Mindanao State University

College of Law Extension

CASES ON
EVIDENCE

Submitted to:
Judge Orlando Gallardo

Submitted by:
Michael Caete
Zyra Male
Muhammad Ershad Marsangca
Zaldy Nawang
Joy Paderanga
Abu Al-Rasheed Tanggol

August 28, 2014

Case 1
DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA V. REBECCA BIONG
G.R. No. 182356 December 4, 2013
FACTS:
30 March 2000: Juan dela Llana (Juan) was driving a car along North Avenue, QC with
his sister, Dra. Leila dela Llana (Dra. dela Llana) at the front passenger seat and a certain
Calimlim at the backseat. While stopped across Veterans Hospital, a dump drunk driven by Joel
suddenly rammed the car from the rear, violently pushing it forward. The cars rear collapsed and
its rear windshield shattered. Apart from a few minor wounds caused by the glass splinters, Dra.
dela Llana did not appear to have suffered other visible physical injuries.
May 2000: Dra. dela Llana started to feel pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder,
which eventually became unbearable to the point that she could no longer move her arm. Upon
consultation with Dr. Milla, she was diagnosed as having suffered from a whiplash injury.
Extensive physical therapy proved to be futile and she had to undergo cervical spine surgery after
consultation with other doctors. As a result of the surgery, Dra. dela Llana was incapacitated
from the practice of her profession.
8 May 2001: Dra. dela Llana sued the owner of the truck, Rebecca Biong (Rebecca), for
damages after the latter refused to compensate her for the injuries she sustained. At trial, Dra.
dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness. She testified
that she lost the mobility of her arm due to the vehicular accident. She identified and
authenticated a medical certificate issued by Dr. Milla which stated that she suffered from a
whiplash injury. In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit when they
met days after the accident, and that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of Joel. The RTC Ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana. CA Reversed
the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1.
WON Dra. dela Llana has established by preponderance of evidence that Joels negligent
act was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury.
2.
WON the medical certificate has probative value.
3.
WON Dra. dela Llanas opinion (as testified by her) has probative value.
4.
WON the SC can take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.

RULINGS:

1.
NO, Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. Dra. dela
Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before
the Court can determine Rebeccas liability as Joels employer. (see Art. 2176, NCC) She should
show the chain of causation between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Only after
she has laid this foundation can the presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel arise. Only after the
negligence, damages and proximate causation are established can the Court proceed with the
application of par. 5, Art. 2180, NCC.
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has
the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible
evidence. Mere allegations are not evidence.
2.
NO, it doesnt. The medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not admitted
in evidence. The RTC did not admit in evidence the medical certificate, hence, the CA erred in
even considering it in its resolution of the case. It is a basic rule that evidence which has not been
admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments.
Even if it is considered, it has no probative value for being hearsay. Evidence is hearsay if
its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge
of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not,
cannot be given credence.
Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The former
depends on its relevance and competence, while the latter pertains to evidence already admitted
and its tendency to convince and persuade.
3.
NO, her opinion has no probative value. Under the RoC, there is a substantial difference
between an ordinary witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be
received in evidence regarding: (a) identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person
with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his
impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person. On the other hand,
the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess.
Even if admitted as expert testimony, the Court does not immediately accord it with
probative value. Its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by
demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on which the logic
of his conclusions is founded.
Dra. dela Llana was not presented as an expert witness but as an ordinary witness. As
such, she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury.

4.
NO, courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
This is not public knowledge, nor is it capable of unquestionable demonstration, nor ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Case 2
PEOPLE V. VIVENCIO SABELLANO AND WESLY SABELLANO
GR no. 93932-33, June 5, 1991
FACTS:
This is an appeal for two criminal cases jointly tried and then decided by RTC, Pasig
Metro Manila on June 6, 1990: Frustrated Homicide and Murder qualified by treachery, of which
the later is the one involved on appeal by Wesley Sabellano, the former being only part of the
consummated crime, murder.
On March 9, 1986 around 3:45 AM, deceased together with his wife and a certain
Gertrudes Basilides went outside for a walk to buy some merchandise. They saw the group of the
accused in a nearby store. They were followed in the guise of having a jog that resulted into the
murder of the deceased using a knife with the participation of four person. The wife and
Basilides were witnesses to the crime.
The court a quo convicted Wesley for the crime of murder, while others were still on
hunt. The accused insisted that thought he was positively identified by the witnesses, but the
conflicting testimonies of two direct witnesses as to the facts of the case is insufficient to convict
him. Thus this appeal.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution established the guilt of the accusedappellant Wesley Sabellana beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically:
1.
Are the inconsistencies in the detailed testimonies of the two witnesses who were present
during the commission of the crime sufficient to support a reasonable doubt "as to the conviction
beyond reasonable doubt"
2.
Is the failure to report immediately to the police authorities conducting the "on-the-spot"
investigation of who the culprit was weakened the credibility of the entire testimony.
3.

Is the defense of alibi tenable?

RULING:
1.
No. The inconsistencies are insufficient to support a reasonable doubt as long as they
pertain to minor details which can not affect the facts material to the case. The truth need not be
narrated with perfect symmetry [People vs. De Gusman, G.R. No. 76742, August 7, 1990]. What
is important is that they agree on essential facts and their respective versions corroborated and
substantially coincide with each other to make a consistent and coherent whole.
2.
Not necessarily. The delay is consistent with our culture that mourning and rites for the
dead take priority [People vs. John Gabriel Gamboa, G. R. No. 91374, February 25, 1991]. It
also held that the failure to report at once to the police authorities the crime witnessed can not be
taken against him [People vs. Demate, 113 SCRA 353, 1982] for a witness to a crime will show
some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case. The Court further opined that the
delay, when adequately explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness [People vs.
Cabanlit, 139 SCRA 94].
3.
No. Alibi can not prevail against the positive identification of the witnesses and in the
absence of any convincing evidence showing Physical impossibility of the accussed's being at
the time and place of the crime.

Case 3
TATING V. MARCELLA
GR No. 155208, March 27, 2007, 519 SCRA 79
FACTS:
Daniela sold a parcel of land to her granddaughter Nena. Thereafter,Daniela executed a
sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the property; the true
agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of
the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of
helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan
nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject
property reconveyed to her. a case was filed by the heirs of the then deceased Daniela against
Nena before the rtc for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale on the ground that it was
simulated for it did not reflect the true intention of the parties as evidenced by Danielas sworn
statement.
ISSUE:
Whether the sworn statement presented as the main evidence to prove the allegation that
the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties is sufficient evidence to
prove that the contract of sale was simulated
RULING:
No it was not sufficient. The Supreme Court ruled that affidavits are classified as hearsay
evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to crossexamine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the
affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. The Court finds that both
the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since
Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the
CA should not have given probative value on Danielas sworn statement for purposes of proving
that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated.

Case 4

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CASTILLO

G.R. No. 116748. June 2, 1997
FACTS:
Accused Marjorie Castillo armed with long barrel twelve gauge shotgun, in company
with persons went to the victims house looking for Jessie Pedroso. Elma Baulite, descended
from their house carrying in her arms Gemma Baulite, her daughter, when she heard somebody
calling her husband in a bragging and threatening voice. Without any intimation, accused fired
one shotgun blast at Elma where it hit Gemma on the abdomen that caused her death. Eliodoro
Pueblo, a neighbor applied tourniquet to Elmas arms and thereafter brought her to the police
station and then to the hospital.
Marjorie Castillo was charged with murder and his defense consisted of plain denial cum
alibi stating that he was at General Santos City at the time of incident looking for a job.

ISSUE:
Whether it was clearly and convincingly established that accused was elsewhere at the
time of the commission of the crime.

RULING:
No. Where an accuseds alibi is established only by himself and his relatives, his denial of
culpability does not deserve any consideration, especially in the face of affirmative testimonies
of credible prosecution witness. Elmas positive identification and testimony made the defense of
alibi worthless. The defense did not clearly and convincingly establish that it would have been
impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof as General Santos City is only about 60 km away
from Surallah, where the crime was committed. Such distance can be negotiated in less than 2
hours by public transportation and therefore did not render it impossible for the accused to be at
the scene of the crime.

Case 5
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ARISTON FRANCISCO

G.R. No. L-43789

FACTS:
On the 28th day of January, 1972, at the Province of Oriental Mindoro, ARISTON
FRANCISCO with Ruby Poras, waylaid one MERCEDITA MANITO a tender girl of 13 years.
Complainant, MERCEDITA MANITO was born on February 3, 1957 and was therefore,
almost 15 years of age on January 28, 1972. She declared on cross examination that appellant
and Poras were able to penetrate her private part with their private organs. When complainant
was asked whether her private part bled, or whether she felt her private part bleed during and
after she was raped, she answered: "I do not know." However, on further cross-examination
complainant was asked whether she felt blood oozing from her vagina and she answered in the
affirmative, further saying that the blood spilled on the ground and stained her dress (upper
garment).
During the incident, complainant stated that she was wearing a pantsuit with an upper
apparel and panty. Her panty and pantsuit where taken by appellant, who refused to return them
in spite of her demand. On January 29, 1972, complainant washed her stained upper garment
because she was afraid the members of her family might discover what had happened to her.
DR. FERNANDO VILORIA, Municipal Health Officer testified that: on February 1,
1972, he conducted an internal examination of Mercedita Manito and issued a medical certificate
(Exhibit "A). On cross- examination he declared that the lacerations he found on the body of
Mercedita were very old and that it was possible that the lacerations were sustained by Mercedita
prior to January 28, 1972.
Complainant, accompanied by her father, filed a criminal complaint for Rape in the
Office of the Police of Bongabon. He then had complainant examined by Dr. Viloria, and
thereafter interrogated her and reduced her statement into writing (Exhibit "B "). She also
executed another one on February 3, 1972 (Exhibit "3"). In her latter statement, complainant
admitted that she had one sexual intercourse the year before with Cirilo Francisco. She also
declared that she did not bleed when she was abused by appellant and Ruby Poras.
In the presence of Corporal Garbin, Lt. Sosa interrogated appellant, who admitted the
commission of the crime. Lt. Sosa prepared appellant's statement, read to the latter the contents
thereof, and asked him whether he acknowledged the contents. When appellant answered in the
affirmative, Lt. Sosa caused him to thumbmark and sign the statement (Exhibit "C").
Coming now to the defense. Appellant rejected his statement (Exhibit "C") claiming that
he signed it only because he was threatened by Patrolman Camacho of the Bongabon Police.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Trial Court erred in convicting the appellant of the crime of rape.

RULING:
Yes. There are certain facts of substance and value that militate against an affirmation of
the finding of guilt in this case, particularly when the evidentiary rule is recalled that in crimes
against chastity, the testimony of the injured woman should not be received with precipitate
incredulity; and when the conviction depends at any vital point upon her uncorroborated
testimony, it should not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free from suspicion. For
rape is an accusation , easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party
accused, though innocent."
The refusal of the Municipal Judge to subscribe to complainant's affidavit because of the
falsity of its contents bolsters appellant's assertion on the witness stand that his answers were
untrue. Besides, the prosecution failed to present Corporal Garbin to corroborate Lt. Sosa's
testimony that appellant, in his Garbins presence, admitted to Lt. Sosa the commission of the
crime. Neither did the prosecution present Patrolman Camacho to rebut appellant's assertions that
he was maltreated. These witnesses, who could have strengthened the case for the prosecution,
were not presented.
As very aptly enunciated by then Justice, now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in
People vs. Dramayo, 60 "(I)t is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be
duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.
The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for
the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What
is required then is moral certainty." Added to this is the fundamental principle that conviction
should rest on the strength of the prosecution evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
defense. 61 The foregoing indispensable criteria have not been met herein. The prosecution
evidence is wanting in proof beyond reasonable doubt. The conclusions of the trial Court are
unwarranted and bereft of convincing factual support. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed
from is hereby set aside, and Ariston Francisco hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt.

Case 6
U.S. V. CAPA AND CARIO

19 Phil. 125 March 20, 1911

FACTS:
Garcia went to the house of Capucao, where the two defendants were living, for the
purpose of getting a fighting cock which belonged to Bautista. On entering the house he made
his wants known to Capa, and after some few moments trouble ensued, resulting in Garcia
receiving a blow over his right eye. Garcia got possession of the cock, and on leaving the house
he was struck on the arm with a stick by the appellant, who, at that time appeared from under the
stairway. Garcia immediately reported the matter to the local authorities.
The defendants were charged and convicted in the Court of First Instance with the crime
of lesione graves. Cario alone appealed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trail court erred in finding that the proofs presented established the
guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
Yes. The offended party said that he was under the care of the doctor for eight days and
that the exterior wound at the time of the trial was cured, but that the bones which had been
fractured had not then been cured; while the other witness stated that when he examined the
injured party he saw a small wound on his hand. The best evidence as to the gravity of this
wound was that of the attending surgeon. For some reason, which does not appear in the record,
the doctor was not called as a witness. It is clear that this testimony does not establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the offended party had lost the use of his arm, nor was hindered in the use
thereof, by reason of that blow. He himself admits that he was under medical treatment for only
eight days, and it is difficult to see why the doctor would have abandoned this treatment and the
care of his patient until his arm had been completely cured.
Under these facts and circumstances the crime must be qualified as that of lesiones menos
graves, as defined in article 418 of the Penal Code.

Case 7

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. HODGES

46 Phil. 502 November 7, 1924
FACTS:
The defendant is charged in four separate cases with violations of section 2 of the Usury
Law in certain money lending transactions had with the prosecuting witness Leopoldo Ortiz.
At the trial of the cases a number of witnesses were called by the prosecution to testify in
regard to the character and reputation of the defendant and their testimony was admitted over the
objection and exception of his counsel notwithstanding the fact that his character had not been
put in issue by the defense.
The prosecuting witness has also testified but his testimony is self-contradictory, exhibits
the same uncertainty of memory which characterized his testimony in regard to case R. G. No.
22475 and when analyzed and summed up, the figures he gives do not agree with the admitted
facts.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the testimonies of the witnesses in regard
to the character and reputation of the defendant.
2.
Whether or not the testimony of the prosecuting witness is sufficient to sustain a
conviction.
RULINGS:
1.
Yes. It is an elementary rule of criminal procedure that the prosecution is not permitted to
touch upon the character of the accused in the original case and that it is only after the defendant
has elected to put his character in issue by calling witnesses and adducing evidence in support
that the prosecution is permitted to follow and disprove the evidence so offered.
2.
No. As against the unsatisfactory and uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting
witness, we have the, on its face, reasonable testimony of the defendant corroborated by
documents and by the testimony of the witness Igpuara on most of the essential points. The
defendant may be guilty but under the circumstances was could at most render a Scotch verdict;
we cannot convict him on mere suspicion.

Case 8

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LIERA

82 SCRA 163 March 17, 1978
FACTS:
The appellants were found by the trial court guilty of the crimes of robbery in band with
homicide, and robbery in band on two counts for robbing the house of Daniela Tindugan at about
11:00 o'clock in the evening of September 11, 1967 and killing her husband, Salvador Tindugan
and thereafter robbing the house of Danielas sister, Tabita Alviar, next door.
Antonio Guevara denied complicity in the commission of the crimes and claimed that he
was somewhere else when the crimes were committed. However, Daniela Tindugan declared that
she recognized the accused whose face is familiar to her having seen him often in the"paradahan"
for jeepneys, when the handkerchief used by the accused to cover his face slipped and fell, thus
exposing his face.
Counsel de oficio contends that the appellant cannot be found guilty of having robbed
Tabita Alviar and Asuncion Gutang in the absence of evidence that the appellant participated in
its commission. Counsel makes capital of the testimony of Tabita Alviar and Asuncion Gutang
that they did not recognize any of the armed men who robbed them; much less point to the
accused as one of the malefactors during the trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding appellant guilty despite absence of
evidence that appellant participated in the commission.
RULING:
Indeed, Tabita Alviar and Asuncion Gutang stated during the trial of the case that they did
not recognize any of the armed men who robbed them on September 11, 1967. Nor did they point
to the accused as one of the malefactors. The record shows, however, that a conspiracy existed
and the crimes were committed simultaneously one after the other and were perpetrated by the
same group of armed men so that the Identification made by Carlito Lara and Daniela Tindugan
that the appellant was one of the robbers is sufficient. While evidence of another crime is, as a
rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as
where it tends to Identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to
show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is
evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime.

Case 9

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MUOZ AND MILLORA

107 SCRA 313 September 10, 1981
FACTS:
Patrolman Agbuya was approached by accused Muoz and Millora to ask for the
whereabouts of Carding Depacina for which the former led the latter to Saysons Store. While
Rosal was conversing with Depacina, Macaraeg, and Sayson in front of Sayson's store, a police
patrol jeep of San Carlos City with both accused Munoz and Millora on board arrived. Munoz
approached Ricardo Depacina, followed by accused Millora, and shot Depacina, who was sitting
down, with a long gun, hitting the latter in the left forehead. Then the two accused loaded the
body of Ricardo Depacina into their jeep and brought him to Calasiao where his dead body was
found lying around. Munoz gave his sworn statement at PC Headquarters in Lingayen,
Pangasinan, which some portions described that it was typical of the way suspected malefactors
and other trouble makers were purged and liquidated at that time. Munoz alleged that his sworn
statement have been extracted under duress, violence, threat, and intimidation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial Court erred in not excluding his confession the same having
been extracted under duress, violence, threat, and intimidation.
RULING:
No. it must not be overlooked that the same was not the main basis of the trial court for
finding appellant Munoz guilty of the crime charged. The principal basis for the conviction of
appellant Munoz was the "direct and positive Identification of the prosecution witnesses which
sufficiently established the Identities of the accused Munoz and Millora as the perpetrators of the
crime. At any rate, the presumption of the law is in favor of spontaneity and voluntariness of the
statement by an accused, and it is incumbent upon him to destroy that presumption.
Appellant Munoz was not able to discharge the burden of proving the involuntariness of
his confession. the statement of the said accused narrates a detailed account of a series of crimes
perpetrated in different towns and barrios of San Carlos City, Pangasinan which only the
declarant could have furnished and which could have been known only by him, factors indicating
voluntariness. Likewise, there is no evidence on record that the investigators had ill-motive to
concoct the facts narrated by the appellant which is another earmark of voluntariness of the
sworn statement in question.

Case 10
MALIG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

160 SCRA 313

FACTS:
Honorato Malig and Antonio Lacson, are both duly appointed Senior Technical Property
Inspectors of the Commission on Audit for Region III and as such conduct verification and post
inspection of government infrastructure projects. They were charge of violating RA 3019 known
as the anti-graft and corrupt practices law by Celso R. Halili, President and General Manager of
Halrey Construction Inc. who had a contract with the Provincial Government of Bulacan for the
construction of Bocaue-San Jose Road because the accused in their official capacity willfully and
unlawfully requested 20,000 pesos from Halili in connection with the said contract. The
Sandiganbayan convicted the accused on the basis of the testimonial,documentary and
circumstantial evidences presented by the plaintiff but on appeal before the Supreme Court the
accused raised the argument that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because of
lack of evidence and it was wrong for Sandiganbayan to hold that the post inspection report done
by the accused was a wrong one because it was made for the purpose of getting the 20,000 pesos
from the plaintiff as shown by the testimonial evidences presented and that by virtue of its being
erroneous purports to be an evidence of the guilt of the accused and that the Sandiganbayan was
wrong in admitting the documentary evidences presented by the plaintiff for the reason that it
was purely hearsay, self serving and immaterial,and was wrong to give weight to the testimonial
evidences presented.
ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of the accused were proven beyond reasonable doubt as decided by the
Sandiganbayan
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the testimonial, documentary and circumstantial
evidence point to the guilt of petitioners-accused beyond reasonable doubt because while it is
true that the accused endeavored to question the sincerity and honesty of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, the reason ventured by the accused in an effort to cash serious doubts on
the credibility of said witnesses, is insufficient to overcome the probable value or weight of their
testimonies which are properly confirmed by the documentary and circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution in this case.

Case 11

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MODESTO

25 SCRA 36
FACTS:
Melencio Modesto was known to be a drunkard in their barangay, he died because of
stabbed wounds on his chest. His father Servillano Modesto was charged for his death and was
convicted by the RTC of the crime of Parricide on the basis of the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution, on appeal he asked for the overturn of the conviction.The
following circumstances attended before his death: The given facts that envelop this case open
up a number of possibilities as to who killed Melencio Modesto. He may have been stabbed by
the three teenagers that were in the street that night; or by Alberto Serano, the houseboy, or
Graciano Cajotoc who was with the deceased on their way to Melencio's house in the night of
March 8, each with the help of someone else; or by Potenciano and Constancio, Servillano's
brothers, said to be in Servillano's house on March 6, 7, and 8; or by other persons among whom
are the accused and members of his family.
ISSUE:
Whether the circumstantial evidence in which this case is entirely built on against the
accused fails to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that viewed in the light of the entire record, the trial court's
conviction of Servillano Modesto is hereby reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the crime of
parricide because from all that has been said, it is difficult to come to a conclusion of guilt. Taken
singly, the pertinent circumstances relied upon by the trial court to support conviction some of
which are not even proved do not in any way warrant the inference that Servillano did away
with his son. Taken collectively, they do not weave a discernible factual pattern consistent with
the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. All this makes it hard to give full
faith and credit to Cajotoc's testimony in court.
Finally, rare and unusual, indeed, is it for a father to liquidate his own flesh and blood. It
is contrary to the ordinary and natural course of things. For a man to kill his own son, there must
be some insuperable force that drives him to do such a dastardly act. That factor is missing in this
case. In fact, no motive has even been intimated by the prosecution. We are thus ushered to the
precept that "though proof of motive is not indispensable to conviction, yet a void in the
evidence in this respect discloses a weakness in the case for the prosecution."
Case 12

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DE LA CRUZ ET. AL.

91 SCRA 525
FACTS:
Benito De la Cruz and Cipring De la Cruz were convicted by the court of first instance of
Samar of the crime of Robbery in band with Double Homicide and was sentenced of capital
punishment for killing Adriana Bago and Edilberto Estriber, hence this automatic review before
the Supreme Court. The followinng circumstances attended the commission of the crime:
Melchor Bago husband of Adriana Bago was a light-house keeper at Hinamok island in Samar as
he was approaching the lighthouse the accused who disembarked from an anchored motorboat
near the lighthouse later tied Melchor Bago inside a cemetery and later robbed and killed
Adriana when he asked Melchor in the cemetery which part of his house was opened, and then
when they demanded from him where his two pistols were being kept.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the lower court in convicting the accused based on circumstantial
evidence of the case is correct.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Circumstantial evidence is considered sufficient for
conviction if the following circumstances are present: a) there is more than one circumstance; b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. There is, indeed, no
direct evidence that both deceased were killed by appellants and their companions. We find,
however, that the combination of all circumstances in this case is sufficient to warrant conviction
with moral certainty.
Melchor Bago testified that after being encircled by the group of five armed men,
appellant Benito de la Cruz inquired from him regarding the firearms issued to him by the
Government. Thereafter, while he was being tied in the cemetery, Benito also asked "what
portion of your house is open?" And he answered "the door facing the sea is now open.
Subsequently, Benito de la Cruz told him before they left him tied to a post in the cemetery that
they would kill his wife.
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Camilo Saborrido a fisherman, whose house was
near that of Melchor Bago, testified that he saw a "pumpboat" anchor in front of the latter's
house. And more significantly, that it had come from the direction of the light-house. He declared
that he could see it clearly because it was a moonlight night. Then he saw seven men disembark
from the boat and proceed uphill towards the house of Melchor. The next day, he found the dead
bodies of Adriana Bago and Edilberto Estriber.

The foregoing chain of circumstances, pieced together, in point of time and by sequence
of events, point to one conclusion that appellants and their companions were the ones who
tied up Melchor in the cemetery; hence, they proceeded to Melchor's house, as they themselves
had categorically told Melchor. In the latter place, they must still have looked for the firearms
issued to Melchor, as shown by the fact that Melchor found things in the House in disarray.
Thereafter, they robbed the house and on that occasion killed Adriana Bago and Edilberto
Estriber. That Adriana was bound hand and foot is characteristic of the same maltreatment that
Melchor received in the cemetery when his arms, his hands and his feet were also bound and tied
by appellants and their companions.

Case 13
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EXTRA
G.R. No. L-29205 July 30, 1976

FACTS:
Leovigildo Saligao, Barrio Captain of Putingbuhangin, San Juan, Batangas sought help
from police officers from the threats he received from Gerardo Extra. For the purpose of
inquiring from the latter his motives and to settle as well any misunderstanding in the presence of
the constabulary authorities, Saligao was accompanied by four police officers at first to the house
of Atanacio Extra, the father of Gerardo. Atanacio acceded their request by sending Porfirio
Aguila to fetch for his son but came back after a few minutes only to inform that Gerardo was
not in his house. When they left, as it was past 9 in the evening, only the flashlight of Barrio
Captain Saligao illuminated their path. And at about 6 meters away Gerardo Extra suddenly fired
at the group taking cover from a coconut tree , hitting first Saligao.
Saligao was brought to Lipa City for emergency treatment. A few days after Saligao died
but an ante-mortem statement was taken upon his admission to the hospital which statement
indicated that Gerardo Extra was the person who shot him with an automatic carbine that night.
On June 26, 1965, a complaint for Frustrated Murder with Direct Assult Upon an Agent
of a Person in Authority was filed against Gerardo Extra. Meanwhile, the accused fled and was
only taken into custody by the police authorities on January 7, 1967.
Accused denied the allegations contending that at the night of the incident, he was in
Batangas engaged in selling cattle.
ISSUE:
Whether the defense of alibi was clear and convincing enough as to preclude the
possibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime.
RULING:
No. The positive identification of the 2 police officers who were with Saligao that night
which led them to immediately execute sworn statements narrating in detail the circumstances
under which they recognized the accused, in the absence of any improper motive shows
spontaneity and sincerity. Hence, greater weight must be accorded the positive testimony than to
the denial of the accused.
As to Saligaos identification of Gerardo Extra as the person who shot him is clear and
categorical. The fact that he died days later is of no moment. The admissibility of an antemortem declaration is not affected by the fact that the declarant died hours or several days after
making his declaration.
Case 14
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ALITAO

G.R. No. 74736 February 18, 1991

FACTS:
Baltazar Alan Alitao and Henry Occena were both security guards of the Talisay-Silay
Milling Company (TASIMICO). Both were in uniform as they were being on duty at the time.
They were seen hitting Jason Concepcion by co-employee Paterno Gallanero, who tried to
intervene the fight unsuccessfully. Carlos Jalandoon, another employee, immediately ran to the
place of the commotion when he heard someone shouted there was a fight. He was stopped by
Alitao himself who poked a gun at him and Occena was pushing him away while Wilfredo
Apungan was stabbing Jason.
It was Jasons brother, Ramon, who brought Jason to Riverside Hospital in an ambulance.
On the way, just before expiring, Jason said that he was manhandled by Alitao and Occena and
stabbed by Wilfredo Apungan.
An information was filed against Alitao, Occena and Apungan for conspiring,
confederating and helping one another in killing Jason Concepcion. Meanwhile, Wilfredo
Apungan was never apprehended and remains at large.
ISSUE:
Whether there exists conspiracy in the crime committed.
RULING:
Yes. It is well-settled and familiar rule that conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence but can be inferred from the acts of the accused. The trial Court, having accorded
credence to the testimony to the two eyewitness, Paterno Gallanero and Carlos Jaladoon that the
accused assaulted the deceased victim in concert, taking turns in hitting with fist blows and the
butt of a shotgun in addition to stabbing him with a knife or some bladed weapon, correctly
attributed such acts to a common design. The contention that the evidence does not pinpoint
individual culpability for the injuries inflicted on the victim must be rejected because the result
of a conspiracy is immutable to all conspirators whatever the part, big or small, each may have
played in it accomplishment.
The existence of a conspiracy is further supported by the testimony of the victims
brother, Ramon, who declared that as Jason was being taken to the hospital, he had identified his
assailants.
Case 15
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BOLIMA

G.R. No. 96549 March 22, 1991

FACTS:
Generoso Lelis and Carmelo Bolima were at the Tabaco Police Station in Albay to thresh
out the dispute in that Lelis was allegedly intruding upon Bolimas territory in the collection of
fees of incoming trucks. Both were collectors in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Tabaco.
Bolima left the police station earlier while Lelis proceeded to join a drinking session with two
other friends at the supermarket. Thereafter someone suddenly attacked Lelis by stabbing him
with a bolo. And three others followed suit in the attack while Lelis struggled to get free.
Someone blew a whistle and so the assailants fled. Lelis was rushed to the Tabaco General
Hospital for first treatment. A police officer was able to talk to the victim while at the hospital.
Right before he expired, when asked who his assailant was, with great difficulty, Lelis replied
with a faint sound saying Gomer.
An information was filed charging Carmelo Bolima, Leopoldo Bitanico, Rogelio
Britanico, Gomer Bolima and Domingo Britanico of the crime of murder.
ISSUE:
Whether conspiracy existed and whether the dying declaration was exculpatory on the
part of those whose names where never uttered by the victim.
RULING:
Yes, conspiracy had been established by the simultaneous attack on the victim and the
multiple wounds inflicted which caused his death. Treachery and abuse of superior strength
attended the commission of the offense.
The appellants offered no objection to the dying declaration. Instead, taking advantage
thereof, they assert that it is exculpatory insofar as they are concerned. Thus, the dying
declaration in effect confirmed the theory that Gomer Bolima was involved in the conspiracy to
murder Lelis. Unfortunately, when the victim was asked to identify the other assailants he was
too weak to answer further for he died soon after.

Case 16

TAN V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-68834, June 6, 1990
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside, reverse, or modify the
decision of the CFI Romblon in a Civil Case.
The deceased had four (4) surviving children, herein plaintiff, who are legal heirs to
property located in Romblon. The said property was mortgaged to Felicito Tan for One Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P150) thru a Deed of Sale with the right to repurchased. It appeared from the
exhibits that the existence of this mortgage had been admitted by the plaintiff, that the property
in questioned was placed as collateral for a loan in the amount of P2,400. But plaintiff
vigorously asserted that they never obtained any loan from defendant bank, despite the fact that
they applied for the loan and have the documents notarized. The respondent appellate court even
stress that the illiterate heirs deserve protection mandated by Art. 24 of the Civil Code.
Because of the failure to redeem the property on the reglementary period, a TCT was
issued in favour to defendant PNB bank. So that on April 24, 1975, plaintiff, who are private
respondent herein, filed with CFI Romblon, an action for the recovery of the real property with
rescission and annulment of contract with damages against Felicito Tan and PNB. The court a
quo decided in favour to the respondent, and subsequently affirmed by the appellate court, thus
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned loan documents are binding and enforceable against
respondents (herein plaintiff).
RULING:
Yes. Their acts of signing and acknowledging the application of loan with PNB, and even
their appearance with the Notary public acknowledging the authenticity of their signatures so
declared that the questioned documents are valid and binding against heirs, except one of the
heirs who were not informed of the mortgaged.

Case 17

PEOPLE V. TANDOY
G.R. No. 80505, December 4, 1990
FACTS:
Accused Mario Tandoy was convicted by RTC dated October 13, 1987 of the crime of
violation of Art. II, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
He made an appeal on the ground that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to
warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt, being that the evidence of a xerox copy of the
marked P10 peso bill as admitted by the trial court is inconsistent with the Best Evidence Rule.
ISSUE:
Is the admission of the trial court of the xerox copy P10 peso bill violates the Best
Evidence Rule?
RULING:
No, it is not a violation. The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the
document are the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such
document was actually executed, or exists, the best evidence rule does not apply. In the case at
bar, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its
existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is
admissible without the need of accounting for the original.

Case 18

LIM TANHU V. RAMOLETE

66 SCRA 425
FACTS:
Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, Alfonso Ng Sua and Antonio Lim Tanhu were partners in a
commercial partnership. When Tee Hoon died, Tan Put, claiming to be the widow, filed a
complaint against spouses Antonio Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay. Later, the complaint included Lim
Tanhus son Lim Teck Chuan, as well as the spouses Alfonso Ng Sua and Co Oyo, and their son
Eng Chong Leonardo.
The defendants filed a single answer with counterclaim. They assert that Tan Put was not
Tee Hoons legitimate wife as the real Mrs. Tee Hoon, Ang Siok Tin, is in Hong Kong. The case
should be dismissed since Tan Put is not the legitimate wife, and thus, lacks the legal capacity to
sue them.
The motion of Tan Put to dismiss the counterclaim of the defendants was overruled.
However, on the date set for the pre-trial, the spouses Lim Tanhus and Ng Suas did not appear.
Thus, they were all declared in DEFAULT.
During the trial, Tan Put suddenly filed a motion to drop Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong
Leonardo as defendants to the case without justifications, which was granted by the court. The
case against the two was dismissed upon order. However, since the spouses Lim Tanhus and Ng
Suas were declared to be in default for their non-appearance in the pretrial, they remain to be
defendants in the complaint. Aside from giving the said order, the court proceeded to hear exparte the rest of Tan Puts evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, by virtue of the nature of the counterclaim of the defendants, either the
dismissal of the complaint be applied to all the defendants or the proceedings be resumed and the
non-defaulted defendants be allowed to present defense on behalf of all of them.
RULING:
Yes. The defendants counterclaim is a compulsory one because the same evidence to
sustain it will also refute the cause or causes of action alleged in plaintiff's complaint. Under the
rules, "(i)f a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court."
In the instant case, it was evident that the judgment against the defaulted defendants was
rendered before the non-defaulted defendants motion for reconsideration of the order dropping
them as defendants in the case was received by them.

It is clear that all the defendants are indispensable parties and under the rules of court and
according to jurisprudence, when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action
should be dismissed. All proceedings held by the respondent CFI particularly the ex-parte
proceedings against the defendants are annulled and set aside.

Case 19
PEOPLE V. CASTAEDA
88 SCRA 562 (1979)
FACTS:

Edmundo Enriquez became the victim of a robbery-killing. He was beaten and stabbed on
the different parts of his body which caused his subsequent death. His wallet containingP60.00,
his wrist watch, ring, shirt, and shoes, were all taken from him. TeresitaNobello, a deaf-mute,
while walking along Taft Avenue and E. de los Santos Avenue, allegedly saw the incident. When
she reported it to the Police, investigation and taking down of sworn statement took place but
nobody was arrested. Castaeda was then arrested at the ice plant where he works, admitting the
crime and pointed two others Juanito and Benedicto. He alleged that it started when they were
drinking when they saw Enriquez (deceased) at the nearby table and Benidicto approached him
and asked for money but instead Enriquez gave him a cigarette. When Enriquez passed along a
dark alley, the accused and companions beat and stabbed (causing death) Enriquez with a pipe
and took the wallet containing P60, ring, watch and shirt. Teresita, as witness, said Castaneda
acted as a lookout while the others beat and stabbed the victim. RTC held that Juanito and
Castaneda shall be punished with Death discrediting their respective alibis.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in admitting extrajudicial admission and testimony of lone
evidence Teresita.
RULING:
No. Trial court is correct in its decision. Extrajudicial confessions of the accused in a
criminal case are universally recognized as admissible evidence against him and this rule is
based on the presumption that no one would declare anything against himself unless such
declarations were true. Accordingly, it has been held that a confession constitutes an evidence of
a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. The
trial court is not bound to believe all that the said witness has said, but it may give weight and
credence to such portions of her testimony as it may deem worthy of belief and disbelieve the
other portions of her testimony. Triers of facts are not bound to believe all that a witness has said;
they may accept some portions of his testimony and reject other portions, according to what
seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances, to be the truth. Even when witnesses are
found to have deliberately falsified in some particulars, the jury are not required to reject the
whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such portions as they may deem worthy
of belief. In this regard, it would suffice to state that the trial court by reason of its proximate
contact with witnesses, is in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and the
false, and in the case at bar, We find no reason to disturb its conclusion that the said witness of
the prosecution saw the incident in question.
Case 20
ORTIGAS V. LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES
G.R. No. L-28773 June 30, 1975

FACTS:
Petitioner is booked on a first class accommodation in defendants airline from Rome to
Manila. The booking was confirmed by its airlines office. The airline employee upong seeing his
Filipino nationality disallowed his boarding and the seat was given to a Belgian. Petitioner has a
heart ailment and was advised by his physician to take only first class accommodations. Ortigas
filed a case for damages.
During the trial, due to so many postponements made by the respondent, including the
no-show of their European employees as witnesses, the case tilted out of their favor. One of their
witnesses was stricken from the list due to his non-appearance in the day that the cross-exam on
him was to be finished.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unfinished testimony of the witness is admissible.
RULING:
No. Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the
witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost
wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and
cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the
uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.

Case 21
SAVORY LUNCHEONETTE V. LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO
G.R. No. L-38964 June 31, 1975

FACTS:
The Savory Luncheonette filed a complaint charging the private respondents with unfair
labor practice for having violated certain provisions of Republic Act 875.To sustain its charges,
petitioner presented as its key witness, its legal counsel, Atty. Emiliano Morabe. As legal
counsel, Atty. Morabe had allegedly taken charge of the labor-management problems of the
petitioner and had thereby acquired first-hand knowledge of the facts of the labor dispute.
Petitioner's counsel conducted the direct examination of Atty. Morabe and concluded the same on
March 2, 1973. Atty. Rodolfo Amante, counsel of LAKAS PILIPINO, was called to crossexamine Atty. Morabe, but he moved for its postponement several times until Atty. Morabe
succumbed to a heart attack.
LAKAS PILIPINO filed a motion to strike out the direct testimony of Atty. Morabe from
the records on the ground that since cross-examination was no longer possible, such direct
testimony "Could no longer be rebutted" and filed another motion seeking the recall of
petitioner's witness Bienvenida Ting for further cross-examination more than two months after
her direct testimony, which were granted by the Court.
ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the Court erred in striking out the testimony of Atty. Morabe.

2.
Whether or not the Court erred in granting the recall of Bienvenida for crossexamination.
RULINGS:
1.
Yes. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial
litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with
quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a
personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a Party has had the opportunity to
cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the rights to
cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or
allowed to remain in the record.
The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to crossexamine may take various forms. But the common basic principle underlying the application of
the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and crossexamine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself
alone.
Private respondents through their counsel, Atty. Amante, were given not only one but
five opportunities to cross-examine the witness, Atty. Morabe, but despite the warning and

admonitions of respondent court for Atty. Amante to conduct the cross-examination or else it will
be deemed waived and despite the readiness, willingness, and insistence or the witness that he be
cross-examined, said counsel by his repeated absence and/or unpreparedness failed to do so until
death sealed the witness's lips forever. By such repeated absence and lack of preparation on the
part of the counsel of private respondents, the latter lost their right to examine the witness, Atty.
Morabe, and they alone must stiffer the consequences. The mere fact that the witness died after
giving his testimony is no ground in itself for excluding his from the record so long as the
adverse party was afforded an adequate opportunity for cross-examination but through fault of
his own failed to cross-examine the witness.
2.
Yes. The motion to recall the witness is intended merely to delay the proceedings and to
harass and inconvenience the witness sought to be recalled. We particularly note that the direct
examination of the witness was completed on March 27, 1973, and that her cross-examination
was conducted on June 4, 1973, or after more than two months since the direct examination. That
interval of time was long enough for private respondents' counsel to scrutinize and dissect the
direct testimony of the witness and prepare himself for cross-examination. That the counsel had
all the time to himself when he conducted his cross-examination on June 4, 1973, and that he
concluded such cross-examination when more time was allotted for it, showed that he had asked
all the questions he could possibly ask. Had the witness been cross-examined right after she gave
her direct testimony, there might be reason to believe the claim that counsel unintentionally
forgot to ask some material questions. But that was not so.