PROVED

BY THE DEFENDANT.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PIECES
OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANTS AS PROOFS
OF THE DUE EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED
DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE
HAS BEEN LOST OR OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE PRODUCED IN
COURT WITHOUT THE FAULT OF THE DEFENDANT.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE
PLAINTIFFS CLAIM THAT THEIR FATHER COULD NOT HAVE
EXECUTED THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENT AT THE TIME OF ITS
ALLEGED EXECUTION.8
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,
reversing the RTC, and ruling as follows:
The case of the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS)
v. Del Rosario in GR No. 146586 (January 26, 2005) is instructive in
resolving this issue. The said case held:
"Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence
other than the original document itself. A party may introduce
secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument not only
when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be
produced in court, provided there is no bad faith on the part of the
offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the
best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence.
A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for non-production of the original instrument. The correct
order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents,
although the court in its discretion may change this order if necessary."
It is clear, therefore, that before secondary evidence as to the contents
of a document may be admitted in evidence, the existence of [the]
document must first be proved, likewise, its execution and its
subsequent loss.
In the present case, the trial court found all three (3) prerequisites
ha[ve] been established by Margarita Prodon. This Court, however,
after going through the records of the case, believes otherwise. The
Court finds that the following circumstances put doubt on the very
existence of the alleged deed of sale. Evidence on record showed that
Maximo Alvarez was hospitalized between August 23, 1975 to
September 3, 1975 (Exhibit "K"). It was also established by said Exhibit
"L" that Maximo Alvarez suffered from paralysis of half of his body and
blindness due to cataract. It should further be noted that barely 6 days
later, on September 15, 1975, Maximo Alvarez was again hospitalized
for the last time because he died on October of 1975 without having
left the hospital. This lends credence to plaintiffs-appellants assertion
that their father, Maximo Alvarez, was not physically able to personally
execute the deed of sale and puts to serious doubt [on] Jose
Camilions testimony that Maximo Alvarez, with his wife, went to his
residence on September 5, 1975 to sell the property and that again
they met on September 9, 1975 to sign the alleged deed of sale
(Exhibits "A" and "1"). The Court also notes that from the sale in 1975
to 1996 when the case was finally filed, defendant-appellee never tried
to recover possession of the property nor had she shown that she ever
paid Real Property Tax thereon. Additionally, the Transfer Certificate of
Title had not been transferred in the name of the alleged present
owner. These actions put to doubt the validity of the claim of ownership

because their actions are contrary to that expected of legitimate

owners of property.
Moreover, granting, in arguendo, that the deed of sale did exist, the
fact of its loss had not been duly established. In De Vera, et al. v Sps.
Aguilar (218 SCRA 602 1993), the Supreme Court held that after proof of
the execution of the Deed it must also be established that the said
document had been lost or destroyed, thus:
"After the due execution of the document has been established, it must
next be proved that said document has been lost or destroyed. The
destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing
the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of
its loss, or by anyone who had made, in the judgment of the court, a
sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or
papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who
has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court
that the instrument is indeed lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before
using copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of
the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the
writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of
its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a
third person or the like).
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who
notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has
about four or five original copies. Hence, all originals must be
accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one.
This[,] petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely
accounted for three out of four or five original copies." (218 SCRA at
607-608)
In the case at bar, Jose Camilions testimony showed that a copy was
given to Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao but he could not recover said copy. A
perusal of the testimony does not convince this Court that Jose
Camilion had exerted sufficient effort to recover said copy. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing testimony does not convince this Court that Jose
Camilion had exerted sufficient effort to obtain the copy which he said
was with Atty. Lacanilao. It should be noted that he never claimed that
Atty. Lacanilao was already too sick to even try looking for the copy he
had. But even assuming this is to be so, Jose Camilion did not testify
that Atty. Lacanilao had no one in his office to help him find said copy.
In fine, this Court believes that the trial court erred in admitting the
secondary evidence because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the loss
or destruction of the deed.
In fine, the Court finds that the secondary evidence should not have
been admitted because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the existence
of the original deed of sale and to establish its loss.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 96-78481 is hereby
REVERSED and a new one entered ordering the cancellation of Entry
No. 3816/T-84797 inscribed at the back of TCT No. 84797 in order to
remove the cloud over plaintiff-appellants title.
SO ORDERED.9
The heirs of Margarita Prodon (who meanwhile died on March 3, 2002)
filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of Defendant and for
Reconsideration of the Decision,10 wherein they alleged that the CA
erred: (a) in finding that the pre-requisites for the admission of
secondary evidence had not been complied with; (b) in concluding that
the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been physically incapable of

personally executing the deed of sale with right to repurchase; and (c)
in blaming them for not recovering the property, for not paying the
realty taxes thereon, and for not transferring the title in their names.
On November 22, 2005, the CA issued itsresolution,11 allowing the
substitution of the heirs of Margarita Prodon, and denying their motion
for reconsideration for its lack of merit.
Hence, the heirs of Margarita Prodon (petitioners) have appealed to
the Court through petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit the following as issues, namely:
(a) whether the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence
had been complied with; (b) whether the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
been physically incapable of personally executing the deed of sale with
right to repurchase;and (c) whether Prodons claim of ownership was
already barred by laches.12

faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original
can be attributed.13
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the
exact contents of a writing are brought before the court,14 considering
that (a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the
writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects
operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and
contracts, because a slight variation in words may mean a great
difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in
the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting;
and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the
terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the
case of attempts at describing other situations generally. 15 The rule
further acts as an insurance against fraud.16 Verily, if a party is in the
possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to
substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally
arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that
its production would expose and defeat.17 Lastly, the rule protects
against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or
unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of
writings.18

Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
1.
Best Evidence Rulewas not applicable herein
We focus first on an unseemly error on the part of the CA that, albeit a
harmless one, requires us to re-examine and rectify in order to carry
out our essential responsibility of educating the Bench and the Bar on
the admissibility of evidence. An analysis leads us to conclude that the
CA and the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case,
and their misapplication diverted the attention from the decisive issue
in this action for quieting of title. We shall endeavor to correct the error
in order to turn the case to the right track.
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies the Best Evidence
Rule, to wit:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written
document the original of the document must be produced in court. The
rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the
contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due
execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or
the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad

But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading

inferences arise only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing.
Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a
writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced
concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of
the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule
cannot be invoked.19 In such a case, secondary evidence may be
admitted even without accounting for the original.
This case involves an action for quieting of title, a common-law remedy
for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real
property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title. In such an action, the competent court is tasked
to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other
claimants to place things in their proper place and to make the one
who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other.
The action is for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would
see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can
thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as
use, and even abuse the property. For an action to quiet title to
prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (a) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and (b) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.20
The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing
may or may not be material to an action for quieting of title, depending
on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance, when an action for
quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a contract for not
complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code
specifically provides that evidence of the agreement cannot be
received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents.
There is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.
It is not denied that this action does not involve the terms or contents
of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue raised
by the respondents as the plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged head on,
was whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly
executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed. They
alleged in the complaint that:
xxxx
9. Such entry which could have been maliciously and deliberately done
by the defendant Margarita Prodon created cloud and [is] prejudicial to
the title of the property subject matter of this case, since while it is

apparently valid or effective, but in truth and in fact it is invalid,

ineffective or unenforceable inasmuch that the instrument purporting to
be a Deed of Sale with right of repurchase mentioned in the said entry
does not exist.21

that end, however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of
the original to the same strict standard to which it would be subjected
had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting
secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.

xxxx

A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof
sufficient to show the lossor explain the unavailability of the original as
to justify the presentation of secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her
witnesses, testified that he had given the original to her lawyer, Atty.
Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve
the original because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his
heart ailment. Such evidence without showing the inability to locate the
original from among Atty. Lacanilaos belongings by himself or by any
of his assistants or representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a
duplicate original could have been secured from Notary Public Razon,
but no effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction.

On her part, Prodon specifically denied the allegation, averring in her

answer that "sometime [o]n September 9, 1975, deceased Maximo S.
Alvarez lawfully entered into a Contract of Sale with Right to
Repurchase, object of which is the titled lot located at Endaya Street,
Tondo, Manila, in favor of defendant."22 In the pre-trial order, the RTC
defined the issue to be tried as "[w]hether or not the alleged document
mentioned in the said entry is existing, valid or unenforceable,"23 and
did not include the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
among the issues.
Apparently, the parties were fully cognizant of the issues as defined,
for none of them thereafter ventured to present evidence to establish
the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. In the course of
the trial, however, a question was propounded to Prodon as to who
had signed or executed the deed, and the question was objected to
based on the Best Evidence Rule. The RTC then sustained the
objection.24 At that point began the diversion of the focus in the case.
The RTC should have outrightly overruled the objection because the
fact sought to be established by the requested testimony was the
execution of the deed, not its terms.25 Despite the fact that the terms of
the writing were not in issue, the RTC inexplicably applied the Best
Evidence Rule to the case and proceeded to determine whether the
requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had been complied
with, without being clear as to what secondary evidence was sought to
be excluded. In the end, the RTC found in its judgment that Prodon
had complied with the requisites for the introduction of secondary
evidence, and gave full credence to the testimony of Jose Camilon
explaining the non-production of the original. On appeal, the CA
seconded the RTCs mistake by likewise applying the Best Evidence
Rule, except that the CA concluded differently, in that it held that
Prodon had not established the existence, execution, and loss of the
original document as the pre-requisites for the presentation of
secondary evidence. Its application of the Best Evidence Rule naturally
led the CA to rule that secondary evidence should not have been
admitted, but like the RTC the CA did not state what excluded
secondary evidence it was referring to.
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because
the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the
issue, the CA did not have to address and determine whether the
existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of
secondary evidence, had been established by Prodons evidence. It
should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the
"existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been
proved by preponderance of evidence.
Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the existence and due
execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase, the presentation
of evidence other than the original document, like the testimonies of
Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo
Razon, and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would
have sufficed even without first proving the loss or unavailability of the
original of the deed.
2.
Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due
execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to
establish and explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase to establish the genuineness and due execution of
the deed.26 This was because the deed, although a collateral
document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting
of title.27 Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the
need for her to prove its existence and due execution by other means
that could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards

In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of

the existence of the deed. Camilon claimed that the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. had twice gone to his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan,
the first on September 5, 1975, to negotiate the sale of the property in
question, and the second on September 9, 1975, to execute the deed
of sale with right to repurchase, viz:
Q
Do you also know the deceased plaintiff in this case, Maximo Alvarez,
Sr. and his wife Valentina Clave, Mr. Witness?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
A
Q
Under what circumstance were you able to know the deceased plaintiff
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and his wife?
When they went to our house, sir.
When was this specifically?
A
Sometime the first week of September or about September 5, 1975,
sir.
Q
What was the purpose of the spouses Maximo and Valentina in
meeting you on that date?
A
They were selling a piece of land, sir.
xxxx
Q
At the time when the spouses Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina
Clave approached you to sell their piece of land located at Endaya,
Tondo, Manila, what document, if any, did they show you?

The title of the land, sir.

What did you tell Valentina Clave?

xxxx

You said that on the first week of September or September 5, 1975

spouses Maximo and Valentina approached you at the time, what did
you tell the spouses, if any?

We went to the house of my aunt so she can meet her personally, sir.

And did the meeting occur?

WITNESS

I asked them to come back telling them that I was going to look for a
buyer, sir.
xxxx
Q
You said that you told the spouse[s] Alvarez to just come back later
and that you will look for a buyer, what happened next, if any?

A
Yes, sir.
ATTY. REAL
Q
What happened at the meeting?

A
A
I went to see my aunt Margarita Prodon, sir.
Q
A
What did you tell your aunt Margarita Prodon?
I convinced her to buy the lot.
ATTY. REAL
Q
What was the reply of Margarita Prodon, if any?
A
She agreed, provided that she should meet the spouses, sir.
Q

I told Valentina Clave in front of the aunt of my wife that they, the
spouses, wanted to sell the land, sir.
Q
What was the reply of your aunt Margarita Prodon at the time?
A
That Valentina Clave should come back with her husband because she
was going to buy the lot, sir.28
The foregoing testimony could not be credible for the purpose of
proving the due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
for three reasons.1wphi1
The first is that the respondents preponderantly established that the
late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been in and out of the hospital around
the time that the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been
supposedly executed on September 9, 1975. The records manifested
that he had been admitted to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in
Quezon City on several occasions, and had then been diagnosed with
the serious ailments or conditions, as follows:

After Margarita Prodon told you that[,] what happened next, if any?
Period of confinement
A

March 31 May 19, 1975

Prostatitis, chronic
Arteriosclerotic heart disease
Atrial fibrillation
Congestive heart failure
CFC III29

June 2- June 6, 1975

Chest pains (Atrial Flutter)

Painful urination (Chronic prostatitis)30

August 23-September 3, 1975

Arteriosclerotic heart disease

Congestive heart failure, mild
Atrial fibrillation
Cardiac functional capacity III-B31

I waited for the spouses Alvarez to bring them to my aunt, sir.

Q
Were you able to finally bring the spouses before Margarita Prodon?
A
Valentina Clave returned to our house and asked me if they can now
sell the piece of land, sir.

Diagnosis

September 15-October 2, 1975

Arteriosclerotic heart disease

Atrial fibrillation
Congestive heart failure
Pneumonia
Urinary tract infection
Cerebrovascular accident, old
Upper GI bleeding probably
secondary to stress ulcers32

G.R. No. 163684

April 16, 2008

FAUSTINA CAMITAN and DAMASO LOPEZ, petitioners,

vs.
FIDELITY INVESTMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

The medical history showing the number of very serious ailments the
late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been suffering from rendered it highly
improbable for him to travel from Manila all the way to Meycauayan,
Bulacan, where Prodon and Camilon were then residing in order only
to negotiate and consummate the sale of the property. This high
improbability was fully confirmed by his son, Maximo, Jr., who attested
that his father had been seriously ill, and had been in and out of the
hospital in 1975.33 The medical records revealed, too, that on
September 12, 1975, or three days prior to his final admission to the
hospital, the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had suffered from "[h]igh grade
fever, accompanied by chills, vomiting and cough productive of whitish
sticky sputum;"had been observed to be "conscious" but "weak" and
"bedridden" with his heart having "faint" sounds, irregular rhythm, but
no murmurs; and his left upper extremity and left lower extremity had
suffered 90% motor loss.34 Truly, Prodons allegation that the deed of
sale with right to repurchase had been executed on September 9, 1975
could not command belief.
The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase and the entry in the primary entry book of
the Register of Deeds did not themselves establish the existence of the
deed. They proved at best that a document purporting to be a deed of
sale with right to repurchase had been registered with the Register of
Deeds. Verily, the registration alone of the deed was not conclusive
proof of its authenticity or its due execution by the registered owner of
the property, which was precisely the issue in this case. The
explanation for this is that registration, being a specie of notice, is
simply a ministerial act by which an instrument is inscribed in the
records of the Register of Deeds and annotated on the dorsal side of
the certificate of title covering the land subject of the instrument. 35 It is
relevant to mention that the law on land registration does not require
that only valid instruments be registered, because the purpose of
registration is only to give notice.36
By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of Notary Public
Razon could only be proof that a deed of sale with right to repurchase
had been notarized by him, but did not establish the due execution of
the deed.
The third is that the respondents remaining in the peaceful possession
of the property was further convincing evidence demonstrating that the
late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not execute the deed of sale with right to
repurchase. Otherwise, Prodon would have herself asserted and
exercised her right to take over the property, legally and physically
speaking, upon the expiration in 1976 of the repurchase period
stipulated under the deed, including transferring the TCT in her name
and paying the real property taxes due on the properly. Her inaction
was an index of the falsity of her claim against the respondents.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA that the
respondents preponderantly, proved that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in
fact.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
August 18, 2005 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624
entitled Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented
by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the Register of
Deeds of the City Manila; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the
costs of suit.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court of the Decision1 dated November 28, 2003 and of the
Resolution2 dated May 12, 2004, both of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 37291 entitled Fidelity Investment Corporation v.
Alipio Camitan, Faustina Camitan, Damaso Lopez, the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna (Branch 37) and the Register of Deeds of
Calamba, Laguna.
The case arose from the Petition3 for the issuance of another duplicate
copy of Certificate of Title No. T-(12110) T-4342 (TCT) filed in 1993 by
herein petitioners, together with Alipio Camitan, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna. The case was raffled to Branch
37 of the said court and was docketed as SLRC Case No. 1198-93-C.
The petition contained, among others, the allegations that: (1) the
petitioners are the true and lawful registered co-owners of a parcel of
land located at Maunong, Calamba, Laguna, consisting of 30,000
square meters covered by the TCT; (2) the lot is declared for tax
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 14187; (3) petitioners paid the
realty taxes on the said property until 1993; (4) the owners duplicate
copy was lost and could not be found despite diligent efforts to locate
it; (5) per Certification4 dated June 21, 1993 of the Register of Deeds of
Calamba, Laguna, there were no legal claims annotated at the back of
the TCT filed with that office; (6) petitioners filed with the Register of
Deeds an affidavit of loss of the said owners duplicate copy; (7) they
secured a certified true copy of the original TCT from the Register of
Deeds with the affidavit of loss annotated at the back thereof; (8) at the
last page of the original certificate of title, a mortgage was annotated,
which upon verification was found to have already been paid; (9) the
Register of Deeds of Calamba could not cancel the mortgage from the
original copy of the title until presentation of the owners duplicate copy
to the bank; and (10) petitioners were in possession of the subject
property.
After due proceedings, the RTC, in its Order5 dated April 8, 1994,
granted the petition, directed the Register of Deeds of Calamba,
Laguna to issue a second owners duplicate copy of the TCT, and
declared void the first owners duplicate copy thereof.
Later, on May 25, 1995, herein respondent Fidelity Investment
Corporation (Fidelity) filed a Petition6 for annulment of judgment and
cancellation of title before the CA. According to Fidelity, on December
16, 1967, it purchased the property covered by the subject certificate of
title from the registered owners thereof pursuant to a Deed of Absolute
Sale7 of the same date. It said that upon execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the payment in full of the purchase price, the
vendors delivered to Fidelity their owners duplicate copy of the TCT,
which has been in its possession since. It also alleged that it had been
in actual physical possession and continuous occupation of the subject
property and that it had been paying the real estate taxes due thereon.
It further said that, sometime in March 1995, upon verification with the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, it learned for the first time of
the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy as recorded under
Entry No. 357701 dated May 26, 1994 and annotated on the TCT.
Thus, it caused the sale of the property in its favor to be annotated on
the TCT. The notice of the sale was annotated on March 28, 1995 as
Entry No. 384954. Fidelity then filed, on April 26, 1995, a Notice of
Adverse Claim with the concerned Register of Deeds, which was
annotated on the TCT as Entry No. 387483.

SO ORDERED.
In fine, Fidelity argued that the Order dated April 18, 1994 is null and
void, the RTC having no jurisdiction to issue the same as the owners

duplicate copy of the TCT was in its possession all along and the
respondents therein had no standing to file the petition on account of
the Deed of Absolute Sale they executed in its favor. It claimed that the
petitioners perjured themselves before the RTC when they stated that
the duplicate copy of the TCT was lost and that they gave notice to all
who had interest in the property, because they failed to notify Fidelity
despite knowledge of the latters possession of the property.
In their Comment,8 private respondents [herein petitioners] Faustina
Camitan, Damaso Lopez, and the surviving heirs of deceased Alipio
Camitan, denied having committed falsehoods in their petition before
the trial court, which they claimed had jurisdiction over the case. They
submitted that the long, unexplained, and questionable silence of
Fidelity on its alleged possession of the owners duplicate copy of the
TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the nonregistration and titling thereof in its name for about 27 years since the
purported sale, was tainted with malice and bad faith, thus, subjecting
it to estoppel and laches.
By its Resolution dated May 27, 1997, the CA gave due course to the
petition for annulment of judgment, and a preliminary conference was
set, directing Fidelity to bring the owners duplicate copy of the TCT. At
the preliminary conference, Fidelitys counsel presented what was
claimed to be the owners duplicate copy of the TCT. Counsel for
private respondents examined the certificate of title and admitted that it
is the genuine owners copy thereof. Thereafter, counsel for Fidelity
manifested that they were no longer presenting other evidence. On the
other hand, counsel for private respondents prayed that an additional
issue, the question of the validity of the deed of sale in favor of Fidelity,
be likewise resolved. Fidelitys counsel objected on the ground of
irrelevancy. However, in order to expedite the proceedings, he agreed
to have private respondents amplify their position in their
memorandum.
In their Memorandum, private respondents retracted their counsels
admission on the genuineness of the owners duplicate copy of the
TCT presented by Fidelity, citing honest mistake and negligence owing
to his excitement and nervousness in appearing before the CA. They
pointed to some allegedly irreconcilable discrepancies between the
copy annexed to the petition and the exhibit presented by Fidelity
during the preliminary conference. They also reiterated the issue on
the validity of the purported deed of sale of the property in favor of
Fidelity.
In its Comment to the Memorandum, Fidelity countered that there were
no discrepancies between the owners duplicate copy it presented and
the original copy on file with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba,
Laguna. It argued that private respondents are bound by the judicial
admission made by their counsel during the preliminary conference. It,
likewise, objected to the inclusion of the issue on the validity of the
deed of sale over the property.
In the Decision dated November 28, 2003, the CA ruled in favor of
Fidelity. It declared that the RTC was without jurisdiction to issue a
second owners duplicate copy of the title in light of the existence of the
genuine owners duplicate copy in the possession of petitioner, as
admitted by private respondents through counsel. According to the CA,
a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and cannot
be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. It said that
honest mistake and negligence, as raised by private respondents in
retracting their counsels admission, are not sufficient grounds to
invalidate the admission.
Hence, this petition, raising the sole issue of
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE JUDICIAL
ADMISSION OF THE COUNSEL OF THE PETITIONERS
DURING THE HEARING IN C.A.-G.R. SP. NO. 37291 WAS
A PALPABLE MISTAKE.
Herein petitioners argue that despite the existence of a judicial
admission, there is still some leeway for the court to consider other

evidence presented. They point out that, even as early as in their

Memorandum before the CA, they had already retracted their counsels
admission on the genuineness of the owners duplicate copy of the
TCT presented by Fidelity, and claim that their counsel was honestly
mistaken and negligent in his admission owing to his excitement and
nervousness in appearing before the CA. Petitioners likewise cite, in
support of their position, the circumstances they alleged in their petition
before the RTC which convinced the latter to issue them a new
owners duplicate copy of the TCT. Further, petitioners raise in issue
the discrepancies between the certificate of title on file with the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna and that submitted by Fidelity
during the preliminary conference before the CA.
In its Comment,9 Fidelity reiterate the arguments it presented before
the CA.
We find for the respondent.
At the outset, we emphasize that the core issue in this case is the
validity of the issuance by the RTC of a new owners duplicate copy of
the TCT in favor of petitioners. The applicable law is Section 109 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree),
which states:
SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate
certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owners duplicate
certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the
owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds
of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss
or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for
the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of
any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or
destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other
person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in
interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct
the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall
contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of
the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be
entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and
shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this
decree.
Petitioners were able to convince the RTC that their owners duplicate
copy had indeed been lost. They appeared to have complied with the
requirements of the law. This led the RTC to grant their petition.
Upon discovery of the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of the
TCT, Fidelity went to the CA seeking to annul the judgment of the
RTC. Unfortunately for petitioners, their counsel admitted the
genuineness of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT presented by
Fidelity during the preliminary conference at the CA. The following
exchange is revealing:
J. MARTIN:
Counsel for the private respondent, will you go
over the owners copy and manifest to the
court whether that is a genuine owners copy?
ATTY. MENDOZA:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. MARTIN:
Alright. Make it of record that after examining
the owners copy of TCT NO. (T-12110) T-4342,
counsel for the private respondent admitted

that the same appears to be a genuine owners

copy of the transfer certificate of title. Do you
have a certified true copy of this or any machine
copy that you can compare?
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. REYES:
Including all the entries at the back page.
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. MARTIN:
Does it include all the list of the encumbrances?
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. MENDOZA:
We do not admit, Your Honor this being only a
xerox copy and not certified . . .
J. MARTIN:
It is only for purposes of substitution. Will you
compare that with the other copy which you
already admitted to be a genuine owners
copy.
ATTY. MENDOZA:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. MARTIN:
Alright. Counsel, are you marking that?
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Your Honor, we request that this copy of the
transfer certificate of title No. T-12110, T-4342 be
marked as Exhibit A to A-3 for the petitioner?
J. MARTIN:

This is a preliminary conference. Unless you have

other incidents to thresh out, I think that we can
terminate the conference this morning. Counsel for
the private respondents?10
The foregoing transcript of the preliminary conference indubitably
shows that counsel for petitioners made a judicial admission and failed
to refute that admission during the said proceedings despite the
opportunity to do so. A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, which dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the
matter or fact admitted. It may be contradicted only by a showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.11
Petitioners, in their Memorandum before the CA, attempted to retract
their counsels judicial admission on the authenticity of the owners
duplicate copy of TCT in the possession of Fidelity. Petitioners
explicate that the wrong admission was an honest mistake and
negligence attributable to the counsels nervousness and excitement in
appearing for the first time before the CA. However, as correctly
pointed out by the CA, such an admission may only be refuted upon a
proper showing of palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. Thus, the claim of "honest mistake and negligence" on the part
of the counsel due to his excitement and nervousness in appearing
before the CA did not suffice.
Petitioners now claim that the "honest mistake and negligence" of their
counsel amount to palpable mistake. They also enumerate observed
discrepancies between the original TCT on file with the Register of
Deeds of Calamba, Laguna and the owners duplicate copy presented
by Fidelity, to wit:
1. On the above left margin of the xerox copy of the
ORIGINAL COPY of TCT No. (T-12110) T-4342 on file with
the Register of Deeds, Calamba, Laguna in question, (Annex
A, Respondents Petition in question before the Court of
Appeals) Annex C, supra, the PRINTED WORDS were:
"(JUDICIAL FORM NO. 109)
(Revised September, 1954.)
However, in the belated submission of the alleged xerox
copy of the alleged duplicate copy of the title in question by
the respondent to the Court of Appeals (Exh. A; Annex "H",
supra,) the following PRINTED WORDS appeared:
"(JUDICIAL FORM NO. 109-D)
(Revised September, 1954.)" (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
[2.] The Serial Number of the Xerox copy of the original copy
of the title in question on file with the Register of Deeds of
Calamba City was written in handwriting as "158640".
However, the Serial Number of the purported duplicate copy
of the original title in question of the respondent
was PRINTED in letters and in figures: "No. 158640".

Preliminary conference.
Alright, after examining the machine copy
consisting of three pages and comparing the
same with the admittedly genuine owners
copy of the transfer certificate of title, counsel
prayed for the substitution of the machine
copy after marking them as Exhibits A-A-3
inclusive. We will return the owners copy to you
so that you can submit this already in lieu thereof.

3. The typewritten words "PROVINCE OF LAGUNA" on the

heading of the xerox copy of the original copy of the said title
on file with the said Register of Deeds were written in big
type of letters.
However, in Exh. "A", Annex H, supra, of the respondent, it
was typewritten with small type of letters.
4. In the FIGURES of the xerox copy of the original copy of
the said title: NO. (T-12110) T-4342 in question,they were
written in a big type of letters. The same is true in the letters

"T" and DASH after the letter "T". The figures "4342" were
printed in big letters.
However, the printed and handwritten figures and words in
Exh. A, Annex C, supra, were small. The figures 4342 were
in handwriting.
5. In the xerox copy of the original copy of title of the
property in question covered by TCT No. (T-12110) T-4342,
which cancelled TCT No. T-10700, the type of letter "T",
figures, 10700 and dash thereof were in big letters.
However, the purported duplicate copy of the original copy of
the title in question submitted to the Court of Appeals by the
respondent, the type of the letter, dash and figures thereof
were in small letters.
6. The type of the printed words, dashes, and figures in the
body of the Xerox copy of the original title in question, it was
typewritten with big letters and figures.
The purported duplicate copy of the original title of the
property in question submitted to the Court of Appeals by the
respondent, the letters, dashes and figures there of were
typewritten in small letters.
7. The letters, dashes, and figures of the xerox copy of the
original title in question were typewritten in a manual
typewriter with big letters.
In Exh. "A", Annex H, supra, the purported duplicate copy of
the original title in question submitted to the Court of Appeals
by the respondent, they were typewritten in a manual
typewriter with small letters and figures.
8. The signatures of the Registrar of Deeds in the xerox of
the original copy of the title in question; had loop in small
letter "d" and the rest had no loops.
In Exh. A, Annex H, supra, of the purported duplicate copy of
the title in question submitted by the respondent to the Court
of Appeals, there was no loop, except there were two (2)
open vertical lines below thereof after four letters.
9. The xerox copy of the original copy of the title in question
after TCT No. T-10700 was cancelled, it was entered in the
Register of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna since September 24,
1957 at 9:10 a.m.
10. In view thereof, it is but NATURAL that the judicial forms
and descriptions of letters and figures of the original copy of
title in question and file with the Register of Deeds its
duplicate copy since September 24, 1954, were the SAME
and already OLD.
11. However, in Exh. "A", Annex H, supra, the purported
duplicate copy of the title in question submitted by the
respondent to the Court of Appeals, the judicial form thereof
was already small and it clearly appeared that it might have
been NEWLY ISSUED NEW COPY OF TITLE. It might be
the revised new form in 1988 that is presently used in the
Register of Deeds.12
Upon examination of the said exhibits on record, it appears that the
alleged discrepancies are more imagined than real. Had these
purported discrepancies been that evident during the preliminary
conference, it would have been easy for petitioners counsel to object
to the authenticity of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT presented
by Fidelity. As shown in the transcript of the proceedings, there was
ample opportunity for petitioners counsel to examine the document,
retract his admission, and point out the alleged discrepancies. But he

chose not to contest the document. Thus, it cannot be said that the
admission of the petitioners counsel was made through palpable
mistake.
Every counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are
necessary or incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit
in behalf of his client. Any act performed by counsel within the scope of
his general and implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as
the act of the client himself. Consequently, the mistake or negligence
of the clients counsel, which may result in the rendition of an
unfavorable judgment, generally binds the client. To rule otherwise
would encourage every defeated party, in order to salvage his case, to
claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel. Then, there would
be no end to litigation, as every shortcoming of counsel could be the
subject of challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is
also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client
through another counsel, and so on, ad infinitum.
This rule admits of exceptions, i.e., where the counsels mistake is so
great and serious that the client is deprived of his day in court or of his
property without due process of law. In these cases, the client is not
bound by his counsels mistakes and the case may even be reopened
in order to give the client another chance to present his case. 13 In the
case at bar, however, these exceptional circumstances do not obtain.
With proof that the owners duplicate copy of the TCT was in the
possession of Fidelity, the RTC Decision dated April 8, 1994 was
properly annulled. In a catena of cases, we have consistently ruled that
if an owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not been lost but
is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is
void, as the court rendering the decision never acquires jurisdiction.
Consequently, the decision may be attacked at any time.14
The circumstances cited by petitioners in support of their petition, i.e.,
the TCT is still in their names; the property in question is declared for
tax purposes in their names; they were the persons informed by the
Municipal Treasurer of Calamba, Laguna for the non-payment of real
estate taxes for the years 1990-1993; they paid the real estate taxes
due on the property; no one was claiming the property per the
certification of the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna; the questionable delay of
Fidelity in registering its claim over the property under the purported
sale of December 13, 1967; and the validity of the Absolute Deed of
Sale, all pertain to the issue of ownership over the property covered by
the TCT.
In a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a
certificate of title in lieu of one allegedly lost, on which this case is
rooted, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court with limited
jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual
ownership of the land covered by the lost owners duplicate copy of the
certificate of title.15 Consequently, any question involving the issue of
ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit where the trial court
will conduct a full-blown hearing with the parties presenting their
respective evidence to prove ownership over the subject realty. 16
At this point, we reiterate the principle that possession of a lost owners
duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to
ownership of the land covered by it. Registration of real property under
the Torrens System does not create or vest title because it is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. The certificate of title, by itself, does not
vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over the particular
property described therein.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November
28, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 12, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37291 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 107372 January 23, 1997

RAFAEL S. ORTAES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES AND ASUNCION
LLANES INOCENTES, respondents.

(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his

property and that of defendants' lot to segregate
his right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all
other expenses that may be incurred by reason of
sale. . .

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two (2)
parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a consideration of
P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. The first deed of absolute
sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 258628 provides in
part:
That for and in consideration of the sum of
THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND (P35,000.00) PESOS,
receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledged, we
have sold, transferred and conveyed, as we
hereby sell, transfer and convey, that subdivided
portion of the property covered by TCT No.
258628 known as Lot No. 684-G-1-B-2 in favor of
RAFAEL S. ORTAEZ, of legal age, Filipino,
whose marriage is under a regime of complete
separation of property, and a resident of 942
Aurora Blvd., Quezon City, his heirs or assigns. 1
while the second deed of absolute sale covering TCT. No.
243273 provides:
That for and in consideration of the sum of
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS
receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledged, we
have sold, transferred and conveyed, as we
hereby sell, transfer and convey, that
consolidated-subdivided portion of the property
covered by TCT No. 243273 known as Lot No. 5 in
favor of RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, of legal age,
Filipino, whose marriage is under a regime of
complete separation of property, and a resident of
942 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City his heirs or
assigns. 2
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned
lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the
latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles. 3 Private
respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of the first
lot is in the possession of another person, 4 and petitioner's acquisition
of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance
before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents
merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions 5 which
were never reflected in the deeds of sale: 6
3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273)
remains with the defendants (private respondents)
until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the
following requirements have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of
way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the
approved plan for the segregation;

During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally

testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, 7 although
such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite
petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said
oral conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court
nonetheless, admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint as
well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this petition.
We are tasked to resolve the issue on the admissibility of parol
evidence to establish the alleged oral conditions-precedent to a
contract of sale, when the deeds of sale are silent on such conditions.
The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private
respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a
party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or
documentary evidence. 8 Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable
unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. 9 Thus,
under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 10 of the Rules of Court,
when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this
case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents
thereof. 11 Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only
repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must
have been waived and abandoned by the parties. 12 Examining the
deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was
subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the
parties. 13
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the
case of Land Settlement Development, Co.vs. Garcia
Plantation 14 where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a
contract may be established by parol evidence. However, the material
facts of that case are different from this case. In the former, the
contract sought to be enforced 15 expressly stated that it is subject to
an agreement containing the conditions-precedent which were proven
through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case, made
no reference to any pre-conditions or other agreement. In fact, the sale
is denominated as absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument, 16 hence,
contrary to the rule that:
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to . . .
the terms of a written instrument by testimony
purporting to show that, at or before the signing of
the document, other or different terms were orally
agreed upon by the parties. 17
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing
unless there has been fraud or mistake." 18 No such fraud or
mistake exists in this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol
evidence is admissible under the exceptions provided by the Rules,
specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true
intent of the parties. Such exception obtains only in the following
instance:

[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or

obscure in terms that the contractual intention of
the parties cannot be understood from a mere
reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic
evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of
the relations of the parties to each other, and of
the facts and circumstances surrounding them
when they entered into the contract may be
received to enable the court to make a proper,
interpretation of the instrument. 19
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any
ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or
doubt in the terms thereof.
Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents' contention that
they "put in issue by the pleadings" the failure of the written agreement
to express the true intent of the parties. Record shows 20 that private
respondents did notexpressly plead that the deeds of sale were
incomplete or that it did not reflect the
intention 21 of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private
respondents). Such issue must be, "squarely presented." 22Private
respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4)
conditions which they tried to prove during trial by parol
evidence. 23 Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not
plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence
rule. 24 Their case is covered by the general rule that the contents of
the writing are the only repository of the terms of the agreement.
Considering that private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer (and
former judge) he was "supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and
practices" and was "expected to know the consequences" 25 of his
signing a deed of absolute sale. Had he given an iota's attention to
scrutinize the deeds, he would have incorporated important stipulations
that the transfer of title to said lots were conditional. 26
One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol evidence is
admissible, it should nonetheless be disbelieved as no other evidence
appears from the record to sustain the existence of the alleged
conditions. Not even the other seller, Asuncion Inocentes, was
presented to testify on such conditions.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the
records of this case REMANDED to the trial court for proper disposition
in accordance with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.