G.R. No.

L-23733 October 31, 1969

HERMINIO L. NOCUM, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Fernando M. Mangubat and Felimon H. Mendoza for plaintiff-appellee.
Domingo E. de Lara and Associates for defendant-appellant.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal of the Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., defendant in the Court below, from a judgment of
the said court (Court of First Instance of Batangas) in its Civil Case No. 834, wherein
appellee Herminio L. Nocum was plaintiff, sentencing appellant to pay appellee the sum
of P1,351.00 for actual damages and P500.00 as attorney's fees with legal interest from
the filing of the complaint plus costs. Appellee, who was a passenger in appellant's Bus
No. 120 then making a trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was
injured as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in
said bus and declared to its conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous items by a
co-passenger. The findings of fact of the trial court are not assailed. The appeal is purely
on legal questions.
Appellee has not filed any brief. All that We have before Us is appellant's brief with the
following assignment of errors:
I
BASED ON THE FACTS THE LOWER COURT FOUND AS ESTABLISHED, IT
ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN NOT ABSOLVING APPELLANT FROM
LIABILITY RESULTING FROM THE EXPLOSION OF FIRECRACKERS
CONTAINED IN A PACKAGE, THE CONTENTS OF WHICH WERE
MISREPRESENTED BY A PASSENGER.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN AWARDING DAMAGES
WITH LEGAL INTEREST IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT, WITH
COSTS AGAINST THE APPELLEE.
Upon consideration of the points raised and discussed by appellant, We find the appeal to
be well taken.

The main basis of the trial court's decision is that appellant did not observe the
extraordinary or utmost diligence of a very cautious person required by the following
articles of the Civil Code:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and
for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of
each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the
safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Analyzing the evidence presented by the parties, His Honor found:
According to Severino Andaya, a witness for the plaintiff, a man with a box went up the
baggage compartment of the bus where he already was and said box was placed under the
seat. They left Azcarraga at about 11:30 in the morning and when the explosion occurred,
he was thrown out. PC investigation report states that thirty seven (37) passengers were
injured (Exhibits "O" and "2").
The bus conductor, Sancho Mendoza, testified that the box belonged to a passenger
whose name he does not know and who told him that it contained miscellaneous items
and clothes. He helped the owner in loading the baggage which weighed about twelve
(12) kilos and because of company regulation, he charged him for it twenty-five centavos
(P0.25). From its appearance there was no indication at all that the contents were
explosives or firecrackers. Neither did he open the box because he just relied on the word
of the owner.
Dispatcher Nicolas Cornista of defendant company corroborrated the testimony of
Mendoza and he said, among other things, that he was present when the box was loaded
in the truck and the owner agreed to pay its fare. He added that they were not authorized
to open the baggages of passengers because instruction from the management was to call
the police if there were packages containing articles which were against regulations.
xxx

xxx

xxx

There is no question that Bus No. 120 was road worthy when it left its Manila Terminal
for Lucena that morning of December 5, 1960. The injuries suffered by the plaintiff were
not due to mechanical defects but to the explosion of firecrackers inside the bus which
was loaded by a co-passenger.
... Turning to the present case, it is quite clear that extraordinary or utmost diligence of a
very cautious person was not observed by the defendant company. The service manual,
exhibits "3" and "3-A," prohibits the employees to allow explosives, such as dynamite
and firecrackers to be transported on its buses. To implement this particular rule for 'the
safety of passengers, it was therefore incumbent upon the employees of the company to
make the proper inspection of all the baggages which are carried by the passengers.
But then, can it not be said that the breach of the contract was due to fortuitous event?
The Supreme Court in the case of Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657, quoted Escriche's
definition of caso fortuito as "an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be
foreseen nor resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning,
compulsions, insurrections, destructions of buildings by unforeseen accidents and other
occurrences of a similar nature." In other words, the cause of the unexpected event must
be independent of the will of man or something which cannot be avoided. This cannot be
said of the instant case. If proper and rigid inspection were observed by the defendant, the
contents of the box could have been discovered and the accident avoided. Refusal by the
passenger to have the package opened was no excuse because, as stated by Dispatcher
Cornista, employees should call the police if there were packages containing articles
against company regulations. Neither was failure by employees of defendant company to
detect the contents of the packages of passengers because like the rationale in the
Necesito vs. Paras case (supra), a passenger has neither choice nor control in the exercise
of their discretion in determining what are inside the package of co-passengers which
may eventually prove fatal.
We cannot agree. No doubt, the views of His Honor do seem to be in line with the reasons
that the Code Commission had for incorporating the above-quoted provisions in its draft
of the Civil Code. Indeed, in approving the said draft, Congress must have concurred with
the Commission that by requiring the highest degree of diligence from common carriers
in the safe transport of their passengers and by creating a presumption of negligence
against them, the recklessness of their drivers which is a common sight even in crowded
areas and, particularly, on the highways throughout the country may, somehow, if not in a
large measure, be curbed. We are not convinced, however, that the exacting criterion of
said provisions has not been met by appellant in the circumstances of this particular case.
It is undisputed that before the box containing the firecrackers were allowed to be loaded
in the bus by the conductor, inquiry was made with the passenger carrying the same as to
what was in it, since its "opening ... was folded and tied with abaca." (Decision p. 16,
Record on Appeal.) According to His Honor, "if proper and rigid inspection were
observed by the defendant, the contents of the box could have been discovered and the
accident avoided. Refusal by the passenger to have the package opened was no excuse
because, as stated by Dispatcher Cornista, employees should call the police if there were

packages containing articles against company regulations." That may be true, but it is Our
considered opinion that the law does not require as much. Article 1733 is not as
unbending as His Honor has held, for it reasonably qualifies the extraordinary diligence
required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be
"according to all the circumstances of each case." In fact, Article 1755 repeats this same
qualification: "A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all the circumstances."
In this particular case before Us, it must be considered that while it is true the passengers
of appellant's bus should not be made to suffer for something over which they had no
control, as enunciated in the decision of this Court cited by His Honor,1 fairness demands
that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers, allowance must be
given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the
passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not
take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to
speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each
passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the
innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case
at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's
baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional
boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as
suggested by the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the passenger
to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already declared that the box
contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a
constitutionally protected domain. Police officers acting without judicial authority
secured in the manner provided by law are not beyond the pale of constitutional
inhibitions designed to protect individual human rights and liberties. Withal, what must
be importantly considered here is not so much the infringement of the fundamental sacred
rights of the particular passenger herein involved, but the constant threat any contrary
ruling would pose on the right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers,
considering how easily the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and abuse.
Of course, when there are sufficient indications that the representations of the passenger
regarding the nature of his baggage may not be true, in the interest of the common safety
of all, the assistance of the police authorities may be solicited, not necessarily to force the
passenger to open his baggage, but to conduct the needed investigation consistent with
the rules of propriety and, above all, the constitutional rights of the passenger. It is in this
sense that the mentioned service manual issued by appellant to its conductors must be
understood.
Decisions in other jurisdictions cited by appellant in its brief, evidently because of the
paucity of local precedents squarely in point, emphasize that there is need, as We hold
here, for evidence of circumstances indicating cause or causes for apprehension that the
passenger's baggage is dangerous and that it is failure of the common carrier's employee
to act in the face of such evidence that constitutes the cornerstone of the common carrier's
liability in cases similar to the present one.

The principle that must control the servants of the carrier in a case like the one before us
is correctly stated in the opinion in the case of Clarke v. Louisville & N.R. Co. 20 Ky L.
Rep. 839, 49 S.W. 1120. In that case Clarke was a passenger on the defendant's train.
Another passenger took a quantity of gasoline into the same coach in which Clarke was
riding. It ignited and exploded, by reason of which he was severely injured. The trial
court peremptorily instructed the jury to find for the defendant. In the opinion, affirming
the judgment, it is said: "It may be stated briefly, in assuming the liability of a railroad to
its passengers for injury done by another passenger, only where the conduct of this
passenger had been such before the injury as to induce a reasonably prudent and vigilant
conductor to believe that there was reasonable ground to apprehend violence and danger
to the other passengers, and in that case asserting it to be the duty of the conductor of the
railroad train to use all reasonable means to prevent such injury, and if he neglects this
reasonable duty, and injury is done, that then the company is responsible; that otherwise
the railroad is not responsible."
The opinion quotes with approval from the case of Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. vs. Shields, 9
Tex. Civ. App. 652, 29 S. W. 652, in which case the plaintiff was injured
by alcohol which had been carried upon the train by another passenger. In the opinion in
that case it is said: "It was but a short period of time after the alcohol was spilt when it
was set on fire and the accident occurred, and it was not shown that appellant's employees
knew that the jug contained alcohol. In fact, it is not shown that the conductor or any
other employee knew that Harris had a jug with him until it fell out of the sack, though
the conductor had collected ... (his) fare, and doubtless knew that he had the sack on the
seat with him. ... It cannot be successfully denied that Harris had the right as a passenger
to carry baggage on the train, and that he had a right to carry it in a sack if he chose to do
so. We think it is equally clear that, in the absence of some intimation or circumstance
indicating that the sack contained something dangerous to other passengers, it was not the
duty of appellant's conductor or any other employee to open the sack and examine its
contents." Quinn v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 98 Ky. 231, 32 S. W. 742; Wood v. Louisville
& N. R. Co. 101 Ky. 703, 42 S. W. 349; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Vincent, 29 Ky. L. Rep.
1049, 96 S. W. 898; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Renfro, 142 Ky. 590, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.)
133, 135 S. W. 266.2 (Emphasis supplied)
Explosive or Dangerous Contents. A carrier is ordinarily not liable for injuries to
passengers from fires or explosions caused by articles brought into its conveyances by
other passengers, in the absence of any evidence that the carrier, through its employees,
was aware of the nature of the article or had any reason to anticipate danger therefrom.
(Bogard v. Illinois C. R Co. 144 Ky. 649, 139 S. W. 855, 36 L. R. A.[N. S.] 337; Clarke v.
Louisville & N. R. Co. 101 Ky. 34, 39 S. W. 840, 36 L. R. A. 123 [explosion of can of
gasoline]; East Indian R. Co. v. Mukerjee [1901] A. C. [Eng.] 396, 3 B. R. C. 420 P. C.
[explosion of fireworks]; Annotation: 37 L. R. A. [N. S.] 725.)3
Appellant further invokes Article 1174 of the Civil Code which relieves all obligors,
including, of course, common carriers like appellant, from the consequence of fortuitous
events. The court a quo held that "the breach of contract (in this case) was not due to
fortuitous event and that, therefore, the defendant is liable in damages." Since We hold

that appellant has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of negligence by showing that
it has exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers, "according to the
circumstances of the (each) case", We deem it unnecessary to rule whether or not there
was any fortuitous event in this case.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is
dismissed, without costs.

[G.R. No. 119756. March 18, 1999]

FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PAULIE U.

CAORONG, and minor children YASSER KING CAORONG, ROSE
HEINNI and PRINCE ALEXANDER, all surnamed CAORONG, and
represented by their mother PAULIE U. CAORONG, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated July 29,
1994, of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch VI, Iligan City. The aforesaid decision of the trial court dismissed the complaint
of private respondents against petitioner for damages for breach of contract of carriage
filed on the ground that petitioner had not exercised the required degree of diligence in
the operation of one of its buses. Atty. Talib Caorong, whose heirs are private respondents
herein, was a passenger of the bus and was killed in the ambush involving said bus.
The facts of the instant case are as follows:
Petitioner is a bus company in northern Mindanao. Private respondent Paulie
Caorong is the widow of Atty. Caorong, while private respondents Yasser King, Rose
Heinni, and Prince Alexander are their minor children.
On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney,
including two Maranaos.Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary
Regional Security Unit No. X, conducted an investigation of the accident. He found that
the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that
certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its
buses. Generalao rendered a report on his findings to Sgt. Reynaldo Bastasa of the
Philippine Constabulary Regional Hearquarters at Cagayan de Oro. Upon the instruction
of Sgt. Bastasa, he went to see Diosdado Bravo, operations manager of petitioner, at its

main office in Cagayan de Oro City. Bravo assured him that the necessary precautions to
insure the safety of lives and property would be taken.[1]
At about 6:45 P.M. on November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who pretended to
be passengers, seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its way to
Iligan City. Among the passengers of the bus was Atty. Caorong. The leader of the
Maranaos, identified as one Bashier Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo
Cabatuan, to stop the bus on the side of the highway. Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on
the arm, which caused him to slump on the steering wheel. Then one of the companions
of Mananggolo started pouring gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the passengers at
bay with a handgun. Mananggolo then ordered the passengers to get off the bus. The
passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus and went behind the bushes
in a field some distance from the highway.[2]
However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead
rack. At that time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the
driver. Cabatuan, who had meantime regained consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong
pleading with the armed men to spare the driver as he was innocent of any wrong doing
and was only trying to make a living. The armed men were, however, adamant as they
repeated their warning that they were going to burn the bus along with its driver. During
this exchange between Atty. Caorong and the assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left
window of the bus and crawled to the canal on the opposite side of the highway. He heard
shots from inside the bus. Larry de la Cruz, one of the passengers, saw that Atty. Caorong
was hit. Then the bus was set on fire.Some of the passengers were able to pull Atty.
Caorong out of the burning bus and rush him to the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan
City, but he died while undergoing operation.[3]
The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Iligan City. In his decision, dated December 28, 1990,
the trial court dismissed the complaint, holding as follows:
The fact that defendant, through Operations Manager Diosdado Bravo, was informed of
the rumors that the Moslems intended to take revenge by burning five buses of defendant
is established since the latter also utilized Crisanto Generalaos as a witness. Yet despite
this information, the plaintiffs charge, defendant did not take proper
precautions. . . . Consequently, plaintiffs now fault the defendant for ignoring the
report. Their position is that the defendant should have provided its buses with security
guards. Does the law require common carriers to install security guards in its buses for
the protection and safety of its passengers? Is the failure to post guards an omission of the
duty to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family which could have prevented
the killing of Atty. Caorong? To our mind, the diligence demanded by law does not
include the posting of security guards in buses. It is an obligation that properly belongs to
the State. Besides, will the presence of one or two security guards suffice to deter a
determined assault of the lawless and thus prevent the injury complained of? Maybe so,
but again, perhaps not. In other words, the presence of a security guard is not a guarantee
that the killing of Atty. Caorong would have been definitely avoided.
.

Accordingly, the failure of defendant to accord faith and credit to the report of Mr.
Generalao and the fact that it did not provide security to its buses cannot, in the light of
the circumstances, be characterized as negligence.
Finally, the evidence clearly shows that the assailants did not have the least intention of
harming any of the passengers. They ordered all the passengers to alight and set fire on
the bus only after all the passengers were out of danger. The death of Atty. Caorong was
an unexpected and unforseen occurrence over which defendant had no control. Atty.
Caorong performed an act of charity and heroism in coming to the succor of the driver
even in the face of danger. He deserves the undying gratitude of the driver whose life he
saved. No one should blame him for an act of extraordinary charity and altruism which
cost his life. But neither should any blame be laid on the doorstep of defendant. His death
was solely due to the willful acts of the lawless which defendant could neither prevent
nor stop.
.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint is hereby dismissed. For lack of
merit, the counter-claim is likewise dismissed. No cost.[4]
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed. It held:
In the case at bench, how did defendant-appellee react to the tip or information that
certain Maranao hotheads were planning to burn five of its buses out of revenge for the
deaths of two Maranaos in an earlier collision involving appellees bus? Except for the
remarks of appellees operations manager that we will have our action . . . . and Ill be the
one to settle it personally, nothing concrete whatsoever was taken by appellee or its
employees to prevent the execution of the threat. Defendant-appellee never adopted even
a single safety measure for the protection of its paying passengers. Were there available
safeguards? Of course, there were: one was frisking passengers particularly those en route
to the area where the threats were likely to be carried out such as where the earlier
accident occurred or the place of influence of the victims or their locality. If frisking was
resorted to, even temporarily, . . . . appellee might be legally excused from
liability. Frisking of passengers picked up along the route could have been implemented
by the bus conductor; for those boarding at the bus terminal, frisking could have been
conducted by him and perhaps by additional personnel of defendant-appellee. On
hindsight, the handguns and especially the gallon of gasoline used by the felons all of
which were brought inside the bus would have been discovered, thus preventing the
burning of the bus and the fatal shooting of the victim.
Appellees argument that there is no law requiring it to provide guards on its buses and
that the safety of citizens is the duty of the government, is not well taken. To be sure,
appellee is not expected to assign security guards on all of its buses; if at all, it has the
duty to post guards only on its buses plying predominantly Maranao areas. As discussed
in the next preceding paragraph, the least appellee could have done in response to the
report was to adopt a system of verification such as frisking of passengers boarding its

buses. Nothing, and to repeat, nothing at all, was done by defendant-appellee to protect
its innocent passengers from the danger arising from the Maranao threats. It must be
observed that frisking is not a novelty as a safety measure in our society. Sensitive places
in fact, nearly all important places have applied this method of security
enhancement. Gadgets and devices are available in the market for this purpose. It would
not have weighed much against the budget of the bus company if such items were made
available to its personnel to cope up with situations such as the Maranao threats.
In view of the constitutional right to personal privacy, our pronouncement in this decision
should not be construed as an advocacy of mandatory frisking in all public
conveyances. What we are saying is that given the circumstances obtaining in the case at
bench that: (a) two Maranaos died because of a vehicular collision involving one of
appellees vehicles; (b) appellee received a written report from a member of the Regional
Security Unit, Constabulary Security Group, that the tribal/ethnic group of the two
deceased were planning to burn five buses of appellee out of revenge; and (c) appellee
did nothing absolutely nothing for the safety of its passengers travelling in the area of
influence of the victims, appellee has failed to exercise the degree of diligence required of
common carriers. Hence, appellee must be adjudged liable.
.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another rendered
ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants the following:
1) P3,399,649.20 as death indemnity;
2) P50,000.00 and P500.00 per appearance as attorneys fees; and
Costs against defendant-appellee.[5]
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends:
(A) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DATED DECEMBER
28, 1990 DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AS WELL AS THE
COUNTERCLAIM, AND FINDING FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BY
ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY THE GARGANTUAN SUM
OF P3,449,649.20 PLUS P500.00 PER APPEARANCE AS ATTORNEYS
FEES, AS WELL AS DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION AND THE SUPPLEMENT TO SAID
MOTION, WHILE HOLDING, AMONG OTHERS, THAT PETITIONER
BREACHED THE CONTRACT OF CARIAGE BY ITS FAILURE TO
EXERCISE THE REQUIRED DEGREE OF DILIGENCE;
(B) THAT THE ACTS OF THE MARANAO OUTLAWS WERE SO GRAVE,
IRRESISTIBLE, VIOLENT, AND FORCEFUL, AS TO BE REGARDED
AS CASO FORTUITO; AND

(C) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER COULD HAVE PROVIDED
ADEQUATE SECURITY IN PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM AREAS AS
PART OF ITS DUTY TO OBSERVE EXTRA-ORDINARY DILIGENCE
AS A COMMON CARRIER.
The instant petition has no merit.
First. Petitioners Breach of the Contract of Carriage

Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts of other passengers, if the
employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the
negligence of petitioners employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men
was made possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the
Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses
and the assurance of petitioners operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary
precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.
Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that
the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances,
simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking
passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as
metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without
violating the passengers constitutional rights. As this Court intimated in Gacal v.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,[6] a common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a
hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioners employees failed to prevent the
attack on one of petitioners buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family. Hence, petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.
Second. Seizure of Petitioners Bus not a Case of Force Majeure

The petitioner contends that the seizure of its bus by the armed assailants was a
fortuitous event for which it could not be held liable.
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous even as an occurrence which could
not be foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable. In Yobido v. Court of Appeals,
[7]
we held that to be considered as force majeure, it is necessary that: (1) the cause of the
breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the event must be
either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it

impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor
must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The absence
of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being excused
from liability.
Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals,[8] it was held that the common carrier was
liable for its failure to take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of
which it was warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event
was foreseeable, and, thus, the second requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This
ruling applies by analogy to the present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao
that the Maranaos were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the
lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was
foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioner
from liability.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals[9] and De Guzman v. Court
of Appeals[10] in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants
constitutes force majeure. InPilapil v. Court of Appeals,[11] it was held that a common
carrier is not liable for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect passengers
from injuries caused by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. On the other hand,
in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled that a common carrier is not
responsible for goods lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by grave or
irresistible threat, violence, or force.
It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the present
case. Art. 1755 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, we held
in Pilapil and De Guzman that the respondents therein were not negligent in failing to
take special precautions against threats to the safety of passengers which could not be
foreseen, such as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. In the present case, this factor
of unforeseeablility (the second requisite for an event to be considered force majeure) is
lacking. As already stated, despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos
were planning to burn some of petitioners buses and the assurance of petitioners
operations manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken,
nothing was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.
Third. Deceased not Guilty of Contributory Negligence

The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory negligence in
returning to the bus to retrieve something. But Atty. Caorong did not act recklessly. It
should be pointed out that the intended targets of the violence were petitioner and its
employees, not its passengers. The assailants motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of
two Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioners bus and the jeepney in
which the two Maranaos were riding. Mananggolo, the leader of the group which had
hijacked the bus, ordered the passengers to get off the bus as they intended to burn it and

its driver.The armed men actually allowed Atty. Caorong to retrieve something from the
bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by
pleading for his life. He was playing the role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act
cannot be considered an act of negligence, let alone recklessness.
Fourth. Petitioner Liable to Private Respondents for Damages

We now consider the question of damages that the heirs of Atty. Caorong, private
respondents herein, are entitled to recover from the petitioner.
Indemnity for Death. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 2206 thereof,
provides for the payment of indemnity for the death of passengers caused by the breached
of contract of carriage by a common carrier. Initially fixed in Art. 2206 at P3,000.00, the
amount of the said indemnity for death has through the years been gradually increased in
view of the declining value of the peso. It is presently fixed at P50,000.00.[13] Private
respondents are entitled to this amount.
Actual damages. Art. 2199 provides that Except as provided by law or by stipulation,
one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him
as he has duly proved. The trial court found that the private respondents spent P30,000.00
for the wake and burial of Atty. Caorong.[14] Since petitioner does not question this
finding of the trial court, it is liable to private respondents in the said amount as actual
damages.
Moral Damages. Under Art. 2206, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants
and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason
of the death of the deceased. The trial court found that private respondent Paulie Caorong
suffered pain from the death of her husband and worry on how to provide support for
their minor children, private respondents Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince
Alexander.[15] The petitioner likewise does not question this finding of the trial
court. Thus, in accordance with recent decisions of this Court, [16] we hold that the
petitioner is liable to the private respondents in the amount of P100,000.00 as moral
damages for the death of Atty. Caorong.
Exemplary Damages. Art. 2232 provides that in contracts and quasi-contracts, the
court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. In the present case, the petitioner acted in a
wanton and reckless manner. Despite warning that the Maranaos were planning to take
revenge against the petitioner by burning some of its buses, and contrary to the assurance
made by its operations manager that the necessary precautions would be taken, the
petitioner and its employees did nothing to protect the safety of passengers. Under the
circumstances, we deem it reasonable to award private respondents exemplary damages
in the amount of P100,000.00.[17]
Attorneys Fees. Pursuant to Art. 2208, attorneys fees may be recovered when, as in
the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines,

Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[18] we held an award of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees to be

reasonable. Hence, the private respondents are entitled to attorneys fees in that amount.
Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in relation
to Art. 2206 thereof, provides that in addition to the indemnity for death arising from the
breach of contract of carriage by a common carrier, the defendant shall be liable for the
loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs
of the latter. The formula established in decided cases for computing net earning capacity
is as follows:[19]
Gross Necessary

Net earning = Life x Annual - Living

Capacity Expectancy Income Expenses
Life expectancy is equivalent to two thirds (2/3) multiplied by the difference of
eighty (80) and the age of the deceased. [20] Since Atty. Caorong was 37 years old at the
time of his death,[21] he had a life expectancy of 28 2/3 more years. [22] His projected gross
annual income, computed based on his monthly salary of P11,385.00[23] as a lawyer in the
Department of Agrarian Reform at the time of his death, was P148,005.00.[24] allowing for
necessary living expenses of fifty percent (50%)[25]of his projected gross annual income,
his total earning capacity amounts to P2,121,404.90.[26] Hence, the petitioner is liable to
the private respondents in the said amount as compensation for loss of earning capacity.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated July 29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Fortune Express, Inc. is ordered to
pay the following amounts to private respondents Paulie, Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and
Prince Alexander Caorong:
1. death indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
2. actual damages in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00);
3. moral damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos(P100,000.00);
4. exemplary damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00);
5. attorneys fees in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
6. compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of two million one
hundred twenty-one thousand four hundred four pesos and ninety centavos
(P2,121,404.90); and
7) costs of suits.
SO ORDERED.