1. HERMINIO L. NOCUM, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

LAGUNA

FACTS: Appellee (Nocum), who was a passenger in appellant's

(Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.) Bus No. 120 then making a trip within
the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a
consequence of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box,
loaded in said bus. A total of 37 passengers were injured.
The bus conductor testified that the box belonged to a passenger
whose name he does not know and who told him that it contained
miscellaneous items and clothes. He also said that from its
appearance there was no indication at all that the contents were
explosives or firecrackers. Neither did he open the box because he
just relied on the word of the owner.
Dispatcher Nicolas Cornista added that they were not authorized to
open the baggages of passengers because instruction from the
management was to call the police if there were packages
containing articles which were against regulations.
The trial court's decision is that appellant(LTBC) did not observe the
extraordinary or utmost diligence of a very cautious person as
required by the articles 1733, 1755, & 1756 of the Civil Code.
Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence.
HELD: NO. We are not convinced that the exacting criterion of said
provisions has not been met by appellant in the circumstances of
this particular case.
Article 1755 provides: "A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances."
In this particular case before Us, it must be considered that while it
is true the passengers of appellant's bus should not be made to
suffer for something over which they had no control, as enunciated
in the decision of this Court cited by His Honor, fairness demands
that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers,
allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on

the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their

common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take
with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his copassengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered
must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He
cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the
innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the
contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be
verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when
such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional
boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.
Since We hold that appellant has succeeded in rebutting the
presumption of negligence by showing that it has exercised
extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers, "according
to the circumstances of the (each) case", We deem it unnecessary
to rule whether or not there was any fortuitous event in this case.
The appealed judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is
dismissed.

2. FORTUNE EXPRESS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PAULIE CAORONG and HER MINOR CHILDREN, 305
SCRA 14 (1999)
FACTS:
Pauli Caurong filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner, a bus company operating in Northern Mindanao,
for the death of her husband, Atty. Talib Caorong. Atty.
Caurong was shot by Maranaos in an ambush involving said
bus.
BACKGROUND OF THE STORY:
o In November 1989, a bus of Fortune was involved in an
accident with a passenger jeepney resulting in the
deaths of several passengers.
o Crisanto Generalao, a local field agent of the Philippine
Constabulary, conducted an investigation on the
accident and found that the owner of the jeepney was a
Maranao and that several Maranaos were planning to
burn some of Fortunes buses for revenge.
o Generalao informed Diosdado Bravo, operations
manager of Fortune, about the plot, and Bravo assured
him that they would take the necessary precautions for
safety.

Several days later, Atty. Caorong was on board a bus to

Iligan when three Maranaos went on board the vehicle.
The leader of the group ordered the passengers to leave
the bus. Atty. Caorong later went back to get something
when he saw that the Maranaos were already pouring
gasoline on the bus and on the driver. Atty. Caorong
pleaded for the life of the driver, after which the driver
jumped out of the vehicle. Caorong was shot to death as
a result.
RTC dismissed the complaint:
o Fortune was not negligent. Disregarding the suggestion
of providing its buses with security guards is not an
omission of petitioners duty. The evidence showed that
the assailants did not intend to harm the passengers.
The death of Atty. Caorong was an unexpected and
unforeseen occurrence beyond petitioners control.
CA REVERSED RTCs ruling:
o Fortune is negligent. Despite the tip to Manager Bravo
of the devious plan by several Maranaos, management
did not do not take any safety precautions at all.
o One available safeguard that could have absolved
Fortune from liability was frisking of incoming
passengers en route to dangerous areas and bag
inspection at the terminals, which Fortune failed to
do. The frisking system is not novel in sensitive and
dangerous places. Many companies adopt this measure.
Fortune did absolutely nothing.
o

ISSUE:
1. W/N Petitioner is liable for the death of Atty. Caorong by
failing to take necessary precautions to ensure the safety of
its passengers;
2. W/N the attack by the Maranaos constituted causo fortuito?
3. Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming
subject ticket extended the period of validity of petitioner's
ticket?
4. Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was
proper?
HELD: Petitioner is liable. Attack was not a fortuitous event.
Article 1763 holds common carriers liable for the injuries to
passengers caused by the wilful act of other passengers, if
its employees failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father in preventing the act.

Despite the warning by the constabulary officer, petitioner

did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.
If petitioner took the necessary precautions, they would
have discovered the weapons and the large quantity of
gasoline the malefactors carried with them.
A common carrier is liable for failing to prevent hijacking by
frisking passengers and inspecting baggages.
The seizure of the bus was not force majeure. Of the four
elements to constitute an event as caso fotuito, the
element
of
unforeseeable
or
unavoidable
circumstances was lacking. The seizure of the bus was
foreseeable, given the fact that petitioner was well-informed
of the possibility, days before the incident. This situation
was likened to a case where the common carrier failed to
take safety precautions despite warnings of an approaching
typhoon.
Petitioner is solely liable for Atty. Caorongs death. There
was no contributory negligence on the part of the victim,
since all he did was pleading for the life of the driver. His
heroic effort was neither an act of negligence or
recklessness.

3. Quisumbing Sr. vs. Court of Appeals 189 SCRA 605

FACTS: Norberto Quisumbing and Gunther Loeffler were
passengers of PALs Fokker Friendship plane flying from Macatan
City bound to Manila. A senior NBI agent, Florencio O. Villarin, a
senior NBI agent and also one of the passengers of the said plane,
saw a certain Zaldy boarded on the same flight. Zaldy was a
suspect for the killing of a Judge Valdez. Villarin sent a note to the
Captain of the plane requesting that they contact the NBI director
to send agents on their point of destination because of the
presence of Zaldy. However, Captain Luis Bonnevie came out of
the cockpit and informed Villarin the he could not send the
message because it would be heard by all ground aircraft stations.
Villarin advised the Captain of the danger having Zaldy and his
companions onboard. Consequently, gunshots ensued between
Zaldys group and Villarin.
Zaldy announced a hold-up and
obtained the belongings of the passengers.
Zaldy and his
companions successfully escaped upon landing in Manila.
Petitioners now demand from PAL indemnity for their lost
belongings. The petitioners contended that PAL is liable for breach
of contract of carriage, for not transporting them and their
belongings at the point of destination without loss or damage. As a
defense, PAL interposed that the incident was force majeure.

ISSUE: Whether PAL can be held liable for the loss of petitioners
belongings due to the hi-jacking?
HELD: The Supreme Court held that PAL cannot be held liable for
the loss of property. Where the defendants has faithfully complied
with the requirements of government agencies and adhered to the
established procedures and precautions of the airline industry and
particular time, its failure to take certain steps that a passenger in
hindsight believes should have been done is not the negligence or
misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an active and
cooperative cause. It was proven that PAL cannot be faulted with
negligence. Hence, there was no breach of contract of carriage
because there was no clear evidence that PAL acted in bad faith in
their obligation to transport the passengers and their properties at
the point of destination. The mandatory use of the most
sophisticated electronic devices may have minimized hijackings but
all these have proved ineffective against truly determined
highjackers. Such incident which occurred was indeed force
majeure.
4. La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals 17 SCRA 739
FACTS: Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor
children, boarded a La Mallorca bus. Upon arrival at their
destination, plaintiffs and their children alighted from the bus and
the father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters from the
vehicle. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage
which was not unloaded. He was followed by her daughter Raquel.
While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the
conductor to give his baggage, the bus started to run so that the
father had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run over
and killed.

contract of carrier, still persists, we rule in the affirmative. It is a

recognized rules that the relation between carrier and passengers
does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carriers premises, to be determined from the circumstances. In this
case, there was no utmost diligence. Firstly, the driver, although
stopping the bus, did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to
run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal and
while the latter was unloading cargo. Here, the presence of said
passenger near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of
responsibility still exists. Averment of quasi-delict is permissible
under the Rules of Court, although incompatible with the contract
of carriage. The Rules of Court allows the plaintiffs to allege causes
of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or
not (Sec. 2, Rule 1). Even assuming arguendo that the contract of
carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held
liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Art. 2180 of NCC.
Decision MODIFIED. Only question raised in the briefs can be
passed upon, and as plaintiffs did not appeals the award of
P3,000.00 the increase by the CA of the award to P6,000.00 cannot
be sustained.
5. Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals GR. No. 118864

Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed
by CA, holding La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to
pay P6,000 plus P400. La Mallorco contended that when the child
was killed, she was no longer a passenger and therefore the
contract of carriage terminated.

FACTS: Private respondents were passengers of Japan Airlines from

California bound for Manila. The flights were to make an overnight
stopover at Nairita, Japan as an incentive for traveling. However,
due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo which rendered the NAIA
inaccessible, respondents flight from Japan to Manila was
indefinitely. JAL assumed the hotel expenses for their unexpected
overnight stay on June 15, 1991. However, JAL no longer settled
their hotel and accommodation expenses during stay at Nauta,
Japan. Since NAIA was only reopened for airlines traffic on June 22,
1991, private respondent were forced to pay for their
accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds
from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Hence, they commenced an action
for damages against JAL for failing to provide care and comfort to
its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and
accommodation expenses from June 16 to June 21, 1991.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contractual obligation between the

parties ceases the moment the passenger alighted form the
vehicle.

ISSUE: Whether or not JAL was liable for the hotel and meal
expenses defrayed by private respondents while pending
destination.

HELD: On the question whether the liability of the carrier, as to the

child who was already led a place 5 meters from the bus under the

HELD: The Supreme Court held that JAL cannot be held liable. In
the case at bar, there was absence of bad faith and negligence on

the part of Japan Airlines. Such occurrence of the eruption of Mt.

Pinatubo amounts to a force majeure. When a party is unable to
fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule is
that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance.
Common carriers are not insurer of all risks. Airline passengers
must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. However, JAL is
not completely absolved from liability. It has the obligation to make
the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on its
first available flight to Manila.
6. Baliwag Transit vs. CA (GR 116110, 15 May 1996)
FACTS: On 31 July 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her 5-year old son,
Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus 2036 bound for
Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat
behind the driver.
At about 7:30 p.m., in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus
passengers saw a cargo truck, owned by A & J Trading, parked at
the shoulder of the national highway. Its left rear portion jutted to
the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was too narrow to
accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the
edge of the road obviously to serve as a warning device. The truck
driver, and his helper were then replacing a flat tire.
Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and
failed to notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the
road. Santiagos passengers urged him to slow down but he paid
them no heed. Santiago even carried animated conversations with
his co-employees while driving. When the danger of collision
became imminent, the bus passengers shouted Babangga tayo!.
Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed
into the stalled cargo truck killing him instantly and the trucks
helper, and injury to several others among them herein
respondents.
Thus, a suit was filed against Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and
Julio Recontique for damages in the RTC of Bulacan. After trial, it
found Baliwag Transit, Inc. liable for having failed to deliver Garcia
and her son to their point of destination safely in violation of
Garcias and Baliwag Transits contractual relation; and likewise
found A & J and its truck driver liable for failure to provide its cargo
truck with an early warning device in violation of the Motor Vehicle
Law. All were ordered to pay solidarily the Garcia spouses.

On appeal, the CA modified the trial courts Decision by absolving A

& J Trading from liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not Baliwag should be held solely liable for the
injuries.
HELD: Yes. As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of
carriage when it failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan
Garcia to their destination safe and sound. A common carrier is
bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with due regard for all the circumstances. In a contract of
carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or
was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the
presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier.
This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that
the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
Article 1759 of the Civil Code provides that Common carriers are
liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willfull acts of the formers employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or
in violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of the
common carriers do not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or
supervision of their employees.
Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code provides
Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate
parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be
displayed at the corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is
parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or, is
placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore,
every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in
reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or
attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at
night at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided
with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be
registered.
x x x However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Ecala
placed a kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the
rear portion of the truck to serve as an early warning device. This

substantially complies with Section 34 (g) of the Land

Transportation and Traffic Code. The law clearly allows the use not
only of an early warning device of the triangular reflectorized plates
variety but also parking lights or flares visible 100 meters away.
Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself admitted that a kerosene lamp is an
acceptable substitute for the reflectorized plates. No negligence,
therefore, may be imputed to A & J Trading and its driver,
Recontique.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA-GR CV-31246) with the modification reducing the actual
damages for hospitalization and medical fees to P5,017.74; without
costs.
7. Cervantes v. CA
FACTS: On March 27, 1989, private respondent PAL issued to
herein petitioner Nicholas Cervantes a round trip ticket for ManilaHonolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila, which is valid until March
27, 1990. On March 23, 1990, petitioner used it. Upon his arrival in
Los Angeles, he immediately booked a flight to Manila, which was
confirmed on April 2. Upon learning that the plane would make a
stop-over in San Francisco, and because he would be there on April
2, petitioner made arrangements to board in San Francisco. On
April 2, he was not allowed to board due to the expiration of his
ticket. He filed a complaint for damages. It was not given due
course by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming
subject ticket extended the period of validity of petitioner's
ticket?
2. Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was
proper?
HELD: (1) From the facts, it can be gleaned that the petitioner was
fully aware that there was a need to send a letter to the legal
counsel of PAL for the extension of the period of validity of his
ticket. Under Article 1898 11 of the New Civil Code, the acts of an
agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal,
unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly.
Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that
the agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal
cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third
person is aware of such limits of authority, he is to blame, and is

not entitled to recover damages from the agent, unless the latter
undertook to secure the principal's ratification.
(2) An award of damages is improper because petitioner failed to
show that PAL acted in bad faith in refusing to allow him to board
its plane in San Francisco. In awarding moral damages for breach of
contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and deliberately
injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or
bad faith. Petitioner knew there was a strong possibility that he
could not use the subject ticket, so much so that he bought a backup ticket to ensure his departure. Should there be a finding of bad
faith, we are of the opinion that it should be on the petitioner. What
the employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence. No injury
resulted on the part of petitioner because he had a back-up ticket
should PAL refuse to accommodate him with the use of subject
ticket.
Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind
of damages is imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, and the existence of bad faith is established. The
wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of
damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. Here, there is
no showing that PAL acted in such a manner. An award for
attorney's fees is also improper.
8. Zulueta vs. Pan Am
FACTS: Mr. Zulueta and his wife and child boarded a flight of Pan
Am from Wake Island to the Phil. Mr. Zulueta, however, had to
relieve himself and thus looked for a secluded place in the beach.
As a result, he was delayed in boarding for some 20 or 30 minutes.
While Mr. Zulueta was reaching the ramp, the captain of the plane
demonstrated an intemperate and arrogant tone thereby impelling
Mr. Zulueta to answer back. Thus, Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded. The
airport manager of then sent Mr. Zulueta a letter stating that his
stay in Wake Island would be for a minimum of one week during
which he would be charged $13.30 per day.
ISSUE: WON Pan Am should be held liable.
HELD: Yes. Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded to retaliate and punish him
for the embarrassment and loss of face thus suffered by
defendants agent.

The Zuluetas had a contract of carriage with the defendant, as a

common carrier, pursuant to which the latter was bound, for a
substantial monetary consideration paid by the former, not merely
to transport them to Manila, but, also, to do so with extraordinary
diligence or utmost diligence. The responsibility of the common
carrier, under said contract, as regards the passengers safety, is of
such a nature, affecting as it does public interest, that it cannot be
dispensed with or even lessenedby stipulation, by the posting of
notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise.
In the present case, the defendant did not only fail to comply with
its obligation to transport Mr. Zulueta to Manila, but, also, acted in
a manner calculated to humiliate him, to chastise him, to make him
suffer, to cause to him the greatest possible inconvenience.
With regard to DAMAGES
It is obvious, however, that in off-loading plaintiff at Wake Island,
under the circumstances, defendants agents had acted with malice
aforethought and evident bad faith. If gross negligence warrants
the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its
imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious
and tainted with bad faith.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the
name implies, to provide an example or correction for public good.
Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court, as
stated earlier, may award exemplary damages in addition to moral
damages.
9. Alitalia v. Court of Appeals 187 SCRA 763
FACTS:
On September 3, 1981, the private respondents Spouses
Jose and Victoria Juliano (hereinafter referred to as the
Julianos), arrived at the Fumicino Airport in Rome, Italy in
order to board Flight AZ 1774 of Alitalia Airways scheduled
to depart at 10:30 a.m. for Hongkong.
However, Flight AZ 1774 left Rome without the Julianos.
When private respondent Jose O. Juliano arrived in Manila,
he returned to his employer Bristol-Myers, Inc., of which he
was Vice-President for Operations, the unused RomeHongkong leg of the Alitalia ticket. However, the cost of the
Thai Airways tickets they had to purchase in lieu of Alitalia
was not refunded by his office.

On December 15, 1981, the Julianos filed a complaint with

the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against the petitioner
for damages from the alleged breach of its contractual
obligations when the petitioner failed to transport the
private respondent to Hongkong on the Alitalia Flight AZ
1774 2 .

RULING:
When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on
a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage
arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he
would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then
the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of
carriage.
When a passenger contracts for a specific flight, he has a
purpose in making that choice which must be respected.
This choice, once exercised, must not be impaired by a
breach on the part of the airline without the latter incurring
any liability. Besides, why should the Julianos be compelled
to wait for another Alitalia flight to risk a similar rebuff and
suffer the consequent further delay?
It was already too much of a coincidence that, at Fumicino
Airport, the Julianos would find another Filipino, in the
person of Ms. Estanislao, in the same predicament that they
were in.
That Alitalia had no intention to accommodate all who had
confirmed their flight reservations could be seen in the
absence of any measure to contract and possible
passengers for each flight who might be within the airport
premises. As a result, some passengers would really be left
behind in the long and disorderly queue at the check-in
counter.
Common carriers, like commercial airlines, are in the
business of rendering service, which is the primary reason
for their recognition in our law. They can not be allowed to
disregard our laws as if they are doing the passengers any
favor by accommodating them.
Because the passengers in a contract of carriage do not
contract merely for transportation, they have a right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy, and consideration.
Hence the justification why
passengers must be spared from the indignity and
inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last
minute.
As held in Trans World Airlines v. Court of Appeals, such
inattention to and lack of care [by the petitioner airline] for

the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost

consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount
to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of
moral damages. Ergo, we affirm the respondent court's
award of moral damages at P200.000.00. This award should
be sufficient to indemnify the Julianos for the delay,
inconvenience, humiliation, and embarrassment they
suffered.
10.Korean Airlines v. Court of Appeals 234 SCRA 717
FACTS:
Sometime in 1980, Juanito C. Lapuz, an automotive
electrician, was contracted for employment is Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, for a period of one year through Pan Pacific Overseas
Recruiting Services, Inc. Lapuz was supposed to leave on
November 8, 1980, via Korean Airlines. Initially, he was
"waitlisted," which meant that he could only be
accommodated if any of the confirmed passengers failed to
show up at the airport before departure. When two of such
passengers did not appear, Lapuz and another person by
the name of Perico were given the two unclaimed seats.
According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in with one
suitcase and one shoulder bag at the check-in counter of
KAL. He passed through the customs and immigration
sections for routine check-up and was cleared for departure
as Passenger No. 157 of KAL Flight No. KE 903. Together
with the other passengers, he rode in the shuttle bus and
proceeded to the ramp of the KAL aircraft for boarding.
However, when he was at the third or fourth rung of the
stairs, a KAL officer pointed to him and shouted "Down!
Down!" He was thus barred from taking the flight. When he
later asked for another booking, his ticket was canceled by
KAL. Consequently, he was unable to report for his work in
Saudi Arabia within the stipulated 2-week period and so lost
his employment.
KAL, on the other hand, alleged that on November 8, 1980,
Pan Pacific Recruiting Services Inc. coordinated with KAL for
the departure of 30 contract workers, of whom only 21 were
confirmed and 9 were wait-listed passengers. The agent of
Pan Pacific, Jimmie Joseph, after being informed that there
was a possibility of having one or two seats becoming
available, gave priority to Perico, who was one of the
supervisors of the hiring company in Saudi Arabia. The other
seat was won through lottery by Lapuz. However, only one
seat became available and so, pursuant to the earlier

agreement that Perico was to be given priority, he alone

was allowed to board.
RULING:
The Court held that the status of Lapuz as standby
passenger was changed to that of a confirmed passenger
when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of
KAL for its Flight No. KE 903. His clearance through
immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed
been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL
thus committed a breach of the contract of carriage
between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his
destination.
A contract to transport passengers is different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation. The business of
the carrier is mainly with the traveling public. It invites
people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages
it offers. The contract of air carriage generates a relation
attended with a public duty. Passengers have the right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that
any discourteous conduct on the part of these employees
toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.
The breach of contract was aggravated in this case when,
instead of courteously informing Lapuz of his being a "waitlisted" passenger, a KAL officer rudely shouted "Down!
Down!" while pointing at him, thus causing him
embarrassment and public humiliation.
The evidence presented by Lapuz shows that he had indeed
checked in at the departure counter, passed through
customs and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus and
proceeded to the ramp of KAL's aircraft. In fact, his baggage
had already been loaded in KAL's aircraft, to be flown with
him to Jeddah. The contract to carriage between him and
KAL had already been perfected when he was summarily
and insolently prevented from boarding the aircraft.
The defendant-appellant Korean Air Lines acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner when
it "bumped off" plaintiff-appellant on November 8, 1980, and
in addition treated him rudely and arrogantly as a "patay
gutom na contract worker fighting Korean Air Lines," which
clearly malice and bad faith, thus entitling plaintiff-appellant
to moral damages.

A review of the record of this case shows that the injury

suffered by Lapuz is not so serious or extensive as to
warrant an award of P1.5 million. The assessment of
P100,000 as moral and exemplary damages in his favor is
reasonable and realistic.
11.M. RUIZ HIGHWAY TRANSIT, INC. and MARTIN
BUENA, Petitioners,
v.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
GUILLERMO
MONSERRAT,
and
MARTA
CONSIGNADO, Respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO
PROVIDE SAFE FLOOR IN PASSENGER BUS. A common carrier
neglects its duty to transport its passengers safely where one of its
passengers died because the floor of its bus gave way after a tire
blow-out caused by overcrowding, overspeeding and weak flooring.
2. ID.; ID.; CARRIERS LIABILITY NOT DISCHARGED BY ERRONEOUS
AFFIDAVITS OF PARENTS OF VICTIM. Signed statements of the
claimants expressing their belief that the transportation company is
not liable to them are not proof that the latter have discharged
their legal liability to claimants, where such belief is erroneous and
said claimants are ignorant.
3. ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED.
In a contract of carriage breached by the passengers death, moral
damages and attorneys fees may be awarded.
DECISION
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
In the Laguna court of first instance, the spouses Guillermo
Monserrat and Marta Consignado sued M. Ruiz Highway Transit,
Inc., and Martin Buena to recover damages for the death of their
four-year old daughter Victoria.
In the morning of May 22, 1954, said child and her parents were
paying passengers in a bus of defendant transportation company
driven by co-defendant Buena, bound for Antipolo, Rizal. In Sta.
Rosa, Laguna, while the bus was running, a rear tire exploded,
blasting a hole in the very place where Victoria was standing in
front of her mother. As a result, the child fell through the hole, and
died that same morning from injuries sustained in the fall.

The court of first instance dismissed the complaint on the ground

that (1) the accident was not due to negligence of the carrier, but
was an act of God; and (2) even if negligence was attributable to
defendants, their liability had been discharged, as evidenced by
Exhibits 2 and 3 quoted in the footnote. 1
On appeal by plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment, upon the finding that (1) defendants failed to prove the
extraordinary diligence required of carriers; and (2) exhibits 2 and 3
did not effect a waiver of plaintiffs right to damages. Said
appellate court, therefore required defendants to pay plaintiffs
P6,000 as indemnity for the childs death, P2,000.00 as moral
damages and P500.00 as attorneys fees, with interest from the
date of its decision, minus the P150.00 that had been given to
plaintiff Guillermo Monserrat, thru Exhibit 3).
In their petition for review by certiorari, the carrier and the driver
raise the following issues: (1) whether in a contract of carriage
breached by the passengers death, his parents may be granted
moral damages; and (2) whether the sum of P6,000.00 may be
awarded as death indemnity for a child passenger. In their brief,
they pose the following questions in addition to the above issues:
(3) was there a contract of carriage between the deceased child
and petitioner transportation company; (4) have petitioners
rebutted the presumption that they have been negligent; (5) was
the bus crowded; (6) was the bus running fast when the tire
exploded; (7) what caused the bursting of the tire; (8) was the bus
floor weak; (9) was the blow-out of the tire caso fortuito; and (10)
was petitioners liability cancelled by Exhibits 2 and 3?
The alleged lack of contract of carriage between the deceased child
and petitioner transportation company, if true, is a complete
defense against claimants cause of action. However, the issue is
now inarguable, it being partly factual, on which the appellate court
made its finding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondents and the child were paying passengers in the bus;
petitioners were duty bound to transport them, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons (Art. 1755, New Civil Code).
Therein they failed. The child died because the floor of the bus
gave way; this reinforces the presumption that petitioners had
neglected to provide a safe conveyance (Art. 1756, New Civil
Code). Evidence of the required extraordinary diligence was not
introduced to rebut the presumption.

On the contrary, the appellate court found that the bus was
overcrowded and overspeeding, and the floor thereof was weak
persuasive indications of negligence; and reasoned out that the tire
exploded due to one or a combination of the following: "The tire
was not strong and safe; the air pressure was not properly checked;
the load was heavy; the excessive speed of the bus must have
overstrained the tire; and the high velocity generated heat in the
tire which could have expanded the already compressed air
therein." 2
Petitioners venture to guess that it was due either to accidental
puncture by a sharp instrument, as a nail, or to latent defect in the
tire. Evidence should have been but was not presented to
establish such defense.
Even conceding that the tire blow-out was accidental, we could still
hold the carrier liable for failure to provide a safe floor in the bus.
Exhibits 2 and 3 are not proof that petitioners have discharged
their legal liability to claimants. What is expressed there is the
latters belief clearly erroneous that petitioners are not liable
to them, and acknowledgment of the voluntary help extended by
petitioner transportation company. The belief is baseless. That
respondents entertained such an ill-founded impression is not to be
wondered at. They are ignorant, illiterate, indigent, and, at the time
they signed Exhibit 2 and 3, thoroughly confused and distracted by
the death of their child.
The minimum death indemnity is P3,000 3 , although this Court has
in various instances granted P6,000.00. As for moral damages, the
carrier is liable therefor to the parents of a child who meets death
while a passenger in any of the carriers vehicles (Art. 2206 and
1764, New Civil Code). Since respondents are indigents, and have
litigated as paupers, they should be allowed attorneys fees of
P500.00.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.
12. ANTONIA MARANAN v. PASCUAL PEREZ
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; COMMON CARRIERS; CASE AT BAR. R.C. was a
passenger in a taxicab owned by P. P. when he was stabbed to
death by the driver, S.V. In the subsequent action for damages, P. P.
cited Gillaco v. MRR, 97 Phil., 884, which ruled that the carrier is
under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the

passengers. Held, the Gillaco case does not apply. There, the
passenger was killed outside the scope and course of duty of the
guilty employee while here, the killing took place in the course of
duty of the guilty employee and when he was acting within the
scope of his duties.
2. ID.; ID.; OLD AND NEW CIVIL CODES COMPARED. Unlike the
old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines in its Article
1759 expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional
assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers.
3. ID.; ID.; BASIS OF CARRIERS LIABILITY FOR ASSAULTS ON
PASSENGERS COMMITTED BY ITS DRIVERS. The Civil Code
provisions on the subject of Common Carriers (Sec. 4, Chap. 3, Title
VIII, Rep. Act No. 386) are new and were taken from AngloAmerican Law (Report of the Code Commission, 64). There, the
basis of the carriers liability for assaults on passengers committed
by its drivers rest either on (1) the doctrine of respondent superior,
or (2) the principle that it is the carriers implied duty to transport
the passenger safely (53 ALR 2d 721-728; 732-734). Under the
first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the
act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It
is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment
only. Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by
the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the
course of the employees duty. It is no defense for the carrier that
the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the
carriers orders (10 Am. Jur. 105-107; 263-265). The carriers
liability her is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the
passengers from assaults committed by its own employees (Dixie
Motor Coach Corp. v. Toler, 1997 Ark. 1097, 126 S.W., 2d, 618; Van
Hoeffen v. Columbia Taxicab Co., 179 Mo. App. 591, 162 S.W. 694;
Brockway v. Mordenti, 199 Misc. 898, 103 N.Y.S. 621; Korner v.
Cosgrove, 141 N.E. 265, 31 A.L.R. 1193).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW CIVIL CODE FOLLOWS SECOND VIEW. As can
be gleaned from the Article 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines
evidently follows the rule based on the second view: (1) the special
undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passengers
that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high
degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and
insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above
all, from the acts of the carriers own servants charged with the
passengers safety; (2) said liability of the carrier from the
servants violations of duty to passengers, is the result of the
formers confiding in the servants hands the performance of his

contract to safely transport the passenger, with the utmost care

prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the
passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or
negligence of the carriers employees against passengers, since it,
and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them.
(Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe 110 Tex 97, 216 S.W. 388, 380, 390;
and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 L.R.A. 84, 85.)
5. ID.; ID.; CARRIERS DUTY IN SELECTING ITS DRIVERS AND
SIMILAR EMPLOYEES. It is the carriers strict obligation to select
its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to their
technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less
important, to their total personality, including their patterns of
behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
6. ID.; ID.; ACTUAL AND MORAL DAMAGES FOR PASSENGERS
DEATH. P3,000 is the minimum compensatory damages
recoverable when a breach of contract of carriage results in the
passengers death (Arts 1764 & 2206, Civil Code) but consistent
with the policy of this Court, the minimal award should be raised to
P6,000. In addition, the parents of the decedent are entitled to
moral damages to compensate for the mental anguish they
suffered. A claim therefore having been properly made, it becomes
the courts duty to award moral damages (Mercado v. Lira, L13328-29 & L-13358, Sept. 29, 1961). Interest upon such damages
are also due to plaintiff-appellant (Art. 2210, Civil Code).

claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was
not liable.
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her
P3,000 as damages against defendant Perez. The claim against
defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff
and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking for
more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction earlier mentioned, during the pendency of the herein
appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final judgment was entered therein.
(Rollo, p. 33).
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco
v. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no
absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers.
The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at
bar are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger
was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty
employee. As this Court there found:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First

Instance of Batangas. Found guilty, he was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken to the Court
of Appeals.

". . . when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had 10 duties to
discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased
from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear that when
Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa, was assigned to guard the
Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station
awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train
he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at
9:00 a.m., two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa
was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passengers of
the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the
killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa
at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger
also awaiting transportation, and not that of an employee assigned
to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its
contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesas assault can not
be deemed in law a breach of Gillacos contract of transportation
by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)

On December 6, 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of

Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelios mother, filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez
and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that
the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the
driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further

Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab
transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had
entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other
words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here
took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when
the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.

DECISION
Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a
taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez when he was
stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.

Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the
Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not
impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of
passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by
their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case
was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from
liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous
events has been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their
exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides for
liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. And herein
significantly lies the statutory difference between the old and
present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the factual situation before
Us, which further accounts for a different result in the Gillaco case.
Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines
expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults
committed by its employees upon its passengers, by the wording of
Art. 1759 which categorically states that.

evidently follows the rule based on the second view. At least three
very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As explained in Texas
Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and
Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85; (1) the special
undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that
full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high
degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and
insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above
all, from the acts of the carriers own servants charged with the
passengers safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servants
violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers
confiding in the servants hands the performance of his contract to
safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of
protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law;
and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must
bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carriers
employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers,
has power to select and remove them.

"Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to

passengers although the negligence or wilful acts of the formers
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers."cralaw virtua1aw library

Accordingly, it is the carriers strict obligation to select its drivers

and similar employees with due regard not only to their technical
competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to
their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral
fibers, and social attitude.

The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers 1 are

new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. 2 There, the basis
of the carriers liability for assaults on passengers committed by its
drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondent superior or (2)
the principle that it is the carriers implied duty to transport the
passenger safely. 3

Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the
lower court rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant
to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against
the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiffs action was
predicated on breach of contract of carriage 7 and the cab driver
was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal
case wherein he was convicted by final judgment.

Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only
when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority
and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of
employment only. 4
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the
later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the course
of the employees duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act
was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carriers
orders. 5 The carriers liability here is absolute in the sense that it
practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its
own employees. 6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines

In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted

only P3,000 to plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum
compensatory damages amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in
connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of
contract results in the passengers death. As has been the policy
followed by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to
P6,000. As to other alleged actual damages, the lower courts
finding that plaintiffs evidence thereon was not convincing 8
should not be disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and 1764 award moral
damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of
the passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish they
suffered. A claim therefor having been properly made, it becomes
the courts duty to award moral damages. 9 Plaintiff demands

P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We

consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages
afore-stated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also
due to plaintiff-appellant. 10
Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual
damages in plaintiffs favor to P6,000, plus P3,000 moral damages,
with legal interest on both from the filing of the complaint on
December 6, 1961 until the whole amount is paid, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. No costs. So
ordered.

13. BACHELOR

EXPRESS,
INCORPORATED,
and
CRESENCIO RIVERA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION), RICARDO
BETER, SERGIA BETER, TEOFILO RAUTRAUT and
ZOETERA RAUTRAUT, respondents.

SUMMARY: Ornominio and Narcisa were on board a Bachelor bus

bound for Cagayan de Oro. When they were passing Butuan, a
passenger ran amuck and stabbed a policeman who was on board.
A stampede ensued; Ornominio and Narcisa were pushed off the
bus as the passengers scampered for the solitary door. As the bus
was still running, the unlucky couple (kasi dalawa sila eh) fell into
the road and died, as the door was forced open by the panicking
passengers. Their parents sued Bachelor, its owner and the bus
driver. RTC absolved them from liability on the ground of caso
fortuito and lack of negligence. CA reversed, holding that RTC
overlooked material facts showing negligence of Bachelor
(inappropriate speed, drivers failure to stop bus promptly, not
enough doors, conductor panicked). SC upheld CA and held
Bachelor et.al. liable.

For the defense of force majeure to prosper the accident must be

due to natural causes and exclusively without human intervention.
Application of the formula for computing damages loss of earning
capacity.
NATURE: Petition for review of a CA decision. Original action for
sum of money [with quotation marks; apparently it was a suit for
damages].
FACTS
August 1, 1980 BACHELOR Express Bus No. 800 was
travelling from Davao City to Cagayan de Oro via Butuan.
Owner/Operator: Samson YASAY. Driver: Cresencio RIVERA.
Conductor: Pedro COLLANGO. Bus had only one door at the
front.

While the bus was in Tabon-tabon, Butuan, the bus stopped

to pick up a passenger.About 15 minutes later, a commotion
arose when a passenger at the rear end of the bus (not
identified by name) ran amuck and stabbed a fellow
passenger who was a member of the Philippine
Constabulary.

A stampede ensued and the bus had to be stopped. In the

aftermath of the incident, passengers ORNOMINIO Beter and
NARCISA Rautraut were found lying on the roadside.
o

Ornominio died on the spot from head injuries. He

was 32 y/o and a carpenter by trade. Narcisa
eventually died due to severe injuries she sustained
from the accident. She was 23 y/o and unemployed.
The passenger who ran amuck was able to jump off
the bus but was killed by the police after he was
pursued into the bushes.

DOCTRINE: Common carriers are presumed negligent in case of

injury or death of a passenger, even when the proximate cause of
the death is a fortuitous event. In such cases, the common carrier
must show that it exercised extraordinary diligence in preventing
harm to its passengers; for it to be absolved from liability. (NCC
1173, 1732, 1733, 1735 & 1736)

Ornominios parents (the SPS. BETER) and Narcisas parents

(the SPS. RAUTRAUT [RA-UT-RA-UT]) filed a complaint for
sum of money against Bachelor, Yasay, and Rivera before
Branch I of the Butuan RTC.

Common carrier must prove that it exercised care and diligence in

protecting its customers in the case of a fortuitous event (e.g., an
unexpected stabbing incident).

TESTIMONIES
o

LEONILA CULLANO (a passenger, testifying for the

defense)

When the commotion occurred, she stood up, and

noticed a wounded man.

SERGIA BETER (also a passenger; Ornominios

mother)

The incident was not a traffic accident or vehicular

accident but a fortuitous event very much beyond
the control of Bachelor, Yasay or Rivera

Bachelor et.al. were not parties to the incident

complained of as it was an act of a third party who is
not in any way connected with them and of which
they have no control and supervision.

RTC DECISION
o

Categorically stated that she saw Ornominio

fall of the bus as the door was pushed open
by the force of onrushing passengers.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The parties presented conflicting evidence as

to how Narcisa and Ornominio died.

From the evidence adduced by Sps. Beter and

Sps. Rautraut, the Court could not see why
the two deceased could have fallen off the
bus when their own witnesses testified that
when the commotion ensued inside the bus,
the passengers pushed and shoved each
other towards the door apparently in order to
get off from the bus through the door.

The passengers could not have passed

through the door because according to
the evidence the door was locked.

Court gave credence to the evidence adduced

by Bachelor et.al. that when the commotion
ensued inside the bus, the two deceased
panicked and, in a state of shock and fear,
they jumped off from the bus through the
window.

Rivera and Collango were not negligent in

their duties. They had every right to accept
passengers absent any manifestation of
violence or drunkenness.

PEDRO COLLANGO (the conductor; an employee of

Bachelor)

Collango opened the door only when the

passengers were shouting at the driver to
stop the bus. Collango was panicking. The
passengers were in a state of panic as well.
She saw Narcisa and Ornominio alight the bus
through the door.

He shut the door after the last passenger had

entered the bus. Some passengers jumped
out of the windows while the bus was running
[Bachelor claims that Ornominio and Narcisa
were among them]. Asked to provide an
estimate of the bus speed at the time the
commotion occurred, he stated that they
were running at not less than 30 or 40 miles
[per hour], equivalent to 48-65 kilometers per
hour. The bus was running slowly as they
have just picked up a passenger. The bus was
running at second gear when the commotion
broke out.

BACHELORS DEFENSES
o

It was able to transport the passengers safely to

their respective places of destination except
Ornominio and Narcisa, who jumped off the bus
without the knowledge and consent of Rivera and
Collango

It had exercised due diligence in the choice of its

employees

HOLDING

Complaint was dismissed.

Transportation companies are not insurers of

their passengers.

If and when such passengers harm other

passengers without the knowledge of the
transportation company's personnel, the
latter should not be faulted.

CA DECISION
o

FACTUAL FINDINGS

There was no evidence to support the

conclusion that the door was locked.

Collangos testimony must not be given

weight because, apart from being
inconsistent, it is biased. He is an employee of
Bachelor; he was also involved in the incident
and would be inclined to testify in his
employers favor.

The lone disinterested eyewitness, Cullano,

testified that the door was opened.

Court gave credence to the testimonies of

Sergia and Cullano.

The bus was not running slowly. 48-65 km/h

cannot be considered slow.

CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWING NEGLIGENCE

Rivera stopping the bus only after
mass agitation by the passengers
Reckless opening of the doors of the
bus while traveling at an appreciably
fast speed
Violation of the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code in operating a public
utility bus with only one door
HOLDING

For Ornominios death - P75,000.00 in

loss of earnings and support, moral
damages, straight death indemnity
and attorney's fees

Costs of suit

Bachelor et.al. appealed to the SC

SUB-ISSUES (HELD)
1) W/N the proximate cause of the incident was beyond the control
of Bachelor et.al. (YES)
2) W/N Bachelor exercised extraordinary diligence to safeguard its
passengers lives (NO)
RATIO
1) RUNNING AMUCK WAS PROXIMATE CAUSE; EVENT WAS
FORTUITOUS; COMMON CARRIERS NOT IMMEDIATELY ABSOLVED
Bachelor is correct in claiming that the proximate cause of
the incident was the stabbing of the constable.
o

The sudden and unexpected stabbing incident drove

the passengers and the bus crew to panic.

A stampede ensued when the passengers all rushed

to the solitary exit, causing the death of Narcisa and
Ornominio (more on this below)

NCC 1173: Except in cases expressly specified by law, or

when it is otherwise declared by stipulations, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were
inevitable. This provision was taken from Art. 1105 of the
Spanish Civil Code, which uses the term caso fortuito.

Lasam v. Smith [Torts]: some extraordinary circumstance

independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is
an essential element of a caso fortuito.

Bachelor et.al. held liable:

For Narcisas death - P45,000.00 for

straight death indemnity, moral
damages and attorney's fees.

ISSUE (HELD)
W/N Bachelor et.al. is liable for the deaths of Ornominio and
Narcisa (YES)

COMMON CARRIER MUST STILL PROVE THAT IT WAS NOT

NEGLIGENT IN CAUSING THE INJURIES RESULTING FROM
FORTUITOUS EVENTS
o

NCC 1756: Common carriers are presumed negligent

if a passenger dies or is injured.

Tan Chiong Sian v. Inchausti & Co.: Common carrier

must prove that it exercised care and diligence in
protecting its customers in the case of a fortuitous
event

BLTB Co. v. IAC: For the defense of force majeure to

prosper the accident must be due to natural causes
and exclusively without human intervention.

Now the Court had to find out if Bachelor could not really be
faulted in any way for the death of Ornominio and Narcisa,
which was brought about by the stabbing incident.

The bus was speeding from a full stop

The victims fell from the bus door when it was

opened or gave way while the bus was still running

Collango panicked and blew his whistle after people

had already fallen off the bus

The bus was not properly equipped with enough

doors in accordance with law

It is therefore clear that Bachelor et.al. have failed to

overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in
the law governing common carriers.

BASIS FOR LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS

o

Culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage

NCC 1732: Common carriers are persons,

corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.

NCC 1733: Common carriers, from the nature of their

business and for reasons of public policy, are bound
to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each
case.

NCC 1755: A common carrier is bound to carry the

passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.

NCC 1756: In case of death of or injuries to

passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733
and 1755.

2) BACHELOR DID NOT EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE

Bachelors arguments:
o

Rivera was driving cautiously giving due regard to

traffic rules, laws and regulations throughout the
course of the trip, even during the incident.
As ruled by the trial court, common carriers are not
insurers of their passengers.

SC: Untenable. There is enough evidence to prove

Bachelors failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It
therefore failed to prove that the deaths of Ornominio and
Narcisa were attributable solely to the fortuitous event.

SC noted that the RTCs and CAs factual findings were

conflicting. [hence the SC reviewed the record]

SC upheld the CAS findings of fact [see above], which point

to the failure of Bachelor to exercise extraordinary diligence.
The RTC disregarded these material facts.

CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWING NEGLIGENCE

o

Rivera did not immediately stop the bus at the height

of the commotion

3) On Bachelors allegation that the Sps. Beter and the Sps.

Rautraut were not the parents of Ornominio and Narcisa,
respectively: Nagpapalusot na lang ang Bachelor. The spouses
were identified as the parents of the deceased during the trial and
were recognized by the RTC as such. The complaint was dismissed
solely on the ground that Bachelor et.al. were not negligent. It is a
belated attempt to evade liability.
4) Award of Damages
FACTORS TO CONSIDER (Alcantara v. Surro):

1) life expectancy (considering the state of health of

the deceased and the mortality tables are deemed
conclusive) and loss of earning capacity
2) pecuniary loss, loss of support and service
3) moral and mental suffering
Villa Rey Rule, as reiterated in People v. Daniel: BASES FOR
COMPUTING LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY:
1) number of years on the basis of which the
damages shall be computed; and 2) rate at which the
losses sustained by the heirs should be fixed.
Using Davila v. PAL formula: at the age of 30 one's normal
life expectancy is 33-1/3 years based on the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality (2/3 x 80-32).
By taking into account the pace and nature of the life of a
carpenter, it is reasonable to make allowances for these
circumstances and reduce the life expectancy of Ornominio
to 25 years.
To fix the rate of losses it must be noted that Art. 2206
refers to gross earnings less necessary living expenses of
the deceased, in other words, only net earnings are to be
considered.
COMPUTATION FOR ORNOMINIO
o

Considering his social standing and position

Deductible, living and incidental expenses=P400 a

month, P4,800 annually, and P120,000 for 25 years.

Daily Income: Considering that Ornominios work is

seasonal (arawan), SC assumed that he works 20
days a month at P25 a day or P500 a month.

Annual Income=P6,000 or P150,000 for 25 years.

Compensation for Loss of support and

service=P30,000 (150,000 minus 120,000)

Straight death indemnity under NCC 2206=P30,000

Moral Damages=P10,000.00 as an exception to the

general rule against moral damages in case of
breach of contract rule Art. 2200 (Necesito v. Paras).

Attorney's fees=P5,000.

TOTAL INDEMNITY for Ricardo and Sergia Beter as

parents and heirs of Ornominio=P75,000.

COMPUTATION FOR NARCISA

o

Straight death indemnity=P30,000.00

Moral damages=P10,000.00

Attorney's fees =P5,000.00

TOTAL INDEMNITY= P45,000.00

No indemnity for loss of earning capacity as there

was no evidence that she had visible means of
support.

DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed, CA decision affirmed.