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Conde, et. al v.

IAC
G.R. No. 70443
September 15, 1986
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Whether or not the courts have acted in grave


abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the case of
fraud

DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE:


Ruling:
This case is about the jurisdiction of
the courts on fraud.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
Braulio Conde (Conde), et. al. filed a
complaint for the recovery of possession of a
parcel of land. He also filed a petition against
Gutierrez (Gutierrez) for fraud. Conde claims
that Gutierrez used fraud to acquire absolute
ownership of the properties of Esteban
Guiterrez (Esteban) and Fermina Ramos
(Fermina) by succession.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Conde, et. al. initially filed a complaint
for the recovery of possession of a parcel of
land before the Court of First Instance in Tarlac
(Now Regional Trial Court Branch 64). After a
full blown trial in the RTC Branch 64, Marcello
Gutierrez lost the suit and was ordered to pay
the Conde, et. al.
Gutierrez filed a petition to the Court
of Appeals (CA) which then reversed the
decision of the RTC ordering Conde, et. al. to
deliver the property to Gutierrez. The decision
became final and executory on December 20,
1982.
Conde, et. al. filed a petition before
the RTC Branch 56, Third Judicial Region in
Capas, Tarlac to annul the judgment of the CA
which was then dismissed for it had no
jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the CA.
Conde, et. al. filed a motion for
reconsideration before the respondent court
which was then denied. A petiton for certiorari,
mandamus, and a writ of injuction was filled
before the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
and raffled to the Third Special Case Division.
The court dismissed the case for lack of merrit
on the grounds that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to annul the IAC.
Finally, Conde, et. al., filed a motion
for reconsideration to this court (Supreme
Court - SC) where it was denied.
ISSUE:

The Petition is DISMISSED


There are two kinds of fraud, Intrinsic
and Extrinsic. Intrinsic fraud is the presentation
of false documents before the courts, while
extrinsic fraud is a fraudulent scheme that
would prevent a party from having his day in
court from presenting his/her case.
The CA was correct in determining
that the fraud committed by Gutierrez was
intrinsic in nature. Even if the contention of
Conde, et. al. were true it would be of no merit
because intrinsic fraud is not sufficient to
attack a judgment of the court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The respondents' counsel, Atty.
Adelaido G. Rivera is fined Five Hundred
Pesos (P500) for his failure to act on the order
to file comment.
SO ORDERED.

Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation


FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at its
copper mines underground operations at
Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a
result of the cave-in that buried them in the
tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased
claimed their benefits pursuant to the
Workmens Compensation Act before the
Workmens Compensation Commission. They
also petitioned before the regular courts and
sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out
that the complaint alleges gross and brazen
negligence on the part of Philex in failing to
take necessary security for the protection of
the lives of its employees working
underground. Philex invoked that they can no
longer be sued because the petitioners have
already claimed benefits under the Workmens
Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds
jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have
a right of selection between availing
themselves of the workers right under the
Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from
the employers by virtue of that negligence
or fault of the employers or whether they may
avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.
RULING:
The court held that although the other
petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmens Compensation Act, such may not
preclude them from bringing an action before
the regular courtbecause they became
cognizant of the fact that Philex has been
remiss in its contractual obligations with the
deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners
been aware of said violation of government
rules and regulations by Philex, and of
itsnegligence, they would not have sought
redress under the Workmens Compensation
Commission which awarded a lesser amount
for compensation. The choice of the first
remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake
of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not
an intelligent choice. The case should
therefore be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. However, should the
petitioners be successful in their bid before the
lower court, the payments made under
the Workmens Compensation Act should be
deducted from the damages that may be
decreed in their favor.
Government of the Philippine Islands vs
HSBC (1938)
G.R. No. 44257 | 1938-11-22
Subject: One-Subject, One-Bill Rule; The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction;
The subject of Act No. 4007 is embraced in the
title; The banking business, being affected with
public interest, is a legitimate subject of police
power by the state
Facts:
The
present
action
involves
the
constitutionality of section 11 of Act No. 4007
entitled "An
Act
to
Reorganize
the
Departments, Bureaus and Offices of the

Insular
Government,
and
for
purposes which reads as follows:

other

"Sec. 11. The provisions of existing law to the


contrary notwithstanding, the total annual
expenses of the Bureau of Banking shall be
reimbursed annually to the Government by
assessment
levied
upon
all
banking
institutions subject to inspection by the Bank
Commissioner. The proportion of expenses of
the Bureau of Banking to be assessed against
each such banking institution shall be the
same as the proportion which its average total
assets bear to the average total assets of all
such banking institutions during the year in
which the expenses were incurred."
The Government of the Philippines (appellant)
brought an action in the lower court to
determine the liability of the appellees under
the
above
provision.
The appellees, which are banking institutions
doing business in this country, demurred to the
complaint upon the ground that it did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
since the statutory provision relied upon by the
appellant was unconstitutional. Specifically,
appellees contend that the subject matter
contained in Section 11 is not embraced in the
title of the Act, in violation of Section 3 of the
Jones Law which requires that the subject of
an act shall be expressed in its title.
The lower court struck down the provision as
unconstitutional. Hence, the present petition
by
the
Government.
Held:
One-Subject, One-Bill Rule
1. Section 3 of the Jones Law provides:
"That no bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject, and that
subject shall be expressed in the title of the
bill."
2. The purposes of these constitutional
provisions have been summarized as follows:
(a) to prevent 'log rolling' legislation
refers to the practice to include in the same bill
wholly unrelated provisions, with the view of
combining in favor of the bill the supporters of
each, and thus securing the passage of
several measures, no one of which could
succeed on its own merits.

(b) to prevent surprise, or fraud, in the


legislature by means of provisions in bills of
which the titles give no intimation;
to defer the practice of enacting laws under
false and misleading titles, thereby concealing
from the members of the legislature, and from
the people, the true nature of the laws so
enacted.
(c) to apprise the people of the subject of
legislation under consideration.
The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should
receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction.
3. We must give the constitutional provision a
reasonable construction and effect. All that can
reasonably be required is that the title shall not
be made to cover legislation incongruous in
itself, and which by no fair intendment can be
considered as having a necessary or proper
connection.
4. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It
is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general
object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
of that object. Mere details need not be set
forth.
5. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the act. The requirement is satisfied
if thelaw has but one general object, and that
is clearly expressed in the title. It is enough if
the body of the Act is germane to the title."
The subject of Act No. 4007 is embraced in
the
title
6. The title of Act No. 4007 is: "An Act to
reorganize the departments, bureaus and
offices of the Insular Government, and for
other purposes." At the time of the passage of
this Act, the Bureau of Banking was already in
existence as one of the bureaus of the Insular
Government. It seems clear therefore that that
bureau is embraced in that title. On the other
hand, the contents of section 11 are germane
to and connected with the organization and
maintenance
of
said
bureau.
The banking business, being affected with

public interest, is a legitimate subject of


police
power
by
the
state
7. It is now beyond question that the banking
business is so affected with a public interest as
to justify its regulation and control under the
police power of the state. Since banks are
indispensable agencies through which the
industry, trade and commerce of all civilized
countries and communities are carried on, the
business which they transact, though for
private profit, is of a preeminently public
nature, and is therefore universally recognized
as a proper subject of legislative regulation
under the police power of the state. The
legislature may establish such reasonable and
general regulations of banking institutions as
may be essential to the public safety, and
provide for the enforcement of such
regulations by a board or bureau supported by
moderate assessments upon those engaging
in
the
banking
business.
8. However, while section 11 of Act No. 4007
is constitutional, it does not apply to the
National City Bank of New York, on e of the
appellees herein. The National City Bank of
New York, being an agency of the United
States, is not subject to taxation by the
Philippine Government except as permitted by
Act of Congress. The form of taxation imposed
under section 11 of Act No. 4007 was not
permitted by any act of Congress.
Eugenio vs Drilon (1996)
G.R. No. 109404 | 1996-01-22
Subject: P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive
effect so as to cover even those contracts
executed prior to its enactment in 1976;
Statutory construction- Intent of the law must
be enforced although it may not be consistent
with the strict letter of the statute; Intent of the
law may be derived from its preamble and
provisions; Buyer justified in suspending
payments due to seller's failure to develop the
subdivision
project;
Decisions,
Orders,
Resolutions of the Office of the President shall
become final after the lapse of 15 days from
receipt, unless a motion for reconsideration is
filed within such period
Facts:
On May 10, 1972, private respondent
Prospero Palmiano purchased on installment
basis from petitioner Florencio Eugenio and
his co-owner/ developer Fermin Salazar, two
lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City.

Acting on complaints for non-development


filed by the Delta Village Homeowners'
Association, Inc., the National Housing
Authority (NHA) rendered a resolution on
January 17, 1979 ordering petitioner Eugenio
to cease and desist from making further sales
of lots in said village or in any project owned
by
him.
Prospero Palmiano filed with the Office of
Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC),
a complaint against Eugenio alleging that, in
view of the above NHA resolution, he
suspended payment of his amortizations, but
that Eugenio resold one of the two lots to the
spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo, in
whose favor title to the said property was
registered. Palmiano further alleged that he
suspended his payments because of
Eugenio's failure to develop the village.
Palmiano prayed for the annulment of the sale
to the Relevo spouses and for reconveyance
of
the
lot
to
him.
The OAALA rendered a decision upholding the
right of Eugenio to cancel the contract.
However, on appeal, the Commission Proper
of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and,
applying P.D. 957, ordered Eugenio to
complete the subdivision development and to
reinstate Palmiano's purchase contract over
one lot. As to the other lot sold to the spouses
Relovo, E & S Delta Village was ordered to
refund all payments made by Palmiano, with
interest.
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon, on
appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC.
Hence, this petition filed by Eugenio.
The issue presented is whether the failure to
develop a subdivision constitute legal
justification
for
the
non-payment
of
amortizations by a buyer on installment under
land
purchase
agreements
entered
into prior to the enactment of P.D. 957, "The
Subdivision
and
Condominium
Buyers'
Protective
Decree"
Held:
P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so
as to cover even those contracts executed
prior
to
its
enactment
in
1976
1. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for
retroactivity in its entirety, but such can
be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent
of
the
law.

Statutory construction- Intent of the law


must be enforced although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the
statute
2. The intent of the law, as culled from
its preamble and
from
the
situation,
circumstances and conditions it sought to
remedy,
must
be
enforced.
3. The intent of a statute is the law. The intent
is the vital part, the essence of the law, and
theprimary rule of construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent. The intention of
the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself
and must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the
letter of a statute when it leads away from the
true intent and purpose of the legislature and
to conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. In construing statutes the
proper course is to start out and follow the true
intent of the legislature and to adopt that
sense which harmonizes best with the context
and promotes in the fullest manner the
apparent policy and objects of the
legislature. (Vol. II, Sutherland, Statutory
Construction)
Intent of the law may be derived from its
preamble
and
provisions
4. P.D. 957 was enacted with no other end in
view than to provide a protective mantle over
helpless citizens who may fall prey to the
manipulations
and
machinations
of
'unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers,' and such intent is nowhere expressed
more clearly than in its preamble.
5. From a reading of the preamble, the
legislative intent must have been to remedy
the alarming situation by having P.D. 957
operate retrospectively even upon contracts
already in existence 'at the time of its
enactment. Indeed, a strictly prospective
application of the statute will effectively
emasculate it, for then the State will not be
able to exercise its regulatory functions and
curb fraudulent schemes and practices
perpetrated under or in connection with those
contracts and transactions which happen to
have been entered into prior to P.D. 957,
despite obvious prejudice to the very
subdivision lot buyers sought to be protected
by
said
law
6. Adding force to the arguments for the

retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole are certain


of its provisions, viz., Sections 20, 21 and 23
thereof, which by their very terms have
retroactive effect and will impact upon even
those contracts and transactions entered into
prior
to
P.D.
957's
enactment.
Buyer justified in suspending payments
due to seller's failure to develop the
subdivision
project
7. As P.D. 957 is applicable to the contracts in
question, it follows that Section 23 thereof had
been properly invoked by Palmiano when he
desisted from making further payment to
petitioner Eugenio due to the latter's failure to
develop the subdivision project according to
the approved plans and within the time limit for
complying
with
the
same.
8. Likewise, the order to refund the payments
made by Palmiano on Lot 12 was similarly
justified on account of the non-development by
the
petitioner.
Decisions, Orders, Resolutions of the
Office of the President shall become final
after the lapse of 15 days from receipt,
unless a motion for reconsideration is filed
within
such
period.
9. Since petitioner Eugenio's motion for
reconsideration of the Executive Secretary's
Decision dated March 10, 1992 was filed only
on the 21st day from receipt thereof, said
Decision had become final and executory,
pursuant to Section 7 of Administrative
Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, which
provides that "(d)ecisions/ resolutions! orders
of the Office of the President shall, except as
otherwise provided for by special laws,
become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof x x x ,
unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is
filed within such period."

Tanada vs Tuvera (1985)


G.R. No. L-63915 | 1985-04-24
Subject:
Legal
Standing;
Publication
Requirement;
Operative
Fact
Facts:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on
matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ
of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive
orders,
letter
of
implementation
and
administrative
orders.
The Solicitor General would have this case
dismissed on the ground that petitioners have
no legal personality or standing to bring this
mandamus proceeding in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and
directly affected or prejudiced by the nonpublication of the presidential issuances in
question, hence, they are not "aggrieved
parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule
65
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
Held:

LegalStanding
1. While the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds
with the public at large," and "it is for the public
officers exclusively to apply for the writ when
public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs.
Boardmen],"
nevertheless,
"when
the question is one of public rightand the
object of the mandamus is to procure
the enforcement of a public duty, thepeople
are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation
the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution
of
the
laws.

2. The right sought to be enforced by

petitioners herein is a public right recognized


by no less than the fundamental law of the
land.

Publication

Requirement

3. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude


the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date
of
its
effectivity.

4. The clear object is to give the general public


adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise
burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.

5. While the people are kept abreast by the


mass media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansa - and for the diligent
ones, ready access to the legislative records
- no such publicity accompanies the lawmaking process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have
actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees.

6.
The publication
of
all presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden on the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within
this category. Other presidential issuances
which applyonly to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative
and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have
been
circularized
to
all
concerned.

7. The publication of presidential issuances "of


a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
arequirement of due process. It is a rule of law
that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed
of
its
contents.

Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)


G.R. No. L-63915 | 1986-12-29
Subject:
requirement

Due Process, Publication

Facts:
8. The very first clause of Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette . . ." The word
"shall" used therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matters of public
concern is to be given substance and reality.

Petitioners demand the disclosure of a number


of presidential decrees which they claimed had
not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.

9. Presidential
issuances
of
general
application,
which
have
not
been
published, shall have no force and effect.
In an earlier decision, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of presidential
issuances which are of general application.
Operative

Fact

10. The implementation/enforcement of


presidential decrees prior to their publication in
the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which
may have consequences which cannot be
justly
ignored.

11. The actual existence of a statute, prior to a


determination [of it invalidity], is an operative
fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects - with respect to
particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination.

Petitioners suggest that there should be no


distinction
between
laws
of
general
applicability and those which are not; that
publication means complete publication; and
that the publication must be made forthwith in
the Official Gazette.

Held:

Publication requirement

1. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides:

"ART.2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen


days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided xxx."

2. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided"


refers to the date of effectivity and not to the

requirement of publication itself, which cannot


in any event be omitted.

the Central Bank Act which that body is


supposed to enforce

3. Publication is indispensable in every case,


but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended.

4.7. Municipal ordinances must also be


published although they are not covered by
this rule but by the Local Government Code.

4. The term "laws" should refer to all laws


and not only to those of general application.

4.1. All statutes, including those of local


application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

4.2. Covered by this rule are presidential


decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution.

4.3. Administrative rules and regulations must


also be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation.

4.4. The charter of a city must be published


notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion
of the national territory and directly affects only
the inhabitants of that place.

4.5.
All presidential
decrees must
be
published, including even,say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements.

4.6. The circulars issued by the Monetary


Board must be published if they are meant not
merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of

5. Examples of issuances that need NOT be


published

5.1. Interpretative regulations and those


merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public.

5.2. Letters of instructions issued by


administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their
duties.

5.3. Instructions issued by the Minister of


Social Welfare on the case studies to be made
in petitions for adoption

5.4. Rules laid down by the head of a


government agency on the assignments or
workload of his personnel or the wearing of
office uniforms

6.
Publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws.

6.1. The mere mention of the number of the


presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"),
the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
even substantial compliance

7. Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the


publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere (i.e.
newspaper of general circulation), as a
requirement for their effectivity.
Due Process
8. Omission of the publication requirement
would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public of knowledge of the laws that
are supposed to govern it. The conclusive
presumption that every person knows the law
presupposes that the law has been published
if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all.

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