incorporating

SPECIAL ISSUE

Report of the
Alternative Committee
on Nuclear Ship Visits

Part 1: The Case Against Nuclear Ship Visits

 Report of
the Alternative Committee
on Nuclear Ship Visits

Part I: The Case Against Nuclear Ship Visits

Table of Contents
page

**
Summary 3

**
Acjl:!Jowledgements

** Members of the Altemative Committee 5

and Terms of Reference

l. Introduction 6

12

IV. Nuclear propulsion an!! th�illi>ba1 environment 18

V. N uclear-free im� economy and trade 22

VI. Nuclear powered vessels and New Zealand sovereignty 26

** 28
List of Submissions to the Alternative Committee
 3

Summary

.. The National Government has incorrectly characterised the issue of visits by nuclear-
powered vessels as being one of safety. Safety is not the only, or even the maln, reason why
nuclear-powered vessels should continue to be banned from New Zealand. Questions of safety
will be addressed in Part Two of our report, but each of the other issues raised in this report on
its own is enough reason to justify the nuclear-free policy.

,. The threat of nuclear weapons has not gone away in the post-Cold War world: the world is
faced with the disturbing dual problems of nuclear powers turning their weapons against non­
nuclear nations (especially in the Third World) and also the emergence of new nuclear weapon
states. New Zealand needs, more than ever, to maintain pressure for nuclear disarmament
through its nuclear-free stand.

,. Nuclear-powered submarines and ships were dangerous and de-stabilising elements of the
Cold War. All classes of nuclear-powered vessels have primarily offensive rather than
defensive roles. World opinion should discourage their continued use; and New Zealand should
not be seen supporting these offensive roles.

,. The advantages for New Zealand of US naval visits are negligible, if not negative. It is the
US rather than New Zealand which obtains benefits from ports visits. There simply isn't a good
reason for giving up our nuclear-free status.

"' An analysis of pas! United States Navy visits to New Zealand shows that none were
concerned with "defending" New Zealand, the official explanation for the visits.

,. Nuclear power produces environmental problems of global significance: from mining and
reprocessing through to decommissioned reactors and radioactive waste. A majority of the
nuclear reactors in the world today are in military vessels. New Zealand has taken a stand
against this technology by disassociating ourselves from land and sea based reactors.

*
Plutonium-239, an inevitable product of nuclear power, is a highly dangerous substance
both physically and politically. It forms a deadly link between the environmental and nuclear­
weapon-proliferation consequences of the continued use of nuclear power.

* New Zealand's nuclear-free policy provides a positive and much needed advantage for
exporters and the tourist industry. There is certainly no evidence of any significant harm to
trade fro the policy. This consideration alone would outweigh any claimed advantages of
abandoning the ban on nuclear-powered vessels.

*
There are issues of democracy at stake too: unless the Government could convince a clear
majority of New Zealanders that a change to the nuclear-free legislation is required, it would be
thoroughly undemocratic to amend it.
 Acknowledgements

The Alternative Committee would like to thank the following individuals for their contributions
to the process of researching, writing and editing Part I of this report:

JacquiBarrington
KateBoanas
Rob Green
NickyHager
Simon Hales
Larry Ross
Michael Szabo
Owen Wilkes

The committee would also like to thank the many individuals and groups who made
submissions on the issue of safety and other aspects of nuclear ship visits which fall within the
terms of reference.

Their submissions will be summarised in Part n of this report.

 MEMBERSHIP
AND TERMS OF REFERENCE OF
Alternative Committee on
Nuclear Ship Visits

The committee members are

Or J. Roger Bray, Research Ecologist, Nelson

Or Joan Chapple, Plastic Surgeon, Auckland
Or Neil Cherry, Meteorology Lecturer, Christchurch
Mr Gerry Coates, Consulting Engineer, Wellington
Or Ranginui Walker, Maori Studies Lecturer, Auckland
Or Peter Wills, Physics Lecturer, Auckland
Or Bill Wilson, Radiobiologist, Auckland

The Alternative Committee will consider a broad range of technical and political issues and
receive public submissions in order to assess the advisability of allowing nuclear powered ships
to enter the territorial waters of AotearoalNew Zealand.

The Committee will consider and make fmdings on the following topics:

1. The safety and environmental records of maritime nuclear reactors in the context of the
severe constraints of military secrecy surrounding them;

2. The rationale for the regulations, codes and liability regimes adopted by New Zealand and
other countries to govern the visits of nuclear powered vessels;

3. The contingency plans and emergency procedures adopted by New Zealand and other
countries to'prepare for and deal with nuclear reactor accidents on visiting ships with due
consideration of a full range of accident severity, including a breach of reactor
containment;;

4. The risks to the New Zealand public, environment, trade, and international reputation
associated with visits by nuclear powered vessels; consideration will be given to the
benefits of the present zero-risk policy in contrast to the finite risk of a nuclear reactor
accident if visits were to resume;

5. The international and domestic political contexts, including recent disarmament initiatives,
within which the New Zealand government is considering alterations to the Nuclear Free
Act of 1987;

6. The issues of national sovereignty, bicultural identity, and representative government

which are raised by the question of changing New Zealand's nuclear free law; careful
consideration will be given to the Treaty of Waitangi. 10 public opinion and to the level of
risk from visits by nuclear powered vessels that New Zealanders would find acceptable.
 Report of the Alternative Committee on Nuclear Ship Visits

Part 1: The Case Against Nuclear Ship Visits

"We will give New Zealanders a clear guarantee that this country will remain nuclear­
free - that is free of both nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered vessels. "
- Jim Bolger, press statement 5 March1990

"We intend to keep New Zealand nuclear-free this term, next term and the term after
that. "
- Jim Bolger, 27 April1991

I. Introduction

The National Government is considering changing New Zealand's nuclear- free policy by amending the
1987 IlUclear-free legislation. Proponents of this change argue that nuclear weapons are somehow no
longer an issue for New Zealand and that the only issue remaining to be resolved is whether nuclear­
powered vessels present a significant threat of accident when visiting New Zealand harbours. The
Special Committee on Nuclear PropulSion was established on 23 December 1991 to report on this
narrow issue of safety.

The Alternative Committee on Nuclear Ship Visits was established in Februaty 1992 in response to the
Government-appointed committee. The reason for forming a second committee was that the basis of the
Government's approach was believed to be flawed: specifically, that there are still important issues
related to nuclear strategy which justify New Zealand's nuclear-free policy and that nuclear reactor
safety during visits is not the only, or even the main, reason for opposing nuclear-powered warship
visits.

The primaty purpose of the Alternstive Committee is to present to the public and the Government the
broad set of reasons why nuclear-powered warships should continue to be baoned and the nuclear-free
legislation retained in i� current form.

This Part One of the Alternative Committee's report looks at these issues. Part Two will cover the
subject of the risks and consequences of a nuclear reactor accident during a nuclear-powered warship or
submarine visit to a New Zealand harbour. Its focus will be a critique of the Government committee's
report. Part Two will be released as soon as is practicable after the Government report becomes
available f o r analysis.

The Alternative Committee has decided to handle nuclear reactor accident issues separately to emphasise
that reactor safety is a red herring in the current discussion of New Zealand's nuclear-free policy. Part
Two will highlight concerns about the safety of nuclear-powered vessels, but most of the main
argument� for preserving the nuclear-free policy do not concern port safety.

The concern over nuclear reactor safety is very simple: the probability of a major reactor accident during
a short visit to a New Zealand harbour is low but the consequences of an accident could be catastrophic.

Since both advocates and opponents of visits by nuclear-powered vessels agree on this general
conclusion, the government's lavishly funded study of this subject seems unlikely to contribute anything
new to the debate. The other, non-safety, issues considered in this report are much more relevant to the
decision whether to maintain New Zealand's nuclear-free policy.
 7

Since 1985. New Zealand has been excluded from active participation in the ANZUS alliance by the
United States. A return to full ANZUS membership is the Government's principal motivation in
attempting to weaken or abOlish the nuclear-free act. But ANZUS has never been a security guarantee
for New Zealand. The treaty simply contains an agreement to consult among the partners in the event of
a security threat.

Finally. we note that a "scientific" review of nuclear-powered ship safety is not a new idea. After the
LabOur Government was elected with a nuclear-free policy in 1984. government officials opposed 10 the
policy came to then Prime Minister David Lange and proposed that he abandon his anti-nuclear election
stand. According to Mr Lange. the strategy proposed to him at that time was to have a scientific review
which concluded that nuclear-powered ships were safe. and then use this as justification for allowing
visits by nuclear-powered warships (and thereafter all nuclear weapon capable warships).!

Precisely the same approach was proposed by then Leader of the Opposition Jim Bolger on 9 July 1987
shortiy before the gerteral election. In front page newspaper stories Mr Bolger announced that a
National Government would call for a new study of the safety of nuclear-powered ships and ban visit�
by nuclear-powered warships until their safety was confirmed.2 Few people al the time doubted that this
was a political strategy desigoed for placating the public while undermining the nuclear-free policy.

The current review of nuclear-powered ship safety is not motivated by any need for nuclear-powered
warships to visit New Zealand. It appears that once again a nuclear propulsion review has been
proposed as a political tool for changing the nuclear-free policy.

The Alternative Committee is using the review as an opportunity to present the reasons why most New
Zealanders still strongly support the nuclear-free policy.

References

1. David Lange. speaking to a public forum in Wellington. 7 June 1992.

2. "National changes ship ban policy", Dominion. 10 July 1987.

"Now that the Soviet threat has receded, [former NATO commander Sir lames] Eberle
was candid about the role of security pacts like ANZUS within the Western alliance.
Such pacts will exist not so much to defend the West from an external threat, he explalns,
but to serve as platforms for launching forces to ensure our access to key resources in the
Third World. 'The new divide is not one of ideology, but of prosperity.' Military
alliances will still be needed, he concludes, to confront those who do not recognise 'the
norms of civilisation' about who should be the haves, and who should be the have nols. "
(New Zealand Lis tener. 8 July 1991,p. 15)

II. New Zealand's nuclear free poU� in the post-Cold War era

Many of those who argue that our nuclear free policy is no longer necessary in a post-Cold War world
believe that nuclear weapons and strategies have somehow disappeared. or lost their relevance. The
reverse is true. In this and the following section we describe the continuing and intended deployment of
nuclear weapons and their new "uses" planned by the western nuclear powers, and the growing problem
of nuclear weapons proliferation.

"For the United States. much of tbe basic framework of the Cold War remains intact, apart from the
modalities for controlling the domestic population .... The changes in the global system are indeed
momentous, but have only a limited impact upon the fundamental bases for US policies towards the
Third World, though they do modify the conditions under which these policies must be executed.... The
removal of the limited Soviet deterrent frees the United States in the exercise of violence, . ". 1
. .

With the transition from a Bush to a CIlnton adminlstration U.S. foreign policy is likely to change in the
coming months, but the loss of the old traditional "enemy" will continue to challenge U.S. military
policy and the civilian strategies that underlie it

In view of ClIrrent political and military uncertainties and in the starkly new circumstances surrounding
the global struggle for resources and sovereignty among nations it is illogical and absurd for our
government leaders to propose a return to nuclear involvement with the United States and the ANZUS
alliance or any other military club. To take that backward step is to pretend that the United States Navy
has somehow been perraanently cleansed of all nuclear weapons and the strategies to deploy lh'1d use
them, United States interests may not coincide with New Zealand interests or with those of our
neighbours and trading partners, As the evidence in this and following sections shows, wc should play
no pan in United States strategies to further its own interests at the expense of those of the South Pacific
or anywhere eise on the globe,

Unlike tile UK, which has removed and plans to destroy its tactical naval nuclear weapons, the US is
retaining a considerable proportion in storage and reserves tile right 10 put them back on its ships at any
time, This could be seen as a "deployment policy" as well as a significant disarmament step. The
'neither confinn nor deny policy' (NCND) will oontinue as a tactic designed primarily to confound
resistance to nuclear weapons in friendly oountries.2 Although the US has taken some positive
disarmament steps, and may even stop nuclear testing temporarily, it still retains a massive nuclear
arsenallooidng for new targets, many in Third World nations.3 The threat of nuclear annihilation
against non-nuclear nations should not be part of the post-Cold War world order,

New Zealand '8 role in Disarmament

This is the precise time, a time of fluid international relationships and diminished nuclear oonfrontation,
to keep up pressure for disarmament. Many nations and their leaders are now more open to negotiation
and initiatives for peaceful relations; but large military-industrial establishments will quickly find or
even generate new conllicts and define new "enemies" to justify their existence as the momentum for
disarmament accelerates. New Zealand and other small nations must challenge attempts to create
enemies in the Third World.

Our nuclear free policy has had international impact because it is an example of a small. western nation
heeding the wishes of Its people to shun all involvement with nuclear weapons, This courageous act
risked retaliation by the United States, the dominant partner in ANZUS, The policy has lasted for eight
years, five of tIlem with the weight of law behind it Retallation has amounted to more bark than bite
because the United States cannot blatantly bully New Zealand without i ncurrin g international censure,

New Zealand's stand agalnst nuclear weapons is seen internationally as a moral stand against totally
immoral weapons of mass destruction. Virtually all nations would agree with that description of tile
weapons themselves, but few have taken such a positive moral step to create pressure for nuclear
disarmament With the fading of the Cold War, now is the time to increase that pressure, not 1:0 relax it
If we begin to dismantle our pioneering nuclear free policy, even with the seemingly small step of
reversing the ban on nuclear propulsion. we will cease to be an example for .otller nations, and a major
catalysl for nuclear disarmament will be lost.

Chemical and biological weapons have been outlawed internationally. Now, the legality of nuclear
weapons is being challenged in an international initiative with the goal of persuading the United Nations
to take the issue to the international Court of Justice (World Court) for an advisory opinion, Formally
launched in Geneva on May 15 this year, the World Court Project has been gaining momentum for
several years since the challenge was first launched in New Zealand io 1987 by Harold a former
Christchurch magistrate.4
 9
:rile Changing Global Balance of Power

With the collapse of the Soviet Bloc the United States and its allies have been left with massive military
and intelligence infrastructure and hardware lacking a clearly defined "enemy". an enemy whose evil
image has been carefully nurtured for decades. The single remaining superpower is the US whose
weapon systems, along with those of Britain and France. include large numbers of nuclear weapons that
will continue to be deployed despite recent and planned cuts to nuclear arsenals by the United States2
and Britains• and despite the recent moves by nuclear powers to suspend testing. at least temporarily.

A recent NATO planning document reveals intent to use nuclear weapons first to end a war. The
document says .....the deterrent value of nuclear arms continues to underpin NATO's entire strategy.
geared to the defence of its 16 member countries. Critics of the Western alliance say this shows NATO
has failed to keep a promise to change nuclear arms into 'weapons of last resort· ...'

With the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the acknowledged six nuclear powers (including Israel). the
world is facing nuclear instability on an unprecedented scale. If the major nuclear powers continue to
possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. it may become virtually impossible to control weapons
proliferation to other countries.

The fact that Israel, India and Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons, while several other countries
may be trying, can be seen as a legacy of decades of Cold War during which the possession and
threatened use of weapons of mass destruction were seen to be "legitimised" by the five nuclear powers.
lf those powers now turn their nuclear attention toward the Third World, the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by new nations will be encouraged. Poor countries that try to acquire nuclear capability will
divert what little economic capacity they have to preparing for nuclear war rather than feeding. clothing
and housing their people and raising their living standards.

The doctrine of deterrence. which provided the rationale for nuclear escalation for decades, will continue
to lose credibility as countries like Iraq and Afghanistan proceed with conventional, or even eventually
nuclear, belligerence in apparent reckless defiance of nuclear-armed adversaries. The likelihood that
nuclear weapons will be used offensively or defensively in a local or regional conflict will increase
dramatically in the next decade.

The Gulf war saw the first large-scale use by the US and its allies of sophisticated electronic
conventional warfare and high-tech weaponry. Contrary to much media emphasis, the new fuel-air and
cluster munitions boniered on mass destruction rather than the highly publicised pin-point accuracy.
There was little doubt that tactical nuclear weapons were on some US, UK and French warships. The
New Zealand government chose to play a limited supporting role in the Gulf and to be counted among
US allies.

Pentagon planning

The Pentagon document entitled "Defense Planning Guidance") provides insight into possible intentions
of the US military and foreign policy in the new global environment. Those intentions would be
focusBed on a "New World Order" with the United States the dominant power. US interests, according
to some sources. do not include any sharing of power even with current close military allies like Japan in
the Pacific region. It is significant that Japan is not an economic ally of the US - acrimony between the
two governments over trade imbalances is an ongoing feature of current relations.

Changes in US foreign policy are likely under the Clinton administration and there is scope for optimism
that Pentagon planoing of the kind described above will not be adopted.

When and where the US falters economically, it finds its status as the pre-eminent military power all the
more essential to prevent any other advanced industrial nation from challenging overall US leadership.
While overt US policy espouses healthy competition among trading nations, the US Pentagon planning
document talks about "deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global
role".
10
The "Defense Planning Guidance" document addresses the issue of nuclear strategy by proposing
reduced nuclear forces, but with numbers of warheads at about 5000 and directed against "every
reasonable adversary". Many of those adversaries who would be targeted,and Indeed may already be
targeted, are in the Third World. Justification by Ihe Pentagon rests upon its judgement that such
nations, for example Iraq,are developing Iheir own weapons of mass destruction or are otherwise hostile
to "western interests".

The military importance of nuclear-powered vessels

Nuclear propulsion for ships and submarines is massively expensive and fraught with technical and
political difficulties. Attempts to develop commercial nuclear ships failed In Japan,Germany and the
United States. Each built and tried to operate a single nuclear-powered surface ship for commercial use.
All of those ship projects were eventually abandoned and no furlher attempts at civilian nuclear shipping
are anywhere in sight. Only the nuclear icebreakers of the former Soviet Union, which may be
considered civilian, are still in operation. They are probably expensive to operate but are apparently
effective in keeping the far norlhero sea lanes open and have recently been earoing foreign exchange by
offering tourist cruises In the Arctic. During a recent cruise one Soviet icebresker was refused
permission to enter an American harbour in Alaska because of concerns about the safety of its nuclear
propulsion.

Only military establishments have been able to "justify" the development and use of nuclear-propelled
vessels because of their key roles In the conduct of the Cold War. It is no coincidence that the five
nations with nuclear powered vessels today (excluding India) are also the five major nuclear weapon
powers. Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines are essential platforms for the launch of sea­
based strategic nuclear weapons.
The specific roles of the various nuclear-powered vessels are discussed In detail in the next section on
alliances.

New Zealand's tenuous independence

Since 1985, New Zealand's nuclear free policy and law have ended visits by nuclear-capable and
nuclear-powered vessels and have served as a symbol to the rest of the world of our willlngness to assert
a degree of independent foreign policy. But New Zealand has continued to supply most of the rest of
what the US wants out of an alliance relationship, namely:

**
Participation In the Gulf war,
**
Purchase of new ANZAC frigates,
**
Orion aircraft patrols of vast areas of the Pacific,
**
Signals intelligence from spy facilities at Tangimoana and Waihopal,
**
Supportive voting In the United Nations General Assembly,
**
Joint exercises with the Australian military,
**
Development of a Low Intensity Conflict capability in the South Pacific with our Ready Reaction
Force.

The Third World focus of Low Intensity Conflict is a US development In counter-insurgency warfare
stemming from Reagan administration doctrine.s "When first conceived in 1977,lhe RDF was seen as a
lean, self-rcliant strike force designed for rapid insertion Into remote Third World battlefields". 9 The
New Zealand Ready Reaction Force was modelied on the US Rapid Deployment Force. It is "equipped
and trained for land operations up to as high a scale of intensity as can be foreseen In the circumstances
.10
of the South Pacific"

Most of the nations of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia - New Zealand's neighbours aod trading
partoers - are developing their economies and reducing their Involvement in �e affairs of the great
military!industrial powers. It would be a major security blunder,both economicaily and militarlly, for
New Zealand to turn its back on these nations in favour of rejoining an ailiance whose major goal is the
suppression o f Third World independence and !he maintenance of exploitative access to global natural
and human resources. Threatened use of nuclear weapons may be a part of such exploitation. If we took
 11
that course, any nation that resisted First World exploitation in an effort to control its own destiny would
automatically be our enemy by virtue of our membership of the western alliance.

Nuclear weapons on visiting United States warships, whatever their system of propulsion, remain a
substantial issue for New Zealanders. In the past, the public protested against visits of nuclear-capable
vessels because they were New Zealand's only concrete point of contact with nuclear weapons. Our
main ways of acting against the possession and threatened use of nuclear weapons on a global scale were
by protesting the almost certain presence of nuclear weapons on visiting military vessels, and later by
dissociating ourselves from nuclear strategies in a formal way through the nuclear-free legislation.
Those actions were very effective at directing world attention toward the dangers and illegitimacy of
weapons of mass destruction.

Our stand remains important because, despite cuts in numbers, the weapons will persist in vast arsenals
that can be globally deployed; the problem will also remain that they could be brought into New
Zealand. The nuclear weapons that were on US Navy vessels are still available for re-deployment if the
US govermnent decides there is a need in some perceived crisis situation. The New Zealand
government and its people will not be told of any such change in deployment, and the neither confirm
nor deny policr will continue to assure our nuclear ignorance during the crisis, which could involve
visits to New Zealand by US and/or UK naval vessels. This is a point which proponents of changing the
nuclear free policy conveniently ignore.

References

1. Chomsky, N. 1992. Deterring Democracy. Hill and Wang, New York. p. 59.
2. "Subject: removal of tactical nuclear weapons." Defense Department Report transcript. Peter
Williams, spokesman. 2 July 1992. EPF407. Williams: "We have affirmed that it [neither confirm
nor deny policy] should remain in effect for all of our forces, both sea based and land based. But
because of the changes in our deployment policy ... -- the result of the President's September
nuclear initiative -- it's been modified. The neither confirm nor deny statement will now read,
US policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard sUrface ships, attack
quote: 'It is general
submarines and naval aircrq{t. However, we do not discuss the presence or absence of nuclear
weapons aboard specific ships, submarines or aircrq{t'." [emphasis added]
3. "Tiny nukes for mini minds", W.M. Arkin and R.S. Noms, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April
1992. pp. 24-25.
4. "From Hiroshima to the Hagne, A Guide to the World Court Project", Keith Mothersson.
International Peace Bureau. Geneva, 1992.
5. Letter to R.E. White from British High Commission, Wellington. 30 June 1992.
6. "Keep building those bombs", H. Gusterson, New Scientist, 12 Octuber 1991.
7. "Nato strategy allows use of nukes first", Dominion, 27 May 1992.
8. lvan Monoy. 1988. A Legacy of the Reagan Doctrine: Low Intensity Conflict, in Low Intensity
Conflict: Theory and Practice in Central America and Southeast Asia, ed. by Barry Carr and
Elaine McKay. La Trobe University, Institute of Latin American Studies, Monash University,
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 9-19.
9. Michael !Gare. 1981. Beyond the Vietnam Syndrome: U.S.lnterventionism in the 1980s. Institute
for Policy Studies, Washington, DC. p. 67.
10. New Zealand Defence Review, 1983. p. 28.
In. Nuclear-powered Vessels and Alliances

Ai; defined by the Bolger Government the debate about nuclear propulsion is about whether the in-port
hazards of naval reactors outweigh the advantages of a resumption of port visits hy vessels of the US and
UK navies and possibly those of other countries, even the ex-Soviet Union. This section argues that
whatever the hazards associated with nuclear propulsion, the advantages for New Zealand of US naval
port visits, in the context of the ANZUS alliance which does not include the UK, are quite negliglble i f
not negative. It is the U S rather than New Zealand which obtains benefits from port visits, and if port
visits are to be made at all it should be on terms dictated by New Zealand rather than by the US.

�I�oes the US Navy make foreign port calls?

The official US Navy "Objectives of visits to foreign ports in the Pacific" are succinctly exp!e�sed in a
document called "Port visits by U.S. Navy ships to foreign countries in Pacific Command"
[ClNCPACINST 3128.3]. in their entirety these reasons are:

a. Protect U.S. interests and support US policies in foreign countries.

b. Assist U.S. representatives abroad in the discharge of their responsibilities.

c. Obtain logistics support.

d. Liberty [Le., shore leave] and recreation.

e. Area familiarisation.

It will be noted that all five objectives are dIrectly related to serving US interests. There is no mention
of fulfilli n g alliance obligations towards smaller allie s, no mention of preparing to defend smaller
nations against aggressive thIrd parties. Neither are these possibilities excluded. "Area familiarisation",
for example could well be in preparation for defending a nation within that area, but it could equally be
for attacking a nation in that area. These "Objectives" have been promulgated by the US Pacific
Commander-in-Chief for the benefit of the individual ship commanders, so we can assume that they are
the 'real' or 'operational' reasons for visits.

The US frequently annonnces other reasons for making port visits. These 'reasons', intended to make a
good impression on the public rather than to express an objective truth, can be described as • declaratory'
reasons, At the height of the controversy over nuclear port visits, for example, US Ambassador to New
Zealand Ann Martindell said in her first formal interview that port visits were essential because
"Without them, the ability of the UnIted States to fulfil! its commitments under the ANZUS Treaty and
to assist in maintaining security in the South Pacific region would be hampered".1 It is unfortunate that
no NZ Government seems ever to have questioned the obvious contradictions between the declaratory
policies and the operational policies of the US Navy.

ys objectives in the Pacific

US objectives in maintaining an enormous military presence in the Pacific were, until recently, generally
assumed to be the containment of the Soviet Union. The recent demise of the Soviet Union as any sort
of credible threat has therefore been expected to lead to a decrease in US military activity. In fact very
little has changed, because the Soviet threat served as a pretext for ongoing US military intervention in
Third World countries. The main change therefore is that the US is now forced to be a little more honest
about its reasons for maintaining by far the most powerful military establishment of any nation in the
Pacific. As far as strategic nuclear weapons are concerned, the Pacific has now become more important
for hosting US nuclear weapons than before, thanks to an increased reliance on submarlne.,based Trident
missiles rather than vuinerableland-based missiles such as Minuteman.
 13

Traditional US o�jectives are illustrated by a statement of Admiral Harry D. Train to a US

Congressional Committee in 1980. He said that"...with or without the threat of the burgeoning Soviet
Navy, the United States requires worldwide maritime superiority over all who would seek to deny us
access to our energy. our raw materials. and our trading pattners." By "our" energy and raw materials he
meant of course the energy resources and raw materials of Third World countries, and in panicular
Middle East oiL

A 1989 US Congressional Research Service paper said"US interest in secure access through Oceanla - a
vast region including Australia, New Zealand. and the small island countries in the central and South
Pacific Ocean - is greater today than at any time since the end of World War 11. The Asian-Pacific
region has become increasingly important for US economic development and security concerns,"

According to George Shultz, Secretary of State at the time NZ went nuclear-free. "America's interests in
the region, and the interests of our friends, require a strong and permanent U .S. presence in every pan of
the Pacific",

With the demise of the 'Soviet threat' little has changed. TIle US military even claims that its
,American threat' is needed even more now than in the past. Recent Congressional testimony2 included
the following:

" ...our regional interests in Asia will remain similar to those we have pursued in the past ... we
believe that our forward presence in the Asia Pacitic region will remain criticaL

"The end of the Cold War... does not mean the end of ... military rivairy among nations... It does
not mean the end of the struggle for power and influence, It may well mean increased instability.
unpredictability and violence .. ,

"."it is in the Third World regions where many of our vital interests lie. the so-called low
intensity corrflkt (LIC) arena... "

One of the problems for the US caused by the loss of the Soviet threat is that the US is now tinding it
harder to get port access for its naval ships and support from its allies. It is lik e the 1970s all over again.
According to US Navy testimony to Congress: "". the move towards relaxation of tensions between
Washington and Moscow has created the perception among some in the region that !be Soviet military
capabiliry in the Pacitic is no longer a matter of major concern. Some are beginning to question the
need for the sometimes difficult political and military efforts so necessary to maintain the vigor of our
framework",

The decision of the Philippines to eject all US military bases is of course the major example of the US
military being even less welcome in the Pacific than before. The end effect for New Zealand of this
increasing unpopularity of US military forces is l11at. just as in the 1970s, we are likely to come under
greater pressure to provide morc access,

Nuclear propulsion has a special role in achieving these above-mentioned objectives. There are four
types of ship dependent on nuclear propulsion. All four cmsses of nuclear-propelled
vessels have primarily offensive mther than defensive roles, If we choose to admit them we will be
indicating to tile rest of the world our readiness to suppon mostly aggressive US military activities.

1. Strategic missile These Ilave 10 remain continuously submerged to guarantee their

invulnerability to pre-emptive attack. US Trident missiles lurking within the waters of the Pacitic
now make up over one third of US nuclear up from 20% a couple of
years ago3 However Ihese submarines rarely visit foreign pens so their presence is not directly
14

relevant to the NZ debate. The 1960 visit of the Halibut (see section on US Navy Nuclear
display, below) was a once-only affair.

2. Aircraft carriers. These massive vessels have prodigious energy requirements, both for getling
to deployment areas at high speeds, and then maintaining high speeds while are being
launched and recovered. They have to carry enormous quantities of aviation fuel, have little
space left for ship fuel, and hence the US Navy would prefer nearly all US aircraft carriers to be
nuclear-powered. Aircraft carriers are the primary ship-class for US interventionary warfare
against smaller countries which in any way challenge US hegemony. Aircraft carriers have little
reason to visit New Zealand however, The 1964 visit of the Enterprise (see bel ow) Is unlikely to
be repeared.

3. Attack submarines. Anack submarines formerly concentrated on the Important role of trailing
Soviet strategic nlissile submatines and, if necessary, pre-emptively destroying ll'1em. This role
continues but has bee n downgraded now that the Commonwealth of States no
longer has strategic submarines out in Pacific waters and no longer Itas alert-status missiles
targeted on the US, AtIlIck submarines are also very important in interveotiooary wars, as in !he
war against fraq, being particularly suited to sinking surface shipping, bo!h and
merchant, and enemy anack submarines, US attack submatines patrolling the Indian Ocean have
made heavy use of Australian ports, while visits 10 NZ were political rsther than operational.

4, Guided missile cruisers. Cruisers are bigger, more heavily-armed vessels than destroyers and
frigates, and are designed to operate in high-threat environments in high-intensity engagements,
ei!her independently or as support for aircraft carriers. Nuclear-powered cruisers are sjX'£ifically
for these sorts of operations, and the enonnous expense of their nuclear propulsion is by
the speed with which they can travel great distances without refueling to support US jnte=t� in
rapidly-developing crises. During the '70s US Congressional testimony was full of examples of
!hese ships allegedly justifying their cost In the '80s there was less enthusiasm for buildirlg
nuclear-propelled surface vessels. In the '90s, as the US loses base facilities, there will probably
be more interest in them, although high costs may be prohibitive, NUClear-powered cruisers have
been the most common nUclear-propelled visitors to NZ and are lllcely to be the most cemmon in
the future, should NZ decide to admit them,

United States Navy visits to New Zealand

US Navy visits to New Zealand began long before World War Il - at least as far back as t':le Treaty of
Waitangi, when vessels of the US Navy Antarctic Expedition of Commodore Wilkes were at Bay of
Islands. The "Great White Fleet" under Admiral Perry put into Auckland in 1908 in the ceurse of a
worldwide fIagwaving tour. The biggest visit of all was in 1925 when almost entire US Navy up
in NZ's four main ports, as part of a deployment intended to demonstrate US Navy ability!o lltillck
Japan. Since World War Il a total of 229 US military ships have made 773 port call s in NZ. Operation
Deepfreeze was responsible for 490 of these in support of Antarctic activities. It is the other 283 which
are of main interest, and they are shown in grsphicai fonn in figure nu. This was corapi!ed
Ministry of External Relations and Trade (MERT) files on foreign ship visits Md chrceked against
contemporary press reports,

Port visits since World War Il fall into 6 clearly defined periods:

1. Aftermath of World War. Several ships visited in the wake of tbe war, and nine of Admiral
Byrd's Antarctic expedition used our ports, This was followed by a of nine in which no
US warships at all came despite these being the peak years of the Cold when the Soviet
Union was supposedly more aggressive, expansi on i st and dangerous thar, at any time before or
since. It is noteworthy that the ANZUS Treaty was signed in the middle of this gap, but with the
exception of a high profile visit by the carrie r Tarawa in 1954 the US did not have much interest
in visits for five years.
 15

Figure III 1 .

Visits to New Zealand (including Cook Islands) by United States Military Ships
(exluding Operation Deepfreeze vessels). from World War 11 to the present.

Type 01 ship
Air ain:rafI carrier
=

A =amphibious warf.... ship

Cru == cruiser
CG Coast guard cutter
20
=

D = deslrOyer
DT = destroyer lender 0
F frigate D D
=

HQ headquarters command ship

D D
=

I "" icebreaker
L iogistics (eg supplies, cargo} D D
D
=

0 = oiler le fuel ranker D

S = scientific (oceanography ate) D D
R = ",pair & salvage D D
ST = seaplane lender D D
Sub 111submarine
D D
D D
D D D
D D
D
D
D

Pericd 1 Period 2 Period 3

VeooeIs with Dud..., propulsion are _

Vessels probably ca.nying nuclerar weapons are in roman characters
VU.UUfree ofnuclear weapons ill itllJic charactm

Within each column, lower vessels in general have more "flrepower" than higher vessels

D D
D D
D D
D
D

70 71

Period 4 Period 5 Period 6

16

2. NZ - "A pleasant place for shore leave". The US Navy in 1956 seemed to suddenly 'discover'
NZ, and US port visits in this period were more frequent than at any other time before or since. A
document in the MERT files indicates that the Navy found New Zealand to be "a pleasant place
for shore leave". Most of the ships were on the way to the Taiwan Straits crisis, in which the US
was 'protecting' Taiwan from the mainland Chinese Government.

3. Nuclear display. It was in the period 1960-66 that nuclear-propelled ships first came to New
Zealand. In 1960 the guided missile submatine Halibut visited and proudly displayed its nuclear­
tipped Regulus missiles in Auckland and Wellington. In 1964 the first nuclear-powered alrcraft
carrier, the Enterprise, visited Wellington together with two nuclear-powered cruisers in the
course of a worldwide cruise intended to impress friends and frighten enemies with the global
reach o f US nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion. Apart from this, the US Navy showed little
interest in New Zealand in this period.

4. Vietnam War. From mid-1966 until late 1973 US Navy ships were visiting at the rate of about
one a month, mostly in connection with the Vietnam war. Ships returning from Vietnam duty to
the US were calling in to provide R&R to their crews and as part of a propaganda effort to
generate enthusiasm in the NZ public for the unpopular Vietnam war, and to remind New
Zealanders that the US was somehow protecting their interests by containing the Vietnamese
menace to the free world. Ship visits were timed to coincide with anulversaries of the Battle of
the Coral Sea, when the US Navy supposedly saved NZ from Japanese invasion. No nuclear­
propelled ships visited, in particular because from 1971 onwards NZ Governments refused to
permit them on the grounds that the US refused to accept liability for nuclear accidents.

5. Muldoon era - Nuclearising New Zealand. From 1976 to early 1984 ships were visiting lit the rate
of one every two months, mostly for politicai purposes. Prime Minister Rob Muldoon was in
power, and. apparently eager to provoke domestic political confrontation, he insisted on inviting
the unpopular South African Springboks to our rugby fields and nuclear-powered vessels to our
ports. The South African and US Governments were only too willing to oblige. This was a
period when concern about nuclear power hazards was increasing worldwide, and the US Navy
was having increasing difficulty obtaining port access for its nuclear vessels. Egypt for example,
totally banned nuclear-powered transits of the vital Suez Canal. Undertnlning the NZ anti-nuclear
movement seemed to be a high priority o f the US Navy, no doubt as part o f a coordinated
campaign to get unimpeded access to more important ports elsewhere. in this period were the
celebrated confrontations between NZ peace squadrons and the nuclear-propelled Trnxtun, Long
Beach, Pintado, HOOdo, Texas, Phoenix and Queerifish. Non-nuclear-propelled ships made a
specialty out of making ' goodwill' visits to all the smaller NZ provincial ports. In the UK, proteat
focused on the impending Trident submarine programme (to replace the aging Polaris boats) and
the expanding commercial nuclear industry rather than on foreign naval visits.

6. TIle Nuclear-free era - No visits. In 1984 New Zealand became nuclear-free with the election of
the Lange Government and Labour's nuclear-free policy (the policy became law in 1987). In
clear violation of its supposed ANZUS commitments the US cut off all militarY contacts with
New Zealand, and no ships visited. Even visits by Operation Deepfreeze ships ceased entirely.

In all this history it is obvious that the port visits, including particularly the nuclear-powered ones,
served US interests rather than NZ interests. VisilS were made for a) operational reasons - to provide
R&R or for the purposes of joint exercises with the Australia and New Zealand navies, or b) for political
reasons - primarily generating NZ enthusiasm for the the Taiwan Strait operation, the Vietnam war, and
for US nuclcar weaponry and nuclear propulSion, and c) to promote the wonders of nuclear power. In
other words all visits were to serve US purposes, and none served NZ purposes, unless one wishes to
argue that the NZ Navy benefits from training in joint exercises designed to develop capabilities for
attacking and invading other countries. Only one of the exercises purported to be concerned with
 17

' defending' New Zealand - the Longex exercise of 1972, and even on this occasion the exercise was
timed to coincide with the NZ election, and was undoubtedly held for political purposes.

The only "benefit" New Zealand conld claim to have received from these visits was income derived from
the sale o f souvenirs, "hospitality" and liquor (military vessels do not pay normal port fees).

Port visits and the Alliance.

There is nothing in the text of the ANZUS Treaty which says that a junior ally has to accept visits by
nuclear-propelled Ships. Nor is lhere anything in lhe text which gives lhe US lhe right unilaterally to
dictate the conditions of New Zealand's participation in ANZUS. The ANZUS Treaty is a brief,
generally-worded document whose main provisions are for consultation among lhe signatories.
However lhe facts of lhe matler are lhat lhe US has suspended lhe alliance activities, including military
exercises, sharing of intelligence and meetings, lhat had evolved wilh New Zealand and Australia over
the years, and instead entered into a de facto bilateral alliance wilh Australia.

A recent aulhoritative report on lhe state of the Australla-NZ-US relationship, by lhe Hawaii-based
USIA East-West Centre. starts off by noting lhat lhe era of overt alliances is over, and lhat ANZUS is
now d ysfunctional in that it is seen as a bullying relationship. and lhat more subtle means for securing
4
NZ compliance wilh US aims will be needed in future.

l'i�clel!; ship visits by other navies

The only other nation likely to make either nuclear-powered or nuclear- weapon-capable ship visits to
New Zealand is Great Britain. Britain has, like lhe US, removed nuclear weapons from all its vessels
olher than lhe strategic missile submarines. However lhe British Navy has no nuclear-powered surface
ships and British nuclear-powered attack submarines have rarely deployed to lhe Pacific in lhe past and
are lhus unlikely to visit New Zealand in lhe near future. There is currently only one operable British
Polaris (strategic) submarine. Many British nuclear-powered submarines are experiencing serious
operational problems due to cracks in lhe reactors. France has on one occasion deployed a nuclear­
powered submarine to the Pacific, in support of lhe operation against the Rainbow Warrior. It is hard to
imagine even Gallic gall being sufficient for France to request nuclear access to NZ ports, or a NZ
government being brave enough to grant it. 5

Conclusions

The US Navy makes port calls in foreign countries to serve its own objectives, irrespective of whether
these coincide wilh or differ from host nation objectives. Apart from small gains of foreign exchange
lhere is no evidence of New Zealand directly benefitting from such visit�.

US naval activity in general has virtually no role in defending US territory or sovereignty, but is
concerned ra1her with maintaining US domination over lhe Pacific and maintaining US access to other
nation's resources. US military activities are mostly offensive rather lhan defensive in nature, and are
interventionary, provocative and destabilising. New Zealand's interests are in no way served by
supporting such activity. If wc need defence and security relationships at all we should be developing
them with other nations in our part of the world wilh similar interests and in a similar strategic situation
to ourselves.

Quite apart from safety of nuclear propulsion and all the complex issues associated wilh the entire
nuclear fuel cycle and accumulating nuclear waste, we should be particularly wary of hosting nuclear­
powered vessels since lhe� are even more intend.ed for lhe offensive aspects of US military activity lhan
are convention311y-powered vessels.

An examination of the histoPj of U S naval port calls in New Zealand shows lhat naval visits here have
not deviated from lhe norm of supponing US objectives ralher lhan host nation interests. The US
18

showed no respect for New Zealand sovereignty or dignity in its attempt to bully us into dropping our
nuclear-free legislation.

The ANZUS alliance never benefitted New Zealand in any way. and since the demise of the SEATO
relationship in 1976 it has served as a vehicle for securing NZ support for US military adventurism
elsewhere.

References

1. Evening Pas!. 1 0 Sept 1979.

2. See quotes in Peacelink. May 1 992. pp. 6-8.
3. Peacelink, May 1992. p. 12.
4. "Australla, New Zealand, and the United States: Fifty years of alliance relations. Report

of a study project". Richard W. Baker, East-West Center. International Relations

Program, co-sponsored by the Australian Institute of International Affairs and the
Institute of Policy Studies. Wellington. September 1 99 1 . p. xi.
S. It is remotely possible that Soviet icebreakers might start operating in Antarctic waters
in their "off-season", in which case NZ port visits might be requested.

IV. Nuclear propulsion and the global environment

The "safety" of nuclear-powered vessels has been very narrowly defined in the context of the
Government review. Many of the consequences of nuclear power. whether military or civilian, already
exist and are of much longer duration than those that might be caused by an accident in a harhour.
Those problems include the environmental impacts of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the disposal of retired
nuclear-powered vessels and nuclear weapons. . The consequences of nuclear power are global. And it
should he recognised thar there are many more nuclear reactors on the sea (almost all of them military)
than on land. Although naval reactors are smaller than land-based reactors. their mobility means that the
consequences of nuclear accidents (!loth reactors and weapons) have the potential to cover most of the
glohe, including the polar regions.

The use of nuclear reactors to produce electrical energy is an environmentally hazardous teclmology that
has already produced many dangerous and expensive accidents.l The costs of these accidents and the
taxpayer subsJdisation of the nuclear industry via the military and via government guarsntees to
underwrite the costs of acciden� have been staggering but widely unappreciated. True costs and public
subsidies have been so high thar on a global scale it is likely that nuclear power is not economically
feasible and never has been . Economic costs and costs to the global .environment continue to mount
with each new nuclear plant accident. Large numbers of aging nuclear power plants, including naval
ones, increase the prohability of another Chemobyl-size accident.

Very few civilian commercial nuclear reactors are being built at present (none in the United States) and
many countries with aging reactors will not replace them because of high costs of decommissioning.
replacement and environmental problems including disposal of radioactive wastes. Marine reactors are
also uneconomic as shown by unsuccessful efforts by several countries to develop commercial nuclear­
propelled ships. Ouly military applications free of normal economic constraints have permitted the
development and deployment of marine reactors.

The nuclear debate has always been about health and safety: ahout the toxicology and epidemiology of
radiation. Information on these matters has been accumulating in scientific and medical literarure at an
ever increasing rate over several decades. Health Physics, in its 61st volume since 1958, is now
 19
produced quarterly covering all aspects of radiation and health. The accumulating bulk of research
papers is leading to the inescapable conclusion that there is no longer any viable concept of "threshold"
or "safe dose" for radiation.

Radiation is a particularly virulent toxin having not only the potential to injure and kill cells, but also to
pennanently and fundamentally alter them, increasing particularly the risk of various cancers over the
lifetime of the affected individual. Of even greater concern is the further capacity to alter reproductive
3
genes so that future generations are irrevocably damaged

A recent estimate to the year 2000 o f the additional fatal eancers caused by military testing of more than
1300 nuclear weapons was 430,000. 4 This is part of the legacy of released radiation that has occurred in
the �§Cll.ce of nuclear w ar . A further part of that legacy escapes from the commercial nuclear reactors.
It has been estimated that the 400 or so nuclear reactors world-wide, even if they continue to operate at
their present safety level, will lose caesium-137 into the environtnent amounting to 16 Chemobyl
S
equivalents every 25 years, quite without another accident

The mining of uranium ore, the enrichment, reprocessing and transportation of nuclear materials, and the
largely unsolved problems of nuclear waste storage, particularly for high level wastes from nuclear
reactor corcs,6 are all threats to the environtnent and to human safety.

Processing uranium for use in reactors and bombs begins with extraction from several different types of
geological fommtion scattered around the globe. This is also the beginning of environtnental problems.
Uranium is radioactive and decays to other elements, some of which are also radioactive, including
radium-226 and radon-222 gas. The gas escapes when the ore is mined and its decay produces more
radioactive elements, some of which contaminate dust particles that penneate the air around an active
mine or windblown mine tallings. The danger to miners from lung cancer caused by inhaling radioactive
dust has been known since the 1930s.

Mining wastes are radioactive and chemically toxic. The solid tailings have accumulated as vast
radioactive mountains at mine sites. Wind and water erosion has moved these wastes into nearby rivers
in some locations causing serious pollution of domestic water supplies. Radium seeks bone in the body
and is more dangerous than strontium-90. Thousands of litres of liquid waste are generated per tonne of
mined ore and can cnntarninate soil and water.

Uranium entichment is necessary to concentrate the desired fissionable isotope, U-235, to levels that will
support a chain reaction. The entichment process is difficult and dangerous, producing uranium
hexalluoride, Uf6. "Hex", as this material is called, is a highly corrosive, reactive gas that requires
extreme care in rumdiing. This process requires vast amounts of electrical energy which in the US was
largely produced from strip-mined coal burned in thennal power plants. The irony in this fact should
not escape the attention of advocates of "clean" nuclear power.

In US enriclLrnent was essentially the province of the government under military auspices through the
decade the 1970s. The Department of Energy currently manages the US enrichment programme.
Private could not be enticed into the entichment field because of the enonnous costs involved
in building and operating an enrichment facility and the risks that insufficient commercial customers
might leave the owner with a radioactive white elephant and financial ruin. Civilian enrichment
enterprise largely in Europe in the 1970s greatly complicating the problem of safeguarding
supplies of uranium and plutonium, the latter from yet another expensive and dangerous
process called reprocessing.

UraniuIl"l fuel removed from any nuclear reactor after a period of operation contains a large number of
radioactive including plutonium. (Naval reactors, because of the high enrichment and high
l"lmn-lU)" ot ,heir fuels, produce little plutonium-239.) Since the days of the Manhattan Project,
pit,tOllillllm·:239 has b<'..ell a pjghly valued fissile material that can supplement limited supplies of U-235
for nuclear l"eac!m� and bombs. The development of breeder reactors on a large scale would create a
20

global "plutonium economy". In fact, Japan's breeder programme led to tile first large commercial
shipment of plutonium, over one tonne from France in November 1992. Many countries along possible
shipping routes (which remained secret for security reasons) have expressed concern about the dangers
of transporting plutonium. The only source of plutonium is nuclear reactors whose "burnt" fuels must be
reprocessed in order to recover tile plutonium. This is why nuclear power reactors have always been
identified as an inherent pan of nuclear weapon production.

Plutonium is an expensive and dangerous commodity, in botll physical and political senses. The driving
force behind it has been nuclear militarism; tile production metllod has been nuclear reactors.

"It [plutonium] is being stockpiled around tile world, witll no idea of what is to become of it or how to
keep it from undergoing tile grim metamorphosis into bombs.,,7 Plutonium's high toxicity is due to its
radioactivity. It would be hard to imagine a worse substance to use as tile basis for a global energy
economy, a virtually limitless fuel, but tile vital ingredient for environmental devastation.

"The 'Candor report' prepared for American Secretary of State Dean Acbeson in 1953 came to a
dismaying conclusion: even by that time it had become impossible to be sure of the whereabouts of all
the world's plutonium. In the ensuing decades this problem has increased ten-thousandfold."g

The costs of the nudem' weapons and power

In economic terms the nuclear weapons industry consumes annually billions of dollars, all diverted from
basic human needs like clean water, food, health, education and housing. Nuclear weapons production
consumes resources, human energy and scientific and engineering expertise in an extravagant, wasteful
and inhumane endeavour. The language of the industry is designed specifically to enable its workers to
avoid thinking about the reallty of their labours. Thus we have an already illusory concept of " safe
dose" in a bomb factory work-place translated into "recommended dose", and levels of radiation
recorded being described as "within normal prescribed limits" as if radiation were necessary to health.
Bomb plants in the US masquerade under such bland names as the "Feed Materials Production Centre"
in Femald Ohio or the "Savannah River National Environmental Research Park".9 Both of tIlese plants,
among others in the weapons production system, have leaked significant amounts of radionuclides into
the environment.

These tIlreats continue and add to the widespread damage to human and other forms of life whlch past
nuclear accidents have produced. It is not widely known that the Chernobyl accident was the biggest
single economIc disaster in world hlstory. The economic loss of the nuclear plant and its electricity
output has been dwarfed by the damage to human and aulmal life and by the loss ofliving space and
arable farm land.

The costs of accidents extend far beyond human health and direct economic losses: "The accident at
Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear reactor in 1979 provides a dramatic demonstration that factors besides
injury, death, and property damage impose serious costs. Despite tile fact that not a singie person died,
and few if any latent cancer fatalities are expected, no other accident in our history has produced such
,,10
costly societal impacts.

We can anticipate other forms of nuclear accident resulting from nuclear wastes accumulating, primarily
in leaky, temporary surface storage, In many countries around the world. An increasing number of those
countries is likely to be in the Third World where economic desperation may drive goveruments to
accept nuclear and toxic wastes from developed countries in return for foreign exchange Of money to pay
off massive foreign debts to those same first world countries.

Attempts in Britain to cope wi.th their own high-level nuclear wastes by deep burial have cost billions of
pounds and have yet to yield any permanent solution.ll

It has been estimated that the cost of "cleaning up" the immediate vicinity of all the nuclear installations
in the US would presently exceed US$400 billion. Even this would only be washing-down, scraping up,
sealing-up or burying radioactive material - vastly expensive but still only temporary in view of the fact
 21
that some nuclear isotopes in wastes are very long-lived, persisting for hundreds or thousands o f years.
Naval nuclear reactors account for a relatively smali proportion of high-level wastes. But the problem of
obsolete nuclear vessels remains: their power plants are moderately radioactive and must eventualiy be
dealt with. This decommissioning process alone is emerging as a major environmental chalienge for
which there is as yet no solution. There are several hundred naval reactors in existence in several
nuclear navies.

New Zealand's environmental role

As New Zealanders, we have willingly taken some steps to curb our contributions to global
environmental problems and are often prepared to take a lead in environmental policy planning. This
has been the case with our attempts to reduce emissions of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) gases that
endanger stratospheric ozone, and emissions of greenhouse gases including CO2 and nitrous oxide
(NzO). The potential for environmental damage has been a major reason we have rejected nuclear
reactors which produce power12 or propel ships.13

References

1. R.D. Pollard, ed. 1979. The Nugget File: excerpts from the government's specialJile on nuclear
power plant accidents and safety defects. Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, Mass.
2. The U.S. Price-Anderson Act of 1957 limits the liability of the nuclear industry in the case of
accidents. Without this industry protection by the American taxpayer it is doubtful that nuclear
power would have been developed in the U.S. Walter Panerson. 1976. Nuclear Power. Penguin
Books. pp. 230-23l .
3. Biological effects o f ionising radiation V . 1990. National Radiation Council of the US Academy
of Sciences.
4. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. 1 99 1 . Radioactive heaven and earth.
Apex Press.
5. J. Gofman. 1 990. Radiation induced cancer from low-dose exposure. CNR Book Division. pp.
17-25.
6. "The geopolitics of nuclear waste", Eliot Marshall, Science, 22 February 199 1 , pp. 864-867.
7. W. Patterson. 1984. The Plutonium Business and the Spread of the Bomb. Granada PubliShing,
London. p. xvi.
8. Patterson. 1984. p . 199. The "Candor Report" was a report o n the bleak prospects of international
control of nuclear materials. It was prepared by a panel chaired by Robert Oppenheimer, head of
the Manhattan Project.
9. R. Del Tredici. 1987. At Work in the Fields of the Bomb.
ID. "Perception of risk" , P. Slovic, 1987, Science 236:283.
1 1. B ritain rushes through plans for underground nuclear slore. New Scientist 6 October 1990, p. 10.
12, Report to the New Zealand Government o f the Fact Finding Group o n Nuclear Power. 1977.
Government Printer, Wellington.
13. The Nuclear-Free Act passed by New Zealand Parliament in June of 1987.
22

V. Nuclear-free image, the economy and trade

The argument most frequently raised by opponents of the nuclear-free policy is that the policy has
hanned New Zealand's trade, No evidence is ever provided to support that contention. In this section
we show that in fact the opposite is true.

The New Zealand economy has undergone immense changes during the past two decades, many
stemming from changes in New Zealand's trading relationships. The trading relationships on which
New Zealand's European economy was built have all but gone: large colonial companies like the
Borthwicks meat exporting company have disappeared during the past ten years. Britain has turned to
Europe and the Commonwealth has ceased to be an economic community.

For New Zealand exporters and producers this has demanded rapid changes and diversification. The
huge Borthwicks-type freezing works, for example, have been replaced by smaller works which now
prooess meat in special ways for new and diverse maricets.

The changes in trading relations are seen in the statistics. Figures V.I and V 2. show Europe (which
mainly means Britain) being replaced by Asia as New Zealand's main export mancet.1

Six of New Zealand ' s top ten trading partners in 1991 were Asian, and ilis Asian countries where
exports are growing most rapidly. New Zealand's economic future relies on developing a diversity of
trade relationships, almost certainly with a focus on Asia.

The significance of these trends to New Zealand's nuclear-free policy is that her interests have been
changing dramatically in recent decades. Many of the new export contracts and mancets and tourism
which the New Zealand economy is now reliant upon had nothing to do with New Zealand's "traditional
ties". The new trading relationships have been developed because the traditional ties ceased to provide
support for the New Zealand economy.

New Zealand must judge it� interests as they are now, not as they were in the 1950s and 60s. The
dependent relationship which New Zealand had with Britain and the United States in the post-World
War n period formed the basis of the military alliances dominated by these two countries.

-- -
Figures v " 1 and V . 2 , .....
- -
' - -
-- JlC
"'"
----- USA

...

''"'' ".. ".. ,,.,

But in the 1990s it is no longer appropriate or necessary for New Zealand to judge national policies like
the nuclear-free policy through the eyes of its "traditional allies". One part of this reassessment is to
consider the effect of the nuclear-free policy on New Zealand's evolving trading relationships and so on
the ecnnomy.

What natural competitive advantages does New Zealand have in international trade?

One is that as a southern hemisphere country New Zealand can supply seasonal produce to northern
hemisphere shops during their off-season. in that situation. for example . New Zealand apples compete
with apples from southern Africa and South America in European markets.

Another advantage is a very cheap ' grass-based' product range: meat, dairy and wool. The decline of
traditional European markets for these has required a rapid diversification of markets. Another
advantage is good climate for rapid growth of plantation forests. Here New Zealand competes with
other countries in a similar position, notably Chile which has large Pinus radiata plantations.

Also, there are smaller scale enterprises aiming at niche markets. for example. mussels cultivated in
isolated parts of New Zealand and air-freighted to the West Coast of the United States. And of course,
there is New Zealand' s reputation as an unspoilt tourist destination. Tourism is now New Zealand's
single largest source of overseas income.

In all of these cases New Zealand producers, exporters and tourism people have realised the advantage
provided by New Zealand's 'clean, green' reputation.

New Zealand timber companies, for example, have recently launched a major international promotion
campaign presenting New Zealand as the world's environmentally sound timber and wood fibre source.

New Zealand' s nuclear-free policy has greatly enhanced and publicised this clean green image probably
more than any other factor. The nuclear-free policy has provided an unexpected competitive advantage
to New Zealand companies and producer boards by building on this increasingly important marketing
image.

The nuclear-free image was built upon our national rejection of nuclear armed and powered vessels but it
also advertises the absence of nuclear power generation in this country. It generally evokes an image of
a country removed from the worst consequences of nuclear technology.

For example. exports of New Zealand wines to Sweden have increased in recent years. "New Zealand' s
big breakthrough into the SwediSh market came after the Chemobyl nuclear reactor melt-down. There
were fears European wine was being contaminated . 2 . .

A rddiation monitoring programme is conducted by our radiation laboratories at Christchurch and Lower
Hutt to provide " a warning of any influx of artificial radioactivity into the reglon, from any source. The
Chemobyl nuclear reactor disaster. of 26 May 1986. highlighted the need to be able to efectively
monitor the impact of incidents which may give rise to transboundary effects. even in countries remote
fromthe incident. New Zealand, as an agricultural food producing country. is particularly vulnerable to
such events. ,,3

If the nuclear-free law were changed to allow nuclear-powered vessels to visit New Zealand there would
be international publicity that New Zealand had "stopped being nuclear-free". This is the last
advertisement in the world that New Zealand needs for its exporters and tourism industry. We would
lose the special nuclear-free incentive for overseas customers to buy our agricultural products.
Competitors would step in quickly and aggressively to take advantage of our abandonment of the
"nuclear-free" image.

At a time when the New Zeallli"1d economy already has severe problems, we simply cannot afford to
throw away one of our most important competitive advantages for no apparent economic or security
gain.
The following quotes express how some people directly involved in the promotion of exports and
tourism see these issues:

Owen Jennin.&$, president of Federated Farmers: "Federated Farmers is not aware of any instance where
our current nuclear-free policy has been a hindrance to trade. Indeed, evidence is mounting ofit being
4
an advantage". IntelViewed by TIME magazine, be said that a reversal of the nuclear-free policy would
5
be "mthelpful".

John McDonald, managing director of the company producing and marketing New Zealand Natural
mineral water, says his marketing strategy is based upon shOwing New Zealand as an unpolluted and
clean environment. For his company "to keep on making inroads overseas New Zealand's clean hnage
had to be maintained". "The Government's moves to change New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance will
reduce overseas demand for products marketed on a 'clean green' image. ,,6

Travel and Leisure, an American magazine selling over one million copies a month, had a special
section on New Zealand in November 1991 which described New Zealand as "the environmental
destination of the 1990's". Tourism Minister John Banks said the publication represented "the big time
'
for little old New Zealand. ,,

Kaikoura District Council: "Kaikoura's natural environment is a significant drawcard for many overseas
tourists. [Kaikoura District) Council, as representatives of the local community, believe that repeal or
amendment to the existing nuclear-free legislation would badly damage New Zealand's good reputation
118
overseas.

lan Frase!, New Zealand's Commissioner General for EXPO 92: "New Zealand's clean green hnage is
important, and the pavilion will be reinforcing this. We are making this statement to a group of people
who live in the most polluted, most congested area of the world. New Zealand's nuclear-free image is
also important and we'll be miling this point, as we did at Expo 88. ,,9

However, Foreign Minister Don McKinnon repeatedly argues that the nuclear-free policy damages New
Zealand's trade with the United States. Is there any basis to this allegation? The Trade Negotiations
Minister, PIJilip Burdon, thinks not. Wben asked abou.t the need to link trade blocks with. military
blocks, Burdon responded: 'There may be a coincidental correlation but to see them as having any
0
automatic linkage simply is neither correct nor responsible" .1

To date there is no published evidence at all to support Mr McKinnon's clalm. Trade statistics (see
figure V.I) show that the value of exports to the United States rose faster between 1984 and 1987, ",hen
the nuclear-free policy was established, than in the periods before and since. There were conceivably
some instances of negative reactions, for example where US officials refused to intercede on New
Zealand's behalf, but they must have had minor impact.

Richard Nottage, chief executive of Mr McKinnon' s Ministry of External Relations and Trade, told
jonmalists in August 1991 that the economic and trade relationship with the United States since the mid
H
1 980s had been "very, very good". On 1 1 September 1992, a new trade agreement between New
Zealand and the United States "'as signed, reflecting "the importance our two govermnents place
2
onmalntaining and expanding our trade and investment ties".1

A recently published summary report of a major study of the ANZUS relationship concluded that post­
ANZUS: "New Zealand's defence relations with Australia continue; economic relations with the US
have not been harmed, and cooperation on other issues proceeds apace. ,,13 (emphasis added)

A comparison with Australia puts alleged trade "problems" in perspective. Australia has accepted
nuclear armed and powered United States warship visits, supports ANZUS, and has permitted the
presence of United States bases which have been acknowledged by the Govermnent as nuclear targets.
Yet the United States Govermnent has not intelVened to stop trade practices which have sabotaged
traditional Australian wheat, beef, sugar and coal markets.
 25

Anger at these actions led conservative Australian fanners to protest during President Bush's recent visit
to Australia. And in an earlier protest they used their tractors to wreck the chained gate of an American
NASA spacetracking base in West Australia.

A variation on the'trade argument used by government officials is thal there may have been little damage
to date, but that the nuclear-free policy still hanns New Zealand's future trade possibilities.

Shortly after possible changes to the nuclear-free policy were announced late in 1991, National Party
Members of Parliament received a confidential briefing from Ministry of Extemal Relations and Trade
(MERT) officials,14 The central theme of that briefing was that the GATT1s intemational trade
negotiations were doomed to fail and that New Zealand's best chances for the future economically lay in
joining a US trade bloc. probably the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Abandoning
the nuclear-free policy, it was argued, would belp New Zealand get into NAFTA.

The MERT argument is seriously flawed. NAFTA, while centred on the US and Canada, is currently
being expanded south into Mexico and Latin America. There is increasing discussion in Australia and
New Zealand about trying to join NAFTA. There are many important issues involved in this subject, but
a major consideration is simply whether, with the types of products New Zealand exports, joining a trade
bloc with the United States is helpful.

The United States produces a surplus of dairy products which it has to dump on the world market. It
also has a plentiful supply of beef and sheep meat. These are New Zealand's main export products.

It makes little sense for New Zealand to base its trading future on ties with countries which already have
a surplus of the kind of products we produce.
Besides. a United States' decision to invite New Zealand to join NAFI'A would of course be based on
wbether it was seen to be in the United States' economic interests. The differences between New
Zealand and the United States in disarmament and defence policies would have no more relevance than
they have had in Mexico's NAFI'A negotiations.

In reality, the New Zealand Government's trading objectives are firmly focused on Asia, with a recent
example being the "Asia 2000" seminars in Auckland.

The 'trade argument' appears only to be used by people whose primary interest is undermining the
nuclear-free policy. It is not heard from the people actually involved in trade; they often say just the
opposite as the earlier quotes illustrate.

A senior member of a New Zealand producer group described to the writer a recent briefing he received
from New Zealand ambassador Denis McLean in Washington.16 He says that Mr McLean raised with
him the hann which New Zealand's nuclear-free policy is causing to NZlUS trade. When asked to
provide evidence of damage, Mr McLean said it was difficult to give specific examples but suggested
that there had been lost opportunities. The producer group representative says that he told Mr McLean
he did not believe there was hann, and that if there was ever a real instance of a k:i wifruit, or beef, or
casein order being lost owing to the nuclear-free policy, to please give him a phone call with the
evidence.

Presumably. Mr McKinnon uses the trade argument because his main reason for opposing the nuclear­
free policy - the wish to support ilie nuclear components of a United States military alliance - has little
backing from the New Zealand public and is harder and harder to justify in the post-Cold War period.

In conclusion, there is no evidence iliat New Zealand's nuclear-free policy has harmed trade. Rather it
should be viewed as a positive and much needed advantage for exporters and the tourist industry. There
would need to be large gains elsewhere from allowing nuclear-powered warship visits to offset the
disadvantages such visits would inflict on the economy.
1. "Time to befriend the Asian Tiger", Ramesh Thakur, Dominion, 30 June 1992. Figures
V.1 and V.2 are from tIDS article by Thalrur.
2. "NZ's nuclear-free plonk appeals to Swedes", Christchurch Mail, 23 July 1 992.
3. National Radiation Laboratory review for the years 1986-1990, Christclrurch, New
Zealand.
4. "Sustainable land management - a landuser's perspective", speech by Owen Jennings,
International Conference on sustainable Management, 1 8 November 199 1.
5. "Nuclear ban shows signs of meltdown", Bronwen Reid, Time Magazine, 27 June 1992.
6. " Sparkling NZ image in danger", Jeremy Flint, Christchurch Star. 1 8 January 1992.
7. "NZ is THE place to go, magazine tells US tourists", Suzanne Pollard of NZPA in Los
Angeles, Christchurch Star, 11 November 1991.
8. G.A. Nolan, District Manager, Kaikoura District Council, letter to Hon D. McKinnon, 1
September 1992.
9. ran Frnser, quoted in the Dominion Sunday Times, 19 April 1992.
10. Transcript from Radio NZ Rural Report, 22 October 1991
11. Jon Schaffer. United States Information Agency report, 1 1 September 1992.
12. "Rosier view of antinuke policy offered". Dominion, 17 August 1991.
13. "Australia, New Zealand, and the United Stares: Fifty years o f alliance relatious, Report
of a smdy project", Richard W. B$er, East-West Center. International Relations
Program, co-sponsored by the Australian Institute of International Affalrs and the
Institute of Policy Studies. Wellington. September 1991. p. xi.
14. Unattributable National Party source.
15. GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
16. Unattributable interview.

VI. Nuclear-powered vessels and New Zealand sovereignty

Foreign warships vIsiting New Zealand are armed emIssaries over which we exert no nonnal legal
control beyond entry pennission. The Iimlted surrender of sovereign control to a foreign power within
our territory is rarely of concern in the case of embassies, consulates and the like, and only wal'l!hips
from other friendly cauntries are invited or pennitted to visit our pons. However, marine nuclear
reactors present an \!Ilusual potential safety hazard and so we may be concerned legitimately about the
suspension of normal legal controls which would take place if nuclear propelled warships were once
again allowed to visit our ports.

Wben a nuclear-powered warship from the American or British Navy vIsits a foreign port, that Navy
issues a statement through dIplomatic channels certifying that all safety precautions and procedures
followed in connection with operations in home ports will be strictly observed. Specifically. an
assurance is given that nothingwill be discharged from the ship which would cause a messurnble
increase in the general background radioactivity of the enviromnent and that during the period of the
visit, ship personnel win be responsible for enviromnental monitoring. There is also an assurance that
appropriate authorities of the host government will be notified immediately in the event of an accident
involving the reactor of the warship. However. on-boarti monitoring or inspection by the bost nation is
not peonitted. Claims arising out of a nuclear incident involving a viSiting nuclear-powered warship are
consigned to be dealt with through diplomatic channels in accordance with customary procedures for the
settlement of international claims.

Concern about accidents with nuclear weapons that mIght be on-board visiting warships was deslt with
formally in 1976. In an exchange of notes between the US and New Zealand, the US made an extension
to the "Standard Statement" covering liability in the case of an in-port accident involving a nuclear
 1.7

weapon. New Zealand accepted that US planning would be adequate to cover such a situation. But the
planning issue was complicated by the neither confinn nor deny policy which meant that any proper
planning by New Zealand would not be diplomatically acceptable.

The passage of the nuclear-free law in 1987 deemed all such assurances and arrangements to be
inadequate for New Zealand and banned nuclear-powered vessels as well as nuclear weapons from our
territory as a measure to make New Zealand nuclear-free and thereby contribute to anns control and
disarmament and national security. Banning nuclear-powered ships was an important measure
contributing to the general thrust of the new law because it made it clear that visits by such vessels could
bring no benefit which was commensurate with the risks involved. Up until then regulation had made it
difficult for nuclear-powered merchant ships (of the handful that existed) to visit New Zealand. but all
relevant regulatory measures were waived for warships in favour of accepting diplomatic assurances.
(Denmark still maintains a practical ban on visits by nuclear-powered warships by refusing to waive the
relevant regulations.)

One of the major factors to be considered in relation to the potentiai hazards posed by nuclear-powered
warships is the issue of who is in control in the event of a mishap. When nuclear-powered ships visited
New Zealand previously, local bodies designed their own contingency plans without detailed knowledge
of what action would be taken by the owners of the vessel in the event of an accident. This was
necessary because US military authorities refuse to cooperate with the host nation in the design, practice
and execution of reactor accident contingency plans. arguing that plans are unnecessary for ports which
are seldom visited. The success of any contingency plan depends on whether it has been designed to
cope with the actuai circumstances of the accident, and whether there is adequate cooperation between
all parties involved.

In the event of radioactive release due to a nuclear reactor mishap in a New Zealand port, a well
executed contingency plan should be able to reduce the number of casualties, bill local authorities would
be given the minimum of infonnation which US military authorities considered was needed for an
appropriate response. If it was thought that public exposure to radiation was going to remain below a
certain level. New Zealand authorities would eventually be infonned via Washington that an accident
had occurred. At an expected exposure level five times higher. advice to take immediate protective
measures would nonnally be given, and execution of the local contingency plan would commence. At
intennediate levels. New Zeaiand authorities would be advised to take preparatory steps to warn the
public that they should be ready to evacuate a cenain area.
Having willingly surrendered key elements of its sovereignty New Zealand could not instruct foreign
personnel to take a particular course of action 10 minimize harm to the local population in the event of a
reactor mishap. We would not have adequate infonnation and we would be wholly dependent on the
advice. infonnation and actions of personnel who are answerable, not to New Zealand authorities. but to
a foreign government for their performance in a crisis with potentially serious consequences for New
Zealanders and their environment. These are indeed grounds for maintaining a total ban on visits by
nuclear-powered warships.

Democracy and national sovereignty

When the National Government initiated its review of the ban on nuclear-powered warships in
September 1991 it argued that most public support for New Zealand's nuclear-free policy concerned
nuclear weapons and that the public was not as concerned about nuclear-powered vessels.

A major opinion poll on nuclear-powered warships was conducted by the National Business Review in
October 1991 after. The poll revealed that 73% of the people interviewed did not support changing the
nuclear-free legislation to ailow nuclear-powered warships back into New Zealand ports. Only a stnall
percentage favouted changing the legislation. A follow-up poll by the NBR showed some decline from
the 73%, but there was still a strong expression of opinion against changing the legislation.

As a moral statement, as an object of national identity and pride and as a declaration of independence,
the nuclear-free policy has become a strong symbol in New Zealand life. Not only do New Zealanders
overwhelmingly support the nuclear-free policy, they also received a clear and unambiguous
commilment from the Government before the last election that the nuclear-free legislation would not be
altered. Thus there are important issues concerning our democratic institutions which must be
considered in relation to any proposal to modifY our nuclear-free stams.

Unless the Government could convince a clear majority of New Zealanders that a change to the nuclear­
free legislation is required, it would be thoroughly undemocratic to amend it

Written submissions to the Alternative Committee on Nuclear Ship Visits

List of Persons or Groups

L New Zealand Council for World Peace - National Office

2. New Zealand Council for World Peace - Christchurch Branch support letter
3. Walhelee Island Peace Group
4. Aml Pasco
5. Pauline Tanglora
6. Jonathan Eisen
7. CND - Auckland
8. Whangarei Green Party Branch
9. JobI! Edward Morton
10. Oliver Hoffman
1 1. Veterans for Peace - Lower Hutt
12. National Consultative Committee on Disarmament - Wellington
13. Barbara Ker-Manu
14. Nelson Regional Combined Peace Groups - Tasman Electorate Survey
15. Ronald Hinvest
1Ii. So<.:iety of Friends - Waikato
17. CND Wellington
-

18. Society of Friends - Wellington (Sam Fisher)

19. Noeline Gannaway
20. Friends of the Earth (NZ) Auckland
-

21. Friends of the Earth - Dunedin (Sandie Legge)

22. Stan Hemsley
23. V. Curie
24. B. Jurgenson (Mrs)
25. Tina Blackman
26. David Pa1ker
27. Helen Kingston
28. Rose May Ailkenhead
29. RA. JOlles
30. Graeme North
31. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom - Auckland (loan Macdonald)
32. University of Canterbury Peace Group
33. E.W. Hall
34. Judiill Bird
35. Graeme Tyree
36. John RC. Hampton
37. RL. Pluck
38. Robin de Bruin-Judge
39. Hawkes Bay Peace Group
40. St Matthew's Caillolic Parish - Christcnurch (Maureen Heffeman)
 29
41. An Dean
42. Frank van Kuyk
43. Bunny Mortimer
44. Roger Morris
45. Edwin Junker - Whangarei CND and Peace Group (55 members)
46. Alan Booth
47. Larry Tanchak
48. Peter Kammler - Green Team, Whangarei
49. Kurt Brehmer
50. John Carter
51. I.M. Dick
52. Barbara Craig
53. Margaret Matich
54. Betty Wheeler
55. Sandra Roberts
56. Carol Btirton
57. Women's Electorai Lobby (NZ) Hamilton (Judy Pickard)
-

58. Hauraki Branch of Royal Forest and Bird Society - Waiheke Island
59. CND Auckland (Maire Leadbeater)
60. Greenpeace - Auckland (Jacqui Bamngton)
61. Jenny Easton - addition to PHA submission - Contingency plans for nuclear powered ships

In addition to the above submissions the Alternative Committee received Votes for Peace post card
submissions from 177 individuals. Of those submissions, 176 supported retention of our nuclear-free
law without alteration or removal of the prohibition on nuclear-powered vessels.

One individual indicated on the card that s/he was in favour of removing the prohibition on NPV.

Joint Submissions to the Alternative Committee on Nuclear Ship Visits

and the Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion

List of Persons and.Groups

L Public Health Association - Wellington

2. P.l Lorimer, Dept of Mathematics. Uniy Auckland
3. Alan P. Stamp, Dept of Physics, Univ Auckland
4. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom - Aotearoa Section (Maureen Hoy)
5. United NaliollS Association (Lauie Salas)
6. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom - Wellington South (Diana Unwin)
7. Prof Rabert E. White, Centre for Peace Studies, Uniy Auckland
8. NZ Foundation for Peace Studies - Auckland (Marion Hancock)
9. Eastern Suburbs Peace Group - Auckland (Sue Rawson)
10. Waiwhetu-Lower Hut! Peace Group (A.P. Quinn)
l l. Methodist-Presbyterian Public Question Committee - Wellington (Helen Wilson)
12. Friends - Quaker Peace and Service - Chnstchurch (Mia Tay)
13. Architects Against Nuclear Arms - Wellington (Derek Wilson)
14. lan Forsyth
15. T. Blake
16. Anker Jongenson, mir1iSI!�r, Denmark
17. John Halrlly, Engineer and St.'1.Ictural Engineer
1 8. Peter of Ulliv Auckland
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