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Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No.

127255, August 14, 1997 Facts:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisionsof the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are
members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners claimare constitutionally-mandated
so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of theConstitution.The law
originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certainamendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the
bill. The bicameral committee submitted itsreport to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved toadjourn for
lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a
quorum. Theinterpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation
of the sponsor of the committeereport, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conferencecommittee report. The Chair called
out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared:There being none,
approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo
wasasking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously.Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to
the Majority Leaders motion, the approvalof the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair.On the same day, the
bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
thePresident of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress. Theenrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject torevocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
havethe effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where
the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of
the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial
incharacter. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private
rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, insteadof seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to the Court.The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House with which theCourt should not be concerned. The
claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyosearlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call establishedthe existence of a quorum. The question
of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when thequorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)En
Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate concurring opinions to
which 4 concur, 2 wrote concurringand dissenting separate opinions to which
2 concur.Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous House Impeachment
Rules approved by the 11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee
onJustice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by theChief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President
Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred tothe House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13
October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform,"
but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. Four months and threeweeks since the filing of the first complaint
or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by HouseRepresentatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated
by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by
at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.Various
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
isunconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against

the same official more than once within a period of one year." Issue: Whether
the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings.Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the
judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987
Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of
powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courtsas a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the
court to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with thecorollary principle of
separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that itsvast powers are utilized only for the benefit of
the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is afundamental
principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division inour Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and
issupreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.
TheConstitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances
to secure coordination in the workings of thevarious departments of the
government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power
to determine the law, and hence to declareexecutive and legislative acts void
if violative of the Constitution.The major difference between the judicial
power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court
isthat while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are
also glaring distinctions between the U.S.