Republic of the Philippines

8th Judicial Region

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES
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xx
Plaintiff;

Civil Case No. 2014-11-CV-03

For:
UNLAWFUL DETAINER

-versusxx
Defendant.
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DECISION
Plaintiff alleges that Ester P. Villar is an absolute owner of a parcel of
residential lot bearing Lot No. 67, situated at Cluster IV, Bliss Calanipawan,
Sagkahan, Tacloban City, containing an area of 50 square meters, more or less.
This lot was purchased by plaintiff from defendant on October 12, 1992, as shown
in a Deed of Absolute Sale. 1
According to plaintiff, he took possession and occupation of this lot
immediately after her purchase from the defendant. Defendant, however, was given
by plaintiff permission to plant vegetables as the former was just living in the
adjacent lot. On March 2015, plaintiff noticed that defendant installed iron door
on the frontage of this lot fronting the road network thereat and constructed also a
covered space with iron roofing near the frontage thereof, thereby closing this
property and since then, depriving plaintiff of her possession and occupation
thereof.
Plaintiff made oral demands as well as sent a demand letter 2 to defendant for
her demolish or remove the iron door and roofing, and eventually vacate the
subject property. The matter was also referred to the barangay justice system 3, yet
to no avail as defendant never gave in to plaintiffs demands; hence this suit.
Plaintiff prays that defendant be ordered to immediately vacate the subject
property and to demolish or remove the iron door and iron roofing constructed
thereon, to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation
expenses.
On the other hand, defendant specifically denies under oath the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated October 12, 1992, presented by plaintiff. She claims that
neither she nor her deceased husband, Arturo Zaragoza, sold any lot to plaintiff.
She avers that said document of sale is fictitious and/or forged.
1 See Exh. B; records, p. 9
2 See Exhs. F & series; records, p. 11-12
3 See Exh. E; records, p. 10
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According to defendant, plaintiff never took possession of the subject lot and
the same has remained in defendant and her familys possession starting in October
1985 until the present. She admits the installation of an iron door on Lot 67 and
preventing the entry of plaintiff, because as lawful possessor and owner thereof,
she is entitled to repair their residential house and make it habitable again after
Typhoon Yolanda.
Defendant further alleges that the demand of plaintiff to vacate the subject
lot is without basis as she and her husband did not sell any lot or rights to plaintiff.
Moreover, as a counterclaim, defendant prays for payment of attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, moral damages and cost of the suit.
The Courts Ruling
In the preliminary conference of this case, the parties raised the following
issues for consideration, to wit:
For the Plaintiff-1. Whether or not the subject residential lot was purchased by plaintiff from
the defendant;
2. Whether or not plaintiff has a better right of possession and occupation of the
said residential lot; and
3. Whether or not defendant is liable for damages.
For the Defendant
1. Plaintiff claims possession of the subject land based on a Deed of Absolute
Sale, dated October 12, 1992, which defendant denies executing. Whether
or not the real issue is one of ownership which is beyond the summary
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.
2. Defendant has been in possession of the subject land for more than thirty (30)
years and had constructed a portion of their house on the subject land and used
the same as repair shop of defendants husband;
3. Whether or not defendant should be ejected from the subject land; and
4. Whether or not defendant is entitled on her counterclaim.

Based on the foregoing and in their pleadings, it is clear that one, plaintiff
relies on the fact that the subject lot was purchased by plaintiff from defendant as
the basis of his claim of possession thereof; and two, defendant, by denying under
oath the fact of sale alleged by plaintiff, raises the issue of ownership as the real
issue in this case.
Generally, claim of ownership by defendant over property in dispute does
not divest the jurisdiction of the inferior court.
Section 16 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, as well as Section 33(2) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act 7691, provide that in
actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.When the defendant raises the defense

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of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession. (4a)

In Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,4 the Supreme Court said:
It may well be stressed xxx that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Clourts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue of
ownership x x x only to determine the issue of possession.

Relatedly, the fact that during the trial of the case in the inferior court
evidence was presented which tended to establish ownership, did not deprive said
court of jurisdiction to determine who had prior possession, and whether that prior
possession was disturbed.5
The only exception to the above rule is where the question of de facto
possession cannot be determined properly without settling the de jure possession
and ownership because the latter is inseparably linked with the former. 6 It has been
held that:
xxx inferior courts may not be divested of their jurisdiction over ejectment cases simply
because the defendant sets up a claim of ownership over the litigated property. But
where there question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the
issue of ownership, because the latter is inseparably linked with the former, the
case must be dismissed, for the inferior court loses jurisdiction over the
same.7 (emphasis added)

In other words, if it appears during the trial that the principal issue relates to the
ownership of the property in dispute and any question of possession which
may be involved necessarily depends upon the result of the inquiry into the
title, the jurisdiction of the inferior court is lost and the action should be
dismissed.8
In this case, plaintiffs claim of rightful possession that is anchored on his alleged
purchase of the property from the defendant, which is vehemently denied by the
latter, places the question of ownership the central issue in this case. The court
cannot decide the issue of who has the better right to possess the subject property
without first resolving the validity and authenticity of the document of sale. As
such, this court is now confronted with a subject of the litigation which is beyond
pecuniary estimation--clearly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.9
4 208 SCRA 108, 121 (1992)
5 Vencilao vs. Camarenta, 29 SCRA 473, 479-481 (1969)
6 Guzman vs. CA, 177 SCRA 604, 616 (1989); citing Andres vs. Soriano, 101 Phil. 848 (1957);
Castro vs. De los Reyes, 109 Phil. 64 (1960); Alvir vs. Vera, 130 SCRA 357 (1984); De la Santa
vs. CA, 140 SCRA 33 (1985)
7 De la Cruz vs. CA, 133 SCRA 520, 528 (1984); also Consignado vs. CA, 207 SCRA 305
(1992)
8 Alvir vs. Vera, 130 SCRA 361
9 Section 19(1), B.P. 129
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In Vda. De Bakit vs. Asperin,10 this issue was clearly enunciated by the High Court,
to wit:
Moreover, Asperin claimed to be entitled to hold said land and to eject Mrs. Bakit
therefrom upon the ground that she had sold it to him, although subject to
redemption, and that, as such buyer, he had agreed to take Mrs. Bakit as his tenant, who
had violated the terms and conditions of their contract of tenancy. Upon the other hand,
Mrs. Bakit maintained that she was not his tenant; that the land belonged to her, not to
Asperin that she had merely mortgaged it to him, as security for the payment of a debt;
and that the instrument incorporating their agreement, entitled "Sale With Conventional
Redemption," did not express their true intent and should be reformed accordingly. The
title to the land in question was thereby put in issue, in a manner affecting
necessarily the cause of action of Asperin. In order to settle such issue, it was
necessary to determine which of the conflicting claims of the parties was true,
and, hence to decide whether the alleged "sale with conventional redemption"
was what it purported to be, as claimed by Asperin or merely a mortgage, as
contended by Mrs. Bakit. In other words, the title to a real property had to be
settled and, in fact, the justice of the peace of Loreto, endeavored to settle it in its
decision, by holding therein that it had been proven that Mrs. Bakit had sold the land to
Asperin subject to redemption, that she had agreed to be and had become his tenant,
that she had failed to comply with her obligations as such tenant and had refused to
deliver his share of the produce of the land, that, instead, "She is withholding said land
and asserting ownership ... thereof" despite repeated demands of Asperin and that she
had not sufficiently established her contention. As stated in Teodoro vs. Balatbat, L-6314
(Jan. 22, 1954):
..., it is evident that plaintiff's pretended right to the possession of the property in
dispute ultimately rests upon his claim of ownership, a claim based upon a
purported contract of sale with right of repurchase admittedly signed by
defendants but claimed by them to be a mere simulation to cloak a mortgage
obligation tainted with usury. If this contract was really a sale subject to repurchase
and the repurchase has, as alleged by the plaintiff, not been made within the time
stipulated, plaintiff would already be the owner of the property sold and, as such, entitled
to its possession. On the other hand, if the contract was, as defendants claim, in reality a
mere mortgage, then the defendants would still be the owner of the property and could
not, therefore, be regarded as mere lessees. In the final analysis then, the case

hinges on a question of ownership and is for that reason not cognizable by

the justice of the peace court. (See, also Nierras v. Juson de Po, L-10878, Feb. 22,
1957. (emphasis added)

WHEREFORE, the instant case is ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

IN CHAMBERS, this 8 June 2016, at Tacloban City.
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Presiding Judge

10 G.R. No. L-15700, April 26, 1961

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