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A.C. No.

9615

March 5, 2013

GLORIA P. JINON, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. LEONARDO E. JIZ, Respondent.

692 SCRA 348 Legal Ethics Duty To Return Clients Fund


That Gloria Jinon engaged the services of Atty. Leonardo Jiz to help her recover a land
title from her sister-in-law. Jinon gave all his financial demands, but Atty. Jiz never made
a move to cause the title to be transferred in Jinons name. Jinon decided to terminate
the services of Atty. Jiz and demanded that Atty. Jiz return the Php45,000.00 she earlier
paid as well as the rents that Atty. Jiz had been collecting (amounting to Php12,000.00).
Atty. Jiz only returned Php5,000.00 from the rent. He then filed an administrative case
against Atty. Jiz and demanded that Atty. Jiz return the money including the
Php17,000.00 acceptance fee. Atty. Jiz averred that Jinon agreed that his services will
be worth Php75,000.00; and that his services will only cover the protection of the rights
of Jinon against her sister in law and not for the recovery of title. As such, deducting the
Php45,000.00 and the acceptance fee of Php17,000.00, Jinon actually still owe Atty. Jiz
Php13,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Leonardo Jiz violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: Yes, he violated Canons 16 and 18. Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties as a
lawyer in neglecting his clients case and misappropriating her fund. The defense raised
by Atty. Jiz cannot be given credence because it appears that the receipt for the
acceptance fee he received from Jinon showed that the Php17 k was the full payment.

The receipt was even signed by him. Said amount is also sufficient to cover the actual
legal services he rendered to Jinon.
Since he was not able to act on the transfer of title, he must return Jinons money.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of
transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately returned. A
lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
own use in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Atty. Jiz was suspended
for two years.

JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO VS. ATTY. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO


and MARICRIS VILLARIN
AC No. 4256. February 13, 2004
Facts: That complainant submitted a photocopy of the marriage contract between her
and respondent Atty. Alejandro in support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage
against the latter and Villarin. She also submitted a photocopy of the birth certificate of a
child of the respondent and also stated that they were married in May 1, 1990 in
Isabela, Province.
The Supreme Court directed respondents to file their comment on the complaint within
10 days but they failed to comply. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended that both respondents be disbarred. The Supreme Court ordered Atty.
Alejandro to be disbarred while the complaint against his co-respondent Atty. Villarin

was returned to the IBP for further proceedings or it appears that a copy of the
resolution requiring comment was never deemed served upon her as it was upon Atty.
Alejandro.
Issue: Whether or not abandonment of lawful wife and maintaining an illicit relationship
with another woman are grounds for disbarment.
Held: Sufficient evidence showed that respondent Atty. Alejandro, lawfully married to
complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with co-respondent Atty. Villarin. Although
the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he co0ntracted a subsequent bigamous
marriage, that fact remains of his deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of
him as member of the bar. A disbarment proceeding is warranted against a lawyer who
abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who
had borne him a child. We can do no less in this case where Atty. Alejandro even fled to
another country to escape the consequences of his misconduct.
Therefore, Atty. Alejandro disbarred from the practice of law while the complaint against
Atty. Villarin was referred back to the IBP.
VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; FAILURE OF
COUNSEL TO FILE BRIEF
BIOMIE SARENAS-OCHAGABIA VS. ATTY. BALMES OCAMPOS
AM No. 4401. January 29, 2004
Facts: That Biomie Sarenas-Ochagabia and her aunts hired Atty. Balmes Ocampos in a
civil case for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land. An adverse
decision was rendered against complainants. Atty. Ocampos filed a Notice of Appeal at
their behest. The Court of Appeals gave them 45 days from notice to file their brief but
Atty. Ocampos was granted a 90-day extension. The extended period lapsed without an
appellants brief being filed, hence their appeal was dismissed. The dismissal was not
challenged, but complainants filed a complaint contending that respondent violated his
duty to inform them of his failure to file appellants brief and of the dismissal of the

appeal.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has exercised due diligence for the protection of the
clients interests.
Held: No..A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of
protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. By failing to file appellants brief,
respondent was remiss in the discharge of such responsibility. That respondent
accepted to represent complainants gratis et amore does not justify his failure to
exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty. Every case deserves full
attention, diligence, and competence regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or free.
Until his final release from the professional relation with a client, a counsel of record is
under obligation to protect the clients interest. If a party has a counsel of record, a court
does not recognize any other representation in behalf thereof unless in collaboration
with such counsel of record or until a formal substitution of counsel is effected. Since
respondent had not then withdrawn as counsel as he in fact filed a motion for extension
of time to file brief, he was under obligation to discharge his professional responsibility.

A.C. No. 10579

December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10579 Legal Ethics Borrowing From Clients Not Appropriate
Civil Claims Cannot Be Litigated in a Disbarment Suit

Facts: That Erlinda Foster hired Atty. Jaime Agtang in a realty dispute in Ilocos Norte.
Agtangs acceptance fee was P20,000.00 plus P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.
For the case, Agtang collected P150,000.00 from Foster as filing fee. He also advised
Foster to shell out a total of P50,000.00 for them to bribe the judge and get a favorable
decision. Although reluctant, Foster gave in to Agtangs demands.
On various occasions, Agtang borrowed money from Foster for his personal use, i.e., car
repair. Such loan amounted to P122,000.00. Foster, being prudent, asked for receipts for all
funds she handed over to Agtang. Later however, Foster learned that she lost the case due
to Agtangs negligence and incompetence in drafting the complaint. She also found out that
the filing fee therefor was only P22,410 (not P150k). Further, it turned out that Agtang was
once the lawyer of the opposing party. When she asked Agtang to return her the balance,
the said lawyer failed to do so hence, she filed an administrative complaint against Agtang.
The IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) eventually ordered Agtang to return the balance of
the filing fee (P127,590.00) as well as the money he borrowed from Foster (P122,000.00). It
was also recommended that Agtang be suspended for three months only.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the IBP-BOG is proper.
HELD: No. The recommended penalty of 3 months suspension is too light. Agtang
was disbarred by the Supreme Court. Agtang is guilty of engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly
misled Foster into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the
prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land
involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he
resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty.
SIDE ISSUE: May the Court order Agtang to return the money he borrowed from Foster?
No. The Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or
she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing
on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyers professional engagement. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is

still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is
the determination of respondents administrative liability. Its findings have no material
bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other. To rule
otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative
cases are filed directly with the Court.

G.R. No. 132365

July 9, 1998

COMMISION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner,


vs.
HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
Allen, Northern Samar and DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN
MAGLUYOAN, respondents.
292 SCRA 264 Legal Ethics Duty of Lawyers To Properly Quote The Supreme Court
Judicial Ethics Duty of the Judge to be Studious of the Principles of Law
In 1996, the Commission on Elections filed criminal cases against certain individuals for
violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The cases were filed with a Regional Trial Court in
Samar presided over by Judge Tomas Noynay. Judge Noynay however dismissed the said
cases as he ruled that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the said cases because said
criminal offenses were punishable with less than six years imprisonment. He said that said
cases should be filed with the MTC.
Atty. Jose Balbuena, member of COMELECs legal department, filed a motion for
reconsideration. He cited a case entitled: Alberto Naldeza vs Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M
No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996 (245 SCRA 286). According to Atty. Balbuena, in the said
case he cited, the Supreme Court has already settled the issue and Atty. Balbuena even
copied in toto the said ruling by the Supreme Court in his motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tomas Noynay is correct in dismissing the case.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court admonished Judge Noynay for dismissing the case as the
same was contrary to Section 32 of B.P. 129 as well as Section 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that election cases are within the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts except certain cases (which were not the cases filed
by COMELEC in this case).
Section 32 of B.P. 129, on the other hand, provides that as a rule, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine EXCEPT otherwise provided by special law. The Omnibus Election Code is a
special law which provides that election offenses, regardless of penalties, are under the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.
Judge Noynay was not able to follow these rules. It is a judges duty to be studious of the
principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the
law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.
On the other hand, Atty. Balbuena is also admonished for being reckless in citing cases.
The Supreme Court said that the passage cited by Balbuena in his Motion was not the
actual decision of the Supreme Court in the said case cited but rather the memorandum of
the court administrator which was quoted in the said case. Further, his citation of Naldeza
vs Lavilles, Jr. was wrong. Not only did he spell Naldeza wrong (as the correct spelling
was NALDOZA), he also cited the wrong SCRA. It should have been 254 SCRA 286 and
not 245 SCRA 286.
Balbuena is reminded of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which requires that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a
decision or authority.

G.R. No. L-24163

April 28, 1969

REGINO B. ARO, petitioner,


vs.
THE HON. ARSENIO NAAWA, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance
of Laguna, LUIS MAGTIBAY, PABLO MAGTIBAY, AURELLO MARTINEZ, GREGORIO
LONTOK, MARIA MENDOZA, MAXIMO PORTO and ROSARlO ANDAYA, respondents.
27 SCRA 1090 Legal Ethics Attorneys Fees; Right Thereto Contingent Fees
In 1964, Luis and Pablo Magtibay engaged the services of Atty. Regino Aro in a partition
case. The Magtibays have no money to pay Atty. Aro and so a contingent fee agreement
was reduced in writing. Atty. Aro did his part in prosecuting the case. Later, Atty. Aro was
able to negotiate a proposed amicable settlement whereby the opposing party agreed to
pay P3,000.00 to the Magtibays. Atty. Aro then advised his clients to meet with the other
party but unfortunately, the Magtibays were not able to do so.
Later in October 1964, Atty. Aro received an order from the trial judge (Judge
Arsenio Naawa) which stated that the case has been dismissed because the Magtibays
had already entered into an amicable settlement (extrajudicial settlement) with the other
party. Atty. Aro opposed the dismissal on the ground that such extrajudicial settlement
without his assistance was fraudulent because it deprived him of the contingent fees.
The Magtibays contended that it is their right to settle the case amicably even without the
assistance of Atty. Aro and that it is also their right to withdraw the services of Atty. Aro even
before the case is settled. The judge agreed with the Magtibays.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Aro is entitled to attorneys fees.
HELD: Yes. It is true that a client can withdraw the services of his counsel at any time
provided the same is grounded on valid reasons. It is also true that a client can enter into an
amicable settlement with the opposing party even without the assistance of counsel.
However, if such is an attempt to defraud or if it is a collusive agreement to deprive the

lawyer of his attorneys fees, then the courts can intervene to protect the lawyers, who are
officers of the court.
In this case, it is undisputed that there is already a written agreement as to Atty. Aros fees
(the contingent fee agreement). Fraud is apparent in this case because it appears that the
amicable settlement initially secured by Atty. Aro for the Magtibays is better than that
secured by the Magtibays without the assistance of Aro. Besides, there was no justifiable
reason as to why the Magtibays dismissed the services of Aro. It was through Aros effort
that the Magtibays right to the disputed property was finally recognized by the other party
(who was actually their aunt).

A.C. No. 6986

March 6, 2006

JULIUS V. AGUSTIN, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. ENRIQUE S. EMPLEO, Respondent.
484 SCRA 91 Legal Ethics Duty of a lawyer in a clients compromise agreement
Julius Agustin was sued for Forcible Entry with Damages. He hired the services of Atty.
Enrique Empleo. In 1998, the trial court ordered the parties to submit their compromise
agreement within 15 days. No compromise agreement was submitted and nothing
happened within the next four years hence the court dismissed the case.
Agustin then filed a disbarment case against Empleo because he said he was prejudiced
when the case was dismissed together with his counterclaim therein. Empleo, in his
defense, asserted that Agustin actually benefited from the dismissal because he was the
defendant therein. Empleo explained that the non-submission of the compromise
agreement was due to complainants own fault in not contacting him for the purpose of

providing the details of said agreement, pointing out that counsels merely assist their clients
and do not decide for them in a compromise agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Empleos assertions are correct.
HELD: No. It is true that a lawyer cannot enter into a compromise agreement without his
clients consent. However, a lawyer is also an officer of the court with the correlative duty to
see to it that cases are disposed in the soonest possible time.
Here, Empleo was fully aware that there is a pending court order for the submission of a
compromise agreement, he should have taken pains to remind Agustin about it and
ascertain the true intent of the latter regarding the same, so that he, as Agustins counsel,
can make the necessary legal action in order for the case not to be unduly delayed and
appear not to be indefinitely pending in the docket of the court concerned. The delay of four
years is likewise inexcusable. The period of almost four 4 years of waiting constitutes
inaction that caused unnecessary delay in the disposition of said cases. The fact that no
damage or prejudice was sustained by Agustin, he being the defendant in that case, is of no
moment.

G.R. No. L-12510

August 27, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
CESAREO DURBAN, defendant-appellant.
36 Phil 797 Legal Ethics Unauthorized Practice of Law
In 1914, a lawyer named Salvador Laguda filed a petition before the Iloilo CFI
recommending that he is appointing Cesareo Durban as his procurador judicial (legal
representative). The judge of the CFI approved the petition. The authority granted to

Durban, a non-lawyer, is limited to the following: appear in matters signed and presented by
Laguda with his own signature and when the latter should send the said Durban to attend to
such matters; that the said Durban should have no authority to make contracts to represent
any person in any justice court; that all contracts and appearances should be made by
Laguda, and that the latter could send Durban to represent him in courts; and finally that
said Durban should not collect any sum for any service.
In one instance however, Durban agreed to represent one Eustaquia Montage in litigating
her claim over a P20.00 worth parcel of land. Durban charged for appearance fees; he even
won the case. Montage paid Durban a total of P50.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Durban engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
HELD: Yes. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 1919, says:
No person not duly authorized to practice law may engage in the occupation of appearing
for or defending other persons in justice of the peace courts without being first authorized
for that purpose by the judge of the Court of First Instance.
Durban acted beyond the authority granted him; he was likewise in violation of the provision
above.

G.R. No. 123686

November 16, 1999

SPS. APOLINARIO MELO and LILIA T. MELO, and JULIA BARRETO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARSENIA CORONEL, respondents.
318 SCRA 94 Legal Ethics Duties to the Court Forum Shopping
Arsenia Coronel incurred a P60k loan from the Rural Bank of Mabalacat. To secure the
loan, she mortgaged her property. She was not able to pay the loan hence her property was

foreclosed. The highest bidder were spouses Apolinario and Lilia Melo who later filed a
petition for ex-parte issuance of a writ of possession in their favor before Branch 60 of RTC
Angeles City.
Coronel countered this by filing a complaint for injunction before Branch 57 of RTC Angeles
City. In the original complaint, Coronel did not attach a certification of non-forum shopping.
Later, she amended the complaint to include the said certification.
ISSUE: Whether or not Coronel is guilty of forum shopping.
HELD: No. There is no forum shopping in this case. The case pending before Branch 60 of
RTC Angeles is totally different from the case pending in Branch 57 of the same court.
Hence, there is no forum shopping.
Coronels complaint is however dismissed without prejudice because of her failure to attach
the certification of non-forum shopping in her complaint. The requirement to file a certificate
of non-forum shopping is mandatory. Failure to comply with this requirement cannot be
excused by the fact that Coronel is not guilty of forum shopping. The rule applies to any
complaint, petition, application, or other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the party
filing it has actually committed forum shopping. Every party filing a complaint or any other
initiatory pleading is required to swear under oath that he has not and will not commit forum
shopping. Compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from, and
independent of, the avoidance of forum shopping itself. Coronels subsequent compliance
did not cure this defect.

August 9, 1932
ENGRACIA CANTORNE, complainant,
vs.
EUGENIANO DUCUSIN, respondent.

57 Phil 23 Legal Ethics Obligations of a lawyer


Sometime in the 1920s, Engracia Cantorne sued one Petrona Basmayor for the loss of
Cantornes shawl. Basmayor was represented Atty. Eugeniano Ducusin (some record say
Ducasin). Ducusin approached Cantorne advising her not to appear in court during trial
because his client allegedly agreed to pay P25.00 for the shawl. Cantorne even spent some
money just to entertain Ducusin in her home. So Cantorne did not appear during the trial
and the suit against Basmayor was dismissed due to Cantornes non-appearance. Cantorne
subsequently filed a disbarment case against Ducusin.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ducusins acts are a ground for disbarment/suspension.
HELD: Yes. An attorney-at-law is in this jurisdiction as elsewhere, an officer of the court,
with an obligation to the courts and the public no less significant than his obligation to his
clients. An attempt to obstruct, pervert, or impede the administration of justice, or to evade
the fair operation of the law, is a ground for suspension or disbarment. Ducusins actuations
frustrated the ends of justice. Evidence shows conclusively that he violated his obligations
to the court and to his client and furthermore obstructed the administration of justice thus
disregarding the fundamental ethics of his profession. Ducusin was suspended for two
years (lessened to a one year suspension by s Supreme Court Resolution in 1933).

A.M. No. 1053

September 7, 1979

SANTA PANGAN, complainant


vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,
93 SCRA 87 Legal Ethics Lack of Candor by a Lawyer Proper name to be used by a
lawyer

In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos
was delayed because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the
records of the said case was checked (one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found
that he used the name Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has
the right to use such name because in his birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro
Dionisio Ramos. D.D. stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mothers surname.
However, in the roll of attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.
HELD: No. The attorneys roll or register is the official record containing the names and
signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a
name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official
oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in the
temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor and
frankness. In representing himself to the court as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead of Dionisio
D. Ramos, respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The
Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar
infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.

G.R. No. L-16731

March 30, 1960

FELIPE ECO, petitioner-appellant,


vs.
JUAN RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
107 Phil 612 Legal Ethics Negligence of a Lawyer Acts that should not be delegated
by a lawyer
In 1956, Felipe Eco was granted a private woodland registration certification by the Bureau
of Forestry but the same was later cancelled by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources (Juan De Rodriguez) due to numerous oppositions and also by reason of Ecos
refusal to submit to a formal investigation. Eco questioned the decision before the court but
the trial court affirmed the Secretarys decision. In 1958, Eco filed a notice of appeal and
also posted the required appeal bond. This was opposed because Eco filed it out of time.
Eco argued that the delay is due to excusable negligence. The alleged negligence
consisted of the erroneous computation by Ecos counsels clerk of the period within which
an appeal may be made, said clerk being of the impression that the prescriptive period to
appeal in certiorari cases is also 30 days like in ordinary civil actions instead of 15 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not the delay is excusable.
HELD: No. What was delegated by Ecos counsel to his clerk was the computation itself of
the period within which the appropriate pleading may be filed. This act is hardly prudent or
wise. The duty to compute the period to appeal is a duty that devolves upon the attorney
which he cannot and should not delegate unto an employee because it concerns a question
of study of the law and its application, and the Supreme Court considers this to be a
delicate matter that should not be delegated. The negligence here cannot, therefore, be
considered excusable.

A.C. No. 5252

May 20, 2004

PRISCILLA Z. ORBE, complainant,


vs.
ATTY. HENRY ADAZA, respondent.
428 SCRA 567 Legal Ethics Gross Misconduct What Conduct Means
In November 1996, Attorney Henry Adaza went to Priscilla Orbe to borrow P60k. Orbe
loaned Adaza the said amount. As security, Adaza issued Orbe two checks to cover the loan
plus interest. The checks however bounced (the second check was even post dated by

Adaza to bear the date January 24, 1996- many months before November 1996 when the
loan was made). Subsequently, because of Adazas failure to pay despite notices and
demand from Orbe, the latter filed a complaint for grave misconduct against Adaza. Orbe
alleged that Adaza is unfit to be a member of the bar. Eventually, the case was referred to
the respective Integrated Bar of Philippines chapter. Despite notices, Adaza failed to appear
in any of the proceedings. The IBP chapter then recommended Adazas suspension for one
year.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza should be suspended.
HELD: Yes. Adazas issuance of worthless checks and his contumacious refusal to comply
with his just obligation for nearly eight years (from SCs date of decision [2004]) is appalling.
The Supreme Court also elucidated on the following:
A member of the bar may be so removed or suspended from office as an attorney for any
deceit, malpractice, or misconduct in office. The word conduct used in the rules is not
limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyers professional
duties but it also refers to any misconduct, although not connected with his professional
duties, that would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law confer upon him. The grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of
the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct,
including dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. Such misdeed puts
his moral fiber, as well as his fitness to continue in the advocacy of law, in serious doubt.

G.R. No. 133250

May 6, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,


vs.

PUBLIC

ESTATES

AUTHORITY

and

AMARI

COASTAL

BAY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, respondents.
403 SCRA 1 Legal Ethics Judicial Ethics Inhibition; Supreme Court Justice
In July 2002, Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation lost a case (PEA-Amari Scandal)
before the Supreme Court involving certain reclaimed lands. Upon receipt of the adverse
decision, Amari filed a Motion for Inhibition asking the ponente of said case, Justice Antonio
Carpio, to inhibit from the case on the ground that before Justice Carpio was appointed to
the Supreme Court, he wrote a column in the Manila Times newspaper where he
questioned the legality of the agreement between the Public Estates Authority and Amari
regarding the said reclaimed property (PEA-Amari deal). Amari insists that Justice Carpio
already prejudged the issue as his bias and prejudice were already apparent. Amari also
prays for a re-deliberation after Justice Carpio inhibits.
ISSUE: Whether or not Justice Carpio should inhibit from the case by reason of the said
Manila Times column.
HELD: No. In the first place, the decision was already promulgated when Amari filed its
motion requesting Justice Carpio to inhibit. The rule is that a motion to inhibit must be
denied if filed after a member of the Court had already given an opinion on the merits of the
case. Reason: a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court (only
to) raise an objection of this sort after a decision has been rendered.
Second, judges and justices are not disqualified from participating in a case just because
they have written legal articles on the law involved in the case.
Third, looking at Justice Carpios Manila Times article, his article questioned the legality of
the PEA Amari deal on the basis of the lack of public bidding. In this particular case before
the Supreme Court, the issue of the absence of public bidding was not raised by any of the
parties involved hence, Justice Carpios write up had nothing to do with the very merits of
the case.

A.M. No. L-363


IN

RE:

July 31, 1962

DISBARMENT

PROCEEDINGS

AGAINST

ATTY.

DIOSDADO

Q.

GUTIERREZ, respondent.
5 SCRA 661 Legal Ethics Conditional Pardon will not bar disbarment
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956.
He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of
the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the
condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a
disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latters conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted
pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely
remitted his sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon
the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in
defense). The crime was actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been
committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being municipal
mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved
is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

G.R. No. L-961

September 21, 1949

BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,


vs.

JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM


JACOB ASSAD, respondents.
84 Phil 569 Legal Ethics Existence of Attorney-Client Relationship
In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against
Selim Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a
certain Atty. Ohnick.
In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and he
thenafter entered his appearance in court.
In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be
disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that in June 1945, Hilado approached Atty.
Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty.
Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter.
Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no
material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilados story,
Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned
with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned,
Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty.
Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind
the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter where it was stated
that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the
letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a
letter explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilados case.
Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential
information was relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was
already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty.
Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court for four months in the said
case.
Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.
HELD: Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty.
Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latters
consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such
consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
Further:
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor-when he is listening to his clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he
is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or
advocating his clients cause in open court.
Anent the issue of what information was relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: It does not
matter if the information relayed is confidential or not. So long as the attorney-client
relationship is established, the lawyer is proscribed from taking other representations
against the client.
Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not actually written by Atty. Francisco but was
only signed by him: It still binds him because Atty. Agrava, assuming that he was the real
author, was part of the same law firm. An information obtained from a client by a member or
assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm, his associates or his employers.
Anent the issue of the fact that it took Hilado four months from the time Atty. Francisco filed
his entry of appearance to file a disqualification: It does not matter. The length of time is not
a waiver of her right. The right of a client to have a lawyer be disqualified, based on

previous atty-client relationship, as counsel against her does not prescribe. Professional
confidence once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.

A.M. Case No. 3195

December 18, 1989

MA. LIBERTAD SJ CANTILLER, complainant,


vs.
ATTY. HUMBERTO V. POTENCIANO, respondent.
80 SCRA 246 Legal Ethics Lawyers Duties to His Client Due Diligence
In 1987, the sisters Ma. Libertad Cantiller and Peregrina Cantiller lost an ejectment case.
The two were later introduced by a friend to Atty. Humberto Potenciano. Potenciano said he
can help the sisters because the judge handling the case was his close friend. Potenciano,
with the little time he got, immediately filed a petition to counter the order to vacate issued
against the sisters. He asked for P1,000.00 for his fees from the sisters.
But later on, the judge handling the case asked Potenciano to inhibit because of the fact
that they are friends. Potenciano then asked an additional P2,000.00 from the sisters. He
said he needs to find another judge who can rule in their favor. He also asked another
P10,000.00 from the sisters. He said this amount is needed in order for them to re-acquire
their apartment. On top of the P10k, he also asked for another P1k for additional expenses.
The sisters were able to pool resources from friends just to raise the amount asked for by
Potenciano.
It turned out however that the court never asked P10k from the parties nor was the
additional P1k asked by the court. Worse, said amount (P11k) was never deposited in court.
The sisters demanded Potenciano to return the said amount but he failed to do so hence
they filed an administrative case against him. In his defense, Potenciano claimed that the
sister were merely harassing him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Potenciano should be subjected to disciplinary actions.


HELD: Yes. From the records, it appears that Potenciano haphazardly prepared the
pleadings he wrote for the sisters. In fact, the cases he filed for the sisters were all
dismissed for lack of cause of action. Worse, he got P11k from the sisters but never used
the same for the case instead he pocketed it for himself. When he contracted the sisters,
Potenciano, as a lawyer, bound himself to undertake his legal services with maximum effort
until the conclusion of the case. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of
a clients cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on
him.
It is also of no moment that Potenciano had little time to prepare for the pleading. When he
accepted the case, his clients reposed full faith in him. But he never complemented the trust
and faith reposed in him. He even bragged his closeness with the judge and even intimated
the need to buy another judge. Such actions are reprehensible.
Potenciano was suspended indefinitely until he can show to the court that he is fit to
practice law.

G.R. No. L-42992

August 8, 1935

FELIPE SALCEDO, petitioner-appellant,


vs.
FRANCISCO

HERNANDEZ, respondent-appellee.

In re contempt proceedings against Attorney VICENTE J. FRANCISCO.


Vicente J. Francisco in his own behalf.

61 Phil. 724 Legal Ethics Respect to the Courts Use of Temperate Language
In 1935, Atty. Vicente Francisco was the counsel for Felipe Salcedo in a case entitled Felipe
Salcedo vs Francisco Hernandez. Salcedo lost in that case and Atty. Francisco filed
a Motion for Reconsideration.
The trial court however ordered Atty. Francisco to explain why he should not be disciplined.
It appears that in the Motion filed by Atty. Francisco, he expressed his disagreement with
the judgment by stating that the judgment is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an
outrage to the right of [Salcedo] and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in
the Municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas (so this could be an election case); that the court
should rectify itself or else the voters in Tiaong might resort to the press publicly to
denounce the judicial outrage and that if uncorrected, the judgment will lead to the
increase [of] the proselytes (new converts) of sakdalism and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. He is guilty of contempt. A lawyer owes respect to the courts. A lawyer is duty
bound to uphold the courts dignity and authority and to defend its integrity. The language
used by Atty. Francisco is uncalled for and unjustified. In order to appeal to reason and
justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats. Even if
assuming that the trial court did err in its judgment, Atty. Francisco should still use
temperate and respectful language in advancing the cause of his client.
His insinuations that the voters in Tiaong, Tayabas might resort to sakdalism (a seditious
movement) is a suggestion to the people there of what they should do should his client not
get a favorable judgment. This is a veiled threat to the courts. It promotes distrust to the
courts.
It is laudable for Atty. Francisco to defend his client with all fervor and energy but he must
do so with respect to the dignity of the courts. The lawyer was fined and reprimanded.
Note: Justice Malcolm dissented; Atty. Francisco is protected by Freedom of Speech.

A.C. No. 8158

February 24, 2010

ATTY. ELMER C. SOLIDON, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. RAMIL E. MACALALAD, Respondent.
613 SCRA 472 Legal Ethics Code of Professional Responsibility Neglect of Duties
Failure to Account
In 2005, Atty. Elmer Solidon engaged the services of Atty. Ramil Macalalad for the latter to
handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land owned by the Solidons in Borongan, Samar.
They agreed for a fee of P80k. Solidon gave P50k as downpayment to Macalalad and the
remaining P30k shall be paid after Solidon shall receive the title over the said property.
But for 6 months after the P50k was given, Atty. Macalalad never gave an update to
Solidon. It turns out that Macalalad never filed any petition to register the land.
Solidon then filed an administrative case against Macalalad. Solidon alleged that Macalalad
neglected his duties and even avoided talking to him despite efforts from Solidon to
communicate with Macalalad.
In his defense, Macalalad averred that he did not file the petition because Solidon failed to
update him and that Solidon never gave the documents he was asking for.
Eventually, the Commission on Bar Discipline recommended Macalalad to be suspended for
three months.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Macalalad should be suspended.
HELD: Yes. Macalalad is guilty of negligence when he neglected his clients cause. This is a
violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is
negligent if he failed to do anything to protect his clients interest after receiving his

acceptance fee. Further, there is also negligence when he failed to update his client about
the status of the case.
Even if assuming that Solidon was also negligent, Macalalad cannot shift the blame to his
client for failing to follow up on his case because it was the lawyers duty to inform his client
of the status of the case. Even if the client has been equally at fault for the lack of
communication, the main responsibility remains with the lawyer to inquire and know the best
means to acquire the required information. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee
for legal services in handling Solidons case, and subsequently failing, without valid excuse,
to render the services, is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Supreme Court also found that not only did Macalalad violated Canon 18, he also
violated Canon 16 when he failed to account for Solidons money. It appears he failed to
return Solidons downpayment of P50k. A lawyer, when he fails to render legal services,
shall immediately account for and promptly return the money he received from his client.
Hence, on top of the recommended 3 months suspension, Macalald was suspended for an
additional 3 months or for a total of 6 months.

G.R. No. L-17194

September 30, 1964

PRIMITIVO SATO, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
SIMEON RALLOS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
12 SCRA 84 Legal Ethics Legal Profession Attorneys Fees Services of a LawyerPolitician
In 1949, the testate estate of Numeriana Rallos owes the government a tax liability
amounting to P130k. Simeon Rallos, the administrator of the said estate, was assisted by

Atty. Primitivo Sato in compromising the said tax liability with the Collector of Internal
Revenue. Eventually, the tax liability was lowered to P22k.
Sato then demanded the payment of his attorneys fees but Rallos refused to pay. Sato then
filed a collection suit against Rallos as the administrator of the said estate. In the complaint,
Sato demanded that according to their verbal agreement, Rallos was supposed to pay a
contingent fee of P20k plus an additional one hectare land.
Rallos denied any agreement as he claimed that Sato, then the Congressman of Cebu,
voluntarily offered his services to Rallos and that Sato was assisting him not as a lawyer but
as a politician. Rallos also alleged that he does not need the services of Sato as a lawyer
because he already has other lawyers assisting him at that time. However, he cannot refuse
the offer of help made by Sato to him since it was a generous offer.
Rallos also assail the complaint filed against him to be procedurally infirm. He avers that
the complaint should not have been filed against him in his capacity as an administrator
because by that time hes no longer an administrator because the estate was already
distributed to the heirs.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sato is entitled to attorneys fees.
HELD: Yes. There is no factual proof of the allegation that Sato offered his help as a
politician and not as a lawyer. But the undisputed fact is that Satos services to Rallos
greatly lowered the tax liability from P130k to P22k. It is certain that Rallos benefited from
Satos service. Rallos even admitted that he accepted the services of Sato, albeit his claim
that he cannot refuse the offer. But the fact is, Sato actualy rendered legal services and
Rallos benefited.
Anent the issue of procedural infirmity, the Supreme Court ruled that in the spirit of the
principle no one can unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, Sato should be
allowed to collect attorneys fees.
However, the attorneys fees to be collected should be the reasonable compensation (also
considering that the agreement between Sato and Rallos was merely verbal). Hence,

instead of collecting P20k plus the one hectare land, Sato may only collect P12.5k from
Rallos. Rallos can however claim proportionate contribution from the other heirs.

A.M.

No.

MTJ-09-1736

July

25,

2011

[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2034-MTJ]


ATTY. CONRADO B. GANDEZA, JR., Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MARIA CLARITA C. TABIN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 4, Baguio City, Respondent.
Legal Ethics Judicial Ethics Conduct of Judges Impropriety
In November 2007, the cars of Atty. Conrado Gandeza, Jr. and Paul Casuga collided with
each other. Later at the scene of the collision, Judge Maria Clarita Tabin arrived. She was
the aunt of Casuga. Atty. Gandeza observed that the judge kept on reminding the
investigating officer that the driver of Gandeza was drunk.
Later at the hospital, blood alcohol test was conducted on the driver of Gandeza. The initial
result returned negative. But Judge Tabin insisted that the doctor do a second test. This
time, the result was positive.
About a week later, a criminal case was filed against the driver of Gandeza. The wife of
Atty. Gandeza, also a lawyer, later observed that a court employee was bringing the records
of the case outside the premises of the court where the case was filed. The court employee
said that the records were requested by Judge Tabin. The case also went to mediation
where Gandeza also learned that Judge Tabin went to the mediation center and inquired
about the case.

All these acts of the judge led to Gandezas filing of an administrative case against Judge
Tabin for Gross Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.
In her defense, Judge Tabin said that she never publicly made known that she was a judge
when she was at the collision scene. But she did admit that the investigating officer as well
as the doctor knew her to be such. She also said that she merely borrowed the records of
the case because she learned that her nephew still did not have a lawyer. She also said that
when she was at the mediation center, she merely went there to assist her sister (Casugas
mom) as the latter did not know where the mediation center was located.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tabin is guilty of Gross Misconduct or Conduct Unbecoming
of a Judge.
HELD: No. But she is guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Her being concern of her nephew is just but natural but as member of the judiciary, she
should know that she should not interfere in the conduct of an investigation. She should
always appear impartial this did not happen when she interfered with the investigation and
when she borrowed the records as well as when she was at the mediation center inquiring
about the records of the case. She may have the best intention devoid of any malicious
motive but sadly her actions, however, spawned the impression that she was using her
office to unduly influence or pressure the concerned people to conduct the medical
examination as well as the investigation in their favor.
Indeed, while Judge Tabins concern over the safety of her nephew and the outcome of his
criminal case is understandable, she should not have disregarded the rules on proper
decorum at the expense of the integrity of the court. Although concern for family members is
deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, she, being a judge, should bear in mind that she is
also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire
Judiciary.

A.M.

No.

MTJ-09-1729

January

20,

2009

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-1910-MTJ)


NORYN S. TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MARIA CLARITA CASUGA-TABIN, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,
Baguio City, Respondent.
Remedial Law Summary Procedure Warrant of Arrest Notice to the Accused
Legal Ethics Judicial Ethics Abuse of Authority
In 2006, a criminal case was filed against Noryn Tan for estafa in the Municipal Trial Court
of Baguio (Branch 4). Arraignment was set to fall on October 10, 2006. Tan was not able to
appear in court hence the presiding judge, Judge Clarita Tabin, issued a warrant of arrest
against Tan. Tan was arrested in Quezon City, her place of residence.
Tan posted bail. Later on, she filed an administrative case against Judge Tabin on the
ground of denial of due process. Tan alleged that she never received notice about the said
arraignment.
In her comment, Judge Tabin said that the notice was coursed through the Chief of Police of
Quezon City and that when two months lapsed after the issuance of said notice and no
return was made by the QC police office, Judge Tabin presumed that Tan received the
notice in the regular course of mail and that there was presumption of regularity in favor of
the police officers. Thus, she issued the arrest warrant against Tan but such issuance was
made in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the arrest warrant was proper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court clarified whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary
Procedure, the general rule is that the court shall not order the arrest of the
accused, unless the accused fails to appear whenever required. In this case, the estafa

case falls under the Rules on Summary procedure. Judge Tabin is not justified in issuing the
warrant of arrest and her defense of good faith is not tenable.
The judge herself admitted that there was no proof that Tan received the notice for her to
appear in court. She merely relied on the presumption of regularity which should not be
used as an excuse in violating the right of the accused to due process. So basic and
fundamental is a persons right to liberty that it should not be taken lightly or brushed aside
with the presumption that the police through which the notice had been sent, actually served
the same on Tan whose address was not even specified.
Judge Tabin failed to uphold the rules. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
her office to know and simply apply it. The Supreme Court held that a judge commits grave
abuse of authority when she hastily issues a warrant of arrest against the accused in
violation of the summary procedure rule that the accused should first be notified of the
charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and
countervailing evidence. Judge Tabin was found guilty of abuse of authority and was fined
P10,000.00.

A.C. No. 5804

July 1, 2003

BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants,


vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, respondent.
Commercial Law Corporation Law Derivative Suit
Legal Ethics Conflict of Interests
Benedicto Hornilla and Federico Ricafort were members of the Philippine Public School
Teachers Association (PPSTA). In 1997, they accused the Board of Directors of PPSTA of
unlawfully spending the funds of PPSTA. However, since the PPSTA was not initiating a

complaint against the Board of Directors, the two then filed a suit on behalf of PPSTA
against the Board of PPSTA.
In the said suit, the Board of Directors were represented by Atty. Ernesto Salunat. Hornilla
et al were against the legal representation being made by Salunat for and on behalf of the
Board of Directors because of the fact that Salunat is part of the ASSA Law Offices. And the
ASSA Law Offices happen to be the retained law firm of the PPSTA. In short, Hornilla et al
alleged that there is conflict of interests.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is conflict of interest.
HELD: Yes. The suit filed by Hornilla et al against the Board of PPSTA is a derivative suit.
Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires
acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the
wrong, a stockholder (in this case a member because PPSTA is non-stock) may sue on
behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring
about a redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the
stockholders. In such a case, even though it was the members who filed the case and not
the corporation itself, the real party in interest is still the corporation (PPSTA) and the suing
members (Hornilla et al) are only the nominal party.
Therefore, since it is the corporation suing, Salunat cannot represent the Board Members of
PPSTA because he is a member of ASSA Law Office which is the retained law firm of
PPSTA. Surely, there is conflict of interest in him representing the Board while his law office
represents the corporation. Salunat was admonished by the Supreme Court.

A.C. No. 6148

January 22, 2013

FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, the Minors JURIS ALEXIS T. MACARRUBO


and GABRIEL

ENRICO

T.

MACARRUBO

as

represented

Mother/Guardian, FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, complainant,

by

their

vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO, respondent.
Re: Petition For Extraordinary Mercy Of Edmundo Macarubbo
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Reinstatement to the Bar Judicial Clemency Guidelines
In February 2004, Edmundo Macarrubo was disbarred for having contracted two bigamous
marriages (gross immorality). He filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. In June
2012, Macarrubo filed a petition for extraordinary mercy with the Supreme Court averring
that he is now a reformed man; that he continued to provide support to his children in all
three marriages; that after his disbarment he went to his hometown (Enrile, Cagayan) where
he tended to an orchard; that he took care of his mom until her death in 2008; that he is
working for the local government there; that he also teaches in a local college there; that he
is active in socio economic activities helping those who are in need.
He presented several documents to prove that he is reformed, i.e., affidavits by respected
people from his locale attesting to his civic works, certifications from the barangay and NBI
as well as other local organizations/agencies. The local church also certified that Macarrubo
has been complying with the doctrines of the church. Further, the local IBP chapter supports
his reinstatement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macarrubo should be reinstated to the Roll of Attorneys.
HELD: Yes. He sufficiently proved that he is reformed. At 58 years old, Macarrubo can still
contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of the society. He
still has productive years ahead of him. The Supreme Court also notes the guidelines in
granting judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community
with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for
the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

BAR MATTER No. 914

October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,


vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
Legal Profession Admission to the Bar Citizenship Requirement
In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City.
He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a
Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Chings father was a
Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he
was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a
foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he
has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant a
profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La
Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a
Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the

age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, upon reaching the age of majority is
construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old
because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in
1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General
recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court
cannot agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed
and its way beyond the allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the
period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it cant be extended any
further). Chings special circumstances cant be considered. It is not enough that he
considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was)
serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didnt give any
explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess its simply
because he never thought hes Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Chings unreasonable
and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

A.C. No. 5862

October 12, 2011

DALISAY CAPILI, complainant,


vs
ATTY. ALFREDO L. BENTULAN, respondent.

Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Duty to Represent Client with Competence and Diligence
Dalisay Capili engaged the legal services of Atty. Alfredo Bentulan as her counsel in a civil
case. Capili lost in the trial court. She wanted to appeal but despite her payment for the
preparation and filing of an appeal brief, Atty. Bentulan failed to file the said pleading. This
resulted to the dismissal of her appeal. Ten years after said dismissal, Capili filed a
disbarment case against Bentulan.
In his defense, Bentulan said that Capilis action is already barred by laches; that in the first
place, Capili knew that the appeal was unmeritorious; that she never actually paid Bentulan
for the preparation and filing of said appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Bentulan should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The lapse of ten years from the alleged misconduct does not bar the filing of
this case. Ordinary statutes of limitation had no application to disbarment or suspension
proceedings against members of the Bar. These proceedings are sui generis. They are not
akin to the trials of actions or suits in which interests and rights are enforced by the plaintiffs
against the defendants, but are rather investigations into the conduct of the members of the
Bar made by the Supreme Court within the context of its plenary powers expressly granted
by the Constitution to regulate the practice of law.
In preparing and filing the appeal brief, the question of whether or not Bentulan was paid his
legal services is of no moment. As a lawyer, he owes fidelity to both cause and client, even
if he is not paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Further, if he believed that
Capilis case was unmeritorious, he should have advised Capili accordingly.
The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable
negligence. This violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:
Canon 18 A lawyer shall service his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03: A lawyer shall not neglect a matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

G.R. No. 145817


URBAN

October 19, 2011


BANK,

INC, Petitioner,

vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEA, Respondent.
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Unconscionable Attorneys Fees Quantum Meruit
In 1994, Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to Urban Bank, Inc. (UBI).
The land was sold for P240 million. As the land was occupied by unauthorized sub-tenants,
ISCIs lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Pea had to negotiate with them for them to relocate. But the
said occupants, knowing that the land was already transferred to UBI, refused to recognize
Pea. ISCI then communicated with UBI so that the latter may authorize Pea to negotiate
with the tenants. Pea had to barricade himself inside the property to keep the tenants out
who were forcing their way in especially so that the local cops are now sympathetic to them.
Pea then had a phone conversation with Teodoro Borlongan, president of UBI, where
Pea explained to him the situation. In said conversation, Pea asked authorization from
Borlongan to negotiate with the tenants. Pea also asked that he be paid 10% of the
purchase price or (P24 million) for his efforts. Borlongan agreed over the phone on the
condition that Pea should be able to settle with the tenants otherwise he forfeits said 10%
fee. Pea also asked that said authorization be put into writing.
The authorization was put into writing but no mention was made as regards the 10% fee, (in
short, that part was not written in the written authorization released by UBI). Pea was able
to settle and relocate the tenants. After everything was settled and the property is now
formally under the possession of UBI, Pea began sending demands to UBI for the latter to
pay him the P24 million fee agreed upon, plus his expenses for the relocation of the tenants
and the hiring of security guards or an additional P3 million. But UBI refused to make
payment hence Pea filed a complaint for recovery against UBI.

The trial court ruled in favor of Pea as it found there indeed was a contract of agency
created between and UBI and that Pea is entitled to the 10% fee plus the expenses he
incurred including litigation expenses. In sum, the trial court awarded him P28 million.
The Court of Appeals however reversed the order of the trial court. It ruled that no agency
was formed but for his legal services, Pea is entitled to payment but applying the principle
of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, Pea should only be paid P3 million.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Pea is entitled to receive the P28 million.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable. Pea is entitled
to payment for compensation for services rendered as agent of Urban Bank, but on the
basis of the principles of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. In the first place, other
than the self-serving testimony of Pea, there was no other evidence presented to support
his claim that Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over the phone. The written
authorization later issued merely confirms the power granted him to negotiate with the
tenants. The written authorization proved the existence of agency but not the existence of
any agreement as to how much Pea should be paid.
Absent any such agreement, the principle of quantum meruit should be applied. In this
case, Pea is entitled to receive what he merit for his services, or as much as he has
earned. In dealing with the tenants, Pea didnt have to perform any extraordinary acts or
legal maneuvering. Hence, he is entitled to receive P1.5 million for his legal services. He is
also entitled to reimbursement for his expenses in securing the property, to wit, P1.5 million
for the security guards he had to hire and another P1.5 million for settling and relocating the
23 tenants. Total of P4.5 million.
The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

A.C. No. 7591

March 20, 2012

CORAZON T. NEVADA, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO D. CASUGA, Respondent.
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Gross Misconduct Malpractice of Law Misconduct
In 2007, Corazon Nevada, filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rodolfo Casuga. Nevada
alleged the following:
1.

That Atty. Casuga acquired several pieces of jewelry from her; the jewelries include
diamond earrings and diamond rings amounting P300,000.00. and a Rolex gold watch
worth $12,000.00; that Casuga assured her that he will sell them; but despite repeated
demands, Casuga never remitted any money nor did he return said jewelries.

2.

That in 2006, Casuga, taking advantage of his close relationship with Nevada (they
belong to the same religious sect), Casuga represented himself as the hotel administrator of
the hotel (Mt. Crest) that Nevada own; that as such, Casuga was able to enter into a
contract of lease with one Jung Chul; that he negotiated an office space with Chul in said
Hotel for P90,000.00; that Casuga notarized said agreement; that he forged the signature of
Edwin Nevada (husband); that he never remitted the P90k to Nevada.
In his defense, Casuga said:

1.

That Nevada actually pawned said jewelries in a pawnshop; that she later advised
Casugas wife to redeem said jewelries using Mrs. Casugas wife; that Casuga can sell said
jewelries and reimburse herself from the proceeds; that he still has possession of said
jewelries.

2.

That he never received the P90,000.00; that it was received by a certain Pastor Oh;
that he was authorized as an agent by Edwin Nevada to enter into said contract of lease.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit in Atty. Casugas defense.
HELD: No. Atty. Casuga is in violation of the following:

1. Gross Misconduct: Casuga misrepresented himself as a duly authorized representative


of Nevada when in fact he was not. He never adduced evidence showing that he was duly
authorized either by Edwin or Corazon. He also dialed to adduce evidence proving that he
never received the P90k from Chul. On the contrary, a notarized letter showed that Casuga
did receive the money. His misrepresentations constitute gross misconduct and his mere
denial does not overcome the evidence presented against him.
2. Violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: It is his duty as a
lawyer to account for all moneys and property of his client that may come to his possession.
This is still applicable even though said property/money did not come to his possession by
virtue of a lawyer-client relationship. He failed to adduce evidence to prove his claim that
Nevada pawned said jewelries. He never presented receipts. Further, even assuming that
Nevada did pawn said items, Casuga was still duty bound to return said jewelries upon
demand by Nevada.
3. Violation of Notarial Rules: He signed a document (contract of lease) in behalf of
another person without authorization. His forgery made him an actual party to the contract.
In effect he was notarizing a document in which he is party in violation of the notarial rules
(Secs. 1 and 3, Rule IV).
4. Malpractice of Law: As a summation of all the above violations, Casuga is guilty of
Malpractice and Misconduct. Such act is punishable under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. However, the Supreme Court deemed that disbarment is too severe a punishment
against Casuga. He was suspended for 4 years from the practice of law. His notarial
commission was likewise revoked and he is disqualified to be a notary public while serving
his suspension. The Supreme Court emphasized: the penalty of disbarment shall be meted
out only when the lawyers misconduct borders on the criminal and/or is committed under
scandalous circumstance.

A.C. No. 4428

December 12, 2011

ELPIDIO P. TIONG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO, respondent.
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Pardon Does Not Bar Sanction Against an Erring Lawyer
Moral Depravity Grossly Immoral Conduct
Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the lawyer of spouses Elpidio and Ma. Elena
Tiong. Elpidio, a US citizen is often times away. For two years, he suspected that his wife
and Atty. Florendo were having an affair. Finally in 1995, he was able to listen to a
telephone conversation where he heard Atty. Florendo mention amorous words to Ma.
Elena. Atty. Florendo confronted the two and both eventually admitted to their illicit
relationship. Atty. Florendo and Ma. Elena then executed and signed an affidavit, which was
later notarized, stating that they admit of their illicit relationship; that they are seeking the
forgiveness of their respective spouse. Elpidio forgave Florendo and Ma. Elena. But
nevertheless, Elpidio filed a disbarment case against Florendo.
Florendo said he can no longer be sanctioned because he was already pardoned.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Florendo is correct.
HELD: No. A petition for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is a sui generis case. This
class of cases is meant to protect the public and the courts of undesirable members of the
legal profession. As such, pardon by the offended party of the act complained of does not
operate to offset the ground for disbarment or suspension. Florendos act of having an affair
with his clients wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and
his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the
ethics of his profession. He violated the trust reposed upon him by his client (Canon 17,
Code of Professional Responsibility). His illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a
disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his
office for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral
conduct, among others. It cannot be also said, as he claims, that their relationship is

merely a moment of indiscretion considering that their affair went on for more than two
years. Florendo was suspended for 6 months.

G.R. No. 100113

September 3, 1991

RENATO

CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Legal Ethics Practice of Law
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsods appointment
was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to
meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC
should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:
1.

Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.

2.

Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.

3.

Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and
held various positions in various foreign corporations.

4.

In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local
corporations until 1986.

5.

In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes
practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in
most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation
work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is
loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working
day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most
of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.

G.R. No. 115849

January 24, 1996

FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK (Formerly Producers Bank of the


Philippines) and MERCURIO RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CARLOS EJERCITO, in substitution of DEMETRIO DEMETRIA,
and JOSE JANOLO, respondents.

252 SCRA 259 Legal Ethics Forum Shopping


Civil Law Contract of Sale Parties to a Sales Contract
Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International Bank), which has been under
conservatorship since 1984, is the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank had an agreement
with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the two to purchase the parcels of land for a
purchase price of P5.5 million pesos. The said agreement was made by Demetria and
Janolo with the Banks manager, Mercurio Rivera. Later however, the Bank, through its
conservator, Leonida Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement as it alleged
that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such an agreement, hence there was no valid
contract of sale. Subsequently, Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank. The regional
trial court ruled in favor of Demetria et al. The Bank filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals.
Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with the said Bank, filed a motion
for intervention with the trial court. The trial court denied the motion since the trial has been
concluded already and the case is now pending appeal. Subsequently, Co, assisted by
ACCRA law office, filed a separate civil case against Demetria and Janolo seeking to have
the purported contract of sale be declared unenforceable against the Bank. Demetria et al
argued that the second case constitutes forum shopping.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is forum shopping.
2. Whether or not there is a perfected contract of sale.
HELD:
1.

Yes. There is forum shopping because there is identity of interest and parties
between the first case and the second case. There is identity of interest because both cases
sought to have the agreement, which involves the same property, be declared
unenforceable as against the Bank. There is identity of parties even though the first case is
in the name of the bank as defendant, and the second case is in the name of Henry Co as
plaintiff. There is still forum shopping here because Henry Co essentially represents the
bank. Both cases aim to have the bank escape liability from the agreement it entered into

with Demetria et al. The Supreme Court did not lay down any disciplinary action against the
ACCRA lawyers but they were warned that a repetition will be dealt with more severely.
2.

Yes. There is a perfected contract of sale because the bank manager, Rivera,
entered into the agreement with apparent authority. This apparent authority has been duly
proved by the evidence presented which showed that in all the dealings and transactions,
Rivera participated actively without the opposition of the conservator. In fact, in the
advertisements and announcements of the bank, Rivera was designated as the go-to guy in
relation to the disposition of the Banks assets.
G.R. Nos. L-45727-45729

June 22, 1938

FLORENCIA A. DE MONDIA, CONSOLACION DECIMO, PANTALEON QUISON,


SIMPLICIO

VARGAS,

CHIA

AYHING,

and

JOSE

SORIANO, petitioners,

vs.
THE

PUBLIC

SERVICE

COMMISSION

and

NEGROS

TRAVELWAYS

CORPORATIONS, respondents.
65 Phil 58 Legal Ethics Right of Client Not To Appeal
De Mondia, Consolacion Decimo and four others sued the Public Service Commission.
They lost in the trial court. They appealed the case however De Mondia and Decimo,
through their counsel, filed a motion where they expressed that for their part, they are no
longer interested in pursuing the case on appeal. The other counsels for the other
appellants however objected to the motion claiming that they were already authorized and
that the two still have interest remaining in the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the other counsels can validly object.
HELD: No. The right to ask for the dismissal of an action or appeal is exclusive to the
moving party and while the dismissal in some cases depends upon the sound discretion of
the courts, dismissal is generally granted. The other counsels cannot continue representing
De Mondia and Decimo since the two clients are entitled to dispense with their services at
any time.

A.C. No. 3773

September 24, 1997

ANGELITA

C.

ORCINO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSUE GASPAR, respondent.
Legal Ethics Canon 22 Termination of Counsel
Orcinos husband was murdered and she was zealous in prosecuting the suspects. She
hired Atty. Gaspar as her counsel and they agreed to a P20,000.00 attorneys fee which
Orcino paid. Atty. Gaspar did his duty religiously from interviewing witnesses to attending
hearings and the preliminary investigation. But on the day bail is to be heard, Atty. Gaspar
failed to appear. Bail was granted in favor of the suspects and this enraged Orcino. She
then went to Gaspars residence where Gaspar reasoned out that he did not receive a
notice of hearing hence his absence. Finding his reason to be insufficient, Orcino
demanded the records of the case and advised Gaspar that shell be hiring another lawyer.
Gaspar complied and thereafter he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The court did not
grant his motion because the same was without Orcinos written consent. Perhaps changing
her mind, Orcino refused to give her consent. Gaspar, however, did not attend the
subsequent hearings. Orcino then filed an administrative complaint against Gaspar for
abandoning the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gaspar violated his duties to his client.
HELD: Yes. The belligerence of Orcino towards Gaspar is understandable and is attributed
to her over zealousness to bring justice to the death of her husband. When she uttered that
shes terminating Gaspars services, she did so in a burst of passion. She did not really
mean to terminate Gaspar at all as evidenced by her refusal to give consent to Gaspars
motion.
At any rate, a lawyer cannot unilaterally terminate his legal services to his client. Unlike the
other way around where a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relationship with or without just cause. Atty. Gaspar has no reason to presume that his

motion shall be granted by the court. He should have not left Orcino in the cold and should
have continued appearing for her until there is a withdrawal of record and a successor
placed in his stead. Gaspar was admonished accordingly. He was also directed to return
half of what was paid him.

G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987


ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners,
vs.
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the
HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental (Branch III), respondents.
154 SCRA 593 Legal Ethics Speedy and Proper Administration of Justice
In 1926, a judgment favorable to Zerna was issued by a cadastral court. In 1957 or thirty
one years later, Banogon filed a motion to amend the 1926 decisions. An opposition was
filed by Zerna in the same year. Banogons counsel repeatedly failed to set for hearing and
in 1971 or fourteen years later, Zerna filed for a motion to dismiss which was granted by
reason of Banogons filing being out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not Banogons suit should prosper.
HELD: No. He slept on his rights hence laches had set in. The Supreme Court also took
time to remind lawyers to judiciously study facts and laws so as to avoid the filing of
improper cases such as this case where the filing of motions and pleadings was way out of
time. One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of
them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their
purposes. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that
only add to the workload of the judiciary. Lawyers do not advance the cause of law or their
clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of
the courts.

[58 Phil. 557] October 11, 1933


JOSE
TOPACIO
vs.
PASCUAL SANTOS, respondent.

NUENO, complainant,

58 Phil 557 Legal Ethics Doing of Falsehood in Court


Nueno was a board member of Manila. He filed a complaint against his fellow board
member Atty. Pascual Santos for the latters alleged connection in illegal gambling

particularly in the game of chance called monte; that he represented as client one Iigo
Hernandez who was charged for running this monte game; that he encouraged
Hernandez to plead guilty in the crime charged (probably to protect the real guilty ones)
even though Atty. Santos knew that Hernandez was merely a waiter in the house where the
alleged monte was being operated. The investigating judge found that the evidence
against Atty. Santos is strong hence he recommended to the Supreme Court that Santos be
disciplined.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Santos should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Santos consented to the doing of a falsehood and deceived the court
when he had an accused plead guilty to an offense which he had not committed. As a
member of the Bar, he violated his oath of office by deceiving the court and consenting a
falsehood to be committed. The Supreme Court however only suspended Atty. Santos for
three months this is because the said complaint against him by Nueno is tainted with
political motives and that the complaint was filed two years after occurrence of the
controversy involved.

A.C. No. 2152 April 19, 1991


TEODORO I. CHAVEZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ESCOLASTICO R. VIOLA, respondent.
196 SCRA 10 Legal Ethics A lawyer shall do no falsehood
In 1966, Atty. Viola assisted Felicidad Alvendia et al in filing a petition against Teodoro
Chavez where he sought to have the Alvendias be declared as bona fide lessees in a land
controversy. Said petition was dismissed because of nonappearance by the Alvendias.
In 1977, Atty. Viola assisted same clients in applying for an original registration of title over
the same land in controversy in 1966. In said application, Atty. Viola insisted that his clients
were the true owners of said land because they acquired it by sale from Teresita Vistan way
back in 1929.
Chavez then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Viola. Chavez said that because of the
conflicting claims that Viola prepared in behalf of his clients, he had willingly aided in and
consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a false and unlawful application for
land registration, in violation of his oath of office as a member of the Bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Viola is in violation of the Lawyers Oath.
HELD: Yes. Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were merely lessees of the
property involved. In his later pleading, he stated that the very same clients were owners of
the same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it matters not which one.
Worse, he offered no explanation as regards the discrepancy.
A lawyer owes honesty and candor to the courts. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness,
especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice.
Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. Atty. Viola was suspended for 5 months.

G.R. No. L-35113 March 25, 1975


EUGENIO CUARESMA, petitioner,
vs.
MARCELO DAQUIS, PHHC, CESAR NAVARRO, NICANOR GUEVARRA, Sheriff of
Quezon City or his Deputy and JUDGE PACIFICO P. DE CASTRO, respondents.
63 SCRA 257 Legal Ethics A lawyer owes candor to the court
An order to demolish the property where Cuaresma was staying was issued by a trial judge
pursuant to a civil case filed by Daquis. Cuaresmas lawyer, Atty. Macario Directo, filed a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court where he alleged that they had no
knowledge of the said civil case hence the order of demolition is unjust. The Supreme Court
however later found out that Cuaresma and his lawyer in fact knew of the existence of said
civil case. The Supreme Court then directed Directo to show cause why he should not be
disciplined.
In his explanation, Directo stated that what he meant was that he and his client belatedly
learned of the civil case; that had there been a mistake committed, it had been an honest
one, and would say in all sincerity that there was no deliberate attempt and intent on his
part of misleading this Honorable Court, honestly and totally unaware of any false allegation
in the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Directo should be subject to disciplinary actions.
HELD: No. But he was reprimanded by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court gave
Directo the benefit of the doubt although it did say that Directos reasoning could very well
be just an afterthought. The Supreme Court also stated that Directo is presumed to be in
good faith especially so that the misstatements in his petition could be attributed either to
his carelessness or his lack of English proficiency. The Supreme Court admonished Directo
to prepare pleadings carefully in the future so that the least doubt as to his intellectual
honesty cannot be entertained. Every member of the bar should realize that candor in the
dealings with the Court is of the very essence of honorable membership in the profession.

G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968


MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, RICARDO P.
HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.
24 SCRA 219 Legal Ethics Counsels Assertiveness
A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latters failure to
pay a debt of P17k. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor. The

sheriff was to conduct a public sale of a property owned by Damaso worth P300k. This was
opposed by Damaso as he claimed the amount of said property was more than the amount
of the debt. Judge Lantin, issuing judge, found merit on this hence he amended his earlier
decision and so he issued a second writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public
sale on Damasos 210 shares of stock approximately worth P17k.
Subsequently, Damaso and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to enjoin
the public sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC ruled that
the petition of the Perez spouses are without merit; that their numerous petitions for
injunction are contemplated for delay. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered
petitioners to pay the cost of the suit but said cost should be paid by their counsels. The
counsels now appeal said decision by the Supreme Court as they claimed that such
decision reflected adversely against their professionalism; that If there was delay, it was
because petitioners counsel happened to be more assertive . . . a quality of the lawyers
(which) is not to be condemned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused.
HELD: No. A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what is not tolerated is a lawyers
insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty
of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the
law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his clients cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather
than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,
and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is
superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

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