Pp vs.

Julaide Siyoh

2/18/1986

FACTS: Julaide Siyoh and Omarkyam Kiram, together with Namli Indanan
and Andaw Jamahali were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and
frustrated murder. On July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his
friends who were also travelling merchants like him (Danilo Hiolen. Rodolfo
de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman) were on their way to Pilas Island,
Province of Basilan, to sell goods they received from Alberto Aurea. They
left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took
their dinner and slept thatnight in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas
Island. Who also helped them from selling their goods to different Islands
near Pilas. Before the incident happened, Antonio, the lone survivor saw
that Kiram was talking with another two persons that he can only recognize
in their faces somewhere near the house where they were selling the goods.
On July 14, 1979, When they were heading back to Pilas Island from BalukBaluk Island through riding apumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at
the front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island,
Antonio de Guzman saw another pump boat painted red and green about
200meters away from their pump boat Shortly after" Kiram turned off the
engine of their pump boat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the
other pump boat as it moved towards them. There were two persons on the
other pump boat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized
them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at
Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope
to the other pump boat which towed de Guzman'spumpboat towards Mataja
Island. On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his
companions were divested of their money andtheir goods by Kiram.
Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to
undress.Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on.>
With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After
that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de
Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming
away from the pump boat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him,
injuring his back. But he was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till
nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodiesof Anastacio
de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a
fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where

he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano
Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province. On July 15, 1979, while
waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw
Siyohand Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested
before they could run. When arrested,Kiram was wearing the pants he
took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at
theProvincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram
SSUE: WoN the respondent-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANTS1.Since it was contested by appellants that
there guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt sincethe prosecution
did not present evidence that the accused were also the one who killed
Anastaciode Guzman because his remains are never recovered.2.The
Credibility of the Witnesssince only 1 witness was presented 3 Appellants
claim (Siyoh and Kiram) that they were not the assailants but also the
victimHELD: They were said to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified piracy with triple murder andfrustrated homicideRATIONALE
1. Number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy, not material; Piracy, a
special complex crimepunishable by deathbut the number of persons
killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. PD532 considers qualified
piracy as a special complex crime punishable by death. Therefore, the
guiltof respondent were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. There was no other evidence presented on why should the lone survivor
tell lies and fabricate storyas to apprehend the accused.
3. Appellants claim that they were not the assailants but also the victim and
that the two persons theyhave identified (Namli Indanan and Andaw
Jamahali) is baseless as view in the proven conspiracyamong the accused.
The Conspiracy was established through the testimony of the lone
witnessand survivor- De Guzman.
US vs. Braganza

02/03/1908

ARBITRARY DETENTION; PENAL CODE. A public functionary who, except

by reason of a crime, detains a person without authority of law or of general

regulations in force in the Islands, is punishable under article 200 of the

Penal Code as for an act of arbitrary detention.
DECISION
We take the same view of this case as to the guilt of the defendants as that
taken by the Attorney-General. He says in his brief:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 200 of the Penal Code reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The public official who, unless it be by reason of a crime, should detain a
person without being authorized to do so by a law, or by regulations of a
general character in force in the Philippines, shall incur the penalty of a fine
of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas if the detention should not have exceeded
three
(3)
days;
.
.
."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
"At the time when the crime herein was committed the accused were
municipal officials, Hilario Braganza being then a councilor of the
municipality of Sagay and Martin Salibio a lieutenant of the barrio of Vito in
said municipality; therefore, they were public officers . . .
"There is no doubt as to the accused having detained Father Feliciano
Gomez, inasmuch as, according to the evidence, they themselves seized
him within the church and took him out of it, telling him that he was under
arrest; they made him pass through the door of the vestry and afterwards
took him to the municipal building and there told him that he was under
arrest . . . he accused detained Father Gomez, not by reason of a crime but
arbitrarily. He had committed no crime, rather on the contrary, he was the
victim of coercion and other outrages. As a priest of the Roman Church, and
the question herein referring also to a Roman church which he is alleged to
be in possession of, he went there to say mass, but a group of Aglipayano
women violently prevented him from carrying out his purpose. No law or
regulation of a general character in force authorizes the accused to commit
the act which they committed . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, without taking into
consideration, however article 11 of the Penal Code as an extenuating
circumstance. So ordered.

US vs. Agravante

01/28/1908

1. ARBITRARY DETENTION. A public officer or agent of the authorities who

detains a person without lawful reason, no crime having been committed
nor a judicial warrant issued therefor, is guilty of arbitrary detention and
incurs, according to the case, the penalties imposed by article 200 of the
Penal Code.
DECISION
At about 10 p. m. on the 13th of January, 1906, Marcelino Acupan and
Apolinario Camacho, members of the Constabulary detachment stationed at
Bacolod, the capital of Occidental Negros, tried to enter the Rizal Theater,
where an acrobatic performance was going on, without the necessary
admission ticket; as Vicente Ibaez, the doorkeeper of the theater, refused
to let them in, Camacho pulled him by the hand and Acupan struck him a
blow and invited him to come out to the street where he would break his
bones.
On account of the scandal created, the chief of the municipal police,
Fortunato Vadlit, who was standing by, approached to inquire what had
taken place; at this moment Simeon Agravante, another member of the
Constabulary, carrying a gun, appeared and wanted to take Ibaez to the
cuartel, but he did not succeed in doing so because the doorkeeper stated
that the performance was not yet over; Agravante then went away, but
shortly thereafter another Constabulary private, also carrying a gun, made
his appearance and compelled Ibaez to follow him to the cuartel. At the
request of Ibaez, Vadlit, the chief of police accompanied him, and when
they reached the cuartel Agravante asked Ibaez what complaint he had to
make, to which the latter replied that Acupan had struck him with his fist;
Agravante then maltreated Ibaez and ordered another private to take the
man away and lock him up; Ibaez and Vadlit objected to the order because
there was no reason therefor, thereupon Corporal Agravante ordered that
the chief of police be locked up also; the order was obeyed by some of the
soldiers who pushed Ibaez and Vadlit in to the jail, where they remained
for about an hour until sergeant Leandro Garguena was informed of the
occurrence, whereupon the latter ordered their release. Ibaez and Vadlit
were subsequently taken to the house of Lieutenant Caswell, but the latter,

being ill, was unable to investigate the matter. On that night the chief of
police,
Vadlit,
was
not
in
uniform.
A complaint was filed on the 14th of March 1906, charging Sixto Chaves,
Simeon Agravante, Apolinario Camacho, and Marcelino Acupan with the
crimes of illegal detention, lesiones, and attempt against an agent of the
authorities. The corresponding proceedings were instituted, and the judge
rendered judgment on the 3d of May, 1906, sentencing Simeon Agravante,
for the crime of arbitrary detention, to pay a fine of 500 pesetas and onefourth of the costs, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in the payment of the fine; Marcelino Acupan was sentenced for
maltrato de obra to the penalty of five days of arresto menor and one-fourth
of the costs; Sixto Chaves and Apolinario Camacho were acquitted with the
remainder of the costs de oficio. From the above judgment the accused
Agravante
appealed.
From the evidence adduced at the trial of this case it appears that the crime
of arbitrary detention, included in case No. 1 of article 200 of the Penal
Code, was committed, inasmuch as, from the facts stated, it appears that
on the night of January 13, 1906, Vicente Ibaez, doorkeeper at the Rizal
Circus, situated at the capital of Occidental Negros, was maltreated by
Marcelino Acupan, a constabulary soldier, for which reason, when Ibaez
was conducted to the cuartel by another, Fortunato Vadlit, the chief of the
municipal police accompanied him to the door of the cuartel when the
latter, together with Ibaez, was locked up in the jail by the accused,
Simeon Agravante, a corporal of Constabulary; the detention lasted for
about an hour. They were then released by sergeant Leandro Garguea,
when he became aware that there was no legal reason for the detention,
because the chief of police, Vadlit, had taken no part in the quarrel at the
gate when Ibaez was maltreated by Acupan; he merely approached the
place of the incident in order to find out what had occurred, and, at the
request of Ibaez, accompanied him to the cuartel for the purpose of
assisting
in
the
investigation
of
the
matter.
The accused, Agravante, the only one who appealed from the judgment of
the court below, pleaded not guilty, but confessed to having detained both

Ibaez and the chief of police, Fortunato Vadlit, because the latter was
drunk and wanted to force an entrance to the cuartel to make an
investigation. However, in view of the preponderance of evidence offered by
the prosecution in favor of the statements made by Vadlit, the allegations of
the accused can not be taken as proven; rather, to the contrary. It has been
shown that by reason of the remarks made by Vadlit to Agravante when
Ibaez was detained, Vadlit was arrested; therefore, it is unquestionable
that the conduct of the accused was arbitrary, and illegal in ordering the
detention of the chief of police, because there was no legal reason for it.
In the commission of the crime of arbitrary detention no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance was present, and in view of the fact that the
offended parties only remained about an hour in confinement, the penalty
to be imposed is that prescribed in case No. 1 of said article 200, a fine, in
the application of which the provisions of article 83 of the Penal Code should
be taken into account. Therefore, the judgment appealed from should be
affirmed as to the appellant, even if circumstance No. 8 of Article 9, referred
to in the decision of the court below, is not considered, inasmuch as the fact
mentioned therein, that Corporal Agravante thought he had authority to
detain the chief of the municipal police for trying to investigate what had
taken place, does not constitute the circumstance No. 8 of article 9 of the
Penal
Code
alluded
to.
It is of record that, on the night in question, Fortunato Vadlit was not in
uniform of chief of police; hence he was not qualified to exercise his office
and make himself known as such chief of police, and for this reason the
crime of attempt against an agent of authorities could not have been
committed. It should further be considered that without an order from
competent authority he could not have made an investigation in the cuartel
of Constabulary; he should have reported the matter to the municipal
president or to the commanding officer, and then what afterwards took
place
might
have
been
avoided.
For the reasons above set forth it is our opinion that the judgment appealed
from, whereby Simeon Agravante is sentenced to pay a fine of 500 pesetas,
and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with one-fourth

of the costs, should be affirmed, all costs as to this second instance to be

also charged against him. So ordered.
People vs. Amado Hernandez

1956

Thus, the petition for bail was granted. On May 30, 1964, the Supreme
Court acquitted Hernandez (People v. Hernandez (1964)).
Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Omar U. Amin

09/13/1990

Facts: It was the height of the Government action against communists and
the Hukbalahap guerillas. President Elpidio Quirino, through his Defense
Secretary (and later, President) Ramon Magsaysay intensified the campaign
against them, and the crackdown was on against communist organizations.
Due to such government action, several communist leaders like Luis
Taruc and the Lava brothers were soon in government custody.

FACTS: An Information was filed against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile as having
committed REBELLION COMPLEXED WITH MURDER. Another (separate)
Information was filed against Enrile for violation of PD No. 1829. The second
Information was filed because Enrile allegedly harbored and concealed in
his house Ex. Lt. Col Gregorio Honasan, who was suspected of having
committed a crime.

On January 20, 1951, the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO)

headquarters was raided. Writer (and future National Artist for
Literature) Amado V. Hernandez, himself a labor leader, was arrested on
January 26 for various rebellious activities with the CLO. Upon his arrest, he
was charged in the criminal information of Rebellion with Murder, Arson
and Robbery. Five years after his arrest, Hernandez asked for bail with the
court where his case was pending, but was denied on the basis of the
nature of the offense (if the crime was complexed, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed). Thus, he filed a petition to the Supreme
Court.

- Allegations: (take note of the date)

Issue: The government, headed by Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla,

argued that the gravity of the crime committed required the denial of the
bail. Moreover, the complex crime charged by the government against
Hernandez has been successfully imposed with other arrested communist
leaders and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

b) PD No. 1829 case: Petitioner entertained and accommodated Col.

Honasan by giving him
food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his
house.

Held: The Supreme Court, through then Associate Justice Roberto

Concepcion, ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with other crimes,
such as murder and arson. Rebellion in itself would include and absorb the
said crimes, thus granting the accused his right to bail. Murder and arson
are crimes inherent and concomitant when rebellion is taking place.
Rebellion in the Revised Penal Code constitutes one single crime and that
there is no reason to complex it with other crimes. As basis, the Court cited
several cases convicting the defendants of simple rebellion although they
killed several persons.

a) rebellion case: Fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some

100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the
residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. On or
about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by
about 100 fully armed rebel
soldiers wearing white armed patches.
(Based on this, the prosecution concluded that Enrile and Honasan were coconspirators in the failed December coup.)

- On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in

abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal
determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case
and expunge the information from the record.
- On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge
of respondent Judge Omar Amin, DENIED Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion.
Enrile filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss but this was
also denied.
- Enrile appealed to the SC on certiorari. Among his arguments were:

a) The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan

in a supposed meeting on
1 December 1989 is ABSORBED IN, OR IS A
COMPONENT ELEMENT OF, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged
against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the
basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;

- Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of

harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the
crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by
the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held
in People v. Hernandez, supra:

b) The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only

one prosecution for all the
component acts of rebellion;

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the

political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to
achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the
intent or motive.

- Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829.

ARGUMENT: PD No. 1829 involves a special law while rebellion is
based on the Revised Penal
Code or a general law.
ISSUE: WoN Enrile could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
HELD: NO! The violation of PD No. 1829 is ABSORBED in the crime of
rebellion.
- The SC cited People v. Hernandez in stating the long-standing proscription
against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to
separate prosecutions.
- If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the
greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two
(2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or
committed in furtherance of rebellion.
- As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion
charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to the charge
of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department
of Justice resolution there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with
murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and
independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100
other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements
is readily apparent.

- The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast

movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Jurisprudence
tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in
themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. In
this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.
- Re: argument of Judge Amin that PD No. 1829 is a special law and rebellion
is under RPC/general law: All crimes, whether punishable under a special
law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves.
- Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed
in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence
such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised
Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however,
constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not
confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws
which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
- The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce
Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with
murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It
cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder.

- As earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator

Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed
Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate,
the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed
with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it
should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being
punished separately.
DISPOSITIVE:
- Petition GRANTED. Information is QUASHED.
Francisco R. Cario vs. People of the Phil., et al.
This is an appeal by way of certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 18, 1958 in the above entitled case, affirming the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused
Francisco Cario guilty as accomplice in the crime of rebellion, and
sentencing him to suffer two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prison correccional and to pay a fine in the sum of P2,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In an information dated April 28, 1952, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the accused was charged with the crime of rebellion with murders,
arsons, robberies and kidnappings, for having, as a high ranking officer
and/or member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and of the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps
(Huks), agreed in conspiracy with 31 others who were charged with the
same crime in other criminal cases then pending in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government and
disrupting its activities.
The specific acts of rebellion which the accused is alleged to have
committed in conspiracy with other members of the Communist Party,
between the period from May 6, 1946 to September 12, 1950, are:
1. The ambush on May 6, 1946 of the 10th MPC Company in Barrio Sta.
Monica, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija; resulting in the death of 10 enlisted men;
2. The raid on August 6, 1946 of the Municipal Building of Majayjay, Laguna;

3. The ambush on April 10, 1947 of 14 enlisted men in Barrio San Miguel na
Munti, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, during which Lt. Pablo Cruz and Pvt. Santiago
Mercado were killed;
4. The raid on the poblacion of Laur, Nueva Ecija, of May 9, 1947;
5. The ambush on August 19, 1947 of a detachment of the 155th Co., in San
Miguel, Bulacan, killing two officers thereof;
6. The raid on Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, of June 1946;
7. The ambush on April 25, 1947 of Mrs. Aurora Aragon Quezon and party at
Barrio Salubsub, Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, resulting in the death of said Mrs.
Quezon and other members of her party;
8. The raid on Camp Macabulos, Tarlac, Tarlac, of August 25, 1950;
9. The raid on Sta. Cruz, Laguna, of August 26, 1950;
10. The raid on Arayat, Pampanga, of August 25, 1950;
11. The seizure on September 12, 1950 of an army scout car in Barrio
Mapalad, Arayat, Pampanga and the murder of two TPs on the said
occasion;
12. The attack on the headquarters of a PC detachment of March 28, 1950,
at Montalban, Rizal; and
13. The raid on San Pablo, Laguna, of March 29, 1950, resulting in the death
of Major Alikbusan of the government armed forces.
Although the defendant-appellant expressly admitted the truth of the
allegations of the commission of robberies, murders, arsons, kidnappings,
etc., in the manner and from alleged and on the dates stated in the
information, he vigorously denied any participation therein.
It appears from the evidence, as found by the Court of Appeals, that the
accused is a close friend of Dr. Jesus Lava (a top leader of the Communists
and a wanted man with a price on his head) who was his classmate in the
high school, and who later on became the godfather of the first child of the
accused. Appellant's wife and children were treated successfully by Dr. Lava
in 1939 and 1943 for various illnesses free of charge, and appellant
believed that his wife and children owe their lives to Dr. Lava. One night in
the year 1946, Dr. Lava arrived in the house of the accused asking for
shelter, stating that he was being persecuted by certain politicians from
Bulacan, on suspicion that he had something to do with the killing of Mayor
Roxas of Bulacan, Bulacan. Appellant gave Lava accommodation for the
night, and early the following morning Lava left. The next time that the
appellant heard from Lava was in May, 1949, when he received a note from

the latter asking for some cigarettes, powdered milk and canned goods. The
note was brought by a boy of 12 or 15 years, named Totoy, and through him
the accused sent the needed supplies. Thereafter, every now and then, the
same boy brought to appellant similar notes from Dr. Lava, requesting for
food and supplies, which the accused furnished in as small amounts as he
could send.
In the first note of Dr. Lava, appellant was instructed to sign "Turko" all
notes to be sent by him to the former and to address them to "Pinang" in
order to conceal their respective identities. This exchange of notes between
them and the furnishing of supplies and foodstuffs by appellant to Dr. Lava
lasted from 1949 until April, 1952, when the accused was arrested and
detained.
The Court of Appeals also found that appellant, as a ranking employee of
the National City Bank of New York, was approached by a prominent
member of a special unit of the Communist Party, entrusted with the
carrying out of raids, hold-ups, etc. for the purpose of raising funds, and
through his assistance the amount of $6,000, part of the proceeds or loot of
said special unit, was changed into pesos and then delivered to the
treasurer of the communists; that appellant also assisted on or about
October 12, 1950, two top-level communists in opening current accounts in
the National City Bank of New York although their initial deposit was below
P2,000, the minimum required by the bank. (However it was not shown that
the persons helped were known by appellant to be communists and the
funds intended to carry out the rebellion.)
Sometime in 1949, appellant was present at a banquet given by the
Communists in honor of Amado V. Hernandez, one of the supposed top-level
members of the organization, on which occasion he was introduced as a
communist to Florentino Diolata, who posed as a communist but who, in
reality, was a person secretly planted by the Constabulary as a spy; that
while being introduced the accused stated that he was at the command of
his comrades for any assistance for the advancement and promotion of
their common purpose.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice

to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices, thus:
ART. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are those persons who, not being
included in article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous
or simultaneous acts.
In the case of People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, 49, we held as an essential
condition to the existence of complicity that there be not only a relation
between the acts done by the principal and these attributed to the person
charged as an accomplice, but that the latter, with knowledge of the
criminal intent, cooperated with the intention of supplying material or moral
aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.
So that there are two elements required, in accordance with the definition of
the term accomplice given in the Penal Code, in order that a person may be
considered an accomplice to a criminal act, namely, that he take part in the
execution of the crime by previous and simultaneous acts and that he
intend by said acts to commit or take part in the execution of the crime.
The crime of rebellion or insurrection has been defined as follows:
ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection How committed. The crime of
rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to
said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any
part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any
of their powers, or prerogatives. (Revised Penal Code)
In the case at bar the appellant did not take up arms against the
Government. Neither was he a member of the Hukbalahap organization.
The Court of Appeals also found that he did not openly take part in the
commission of the crime above defined by any other act without which said
crime would not have been committed. (Decision, p. 7) Said the Court of
Appeals:

There is no clear and conclusive evidence that the accused is a member of

the Communist Party or of its sister organization, the 'Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan', but there can be no doubt that he is a sympathizer
of the communists and helped them by giving supplies to Dr. Jesus Lava,
and by sending notes to him, knowing that he is a top-level communist with
a high price on his head. And not only that. The accused also helped a toplevel communist in changing six thousand dollars ($6,000) into pesos in the
National City Bank of New York, of which he was a ranking official with the
designation of Pro Manager. He also introduced to the bank two top-level
communists and helped them in opening checking accounts in the bank
where they deposited money used in the activities of the Communist Party.
By extending such help to well-known members of the Communist Party and
knowing that the avowed purpose of said party is to overthrow the
government, the accused, by means of overt acts gave them aid, comfort,
and assistance, and indirectly helped them in their fight against the
Government. Of course the accused did not take direct participation in the
acts alleged in the information, nor did he directly force or induce the
communists to commit such acts; neither did he openly take part in the
commission of the acts of rebellion by another act without which the act of
rebellion would not have been accomplished. However, the acts done by
him as above stated constitute acts of cooperation with the communists in
their primordial purpose of overthrowing the government, and such acts
naturally have contributed to some extent in the advancement and
promotion of their purpose. By such cooperation knowingly extended by
him, he is liable as an accomplice in the crime of rebellion as found by the
trial court.
We cannot agree to the above conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
above-mentioned acts of appellant constitute acts of cooperation in the
execution of the act of overthrowing the government. If appellant's acts
may be considered an indirect help or aid in the rebellion, which we
positively doubt, the same cannot constitute previous or simultaneous acts
of uprising or rebellion. In the crime of treason any act of giving comfort or
moralaid may be criminal, but such is not the case with rebellion or
insurrection where the Code expressly declares that there must be a public
uprising and the taking up of arms in rebellion or insurrection. The act of

sending or furnishing cigarettes and food supplies to a famous Huk does not
prove intention to help him in committing rebellion or insurrection. Neither
is the act of having $6,000 changed to Philippine money or in helping Huks
to open accounts, by themselves show an intent or desire to participate or
help in an uprising or rebellion. Appellant's work was as a public relations
officer of the bank of which he was an employee, and the work above
indicated performed by him was a part of his functions as an employee of
the bank. These acts by themselves do not and cannot carry or prove any
criminal intent of helping the Huks in committing the crime of insurrection
or rebellion. The law is to the effect that good faith is to be presumed. No
presumption of the existence of a criminal intent can arise from the above
acts which are in themselves legitimate and legal. Said acts are by law
presumed to be innocent acts while the opposite has not been proved.
But granting, for the sake of argument, that appellant had the criminal
intent of aiding the communists in their unlawful designs to overthrow the
Government, the assistance thus extended by him may not be considered
efficacious enough to help in the successful prosecution of the crime of
insurrection or rebellion so as to make him an accomplice therein. (People
vs. Tamayo, supra.) We, therefore, find that the supposed acts found by the
Court of Appeals to have been committed by the appellant do not
necessarily and legitimately lead to the conclusion that he performed said
acts precisely with the criminal intent of helping in the execution or the
carrying out of the rebellion or insurrection.
For the foregoing considerations, we declare that the guilt of appellant as
an accomplice in the crime of rebellion or insurrection as charged in the
information has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, his supposed
acts not having been shown to be acts of direct cooperation in the
execution of the crime, nor have they been introduced by a criminal intent,
nor were they shown to be sufficiently efficacious to make appellant guilty
as accomplice in the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
appellant absolved from the charge contained in the information. With
costs de officio.
Arthur Medina y Yumul, vs. Marcelo F. Orozco, Jr.

12/22/1966

On application for habeas corpus. The facts are: At about 12:00 p.m. on
November 7, 1965, petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul was arrested and
thereafter incarcerated in the Caloocan City jail, allegedly as one of those
responsible for the death of one Marcelo Sangalang y Diwa which occurred
on October 31, 1965 in said city. At about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of the
same day, November 7, 1965, the case against Medina and two others for
Sangalang's murder was referred to a fiscal, who forthwith conducted a
preliminary investigation in petitioner's presence. At about 3:40 p.m. on
November 10, 1965, an information for murder was filed against petitioner
Arthur Medina y Yumul, and Antonio Olivar y Flores and Alexander Enriquez
y Raginio in the Caloocan branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
docketed as Criminal Case No. C-1197 of said court. By court order, they
were promptly committed to jail. Arraigned, Medina and his co-accused
stood trial which has not yet terminated.
1. First to be considered is the charge of arbitrary detention. Petitioner
claims violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime for
which petitioner is detained is murder, a capital offense. The arresting
officer's duty under the law1 was either to deliver him to the proper judicial
authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is
that he was not released. From the time of petitioner's arrest at 12:00
o'clock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the
information against him for murder actually was in court, over 75 hours
have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday;
November 8 was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election
day) was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an
easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the
information and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the
clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of
commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the certainty of
locating those officers and employees could very well compound the fiscal's
difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from
declaring that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought
to court on the very first office day following arrest.2

2. Nor could discharge from custody, by now, be justified even on the

assumption that detention was originally arbitrary.
Petitioner at present is jailed because of the court's order of commitment of
November 10, 1965 upon a murder indictment. No bail was provided for
him, because he is charged with a capital offense. Such detention remains
unaffected by the alleged previous arbitrary detention. Because, detention
under a valid information is one thing, arbitrary detention anterior thereto
another. They are separate concepts. Simply because at the inception
detention was wrong is no reason for letting petitioner go scot-free after the
serious charge of murder has been clamped upon him and his detention
ordered by the court. The first is illegal; but the second is not.3 Thus, the
petition for habeas corpus came too late.4
3. As unavailing is petitioner's claim that no preliminary investigation was
conducted by the fiscal before the criminal charge against him was
registered in court. Other than that averment in the petition herein,
petitioner has nothing whatsoever to show for it. Upon the other hand, the
assertion that such investigation was made on the very day of petitioner's
arrest and in his presence, is confirmed by the fact that on November 12,
1965 he moved the office of the city fiscal for a reinvestigation of his case.
And that reinvestigation was held on December 1, 1965. Thereafter, the
case against him proceeded to trial. Add to all of these the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties,5 and the
question of lack of preliminary investigation is well nailed down.
4. Besides, the proper forum before which absence of preliminary
investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this
Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the
regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is
frequently waived.6 These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court,
not an appellate court.
5. The cry of deprivation of a speedy trial merits but scant consideration.
The arraignment of petitioner set for December 1, 1965 was postponed to
December 20, 1965, thence to February 28, 1966, to March 14, 1966, all on
petition of counsel for the accused, including petitioner. Then, on April 14,

1966, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the date of hearing on the merits.
And again, the hearing scheduled on July 26, 1966 was transferred to
September 6, 1966 on motion of defendant Alexander Enriquez with the
conformity of petitioner's counsel. Finally, on motion of petitioner's counsel,
the hearing on September 6, 1966 was recalendared for December 6, 1966.
In this factual environment, we do not see denial to petitioner of the right to
speedy trial. Delay of his own making cannot be oppressive to him.7
For the reasons given, the petition herein to set petitioner Arthur Medina y
Yumul at liberty is hereby denied. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Melencio Sayo, et al. vs. Chief of Police, et al. 05/12/1948
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having
committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City
of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a
complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948,
when the petition for habeas corpusfiled with this Court was heard, the
petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet
released or filed against them an information with the proper courts justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a
sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum in Manila, And it had to be
transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for
deliberation and decision. We have not until now an official information as
to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by
the Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever night have been the
action taken by said office, if there was any, we have to decide this case in
order to lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for the
information and guidance in the future of the officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to
decide whether or not the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their
liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within
the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided
in the next proceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or

employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail
to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of
six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted
article, the precept of our Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and
the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are
of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article,
mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial
power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged
with having committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article
202 of the old Penal Code formerly in force of these Islands, which penalized
a public officer other than a judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall
arrest a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person
to the judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was
no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to was the judge of a
court of justice empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to order the
temporary commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the
city fiscals or any other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so.
Because article 204, which complements said section 202, of the same
Code provided that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and medium
degrees shall be imposed upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer
who, within the period prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal
procedure in force, shall fail to release any prisoner under arrest or to
commit such prisoner formally by written order containing a statement of
the grounds upon which the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code
has not been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code the import of said
words judicial authority or officer can not be construed as having been
modified by the mere omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons...against unreasonable seizure

shall not be violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement]

shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
the examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness
he may produce." Under this constitutional precept no person may be
deprived of his liberty, except by warrant of arrest or commitment issued
upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant and
his witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a
public officers must be surrendered can not be any other but court or judge
who alone is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or provisional
detention of the person arrested pending the trial of the case against the
latter. Without such warrant of commitment, the detention of the person
arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our
Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court,
which, referring to the duty of an officer after arrest without warrant,
provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall, without
unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal
Code, take the person arrested to the proper court orjudge for such action
for they may deem proper to take;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which
reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to the Court,
he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He
shall also informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence
presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses
or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the
witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be
taken in writing and subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102
of the Rules of Court. According to the provision of said section, "a writ
of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if
it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue
of a judgement or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order, the

writ shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise,
the writ shall be allowed and the person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code
can not be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other
city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or
temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of
a person arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan,
40 Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on
January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation which the city of
fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided
for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with
offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled,
but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing
the corresponding information against the defendant with the proper
municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result of the
investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a
warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by a law as a substitute, in
a certain sense, of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent
a hasty or malicious prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses
triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper
preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary
investigation in case of temporary absence of both the justice of the peace
and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality, town or place,
are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a
warrant of arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with
section 6, Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary
investigation which a city fiscal may conduct under section 2, Rule 108, is
the investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an
offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court
or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter
do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint
must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or

through one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for the purpose
of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper court the
necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation
so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or
commitment of the accused.

than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances,
such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to
make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be
taken into consideration.

When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the

officer or person making the arrest should, as abovestated, without
unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested, within the period
of time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having
jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section
17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if the
court has original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the
preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no
original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First
Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.

To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person
arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law
without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city
fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an
information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the
latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process
issued by a court or judge.

In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the
municipal court or the Court of First Instance, the officer or person making
the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the
city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and
file, if proper, the corresponding information within the time prescribed by
section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a
warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the accused. And
the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless
it is materially impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of the
person or officer making the arrest without warrant is in such cases ready
and available, and shall, immediately after the investigation, either release
the person arrested or file the corresponding information. If the city fiscal
has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having committed the
offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength of
the testimony or evidence presented, he should release and not detain the
person arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code,
without prejudice to making or continuing the investigation and filing
afterwards the proper information against him with the court, in order to
obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the purpose of
determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a

warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in
those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may
do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly
with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political
subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the
arrest even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability
that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a
fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person
charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other
persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the
responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the
petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the
absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had
complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners
within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have
ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually detained when the
said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold
that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their

release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a

process issued by a competent court of justice. So ordered.

from a native uway cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in 3

pieces of komiks paper.

United States vs. Catalina Silvano 09/06/1917

According to the accused, when the police arrived at her house, she saw
Sgt. Yte and PFC Jose Luciano. She invited Sgt. Yte to enter her house while
Luciano was left in the jeep that was parked near the house. While inside
the house Yte showed the accused something he claimed as
a searchwarrant, when someone coming from the kitchen uttered eto na
They proceeded to the kitchen and saw Luciano holding a plastic bag with
four other companions. They confronted the accused and insisted that the
bags belonged to her. Accused denied the accusation and told them that
she doesnt know anything about it. She was made to sign a
prepared document. She was brought to the police station and was
detained.

The defendant and appellant caused the death of her husband, Maximon
Catalong, by hitting him with a hammer. While this fact is principally
established by circumstancial evidence, this evidence is convincing and is
of such a nature as to be only consistent with the theory that the wife
committed the crime of parricide. We find no reason for interfering with the
findings of the trial court. (U. S. vs. Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil.
Rep., 295.)
Having in mind article 402 in connection with article 95 of the Penal Code,
the defendant and appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and to pay
the costs of both instances. The Attorney-General also recommends that the
defendant be ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of P1,000. If this was a case of first impression, the writer would hesitate to
fix this sum arbitrarily in a criminal prosecution and with no basis having
been laid in the trial, but having in mind the practice of the court, accedes
to the request without argument. So ordered.
People of the Philippines vs. Yolanda Gesmundo

03/9/1993

Facts: According to the prosecution, in the morning of Nov. 17, 1986, PO

Jose Luciano gave money and instructed his civilian informer to
buy marijuana from the accused at the Cocoland Hotel. He actually saw the
accused selling marijuana to his civilian informer and that same day Luciano
applied for a search warrant.
About 2pm that day, a police raiding team armed with a search warrant
went to the Brgy captain for them to be accompanied in serving the said
warrant at the residence of the accused. The police was allowed to enter
the house upon the strength of the warrant shown to the accused. The
accused begged the police not to search and to leave the house. The police
still searched the house and was led to the kitchen. She pointed a
metal basinon top of a table as the hiding place of died marijuana flowering
tops contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN. The police also recovered

The court renders judgment finding the accused guilty.

Issue: Whether or Not the evidence was properly obtained by the police.
Held: In the investigation report prepared by Luciano stated that during
the search they discovered a hole at the backyard of the house of the
suspect, there was a big biscuit can inside the hole and on top of the cover
a flower pot was placed wherein the marijuana was kept. However, there
was no mention of any marijuana obtained from a flower pot in any of their
testimonies. There were inconsistencies insofar the prosecution is
concerned, as to what was recovered and where, the trial court concluded
that these inconsistencies are trivial. There must sufficient evidence that
the marijuana was actually surrendered by the accused. As held in PP vs.
Remorosa, Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the guilt of appellant and his
culpability to the crime charged.
The claim that the marijuana was planted was strengthen as the police
violated sec 7, rule 126 rules of the court provides no search of a house,
room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is mandatory to

ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said

rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.
The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to the court as the
accused was not informed of her right not to sign the document neither was
she informed that she has the right to the assistance of a counsel and the
fact that it may be used as evidence against her. It was not proved that
the marijuana belonged to her. Not only does the law require the presence
of witnesses when the search is conducted, but it also imposes upon the
person making the search the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the
property seized. He is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the
judge who issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory
thereof duly verified under oath. Again, these duties are mandatory and are
required to preclude substitution of the items seized by interested parties.
The guilt of the accused was has not been established. Judgment is
reversed.
Florentino Gallego vs. People of the Phil
Topic: Judicial Notice
Facts: Florentino Gallego, in view of holding a religious meeting at the
public market without the required permit, was convicted of slight
disobedience of an agent of a person in authority. He however assailed the
decision of the court by contending that there is no proof of the existence of
an ordinance in force requiring a permit for the holding of a meeting; and
claims that it is error for the Court of Appeals to take judicial notice of
Ordinance No. 2, series of 1957 of Lambunao, Iloilo when the trial court
itself allegedly did not take cognizance of the ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not the Court may be prohibited in taking judicial notice
of an ordinance.
Ruling: No. There is nothing in the law that prohibits a court from taking
cognizance of a municipal ordinance. On the contrary, Section 5 of Rule 123
of the Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial notice of matters which
are capable of unquestionable demonstration. This is exactly what the Court

of Appeals did in this case in holding that "contrary to petitioner's

contention, there was an existing municipal ordinance at the time
(Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957) providing for a previous permit for the
holding of religious meeting in public places."
Besides, it is not true, that the trial court did not take notice of the
ordinance in question. For the lower court mentioned petitioner's "failure to
secure the necessary permit" with obvious reference to Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1957. In People vs. Gebune, 87 Phil. 727, it was held that courts
of first instance should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances within
their respective jurisdictions. It must be in compliance with this ruling that
the trial court took notice of said Ordinance.c
People of the Philippines vs. Jacob Quitorio

Jan 6, 1998

Accused-appellants were charged with rape with homicide in an amended

information filed on 16 April 1993 (and docketed as Criminal Case No. 129)
before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Eighth Judicial Region,
sitting in Dolores, Eastern Samar. The accusatory portion thereof read as
follows:
On September 6, 1992 at about 12:00 oclock midnight in Poblacion Dolores,
E. Samar and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused unlawfully conspired and helped one another and by means
of force and intimidation have [sic] carnal knowledge with one Elena
Dacutanan y Gabane and with the use of deadly weapons inflicted injuries
upon said victim which caused the death of the latter.
Contrary to law.
At the arraignment, each accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
The prosecution presented the following as its witnesses for its evidence in
chief: Benjamin Dongsal, Yolanda Caspe, Dr. Yolanda N. Bacsal of the
Dolores Community Hospital, Gil Sobremonte of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) of Dolores, Eastern Samar, and Rodrigo Gabane; while PNP
Investigator Albert Donceras testified on rebuttal.

On their part, accused-appellants took the witness stand and each raised
the defenses of denial and alibi. To corroborate their alibi, the following
were presented: Gregorio Bantilan, for accused-appellant Jayson Pomida;
Basilio Pomarejo, for accused-appellant Pacificador Campomanes; and Lito
Librella, for accused-appellant Jacob Quitorio.
Accused-appellants likewise presented Romeo Campomanes, then Chief of
Police of Dolores, Eastern Samar and the brother of accused-appellant
Pacificador Campomanes, Matilde Cardona, Mrs. Patricia Almazan, Artemio
Almasan and Engineer Agrifino Senubio.
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the prosecutions evidence, and
finding that the People established accused-appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, promulgated its decision2 on 14 July 1994, decreeing as
follows:
Accordingly, this court do [sic] hereby sentence [sic] accused Jacob Quitorio
and Jayson Pomida each to Two [terms of] Reclusion Perpetua and each to
an additional imprisonment [term] of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum.
If reclusion perpetua (though not synonimous [sic] [with] but distinct from
life imprisonment and an [being] indivisible penalty) is to be computed at
thirty (30) years, then the total penalty for each of the two accused, Jacob
Quitorio and Jayson Pomida would be as it is hereby ordered to be seventy
(70) years as minimum to seventy-seven (77) years and four (4) months, as
maximum.
The third accused, Pacificador Campomanes, who at the time of the
commission of the crime was only 16 years, 9 months and 9 days having
been born only on November 27, 1975, as evidenced by his Certificate of
Live Birth found on page 327 and Certification found on page 49 of the
records, is a Youthful Offender.
Considering therefore his age of about 17 years only at the time of the
commission of the crime, he shall be entitled to a penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law.

The law provides that: When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. (Last par. of Art. 335,
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 2638, approved June 18, 1960, and
RA 411, approved June 20, 1964).
However, in the case of People vs. Narit, G.R. No. 77087, May 23, 1991:
The Supreme Court considered the death penalty as no longer impossible
[sic] in consonance with the provision of Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution, hence, the death sentence imposed on the accused-appellant
has been automatically commuted to reclusion perpetua.
As a consequence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua which should have
been imposed on the third accused, Pacificador Campomanes, is hereby
reduced to one degree lower pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code. That is, to reclusion temporal or 12 years and 1 day to
10 years.
Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the accused Pacificador
Campomanes for one count and that is for himself alone is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10
years of prision mayor, as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
But having conspired with the other two accused, Jacob Quitorio and Jayson
Pomida in raping and killing the victim Elena Gabane, he is further
sentence[d] to two more [terms of] 10 years of prision mayor as minimum
to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal,as maximum.
The total penalty therefore of accused Pacificador Campomanes is thirty
(30) years, as minimum to fifty-two (52) years, as maximum.
This court further orders the three accused herein to indemnify joint and
several [sic] the heirs of the victim Elena Gabane, the sum of P50,000.00 as
actual damages for the death of the said victim; P75,000.00 as moral
damages; P25,000.00, as exemplary damages; P7,100.00 also representing
the total actual expenses in connection with the death of the victim Elena
Gabane; and to pay the cost [sic], also joint and several [sic], without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency .

The accused, Pacificador Campomanes was released on recognizance while

this case was still pending for preliminary investigation before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, but with his conviction his recognizance is hereby ordered
cancelled and without anymore force and effect. This accused, Pacificador
Campomanes therefore, should be, as it is hereby ordered detained until
this case is finally decided by the higher court, should there be an appeal by
the three accused herein within the 15-day reglamentary [sic] period for
appeal.

not able to see the face of the woman who was partly covered but she was
able to recognize the three men. The area was well lighted by the
fluorescent lamp in the street and by the moonlight. Pacificador
Campomanes was holding the woman by her left armpit while Jacob
Quitorio was supporting her by her right armpit. Jason Pomida was
destroying the wire fence of the school. Upon seeing her, Campomanes
beckoned to her. Afraid, Caspe ran way using a different route to her house.
(TSN, June 29, 1993, pp. 2-7).

xxx

The following morning, a woman, who turned out to be Elena Gabane, was
found dead in the grounds of the Dolores Elementary School. She was raped
and her body bore several fatal stab wounds. The report of Dr. Yolanda
Bacsal who conducted a post mortem of the cadaver, contained the
following findings:

After a careful perusal and scrutiny of the records of this case, the same is
wanting of an agreement signed by the three accused herein to the effect
that during their detention period, they will abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
So in the event this decision of conviction against the three accused herein
is affirmed on appeal, should they appeal, the three accused shall only be
entitled to four-fifth (4/5) of the time during which they have undergone
their preventive imprisonment, which commenced on November 3, 1992, as
evidenced by the Receipt of Detainee, found on page 46 of the records of
this case.
SO ORDERED.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General, as follows:
On September 6, 1992, Elena Gabane, a singer-guitarist of the United
Pentecostal Church of Dolores, Eastern Samar, told the family of Benjamin
Donsal, a brother pastor with whom Gabane had been staying, that she was
going home later that night to Cadayao, Jiabong, Samar. She was supposed
to ride the Roureyjay bus bound for Catbalogan which normally leaves at
midnight (TSN, Oct. 26, 1993, pp. 2-3).
At about midnight, Yolanda Caspe was on her way home from the house of
her friend Tilde, where they were having a drink. At the corner of Tegio St.
and the provincial road, she saw three male persons carrying or dragging a
woman with long hair and wearing a white jacket and short skirt. She was

CHEST: Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 13 cms depth, clean cut
edges, along the 3rd intercostal space, parasternal area, left, directed
downwardly, hitting the heart.
Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 5 cms depth, clean cut edges, along
the 5th intercostal space, parasternal area, left.
Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 5 cms depth, 3rd intercostal space,
clean cut edges, anterior axillary line, left.
Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 18 cms depth, clean cut edges, along
5th intercostal space, midclavicular line, left.
Stab wound, 3 cms longest diameter, 8 cms depth, clean cut edges, 2nd
intercostal space, midclavicular area, right.
Stab wound 3 cms longest diameter, 18 cms depth, clean cut edges, 4th
intercostal space, directed upwardly parasternal area, right.
Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 8 cms depth, clean cut edges, 4th
intercostal space midclavicular, right.
Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 3 cms depth, 4th intercostal space,
parasternal area, right.
GENETALIA: Right labia minora lacerated.
Vaginal canal, admits 2 fingers without difficulty.
Hymen lacerated at 6:00 oclock, 5:00 oclock. 12:00 oclock, compared to the
face of the clock, V-shape in appearance.
Caspe was able to identify the body of the victim as the same woman she
saw the night before in the company of the appellants because of her long

hair and attire. She easily identified the appellants in a line-up of ten men
(TSN, June 30, 1993, pp. 15, 22, 27-28).3crlwvirtualibrry

homicide, namely, that personally committed by him and that committed by

each of the other two accused.

The trial court convicted accused-appellants on the basis of the following

circumstantial evidence, which, when combined, sufficed to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:

Accused-appellants then seasonably interposed the instant appeal.

(1) The positive identification by prosecution witness Yolanda Caspe of

accused-appellants, i.e., from a distance of 15 to 20 meters, she clearly saw
Pacificador Campomanes holding the left arm of the victim by her armpit
and his right arm holding a weapon; Jacob Quitorio holding the victims right
arm and armpit; and Jayson Pomida destroying and making an opening near
the corner of the hog wire fence of the Dolores Elementary School, Dolores,
Eastern Samar.

In our resolution of 5 August 1996, we dismissed the appeal of accusedappellant Pacificador Campomanes for failure of his bondsmen to surrender
him, thereby failing to comply with the resolutions of 22 May 1995, 13
December 1995 and 6 March 1996. Judgment on the bond was thereafter
entered. This appeal then proceeds only insofar as accused-appellants Jacob
Quitorio and Jayson Pomida are concerned.
In their Appellants Brief, accused-appellants contend that the trial court
erred:

2) The finding of Dr. Yolanda N. Bacsal that the victim suffered eight (8)
serious and fatal wounds and was raped, possibly by more than one person;

I IN CONVICTING [THEM] OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE BASED

SOLELY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

3) The fact that on the morning of 7 September 1992, the police found,
within the premises of the Dolores Elementary School, the corpse of a
woman who was later identified as Elena Gabane, the victim;

II IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS

YOLANDA CASPE.

4) The admission of accused-appellant Jayson Pomida in his affidavit

(Exhibit 3-B) that he recognized the victim Elena Gabane as the woman
being carried allegedly by PFC Oscar Renomeron, Danilo Segubio and John
Doe on the night of September 6, 1992; and
5) The rebuttal testimony of Albert Donceras, PNP Investigator, that at the
PNP Headquarters in Borongan, Eastern Samar, prosecution witness Yolanda
Caspe pointed out Pacificador Campomanes and Jacob Quitorio as the ones
holding the left arm and the right arm, respectively, of the victim Elena
Gabane; and Jayson Pomida as the one destroying and making an opening
in the hog wire fence of the Dolores Elementary School; and that these
accused did not object after they were so pointed out.
The trial court further ruled that conspiracy among accused-appellants was
sufficiently established by their joint acts of carrying the victim and placing
her inside the school compound. In view thereof, the RTC held that each
accused-appellant was liable for three separate crimes of rape with

Accused-appellants discuss these assigned errors jointly and, in the main,

denounce the credibility of the testimony of Yolanda Caspe, thus:
Her testimony is unworthy of belief. She does not even know the family
name of Tilde whom she considers as her friend (TSN, p. 13, June 29, 1993).
She does not really know the actual time she went to Tildes house, the time
they started drinking and the time they finished drinking because she did
not have a time piece then (TSN, p. 5, June 30, 1993), and besides she does
not know how to tell the time and neither can she tell how long is one
minute or one hour (TSN, p. 8, Oct. 12, 1993). How was she able to tell that
they started drinking at 11:00 oclock and she went home at 12:00 oclock?
Was she coached to state that particular time in order that her testimony
will jibe with the testimony of Dr. Yolanda Bacsal, the doctor who conducted
the post mortem examination, that the victim died probably at 12:00 oclock
midnight or at about 12:30 oclock? (TSN, p. 12, July 28, 1993)
It is also quite intriguing that a woman, single at that (although she testified
on cross-examination that she had children, TSN, p. 8, Oct. 12, 1993) would

be out of her house for a drinking spree during such unholy hour when there
was even no occassion [sic] to celebrate (TSN, p. 6, June 30, 1993).

be credible in itself as when it conforms to the common experience and

observation of mankind. (People vs. Jalon, 215 SCRA 680).

Witness Yolanda Caspe went on to testify that on her way home, she saw, at
a distance of fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters, the three accused, namely,
Pacificador Campomanes, Jacob Quitorio, and Jayson Pomida. Accused
Pacificador Campomanes was holding the left arm of a woman, whom she
later came to know as Elena Gabane; accused Jacob Quitorio was holding
the right armpit of Elena Gabane; and accused Jayson Pomida was
destroying and making an opening at the wire fence of the Dolores
Elementary School. The three accused then tried to place the victim inside
the wire fence. The accused then noticed her presence and one of them,
Pacificador Campomanes in particular, beckoned her with a weapon and so
she took another street and ran home, took her supper and slept.

xxx

On cross-examination, she even described the attire of the victim (TSN, p.

27 & 28, JUn [sic] 30, 1993) and each of the accused as follows:
1. Accused Pacificador Campomanes was wearing white shorts, white
sando, and white hat;
2. Accused Jacob Quitorio was wearing maong pants, gray T-shirt the
sleeves of which were detached, and wearing slippers (tsenelas); and
3. Accused Jayson Pomida was in fatigue pants cut on the knee with
sleeveless white T-shirt. (TSN, p. 25, June 29, 1993)
The foregoing testimony is incredible. If said witness had in fact seen such
shocking incident where she herself was frightened by one of the accused,
it is so surprising that she could relate in detail not only each and every act
of the accused but even theirrespective attire. Is this not a [sic] proof of a
coached and rehearsed witness? Of a prevaricated story?
Furthermore, if the herein accused were the perpetrators of the crime
charged and had in fact noticed the presence of Yolanda Caspe, will it not
be more in harmony with human nature that herein accused would have
exerted every effort to eliminate the witness and not merely frighten her? In
this jurisdiction well-settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must
proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but the same must

Furthermore, the prosecution failed to rebut the testimony of Patricia

Almazan that there was no electric bulb at the area where the incident
happened. This is very material to the prosecution. Considering the time of
the incident which is 12:00 oclock midnight and the distance of the alleged
eyewitness from the place of the incident which is about 15 to 20 meters (or
even 30 meters, as declared on cross examination, TSN, p. 9 & 16, June 30,
1993) the illumination coming from the moonlight would not give the
witness a clear view of the incident much less of the identity of the accused.
The witness having also consumed two bottles of beer grande together with
her friend, the same surely affected her senses, particularly her vision. As
such, there is serious doubt on the identification made of accusedappellants as the culprits. It has been held that the identity of the offender
like the crime itself must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs.
Jalon, supra).
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges us to
affirm the challenged judgment as the guilt of accused-appellants was
proven beyond reasonable doubt; further, there is no reason to disturb the
findings and conclusion of the trial court as to the credibility of Yolanda
Caspe, who had no motive to falsely implicate accused-appellants. Although
there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of rape and the killing of
the victim, the OSG asserts that the following circumstantial evidence
clearly linked accused-appellants to the crime, viz:
(i) a body of the woman was found dead in the grounds of the Dolores
Elementary School; (ii) the body bore several fatal stab wounds and had
been sexually molested; (iii) there was no sign of struggle or blood (except
where she was lying) in the area where she was found, indicating she was
killed elsewhere; (iv) her death occurred at about midnight of September 6,
1992; (v) at about that time, she was seen by eyewitness Caspe in the
company of appellants in the vicinity of the school where her body was
found dead; (vi) appellants were carrying or holding the woman in a way
that created suspicion, as they were holding her by the armpits; (vi) [sic] in

the area where the victim was last seen alive near the corner of the school,
blood stains were found; and (vii) appellants were easily identified by Caspe
in a police line-up. All the foregoing circumstances, taken together, point to
appellants as the culprits.
A scrutiny of the evidence convinces us that accused-appellants deserve to
be acquitted, not necessarily because they did not commit the crime
charged, but in light of the prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and inability to overturn the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Constitution.4 In criminal cases, it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to establish its case with that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind,5 with evidence which stands or falls on
its own merits and which cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.6crlwvirtualibrry
Indeed, a conviction in this case could only have been had on the basis of
circumstantial evidence which, under Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court, is sufficient to convict provided the following are present:
1. There is more than one circumstance;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. The combination of the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence may be upheld only if the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person; i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of
guilty.7crlwvirtualibrry
In the instant case, we note that only the fact of the victims death was
sufficiently proven, as the evidence to prove the commission of rape is
weak. The presence of hymenal lacerations, as found by Dr. Yolanda Bacsal,
was not sufficiently shown to be due to the insertion of the male organ

under circumstances that would qualify as rape. In the first place, Dr. Bacsal
admitted that her examination of the victim was the first of this type she
conducted since becoming a doctor, and that her only basis for concluding
that the victim was raped was the presence of the hymenal lacerations. Yet,
Dr. Bacsal admitted that the mere presence of hymenal lacerations due to
sexual intercourse did not necessarily mean that the victim had been
raped.8 Likewise, the doctors qualification as an expert was unconvincing
as she could not even answer the questions as to her basis for stating that
it was possible that more than one person raped the victim; and as to the
period of time that had lapsed from the infliction of the lacerations until she
conducted the examination at 10:00 a.m. of 7 September 1992, thus:
Q What is then your basis in telling the court that the victim could have
been raped?
A There were lacerations at 6:00 oclock, 5:00 oclock to 12:00 oclock.
Q Since you became a doctor, this is your first of a medical case, am I
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q In other words, you have not yet examine any other victim who have
suffered the same thing as the victim in this case, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Your findings doctor under exhibit A-3 under the heading Genitalia says
that the vaginal canal admits 2 fingers without difficulty without resistance
and the hymen lacerated at 6:00 oclock, 5:00 oclock to 12:00 oclock,
compared to the face of the clock, and V-shape in appearance, according to
your testimony you said that the victim was raped, am I correct, doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q If a woman who suffers sexual intercourse with a man suffer hymenal
laceration without necessarily been rape?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is again your basis doctor in telling the court in your direct
testimony that it is possible that more than 3 or more than 1 person raped
the victim?
A (No answer).
Q Is it also possible that she was rape[d] by only one person?
A Yes it is possible.
Q You told the court that this hymenal laceration were [sic] compared to the
face of the clock, V-shape in appearance and when asked by the Prosecutor
you told the court that these are fresh wounds, did I get you right?
A Yes, sir.

Q Could you determine to the court, how many hours had lapse from the
time these lacerations occured [sic] until you conducted your examination
at 10:00 oclock in the morning of September 7 if you remember?
A (No answer).
Q You are not in a position to tell doctora?
A (No answer).9 (underscoring supplied)
Worse, when asked what her basis was for concluding that the victim was a
virgin at the time she was raped, Dr. Bacsal merely replied, without any
further qualification, that the vaginal canal admitted two fingers, thus:
Q Was Miss Gabane virgin at the time she was raped?
A Yes, sir.
Q As an expert witness, how did you come to the conclusion that Miss
Gabane was virgin at the time she was raped?
A Because the vaginal canal admits two fingers.10crlwvirtualibrry
However, that the vaginal canal admits two fingers is hardly proof of a rape
victims virginal state.
We now resolve the liability of accused-appellants.
There is only one circumstance which could have linked them to the brutal
slaying of Elena Gabane, viz., their having been seen dragging the body of a
woman toward the premises of the Dolores Elementary School, as testified
to by Yolanda Caspe. The veracity then of Yolandas claim depends entirely
on her credibility, and accused-appellants, quite understandably, leave
nothing to chance to convince us that Yolandas testimony should not be
accorded the slightest bit of credence.
It is settled that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial
court in passing on the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears, on
record, some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which the trial
court overlooked and which, if considered, would affect the result of the
case. The reason therefor is founded on practical and empirical
considerations. The trial judge is in a better position to decide the question
of credibility since he personally heard the witness and observed his
deportment and manner of testifying.11 Our reading of the transcripts of
the stenographic notes of the testimony of Yolanda Caspe reveals
circumstances that cast serious doubt as to her truthfulness or greatly
impair her credibility.

First. It is doubtful if Yolanda, as she testified during direct examination, was

in the house of Tilde at 11:00 p.m. of 6 September 1992. In her
statement12 taken on 23 September 1992 by PNP officer Albert Donceras,
but subscribed and sworn to on 5 October 1992 before Municipal Circuit
Trial Judge Ricardo Lapesura, Yolanda declared that she was, at that hour, in
the house of Yolly who invited Yolanda for a snack because Yolanda was one
of the sponsors at the baptism of Yollys child. Yolandas explanation that she
did not mention this to Donceras13 is lame. Moreover, as Yolanda likewise
testified during direct examination, it was not a snack that she partook of,
but two grande (big) bottles of beer. Further, as Yolanda admitted on crossexamination, she was not invited by Tilde nor Yoly; she invited herself.14 We
find this portion of Yolandas testimony, however, at odds with the test of
credibility in light of Yolandas admission that said visit was her first to Tildes
residence.15crlwvirtualibrry
Second. We likewise doubt whether Yolanda was in full possession of her
physical and mental faculties, given her admission that she drank two big
bottles of beer with Tilde. There is no evidence whatsoever that Yolanda was
accustomed to this level of alcohol intake, and that unlike a normal person,
her having imbibed such a prodigious quantity of alcohol did not leave her
reeling. Notably, that Yolandas ability to perceive was affected by the beer
she imbibed was evidenced by her confusion as to the number of men she
saw. In her sworn statement,16 she categorically declared that she saw four
men and even mentioned their names, to wit: the three accused-appellants
and one Rommel Padro, with the latter serving as the look-out. Thus her
answers to the fifth and ninth questions in the sworn statement:
05.Q Did you recall any incident that occcured [sic] while you were [on] the
street?
A. Yes sir, while I was on my way home far from the house of Yolly, who is
my friend, and who invited me for a snack because I was one of the
sponsor[s] of her child in the baptismal [sic], and while I was [o]n the street
of the bacck of the Dolores Central School Campus. I saw four (4) persons
carrying a woman, one person holding the left arm, one person holding the
right arm and a person was opening the hog wire fencce of the school fence
while another person was a look out near the fence.

xxx
09.Q Who was the person holding the right and the left arm[s] and the
person who was opening the hog wire fence of the school fence and the
person to be [sic] the look out of those person[s] if you know?
A Pacificador Campomanes was holding the left arm Jacob Quitorio was
holding the right arm while Jason Pomeda [sic] was the one opening the hog
wire fence of the school and Rommel Padro was the look out man.
Yet, in her testimony in open court, she mentioned seeing only three men,
namely, accused-appellants herein.17 And when confronted during crossexamination with her aforementioned answers in her sworn statement, she
attempted to justify the inconsistency by claiming that the aforequoted
question and answer No. 05 were not asked of her and were not given by
her, respectively, thus:
Q You just identified in court your affidavit which according to you were [sic]
sworn before the Municipal Judge and the contents were read and explained
to you, I will read to you question and answer number 5 in our exhibit 1 and
I quote, Did you recall any incident that occured [sic] while you were [on]
the street? and your answer is, Yes, sir while I was on my way home from
the house of Yolly, who is my friend, and who invited me for a snack
because I was one of the sponsors of her child in the baptismal [sic], and
while I was [o]n the street at the back portion of the Dolores Central School
Campus, I saw 4 persons carrying a woman, one person holding the left
arm, one person holding the right arm and a person was opening the hog
wire fence of the school fence while another person was a look out near the
fence, do you remember having been asked that same question and having
given the same answer?
A I did not.
Q The question and answer which was just read to you, you just said a while
ago that you do not recall having been asked that question and having
giving the same answer, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q In other words, this particular portion of your affidavit was not actually
asked from you and you did not give the same answer, is that correct?
A No, sir.18crlwvirtualibrry

Worse, aware of the difficulty of extricating herself from her web of

falsehoods, Yolanda even had the temerity to suggest that Donceras (or
some other person) supplied the false information that she saw four persons
carrying the woman, and had likewise furnished the name of Rommel Padro,
whom she did not even know. Thus, while still on cross-examination, she
testified:
Q Did you not say in your direct testimony that you saw these three persons
bringing a woman whom you do not know whether it [sic] was dead or
alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q You saw only three accused not four?
A The woman whom they were carrying was the four[th].
Q I am asking you Mrs. Witness along [sic] the woman according to you in
your testimony, you saw only three not four?
A Three.
Q So, the fourth person that you saw was the woman?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know one Rommel Padro?
A No, sir.
Q Are you sure?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will read to you question and answer number 6 in your affidavit, exhibit
I, the question read this way and I quote, Who were these persons if you
know?, your answer was, It was Jacob Quitorio, Jayson Pomida, Rommel
Padro and Pacificador Campomanes, my question is this, do you recall
having asked that question and having given the same answer?
A No, sir I only answered three.
Q So, that answer which was just read to you, the question and answer
number 6 on exhibit I of you affidavit is not true because you just told now
that there were three?
A I saw only three.19crlwvirtualibrry
The denial, simply put, leaves us incredulous. Yolandas statement was taken
on 23 September 1993 by PNP officer Albert Donceras and subscribed and
sworn to before Judge Lapesura on 5 October 1992. Donceras was clearly
performing his official duty in taking Yolandas statement; hence, in absence
of any showing to the contrary, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed must stand.20 Yolanda cannot then be heard to say
that Donceras did not ask question no. 05 of her and that she did not
answer as therein stated. It is likewise to be presumed that Judge Lapesura,
in the performance of his official duty, must have satisfied himself that,

among other things, the answers to the questions propounded by Donceras

were indeed made by Yolanda, considering the solemnity of the oath he
administered to her. As a matter of fact, during the preliminary
examination,21 Judge Lapesura directed Yolanda to examine and read her
sworn statement, after which, she explicitly admitted it to be of her making.
Despite having been afforded ample opportunity to correct or complain
about any erroneous statements, she failed to disavow any of her
statements.
Yolandas inclination to falsehood, however, did not last long. On the second
day of her cross-examination she, perhaps unwittingly, admitted that
Donceras did in fact ask her the subject questions and that she so answered
them, thus:
Q So Sgt. Donceras conducted an investigation of your person at Borongan,
is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You were asked questions and you gave corresponding answers?
A Yes, sir.
Q And those questions and answers which you made were reduced by
Donceras into writing?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as a matter of fact after it was reduced into writing you were made to
sign the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, I am informing you again that this Exhibit I is a sworn statement of
Yolanda Caspe taken by Albert Donceras at the Borongan Provl.
Headquarters of the PNP, on Sept. 23, 1992, now my question is, is this the
same statement which according to you just now was made and reduced
into writing?
A Yes, sir.22crlwvirtualibrry
Third. We note yet another set of circumstances that does not augur well for
Yolandas credibility as a witness.
Yolanda estimated that she was 20 to 30 meters away when she saw the
three or four persons.23 At that time, even with the moonlight and the
fluorescent light which Yolanda claimed to have illuminated the place,24 we
refuse to believe that she was able to take special note, not only of the
faces of the persons she saw, but likewise, how they were dressed and even
to the extent of being able to discern the color of their clothes, to wit: Jacob
Quitorio wore maong pants and a gray T-shirt with detached sleeves; Jayson

Pomida had on fatigue pants cut on the knee and a white sleeveless T-shirt;
while Pacificador Campomanes wore white shorts and a white sando.25 If
even to further tax her credibility, Yolanda added, on cross-examination,
that the sando of Campomanes had holes.26 As to the attire of the victim,
Yolanda narrated that the woman she saw wore a short checkered black
skirt and white jacket,27 despite the fact that earlier in her testimony,
Yolanda admitted she was unable to see the clothes of the woman since her
view was obstructed by Jacob Quitorio, thus:
Q You were at a distance of around 20 to 30 meters so much so that you
saw the woman wearing a short skirt and a white jacket, did you not say so?
A Yes, sir.
Q But when you were asked by the Court what you observed on [sic] her
dress or clothes you said you did not see because somebody was covering
the woman and this was Jacob Quitorio, did you not say so?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, Jacob Quitorio was in front of the woman, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.28crlwvirtualibrry
Fourth. Yolanda exhibited conduct or behavior grossly contrary to ordinary
human experience. Despite allegedly seeing a woman, probably dead by
the manner her body was being held and dragged, and after even being
threatened by one of the womans assailants, Yolanda simply went home
and did nothing but sleep. She then told no one of what she witnessed,
although by 7:00 a.m. the following morning, she already knew that a
woman had been raped and had concluded that the rape victim and the
woman she had seen the night preceding were one and the same.29 This
deafening silence, despite the fact that Yolanda knew the barangay captain
of the place where the Dolores Elementary School was located and some
policemen of Dolores,30 is beyond us. Likewise, as declared by her in her
sworn statement and reiterated on cross-examination, she saw policemen
inspecting and investigating the crime scene, thus:
Q I will read to you again Mrs. Witness question and answer No. 14 on
Exhibit 1 which is your sworn statement, I quote, The following day,
September 7, 1992, what did you observed [sic] from [the] people of
Dolores, Eastern Samar? And your answer was, I quote, At about 7:00
oclock in the morning of that day, I learned from persons that there was a
lady about 17 years old, who was killed, and I saw some Policemen
inspecting and investigating the crime scene, and I learned later that the

woman was raped. Do you also recall having been ask[ed] and having given
the same answer?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will read again the next question and answer No. 15, I quote, What did
you observed [sic] from the Police Investigator, if you know? Your answer
was, I quote, I observed that they inspect[ed] and investigate[d] from [sic]
the hog wire fence where I saw the four persons in [sic] the night before
that day of September 7, 1992, carrying a woman. Do you also recall having
been ask[ed] that question and having given the same answer?
A Yes, sir.31crlwvirtualibrry
Yet, she opted to do nothing. True to form, however, she once more
contradicted herself as these answers were diametrically opposed to those
which she had given just two (2) pages earlier, reckoned by the pagination
of the transcripts, to the effect that she did not see policemen investigating
the premises of the Dolores Elementary School on the morning of 7
September 1992, thus:
ATTY. GAVAN:
Q Now, you just saw the body of the victim while [sic] being alighted from
the patrol car from the answer of yours, am I made to understand that you
did not go to the crime scene on [sic] the following morning?
A I did not go to the school, sir.
Q You are also sure of your answer?
A Yes, sir.
Q So you did not see the policemen at the scene where you saw the
accused on [sic] the night before?
A No, sir.
Q Are you sure of our answer?
A Yes, sir.32crlwvirtualibrry
All told, we can hardly be blamed for harboring grave doubts as to Yolandas
credibility as a witness, resulting in our inability to reconcile our conscience
with the verdict of the trial court.

Before we close, however, some observations regarding thr decretal portion

of the appealed decision are in order. First, it is the longest we have seen
thus far in cases which have reached us, the trial court discussing therein
matters properly belonging in the body of the decision. In criminal cases,
trial judges must strictly observe Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court. Second, the trial court erroneously ruled that the penalty
of reclusion perpetua was to be computecd at thirty (30) years, and that
accused-appellants Jacob Quitorio and Jason Pomida, each sentenced to teo
terms of reclusion perpetua and to an additional penalty of 10 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, should each serve a total of 70 years as minimum to
77 years and 4 months as maximum. Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal
Code, the duration of reclusion perpetua is a from 20 years and 1 day to 40
years. The thirty-year period for reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of
successive service of sentence under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
Third, assuming that the trial court was correct in holding that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime, for which reason eacch accused was
liable for three offenses, viz: that committed bu him and those committed
by each of his two-accused, then the penalty of accused-appellants Jacob
Quitorio and Jason Pomida should each be reclusion perpetua for that
committed by Pacificador Campomanes, and not the penalty imposed on
the latter for the crime he committed since his reduced penalty was due to
the mitigating circumstances of minority under Article 68(2) of the Revised
Penal Code. Mitigating circumstances are personal to an accused in whose
favor they are determined to exist and cannot be enjoyed by his coconspirators or co-accused. Fourth, while the trial court was correct in ruling
that the prescribed penalty for rape was death, but that could not, however,
be imposed in view of the prohibition in Section 19(1) of Article III of the
Constitution, the RTC nevertheless erred in reasoning that the prescribed
penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua, hence, the penalty next lower
in degree was reclusion temporal. In People v. Muoz, we ruled that the
constitutional prohibition did not alter the periods for the penalty for murder
for purposes of determining the proper imposable penalty, i.e., the intent of
the framers of the Constitution was merely to consider the death penalty
automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua. The same thing may be said
as regards rape with homicide. The penalty of death provided under the

governing law then was deemed reduced to reclusion perpetua; however,

for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death was still the penalty to be
reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty of accused Campomanes
should have been reclusion perpetua. In any event, this matter has been
rendered moot by the passage of R.A. No. 7659, entitled An Act to Impose
the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for the Purpose the
Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and For Other
Purposes.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Case No. 129 of Branch 4 of
the Regional Trial Court, Eighth Judicial Region, sitting in Dolores, Eastern
Samar, is hereby REVERSED on ground of reasonable doubt, and accusedappellants JACOB QUITORIO and JAYSON POMIDA are hereby ACQUITTED
and their immediate release from detention is ORDERED, unless their
further detention is warranted for any other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall submit to this Court, within
ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this decision, a report on the release
of the abovementioned accused-appellants.
US vs. Eladio Cinco & Eusebio Redoa

Oct 13, 1917

This appeal is brought by the defendants Eladio Cinco and Eusebio Redoa
to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Samar, finding them guilty of the falsification of a private document.
It appears that Eusebio Redoa had been deputized to conduct a ale under
an execution issuing from the Court of First Instance of said province, which
sale by advertised to take place at the municipal building in Borongan,
Samar, on the 10th day of October, 1914. On that day the property was
properly put up at auction, but according to the testimony of the witnesses
for the prosecution, no bid or offer for the same, or any part thereof, was
made by any person during the lawful hours of sale, and as a result the
property remained unsold. On the other hand the witnesses for the defense
testify that the defendant Eladio Cinco made a bid and became the
purchaser of the property as sole bidder.

The theory of the prosecution is that no such sale took place and that by
collusion between the defendants a false return was made showing that
Eladio Cinco had become the purchaser of the property. The trial court so
found and we see no reason for disturbing this finding. At any rate the
defendant Redoa, as deputy sheriff, prepared a return of the execution
showing that Cinco had become purchaser at the execution sale, and that
the purchase price (P160) had been paid by him to Redoa.
It further appears that prior to the day of sale the execution creditor had
prepaid the estimated costs incident to the sale, and a a consequence they
were entitled to be reimbursed for such costs from the proceeds of the sale,
as well as to receive the principal amount to be made by execution, any
surplus being payable of course to the debtors in the execution. At the
principal debt to be made by the execution amounted to P156.24, it is
obvious that the judgment creditors were entitled, by way of the principal
debt and cost, to the entire proceeds of the sale.
In order to avoid the necessity of paying cash for the entire property, Eladio
Cinco approached the judgment creditors, and made an arrangement
whereby they delivered to him their joint receipt, acknowledging the
payment of P160, the proceeds of the sale. This receipt was obtained by
Cinco for the purpose of showing that the purchase price had been satisfied,
but as a matter of fact he paid them only P50, it being agreed between him
and them that he could pay the balance at his convenience.
When the deputy sheriff Redoa came to make up his return it seemed to
him that what was needed was not a receipt from the judgment creditors to
Eladio Cinco but a receipt from them to himself, showing that the money
had been paid by him as deputy sheriff to the proper parties. Accordingly
another and different receipt was prepared by Eladio Cinco under the
direction of Redoa. If these proceedings had been regular the proper
course would have been to surrender the first receipt and procure the
judgment creditors to sign the new one in its place. Instead of this, the
defendant Eladio Cinco wrote the names of said creditors, without their
knowledge or consent, at the foot of the receipt and placed cross marks
between the Christian name and surname in each instance, the fact being
that these people were illiterate and in any event would necessarily have

signed by making their marks. The present prosecution is based upon the
falsification of said receipt. The original receipt has not appeared in
evidence and was doubtless destroyed or suppressed; but the false receipt
was attached by Redoa to his return of the execution.
The principal victim of the scheme revealed in the record were the debtors
in the execution, for as a result of the supposed sale they were
dispossessed of their land and as the proof shows suffered considerable
damage thereby. But as the official return to the execution is a public
document, no serious effort has been made to secure a conviction of the
defendant Redoa upon the charge of falsifying the return, owing to the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Weems vs. United
States (217 U. S., 349); and the judgment of conviction in the lower court is
exclusively based on the charge of the falsification of the private document,
the receipt to Redoa, in violation of article 304 of the Penal Code.
In order to sustain a conviction for the falsification of a private document it
is necessary to prove that the falsification was committed to the damage of
another, or with the intent to cause such damage. That this condition is
fulfilled in the present case appears obvious for two reasons. In the first
place the falsification was effected for the purpose of giving the appearance
of legal validity to the sale, whereby the debtors in the execution, being the
owners of the land, were wrongfully dispossessed; and in the second place
the receipt itself purported to extinguish an obligation which had not been
in fact satisfied. It will be another that the receipt to Redoa was not a
counterfeit of the receipt originally given to Cinco but was a new receipt to
Redoa. Besides as we have already seen, Eladio Cinco had paid only P50 to
the judgment creditors when the first receipt was taken by himself; and
consequently the best in any event had been only in part extinguished.
Furthermore the case for the prosecution is evidently not affected by the
fact that the whole transaction was probably fraudulent and that the sale
could have been avoided in a proper proceeding. The falsification of a
receipt may clearly sustain a conviction notwithstanding the fact that the
principal debt may be voidable; for the receipt shows the absolute
extinguishment of the liability to the extent of the amount stated therein.

The case against Eusebio Redoa, a coauthor in this crime, is not quite so
well made out as that against Eladio Cinco. We have it on Redoa's own
testimony that the receipt in question was written by Eladio Cinco under
Redoa's directions and in his presence. He also testified that the names of
the three purported subscribers were also written by Cinco upon the same
occasion and likewise in Redoa's presence. But Redoa says that the
marks of the three subscribers (who were illiterate) were really and truly
made by themselves respectively at the same time, they being then and
there present. This testimony if true would show that no falsification was
committed and that the marks accompanying the signatures were genuine.
Other proof, however, which is conclusive, shows that the marks were made
in the absence of the parties whose names were signed to the receipt; and
the following peculiarity of the signatures was proved by a competent
expert, namely, that in each case the defendant Cinco first wrote the
Christian name, then the mark, and finally the surname, instead of making
the mark after the full name was written. If the marks had been made by
the purported subscribers they would naturally have been written after full
names had been written by Cinco. This peculiarity of the signatures,
namely, that the marks were written immediately after the Christian names
were written and before the surnames were written was fairly apparent to
the eye of any person reasonably familiar with the art of writing. Now if we
accept as proved the fact that the marks were thus written, it necessarily
follows that upon his own testimony Redoa was present at the act and was
guilty as one of its authors. Redoa says that he immediately carried the
receipt away, and it was used by him for the purpose for which it was
intended. There is also ample proof that the whole fraudulent transaction
regarding the sale, of which the fabrication of this receipt was a feature,
was the result of collusion and conspiracy between the two defendants.
With reference to the legal aspects of the offense, it is clear that there can
be no conviction under article 304 of the Penal Code in relation with
subsection 1 of article 300, since it is not shown that the marks which were
intended to impart the appearance of authenticity to the false signatures
were made in imitation of the genuine marks of the parties whose names
were signed. It has been the uniform ruling of this court that where a person
signs the name of another to a document without attempting to imitate his
signature, he cannot be convicted under paragraph 1 of article 300. (U.

S. vs. Paraiso, 1 Phil., 66; U. S. vs. Roque, 1 Phil., 372; U.

S. vs.Buenaventura, 1 Phil., 428; U. S. vs. Balmori, 1 Phil., 661; U.
S. vs. Castro, 6 Phil., 10.)1awphil.net
It is however, the opinion of the court that the offense in this case is
punishable under article 304 of the Penal Code, in relation with subsection 2
of article 300, notwithstanding statements to be found in some of the cases
tending to a different conclusion. (U. S. vs. Buenaventura, 1 Phil., 428.) In
United States vs. Braga (12 Phil., 202, the accused had used a rubber stamp
bearing the name of the company by which he was employed, signing his
own name in connection therewith. He had authority so to use the stamp for
the purpose of buying goods for the company, but not for the purpose of
obtaining money. It was held that in so signing an order by which he
obtained money he was guilty of falsification under article 304 of the Penal
Code, in connection with subsection 2 of article 300, for the reason that in
effecting the transaction in question he made it appear that the company
was a party thereto when, as a matter of fact, it did not participate therein.
In the court below, the defendant Cinco was sentenced to two years, eleven
months and ten days, presidio correccional in its minimum and medium
degree, while the defendant Redoa was sentenced to one year, eight
months and twenty-one days, presidio correccional in its minimum and
medium degree. We believe that the discretion of the judge in imposing a
more severe penalty upon Eladio Cinco was properly used. Each defendant
was also sentenced to pay a fine of P125 and to undergo the accessory
penalties and subsidiary personal liability in case of insolvency a provided
by law, and to pay one-half of the costs.
As we find no error prejudicial to the defendants in the action of the court
below the judgment of said court should be affirmed with costs. So ordered.
Susan mendoza-arce vs. Office of the ombudsman

April 5, 2002

FACTS: Respondent Santiago B. Villaruz was originally the administrator of

the estate of his mother Remedios Bermejo Villaruz. However, in an order
issued by the trial court, he was removed as such for patent neglect of his
legal duties and failure to comply with the court orders.

In his place, respondent's eldest brother, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., was

appointed regular administrator and was required to file a bond.
Thereafter, Nicolas filed a motion for the approval of his bond. Santiago
and his brother, Jose Ma. Villaruz, opposed Nicolas' motion and prayed that
Jose Maria be instead appointed regular administrator. Attached to their
opposition was a certification executed by their mother Remedios before
she passed away. Subsequently, Judge Patricio denied the oppositors'
opposition, while recognizing the validity of the certification executed by
Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz.
On October 12, 1998, Judge Sergio Pestao, to whom the case was in the
meantime reassigned, approved the administrator's bond of respondent
Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr.
After receiving a copy of Judge Pestao's order, respondent Susan MendozaArce, Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, prepared a
Letter of Administration (LOA).
On December 7, 1998, administrator Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., accompanied by
three armed security guards and respondent's Deputy Sheriff Charles
Aguiling, took possession of the entire estate of the decedent. This gave
rise to the present action. In a letter-complaint to the Ombudsman,
respondent Santiago B. Villaruz alleged that petitioner committed two
crimes in issuing the LOA, to wit: 1) falsification by a public officer under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and 2) Corrupt practice in violation of
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019).
Respondent accused petitioner of acting "with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence" by falsely attributing to Judge
Pestao the appointment of Nicolas B. Villaruz as new administrator and
investing him with "full authority to take possession of all property/ies" of
the decedent, because the fact was that it was Judge Patricio who had
appointed Nicolas administrator of the estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari in this case should have
been filed in the Court of Appeals.
HELD: NO. In Tirol, Jr. v. del Rosario, it is held that although as a
consequence of the decision in Fabian v. Desierto, appeals from the orders,
directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are now
cognizable by the Court of Appeals, nevertheless in cases in which it is

alleged that the Ombudsman has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 may be filed in the Court to set aside the Ombudsman's order
or resolution. In Kuizon v. Desierto it is again held that the Court has
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of
the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman, "the rule, of course, is that a criminal
prosecution cannot be enjoined. But as has been held, infinitely more
important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal
procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary
arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution."
Indeed, while the Court's policy is one of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers with a latitude
of discretion in the determination of probable cause, nonetheless
exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, to wit:
When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of
the accused;
When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;
When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance.
When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and motion
to quash on that ground has been denied.
OMBUDSMAN; THE COURTS WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE DISCRETION OF
THE OMBUDSMAN TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE EXCEPT WHEN the
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED ARE IMPAIRED.
Agustina Enemecio vs. Ombudsman

Jan 13, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio (Enemecio) is a utility worker at

the Cebu State College of Science and Technology, College of Fisheries
Technology (CSCST-CFT), Carmen, Cebu. Private respondent Servando
Bernante (Bernante) is an Assistant Professor IV of CSCST-CFT.
Enemecio filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct,
falsification of public documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation
against Bernante before the Office of the Executive Dean of CSCST-CFT. Dr.
Severino R. Romano, CSCST-CFT Executive Dean, indorsed the complaint to
the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (Ombudsman).
Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against
Bernante for falsification of public document. Enemecio further asserted
that Bernante made it appear in his leave application that he was on forced
leave from 15 May 1996 to 21 May 1996 and on vacation leave from 22 May
1996 to 31 May 1996. In truth, Bernante was serving a 20-day prison term,
from 14 May 1996 to 2 June 1996, because of his conviction of the crime of
slight physical injuries. Bernante was able to receive his salary during his
incarceration since then CSCST-CFT Superintendent approved Bernantes
application for leave. Enemecio contended that Bernante was not entitled to
receive salary for that period because of his falsified leave applications.
The Ombudsman rendered a decision dismissing the administrative
complaint against Bernante. On the same date, the Ombudsman dismissed
the criminal complaint against Bernante finding no probable cause. The
Ombudsman denied Enemecios motion to reconsider the dismissal of the
criminal complaint. Enemecio filed a special civil action for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals stating that the proper remedy available to Enemecio
was a petition for review under Rule 43 and not a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
In her motion for reconsideration, Enemecio argued that the appellate court
should not have relied on Fabian. Enemecio contended that Fabian declared
void only Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770) and Section 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (AO No. 07) insofar as they provide
for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court. Enemecio asserted that the other provisions of Section 27
of RA 6770 and Section 7 of AO No. 07, including the final and
unappealable character of orders, resolutions or decisions exonerating a
respondent from any criminal liability, still stand. Enemecio stated that she

filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals
because she considered Bernantes absolution from the administrative
complaint as already final and unappealable. As there was no adequate
remedy of appeal, Enemecio claimed that her only recourse was a petition
for certiorari before the appellate court under Rule 65.
In denying Enemecios motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
clarified that Fabian does not apply to Enemecios petition assailing the
dismissal of the criminal complaint against Bernante. The appellate court
stated that what Fabian declared void was Section 27 of RA 6770, which
authorized appeals to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases. Under the Fabian ruling, the appellant
should take such appeal in administrative disciplinary cases to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals added that it follows that the
power to review decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is retained
by the Supreme Court under Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus, the appellate
court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner availed the wrong remedy
HELD: YES. It is clear from the records that Atty. Fernandez filed with the
Court of Appeals a certiorari petition assailing the Ombudsmans Resolution
and Order dismissing the criminal case, not the administrative case against
Bernante. For this reason, the appellate court in its 7 December 2000
Resolution rectified itself and stated that Fabian does not apply to
Enemecios petition as the Fabian ruling applies only to administrative
disciplinary actions. Atty. Fernandezs attempt to mislead this Court in a last
ditch effort to secure a decision favorable to his clients cause does not
escape
our
attention.
Even if we consider Enemecios petition before the Court of Appeals as
questioning the dismissal of the administrative case against Bernante, the
action must also fail. Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions should be brought to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43. 21 The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling
is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule
43 as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters in Section 27 of RA

6770, including the finality or non-finality of decisions of the Ombudsman,

remain valid.
In any event, jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the
Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause in criminal cases is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
under Rule 65. Since Enemecio filed a certiorari petition before the Court of
Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, she availed of a wrong remedy in
the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should be dismissed outright.
Inocentes Amora vs. Court of Appeals

July 20, 1982

Petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners Inocentes Amora, Jr. and Claudio Murillo were accused of four (4)
counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents in Criminal Cases
Nos. 1220 to 1223 of the Court of First Instance of Bohol. Typical of the four
informations is that filed in Criminal Case No. 1220 which reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal hereby accuses Claudio Murillo
and Inocentes Amora, Jr. of the crime of Estafa Thru Falsification of Public
Documents, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of October 1972, in the municipality of
Guindulman, province of Bohol, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with abuse of confidence,
did then- and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Time Book
and Payroll bearing Voucher No. 172 of the municipality of Guindulman,
Bohol, covering the period from September 1 to 30, 1972 by making it
appear in lines 18 and 20, Sheet II of said voucher that Vicente Begamano
and Alfredo Bagtasos rendered 21 days services each in "gathering
boulders for shore protection" for the period from September 1 to 30, 1972
when they did not in fact render said services and by misappropriating and
converting to their personal use, the amount indicated in said voucher as
having been received by the said Vicente Begamano and Alfredo Bagtasos
in the total sum of TWO HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P210.00) Philippine
currency, belonging to and owned by the municipality of Guindulman,

Bohol; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines,

particularly the municipality of Guindulman, Bohol.

(10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor; the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against appellants.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 315 and 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 48 of the same Code.

The factual background is as follows:

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Bohol rendered the following
judgment:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Guilty as charged. Each of them is
hereby imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from Two (2)
Years and One (1) Month to Six (6) Years and to pay a fine of P1,500.00 for
each of the four (4) above-entitled cases, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals which held that the accused
were not guilty of estafa because
Evidently, as shown above, the Municipality of Guindulman did not suffer
any loss or damage arising from the payrolls. On the contrary, the
government gained from the said project. This stubborn fact was expressly
admitted by Municipal Treasurer Salutan, Jr. in his testimony to the effect
that said municipality suffered no loss or damage on any of these payrolls
(tsn, pp. 42-43, May 26, 1976).
However, the Court of Appeals found that Inocentes Amora, Jr. was a
municipal employee and convicted him of falsification by public officer.
Although Claudio Murillo was not in the government service he was also
convicted of falsification by public officer on the ground that there was a
conspiracy between him and Amora. The Court of Appeals also held that the
appellants were motivated by a single intention and so found them guilty of
only one (1) instead of four (4) crimes. The dispositive portion of its decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, [the] judgment is hereby modified in that appellants Claudio
Murillo and Inocentes Amora, Jr., are guilty of Falsification by public officers
penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and are hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from Six (6) Years to Ten

The town of Guindulman, Bohol, had a project which required the placing of
boulders as rip-rap in its wharf. The town appropriated P15,500 for the
project and a canvass of prices for the boulders was made. Claudio Murillo,
a private contractor, submitted the lowest bid of P10,000 per cubic meter of
boulders so he was awarded a contract to supply the same, including their
hauling and-piling at the municipal wharf.
Pursuant to the request of Guindulman Mayor Lilio Amora, Murillo used
around 200 workers supplied by barrio captains under the "bayanihan"
system, so-called because the workers were paid P8.00 for every truckload
of boulders loaded, unloaded and piled. A truckload was 3 cubic meters and
was handled by about 6 to 7 workers who divided the P8.00 among
themselves. Payment was sometimes made in the form of rice or corn grits.
In claiming payment from the town, Murillo prepared and accomplished 4
daily timebooks and payrolls which had the names and signatures of the
workers, the number of days worked, the daily rate, the amount paid and
information in respect of their residence certificates. The accomplished
payrolls were certified by Inocentes Amora, Jr. as a government time-keeper
and checker. Thereafter the payrolls were presented to Mayor Amora for
approval and lastly to the Municipal Treasurer for payment. In this manner
Murillo was able to obtain payment under his contract.
There is no question that the petitioners committed falsification of public
documents. The issue presented in the instant petition are legal, not
factual, and may be stated as follows:
1. Whether or not the petitioners may be convicted of falsification by public
officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code considering that there is
no allegations in the four informations that they are public officers; and
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding their defense
of good faith.
On the basis of the second issue alone, the petition is highly impressed with
merit and should be granted.

The petitioners claim that "(1) they were simply following the 'bayanihan'
system adopted by the municipality of Guindulman and by the engineering
district since 1969 which consisted of making payrolls the total amount of
which equal the price the municipality was to pay the contract of a certain
piece of work and (2) the municipality suffered no actual damage." Murillo
specifically said, in the words of the trial court, that "that in July 1972, the
municipality of Guindulman awarded him the contract, after bidding, to
supply boulders and place them in rip-rap on the causeway to the wharf at
P10.00 per cubic meter of boulder. He utilized between 100 to 200 laborers
and he paid them under 'pakyao' system at P8.00 per truckload of boulders
which included loading and unloading. He used another group of laborers to
undertake the rip-rap. Although the project was truly a contract for a piece
of work, nevertheless he used the daily wage method and not the contract
vouchers, 'This was not his Idea but by the municipal mayor and treasurer
to prepare a payroll and list of laborers and their period of work and to pay
them the minimum wage so that the total payment would equal the total
contract price. 'This is the so-called bayanihan system practiced by former
Mayor Bertumen and Engineer Bertumen of the 2nd engineering district. In
the payrolls only some 20 names of the 200 laborers were listed as not all
of them, could be accommodated. Those not listed received their wages
from those listed. As all of the utilized laborers were duly paid, not one
complained. Neither did the municipality complain. All the payrolls were
thus prepared by him, had them approved by the municipal mayor and had
them paid by the municipal treasurer. The group leaders of the laborers,
who collected the sums indicated in the payrolls, then delivered them to his
house and he issued no receipts therefor."
It is quite obvious that the proper method for claiming payment under
the pakyaw contract was for Murillo to simply bill the town for so many
cubic meters of boulders which had been delivered and piled at the
municipal wharf. Instead he and Inocentes Amora, Jr. resorted to the payroll
system which is not only cumbersome but also involved falsification. The
reason could only be that they were ignorant and ill-advised as claimed.
Both Mayor Amora and Treasurer Salutan knew that Murillo's contract was of
the pakyaw type and so there was no need for the presentation of payrolls.
Both Amora and Salutan are not unlettered as their positions indicate

Amora is also a lawyer. But why did both officials cooperate in using the
payroll system instead of a simple direct billing? If the petitioners are guilty
of falsification, Mayor Amora and Treasurer Salutan are equally guilty
because notwithstanding their knowledge of the nature of the contract
Amora approved the payrolls and Salutan made payments pursuant thereto.
From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman
suffered no damage and even gained on the project (the cost of the
boulders actually delivered was P18,285.00 but Murillo was paid only
P13,455.00) plus the additional fact that the alleged complaining witness
mentioned in the informations suffered no damage whatsoever and were in
fact awarded no indemnity, it is obvious that the falsifications made by the
petitioners were done in good faith; there was no criminal intent. "The
maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea a crime is not committed if
the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent." (U.S.
vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504, 507 [1911].) There car! be no conviction for
falsification of a public document in the absence of proof that the
defendants "maliciously perverted the truth with wrongful intent of injury
the complaining witness." (U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341, 344 [1902].) Thus the
learned Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino has said, "there is no falsification of a
public document if the acts of the accused are consistent with good faith.
Thus, it has been held that 'a conviction for falsification of a public
document by a private person will not be sustained when the facts found
are consistent with good faith on the part of the accused.' In other words,
although the accused altered a public document or made a mistatement or
erroneous assertion therein, he would not be guilty of falsification as long as
he acted in good faith and no one was prejudiced by the alteration or error."
(II Revised Penal Code, pp. 986-987 119761.)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the Court of
Appeals which adjudged the petitioners guilty of falsification is hereby
reversed and the petitioners are acquitted with costs de oficio.
Felix O. Alfelor, Srvs. Bonifacio C. Intia

April 30, 1976

The Judiciary Act 1 and the Rules of Court 2 set forth with clarity the
jurisdiction of a municipal court over crimes. That was the point stressed by
petitioners to respondent Judge. 3 It did not avail, their motion to dismiss a

falsification charge against them having been denied. They did point out
that in the very complaint itself it was admitted that it was in another
municipality where such alleged falsification took place. Respondent Judge
was not persuaded; he accepted the view set forth in the objection to the
motion to dismiss that the municipal court of Tigaon, his station, was vested
with jurisdiction as it "is one of the intervening municipalities where the
jeep carrying the ballot box (the contents of which were allegedly falsified)
passed through." 4 He maintained that falsification is a continuing offense.
He did not budge, notwithstanding his attention being called to
authoritative decisions that affirmed the contrary. Clearly then, there is
merit to this petition. certiorari and prohibition lie.
The principal petitioner, Felix O. Alfelor, and respondent Felix A. Fuentebella
were congressional candidates in the second district of Camarines Sur in the
1965 elections, with the latter being proclaimed as winner resulting in the
filing of an electoral protest by the former. 5 Respondent Fuentebella in turn
charged his opponent and the other petitioners in the municipal court of
Tigaon, Camarines Sur, presided by respondent Judge, with falsification of
public or official documents contained in the ballot box of a precinct in
Parubcan, Camarines Sur, the alleged criminal act having taken place in still
another municipality, Iriga, Camarines Sur. 6 There was on the part of
petitioners a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the
situs of the alleged falsification being in another municipality, Iriga,
Camarines Sur. 7Respondent Judge in the challenged order issued on April
29, 1967 denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that falsification was a
continuing offense. 8 A motion for reconsideration was filed. It was
denied. 9 Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
As noted at the outset, the petition merit.
1. Reference was previously made both to the Judiciary Act and the Rules of
Court as to the jurisdiction of municipal courts to try criminal cases being
confined only to such offenses committed within the limits of the territories
appertaining to their position. 10 In the latest case in point, Lopez v. City
Judge, 11 Justice Dizon, as ponente,restated the basic rule thus: "It is
settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was
committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction (U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the

provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have

original jurisdiction only over criminal offenses committed within their
respective territorial jurisdiction." 12 As was pointed out by him, such a
doctrine goes back to U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 13 a 1905 decision. Beltran v.
Ramos, 14 Ragpala v. Justice of the Peace of Tubod, 15People v.
Yumang 16 and People v. San Antonio 17 may likewise be cited on this
point.
2. That much, as was pointed out by Justice Dizon, is settled law. It is to be
assumed that respondent Judge would not deliberately ignore what it
commands. His persistence can be ascribed to his view that falsification is a
continuing offense. He was led to conclude, therefore, that an ingredient
thereof took place within his jurisdiction. Here his stand is decidedly
opposed to what this court has uniformly and consistently held.
Again, Lopez v. City Judge 18 points the way: "We now come to consider the
question of when and where is the offense of falsification of a private
document deemed consummated or committed? Upon this point, We have
ruled clearly and definitely in U.S. v. Infante, ... that the crime of falsification
of a private document defined and penalized by Article 304 of the Penal
Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) is
consummated when such document is actually falsified with the intent to
prejudice a third person, whether such falsified document is or is not
thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was intended." 19 United States
v. Infante 20 was decided as far back as 1917, almost sixty years ago. Less
than a month later that same year, United States v. Barreto, 21 which spoke
to the same effect, was promulgated. As was pointed out by Justice Carson
who likewise penned the Infante opinion: "It is evident, therefore, that the
place where the crime is committed is the place where the document is
actually falsified, and that the improper or illegal use of the document
thereafter is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of
falsification of a private document; and even if it were otherwise, the charge
that the crime was committed in a specific place would seem to be a
sufficient allegation that all of the acts necessary to its consummation were
in fact done at the place indicated." 22 There is also this opinion of Chief
Justice Avancena in People v. Villanueva: 23 "The falsification of each of
these six money orders committed separately by means of different acts
constitutes independent crimes of falsification. (U.S. v. Infante and Barreto,
36 Phil. 146), and the appropriation of the respective amounts thereof by

the defendant, likewise constitutes different crimes of malversation." 24All

of the above cases explicitly ruled on the specific point at issue. It does not
admit of doubt though that while no such categorical statement may be
found in other decisions of this Court, it has always been assumed that
falsification is not a continuing offense. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the order of
respondent Judge of April 29, 1967 and the order of May 25, 1967 denying
the motion for reconsideration are reversed, nullified and set aside and
declared to be of no force and effect. The writ of prohibition is likewise
granted, respondent Judge being enjoined to desist from taking any further
action on the complaint for falsification of public and/or official documents
filed against petitioners in his sala except for the purpose of dismissing the
same. No costs.
Melencio J. Gigantoni vs. People of the Philippines, et al. June 16,
1988
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 01119 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Melencio Gigantoni y Javier," promulgated on November 13, 1985, which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 159, Pasig, Metro
Manila, finding the accused guilty of usurpation of authority under Article
177 of the Revised Penal Code with modification of the penalty by reducing
the same to one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor to one (1) year
and one (1) day of prision correccional, after crediting the accused with a
mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary confession of guilt.
Petitioner Melencio Gigantoni y Javier, was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal, Pasig, with the crime of usurpation of authority in violation of
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code upon an information alleging that the
crime was committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th and 15th day of May, 1981, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is not a bonafide agent of
the CIS, Philippine Constabulary, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
knowingly and falsely represented himself as a bonafide agent of the CIS,

Philippine Constabulary, said accused, knowing fully well his representation

to be false.
After arraignment during which the accused pleaded not guilty and after
trial, the lower court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty as
charged. On appeal to the appellate court, the judgment was affirmed with
modification only as to the penalty imposed.
The facts of the case, as recited in the decision of the appellate court, are
as follows:
During the period material to this case, or in 1981, accused-appellant
Melencio Gigantoni was an employee of Black Mountain Mining Inc. and
Tetra Management Corporation, which are both private companies doing
business in the Philippines .... On May 14, 1981, as an employee of said
companies, Gigantoni went to the office of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) at
Vernida Building, Legaspi Street, Makati, Metro Manila, allegedly to conduct
verification of some travels made by Black Mountain's officials. Upon
reaching the said PAL office, he falsely represented himself to the PAL legal
officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating a kidnapping case, and requested
that he be shown the PAL records particularly the passenger manifests for
Manila-Baguio-Manila flights covering the period February 1 to 3 1981. He
explained that he was then at the tracking stage of aforementioned
kidnapping case. ... To further convince the PAL officials of his supposed
mission, Gigantoni exhibited his Identification card purporting to show that
he was a PC-CIS agent. ... Thereupon, his aforesaid request was granted,
and PAL legal officer Atty. Conrado A. Boro showed to him the requested PAL
records. Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of the requested manifest
...and the used PAL tickets of one Cesar (Philippe) Wong, an SGV auditor,
and that of a certain Daisy Britanico, an employee of Black Mountain.
Thereafter, he left the PAL premises.
When Gigantoni was no longer around, PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno,
Jr., inquired from Atty. Boro about Gigantoni's purpose in securing copies of
PAL records. They then became suspicious of the accused" real identity
prompting them to conduct verification from the PC-CIS office. They
subsequently learned from General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no
longer a CIS agent since June 30, 1980 as he had been dismissed from the

service for gross misconduct ... brought about by the extortion charges filed
against him and his final conviction by the Sandiganbayan for the said
offense.... Upon discovering the foregoing, Atty. Puno immediately alerted
the NBI as Gigantoni would be coming back to the PAL office the following
day. ...
On May 15, 1981, when Gigantoni returned to the Makati PAL office, he was
brought by Atty. Puno to their conference room while awaiting for the arrival
of the NBI agents who were earlier contacted. In the presence of Atty. Boro
and a PAL security, Gigantoni was confronted by Atty. Puno as to his real
Identity. He later admitted that he was no longer with the CIS; that he was
working for the Black Mountain Mining Corporation; and that he was just
checking on a claim for per diem of one of their employees who had
travelled. ...
Upon the arrival of NBI agents Teodoro Pangilinan, Lolito Utitco and Dante
Crisologo, Attys. Puno and Boro turned over the person of Gigantoni to the
NBI. They also submitted a complaint affidavit against Gigantoni .... On that
same day, after the investigation, arrest and booking conducted by the NBI,
Gigantoni was charged before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, thru
its office in Makati, with the crime of Usurpation of Authority.
The petitioner-accused raised substantially the same errors on appeal to
respondent appellate court, to wit:
1. The appellate court erred in interpreting that presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed, its applicable in the case at bar;
2. The appellate court erred in its interpretation of the difference between
suspension and dismissal.
The gist of petitioner's contention is that he could not be guilty of the crime
charged because at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, he
was still a CIS agent who was merely suspended and was not yet informed
of his termination from the service. Furthermore, he avers that the receipt
by him of the notice of dismissal, if there was any, could not be established
on mere presumption of law that official duty has been regularly performed.
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of authority or official

functions, under which the petitioner was charged, punishes any person: (a)
who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent or
representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government
or of any foreign government; or (b) who, under pretense of official position,
performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of
the Philippine Government or any foreign government or any agency
thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. The former constitutes the
crime of usurpation of authority under which the petitioner stands charged,
while the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.
The question before us isdid petitioner knowingly and falsely represent
himself as an agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary? Petitioner admits
that he received a notice of his suspension from the CIS effective June 20,
1980. This admission is supported by the record (Annex "D") which shows
the letter of Lt. Col. Sabas Edades to petitioner, dated June 23, 1980,
regarding said action. Said official letter was also sent to the Commissioner
of the Merit Systems Board, Civil Service Commission, the Minister of
National Defense and the Commanding General of the CIS. However, as to
petitioner's alleged dismissal effective June 20, 1980, he denies having
been informed thereof. The record is bereft of any evidence or proof
adduced by the prosecution showing that the dismissal was actually
conveyed to petitioner. That is why the court, in convicting him, relied on
the disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed,
that is, that it is presumed that he was duly notified of his dismissal.
The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified of
his dismissal from the service negatives the charge that he "knowingly and
falsely" represented himself to be a CIS agent. The constitutional
presumption of innocence can only be overturned by competent and
credible proof and never by mere disputable presumptions, as what the
lower and appellate courts did when they presumed that petitioner was duly
notified of his dismissal by applying the disputable presumption "that
official duty has been regularly performed." It was not for the accused to
prove a negative fact, namely, that he did not receive the order of
dismissal. In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged
lies on the prosecution. Hence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to
establish by positive evidence the allegation that the accused falsely

represented himself as a CIS agent, by presenting proof that he knew that

he was no longer a CIS agent, having been duly notified of his dismissal. It
is essential to present proof that he actually knew at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense that he was already dismissed from the service.
A mere disputable presumption that he received notice of his dismissal
would not be sufficient.
The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it makes no
difference whether the accused was suspended or dismissed from the
service, "for both imply the absence of power to represent oneself as vested
with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly
was deprived of " (Emphasis supplied). The observation of the Solicitor
General is correct if the accused were charged with usurpation of official
function (second part of Article 177), but not if he is charged merely with
usurpation of authority (first part of Article 177). The information charges
the accused with the crime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly and
falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine Government."
Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not been
shown that the information given by PAL to the accused was confidential
and was given to him only because he was entitled to it as part of the
exercise of his official function. He was not charged in the information for
such an offense. In fact, it appears from the record of the case that the
information, which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was
readily made available to the accused because PAL officials believed at the
time that he was a CIS agent. And this was the only offense with which he
was charged in the information, that he knowingly and falsely represented
himself to be a CIS agent.
Premises considered, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court
affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court is reversed
and set aside. Petitioner-accused, Melencio Gigantoni y Javier is hereby
aquitted of the crime charged.
El Pueblo de Filipinas vs. Miguel Ambal June 14, 1940

In view of the criminal case No. 8369 of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, I followed against Evaristo Austria and Alejandro Austria for the
crime of murder, the accused, stating as a prosecution witness he said,
answering the direct questions of the Prosecutor, that when arriving
Evaristo Austria near the house of his brother Alejandro, that cry and said
"Ka Andong, get up, and I could kill the person you mandabas kill me, I'm
sure he's dead, here is the penknife in bloodied. " When subjected to crossexamination, the accused under the same oath ready to tell the truth,
correct his earlier statement and said that not clearly heard everything he
said Evaristo Austria and what did not hear clearly understood, because he
said in voice low and not very noticeable, was "I have killed the person to
whom you sent me watch". "I have killed the person to whom you sent me
to kill." Having given these contradictory statements and irreconcililables,
Batangas Provincial Prosecutor will process the accused for the crime of
perjury. Held the preliminary investigation by the Court of First Instance of
the province and after the Prosecutor's evidence before been presented, the
judge issued an order dismissing the complaint for the reason that the
crime she allegedly has not been committed or the defendant is responsible
for the. The judge stated that the accused had the right to correct or rectify
the testimony she had given and that doing so in cross-examination did not
commit the crime of perjury. The prosecutor appealed the dismissal order.
The only thing that arises in this appeal is whether a witness is wrong to
give evidence in the direct configuration questions that directs the
Prosecutor and then rectifies it, corrects or clarifies in cross-examination,
commits the offense of perjury and is criminally responsible for the . We
declare that, in such circunstanciasl, the defendant gave evidence can
rectify any errors or mistakes incurred in rendering his testimony in the
criminal case.Rectification came spontaneously and immediately after
having apperceived the mistake it had incurred and in these circumstances
can not believe that I act with malice or charged with criminal intent to
falsify their testimony.The prosecution presented some evidence tended to
show that the defendant had been induced to change his statement given
on direct questions, but we agree with the Court that such evidence is
sufficient to destroy the good faith and lack of criminal intent of the
accused. The order under appeal, the costs of trade is confirmed.

United States vs. Federico Caet

March 25, 1915

This is an appeal by the United States from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province, sustaining a demurrer to the information filed
against the defendant in the above-entitled case, for the crime of perjury,
and dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
On January 9, 1914, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo Province filed the original
information in this case the defendant's demurrer to which was sustained,
and the information ordered amended, by the lower court. An amended
information was filed on March 2, 1914, which charges the crime of perjury,
as follows:
That on or about September 29 of the present year, 1913, in the
municipality of Iloilo, Iloilo Province, Philippine Islands, the said defendant
Federico Caet presented to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a motion
asking for annulment of the judgment of said court, dated March 28, 1913,
rendered in the civil suit docketed as No. 1842 and entitled "Adraham Weill,
as attorney for levy Hermanos, plaintiff, vs. Federico Caet, defendant," for
a sum of money; with the further prayer that said case be reopened, and, as
an integral and essential part of said motion, the said defendant presented
the affidavit signed by himself, in which the defendant Federico Caet did
knowingly, under oath, willfully, intentionally, criminally and falsely make,
sign and swear to as true, before the notary, before the notary public J.E.
Blanco, duty appointed by the Supreme Court of these Islands as such
notary and authorized by law to administer oaths, the following affidavit as
hereinafter quoted:
'PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, City of manila, ss:
Don Federico Caet, after being duly sworn, states:
1. That on January 6, 19913, Abraham Weill, as representative of Messrs.
Levy Hermanos, of Iloilo, filed in the Court of First Instance of said province
a suit against the deponent, praying for judgment for the sum of P12,700,
and at the same time secured an attachment upon all his property, as a
result whereof the sheriff attached the two automobile the price of which

was the subject matter of said suit, as well as other vehicles and furniture of
the deponent, said case having been docketed as No. 1842 of that court.
2. That, by reason of the filing of said suit and inssuance of the said
attachment, deponent went to Iloilo and, after certain negotiations with the
plaintiff Weill, executed and delivered to the latter a contract in writing for
complete adjustment of the claim which was the subject matter of the suit,
and copy of this instrument of compromise is annexed to this affidavit,
marked with the letter A, as an integral part thereof.
3. That said instrument of compromise was executed in duplicate by
deponent before the notary public Don Engracio Padilla of Iloilo, and, after
being executed, one copy was delivered to the plaintiff Weill, and the other,
after being signed by the plaintiff underneath deponent's signature, was
delivered by the latter to Don Ruperto Montinola, whom deponent had
employed as his attorney on receiving notification of the attachment; and
that in consideration of the execution and delivery of the said instrument of
compromise plaintiff agreed to request dismissal of the suit and also of the
attachment issued in said orders as stated above.
4. That the said instrument of compromise was drawn up by Don Ruperto
Montinola, attorney for deponent, and stipulated between the plaintiff Weill
and the said attorney Don Ruperto Montinola, in behalf of deponent and in
his presence that said attorney and the plaintiff would go immediately to
the court and presented said instrument of compromise and make other
necessary arrangements for securing dismissal of the suit and the
attachment.
5. That on January 11, 1913, that is the next day after the execution of said
instrument of compromise, the plaintiff Weill telegraphed to the sheriff of
Occidental Negros, notifying him said case had been compromised and
directing him to raise the attachment levied upon deponent's property, and
the sheriff thereupon exhibit said telegram to deponent and in conformity
therewith raised the attachment.
6. That when the sheriff exhibits said telegram to deponent and raised the
attachment levied upon his property, deponent believed in good faith that
the agreement made in the instrument of compromise with the plaintiff had

been carried out and that suit, as well as the attachment, had been
dismissed.

instrument of compromise, but the plaintiff Weill said to him in reply that
the account could be fixed up later.

7. That in the months of February, March and April of the year 1913,
deponent delivered to Messrs. Lizarraga Hermanos, in conformity with the
agreement in said instrument of compromise, one thousand six hundred
and thirteen (1,613) piculs of sugar, from the sale whereof said firm turned
over to the plaintiff Weill the sum of P4,500, the net proceeds from the sale
said sugar, after deduction of the sum of P1,600 for expenses, instead of
the P2,000 stipulated in said instrument of compromise.

10. That on August 15, 1913, after judgment had been rendered against the
deponent by virtue of said suit and without his consent, as is hereinafter set
forth, an order of execution was issued and delivered to the sheriff, and
then deponent went to Iloilo to learn why the plaintiff had secured judgment
and execution against his property after the compact of compromise
hereinbefore mentioned had been entered into, and upon talking with the
plaintiff the latter agreed, in conformity with the stipulation in said compact
of compromise, not to take any further steps against the deponent by virtue
of said judgment, and thereupon, that is, August 15, 1913, plaintiff sent a
telegram to the sheriff, notifying him that said suit had been compromised
and directing him to suspend the execution.

8. That on April 5, 1914, the plaintiff Weill wrote deponent a letter, which
reads thus:
ILOILO, April 5, 1913.
Sr. FEDERICO CAET,
Bago, Occidental Negros.
MY DEAR SIR:
The bearer hereof, master of the lorcha Emilia, is leaving for your place to
pick up the sugar you have ready.
Seor Montinola showed me your telegram and it was very difficult to find a
lorcha.
Let us know whether you have any more on hand in order to send you more
transportation.
According to Seor Montinola the firm of Lizarraga Hermanos has during
this week received from you some two hundred eighty picul of sugar but
account has not yet been rendered us.
We remain,
Your obedient servants,
FOR LEVY HERMANOS,
(Sgd.) A. WEILL.
9. That on April 11, 1913, when the last sum from the proceeds of the sale
of said sugar, amounting to P200, had been delivered to the plaintiff,
deponent sent through his son-in-law, Angel Mascua, a message to the
plaintiff, requesting the latter to please fix up his account and give him a
memorandum of the balance still due after deduction of the proceeds of the
sale of the sugar, so that deponent could execute or deliver to plaintiff a
note for the balance of the debt, in conformity with the stipulation in the

11. That on August 24, 1913, notwithstanding the agreement made with the
deponent, plaintiff again directed the sheriff to proceed with said execution
and the latter, on the same day, took possession of the two automobiles
that had been sold by the plaintiff to deponent for the sum of P11,000; and,
on September 1, sold in the town of Bacolod, by virtue of the execution, for
the sum of P4,005, the Renault automobile for which deponent had paid
plaintiff P6,500; and, on September 12, in the city of Iloilo, the said Weill
took part in the auction and purchased for the sum of P600 the Brazier
automobile for which deponent had paid the plaintiff P4,500 and
subsequently sold it to a third party for the sum of P2,000.
12. That on Sunday, September 21, 1913, the said sheriff of Occidental
Negros, at the instance and petition of the plaintiff, went to deponent's
house on his hacienda in the town of Bago, Occidental Negros, and finding
the house closed, penetrated therein by force and levied attachment upon
and seized all the deponent's furniture and effects and took them to the
town of Bago in order to sell them, and there the said sheriff is preparing to
sell and will sell such furniture and effects at public auction.
13. That, upon going to Iloilo by reason of the notice of attachment of
August 15, deponent learned fore the first time that the suit of the
defendant Weill had not been dismissed, in conformity with said compact of
compromise of January 10, 1913, but that the said Ruperto Montinola,

attorney for deponent, and the plaintiff Abraham Weill had, illegally and
without deponent's knowledge, agreed to leave said suit pending and that
the said Ruperto Montinola, in conformity with the said unlawful compact of
February 27, 1913, had presented a reply, the contents whereof deponent
does not know.
14. That on March 28, 1913, Ruperto Montinola, conspiring deceitfully with
the plaintiff to defraud deponent, and without the latter's knowledge or
consent, drew up and submitted a petition asking that judgment be
rendered against deponent, as defendant in said suit, for the sum of
P10,750.99, and copy of this judgment, marked Exhibit B for it
identification, is annexed to this affidavit as an integral part thereof.
15. That on the same day, March 28, 1913 the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo Province rendered judgment against the deponent for the sum of
P10,758.99, in conformity with the petition mentioned that was presented
by deponent's attorney, and copy of this judgment, marked Exhibit C for its
identification, is annexed hereto as a part of this affidavit.

authorization sufficient in law for exercising the action brought by him or for
requesting that judgment be rendered in his favor, as the representative of
Levy Hermanos, because he was not the real party in interest with reference
to the subject matter of the action.
(Sgd.) FEDERICO CAET.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of September, 1913, by
Don Federico Caet who exhibited to me his personal cedula No. F-612224,
issued at Bago, Occidental Negros, January 7, 1913.
(Sgd.)
J.E.
Notary Public until December 31, 1914.

BLANCO,

(Notary's seal Doc. No. 122. Page No. 27.)

16. That deponent has in good faith carried out all the stipulations in the
compact of compromise of January 10, 1913, without ever having been
informed or having knowledge of the fact that the plaintiff Weill had not
fulfilled his agreement to dismiss said suit, and without knowledge that the
said Weill had secured judgment against the deponent as stated above.

That said affidavit was presented by the defendant to the Court of First
Instances of Iloilo, when the defendant knew that the facts and statements
contained in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, 17, and 18 of said affidavit
were false and contrary to the truth, that said statements are essential for
determination of said civil suit, and the defendant did deliberately,
maliciously and criminally swear to and present to the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo the said false affidavit for the purpose of securing a
decision in his favor, to prevent execution upon and sale of his property in
the said civil suit; in violation of the law.

17. That the said judgment was rendered against the deponent as a result
of the fraud of the said plaintiff Abraham Weill and of his own attorney
Ruperto Montinola, and by surprise and excusable negligence, on
deponent's part, in having confided implicity in said attorney Ruperto
Montinola, and in not having personally examined the orders of the Court of
First Instance to determine whether or not the plaintiff had carried out his
agreement to request dismissal of the suit.

To this amended information the defendant interposed another demurrer

based on the following grounds; (1) That the facts alleged in the information
do not constitute the crime charged against the accused, and (2) that the
crime charged was not committed, in any case, within the jurisdiction of the
court. This demurrer was overruled as to the first ground, but sustained as
to the second, and on March 24, 1914, the case was ordered dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff appeals from this order of dismissal.

18. That for the reason hereinbefore set forth the deponent has been the
victim of surprise and deceit, such as ordinary prudence was unable to
avoid, and by reason thereof he been greatly injured in his rights and
interest; and the judgment rendered in the said orders is completely null
and void for the reason that the plaintiff Abraham Weill lacked power or

In disposing of this appeal we follow substantially the line of reasoning

adopted in his brief by the Attorney-General, with which we are in entire
accord.

The only question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction. The lower court
found that the crime charged in the amended information was completed in
Manila, inasmuch as the affidavit upon which the charge of perjury rested
was subscribed and sworn to before a notary in that city, and therefore held
that it lacked jurisdiction over the offense.
Without considering or deciding whether the facts alleged sufficiently
charge the commission of the crime of perjury in the city of Manila, we hold
that the complaint sets forth facts which, if proven, are sufficient to sustain
a finding that the defendant committed the crime of perjury within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, in that in a judicial
proceeding pending in that court, "the defendant did deliberately,
maliciously and criminal swear to and present in the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo the said false affidavit," such affidavit being known to him to be
false, and being intended by him to mislead the court, It is immaterial
where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from
the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to"
and knowingly submitted false evidence material to a point at issue in a
judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province.
The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila,
but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit.
Viewed in this light, the question which the case presents for determination
resolves itself into an inquiry as to whether, in this jurisdiction, it is perjury
to submit under oath false evidence upon a material point in issue in a
judicial proceeding by means of an affidavit. Section 3 of Act No. 1697,
defining and penalizing the crime of perjury in the Philippine Islands, reads
as follows:
Any person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer,
or persons, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an
oath to be administered that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly,
or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him
subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes
any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of
perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand

pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall,
moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving
testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the
judgment against him is reversed.
As was said in the case of United States vs. Estraa (16 Phil. rep., 520),
"section 3 of our perjury law is practically the same as that of nearly all of
the State of the Union," and, 'by the common law, perjury is the willful and
corrupt taking of a false oath, lawfully administered, in a judicial proceeding
or the course of justice in regard to a matter material to the issue or point
of inquiry. (30 Cyc., 1399, the cases cited therein.) And further that "this
definition of perjury, as modified by statute, may be more accurately
defined to be the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood, under oath or
affirmation administered by authority of law, in material matter, the offense
being enlarged and made to extend to other false oaths than those taken in
the course of judicial proceedings. (30 Cyc., 1400, and cases cited.)"
Wharton, in his work on Criminal Law (11th ed. Vol. 2, sec. 1508), says:
"Perjury, as the offense, modified by statute, is now generally defined is the
corrupt assertion of a falsehood, under oath, or affirmation, and by legal
authority, for the purpose of influencing the course of law. Or, to give a
definition drawn from the older common-law authorities, it is the willful
assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge, made by a
witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his evidence, either upon oath or
in any from allowed by law to be substituted for an oath, whether such
evidence is given in open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such
assertion being known to such witness to be false, and being intended by
him to mislead the court, jury, or person holding the proceeding."
It will be seen that, according to this definition, willful assertion as to matter
of fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge made by a witness in a judicial
proceeding as part of his evidence, either upon oath or in any form allowed
by law to be substituted for an oath, and whether such evidence is given in
open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such assertion being known to
such witness to be false, and being intended by him to mislead the court
holding the proceeding, constitutes the crime of perjury.

In view of the definition of perjury, as modified by statute, which has been

accepted and followed in numerous cases, and upon the authority of the
case of the United States vs. Estraa, referred to above, we hold that it is
perjury in this jurisdiction to submit false evidence in a judicial proceeding
by means of an affidavit.
The conclusion thus reached is not only founded upon the soundest
principles of reason and of law, but is even demanded by paramount
consideration of public policy; for a contrary doctrine would open the way to
injustice and fraud. Our Code of Civil Procedure provides that evidence may
be given by means of an affidavit in certain instances (sec. 348), and that
such affidavit may be taken in a foreign country before any judge of a court
of record having a seal (sec. 351). It is easy to conceive of a case where a
person, interested in the outcome of a judicial proceeding pending in one of
the courts of these Islands, with the deliberate purpose of influencing the
course of law in his favor, might go to a foreign country, and there before a
judge of a proper court of record, subscribe and swear to an affidavit setting
forth facts known to him to be false, but perfectly suited for the purpose he
has in view, and then cause such affidavit to be filed with court in which the
case is pending. He could thus accomplish his purpose with absolute
impunity, if it should be held that it is not perjury in this jurisdiction to
submit under oath false evidence material to a point in issue in a judicial
proceeding by means of an affidavit, such as was done by the defendant in
the case at bar.
As was said in the case of Herring vs. State (199 Ga., 709; 46 S. E., 876):
"The nice and subtle technicalities with which some of the courts in the past
surrounded the crime of perjury rendered a conviction for that offense wellnight impossible. It is probable that these niceties were devised by the
common-law courts, on account of the barbarous punishment which was
visited upon persons convicted of this offense. The punishment has been
humanely mitigated, and at the same time the class of persons competent
to testify in court has been greatly enlarged. As all faith in judicial
proceedings rests upon the final sanction of an oath, it is good policy, not
only for this reason by for those above indicated, to facilitate, in so far as
may be consistent with law and justice, convictions for his crime."

The order entered in the court below sustaining the demurrer should be set
aside. without special condemnation of costs in this instance. So ordered.
Pp vs. Lucio Capinlac 07/15, 1937
This is an appeal taken from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the information filed by the
fiscal, which reads as follows:
That on or about February 6, 1931, in the municipality of Tarlac, Province of
Tarlac, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed defendant willfully, maliciously and feloniously, knowingly
making untruthful statements, made and subscribed an affidavit before the
register of deeds, Mr. Marcelo M. Sibal, who is authorized by law to receive
and administer oaths, upon facts pertinent to the issuance of an order of
the Court of First Tarlac for the purpose of causing the register of Deeds of
said province to issue to him a new copy of his homestead title No. 201
(Patent No. 3555), knowing such facts stated by him in the affidavit in
question to be false.
Contrary to law.
The defendant's demurrer was based principally upon the averment that the
facts alleged in the information do not constitute a crime. The lower court,
being of the opinion that the fact alleged in the information do not
constitute either the crime of false testimony under article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code or that of offering false testimony in evidence defined in
article 184 of said Code, held that the demurrer was well founded and
ordered the dismissal of the case. The provincial fiscal appealed from the
other of dismissal.
While the Solicitor-General agrees to the conclusions arrived at by the lower
court to the effect that the facts enlarged do not really constitute false
testimony under any of the two above cited articles, he contends, for the
first time in this instance, that the appealed order is not in accordance with
law and that the defendants demurrer should have been overruled on the
ground that the facts alleged in the information constitute falsification of a
public document. This court is of the opinion that the conclusion of the

lower court is correct, but not precisely for the reason that the fact alleged
in the information do not constitute any of the crimes defined in articles 183
and 184 of the Revised Penal Code, but because they do not constitute the
crime of perjury defined and punished in section 3 of Act No. 1697. It should
be taken into consideration that the acts imputed to the defendant took
place on February 6, 1931, according to the allegations of the information,
and the law then in force in the matter of perjury was said Act No. 1697
because the Revised Penal Code, articles 184 et seq. of which punish false
testimony, took effect only on January 1, 1932.
Even, if this court were to consider the question under the provision of said
section 3 of Act No. 1697, the conclusion arrived at would be the same on
the ground that the information do not allege facts constituting perjury. In
order that this crime could exist, it was necessary that the false statements
of the defendant referred to material matter and not merely to facts
pertinent to the case in connection with which they were made. The
allegation contained in the information in question is to the effect that the
defendant's false statements referred only to facts pertinent to the case
mentioned by him without stating, however, in what said facts consist. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable to the case at bar
because they are more severe and strict than those of Act No. 1697. The
rule is that penal laws have a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor
the person guilty of a felony (article 22, Revised Penal Code).
Without making it understood that this court sanctions the practice of
raising for the first time in this instance a question which could have very
well been raised in the lower court, it is held that neither is the information
sufficient to impute to the defendant the crime of falsification of a public
document. It does the effect that such is the charge against the defendant.
On the contrary, he is clearly false testimony or perjury. As stated in the
case of United States vs. Enriquez (1 Phil., 179), one of the purposes of
every information is to notify the defendant of the criminal acts imputed to
him so that he can duly prepare his defense. The information should state
the facts and the circumstances constituting the crime charged in such a
way that a person of common understanding may easily comprehend and
be informed of what it is about.

For the foregoing consideration, this court holds that the defendant's
demurrer to the information filed against him in accordance with law.
United States vs. Lope Estraa

Sept 06, 1910

The complaint filed in this case is as follows:

That on the 26th of July, 1909, in the municipality of Bacolod, Province of
Negros Occidental, Philippine Islands, the said Lope Estraa, having been
duly sworn as a witness in the Court of First Instance of the said province in
criminal case No. 1055, entitled "United States vs. Gil Gamao et al.,"1 for
murder, illegally, maliciously, willfully, and falsely testified and declared,
under oath, that on the 15th day of May, 1909, one Dionisio Tambolero
came to his house in Japitan, within the jurisdiction of the municipality of
Escalante, in said province, at about 7 p.m. on the said 15th day of May,
1909, and that he remained in the house of the said accused (Lope Estraa)
until the following day; when, as a matter of fact, and as accused, Lope
Estraa, well knew, the said Dionision Tambolero was not at Japitan on the
said 15th day of May, 1909; all of which was in violation of the statutes in
such case made and provided.
The accused was arraigned, plead not guilty, tried, convicted, and
sentenced to be confined in the Insular penitentiary, for the period of one
year and one day, and "to hereafter be incapable of holding public office or
of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands," and to pay the
costs of the cause. He appealed to this court.
The Roman Catholic priest in charge of the parish in the town of Escalante,
Province of Occidental Negros, was fatally wounded on the night of May 15,
1909, and died about 5 a.m. on the following morning. Subsequently
thereto criminal case No. 1055, wherein the United States was plaintiff and
Gil Gamao et al. were defendants, charged with the assassination of the
said priest, was instituted in the Court of First Instance in the said province.
The appellant, Lope Estraa, was called as a witness for the defense in said
criminal case and after being duly sworn according to law, testified, among
other things, that he was then living in the barrio of Japitan, jurisdiction of
the said town of Escalante, and that one Dionisio Tambolero came to his

house in the said barrio about 7 p.m. on May 15, 1909, and remained there
all night, leaving about 5 a.m. on the following morning. The prosecuting
officers, believing this testimony to be false, filed a complaint against the
appellant, charging him with the crime of perjury. On the trial of this case in
the court below the appellant again testified that the said Tambolero passed
the night of May 15, 1909, at his house, and called as witnesses to
corroborate him on this point his wife and stepson who did in fact
corroborate the testimony of the appellant, in that the said Tambolero came
to the appellant's house and passed the night of May 15, there, but they
could not specifically state the hour he left the following morning.
Dionisio Tambolero testified in this case that he did not know exactly where
the defendant's house is situated in the barrio of Japitan and that he never
was at any time in the house of the defendant in the said barrio; that on the
morning of the 15th of May, 1909, he went to the church in Escalante, heard
mass, and returned to his house in the said town of Escalante; that at about
4 o'clock in the afternoon he returned t the sacristia, arriving there abut 5
o'clock that afternoon, had a conversation with Natalio Inson about certain
baptisms which had taken place on that afternoon, and that on leaving
the sacristia he went to the store of one Jose Nieva and remained there until
about 6.30 or 7 o'clock in the evening; that on leaving this store he returned
to his own house and later went to the house of his compadre; that he and
his family did not sleep in his own house on the night of May 15 on account
of it being used for the storage of tobacco, but that they did sleep in the
next house, which was owned by an employee of his; that the next morning,
when he was informed by a policeman named Clemente Magallon of what
happened to the priest on the night before, he went direct to the convent,
arriving there a few minutes after 5 o'clock; that within one-half hour after
he arrived at the convent Gregorio Tudanca gave him some money and sent
him to a Chinese store to buy nails to be used in making a casket for the
deceased priest.
According to the testimony of this witness he did not leave the town of
Escalante at any time during the night of May 15, 1909. He was in
the sacristia of the church at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of May 15, and was
at the convent the following morning just a few minutes after 5 o'clock. The
testimony of this witness as to the time he was at the sacristia on the

afternoon of the 15th of May is corroborated with reference to the time he

went to the convent on the following morning is corroborated in every
particular by the testimony of Gregorio Tudanca, Celedonia Samonte, and
Vicente Olmedo, all of whom testified positively that they saw the said
Tambolero at the convent about 5 o'clock on the morning of the 16th of May
assisting in the preparation of the body of the deceased priest for
interment. So it has been conclusively established that Dionisio Tambolero
did not go to the house of the appellant in the barrio of Japitan on May 15,
neither did he spend the night of the 15th of May in the appellant's house.
Considering the distance from the appellant's house to the town of
Escalante, which requires at least two and one-half hours, either by land or
water, and the difficulties to be encountered in making this journey, it was a
physical impossibility for Tambolero to have left the house of the appellant
at the time stated by him (the appellant) and to have arrived at the convent
at the time he appeared there to assist in the burial of the priest. The
appellant, Lope Estraa, did therefore knowingly and intentionally testify
falsely, under oath, before a legally constituted tribunal, when he swore
that Tambolero passed the night of May 15 in his (appellant's) house.
The prosecution in this case is based on the said false testimony of the
appellant given in criminal case No. 1055. It may be inferred that Dionisio
Tambolero was a material witness for the prosecution in said criminal case
No. 1055. If said Tambolero did, in fact, testify as a witness for the
prosecution in that case, the record of the case at bar fails to disclose what
his testimony was. Tambolero did not state that he was a witness in the said
murder case (No. 1055), neither did he make any reference to what he
knew, if anything, about the commission of that murder; but on the
contrary, reading his testimony alone, it would appear that he knew nothing
about the facts surrounding the commission of that crime, as he stated that
after leaving the Chinese store he went to his own house, slept in the house
of one of his employees, and was informed the following morning by a
policeman that the murder had been committed. The only reference to the
testimony of Tambolero in said murder case appears in the appellant's brief,
wherein his counsel states that "In said case (referring to criminal case No.
1055) a witness for the prosecution, called Dionisio Tambolero, testified that
on the night of May 15, 1909, when the murder was committed he saw
Mauricio Gamao, with a bolo in his hand, come out of the lower part of the

convent." (Mauricio Gamao was one of the defendants charged with the
assassination of the priest in case No. 1055.) If this statement of counsel for
the appellant be accepted as true, hen Tambolero did testify that he saw
one of the defendants in that case (No. 1055) on the night of the murder
leaving the lower part of the convent with a bolo in his hand. This statement
of counsel will be considered later.
Counsel for the appellant insists that the court below should have dismissed
this case for the reason that the facts alleged in the complaint do not
constitute the crime of perjury as defined and punished by Act No. 1697,
basing his contention on the ground that in order to sustain a conviction
under said Act it was necessary to show that the appellant had testified
twice about a certain matter, his latter testimony testified once he should
have been charged with the crime of false swearing (falso testimonio),
under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Penal Code.
Section 3 of the Act No. 1697 is as follows:
Any person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer,
or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an
oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly,
or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him
subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes
any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of
perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand
pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall,
moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving
testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the
judgment against him is reversed.
This section specifically provides that any person who has taken an oath
before a competent tribunal that he will testify truly, or that any written
testimony by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath,
states or subscribes to any material matter which he does not believe to be
true, is guilty of perjury. This section does not impliedly require as an
essential element of the crime of perjury that a defendant who is
prosecuted for having violated these provisions should have testified twice
in any case or in any investigation, his second testimony being

contradictory of his first, but he can be charged and convicted of the crime
of perjury if he willfully testifies, under oath, as provided in said section, to
any material matter which he does not believe to be true.
In the case of the United States vs. Concepcion (13 Phil. Rep., 424), the
defendants were inspectors of the election board in the municipality of
Calibo, Province of Capiz, in the election for Delegates held on the 31st of
July, 1907. The defendants were accused and convicted for having violated
the provisions of the Election Law, in that they refused to inscribe the name
of one Esteban Leocario without just cause. The point in controversy in said
case was whether or not Esteban Leocario appeared before the inspectors
(the accused) in order to have his name registered in the electoral list. The
accused were convicted of having violated the provisions of the Election
Law and on appeal to this court the sentence and judgment of the lower
court was affirmed. The defendants having testified in that case that the
said Esteban Leocario did not appear before them on the day alleged, to
have his name registered as an elector, the prosecution filed a complaint
against the said defendants charging them with the crime of perjury. The
fact in controversy in both cases was only one, namely, the appearance or
nonappearance of Esteban Leocario before the election inspector. The
defendants having been convicted of the crime of perjury, they appealed,
and this court, in passing upon the questions involved, said (pp. 425, 429):
The important question in the case, however, is whether this offense is to
be punished by the provision of the Penal Code, articles 318 and following,
or whether these articles have been impliedly repealed by section 3 of Act
No. 1697. If the case falls within the provisions of the Penal Code and those
provisions are still in force, the judgment must be reversed, because this
case for perjury was tried and decided in the court below before the
testimony was given.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Our conclusion is that the articles of the Penal Code relating to perjury have
been repealed, and that the crime is now defined and punished by section 3
of Act No. 1697.

So the reason given by counsel for the appellant as to the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint is untenable, but there is a good reason why
the complaint is insufficient in law, and that is that there is no allegation in
this complaint that the testimony of the appellant in criminal case No. 1055
was material to the issues involved in said case. This question apparently
escaped the attention of the trial court, the prosecuting officers, and
counsel for the appellant. It is not mentioned anywhere in the record, nor
the brief's filed in this court.
As we have said, the appellant willfully and contrary to the oath which he
had taken, testified in said criminal case No. 1055 that Tambolero came to
his house about 7 p.m. on May 15 and remained there until 5 a.m. of the
next day. This testimony was false, but the record does not disclose (aside
from the statement of the counsel before mentioned) whether or not this
false testimony did affect, or could have in any way affected, the question
involved in said murder case.
It is now necessary to determine whether or not the appellant is guilty of
the crime of perjury under section 3 of Act No. 1697, above quoted (the
provisions of the Penal Code with reference to false testimony having been
repealed by Act No. 1697), when it is not alleged in the complaint, nor does
it appear from the record, that the false testimony given by the appellant in
said criminal case No. 1055 was material to the issues involved therein.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, it is well settled that an
indictment for perjury must show conclusively that the testimony given or
assertion made by the defendant on the trial on which he was sworn or it
will be fatally defective. This may be done either by a direct allegation that
it was material, or by the allegation of facts from which its materiality will
appear. (30 Cyc., 1433, and U. S. vs. Singleton, 54 Fed. Rep., 488; U. S. vs.
Cowing, 25 Fed. Cas., No. 14880, 4 Cranch C. C., 613; Hembree vs. State,
52 Ga., 242; State vs. Anderson, 103 Ind., 170 State vs. Gibson, 26 La. Ann.,
71; State vs. Williams, 60 Kan., 837; People vs. Ah Bean, 77 Cal., 12;
Gibson vs. State, 47 Fla., 16; State vs. Cunningham, 66 Iowa, 94; People vs.
Collier, 1 Mich., 137; Wood vs. People, 59 N. Y., 117; Buller vs. State, 33 Tex.
Cr., 551, and numerous other cases cited.)

No objections to the sufficiency of the complaint were made in the court

below, and it is now well settled that it is not error for this court to refuse to
sustain such objections taken for the first time on appeal when the fatal
defectsin the complaint are supplied by competent proof. (Serra vs. Mortiga,
204 U. S., 470, reported in 11 Phil. Rep., 762.)
The complaint in the case at bar is fatally defective for the want of an
allegation that the testimony, alleged to be false, was material to the issues
involved in the murder case. Our statute (section 3 of Act No. 1697, supra)
specifically makes materiality an essential element of the crime of perjury
and without this the crime can not legally exists. As no objection to the
sufficiency of the complaint was raised this fatal defect could have been
supplied by competent testimony on the trial.
The materiality of a
can not be left to
Nelson vs. State vs.
Garrett vs. State, 37

matter sworn to must be established by evidence and

the presumption or inference. (30 Cyc., 1443, and
Aikens, 32 Iowa, 403; wood vs. People, 59 N. Y., 117;
Tex. Cr., 198.)

The term "material matter" means the main fact which was the subject of
the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact
or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony
relative to the subject of the inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit
of any witness who testifies. (In reFranklin County, 5 Ohio S. and C. PI. Dec.
691; 7 Ohio, N. P., 450; People vs. Green well, 5 Utah, 112, 13 Pac., 89.)
By the common law perjury is the willful and corrupt taking of a false oath,
lawfully administered in a judicial proceeding or the course of justice in
regard to a matter material to the issue or point of inquiry. (30 Cyc., 1399,
and cases cited therein.)
This definition of perjury, as modified by statute, may be more accurately
defined to be the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood, under oath or
information administered by authority of law, in a material matter, the
offense being enlarged and made to extend to other false oaths than those
taken in the course of judicial proceedings. (30 Cyc. 1400, and cases cited.)

In the case of the State vs. Hattaway (10 Am., Dec., 580) one Shackleford
having indicted for stealing a cow and afterwards discharged, brought an
action against the prosecutor for malicious prosecution. In this action
Hattaway was called as a witness and testified that Shackleford purchased
the cow in question from one Carter, and that he was present at the time.
Being asked where he lived at the time, he said, "Near Carter's; perhaps
within 100 yards;" whereas it was proved that he did not live in the State.
The perjury assigned was his false testimony as to where he lived. The trial
court instructed the jury that the testimony was not material so as to
constitute perjury, but the jury thought otherwise and found the defendant
guilty. The defendant then moved to set aside the verdict as contrary to the
law, and the court in passing upon this motion said (p. 581):
It seems to be agreed by all the writers on criminal law, that one ingredient
in the crime of perjury is that the oath relate to some matter material to the
question in issue: . . . There can be no doubt but that an extrajudicial oath,
or one relating to a matter utterly immaterial, or even an impious oath,
taken in idle conversation, may be as offensive in the eye of justice. But
there are many offenses against morality and religion which are not
cognizable in courts of justice. For such offense, a man is answerable only
to his God, and not to the laws of his country. . . .
There is no offense the general character of which is better understood than
that of perjury; and no point better settled, perhaps, than that the oath
must relate to some fact material to the issue.
There is a distinction between perjury and false swearing; the one is
stubborn and corrupt, while the other is simply not true, lacking the
elements which go to constitute the crime of perjury. (Miller vs. State, 15
Fla., 577.)
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 is a copy, with the necessary changes only, of
section 5392 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. This section
(5392) is as follows:
Every person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes
an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify

truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by

him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oaths states or
subscribed is true, is guilty of perjury, which he does not believe to be true,
is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
thousand dollars, and by imprisonment, at hard labor, not more than five
years; and shall, moreover, thereafter be incapable of giving testimony in
any court of the United States until such time as the judgment against him
is reversed.
The essential parts of this section (5392) and section 3 of that Act No. 1697
are exactly the same. It is also true that section 3 of our perjury law is
practically the same as that of nearly all of the States of the Union wherein
materiality is made, by statute, an element of the crime.
An essential element of the offense created by the statute (section 5392,
Rev. Stat.) is the materiality of the matter charged to have been falsely
stated. (U. S. vs. Landsberg, 23 Fed. Rep., 585.)
In some jurisdictions the prosecution of perjury is continued until the same
proceedings in which the perjury is alleged to have been committed has
been ended, but under our law (Act No. 1697) it is not necessary that the
proceeding in which the perjury was committed should be terminated
before
prosecution
for
that
crime
is
commenced.
(U. S. vs. Concepcion, supra.) The contrary rule obtained for prosecutions
under the provisions of the penal code. (U. S. vs. Opinion, 6 Phil. Rep., 662;
and U. S. vs. Adolfo, 12 Phil. Rep., 296.) Where materiality is made by
statute, as in Act No. 1697, an essential element of the crime of perjury, the
doctrine of the courts that it must be shown by competent proof that the
false testimony was material to the issues involved, is settle beyond
question. This doctrine pervades the entire adjudged law on the subject.
"Whatever we move in this department of our jurisprudence we come in
contact with it. We can no more escape from it than from the atmosphere
which surrounds us."
Aside from the statement of counsel in his brief, heretofore referred to, the
prosecution has failed to establish the legal guilt of the accused of the
crime of perjury, inasmuch as it has not been proven in any manner that
the false testimony of the appellant was material in the murder case.

We shall now determine in what way, if any, the said statement of counsel
can affect the guilt of the accused. As we have said, he has not committed
a crime (if this statement of counsel does not affect the result) for which he
can be punished under the law in force in this jurisdiction. In order to
sustain a conviction based on a fatally defective complaint, the defects
must be supplied by competent proof. Counsel in his printed brief in this
court states that the witness Tambolero testified in said murder case that
when the murder was committed he saw one of the defendants come out of
the lower part of the convent with a bolo in his hands. This is not a
confession, as there is a marked difference between a confession and such
a statement, but this is purely a statement by counsel made in the
appellate court. It is more than probable that the appellant himself knows
nothing of this statement; no doubt he has never seen the brief filed in this
case. So such a statement made for the first time on appeal is not
competent proof to established the guilt of the appellant. when such guilt
must depend solely upon the said statement. Counsel for appellant was not
authorized by his client to make this statement.
In the case of Sweet Clayton vs. State (4 Tex. App., 515), George Spears and
Sweet Calyton were indicated in the district court of Uvalde, Texas, for the
crime of conveying, or causing to be conveyed, into the jail of Uvalde
County, certain instruments for the purpose of aiding two prisoners to make
their escape. A motion for the arrest of the judgment was made in the court
of appeals, based on the ground of the insufficiency of the indictment. The
court did not sustain the contention of counsel for the defendants, but on its
own motion reversed the judgment on another ground which was not raised
by counsel and which referred to the admissions made by defendant's
counsel, and in passing upon this question the court, speaking through Mr.
Justice White, said (p. 518):
The charge of the court, which was otherwise unexceptionable, presents an
error which will necessitate a reversal of the case. In the fourth subdivision
of the charge the jury are told that "it is admitted by the defendant's
counsel that John Woods and Lark Calyton were prisoners legally confined in
the county jail of Unvalde County, on an accusation of felony, to wit, theft of
a cow." As was said in the case of Nels vs. The State: The prisoner's counsel
had no authority to make any statement or admission to supply the place or

have the force of evidence against him. No confession of theirs could bind
or affect him. Their admission could not in law prejudice or affect his rights;
nor could they be in any wise jeopardized by the assumption of any grounds
whatever upon which his defense may have been placed by his counsel.
Whether those grounds were correct or incorrect, true or false, was wholly
immaterial. That was not the question for the consideration of the jury,
whose duty it was to decide the question of the guilt or innocence upon the
law as given them by the court, and the evidence as given by the
witnesses, irrespective of any admissions by the prisoner's counsel, or any
grounds upon which they may have rested his defense.
In this case, defendant's counsel no doubt admitted in open court, at the
time the defendants were on trial and in their presence, that the said Woods
and Clayton were prisoners legally confined. It does not appear that the
defendants made any objections to the said admission. Notwithstanding all
these facts the court reversed the judgment solely for this reason.
In the case at bar we do not find it necessary to go as far as the Texas court
did, for the reason that the statement of counsel for the appellant was not
made in the trial court and this record fails to disclose whether said
statement was made in the presence of the accused; but it does
conclusively show that the same was made for the first time in the printed
brief on appeal. So such a statement can not be accepted as competent
proof to supply the fatal defects in the complaint and form the basis upon
which a conviction can be entered. Our conclusions are, therefore, that the
appellant is not guilty of the crime of perjury for the reasons above set
forth. The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de
officio.
Feliciano C. Maniego vs. Pp April 10, 1951
This petitioner was convicted, by the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals,
of a violation of article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. He pleads for
acquittal, insisting upon purely legal points.
The facts found by that appellate court are substantially the following:

That on February 27, 1947, the accused, although appointed as a laborer,

had been placed in charge of issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic
violations in the Sala of Judge Crisanto Aragon of the Municipal Court of the
City of Manila. It appears furthermore, from the testimony of Clerk of Court
Baltazar and Fiscal De la Merced, then Deputy Fiscal attending to traffic
violations, that the accused had been permitted to write motions for
dismissal of prescribed traffic cases against offenders without counsel, and
to submit them to the Court for action, without passing through the regular
clerk. On the day in question, Felix Rabia, the complainant herein, appeared
and inquired from the accused about a subpoena that he received. He was
informed that it was in connection with a traffic violation for which said
Rabia had been detained and given traffic summons by an American MP.
The accused after a short conversation went to Fiscal De la Merced and
informed the Fiscal that the case had already prescribed. The Fiscal having
found such to be the case, instructed the accused that if the traffic violator
had no lawyer, he could write the motion for dismissal and have it signed by
the party concerned. This was done by the accused and after the signing by
Felix Rabia the matter was submitted to the Court, which granted the
petition for dismissal.
According to Felix Rabia and Agent No. 19 (La forteza) of the National
Bureau of Investigation, the accused informed Rabia that the latter was
subject to a fine of P15; that Rabia inquired whether the same could be
reduced because he had no money, and that the accused informed Rabia
that he could fix the case if Rabia would pay him P10; which Rabia did and
the accused pocketed. This charged was denied by the accused.
The pertinent portion of article 210 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of
any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or
through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods and fine of not lees than
the value to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon if the
same shall have been committed.

If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an

act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he
shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph. . . .
As correctly indicated by counsel for petitioner the four essential elements
of the offense are: (1) the the accused is a public officer within the scope of
article 203 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that the accused received by
himself or thru another, some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such
gift, present or promises has been given in consideration of his commission
of some crime or any act not constituting a crime; (4) that the crime or act
relates to the exercise of the functions of the public officer.
There can be no question that petitioner was a public officer within the
meaning of article 203, which includes all persons "who, by direct provision
of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take
part in the performance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or
shall perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an
employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class." That definition
is quite comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public servant from the
highest to the lowest. For the purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the
standard distinction in the law of public officers between "officer" and
"employee".
Petitioner, however, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in regarding
him as a public officer, expounded and discussed several grounds arranged
under the following hearings:
a. The doctrine of "the temporary performance of public functions by a
laborer" should not apply in defendant's case.
b. The overt act imputed on the accused does not constitute a circumstance
by which he may be considered a public official.
c. His appointment as laborer came from one source, while the designation
and delimitation of the functions of his appointment came from another
source.
After having carefully considered the expository argumentation, we are
unconvinced. The law is clear, and we perceive no valid reason to deny
validity to the view entertained by the Spanish Supreme Court that, for the
purposes of punishing bribery, the temporary performance of public
functions is sufficient to constitute a person a public official. This opinion, it

must be stated, was followed and applied by the Court of Appeals because
the accused, although originally assigned to the preparation of summons
and subpoenas, had been allowed in some instance to prepare motions for
dismissal of traffic cases.
And this Tribunal has practically concurred with the Spanish court when it
opined1 that a laborer in the Bureau of Post temporarily detailed as filer of
money orders was a public officer within the meaning of article 203 of the
Revised Penal Code. Indeed, common sense indicates that the receipt of
bribe money is just as pernicious when committed by temporary employees
as when committed by permanent officials.
The second essential element has likewise been proven. The Court of
Appeals said this petitioner received ten pesos from Rabia (and pocketed
the money) in consideration of his "fixing" Rabia's case, and thereafter he
"fixed" it by filing a motion for dismissal, which was approved in due course.
In connection with the last two elements of the offense, it should be stated
that our pronouncements under the first sufficiently answer petitioner's
propositions elaborated in several parts of his brief, revolving around the
thesis that since he was a mere laborer by appointment he may not be
convicted, because the preparation of motions for dismissal is not surely the
official function of a laborer. Enough to recall that although originally
appointed as a mere laborer, this defendant was on several occasions
designated or given the work to prepare motions for dismissal. He was
consequently temporarily discharging such public functions. And as in the
performance thereof he accepted, even solicited, monetary reward, he
certainly guilty as charged.

protection that RA 7610 accords to this helpless sector of society.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED, but the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000. Costs
against appellant.
Ricardo Parulan vs. Director of Prisons

Feb 17, 1968

On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to

the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to
release immediately and without delay the body of the petitioner from
unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief prayed for on certain
allegations in the petition, to the effect that petitioner's confinement in the
state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, under the administrative and
supervisory control of the respondent Director of Prisons, is illegal, for the
reason that the sentence of conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the
crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code, was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his
person and of the offense with which he was charged.

People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto B. Larin Oct 7, 1998

It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, was confined in the
state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life
imprisonment which, however, was commuted to twenty (20) years by the
President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred to the
military barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley) situated at
Makati, Rizal, under the custody of the Stockade Officer of the said military
barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while still serving his prison term
as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his confinement. Petitioner was
recaptured in the City of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of
service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code,
before the Court of First Instance of Manila, after due trial, petitioner was
found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced accordingly with the
imposable penalty prescribed by law, on August 3, 1966.

Republic Act. No. 7610 penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuses.
It was enacted in consonance with the policy of the State to "provide special
protection to children from all forms of abuse." The Court thus applies this
law to the present case and grants the victim the full vindication and

Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition, and on the
basis thereof, we shall proceed to discuss the merits of the case regarding
the validity and legality of the decision sentencing the petitioner to a prison
term for the crime of evasion of sentence.

Wherefore, there being no issue about the penalty imposed, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed in toto. With costs.

Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional

rights, lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive
penalty affords grounds for relief by habeas corpus.
The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First
Instance of Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose
the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense with which he was charged
evasion of service of sentence?
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Place where action is to be instituted. (a) In all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality of province where the offense was committed or any of the
essential ingredients thereof took place.
There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses
because some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one
province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the
court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime
took place has jurisdiction to try the case.1 As Gomez Orbaneja opines
Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos resultados como hechos
independientes en sentido natural, el principio del resultado no basta para
fijar el forum delicti commisi, y ha de aceptarse que el delito se comete en
cualquiera de los lugares donde se produzca uno de pesos plurales
resultados.2
There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof
for its consummation may have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of
the very nature of the offense committed, the violation of the law is deemed
to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or malversation3 and
abduction 4 may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are
the crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where the deprivation of
liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another 5 and libel
where the libelous matter is published or circulated from one province to
another. 6 To this latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of
service of sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service

of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus defeat the
purpose of the law, moves from one place to another; for, in this case, the
act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a
single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it
may be. It may not be validly said that after the convict shall have escaped
from the place of his confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as
long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to
continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at
any place where he may be found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court
may be invoked in support of this conclusion, for, under section 6[c] thereof,
one of the instances when a person may be arrested without warrant is
where he has escaped from confinement. 7 Undoubtedly, this right of arrest
without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest,
the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime evading the
service of his sentence.
WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.
In Re: Antonio Infante
Antonio Infante vs. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental
12/12/1952
This was a petition of habeas corpus filed in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental by Antonio Infante, and the petition having been
granted, the Provincial Fiscal has appealed to this Court.
It appears that the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17
years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, which he
recommended to serve on June 21, 1927, and that on March 6, 1939, after
serving 15 years, 7 months and 11 days he was granted a conditional
pardon and released from imprisonment, the condition being that "he shall
not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines".
On April 25, 1949, Infante was found guilty by the Municipal Court of
Bacolod City of driving a jeep without license and sentence to pay a fine of
P10 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On July 13, 1950,
"by virtue of the authority conferred upon His Excellency, the President, by
section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code", the Executive Secretary

ordered Infante re-arrested and re-committed to the custody of the Director

of Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, for breach of the condition of the aforesaid
pardon.lawphil.net
It was the main contention of the petitioner that section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code upon which he was ordered re-incarcerated,
had been abrogated, and he was sustained by the court below.
Since this appeal was taken, this Court has handed down a decision (Sales
vs. Director of Prisons * 48 Off. Gaz., 560) in which these ruling were laid
down:
The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930,
contains a repealing clause (article 367), which expressly repeals among
other acts sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code.
It does not repeal section 64 (i) above quoted. On the contrary, Act No.
4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which is subsequent to the Revised
Penal Code, in its section 9 expressly preserves the authority conferred
upon the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the
President to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any person who
violates the condition or conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the
enactment of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. In this connection, we
observed that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code and article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code are but a reiteration of 3?3 Acts Nos. 1524 and
1561, under which a violator of a conditional pardon was liable to suffer and
to serve the unexpired portion of the original sentence.
We are of the opinion that article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes violation of a conditional pardon as an offense, and the power
vested in the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code
to authorize the recommitment to prison of a violator of a conditional
pardon to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence, can stand
together and that the proceeding under one provision does not necessarily
preclude action under the other. . . .

The second ground of the petition was that the remitted penalty for which
the petitioner had been recommitted to jail one year and 11 days had
prescribed. This contention was also sustained in the appealed decision.
Said the Court:
Segun el articulo 92 del Codigo Penal Revisado, la pena de un (1) ao y
once (11) dias que corresponde a la pena de prision correccional, prescribe
a los diez (10) aos.
Por manera que, habiendo transcurrido mas de diez (10) aos la
responsabilidad criminal del solicitante proviniente de la infraccion de su
indulto bajo condicion, ha prescrito con exceso.
The contention is not well taken. According to article 93 of the Revised
Penal Code the period of prescription of penalties commences to run from
the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. It is
evident from this provision that evasion of the sentence is an essential
element of prescription. There had been no such evasion in this case. Even
if there had been one and prescription were to be applied, its basis would
have to be the evasion of the unserved sentence, and the computation
could not have started earlier than the date of the order for the prisoner's
rearrest.
We think, however, that the condition of the pardon which the prisoner was
charged with having breached was no longer operative when he committed
a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law.
Pardon is an act of grace, and there is general agreement that limitations
upon its operation should be strictly construed (46 C.J. 1202); so that, where
a conditional pardon is susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is to
be construed most favorably to the grantee. (39 Am. Jur., 564) Thus, in Huff
vs. Dyer, 40 Ohio C.C. 595, 5. L R A, N S, Note 1064), it was held that the
duration of the conditions subsequent, annexed to a pardon, would be
limited to the period of the prisoner's sentence unless an intention to
extend it beyond that time was manifest from the nature of the condition or
the language in which it was imposed. In that case, the prisoner was
discharged on habeas corpus because the term of the pardon in question
did not, in the opinion of the court, imply that it was contemplated to have

the condition operated beyond the term of his sentence. The herein
petitioner's pardon, it will be noted, does not state the time within which
the conditions thereof were to be performed or observed. In adopting, which
we hereby do, the rule of strict construction, we take into account, besides
the benevolent nature of the pardon, the fact that the general run out
prisoners are unlettered or at least unfamiliar with the intricacies and legal
implications of conditions subsequent imposed in a pardon.

sentence could have been intended as a reward for his past exemplary
behavior with little or no thought of exacting any return from him in the
form of restraint from law violations, for which, after all, there were
independent and ample punishments. The judgment of the lower court is
affirmed, without costs.

There are courts which have gone so far as to hold, not without plausible
argument, that no conditions can be attached to a pardon that are to
extend after the expiration of the term for which the prisoner was sentence,
although this view is not shared by the weight of authority. (39 Am., Jur.
564, 567; 46 C.J. 1201.)

Santiago Austero, a police sergeant at Tiwi, a town in the Province of Albay,

proposed to Barbara Cirio, a young woman 16 years of age, who was
married to Gregorio Colada, that he pay the land tax for her on certain land
inherited from her father, in exchange for a hog that belonged to her. The
offer was accepted and Santiago Austero handed to Barbara Cirio two
receipts for payment of the land tax made out in favor of Angel Cirio,
Barbara's father, and thereupon obtained delivery of the hog which was
valued at P45. Barbara Cirio, however, was subsequently notified by the
municipal treasurer that she was delinquent in the payment of said tax, in
view of which her husband, Gregorio Colada, went to the municipality with
the two receipts showing the payment of the tax as delivered by Austero;
but Santiago Austero, who was there, snatched them from his hand and tore
them up; the pieces were, however, recovered later on and the receipts
thus pieced together and offered in evidence as corpus delicti, being
Exhibits A and B, demonstrated the fraud which had been perpetrated on
the young woman Cirio by giving her receipts with which she could prove no
payment whatever.

Unless the petitioner's pardon be construed as above suggested, the same,

instead of an act of mercy, would become an act of oppression and
injustice. We can not believe that in exchange for the remission of a small
fraction of the prisoner's penalty it was in the Executive's mind to keep
hanging over his (prisoner's) head during the rest of his life the threat of
recommitment and/or prosecution for any slight misdemeanor such as that
which gave rise to the order under consideration.1awphil.net
There is another angle which militates in favor of a strict construction in the
case at bar. Although the penalty remitted has not, in strict law, prescribed,
reimprisonment of the petitioner for the remainder of his sentence, more
than ten years after he was pardoned, would be repugnant to the weight of
reason and the spirit and genius of our penal laws. If a prisoner who has
escaped and has given the authorities trouble and caused the State
additional expense in the process of recapturing him is granted immunity
from punishment after a period of hiding, there is at least as much
justification for extending this liberality through strict construction of the
pardon to one who, for the same period, has lived and comported as a
peaceful and law-abiding citizen.
Not improper to consider in this connection is the circumstance that the
prisoner's general conduct during his long confinement had been
"excellent", which had merited his classification as a trustee or penal
colonist, and that his release before the complete extinguishment of his

United States vs. Santiago Austero

Oct 27, 1909

All the foregoing facts have been fully proven; the silence of the defense
has contributed to such proof; it has offered no evidence at all, resting its
case solely on the point of law as to whether, by such acts, the crime of
falsification was committed or merely that of estafa.
The falsification charged in the complaint consists, according to the same,
in that "the accused did falsify official public documents, to wit, two land tax
receipts, Provincial Form 25, numbered . . . whereon the name of Dionisio
Austero originally appeared, making on said document, which was a lawful
and real one, an alteration which changed its sense, that is to say, erasing
the name written thereon and subsisting for it that of Angelo Cirio, the
father of the injured woman."

Counsel for the accused has admitted it so appears apud acta that the
receipts A and B were originally made out to Dionisio Austero . . . .
Dionisio Austero was the father of Santiago Austero and held the receipts in
question showing the payment made by him for the land tax in 1902.
Santiago Austero erased the name of his father, Dionisio Austero, and wrote
over the erasure the name of Angelo Cirio, the father of Barbara Cirio, so as
to show that the latter had paid the same tax for the year 1904; he thus
managed to deceive her and profit thereby to the extent of a hog, valued,
as already stated, at P45.
The defense endeavored to show that the above facts constitute the crime
of estafa only, not that of falsification, and in support thereof cited the
decisions of this Supreme Court in the cases of United States vs. Paraiso (1
Phil. Rep., 66), United States vs. Roque (1 Phil. Rep., 372), United States vs.
Leyson (5 Phil. Rep., 447), United States vs. Sayson (6 Phil. Rep., 382),
and United States vs. Angeles (6 Phil. Rep., 435).
In the instance the Attorney-General very rightly observes that none of the
above-cited decisions apply in the present case.
In the cause against Paraiso the doctrine is established that "the agent of a
mercantile concern who signs false receipts with the name of a third person
is not guilty of falsification under articles 300 and 304 of the Penal Code if
he does not attempt to imitate the signature or mark of that person." In that
against Roque: "The signing of another's name to a receipt with design to
deceive does not constitute falsification unless there is an attempt to
imitate the genuine signature." In that against Buenaventura: When no
attempt has been made to imitate the signature or writing of another, there
can be no conviction for falsification . . . ." And in that against Leyson:
"Leyson did then and there counterfeit and feign the signature of J. Y.
McCartey . . . ." In all of the foregoing decisions the matter at issue has
been the falsification of signatures.
The case at bar has not to do with the falsification of a signature, nor is it
necessary to inquire whether or not an attempt was made to imitate the
signature or writing which constitutes the sign of authenticity, or reason for
according credit to the document. The falsified documents in question are

printed ones. The blanks that are filled out in this class of documents with
the name of the taxpayer, the location of the property and certain figures,
need not, nor can they be imitated, inasmuch as their authenticity lies in
the issue thereof by an officer authorized by law so to do, and in the stub
from which the same are detached when lawfully issued. As the complaint
states, the documents exhibited in the case are genuine ones, the
falsification consists in that the truth therein contained has been altered.
In the cases against Sayson and Angeles, this Supreme Court has
established the doctrine that the falsification of seals, or of certificates of
ownership of cattle, is not punished under article 301 in connection with
article 300 of the Penal Code, but by article 311, as in the case of Sayson,
and 312 as in that of Angeles.
The above cases refer to special kinds of falsification, different from the
eight general forms specified in article 300. In none of them has reference
been made to any acts that might be qualified as estafa but to acts that
purely and simply constitute the crime of falsification.
The established rule has been constantly maintained, both in Spain and in
its colonial possessions, as well as by the Supreme Court in these Islands in
punishing, under paragraph 1 of article 300, the counterfeiting of feigning
of a signature, writing, or rubric, only when an attempt is made to imitate
the signature, writing, or rubric of a person in order to induce another to
accept the document as written, signed, or rubricated by the former.
Counterfeiting consists in making one thing so similar to another that they
can only be distinguished with difficulty. To feign a signature, writing, or
rubric is to imitate the same. Where the imitation is such that anyone would
mistake it for the signature, writing, or rubric that was imitated, the crime of
falsification is committed as defined by paragraph 1 of article 300 of the
Penal Code. Where said imitation is not complete, or, when there is no
limitation, and the signature, writing, or rubric does not appear
counterfeited, but the issuance or execution of a document is merely
supposed to have been done by a certain person then the case defined by
article 300 does not apply.
All the foregoing and elemental doctrine does not apply in the present case;
the question is not whether the accused counterfeited or feigned the

signature, writing, or rubric of some person, nor had he any necessity to

imitate another's writing. By substituting the name of Angelo Cirio for that
of Dionisio Austero he did not counterfeit or feign any signature, writing, or
rubric whatever. What he did do was to foist a printed document as a
receipt to Angelo Cirio for the payment of the land tax for 1903; it was not a
false one by reason of the fiction of the signature, writing, or rubric
appearing thereon, but a real and authentic one issued in favor of Dionisio
Austero as a voucher of a payment made by him in 1902 for his land tax. He
who shall feign the handwriting of a document, thereby attempting to cause
others to believe that it was written by a given person, or imitates the
signature or rubric of said person in order to induce the belief that it was
drawn by him, utters a false document. But a document genuine in every
respect, made out in favor of Dionisio Austero, but which subsequently
turns out to be false because in lieu of said name, that of Angelo Cirio has
been inserted is not a false document by reason of the counterfeiting or
feigning of the signature, writing, or rubric of any person, but by reason of
the alteration made thereon and which is punished under paragraph 6 of
article 300 above cited.
The Attorney-General has therefore in this instance very properly applied
the doctrine set up by two decisions of this court, and by another of the
supreme court of Spain which, and especially the latter, are conclusive in
defining the responsibility of the culprit, the extent and the manner of
applying the penalty.
In the case of the United States vs. Victoria (9 Phil. Rep., 81) although it
deals with the crime of falsification of a private document, while in the
present case the falsification of a public one is involved, the fundamental
doctrine is the same. Victoria had altered an account which called for the
sum of P10 by substituting a "3" for the "1" so as to make it appear "P30"
instead of "P10" and had collected P30 from the payor of the account; he
was a clerk in a commercial firm to which he, however, only handed P10,
profiting thereby to the extent of P20. "The fact," as this court said,
"involves the characteristics of the crime of estafa, besides that of
falsification, which served as the means for its commission, because by
adopting deceitful means he obtained a price which he would not otherwise
have secured by telling the truth."

The above decision has nothing to do with the previous ones even as
paragraph 6 of article 300 of the Penal Code has nothing to do with the
paragraph 1 thereof. A document is not falsified in one manner only;
according to the said article there are eight; each paragraph indicates a
different species, and clearly the various species within the class must
necessarily differ from each other as each is a specific variation in the class,
or type of crime. 1awph!l.net
In the decision rendered in the case of the United States vs. Llames (1 Phil.
Rep., 130), the court held: "The writing of a false receipt by an employee of
the revenue department for the purpose of embezzling the amount is a
necessary means for the commission of the latter offense and the penalty is
that of the higher offense, to wit, that of falsification."
The decision rendered by the supreme court of Spain on the 14th of
December, 1888, reads as follows:
An employee of a city government (Ayuntamiento) who alters the figures in
a warrant officially issued for the payment of municipal obligations, and by
said means unlawfully appropriates a certain sum of money, commits the
crime of estafa defined by paragraph 1 of article 547 of the Penal Code of
Spain (art. 534 of that of the Philippines), through the falsification of an
official document as included in article 315 (301 of that of the Philippines).
Since the falsification was a necessary means to commit the estafa, article
90 of the code (89 of that of the Philippines) must of necessity be applied to
the case in order to impose, in strict compliance therewith, the penalty for
the more serious crime in its maximum degree.
The estafa committed by this accused consisted of the gain which, by
deceitful means, he obtained from a hog valued at P45, a sum less than 250
pesetas. This is punished by the code with he penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium degrees.
The deceit consisted in the delivery of a true printed official document,
which was a land-tax receipt issued to Dionisio Austero for the year 1902;
the accused changed the name written thereon to that of Angelo Cirio so as
to make it appear as a receipt for the land tax due by the latter, as if he had
paid it for the year 1903 or 1904; he thus committed the falsification

defined in paragraph 6 of article 300, which consists of making alteration or

interlineation in a genuine document which alters its meaning, and "which
is punished with presidio mayor and a fine of from 1,250 to 12,500
pesetas."
But inasmuch as under article 89 where one of the crimes is the necessary
means for committing the other, only the penalty corresponding to the
more serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum degree, and as the
maximum degree of presidio mayor is from ten years and one day to twelve
years, the penalty of eleven years and one day of presidio mayor should be
imposed on the accused herein.
The Court of First Instance of Albay which tried the case sentenced the
accused to eight years and one day of presidio mayor, to the accessory
penalties, to pay a fine of 1,250 pesetas, to make restitution of the hog to
Barbara Cirio or otherwise pay P45, the value of the same, and to pay the
costs.
From the said judgment the accused has appealed.
It being understood that the main penalty shall be eleven years and one
day of presidio mayor the judgment appealed from is otherwise affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
United States vs. Nicasio Capule

Jan 2, 1919

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction rendered in this

case by the Honorable Vicente Jocson, judge.
On September 2, 1903, Nicasio Capule, for the purpose of appropriating to
himself a tract of coconut land, situated in the town of San Pablo, Laguna,
without the knowledge or consent of the owners thereof, the married couple
Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili, by agreement and cooperation with the
notary public, Inocente Martinez, who later died, prepared and drew up a
document setting forth the sale in his favor of the said land, pretending that
it was made and executed by the said owners of the tract, stating in the
document that they had made the declaration that they had sold said land
for the sum of 550 pesos paid at the time of the sale to the vendors, and
Jacinto Peaflor and Jorge Tolentino appear in said document as witnesses of

the execution thereof; and Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia as the signers
of the deed of sale, because the alleged vendors did not know how to do so.
Recorded at the bottom of the document was their ratification of its
contents in the presence of said notary, before whom the said married
couple appeared. The defendant Capule exhibited said document later,
although he had been assured that it was false, in a trial before the justice
of the peace of that town in the attempt to sustain his alleged right to the
said piece of land.
For this reason a complaint was filed on February 3, 1910, by the provincial
fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, charging Nicasio Capule with
the crimes of falsification of a public document and estafa. After due trial
the judge rendered judgment therein on March 21, 1911, sentencing Nicasio
Capule to the penalty of eight years of presidio mayor, to payment of a fine
of 2,000 pesetas, the accessories, and the costs; from which judgment the
defendant appealed.
The document whose falsification is here in question, Exhibit A, the original
whereof appears at pages 17 and 148 of the file exhibits and has been
attached to the complaint, seems to have been executed on September 2,
1903, by Aniceto Maghirang y Espiritu and Isabel Pili y Emnaceno, of legal
age, residents of San Pablo, who declare therein that they have agreed with
the accused Capule on the real and absolute sale of a piece of land planted
with 42 fruit-bearing coconut trees and approximately 300 not bearing fruit,
for the sum of P550, which the purchaser has paid them to their entire
satisfaction, which land is located in the place called Quinayoan, barrio of
Dolores of the said town, with its boundaries and situation stated; and
further setting forth that the land is the property of Isabel Pili, who acquired
it by inheritance from her deceased niece, Claudia Reyes, according to a
certified copy of some affidavit proceedings; that the land described had
not been sold, ceded or encumbered in favor of any person other than
Nicasio Capule, to whom then and thenceforth they delivered the
possession and usufruct of said land as its legitimate owner, with right to
alienate it, they being responsible to Capule, his heirs and successors in
interest for the ownership, and agreeing to defend him against any just
claims that might be presented; and Nicasio Capule y Capitulo, informed of
the contents of the document by the vendor married couple, accepted it on

his part; and as the vendors do not know how to sign Eulogio Ortega and
Doroteo Guia do so at their request, as does also the purchaser, who signs
the document in duplicate and to the same effect in the town hall of San
Pablo, and there furthermore appear therein the signatures of Jacinto
Peaflor and Jorge Tolentino as witnesses. On the same date appears the
certificate of the notary public, whose commission extended to January 1,
1905, wherein it is recorded that personally appeared before him the
married couple Maghirang and Pili, whom he knew as the executors of the
foregoing document and they ratified it as executed of their own free will,
the husband, as well as the purchaser, exhibiting his cedula, but not the
woman because she was exempt from payment thereof.
It likewise appears from the evidence adduced in this case that said married
couple Maghirang and Pili were the owners of said land, which they
possessed and had the usufruct of and for which they paid to the
Government the corresponding land tax; that on January 31, 1904, said
married couple sold a portion of said land with 150 coconut trees to Esteban
Reyes and his wife Elisea Maghirang for 250 pesos, according to Exhibit B,
and since then Reyes has possessed and had the usufruct of the portion of
land he had bought, and made declaration before the land-tax board in
May, 1906, as of land belonging to him, according to Exhibit E, which sale
was ratified by the vendors in favor of Reyes before the notary Segundo
Abrera on May 2, 1908, Exhibit C.
On May 2, 1908, the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili
likewise sold the remaining portion of the said land with its coconut trees to
Melecio Brias for the sum of 650 pesos, before the notary public Segundo
Abrera, according to Exhibit J, and since then Brias has possessed and had
the usufruct of the land purchased, although in the tax list the tract
continues in the name of the vendor, who had made declaration in May,
1906, Exhibit K, and had been paying the tax from 1903, Exhibit P, although
Reyes, the owner of one part which he had bought in 1904, appears to have
paid the tax up to 1910, Exhibit F. Although Esteban Reyes was in lawful
possession of a portion of the land he had purchased, on February 2, 1909,
Nicasio Capule filed a complaint before the justice of the peace of San Pablo
accusing him of the theft of coconuts from the land he possessed and of
which Reyes was the owner; but the court dismissed the case for lack of

evidence of the right alleged by the plaintiff, with the costs against him,
Exhibit D, page 17 of the record.
On April 16, 1909, Nicasio Capule, claiming to be the owner of the coconut
land situated in Dolores, the subject matter of an alleged sale, accused the
married couple Maghirang and Pili and Eusebio Soriano of theft, and in spite
of the fact that he exhibited the document marked "Exhibit A", setting forth
the said sale made in his favor by that married couple, the justice of the
peace acquitted the accused of the crime of theft, Exhibit 1, page 67; and
on June 4, 1909, according to Exhibit I, page 107 of said record, Aniceto
Maghirang and Guadalupe Javier were also acquitted of the crime of
coercion with which they were accused.
On October 21, 1909, Nicasio Capule and his wife were accused by Nemesio
Brias of the crime of theft in the justice of the peace court of San Pablo
and upon trial were sentenced to two months of arresto mayor and
payment of P14.25 with the costs, from which judgment they appealed to
the Court of First Instance, page 54 of the record, although at the request of
the fiscal the case was dismissed, because the action exercised by the
complainant had to be settled in a civil suit.
Although Capule presented, in some of the said hearings before the justice
of the peace court of San Pablo, the deed of sale, Exhibit A, for the purpose
of proving that he was the owner of the land in question, yet in the
judgments rendered therein said instrument was held to be false and no
probative value whatever was attached to it.
Aniceto Maghirang denies that he sold the said land to Nicasio Capule or
that he executed in his favor any document of sale, stating that he had
conferred a power of attorney upon him so that he might represent himself
and his wife, who later died, in a suit they had with Maximino Reyes,
because of the absolute confidence they had in the defendant, just as it was
the latter himself who drew up the document that was later signed in his
stead by Eulogio Ortega, because he could not read or write; but he denied
that he or his wife had ever been in the house of the notary Inocente
Martinez to execute or ratify any document or that he and his wife Isabel
Pili, when she was alive, had told the defendant Capule that they wished to
sell the said land and that he had offered to buy it. Nicasio Capule avers

that the said document, Exhibit A, was drawn up in his own house in the
presence of the married couple, Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili, for whom
he had to translate the contents of the document into Tagalog, and they
then signified their agreement; and as they could not sign, Eulogio Ortega
and Doroteo Guia did so in their stead, and at that time Jacinto Peaflor and
Jorge Tolentino, also signed it as witnesses; and that on the afternoon of
that day the married couple Maghirang and Pili appeared in the house of the
notary Martinez and ratified before him the said document in the presence
of the witness testifying; all of which Aniceto Maghirang denies, asserting
that he did not execute said document, or ratify it before the notary
Martinez, for he had never been in the latter's house nor had he ever seen
the document, Exhibit `A. His wife, Isabel Pili, did not testify, for she had
died in the meantime.
Let us examine the statements of the persons who appear to have signed
the document, impugned as false, in place of the married couple executing
it, and one of the witnesses to the execution of the said document, for it
does not appear that the other, Jorge Tolentino, testified.
Upon making his statement and after having been informed of the contents
of the document, Exhibit A, Doroteo Guia denied that he had been present
in the drawing up and execution thereof, or that he had ever known that the
married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili had sold any land to the
defendant, Nicasio Capule, although he remembered that on a certain
occasion said married couple had asked him to sign for them in the
defendant Capules's house a document of power of attorney made out in
Capule's favor, so that the latter might represent them in a suit they were
prosecuting against Maximino Reyes, and believing that it was in fact a
question of a power of attorney, as they had assured him, went to the
defendant's house and without informing himself of the contents of the
document that Capule spread out on a table, signed it, but he denies that
Eulogio Ortega, Jacinto Peaflor, and Jorge Tolentino with whom he was
acquainted, were present in that house.
Eulogio Ortega likewise denied that he signed any document of sale of land
or that he had ever been informed that the married couple Maghirang and
Pili had sold any land to the defendant Nicasio Capule, although he

remembers that one day about seven years ago Nicasio Capule and Isabel
Pili came to his house and the latter told him that as she did not know how
to write she begged him to do the favor of signing in her stead a power of
attorney, whereupon the defendant told him that as he did not know
Spanish the contents of said document would be translated to him so that
he might understand them, stating at the same time that a power of
attorney was conferred upon him, Capule, by Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel
Pili in the suit against Maximino Reyes, the attorney thus authorized
responding for its result, without the necessity for the intervention of the
married couple granting the power; and that after being informed of the of
the contents of the document presented to him he signed it, and he asserts
that said document is Exhibit A; that on that occasion Doroteo Guia, Jacinto
Peaflor, and Jorge Tolentino were not present; and that one Sunday, when
he was passing a tienda with Jorge Tolentino and Domingo Capuno, the
defendant Capule, who was there, called to him and after offering them
wine told him that they should understand each other for that document
which he, Capule, had said was a power of attorney was really a deed of
sale executed in his favor by Aniceto Maghirang and in case of winning the
suit Capule would give him P200.
Jacinto Peaflor, who figures in said document as a witness, having the
same before him, stated that the signature which appears therein with his
name and surname looks like his, but he could not assert definitely whether
such signature was his or not, for he does not remember having signed
such a document in the presence of the married couple Maghirang and Pili
and the individuals Eulogio Ortega, Doroteo Guia, and Jorge Tolentino,
setting forth the sale of a tract of lands to Nicasio Capule, and that he did
not recognize the signatures of Doroteo Guia and Eulogio Ortega.
From the result of taking these statements and the conduct of the accused
together, it is logically inferred that after preparing the document, Exhibit A,
he tried by all the means he thought expedient to assert his ownership of
the land which, under an alleged title of acquisition, had come to be his
property and to that end he tried to dispose of the products of the young
trees that there were on the tract, even daring to trample upon the
legitimate rights of its original owners and of the new ones who had later
acquired it, up to the point of accusing them as perpetrators of crimes

directed against his pretended and false right of ownership, which he

claimed to have acquired through the said false instrument.
Believing that with the document, Exhibit A, he could get the courts to
override the true owners of the land, which he pretended its original owners
had sold, in the various complaints he presented before the justice of the
peace of San Pablo against the offended alleged owners and one of the new
owners who acquired part of the land in question, as well as when he was
accused of theft by the owner of the remaining part of the tract, the
defendant dared to assert that he was the owner thereof and of the coconut
trees growing thereon, even to the point of exhibiting said false instrument,
but in spite of his allegations and his documentary evidence the persons
accused by him were acquitted, while Capule himself was convicted of theft
of coconuts on a complaint of one of the owners of said land. The notary,
Inocente Martinez, was not examined, for he had died in the meantime.
It therefore appears to be plainly proven that the crime of falsification of a
document has been committed, and while it may not be public still it is of
an official or notarial character, provided for and penalized in articles 300
and 301, because the defendant executed upon said notarial document of
an official character acts constituting falsification, by counterfeiting therein
the intervention of the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili, to
whom he ascribed statements different from what they had made to him
and by perverting the truth in the narration of facts, getting two persons to
sign in the name of said married couple through deceit, after giving them to
understand that the document contained a commission or power of
attorney, when in fact it was a deed of sale of a piece of land, the legitimate
owners whereof had never intended or consented to its alienation.

None of the persons who appear to have signed said document and seem to
have been present at its execution were informed of its true contents,
because they all confided with the greatest good faith in the false and
deceitful statements of the defendant, believing what he said to the effect
that said instrument was a commission voluntarily conferred upon him by
the couple executing it, who never intended to execute any document of
sale of their property to the defendant, who went to the extreme of getting
a notary to certify to its ratification before him, made apparently by the
alleged vendors in the contents of the said false document.
The fact that the married couple Maghirang and Pili did not know how to
read and write certainly reveals great ignorance and lack of culture in them,
but when they got to be landowners and acquired property of some value,
they cannot be absolutely denied the ability to distinguish a deed of sale
from a power of attorney, because they have demonstrated well enough
that they understood their purpose to be that the defendant should
represent them in a suit pending in a court and that they had never
intended or executed any fact for the alienation of a tract of land belonging
to them in favor of the defendant, and it is therefore unquestionable that he
took advantage of the opportunity when he was to have executed a
document or instrument of power of attorney, which the married couple
desired, to draw up maliciously and deceitfully a deed of sale in his favor,
deceiving the alleged vendors and the two persons who signed for them
and making them believe that the document executed was a power of
attorney or commission, when it fact it was a deed of sale and is the Exhibit
A, wherein, if he did not forge the signatures of the two witnesses Peaflor
and Tolentino, he must have obtained them in an equally deceitful way.
If it were true that the vendors had really alienated their coconut land to the
defendant, their continuing to pay the land tax is unexplained. In January,
1904, a part of said land with its coconut trees was sold to Esteban Reyes
and in May, 1908, the rest of the tract was sold to Melecio Brias. Persons
so simple, even ignorant and of little culture, as the offended parties, would
not have dared to sell successively to two of their neighbors in two portions
the said land, if it had been in fact already sold to the defendant Capule;
while the latter, by profession a clerk and acting as such for the notary
Martinez, who made sworn statements before the assessment board and

paid the land tax for the year 1906, never complied with these obligations
of landowner in connection with the land which, according to Exhibit A, he
had acquired on September 2, 1903, yet on the other hand it does not
appear why he did not enter in possession of the tract if he had really
bought it in September of that year, which indicates that although he dared
to draw up a false document with the connivance of the notary, his
boldness did not prevail to the extent of depriving in a frank and open
manner its legitimate owners of the possession of the land by appealing to
the courts to assert his right, provided he was sure that it was legitimate.

know whether the receipts had been made out in her name. The defendant,
who is a person of more education and knowledge than the offended
parties, even alleged other defenses which were in like manner as those
stated completely unsupported.

Although under article 535 of the Penal Code those who commit fraud by
causing another to subscribe a document by the use of deceit, as the
defendant has done, incur, according to paragraph 7 thereof, the penalties
set forth in the preceding article; still when as in the present case the crime
of falsification was committed for the purpose of getting a piece of real
property, which is the profit its perpetrator sought to obtain, he is regarded
as duly punished as guilty of falsification of a notarial document, in which
crime fraud or estafa is held to be included, with the penalties indicated in
said article 301 of the Code.

He tried to prove that in January, 1906, he sold said land under pacto de
retro for two years to Andres Borja, who possessed it during those two
years, although the alleged purchaser Borja said that only a private
document was made out for the sale nor did he require of the defendant
any previous document of ownership to evidence the defendant's right to
the land sold, which private document was not exhibited in the case and no
proof was adduced to show Borja's possession of the land sold to him; and
what is stranger still is that in the declaration of ownership of the land,
Exhibit K, page 116, presented by the offended party Aniceto Maghirang in
May of the same year, 1906, the alleged Andres Borja appears to have
signed as a witness, attesting that the land was Aniceto Maghirang's and
thus Andres Borja signs at page 87 of his statement, in spite of the alleged
previous purchase, nor does it appear that the defendant redeemed the
tract.

The defendant pleaded not guilty and alleged that the married couple
Maghirang and Pili had positively sold him the land to which Exhibit A refers
for the sum of P500 which he forthwith delivered to them, Eulogio Ortega
and Doroteo Guia and two other eyewitnesses to the execution of the
document having signed the instrument which he drew up in his house in
the presence of all of them, and that it was he who drew up the certificate
of ratification authorized by the notary and interpreted the contents of the
document with its ratification before the notary to the vendors, who really
did not know or understand Spanish, on the afternoon of the same date on
which said instrument was drawn up; further stating that immediately
afterwards he took possession, in the same month of September, 1903, of
the land he had bought and from that time on picked the fruit the coconut
trees produced, although he was disturbed in his possession by the vendors
themselves and the neighbors Esteban Reyes and Melecio Brias; that it
was true that he had not in 1906 made any declaration of ownership of said
land, as is ordered for the purposes of assessment, but he paid the land tax
for that time by delivering the money to Isabel Pili, although he did not

An attempt was also made to prove that in November, 1908, the defendant
Capule sold the same land absolutely to Marcelino Capiria with another
tract, which is set forth in the document, Exhibit B, ratified before a notary,
for the sum of P2,500, and the purchaser forthwith took possession of the
lands sold. If this absolute sale is true it is incomprehensible why the
purchaser Capiria did not ever attempt to enter into possession of the land
in question sold to him in November, 1908, on which date the original
owners, Maghirang and Pili, had already got rid of said land, having sold a
part thereof to Esteban Reyes on January 31, 1904, and the remainder on
May 2, 1908, to Melecio Brias. These new owners took possession from
that time on of the respective portions of the land they had acquired, nor
does it all appear in the case that the purchaser Capiria asked the alleged
vendor to make delivery of the land sold to him, or that he ever appealed in
any way to the courts. Moreover, in presenting his complaints years later
against the married couple Maghirang and Pili and others, the defendant
Capule did so in the capacity of owner of that very land, so it is not true that
he had previously sold it to the said Capiria.

These two alleged sales to Borja and Capiria were ways and means chosen
by the defendant to see if he could effectually deprive the married couple
Maghirang and Pili of their right to the land in question, since at that time
he did not yet dare to exhibit the false instrument he had maliciously and
fraudulently drawn up and he did not secure from said document the results
he expected and intended to become the owner of the land by means of a
false instrument.
Likewise the alleged transaction that he says Eulogio Ortega proposed to
him to allow rescission of the alleged sale in the document, Exhibit A,
through return of the price by the vendors, a transaction proposed,
according to the accused and his witness Silvestre Capiria, one day in the
month of July, 1909, is in every way unlikely to have been made in the
name of Aniceto Maghirang, because the land had already been sold some
years before to Esteban Reyes and Melecio Brias, and therefore the
offended party could not get Ortega to talk with the defendant to propose
said transaction for the return of a piece of land that had never been sold to
him but to the said Reyes and Brias in 1904 and 1908, and in 1909 he no
longer had any interest or right in the land in question, aside from the fact
that he has not proved that the offended party Maghirang ever intrusted
such a commission to Eulogio Ortega or authorized him to make the
proposition. Eulogio Ortega denied having interviewed the defendant
Capule on behalf of Aniceto Maghirang. Such allegations are nothing more
than ingenious quibbles and tricks invented by the defendant's counsel to
save him from the punishment he deserves as the proven perpetrator of the
crime of falsification.
Starting from the hypothesis that the defendant really obtained in a
fraudulent and deceitful manner the consent of the married couple
Maghirang and Pili to the execution of said false instrument, his counsel
argues that still he was not guilty of the crime of falsification of a public
document, in accordance with the finding of this court in the decision of the
case against Geronimo Milla (4 Phil. Rep., 391), wherein the following
principle was laid down:
The fact that one's consent to a contract may be obtained by mistake,
violence, intimidation, or fraud does not make the contract a false contract,

and therefore a person who has obtained such contract by those means,
whatever be the crime he may be guilty of, is not guilty of the crime of
falsification either of a public or of a private document.
This was the question of a contract wherein the offended parties gave their
consent to the execution of the document that was later impugned as false,
although this consent was obtained through intimidation which the
defendants in that case, Juan Cardona and Geronimo Milla, had used upon
them, and for this reason the court, in view of the fact that the contracting
parties consented to the terms of the instrument, could not find that there
was falsification in the statement of the facts, according to article 300 of
the Penal Code, merely because the consent had been secured through
intimidation.
As has been seen, there was no contract in the present case, nor any
consent to the contract pretended to have been stipulated in the
instrument, Exhibit A, wherein the defendant entered statements ascribed
to the alleged vendors, who proposed and intended to execute an
instrument of commission or power of attorney in favor of the defendant,
but not a deed of sale, as in bad faith and with evident perverseness the
defendant did, perverting the truth in the statement of facts and ascribing
to the offended parties statements different from those they made to him in
the counterfeited document, since the statements set forth therein were not
characteristic and constitutive of an instrument of power of attorney in his
favor in order that he might represent them in a suit against Maximino
Reyes.
Finally, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Weems vs. U.S. (217 U.S., 349) is vainly invoked, for Nicasio Capule is not a
public officer and, moreover, as he is accused of the crime of falsification of
a notarial document of official character equivalent to a public document
the principle laid down in said decision is totally inapplicable in his favor.
The defendant Capule does not come within the purview of article 300 of
the Penal Code, but of 301, which fixes the penalty, not of cadena
temporal but of presidio mayor; further keeping in mind that the act of
falsification of a public document in itself constitutes a crime, morally and
legally punishable, even though to date the penal law with respect to

falsification of a public document committed by public officers, in lieu of

said article 300 of the code, has not yet been promulgated; but article 301,
applicable to the present case, has not been repealed and subsists in all its
force.
The concurrence of neither extenuating nor aggravating circumstances can
be found in the commission of the crime, and therefore the penalty fixed in
said article 301 of the code must be imposed in its medium degree.
For these reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed
from are found to be refuted, we hold that it should be affirmed; provided,
however, that Nicasio Capule be sentenced to the penalty of eight years
and one day of presidio mayor, to the accessories fixed in article 57 of the
code, to the payment of a fine of 5,000pesetas, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, according to article 51; and to the costs
in the case. So ordered.
Francisco M. Lecaroz, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.
03/25/1999
Facts: Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa
Cruz, Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the
outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong
Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its SanguniangBayan (SB)
representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election
of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won the KB Chairman of Barangay
Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of
the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not
yet sit as member of the municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque
had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received his appointment
papers, President Aquino was already in power. But still Red was not allowed
to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the
approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary for more than a
year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino
administration after three years and nine months from the date he received
his appointment paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the Mayor

and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the
position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for
estafa through falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one
(1) information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan
rendered a decision finding the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa.
However, with respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019, The
Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having
denied their motion for reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his
successor is appointed or chosen or has qualified.
Held: YES. To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on
the terms of office of KB youth sectoral representatives to the SB and of the
KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of the KB
Constitution respectively provide - Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner
removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall
hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first
Monday of March 1980.
In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association
of barangay councils and the president of the federation of kabataang
barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous with their tenure is
president of their respective association and federation .
xxxx
Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to
hold office until the last Sunday of November 1985 or such time that the
newly elected officers shall have qualified and assumed office in accordance
with this Constitution.
The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral
representative to the SB since he did not present an authenticated copy of
his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of office.

Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of

the SB although in a holdover capacity since his term had already expired.
The Sandiganbayan however rejected this postulate declaring that the
holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in
the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of
B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB.

Facts: Reodica was charged by the CFI of Palawan for the falsification of a
public document. On July, 1931, Reodica, then treasurer of Bacuit, Palawan,
allegedly falsified municipal payroll documents by making it appear that
Sinforoso Cordero, who was on leave, rendered services as secretary for
that month. The payroll was received by Reodica, with an authorization by
the municipal president allowing him to pay Cordero.

The Supreme Court disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of

holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed
term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually
provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall
remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been
elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not
become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor
elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry
over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond
the term fixed by law.

Issue: WON the acts of Reodica constitute falsification of public document.

In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian
member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in
case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed
from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory
provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his
successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified.The legislative intent of
not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the
legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the lawmaking body favors the same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices,and courts generally
indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by
statute, a condition which may result in an executive or administrative
office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one
lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on obvious
considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically
intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a
vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions.
People of the Philippines vs. Lorenzo Reodica, et al. 12/7/1935

Decision: While the information stated that the Reodica certified in the
payroll that paid Sinforoso Corderos salary on July 31, 1931, it does not
allege, however, that this was not true, and although it appears that
Reodica made this payment on July 23, he was not charged, Cordero having
been in fact paid services. The alterations in the certification do not affect
the veracity of the document and do not constitute the crime of falsification.
The appealed judgment is reversed, and the appellant acquitted, with costs
de oficio.
People of the Philippines vs. Dionisio A. Maneja

06/10/1914

The sole question raised in this appeal is whether the period of prescription
for the offense of false testimony which, in the instant case, is five years
(art. 180, No. 4, in relation to art. 90, Revised Penal Code), should
commence from the time the appellee, Dionisio A. Maneja, adduced the
supposed false testimony in criminal case No. 1872 on December 16, 1933,
as the lower court held, or, from the time the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the aforesaid basic case became final in December, 1938, as the
prosecution contends.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library.
We hold that the theory of the prosecution is the correct one. The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91,
Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of false testimony,
considering that the penalties provided therefor in article 180 of the Revised
Penal Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of testifying falsely
does not therefore constitute an actionable offense until the principal case

is finally decided. (Cf. U. S. vs. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663; People vs. Marcos,
et al., G.R. No. 47388, Oct. 22, 1940.) And before an act becomes a
punishable offense, it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the
offended
party,
the
authorities
or
their
agents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
If the period of prescription is to be computed from the date the supposed
false testimony is given, it would be impossible to determine the length of
such period in any particular case, depending, as it does depend, on the
final outcome of the basic case. For instance, a witness testifies falsely
against an accused who is charged with murder. If the accused is found
guilty, the penalty prescribed by law for the perjurer is reclusion
temporal (art. 180, No. 1, Revised Penal Code), in which case the period of
prescription is twenty years (art. 90, idem). On the other hand, if the
accused is acquitted, the penalty prescribed for the perjurer is only arresto
mayor (art. 180, No. 4, idem), in which case the period for prescription is
only five years. Upon these hypotheses, if the perjurer is to be prosecuted
before final judgment in the basic case, it would be impossible to determine
the period of prescription - whether twenty years or five years - as either of
these two periods is fixed by law on the basis of conviction or acquittal of
the defendant in the main case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the offense of false
testimony is the same, whether the defendant in criminal case No. 1872
were convicted or acquitted, is of no moment, it being a matter of pure
coincidence. The four cases enumerated in article 180 of the Revised Penal
Code - and the instant case falls on one of them - uniformly presuppose a
final judgment of conviction or acquittal in the basic case as a prerequisite
to
the
action
ability
of
the
crime
of
false
testimony.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Order of dismissal is reversed, and let the case be remanded to the court of
origin
for
further
proceedings,
without
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
United States vs. Isidoro Aragon

12/28/1905

This was an action for the crime of giving false testimony.

The complaint filed in said cause was as follows:
The undersigned accuses Isidoro Aragon of the crime of false testimony in a
civil cause, committed as follows:
That on February 23 of the present year (1904), E.H. Warner filed the
following complaint:
"United States of America, Philippine Islands. In the justice of the peace
court of the city Manila. Edwin H. Warner, plaintiff, vs. Claro Magcauas,
defendant.
"The plaintiff appears and as a cause of action against the defendant,
alleges:
"I. That the plaintiff is the plain and absolute owner of a great extension of
land commonly known by the name of Hacienda of Pasay, situated partly in
Malate and Singalong, in the jurisdiction of the city of Manila.
"II. That the defendant, as a tenant, occupied a small piece of the said
hacienda located in Singalong, in the jurisdiction of the city of Manila, which
measured approximately 10,000 meters square, and for the occupation of
which as a tenant he paid an annual rental of 13 pesos 3 reales and 12
cuartos.
"III. That the defendant has failed to pay and is owing to the plaintiff the
rents corresponding to the years 1899, 1900, 1901, 1902, and 1903, at the
annual rate of 13 pesos 3 reales and 12 cuartos, which amounts to the sum
of 77 pesos 2 reales, or $_____, notwithstanding that the payment of same
has been repeatedly requested by the plaintiff.
"Wherefore the plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant for the said
sum of $_____, being the rents corresponding to the said years, for the costs
of this action, and for such other and further relief as the court may deem
equitable and just in the premises.
"Manila, February 23, 1904. For Sutro and Ortigas, Eusebio Orense, attorney
for the plaintiff."
That on the 4th day of March of the present year the accused was
summoned as a witness to appear before the justice of the peace court of
Manila, and after having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
"Q. Have you ever heard about the Pasay or Pineda estate? A. I have
heard ... question of lands.

"Q. Do you know the Pasay estate? A. I do not know.

"Q. What is it that you heard about the Pasay estate? A. Well, I can tell
that with reference to the Pasay estate that there has been objection to the
survey, to the assessment of that land, plenty of that, nothing more.
"Q. When was it that you say objection was made to the survey and nothing
more? A. Four years ago to-day.
"Q. Prior to that survey had you not heard any talk about the Pasay estate?
A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you know if the Augustinian Fathers, during the years 1895 and
1898, brought any action for forcible entry and detainer against Agustin
Montilla, and whether in said action, by reason of the decision ousting Mr.
Montilla, the defendant, Claro Magcauas, in this case was likewise ousted
from his land as a sublessee of Mr. Montilla? A. I do not remember, sir.
"Q. Did you knot know then Mr. Agustin Montilla as administrator of the
Pasay estate? A. I do not remember.
"Q. Were you justice of the peace for Singalong? A. Assistant.
"Q. But were you acting at the time? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. In the justice of the peace court where you were acting was there not a
suit brought by Mr. Montilla for forcible entry and detainer against the
tenants of the Pasay estate, among them the defendant in this case, and for
the lands in question? A. I do not remember.
"Q. Can you not assure that in your court not even a single action for
forcible entry and detainer was brought against Mr. Montilla? A. I do not
remember, sir.
"Q. Do you not remember that while you were justice an order was received
from the judge of the Court of First Instance calling upon you to forward a
list of all the actions for forcible entry and detainer pending in your court
and brought by Don Agustin Montilla against various tenants of the Pasay
estate? A. I do not remember, sir.
"Q. Do you not remember having received any order from the Court of First
Instance as to these actions for forcible entry and detainer in regard to the
Pasay estate? A. I remember having received orders, but I do not
remember to what they referred.
"Q. Don't you remember that in the justice of the peace court while you
were acting judge, there was pending an action for forcible entry and
detainer against Claro Magcauas, Manuel Santajuana, Felipe Villanueva,
Pedro Pascual, Escolastico Verge, Claro Villanueva, Anastasio Ramos,
Agustin Bonifacio, Arcadio Villanueva, Bernardino Isidro, Maximo de los
Santos, Severo Dineral, Florentino Gabriel, Pedro Nagomboy, Leocadio
Villareal, Leonardo Tailer, Catalino O. Santiago, Demetrio Espiritu, P. Tomaso,
N. Vergel, H. de los Reyes, Jose Carlos, Honorio Santiago, Rufino de Jesus,
Victorino Delignac, Aniceto Ordoez, Clemente Isidro, Claro Naracos,

Eulogio Alcantara, Simeon A. Protasio, Apolonio C. Santos, Gregorio R.

Patricio, Alejandro Dionisio, Aniceto Severo, Pascual Villanueva, Ignacio
Pernate, Engracio Flores, Crispino Ampagan, Lino Vergel, Macario Sergis,
Dimas Dison, Modesto Protasio, Severo Vizcara, Isidro Vizcara, Petrona
Vizcara, and Bonifacio Vizcara, by Agustin J. Montilla? A. No, I do not
remember.
"Q. None of those mentioned in my question? A. I do not recollect now
anyone.
"Q. Did you not know Father Benito Ibaez, administrator of the Hacienda of
Pasay? a. No; neither.
"Q. Father Martin Arconada, who was administrator of the estate did you
know him personally as administrator of that estate? A. I do not
remember whether he has been administrator or not.
"Q. You do not remember whether any orders were published in Singalong
by means of the public crier, within Pasay, notifying the decision rendered in
the suit in favor of Mr. Montilla against the Augustinian Friars, and warning
all the tenants of the Pasay estate to pay thereafter Mr. Montilla as a lessee
of that estate? A. If you talk about public crier I do not remember, sir.
Truly there have been notices by means of public criers, because there in
that month the revolution broke out."
All these statements are absolutely false, and are essential to the case at
issue wherein they were made, because really and truly the accused had
heard about the Pasay estate prior to the four last years, and he well knew
that at that time there were brought in the justice of the peace court at
Pineda when he was filing that office many actions for forcible entry and
detainer, instituted by Agustin J. Montilla against tenants of the estate, he
having received an order from the Court of First Instance asking for a list of
said actions, with a statement of the actions for forcible entry and detainer
and the answers filed by the defendants, and the accused himself signed
three lists which he forwarded to the Court of First Instance; because the
accused himself received an order from the Court of First Instance enjoining
him to notify all the tenants of the Pasay estate of the decision rendered in
favor of Don Agustin J. Montilla, in the suit brought by him against the
Augustinian Friars, and the accused himself having rendered an order
wherein the proper action was taken for the compliance with such order of
the Court of First Instance, and the accused himself having taken part in
various other proceedings had for the purpose of complying with such
orders from the Court of First Instance; because the accused knew that Don

Agustin Montilla was the administrator of the Pasay estate, was substituted
by reason of the suit by him brought against the Augustinian Friars by the
curate of the pueblo, Father Benito Ibaez, and he, the accused, likewise
knew that Father Martin Arconada, the procurator of the convent of the
Augustinian Fathers, did intervene in the management of the Pasay estate,
and because, he, the accused, likewise knew that in the years 1895 and
1898 there was brought by the Augustinian Friars against Mr. Montilla an
action for forcible entry and detainer of the Pasay estate, the result of which
was that said Mr. Montilla, together with many other tenants of the Pasay
estate, were ousted; all contrary to the form of the statute in such cases
made and provided.
This complaint was duly signed and sworn to.
At the close of the trial in the inferior court the defendant was found guilty
of the crime charged in the said complaint and was sentenced to be
imprisoned for a period of three months of arresto mayor, with the
accessories of article 61 of the Penal Code and to pay a fine of 1,500
pesetas or to suffer, in case of insolvency, the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, which should not exceed one-third part of the period of
imprisonment imposed, and to pay the costs.
From this sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
It is admitted that the defendant gave the testimony set out in the
complaint, during the trial of a civil case in the court of a justice of the
peace of the city of Manila, between Edwin H. Warner, plaintiff, and Claro
Magcauas, defendant, an action brought by the plaintiff to recover of the
defendant the annual rent for a certain tract of land for the years 1899,
1900, 1901, 1902, and 1903. The defendant was summoned as a witness to
appear before said justice of the peace, to give testimony upon the trial of
this cause.
It is difficult to ascertain from an examination of the alleged false testimony
set out in the said complaint just how the questions and answers in said
false testimony have any bearing whatever upon the issue that was being
tried before said justice of the peace. Admitting, however, that they must
have had some reference to some question presented before the court, we

proceed to an examination of the question whether such testimony was

false.
Chapter VI of Title IV of the Penal Code provides the punishment for false
testimony in both criminal and civil cases, but this chapter makes no
attempt to define false testimony or in any way to indicate of what false
testimony consists.
Escriche in his valuable dictionary (p. 972) defines false testimony to be:
"La impostura o acusacion contra un inocente y la deposicion que hace un
testigo contra la verdad."
"Falso testimonio" under Spanish law corresponds to "false swearing" under
English law. False swearing, under the English law, is committed by a person
who swears falsely before any person authorized to administer an oath
upon a matter of public concern, under such circumstances that the false
swearing would have amounted to perjury if committed in a judicial
proceeding.
Bishop in his work on criminal law (Vol. 2, p. 588) says:
False swearing is the name given in the statutes of some of the States to
false declarations on oath which, while not within any common law or
statutory designation of perjury, are, by such statutes, rendered otherwise
indictable.
Article 321 of the Penal Code provides that
False testimony given in a civil cause shall be punished with a penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to presidio correccional in its
medium degree and a fine of from 625 to 6,250 pesetas.
If the amount of the claim should not exceed 625 pesetas, the penalties
shall be those of arresto mayorand a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas.
This testimony was given in a civil cause and it was the duty of the
Government to prove that it was false. Not only was it the duty of the
Government to show that the testimony was false but that it was given

knowing that it was false and with malicious intent. Viada, in his valuable
Commentaries on the Penal Code (vol. 2, p. 449, 4th ed.), says:
Comete el delito de falso testimonio todo el que falta maliciosamente a la
verdad en sus declaraciones, sea negandola, sea diciendo lo contrario a
ella.
During the examination of the defendant as a witness in the cause in which
it is alleged he gave false testimony he was asked certain questions with
reference to the existence of certain facts. His answers invariably were that
he did not remember, or that he had no recollection concerning those facts.
His answers invariably were that he did not remember, or that he had no
recollection concerning those facts. The prosecuting attorney proved the
existence of the facts with reference to which the defendant was
questioned, but failed to prove that the statements of the defendant with
reference to those facts were false. The mere fact that the defendant had
had to do in the year 1896 with certain facts and relations was not sufficient
to prove that he stated a falsehood when he stated in December, 1904, that
he had "no recollection with reference to such facts or relations." The
evidence adduced during the trial fails, in our judgment, to show that the
defendant testified falsely or gave false testimony as was charged in the
complaint.
In order that a defendant may be convicted under article 321 of the Penal
Code for giving false testimony, the following facts must be shown:
First. The testimony must be given in a civil cause.
Second. The testimony must relate to the issues presented in said cause.
Third. The testimony must be false.
Fourth. The false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the
same to be false.
Fifth. Such testimony must be malicious and given with an intent to affect
the issues presented in said cause.
The evidence adduced during the trial of this case is not sufficient to show
that the defendant committed the crime charged in the complaint. The
judgment of the inferior court is therefore reversed and the said cause is
hereby ordered to be dismissed.
Honorio Saavedra, Jr. vs. DOJ 09/15/1993

FACTS: Owners of Pine Philippines, Inc. (PPI) and respondent Gregorio

Ramos, sold their shares of stock to petitioner Saavedra. A Memorandum of
Agreement, which contained an automatic rescission clause, was executed
to evidence the transaction. Petitioner withheld payment for the reason that
sellers failed to comply with their warranties, however the balance was
deposited in escrow to be released once the warranties were complied with.
Petitioners filed in behalf of PPI a verified civil complaint for damages
against private respondent alleging that he (petitioner was the President
and principal stockholder of the company. Respondent questioned
petitioners capacity to sue in behalf of PPI claiming that petitioner ceased
to be its president when the sale of PPI stocks was automatically rescinded.
After executing a document entitled Rescission of MoA, Ramos filed a case
with the SEC praying that the rescission be declared valid and legal. During
the pendency of the case in SEC, private respondent filed a criminal case
for perjury against petitioner alleging that petitioner perjured himself when
he declared in the verification of the complaint that he was the President of
PPI. In his answer, petitioner contended that since the issues of ownership
and automatic rescission were still pending unresolved in the SEC, there
was no basis to charge that he asserted a falsehood in claiming to be
President. Despite this, Provincial fiscal found a prima facie case for perjury
against him. Petitioner sought a review with the DOJ, which also upheld the
finding of probable cause for perjury.
ISSUE: W/N DOJ should have deferred the proceedings since the issue was
still pending with the SEC.
HELD: YES. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and
will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal having been placed within its
special competence. In such cases the judicial process is suspended
pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the dispute.
Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question which is within the
legal competence of an administrative body prior to resolution of that
question by that administrative tribunal, much less can the Provincial
Prosecutor arrogate to himself the jurisdiction vested solely with the SEC.
That the issues of ownership and auto rescission are intra corporate, the
Provincial Prosecutor clearly has no authority to rule on the same.

US vs. Barbara Capistrano

03/15/1920

On the 29th of April, 1918, Barbara Capistrano made a sworn declaration

before the fiscal of the city of Manila, accusing her father, Alejo Capistrano,
of the crime of rape committed upon her person. After the corresponding
preliminary investigation was conducted by said fiscal, the latter, on April
29, 1918, filed an information with the Court of First Instance of the same
city against the said Alejo Capistrano for the crime of rape alleged to have
been committed upon the person of his said daughter. On May 11 of the
same year, several days before the hearing of the cause No. 16900
instituted upon said information, the said Barbara Capistrano filed a motion
with the court praying for the dismissal of the cause against her father on
the ground that it was not the latter who had raped her, as she has
previously stated before the fiscal of the city, but a Spaniard named Juan,
an employee of the Lerma Park Cabaret, Caloocan, Rizal Province, and that
if she had made a different statement before at the police station, it was on
account of the instructions of the said Spaniard Juan. At the hearing of the
cause aforementioned, after recognizing having stated before the fiscal
concerning the fact of her father having raped her on the night of April 26,
1918, saying having made similar statement before the fiscal because the
Spaniard had instructed her to denounce her said father, the same Barbara
Capistrano said that this statement was not true and that the truth was that
which she was telling before the court, or rather that it was the Spaniard
Juan who abused her person, and not her father. From this testimony, the
fiscal having been obliged to move for the dismissal of the cause, same was
dismissed by the court in his decree of the 15th of the same month of May,
ordering Alejo Capistrano's immediate release. In view thereof, the fiscal
filed against said Barbara Capistrano the information giving rise to the
present cause for the crime of perjury. Said information read as follows:
The undersigned accuses Barbara Capistrano of the crime of perjury
committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 1918, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said accused, declaring before the assistant fiscal of the city of
Manila, Luciano de la Rosa, affirmed under oath, before the said fiscal who
was duly authorized to receive oaths, that one called Alejo Capistrano, the

father of the said accused, had raped her on the 26th day of April, 1918;
that later after said date, or on May 15, 1918, the aforementioned accused,
testifying before his Honor, Manuel Vivencio del Rosario, as the principal
witness for the prosecution in the criminal cause No. 16900 of the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, said that the real author of the crime of
rape of which she had complained before the aforesaid assistant fiscal,
Luciano dela Rosa, was not her aforesaid father, Alejo Capistrano, as she
had then previously stated before the said fiscal, but one called Juan,
Spaniard by nationality; that this last testimony, taken before the Honorable
Judge, Manuel Vivencio del Rosario, is a false testimony for the said accused
knew very well upon testifying before said judge that the real author of the
rape of which she was the victim was not the so-called Juan but her father
called Alejo Capistrano; that the sworn statements made by said accused
before the said assistant fiscal, Luciano de la Rosa, on the 27th day of April,
1918, where very essential to the investigations conducted by the latter,
inasmuch as without said statements, said fiscal would not have filed, as he
did, the information for the crime of rape against the said Alejo Capistrano,
which information is now pending before the Court of First Instance of this
city of Manila and bearing R. G. No. 16900. Acts committed against the law.
The accused demurred to the foregoing information on the ground that
same was fatally defective for the reason that in said information it does not
appear that the testimony taken by the accused before the court at the
hearing of the aforesaid cause for the crime of rape and which was false
according to the information, and expressive of the fact that the real author
of the crime of rape denounced by her before the fiscal was not her father,
as she had previously declared under oath before the said fiscal, but one
called Juan, a Spaniard was a statement important and essential to the
question involved in said criminal cause or raised at the hearing thereof.
This demurrer was overruled by the trial court and the accused excepted to
this ruling and pleaded not guilty. After the hearing of this present cause,
the Court of First Instance aforesaid rendered his judgment on April 25,
1918, declaring the accused guilty of the aforementioned crime of perjury
mentioned and penalized in section 3 of Act No. 1697. But in view of the
fact that the accused was below 18 years of age, the court suspended the
judgment, ordering the commitment of the said accused in the
government's reformatory until she becomes of age, and sentencing her,

furthermore, to be forever disqualified from testifying before any court of

these Islands. From this judgment the accused appealed and her defense
alleges that the trial court erred:
1. In overruling the demurrer interposed against the information in
question.
2. In not reciting in the judgment that the statement of the accused before
the fiscal of the city of Manila was not freely and voluntarily made but was
made under third party's threats and duress.
3. In not acquitting the accused.
It is said in the information, as has already been seen, that when the
accused testified under oath on May 15, 1918, before the Honorable Manuel
Vivencio del Rosario, as a witness for the prosecution in the criminal cause
No. 16900 of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, she said that
the real author of the crime of rape which she had denounced before the
assistant fiscal, Luciano de la Rosa, was not her father, Alejo Capistrano, as
she previously stated under oath before the said fiscal, but one called Juan,
a Spaniard, and that this last testimony taken before the Honorable Manuel
Vivencio del Rosario was false for the said accused knew very well upon
testifying before the said judge that the real author of the crime of which
she was the victim was not the aforementioned Juan but her own father
called Alejo Capistrano. But it is not alleged in the information, as the
Attorney-General admitted in his brief, expressly or impliedly, that the
aforesaid testimony, taken by the accused at the hearing of the cause for
rape against her father, was essential and important in said cause.
Wherefore, the fact alleged by the accused to support her demurrer to said
information is true

For the crime of perjury to be punishable, the false testimony willfully taken
or subscribed contrary to the oath must related to, or concern, "any
material matter which he (the witness) does not believe to be true."
"Perjury, as modified by statute (Act No. 1697), may be defined to be the
willful and corrupt assertion to a falsehood, under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law, in a material matter, the offense being
enlarged and made to extend to false oaths other than those taken in the
course of judicial proceedings," such was what this court said in the case of
United States vs. Estraa (16 Phil. Rep., 520), citing 30 Cyc., 1433, and
other cases mentioned therein. In the main body of said decision, this court
said:
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, it is well settled that an
indictment for perjury must show conclusively that the testimony given or
assertation made by the defendant and charged to be false was material to
the issue on the trial in which he was sworn or it will be fatally defective.
This may be done either by a direct allegation that it was material, or by
allegations of facts from which its materiality will appear. (30 Cyc., 1433,
and U. S. vs. Singleton, 54 Feb. Rep., 488; U. S. vs. Cowing, 25 Fed. Cas.,
No. 14880, 4 Cranch C. C., 613; Hembree vs. State, 52 Ga., 242;
State vs. Anderson, 103 Ind., 170; State vs. Gibson, 26 La. Ann., 71;
State vs. Williams, 60 Kan., 837; People vs. Ah Bean, 77 Cal., 12;
Gibson vs. State, 47 Fla., 16; State vs. Cunnigham, 66 Iowa, 94;
People vs. Collier, 1 Mich., 137; Wood vs. People, 59 N. Y., 177;
Buller vs. State, 33 Tex. Cr., 551, and numerous other cases cited.)
The complaint upon which the aforesaid cause of United States vs. Estraa
was instituted, was wanting of an allegation that the testimony of the
accused, alleged to have been given falsely under oath, was material to the
issue involved therein, and this court said in that cause:
The complaint in the case at bar is fatally defective for the want of an
allegation that the testimony, alleged to be false, was material to the issues
involved in the murder case. Our statute (section 3 of Act No. 1697, supra)
specifically makes materiality an essential element of the crime of perjury
and without this crime can not legally exist.

It is, therefore, necessary that in the information filed in this instant case
against Barbara Capistrano and inserted in the beginning of this decision, it
should have been expressly and definitely stated that the testimony
alleged to be false according to said information, and given by the accused
Barbara Capistrano before the Court of First Instance whereby she stated
that the real author of the crime denounced by her was not her father Alejo
Capistrano but one Juan, a Spaniard was important and material to the
issues involved in the said case for rape against Alejo Capistrano. The want
of this allegation in the information makes the latter fatally defective, and in
no way can it be accepted, as the Attorney-General so understands in his
brief, that such an omission, in the instant case, had been cured by the
allegation in same information that said testimony was false and by the
admission in evidence, without the objection on the part of the defense, of
the record of the case for rape against Alejo Capistrano whereby it appears,
according to the fiscal, that the false testimony taken by the accused in the
said case was so material that same was dismissed by the order of the
court (in support of his opinion the Attorney-General invoking the
aforementioned case of U. S. vs. Estraa and the case of Serra vs. Mortiga
[204 U. S., 470; 11 Phil., 762]), because in either of the cases cited by the
Attorney-General (the informations thereof not having mentioned the
material averments, to wit. In the first of said cases that the testimony
alleged to be false was material, and in the second, an adultery case, that
concerning the place and the knowledge of the accused that the woman
was married) no objection was inter[posed in the lower court at the proper
stage of the proceedings to the sufficiency of the information, no demurrer
was set up against said information due time, and, consequently, in the first
of the cases aforementioned, this court said: "As no objection to the
sufficiency of the complaint was raised this fatal defect could have been
supplied by competent testimony on the trial." Naturally, the court
overruled the appellant's objection on the ground that said defect was first
raised before this court when the case was before us on appeal, and this
court further said (syllabus);
Where a complaint is fatally defective, either in form or in substance, and
no objection is taken at the trial but is raised for the first time on appeal, it
is not error for this court to refuse to sustain such object when the fatal

defects are supplied by competent proofs. (Serra vs. Mortiga, 204 U. S.,
470, reported in 11 Phil. Rep., 762.)
In the case of Serra vs. Mortiga no objection was raised at the trial to the
sufficiency of the complaint for adultery filed against the accused
notwithstanding that same was defective, as has been already said. This
court also overruled the objection for the first time raised on appeal by the
accused against said complaint, and decided the case on its merits, taking
into consideration the evidence presented at the hearing. Said decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States holding in the syllabus
thereof the following:
While a complaint on a charge of adultery under the Penal Code of the
Philippine Islands may be fatally defective for lack of essential averments as
to the place and knowledge on the part of the man that the woman was
married, objections of that nature must be taken at the trial, and if not
taken, and the omitted averments are supplied by competent proof, it is not
error for the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands to refuse to sustain
such objections on appeal.
What occurred in the instant case is just the reverse from that which took
place in the two cases aforementioned for the reason that, the fiscal having
filed the information against Barbara Capistrano for the crime of perjury on
May 15, 1918, and the accused having appeared thru her counsel two days
after or May 17, on the 21st of same month, three days after receiving
notice of the information, said accused filed a demurrer (c copy of which
was received by the fiscal and which we have already mentioned
hereinbefore) on the ground that said information was defective for the
want of the allegation aforementioned concerning the importance and
materiality of the testimony alleged as false therein, praying for this reason
the amendment thereof and the dismissal of the case with costs de officio.
On the 5th of June following, this prayer was overruled by the court as
improper. On the 8th of the same month the accused interposed her
exception in writing to this decision. The said case was duly heared and the
accused appealed from the judgment rendered thereon. She now assigns in
her brief before this court as the first error alleged to have been committed

by the lower court the fact that the latter has overruled the demurrer
aforementioned.
Wherefore, the doctrines laid down in the two cases aforesaid are not
applicable to the instance case. And if anything at all can be inferred from
said doctrines, it is in the sense contrary to what the Attorney-General has
said, i. e., the accused having demurred in due time to the information for
being fatally and essentially defective, and having excepted to the ruling
dismissing said demurrer, the omission in the information of the aforesaid
allegation the materiality and importance of the statement alleged as
false therein had not been cured by the filing of an amended information.
Nor was such a defect cured by the allegation in the information that the
aforementioned statement was false or by the admission in evidence
without defendant's objection of the record of the aforementioned cause for
rape against Alejo Capistrano. The overruling of the demurrer
aforementioned having been assigned by the appellant in her brief before
us as the first error committed by the lower court, this court cannot set
aside the consideration of said objection in view of the appellant's appeal
interposed against such decision. And one of the essential elements of the
crime of perjury created by the law (art. 5392, Rev. Stat.) being the
materiality and importance of the fact alleged as having been falsely
uttered (U. S. vs. Landsberg, 23 Fed. Rep., 585), as was stated by this court
in United States vs. Estraa (supra), and there being no allegation in the
information relative to the materiality and importance of the testimony
taken by the accused at the hearing of the case for rape against Alejo
Capistrano to the issues therein involved, said information is null and
void ab initioand the criminal proceedings must be dismissed.
However, it being undeniable that the testimony taken under oath by the
accused before the Court of First Instance at the hearing of the cause for
rape against Alejo Capistrano and alleged as false in the information, dealt
with an important and essential matter involved therein, for by virtue of
said testimony the cause was dismissed by the court, and the accused
having raised in her appeal, discussed by the Attorney-General in his brief,
the question whether or not the appellant was guilty of the crime of perjury
and should be convicted of said crime, we now proceed to the consideration
of this particular.

For this object we hereby reproduce the brief statement of facts

incorporated by the trail court in his judgment and taken from the results of
the evidence adduced at the trial, in the following terms:
When this cause was called for a hearing, the accused appeared with her
counsel Gonzales, and the Government was represented by Assistant Fiscal
De la Rosa.
The evidence adduced in this cause conclusively establish the fact that on
the 27th of April of this year, the accused Barbara Capistrano and the
policeman Varsovia appeared before the office of the prosecuting attorney
of this city to file a complaint against one Alejo Capistrano, the father of the
accused Barbara Capistrano, for the crime of rape committed by the former
upon the person of the latter.
After taking the oath required by law before the corresponding official or the
assistant fiscal of this city, Luciano de la Rosa, Barbara Capistrano declared
before the said officer the following: that between 11 and 12 o'clock on the
night of April 26 of the present year, she was raped by her father Alejo
Capistrano in a house on calle Dimas-Alang, Caloocan.
In view of the foregoing statement of Barbara Capistrano the assistant fiscal
De la Rosa, having found reasonable grounds for proceeding against the
person mentioned by Barbara Capistrano in her said statement, filed the
corresponding information appearing on page 1 of the criminal cause No.
16900, accusing Alejo Capistrano of the crime of rape.
The case for rape was heared before this court on May 15, 1918, and after
taking the necessary oath, the offended party, Barbara Capistrano, testified
before the court in substance as follows: that she made a statement before
the prosecuting attorney accusing her father of the crime of rape for the
reason that her statement before the fiscal that her father was the author of
the rape upon her person was not true; that her father was not the one who
raped her but the Spaniard aforesaid.
At the hearing of this crime the accused testified and again swore before
the court that what she in reality stated before the fiscal was what the said
Spaniard, Juan Sol by name, had insinuated to her; that when she declared

before the fiscal, the Spaniard aforesaid was not present; that her
statement before the said Fiscal was not the truth but that, for her fear of
Juan Sol, on account of the latter's threat upon her, she stated the person
who raped her was her father.
If follows, therefore, that the accused Barbara Capistrano stated under oath
two contradictory statements: one before the assistant prosecuting attorney
of the city who conducted the preliminary investigation before filing the
information against her father Alejo Capistrano for rape, statement whereby
she was accusing the latter of the said crime; and another before the Court
of First Instance at the hearing of the same cause for rape, saying that the
one who raped her was not her father but one called Juan Sol, and that for
her fear to the latter who had threatened her, she made the former
statement before the fiscal of the city, imputing the commission of the said
crime to her father.
According to section 3 of Act No. 1697, a person is guilty of the crime of
perjury and must be punished by the penalty mentioned in said Act, "who,
having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any
case in which the law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be
administered, that he will testify, declare, deposed or certify truly, or that
any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him
subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes
any material matter which he does not believe to be true. . . ."
The testimony of the accused taken under oath, which is alleged as false in
the information, was the second statement or that one taken by her before
the Court of First Instance at the hearing of the cause for rape, and the one
alleged in said information as true was her statement under oath before the
fiscal of the city at the preliminary investigation. Wherefore, in order to hold
the accused guilty of the crime of perjury, it was necessary to prove that
she did not believe said testimony as true or, what amounts to the same
thing, that which she testified to before the Court of First Instance was not
true.
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely on the contradictory
sworn statements of the defendant, but the state must prove which of the
two statements is false and must show that statement to be false by other

evidence than the contradictory statement. . . . Of course where perjury is

charged in giving testimony contrary to that given on a prior examination,
the accused is entitled to show that his statements on the prior examination
were induced by threats and duress; and after adducing evidence in support
of this contention, he properly may insist that the court explicitly instruct
the jury to determine whether or not such testimony was voluntary. (21 R.
C. L., 271, citing People vs. McClintic [Mich.], 160 N. W., 461; L. R. A.
[1917C], 52 and note; Billingsley vs. State. 49 Tex. Crim., 620, 95 S. W., 520,
13 ann. Cas., 730.)
In People vs. McClintic (supra) the court held the following:
1. Perjury; Contradictory Statements; Effect. Contradictory statements
under oath will not alone convict one of perjury. (For other cases, see
Evidence XII l, in Dig. 1-52 N. S.)
2. Evidence; Perjury; Cause of Contradictory Statements. Upon trial of
one for perjury, evidence is admissible that statements contradictory to
those alleged to be false, which were made under oath before a committing
magistrate, were induced by threats and duress. (For other cases, see
Evidence XI t, in Dig. 1-52 N. S.)
3. Criminal Law; Perjury; Instructions. Instructions in a prosecution for
perjury in giving testimony at a criminal prosecution contrary to that given
before a committing magistrate, and which is claimed to have been given
under duress, must explicitly inform the jury to determine whether or not
such testimony was voluntary. (For other cases, see Trial III e, 5, in Dig. 1-52
N. S.)
In the syllabus of Billingsley vs. State the following is said:
4. Perjury; Evidence; Contradictory Statements. A conviction for perjury
cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statements of the
defendant, but the state must prove which of the two statements is false
and must show that statement to be false by other evidence than the
contradictory statement.
The evidence adduce by the prosecution in this cause consisted: 1. In
presenting the transcription of the stenographic notes certified to by the

respective stenographers and taken at the hearing of the cause for rape
against Alejo Capistrano. In this transcription appears the fiscal's exposition
of the motion filed by the accused for the dismissal of the said cause (rape)
on the ground that her father was not the autor of the said crime but one
called Juan a Spaniard, in contradiction with her statement at the
preliminary investigation conducted by the said fiscal; the fiscal's prayer to
accept the said statement of the accused; the said testimony under oath
taken by her before the court wherein she made the same statement which
is briefly and substantially mentioned in a paragraph of the judgment
hereinbefore inserted. 2. In presenting the cause No. 16900 of the said
court against Alejo Capistrano for the aforementioned crime of rape,
wherein the information against the latter and the aforesaid testimony of
the accused appear, and the decision or order of the court dismissing said
cause in view of said testimony. 3. And the testimony of the policeman
Osmundo Varsovia taken at the hearing of the present cause for perjury, the
terms of which appear in the paragraph of the judgment hereinbefore
inserted, and the testimony of the stenographer who took the record in the
said cause and transcribed the testimony of the accused, certifying this last
particular and the fact that said accused testified under oath.
In short, therefore, the prosecution confined itself in proving that the
accused stated under oath the two contradictory statements
aforementioned and that the accused stated to the policeman Varsovia, on
the morning of April 27, 1918, that her father Alejo Capistrano raped her
between the hours of 11 and 12 of the previous night, as well as the fact
that the same policeman was present when the accused took her oath
before the fiscal prior to the latter's taking the declaration of the accused in
the aforesaid preliminary investigation. The foregoing is not proving, as it
can be clearly seen which of the two contradictory statements of the
accused was the false statement or showing the falsity of either upon other
evidence distinct from the same contradictory statements. It is simply
showing or exposing said two statements in order to point out that the
accused, declaring under oath in one or the other, made two statements
contradictory with each other and involving one and the same fact.
But, moreover, the accused in her testimony at the hearing of the case for
rape said, among other things, that nothing took place between her and her

father on the 26th of April of that year, 1918; that on the next day she went
to the fiscal's office to file a complaint against her father, accusing the
latter what the Spaniard told her to do; that the Spaniard, after having
abused her person, told her to accuse her father before the fiscal, and
recounted what she then told the fiscal against her father; that on April 26
she did not sleep in the house No. 25 on calle Dimas-Alang but in the dance
hall, in the house of one Pedro de los Santos; that everything she had said
before the fiscal relative to the case of her father being the author of the
said crime of rape was not true; that she knew the Spaniard called Juan,
who was not a cook in the Dimas-Alang dance hall; that it was not her father
who abused her person but the said Spaniard; that all that she stated
before the fiscal was what she receive from the instruction of the said
Spaniard Juan; and that before going to the fiscal's office she had been
instructed by the Spaniard to declare against her father, and the real author
of said rape was not her father but the said Spaniard, called Juan. And
finally, upon being asked by the fiscal "Which is true, your statement before
the fiscal accusing your father as the author of the crime of rape or this
statement of yours before the court accusing the said Spaniard?" she
replied: "The truth is what I have stated here." In view of this statement the
court handed down the order aforementioned, dismissing the case for rape
and decreeing the release of the accused Alejo Capistrano.
In the testimony given by her at the hearing of the present cause for
perjury, the accused reiterated what she has said before, i. e., that it was
not her father who raped her but a Spaniard; that she stated before Fiscal
De la Rosa that her father had committed upon her the said rape, but that
afterwards she said that it was not her father because she was told by her
aunt to tell the truth; that the Spaniard was the real author of said rape;
that she does not know the name of the Spaniard for she could not
remember it, but that she could recognize him should she see him. And
when asked by counsel for the defense to look around that place whether
she could find the Spaniard to whom she was referring and to tell where the
latter was, she answered: "There he is," pointing at Juan Sol, who was then
present at the hearing; and upon being immediately asked why it was that
she told the fiscal it was her father who raped her when in reality it was that
Juan Sol, the Spaniard, who committed said crime, she replied: "Because
this gentlemen was threatening to kill me in case I would not tell it was my

father;" she further said that said threat took place on the day the rape was
committed and that under this influence she made the statement before
Fiscal De la Rosa accusing her said father; that the Spaniard Juan Sol was
then carrying a penknife with which he threatened her, and that this threat
was made by said Spaniard after the consummation of the criminal act.
As it appears from the foregoing facts, the accused has explained why at
the preliminary investigation before the fiscal of this city she accused her
father as the author of the crime of rape of which she was the victim, her
reason being that she was instructed, intimidated and threatened by said
Spaniard with a penknife, which he had at the time she was raped and after
this act had been committed, in order that she should declare in that sense.
She also said that after having given said statement, her aunt Petra de Los
Santos told and admonished her to tell the truth. She had repeatedly stated
at the hearing of the case for rape as well as at the hearing of this case for
perjury that the Spaniard Juan Sol was the one who raped her and not her
father Alejo Capistrano. Finally, at the hearing of this case and in the
presence of Juan Sol himself, she had the courage to point out the latter as
the author of the crime of rape, saying furthermore that this gentlemen was
threatening to kill her should she not say that it was her father who had
raped her.
With the means within her reach, the accused then proved that her
statement at the preliminary investigation before the fiscal of the city,
accusing her father and not the Spaniard Juan Sol, as the author of the rape
of which she was the victim, was made on account of the duress and
threats the latter made upon her so that she should declare in that sense
a fact which, having taken place without any eyewitness, was not possible
to be related by any one other than the own testimony of the accused taken
under oath as a witness in her own behalf at the hearing. But she presented
another evidence of great importance at the very time of the hearing by
pointing out Juan Sol, who was present at the moment, as the very person
who had raped her and who afterwards had intimidated and threatened her
in order that she should declare in the manner she did before the fiscal of
the city, as has been said before. Moreover, counsel for the defense
presented in evidence on that very occasion the proceeding No. 3511 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal entitled "The United States vs. Juan Sol" for

rape, consisting of 12 pages, i.e., the criminal cause against said Juan Sol
for the rape committed upon the person of the accused. And when the
defense rested, they stated that there appears in the said criminal
proceeding a prosecution for rape against said individual (Juan Sol).
However, the said proceeding was not forwarded, together with the present
case, to this court.
On the other hand, the prosecution presented no other evidence, as has
been said before, than the two contradictory statements of the accused;
and according to the doctrines laid down by American courts in the two
decisions hereinbefore inserted, it must prove by other evidence than the
two contradictory statements themselves, which of them was false or more
properly speaking, that the false statement, according to the allegation in
the information, was the one given by the accused before the court of first
instance at the hearing of the cause for rape aforementioned and in which
she testified that it was not her father who raped her but the Spaniard Juan
Sol. The prosecution did not only fail to present evidence tending to prove
the existence of said falsehood, but when it should have produced as a
witness Juan Sol, who was in the court room and was pointed out by the
accused with her finger as the author of the rape of which she had been the
victim, and when it was within its power to produce said man on the
witness-stand, who must be the first to protest and reject the said
imputation in the presence of the court, did not avail itself of these
evidence in order to contradict and belie the clear and definite statement
made by the accused against the said Spaniard not only in the sense that
the latter had raped her but also in that he had induced and compelled her,
by threats and duress, to declare at the preliminary investigation before the
fiscal that which was true according to the information, an affirmation which
the prosecution was in duty bound to prove by producing the said Juan Sol
as a witness. And having failed to do so, such a failure is fatal to the
prosecution.
In the judgment appealed from, the lower court did not pass upon the
question whether the statement of the accused at the preliminary
investigation before the fiscal of this city was given voluntarily or not. This
the lower court must have done according to the doctrine laid down
in People vs. McClintic (supra) mentioned in the above-inserted paragraph

of 21 R. C. L., 271, and, even disregarding this doctrine, in view of what the
accused has testified to relative to the threats and duress made upon her
by Juan Sol, in connection with the absence of any evidence on the part of
the prosecution to rebut the testimony of the accused respecting that
particular.
On the other hand, after considering as real and true the facts recited by
the accused at the preliminary investigation before the fiscal of the city in
the presence of the policeman Varsovia, the lower court in the same
decision declares that later when they had possessed their right spirit, and
by means of undue influence, undoubtedly the influence exercised by the
father of the accused, the latter falsely took her oath at the hearing of the
case for rape, saying that she was not raped by her said father but by a
Spaniard called Juan Sol. The court further adds that the father of the
accused induced her daughter to tell a falsehood at the hearing of the said
cause in order to free himself thereof. These assertions of the trial court do
not find any support or basis in the evidence for there is not a word of
record expressing, or even indicating, that Alejo Capistrano, the father of
the accused, has exercised upon the latter undue influence or employed
means to induce her to tell a falsehood at the hearing of the case for rape
aforementioned, as the judgment of the lower court speaks. The lower
court's assertion in this sense is completely inaccurate and with this
inaccuracy is certainly contrasted the fact that in the said judgment no
mention has been made, for the just and upright appreciation of the facts
submitted during the trial, concerning the insufficiency of the evidence of
the prosecution in not presenting as witness Juan Sol in order to rebut and
impugn, as has been already said, what the accused has testified to
regarding the particular aforementioned.
In the face of the notorious insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution
and the effect of the evidence adduced by the accused, it not being, on the
other had, improbable that the accused, a young woman 14 years of age,
would have declared in the terms she did before the fiscal of the city at
preliminary investigation of the cause for rape against her father Alejo
Capistrano, compelled by threats alleged by her to have been made upon
her by Juan Sol, nor is it also improbable that the latter was the one who
raped her and not her own father, and it not being proven that when the

accused testified under oath before the court of first instance at the hearing
of the said cause for rape, giving the statements which gave rise to the
dismissal of said cause, she would have transgressed the truth, and there
being on the contrary, sufficient reasons leading us to believe, with
sufficient ground, that she (the accused) was induced or compelled by
threats and duress, to state what she had stated before the fiscal of the city
at the preliminary investigation of the cause for rape aforesaid it is not
proper to hold the accused guilty of the crime of perjury aforementioned nor
to impose upon her any penalty for said crime.
For the foregoing reasons and considerations, we reverse the judgment
appealed from the acquit the accused, with the costs of both instances de
officio. So ordered.
Pp vs. City Court of Manila

09/24/1987

Facts: Oct. 17, 1972 - Diolito dela Cruz figured in an accident

Oct. 18 an info for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
(SPIRI) was filed against private respondent driver of the truck
Oct. 18 the victim died
Oct. 20 private respondent was arraigned on the charge of SPIRI; he
pleaded guilty
Oct 24 an info for homicide thru reckless imprudence (HRI) was filed
against priv. Resp.
Nov. 17 city court of Mla dismissed above info on the ground of double
jeopardy
Issue: WON there was double jeopardy
Ratio Decidendi: Where the victim of an accident died 2 days prior to the
arraignment of the accused who pleaded guilty to an info for SPIRI, he can
no longer be charged with HRI as no new fact supervened after the
arraignment.
Reasons: Molo v. People held that where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
Above case not applicable in the instant case bec. there was no
supervening event (kasi nga patay na si Diolito nung na-convict si Gapay for

SPIRI, if it were the other way around, i.e. na-convict muna si Gapay bago
namatay si Diolito, walang double jeopardy kc may supervening event na)
Dispositive Portion: Order of dismissal of lower court affirmed.
Sammy Rodriguez vs. Jaime C. Eugenio 04/20/2007
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Sammy Rodriguez
against respondent Jaime C. Eugenio, Process Server at the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 121, for Grave Misconduct (Violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).
Complainant alleges that he is the uncle of Sonny Acbay, accused in
Criminal Case No. C-69159 for Robbery filed before Caloocan City, RTCBranch 121, presided by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles.
The complaint states that sometime in June 2004, he went to Atty. Isabelo E.
Sicat (Atty. Sicat), Public Attorneys Office (PAO) counsel de officio of his
nephew Acbay, to inquire about the latters case and was told to follow it up
at the staff room of Caloocan City RTC-Branch 121. On his way to Branch
121, he met respondent who offered to work on the dismissal of the criminal
case against his nephew. Respondent asked complainant for P300.00 which
the latter promptly paid up. A week later, respondent again asked P500.00
ostensibly to be given to Meycauayan policemen. On several occasions
thereafter, complainant avers that he had given respondent an additional
aggregate amount of P1,700.00 for the dismissal of the case against his
nephew.
On 14 September 2004, after his nephews case was again reset, he asked
Atty. Sicat why the case was still not dismissed. Atty. Sicat informed him
that the court was still waiting for the return notice of the subpoena sent to
private complainant Geraldine Calderon. Before noon of the same day,
complainant went to see respondent at Caloocan City RTC-Branch 124 and
was told that if he will give another P1,500.00 (P1,000.00 for Atty. Sicat
and P500.00 for transportation to serve the subpoena) the case will be
dismissed. Since he did not have any money with him, he agreed to give
the money late afternoon the next day.

Thereafter, complainant sought the help of Erwin Tulfo of ABS-CBN. The next
day, 15 September 2004, at around 3:00 p.m., complainant, accompanied
by Erwin Tulfo, dropped by at the Caloocan Police Station which proposed to
undertake entrapment of respondent. Subsequently, the entrapment in the
vicinity of the Judicial Complex was conducted with complainant handing
the white envelope containing P1,500.00 to respondent, who was then
apprehended.
Later, respondent was charged with robbery, docketed as Criminal Case No.
C-71514, before the Caloocan City RTC-Branch 122.
On 5 October 2004, Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, Presiding Judge of
Caloocan City RTC-Branch 121, endorsed1the instant administrative
complaint and stated that on 7 July 2004, she requested the immediate
relief of respondent. On 15 September 2004, long after his relief from
Branch 121, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto near the Judicial
Complex in another entrapment operation initiated by complainant with the
assistance of Erwin Tulfo of ABS-CBN and the police, precipitated by
respondents repeated extortion from complainant.
Parenthetically, Atty. Sicat of the PAO accomplished an Affidavit2 attesting
that he is the resident public attorney of Caloocan City RTC-Branch 121, and
the counsel de officio of accused Sonny Acbay in Criminal Case No. C69159; and that he never tasked respondent to demand money from
anyone for the dismissal of a case, much less, did he ever receive money
from respondent.
In his Comment3 dated 28 January 2005, respondent vehemently denies
the allegations against him asserting that the "entrapment" was really a
"set-up" perpetrated by complainant. Prior to 15 September 2004, he met
complainant only once, which was sometime in June 2004, when he served
a subpoena in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Thereafter, he did not meet
complainant again until 15 September 2004 since he was transferred on 7
July 2004 to the Caloocan City RTC-Branch 124. Respondent asserts that the
charges against him are incredulous, for how could he ever represent that
he could have a case dismissed when he is only a lowly process server and
not a judge. Moreover, Judge Angeles is very strict in requiring her
personnel not to be involved in any case. Thus, he has no influence at all

over any case. What really happened on 15 September 2004 was that he
was invited by complainant for a snack of "goto" which he accepted. While
he was looking at the cauldron containing "goto," complainant suddenly
thrust in his trouser pocket the money saying that it was for his
transportation fare to Meycauayan, Bulacan. Before respondent could reply,
policemen suddenly appeared and arrested him. He was subjected to an
ultra-violet examination of his hands which yielded negative results for he
never really touched the money because he had no intention to receive it
and Judge Angeles already had another process server. Lastly, respondent
contends that since the charges against him are trumped up, complainant,
bothered by his conscience, executed an Affidavit of Desistance. Thus, he
prays for the dismissal of the instant complaint.
On 8 June 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its
report4 and recommended the following:
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is our
recommendation that the instant administrative complaint be docketed as a
regular administrative case and respondent Jaime C. Eugenio be DISMISSED
from the service with forfeiture of his retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to his reinstatement in government
service.5
On 2 August 2006, we required6 the parties to manifest within ten days
from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution based on
the pleadings filed.
On 6 October 2006, respondent submitted his manifestation7 stating he
was submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
Complainant failed to file his manifestation despite notice sent and received
by him.
Resultantly, the case was submitted for decision based on the pleadings
filed.
The Court, after examining the records of the case, upholds the findings of
the OCA.
At the outset, we reiterate the settled rule that a complainant who suddenly
changes his mind cannot simply withdraw an administrative complaint filed
against an official or employee of the judiciary.

Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the

complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be
detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the
complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power. Desistance cannot
divest the Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint
against the respondent. To be sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct
and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary. And the program
and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people
should not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements
between the parties.8
The issue in administrative cases is not whether the complainant has a
cause of action against the respondent, but whether the employee against
whom the complaint is filed has breached the norms and standards of
service in the judiciary. Clearly, this Court has the power and the duty to
root out misconduct among its employees, regardless of the complainants
desistance.9 Besides, the Desistance mentioned by respondent refers to the
affidavit10 executed by complainant in the Robbery case filed before the
Caloocan City RTCBranch 122, which merely stated that the former was no
longer interested in pursuing the case as he believed that there was no
criminal intent on the part of respondent and the incident arose from petty
misunderstanding and misapprehension of facts. Pertinent portions of the
affidavit read: 2. That after due deliberation and studying regarding the
circumstances surrounding the facts of the case that lead to the filing of the
complaint, I was convinced that there was no criminal intent on the part of
the accused and that the incident arose merely out of petty
misunderstanding and misapprehension of facts;
3. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing
and to inform the Court that I am desisting and no longer interested in
further pursuing the above-criminal case;
4. That I am further executing this affidavit of my own free will and
voluntary act and deed without any force, intimidation, as monetary
consideration on my part.11
It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his

complaint.12 Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence that

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.13 Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not
necessary, as the standard of integrity demanded of members of the Bench
is not satisfied and merely allows one to escape the penalties of the
criminal law.14 In the case at bar, complainant adduced substantial
evidence to support his allegations.
As gleaned from the complainants affidavit-complaint, respondent
demanded sums of money for the dismissal of the criminal case against
complainants nephew.
4. Noon din ay nag-follow-up ako sa staff room ng Branch 121 at nakausap
ko si Jimmy Eugenio na nagsabi sa akin na lalakarin daw niya ma-dismiss
ang kaso magbigay lamang ako sa kanya ng tatlong daang (P300.00) piso;
5. Nagbigay ako ng tatlong daang (P300.00) piso kay Jimmy Eugenio noong
araw na iyon mismo.
6. Makalipas ang isang lingo pagkabigay ko ng tatlong daang (P300.00) piso
kay Jimmy Eugenio, sinabihan na naman ako ni Jimmy na magbigay sa
kanya ng 500 pesos para ibigay daw niya sa pulis Meycauayan;
7. Muli ay nagbigay ako sa kanya (Jimmy) ng limandaang (P500.00) piso
noong buwan din ng Junio, 2004;
8. Noong July 2004, hindi pa rin na-dismiss ang kaso ng aking pamangkin.
Nag-text sa akin si Jimmy at sinabi na pumunta ako sa Branch 121. Nagkita
kami sa Branch 121 at muli ay nanghingi si Jimmy ng tatlong daang
(P300.00) piso para daw pambili ng papel at panlakad ng subpoena. Ako ay
nagbigay sa kanya ng tatlong daan (P300.00) piso dahil sa hangarin ko na
ma-dismiss ang kaso ng aking pamangkin;
9. Noong July 2004 nagkita kami muli ni Jimmy sa husgado at siya ay
nagpadagdag ng 200 piso. Muli ay nagbigay uli ako kay Jimmy ng
dalawandaang (P200.00) piso;
10. Makalipas ang isang lingo matapos ang aking bigay na dalawandaang
(P200.00) piso, noong buwan din ng Julio, 2004 ay muling nagpadagdag si
Jimmy ng tatlong daang (P300.00) piso 300 piso (sic) dahil kulang daw ang
perang ibinigay ko para ma-dismiss ang kaso;
11. Hindi pa rin nadi-dismiss ang kaso ng aking pamangkin noong buwan ng
Agosto, 2004. Nagkita kami ni Jimmy sa husgado at muli ay nanghingi si
Jimmy ng 900 piso. Dahil sa kawalan ng sapat na 900 piso ang halagang ito
ay sinikap ko na maibigay sa kanya mula sa pagsasangla ng bracelet ng
aking anak at isang VCD. Hinulugan ko kay Jimmy ang siyam na raang

(P900.00) piso na hinihingi niya ng tatlong (3) beses na instllment na tigtatatlong daang (P300.00) piso;
12. Matapos kong maibigay kay Jimmy ang kumpletong siyam na raang
(P900.00) piso, hindi pa rin nadi-dismiss ang kaso ng aking pamangkin;
13. Noong Septiembre 14, 2004, matapos ang hearing ng aking pamangkin
na si Sonny Acbay sa RTC Branch 121 at ma-reset na naman ang kaso,
kinausap ko si Atty. Sicat kung bakit hindi nadi-dismiss ang kaso ng aking
pamangkin samantalang ang private complainant na si Geraldine Calderon
ay di sumisipot at wala na sa kanyang tinitirahan sa Valenzuela City.
Nagpaliwanag si Atty. Sicat na kailangan nakasulat sa return ng subpoena
na wala na ang nagrereklamo sa kanyang address na natala sa Information.
Sinabi pa ni Atty. Sicat na na-reset ang kaso dahil wala pang return ang
notice kay Geraldine Calderon;
14. Dakong 11:45 AM, Sept. 14, 2004 pinuntahan ko si Jimmy sa Branch 124
at sinabi ko na na-reset na naman sa September 30, 2004 ang hearing.
Habang kami ay nasa pasilyo ng Justice Hall, dumaan si Atty. Sicat at
kinausap ni Jimmy Eugenio. Narinig ko muli ang paliwanag ni Atty. Sicat na
sinabi na niya sa akin ilang sandali lamang ang nakalipas. Ang sabi ni Jimmy
ay sundin ang sinasabi ni Atty. Sicat;
15. Nang nakaalis na si Atty. Sicat, nagsabi sa akin si Jimmy ng ganito,
"Magbigay ka ng halagang 1,500 piso. Ang isang libo ay ibibigay kay Atty.
Sicat at ang 500 piso ay pamasahe para sa pagpapadala ng subpoena." Ang
sabi ni Jimmy ay ibigay ko ang pera sa kanya sa dakong hapon ng araw na
iyon. Nagtaka ako kung bakit hinihingan ako ni Jimmy ng 1,000 piso para
kay Atty. Sicat at kung bakit sa kanya (Jimmy) ko ibibigay samantalang hindi
naman ako hinihingan ng pera ni Atty. Sicat at sa simula pa lamang na
makilala ko si Atty. Sicat ay sinabihan na niya ako na libre at walang bayad
and serbisyo ng PAO lawyer na tulad niya. Sinabihan pa rin ako ni Atty. Sicat
na bawal ang magbigay ng pera o anuman pabuya sa kanilang mga PAO
lawyer. Gayunman ay sinagot ko si Jimmy na wala akong pera ng araw na
iyon at ako ay nakiusap sa kanya na bukas na lamang ibibigay ang
naturang halaga;
16. Dahil sa walang-wala na akong pera na pambigay sa hinihingi ni Jimmy
na isang libo limandaang (P1,500) piso, ako ay nagsadya kay G. Erwin Tulfo
ng ABS CBN noong dakong hapon ng Septiembre 14, 2004. Ang sabi ko kay
G. Erwin Tulfo, "Yung pamangkin ko nakakulong sa Caloocan mag-iisang
taon na sa Septiembre 14, 2004, nakapagbigay na ako kay Jimmy, isang
empleado husgado, ng 2,500 piso. Hindi pa kasama dito ang mga gastos ko
kapag pinapakain si Jimmy. Ngayon na naman ay hinihingan ako ng 1,500
piso." Sinabi ko na rin kay G. Erwin Tulfo ang usapan namin ni Jimmy na
magbibigay ako sa kanya ng 1,500 piso kinabukasan, petsa 15 ng
Septiembre 2004;

17. Kinabukasan, dakong ika-3 ng hapon, Septiembre 15, 2004, muli ay

nagsadya ako kay G. Erwin Tulfo. Sinamahan ako ni G. Erwin Tulfo at kami
ay nagtungo na sa Caloocan Police Station.15

3. Entrapment in the vicinity of the Judicial Complex was conducted with

complainant handing the white envelope containing P1,500.00 to
respondent;

The evidence presented by the complainant is sufficient to convince the

proper authorities to conduct an entrapment of respondent. In entrapment,
ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of ensuring and capturing
the law-breakers in the execution of their criminal plan.16 Entrapment has
received judicial sanction as long as it is carried out with due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards. Furthermore, there is no scintilla of
evidence that the manner in which the National Bureau of Investigation
agents conducted the operation was tainted with illegality. We rule that
absent strong and convincing proof to the contrary, this Court is bound by
the presumption that the arresting officers were aware of the legal
mandates in effecting arrest and strictly complied with the same.17

4. The front left pocket of respondents pants tested positive for the
presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder, based on the laboratory report
of the Philippine National Police, Northern Police District Crime Laboratory
Office, Caloocan City Police Station.

In Co v. Calimag, Jr.,18 this Court said: "[a]n accusation of bribery is easy to

concoct and difficult to disprove, thus, to our mind, the complainant must
present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation." In order
that the allegation of a charge of this nature may not be considered a fairy
tale, evidence, other than the doubtful and questionable verbal testimony
of a lone witness, should be adduced. Entrapment should have been
pursued. Evidence of a reasonable report to police authorities should have
been presented. Record of where the bribe money came from, its specific
denominations and the manner respondent accepted and disposed of it
should have been clearly shown.
In the case at bar, evidence on record shows that complainant has complied
with these requirements, such as:
1. On 15 September 2004, complainant sought the help of Erwin Tulfo of the
ABS-CBN to apprehend respondent;
2. Complainant and Erwin Tulfo went to the Caloocan Police Station to report
the matter;1vvphi1.nt

Clearly, respondent solicited and received money from the complainant for
the dismissal of the criminal case against the latters nephew. The probative
weight of the affidavit-complaint of the complainant as well as the results of
the entrapment cannot be overcome by the latters bare denials.
A perusal of respondents Sinumpaang Salaysay19 reveals that while he
denies all the allegations that he asked and received money from
complainant on several occasions, he failed to set forth the substance of the
matters upon which he relies to support his denial. It is settled that denial is
inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and
is with nil evidentiary value. Like the defense of alibi, a denial crumbles in
the light of positive declarations.20
In an effort to escape liability, he interposes the defense that on 15
September 2004, complainant voluntarily gave him money as his
transportation fare in going to Meycauayan, Bulacan. Complainant directly
put the money in his pants pocket but before he could react, though, a
policeman appeared and arrested him. In other words, he interposed the
defense of frame-up.
This Court is not persuaded by respondents version that he was framed up.
Frame-up as a defense has been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor, for it can just easily be concocted but is quite difficult to prove.
And the defense of frame-up must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence because it is of the same category as alibi. In the case at bar,
respondent failed to present convincing evidence to substantiate his claim.
Worth noting is that there is no proof on record that complainant was
induced or influenced by any improper motive to perpetrate such "set-up."

The Court also addresses respondents defense of absence of fluorescent

powder on his hands. This is a lame excuse. Laboratory report of the
Philippine National Police, Northern Police District Crime Laboratory Office,
Caloocan City Police Station, showed presence of ultraviolet fluorescent
powder on the front left pocket of respondents pants which coincides with
his own admission that the money was placed in his pocket.
Lastly, in the affidavit of Atty. Sicat, he vigorously denied that he asked
respondent to demand money in exchange for the dismissal of the case,
much less received any single centavo from respondent. These clearly
demonstrate that respondent had been working alone and further highlight
his sole liability for his wrongful actions.
Respondent has clearly demonstrated his failure to observe the standard
and behavior required of an employee in the judiciary and he cannot avoid
responsibility for his acts. He has shown beyond doubt his unfitness for
public office. The judiciary must be cleansed of corrupt employees like
Eugenio or run the risk of eroding the public confidence.
Respondent as Process Server serves Court processes such as subpoenas,
subpoenas duces tecum, summonses, court orders and notices; prepares
and submits returns of service of processes; monitors messages and/or
delivers Court mail matters; keeps in custody and maintains a record book
of all mail matters received and dispatched by the Court; and performs such
other duties as may be assigned by the Presiding Judge/Clerk of
Court.21 Clearly, then respondent should have known that he had
absolutely no power or authority to talk to litigants and give false hopes
regarding their cases.
We cannot overly emphasize our previous pronouncements that,
circumscribed as it is with a heavy burden of responsibility, the official and
nonofficial conduct required of court personnel - from the presiding judge to
the rank and file - must always be beyond reproach. It is imperative that
they maintain the good name and standing of the court as a true temple of
justice, the administration of which is a sacred task. By the very nature of
their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it - from the highest
officials to the lower employees - must faithfully adhere to and hold

inviolate the principle solemnly enshrined in our Constitution: that a public

office is a public trust.
Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline.1a\^/phi1.net A public
servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity
for no less than the Constitution mandates the principle that "a public office
is a public trust and all public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency."22 All public officers and employees, especially those
in the judiciary, must at all times exercise a high degree of professionalism
and responsibility, which includes optimum performance of duties. Hence,
this Court shall never countenance any conduct, act or omission that would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to
diminish public confidence in the judiciary.
As the administration of justice is a sacred task, the persons involved in it
ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty and integrity.23 Their
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but, above all else, must be above suspicion. Every employee of
the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.24
Misconduct has been defined as any unlawful conduct, on the part of the
person concerned with the administration of justice, prejudicial to the rights
of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means
wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily
imply corruption or criminal intent.25 Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior;26 while
"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant;
shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."
Respondents act of demanding and receiving money from the uncle of a
party litigant constitutes grave misconduct in office. It is this kind of gross
and flaunting misconduct, no matter how nominal the amount involved on
the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering
the law and rendering justice quickly, which erodes the respect for law and
the courts.28

Pursuant to Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order 292, Grave Misconduct, being in the nature of grave
offenses, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in government service.29
In addition, respondents solicitation of money from complainant in
exchange for a favorable decision violates Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel which took effect on 1 June 2004 pursuant to A.M. No.
03-06-13-SC. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel expressly provide:
SECTON 1. Court Personnel shall not use their official position to secure
unwarranted benefits, privileges, or exemption for themselves or for others.
SECTION 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or
benefit on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift shall
influence their official actions.
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a
few erring court personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the
impression that decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the
disillusionment of the public. This Court has never wavered in its vigilance
in eradicating the so-called "bad eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever
warranted by the gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in
an administrative case is meted to erring personnel. The following are cases
of misconduct committed by court employees who demanded money from
litigants and were meted the penalty of dismissal:
In Frankie N. Calabines v. Luis N. Gnilo, Dolor M. Catoc v. Feliciano Calinga,
Evelyn L. Caguitla, Luis N. Gnilo and Atty. Michael P. Musico,31 the penalty
of dismissal was imposed on four employees of the Court of Appeals for
receiving a sum of money from party litigants in exchange for a supposed
decision which did not actually exist.
In Re: Criminal Case No. MC-02-5637 Against Arturo V. Peralta and Larry C.
De Guzman, Employees of MeTC, Br. 31, Q. C.,32 a clerk of court and a

sheriff were dismissed from service for receiving marked money from a
litigant in exchange for the execution of a writ.
In Hidalgo v. Magtibay,33 a process server and a jail officer were dismissed
from service for asking grease money in the amount of P2,000.00 to
facilitate the release from detention of a certain Dionisio Catimbang who
had a pending case in the Tanuan City RTC- Branch 6.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Morante,34 we ruled that the
abominable act of a clerk of court of extorting money in exchange for court
orders warrants his dismissal from service and imposition of accessory
penalties.
In Fabian v. Galo,35 a court stenographer was dismissed from service when
she demanded and received various sums of money on the promise that
she would obtain a favorable decision for a litigant.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Barron,36 a judge was dismissed for
demanding and receiving money from a party litigant. The conduct of
respondent judge shows that he can be influenced by monetary
considerations.
We have been resolute in our drive to discipline and, if warranted, to
remove from the service errant magistrates, employees and even justices of
higher collegiate appellate courts37 for ANY infraction which tends to give
the Judiciary a bad name. To underscore our earnestness in this pursuit, we
have, in fact, been unflinching in imposing discipline on errant
personnel38 or in purging the ranks of those undeserving to remain in the
service.39We can do no less in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, Jaime C. Eugenio is found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct. He is
DISMISSED from service effective immediately, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality in the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.