DIVISION:

Case 1 : 2 Even though a person has been convicted by a court, he is still allowed to fight elections.
Justify with case analysis.
Ans. Yes, this is right and it was seen in the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu
Yadav, (2005) 3 SCC 284; in the Supreme Court of India.
BENCH: N.Santosh Hegde,S.B.Sinha & P.K.Balasubramanyan

ISSUES
We will examine whether the two issues namely (A) the existence of the prima facie case against the
accused and (B) the evidentiary value of retracted confession; have been considered by the High Court as
well as by this Court in the previous proceedings or not.
RULE
Section 164 and 437(1)(i) of CRPC
ANALYSIS
The learned counsel for the respondent further contended that this Court in Jayendra Saraswathi's case
(supra) having not agreed with the law laid down in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar (II) ought to have overruled
the said judgment in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar (II). We consider this as an argument of desperation. In
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar II there has been no declaration of any law made as such. This Court only applied
the requirement of Section 437(1)(i) of CRPC. to the facts of the case and came to the conclusion that
there was prima facie case against the respondent, hence, cancelled his bail.
CONCLUSION
"The case of Kalyan Chandra Sardar (supra) was decided on its own peculiar facts where the accused had
made 7 applications for bail before the High Court, all of which were rejected except the 5th one which
order was also set aside in appeal before this Court. The 8th bail application of the accused was granted by
the High Court which order was subject matter of challenge before this Court. The observations made

therein cannot have general application so as to apply in every case including the present one wherein the
court is hearing the matter for the first time."
Case 2. Religious conversion merely for the purpose of multiple marriages is not permitted.
Do you agree with this statement? Justify with case analysis.
Ans. The Supreme Court of India outlawed this practice by its decision in the case of Sarla
Mudgal v Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635.
Bench: Kuldip Singh (J)

In the Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, there were two main petitioners. The first was
Kalyani, a NGO that works with needy and distressed women, which is headed by Sarla
Mudgal. The next petitioner was Meena Mathur, married to Jitender Mathur, in 1988,
Meena finds that Jitender converted to Islam and solemnized second marriage with Sunita
Narula, also known as Fathima. Meena Mathur complains that her husband converted to
Islam only for the purposes of getting married again and circumvented the provisions of
Section 494 of IPC.[3]
In Writ Petition 424 of 1992, Geeta Rani, married to Pradeep Kumar alleged physical and
mental violence by her husband. She later found out that her husband, Pradeep, eloped
and married another woman after converting to Islam, in 1991. Sushmita Ghosh,
petitioner in Civil Writ Petition 509 of 1992 married G. C. Ghosh according to Hindu
rituals in 1984. The husband told her that she wanted a divorce and the petitioner argued
that she was the legally wedded wife. The husband embraced Islam and wanted to get
married to Vinita Gupta. The petitioner has prayed to not let her husband to enter a
marriage with Vinita Gupta.

ISSUES
Whether a Hindu husband married under Hindu law is allowed to embrace Islam and then
second another?
Whether the husband can be charged under 494 of IPC?
RULE

In the case Section 494 of IPC, article 14, 15, 20 were discussed in detail.
ANALYSIS
Sarla Mudgal judgment was hailed as precedent for Uniform Civil Code, and cited various cases
where personal laws of different religions have come in conflict. The second marriage of Hindu
Husband was considered void under Section 494 of IPC, In the judgement the judge gets into
detailed examination of the case, Justice Kuldip Singh, while delivering the judgment remarked,
When more than 80% of the citizens have already been brought under the codified personal law
there is no justification whatsoever to keep in abeyance, any more, the introduction of uniform
civil code for all citizens in the territory of India. There was an appeal to the government to
have a re-look at Article 44 of Indian Constitution, which suggest Uniform civil code for the
citizens.
It was submitted by Mr. Yusuf Muchala, senior advocate, appearing for the All-India Muslim
Personal Law Board and also by the advocate of the Jamiat Ulema Hind that the Sarla Mudgal
Judgment would render the status of the second wife as that of a concubine and children born of
that wedlock as illegitimate to this the Honble judges have held this issue is not involved in the
present case. What we are considering is the effect of second marriage via the first marriage
which subsists in spite of conversion of the husband to Islam, for the limited purpose of
ascertaining his criminal liability under Section 17 of the H.M. Act read with Section 494 IPC.
As and when this question is raised, it would be open to the parties to agitate the legitimacy of
such wife and children and their rights in appropriate proceedings or forum.
The judgment was heavily criticized for remarks made on minorities made as part of the
judgment, and invocation of Uniform Civil Code.
CONCLUSION
The Court held that the first marriage would have to be dissolved under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
The mans first marriage would therefore, still be valid and under Hindu law, his second marriage,
solemnized after his conversion, would be illegal under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Sarla
Mudgal judgment was hailed as precedent for Uniform Civil Code, and cited various cases where personal
laws of different religions have come in conflict. Sarla Mudgal judgment was hailed as precedent for

Uniform Civil Code, and cited various cases where personal laws of different religions have come in
conflict. The second marriage of Hindu Husband was considered void under Section 494 of IPC, In the
judgement the judge gets into detailed examination of the case, Justice Kuldip Singh, while delivering the
judgment remarked, When more than 80% of the citizens have already been brought under the codified
personal law there is no justification whatsoever to keep in abeyance, any more, the introduction of
uniform civil code for all citizens in the territory of India.[5] There was an appeal to the government to
have a re-look at Article 44 of Indian Constitution, which suggest Uniform civil code for the citizens.
Cohabitation for a long period of time is sufficient to prove marriage. Do you agree with this statement?
Please justify your answer with the following.

NAME OF THE CASE: Pyla Mutyalamma @ Satyavathi v. Pyla Suri Demudu and Anr.NAME OF THE
JUDGES: H.S. Bedi and Gyan Sudha Mishra
ISSUES: Whether the wife is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CRPC for the sole reason that
"law leans in favour of legitimacy and frowns upon a live-in relationship?
RULES: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 125; Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 494
Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.
(1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain(a) His wife, unable to maintain herself, or
(b) His legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain
itself, or
his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority,
where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to
maintain itself, or
(d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class
may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance
for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate not
exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the

same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct: Provided that the
Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such
allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of
such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means. Explanation.- For
the purposes of this Chapter,(a) " minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of
1875 ); is deemed not to have attained his majority;
(b) " wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her
husband and has not remarried.
ANALYSIS: The law also presumes in favour of marriage and against concubinage when a
man and woman have cohabited continuously for a long number of years and when the man
and woman are proved to have lived together as man and wife, the law will presume, unless
the contrary is clearly proved, that they were living together in consequence of a valid
marriage and not in a state of concubine. Several judicial pronouncements right from the
Privy Council up to this stage, have considered the scope of the presumption that could be
drawn as to the relationship of marriage between two persons living together. Section 125,
C.R.P.C. proceeds on de facto marriage and not marriage de jure e. Thus, validity of the
marriage will not be a ground for refusal of maintenance if other requirements of Section 125
Cr.P.C. are fulfilled. It was still further laid down in the case of Sethu Rathinam vs. Barbara8
that if there was affirmative evidence on the aforesaid points, the Magistrate would not enter
into complicated questions of law as to the validity of the marriage according to the
sacrament element or personal law and the like, which are questions for determination by the
civil court. If the evidence led in a proceeding under Section 125 C.R.P.C. raises a
presumption that the applicant was the wife of the respondent, it would be sufficient for the
Magistrate to pass an order granting maintenance under the proceeding.
CONCLUSION: The court held that the partner was entitled to maintenance under Section
125 irrespective of the fact whether she was married or not. The fact that they stayed together
for a sufficient period would amount to marriage and thus, maintenance.

Case 3: Even though Indian Constitution permits freedom of religion, it is compulsory to stand up
for the national anthem even though expressly prohibited by the persons religions. Do you agree
with this statement? Please justify your answer with the following.

Ans. I agree and believe It is the constitutional duty of every citizen, under Article51A(a) of the
Constitution, to respect its ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem. Standing
during the national anthem does not necessarily mean respect for the national anthem. Nor does sitting
during the anthem mean disrespect or qualify as a crime. What qualifies as crime is a wilful act
committed to insult the National Anthem.

Court: IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appellant: Bijoe Emmanuel

Respondent: State of Kerala
Citation: (1986) 3 SCC 615
Honble Judges/Coram: M.M. Dutt and O. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.

If not standing for the national anthem amounts to treason

If there is any standard for nationalism
Who decides the standards for nationalism, if there are any

Rules:The articles/sections/rules of different statutes/Acts/Ordinance/Indian Constitution which are

involved in the case are:

Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 - Section 3; Constitution of India - Article
19, Constitution of India - Article 21, Constitution of India - Article 25

Analysis: It is the constitutional duty of every citizen, under Article51A(a) of the Constitution, to respect
its ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem. Standing during the national anthem
does not necessarily mean respect for the national anthem. Nor does sitting during the anthem mean
disrespect or qualify as a crime. What qualifies as crime is a willful act committed to insult the National
Anthem.

Section 3 of the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 (as amended in 2005) does not dictate
whether a person should sit or stand when the anthem is playing or sung.

Section 2 of the Insults Act leaves nothing to imagination when it specifies what constitutes an insult to
the national flag and the Constitution. These include public acts of burning, mutilating, defacing, defiling,
disfiguring, destroying, trampling upon the National Flag or the Constitution.

However, various judgments show that the courts have always taken into consideration the diverse faiths
and beliefs practised by citizens.

The 1986 Supreme Court judgment in Bijoe Emmanuel vs. State of Kerala dealing with the expulsion of
three children who belonged to the Jehovahs Witnesses sect, for refusing to sing the national anthem in
school, said this was contrary to fundamental rights of free speech and freedom to practise their religion.

Conclusion: The Constitution of India and the Apex Court have upheld the freedom of a person and have
respected the beliefs a person has in their respective religions and in order to show its complete secular

nature has exempted people from singing the national anthem if it hurts their religion but standing for the
national anthem is respect enough.

Cohabitation for a long period of time is sufficient to prove marriage. Do you agree with this
statement? Please justify your answer with the following.
.
NAME OF THE CASE: Pyla Mutyalamma @ Satyavathi v. Pyla Suri Demudu and Anr.
NAME OF THE JUDGES: H.S. Bedi and Gyan Sudha Mishra J

ISSUES: Whether the wife is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CRPC for the sole reason that
"law leans in favour of legitimacy and frowns upon a live-in relationship?
RULES: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 125; Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 494
Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.
(1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain(a) His wife, unable to maintain herself, or
(b) His legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or
his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such
child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or
(d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon
proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of
his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the
whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time
to time direct: Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in

clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the
husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means. Explanation.- For the
purposes of this Chapter,(a) " minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875 ); is
deemed not to have attained his majority;
(b) " wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and
has not remarried.
ANALYSIS: The law also presumes in favour of marriage and against concubinage when a man and
woman have cohabited continuously for a long number of years and when the man and woman are proved
to have lived together as man and wife, the law will presume, unless the contrary is clearly proved, that
they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of concubine. Several
judicial pronouncements right from the Privy Council up to this stage, have considered the scope of the
presumption that could be drawn as to the relationship of marriage between two persons living together.
Section 125, C.R.P.C. proceeds on de facto marriage and not marriage de jure e. Thus, validity of the
marriage will not be a ground for refusal of maintenance if other requirements of Section 125 Cr.P.C. are
fulfilled. It was still further laid down in the case of Sethu Rathinam vs. Barbara8 that if there was
affirmative evidence on the aforesaid points, the Magistrate would not enter into complicated questions of
law as to the validity of the marriage according to the sacrament element or personal law and the like,
which are questions for determination by the civil court. If the evidence led in a proceeding under Section
125 C.R.P.C. raises a presumption that the applicant was the wife of the respondent, it would be sufficient
for the Magistrate to pass an order granting maintenance under the proceeding.
CONCLUSION: The court held that the partner was entitled to maintenance under Section 125
irrespective of the fact whether she was married or not. The fact that they stayed together for a sufficient
period would amount to marriage and thus, maintenance