Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
1. Generally
a. Louisiana Civil Code Article 11 guides us as to the
[m]eaning of words[.] **5 It states: Words of art and
technical terms must be given their technical meaning
when the law involves a technical matter. In re Succession
of Brown, 2010-1394 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/29/11), 69 So. 3d
1211, 1214.
b. The word shall is mandatory and the word may is
permissive. see Ogea v. Merritt, 2013-1085 (La. 12/10/13),
--- So.3d ---- ; also Babineaux v. PernieBailey Drilling Co.,
261 La. 1080, 109596, 262 So.2d 328, 33334 (1972)
c.
2. Of Constitutions
a. In seeking to ascertain constitutional intent, the same
general rules used in interpreting laws and written
instruments are followed. CaddoShreveport Sales & Use
Tax Comm'n. v. Office of Motor Vehicles, 972233, p. 6
(La.4/14/98), 710 So.2d 776, 780; Radiofone, Inc. v. City of
New Orleans, 930962, p. 6 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 694,
698.
b. In re Office of Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court,
2012-1342 (La. 10/16/12), 101 So. 3d 9, 15
c.
3. of contracts
a. of LLC Operating Agreements
i. 1An operating agreement is contractual in nature;
thus, it binds the members of the LLC as written and
is interpreted pursuant to contract law. Kinkle v.
R.D.C., LLC, 889 So.2d 405, 409 (La. App. 3d. Cir.
2004).
4. of testaments
The law does not require one to do a vain and useless thing.
4.
When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead
to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be
2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
6.
We note, however, that legislative intent is not the appropriate starting
point for statutory interpretation. See Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d
885, 888 (La.1993) (quoting Zeringue v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety,
467 So.2d 1358 (La.App. 5 th Cir.1985)). Rather the appropriate starting
point is the language of the statute itself. Id. When a statute is clear
and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd
consequences, the statute is applied as written, and no further
interpretation may be made in search of legislative intent. See La.
Civ.Code art. 9. However, when the language of a statute is susceptible
of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning
that *616 best conforms to the purpose of the law, and the meaning of
ambiguous words must be sought by examining the context in which
they occur and the text of the law as a whole. See La. Civ.Code arts.
10, 12. Where a statute is ambiguous or susceptible of two reasonable
interpretations, statutory interpretation is necessary. Touchard, 617
So.2d at 887. **11 The construction to be given to legislative acts
rests with the judicial branch of government. Touchard, 617 So.2d at
885 (citing State v. Sissons, 292 So.2d 523 (La.1974); Ethyl Corp. v.
Collector of Revenue, 351 So.2d 1290 (La.App. 1 st Cir.1977)).
In re Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 98-3034 (La. 10/19/99), 749
So. 2d 610, 615-16
Pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 13, [l]aws on the same subject matter
must be interpreted in reference to each other. In explaining the
meaning of former Civil Code Article 17, the supreme court stated:
2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
*315 Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same
person or things, or to the same class of persons or things, or which
have a common purpose; and although an act may incidentally refer to
the same subject as another act, it is not in pari materia if its scope
and aim are distinct and unconnected. It is a well established rule that
in the construction of a particular statute, or in the interpretation of its
provisions, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the
same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as
together constituting one law, although they were enacted at different
times, and contain no reference to one another, The endeavor should
be made, by tracing the history of legislation on the subject, to
ascertain the uniform and consistent purpose of the legislature, or to
discover how the policy of the legislature with reference to the subject
matter has been changed or modified from time to time. In other
words, in determining the meaning of a particular statute, resort may
be had to the established policy of the legislature as disclosed by a
general course of legislation. * * *
1.
2.
3.
4.
Id.; See La. R.S. 24:177(A) and (B)(1). The occasion and
necessity for the law, the circumstances under which it was
enacted, concepts of reasonableness, and contemporaneous
legislative history may also be considered in determining
legislative intent. Graves, 120232 at 45, 105 So.3d at 685;
La. R.S. 24:177(B)(2)(a). The legislature is presumed to have
enacted an article or statute in light of the preceding law
involving the same subject matter and court decisions
construing those articles or statutes. Id.; La. R.S. 24:177(C).
5.
6.
7.
Rebel Distributors Corp., Inc. v. LUBA Workers' Comp., 20130749 (La. 10/15/13)
8.
OFFER means:
Bach then argues that the contents of KD Gretna's email do
not constitute an offer under Louisiana law. Specifically, Bach
argues that in order to constitute an offer to lease, KD
Gretna's email would have to contain the essential elements
of the lease, including both a precise reference to the thing to
be leased and the exact rent to be paid. See La. Civ.Code art
2676 (noting that rent must be fixed in a sum either certain
or determinable). Furthermore, Bach argues that an offer
must give the other party the right to assent to the contract,
or in other words, an offer must declare[ ] the offeror's intent
to be bound. Reynolds v. Conger, No. 952643, 1995 WL
686878, at *5 (E.D.La. Nov. 17, 1995). Otherwise, the overture
is merely an invitation to negotiate or an expression of
willingness to receive offers. Delta Testing & Inspection, Inc.
v. Ernest N. Morial New Orleans Exhibit Hall Auth., 962340
(La.App. 4 Cir. 8/20/97), 699 So.2d 122, 124, writ denied, 97
2350 (La.12/12/97), 704 So.2d 1194.
Mootness:
From Lions Gate Films, Inc. v. Jonesfilm
2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Search Details
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Delivery Details
Date:
Delivered
By:
Gregory Marsiglia
Client ID:
NO CHARGE
Status Icons:
20 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Legis. Law & Proc. 7:5 (2015 ed.)
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
Legislative Law And Procedure
Database updated November 2015
P. Raymond Lamonicaa0, Jerry G. Jonesa1
Chapter 7. Statutory Construction: Procedure and Process
7:5. Plain meaningText ItselfDiscussion and commentary
La. Civil Code Article 9s statement that when a law is clear
and unambiguous and does not lead to absurd
consequences it shall be applied as written provides the
basis for a plain meaning rule of statutory construction.
Indeed, the Court in Louisiana Municipal Association v. State of
Louisiana1 declared, La. Civ. Code art. 9 is the Louisiana
enactment of the plain meaning rule. State v. Freeman 2
illustrates the Louisiana Supreme Courts application of this
principle of statutory construction. The defendants challenged
their conviction of unlawful hunting of deer. They contended
that the word deer was not proceeded by an a, an, or
the therefore it was not limited to the singular but included
its plural form. Because the word deer included its plural
form, the defendants argued they were improperly charged
with multiple counts. The defendants also argued that one of
the statutes upon which they were charged required that the
hunting be from a moving vehicle and that the state had failed
to prove that the vehicle was moving at the time of the offense.
The Supreme Court agreed. It rejected the lower courts
conclusion that the vehicle only needed to be capable of
moving. It also rejected the multiple counts on the basis that
the legislature did not clearly write in the statute words which
made the hunting of individual deer illegal (thus allowing
multiple counts) and which did not address other than shooting
from a vehicle that was actually moving. Simply stated: the
words of the statute were controlling. In reaching that
purportedly direct conclusion, however, the court felt
compelled to address (1) a provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure analogous to La. R.S. 1:7 regarding the flexibility of
the use of the plural and singular; (2) the rule of lenity in
construing criminal statutes; and (3) the principles of in pari
2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
materia.3
Another example of the plain meaning method of textual
interpretation is evident in Roche v. Big Moose Oil Field Truck
Service. The issue was whether children who were not yet
finally adopted could recover in a wrongful death action when
their soon-to-be adoptive father died in a work-related accident.
The court looked at the La. Civil Code article 2315 beneficiary
categories and found that it included only adopted children.
Again, the language of the statute controlled when the words
were clear.
Additional examples of Louisiana courts use of the plain
language method of interpretation are noted below. 4
As discussed above in connection with this method of plain
language or plain meaning construction, Louisiana courts
consistently observe that when interpreting a statute, they are
bound, if possible, to give effect to all its parts and not construe
any sentence, clause, or word as unmeaning and surplusage if
a construction can be legitimately found which will afford force
to and preserve all the words of the statute.5
The above interpretation principles are also applicable to
constitutional interpretation.6 In determining whether the
language would lead to results that are absurd, one considers
in addition to the legal conclusion posited by the principle that
the legislature would not intend such absurdity, that the
electorate similarly would not intend such. In the theoretical
situation where one might find a disagreement between the
two, the electorate should control, as the final actor in the
adoption process.7
Commentary. The principle of interpretation generally
described as the plain meaning rule is similar in other
jurisdictions.
The meaning of the statute must be sought in the
language in which the act is framed and if thats
plain the sole function of the court is to
enforce it according to its terms.8
But even within the supposedly strict confines of the plain
meaning rule, there is an inherent question. Sometimes it is
quite apparent that more than a simple reading of the text is
required to determine whether such text is clear,
unambiguous, and does or does not lead to absurd
consequences. These determinations call for the use of reason
and logic, especially in distinguishing between a literal
2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
J.B. Nachman Professor Of Law, Paul M. Herbert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
a1
Member Louisiana, Texas and District Of Columbia Bars, Chief Legislative Counsel, Louisiana Senate.
Louisiana Mun. Assn v. State, 773 So. 2d 663, 669 (La. 2000).
State v. Freeman, 411 So. 2d 1068, 1072 (La. 1982). The opinion specifically cites prior case law
supporting the rule of lenity for interpretation of criminal statutes: State v. Boniface, 369 So. 2d 115
(La. 1979) and State v. Cox, 344 So. 2d 1024 (La. 1977). See also La. R.S. 14:3: The articles of this
Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order
to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine
construction according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with
the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.
Walker v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co., 110 La. 718, 34 So. 749 (1903) (Noting that where the language is
clear and unambiguous, a statute must be held to mean what it plainly expresses, and no room is left
for construction, the court concluded that the statute providing for a right of action against a person
who causes damage to another in case of death shall survive in favor of the minor children of the
deceased (Act. No. 71, p. 94, of 1884) does not include grandchildren or any other descendants);
Northwest Louisiana Production Credit Assn v. State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 746 So. 2d 280
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1999) (Observing that in order for federal instrumentalities to be subject to state
taxation, Congress must clearly provide for such, the court held that the NLPCA is designated as a
federally chartered instrumentality, and because the clear and plain language of 12 U.S.C.A. Section
2071 or 2077 does not permit such taxation, the State may not tax the NLPCA); Broussard v. F.A. Richard
& Associates, Inc., 732 So. 2d 578 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1999) (Reasoning that when a statute is clear, the
court must give credence to the mandate expressed by the legislature by interpreting the statute based
upon the plain wording of the law, the court determined, inter alia, that the limitation period for the
legal malpractice action provided under La. R.S. 9:5605 did not apply to the plaintiffs action because
her action did not arise out of an engagement to provide legal services as clearly stated in the
statute.).
State v. Fontenot, 112 La. 628, 36 So. 630 (1904); Dore v. Tugwell, 228 La. 807, 84 So. 2d 199 (1955); In
re Succession of Boyter, 756 So. 2d 1122 (La. 2000).
East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd. v. Foster, 851 So. 2d 985 (La. 2003).
East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd. v. Foster, 851 So. 2d 985 (La. 2003).
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, 2A Section 46.01, 8191 (5th Ed CBC 1992); State
Through Dept. of Highways v. Bradford, 242 La. 1095, 141 So. 2d 378 (1961).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 552 U.S. 1254, 128 S. Ct. 1695, 170 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2008) , demonstrates
that plain language may not be clearly evident from the language itself. In the first comprehensive
interpretation of the scope of the U.S. Const. Amend. II right to bear arms, Justice Scalia, an ardent
supporter of the plain (and original at time of enactment) meaning rule, writing for the majority
showed how plain does not mean literal. After recognizing the need for and interrelation of both
historical and language analysis he states the issue:
2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Does the preface [a well- regulated militia] fit with an operative clause [right of the
people to keep and bear arms] that creates an individual right to keep and bear arms?
It fits perfectly, once one knows the history that the founding generation knew
and that we have described above. (brackets and emphasis added). Slip opinion at
p.25.
Scalia argues that a purposive qualifying phrase that contradicts the word or phrase it modifies is
unknown this side of the looking glass [i]f bear arms means, as we think, simply the carrying of
arms, a modifier can limit the purpose of the carriage (for the purpose of self-defense or to make war
against the King). But, if bear arms means, as the petitioners and the dissent think, the carrying of
arms only for military purposes, one simply cannot add for the purpose of killing game. The right to
carry arms in the militia for the purpose of killing game is worthy of the mad hatter (slip opinion at
pp. 1516). This statutory interpretation technique addresses both language and historical issues.
Another such situation where the word analysis requires more than literal exposition is presented in
Abramski v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014) in which the 5-4 decision is based upon whether there is a need
to look at the statutes context, structure, and purpose, (majority) versus whether the plain
language (even though in statutory context) minimizes such need unlike Heller (dissent by Justice
Scalia). These cases illustrate the illusion that plain language is a simplistic, fundamentalist approach.
The determination of the meaning known to the ordinary citizen at the time of enactment is not always
straight forward or simple as the Heller case remarkably demonstrates. It involves analysis of the
language and the meaning of the language, which may need to be determined from sources outside of
the language, i.e., history. This approach is consistent with the proper approach in Louisiana of
determining legislative intent. See 7:4 and 7:9 to 7:11.
See also, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), involving the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, in which the robust discussion between the majority and dissents illustrate the competing interests
of a pragmatic approach versus an insular doctrinaire approach governed by statutory construction
rules or canons, and also the related difficult and reasonably debatable choices involved in both
approaches. See also, generally, discussion at 7:3, supra.
9
Sanders v. Hisaw, 94 So. 2d 486 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
10
Breaux v. Hoffpauir, 674 So. 2d 234 (La. 1996); U.S. Pollution Control, Inc. v. National American Ins. Co.,
663 So. 2d 119 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995).
11
See e.g., Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917); King v. Town of Pineville, 16
So. 2d 364 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
12
Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917).
13
Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 490, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 552 U.S. 1254, 128 S. Ct. 1695, 170 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2008) , demonstrates
that plain language may not be clearly evident from the language itself. In the first comprehensive
interpretation of the scope of the U.S. Const. Amend. II right to bear arms, Justice Scalia, an ardent
supporter of the plain (and original at time of enactment) meaning rule, writing for the majority
showed how plain does not mean literal. After recognizing the need for and interrelation of both
historical and language analysis he states the issue:
Does the preface [a well- regulated militia] fit with an operative
clause [right of the people to keep and bear arms] that creates an
individual right to keep and bear arms? It fits perfectly once one
knows the history that the founding generation knew and that
we have described above. (brackets and emphasis added). Slip
opinion at p.25.
Scalia argues that a purposive qualifying phrase that contradicts the word or phrase it modifies is
unknown this side of the looking glass [i]f bear arms means, as we think, simply the carrying of
arms, a modifier can limit the purpose of the carriage (for the purpose of self-defense or to make war
against the King). But, if bear arms means, as the petitioners and the dissent think, the carrying of
arms only for military purposes, one simply cannot add for the purpose of killing game. The right to
carry arms in the militia for the purpose of killing game is worthy of the mad hatter (slip opinion at
pp. 1516). This statutory interpretation technique addresses both language and historical issues.
2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
The determination of the meaning known to the ordinary citizen at the time of enactment is not always
straight forward or simple as the Heller case remarkably demonstrates. It involves analysis of the
language and the meaning of the language, which may need to be determined from sources outside of
the language, i.e., history. This approach is consistent with the proper approach in Louisiana of
determining legislative intent. See 7:4 and 7:9 to 7:11.
14
Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917).
15
Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process; Basic Problems in Making Application of Law, 1169, reproduced in
Eskridge and Frickey, eds., Foundation Press, 1996, and cited by the Comment to Section 18 of the
Uniform Statute and Rules Construction Act (Uniform Construction Act) (National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1995)). As of this writing, the Uniform Act has not been
adopted by any legislature. This may be evidence of the general lack of concern with developing
systematic approaches to statutory constructionor the difficulty of doing so.
16
17
Otto J. Hetzel, Michael E. Libonati, and Robert F. Williams, Legislative Law and Statutory Interpretation:
Cases and Materials, 3rd ed. (New York: Lexis Publishing, 2001), 482. See also La. Civil Code art. 11.
End of Document
7:1.OverviewScope
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise | Legislative Law And Procedure
Search Details
Search
Query:
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Delivery Details
Date:
Delivered
By:
Gregory Marsiglia
Client ID:
NO CHARGE
7:1.OverviewScope, 20 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Legis. Law & Proc. 7:1 (2015 ed.)
20 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Legis. Law & Proc. 7:1 (2015 ed.)
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
Legislative Law And Procedure
Database updated November 2015
P. Raymond Lamonicaa0, Jerry G. Jonesa1
Chapter 7. Statutory Construction: Procedure and Process
7:1. OverviewScope
Statutory construction is most often thought of as part of the
judicial process. However, construction issues begin before
and continue beyondthe traditional judicial process which
involves primarily the application of legislation to facts as a
part of dispute resolution.
While there is often widespread skepticism of the political
process, there remains a fundamental belief in seeking
solutions to problems through the enactment of legislation.
Through
the
enactment
process,
concepts
become
authoritative policies expressed (whether poorly or well) by the
specific text of statutory law. It is through such textual
expression, and its implementation, interpretation, and
enforcement, that most formal authoritative public policy is
reflected.
The political dynamics of the legislative process and its
participants are beyond the focus of this volume. The initial
adoption, amendment or defeat of legislation may ultimately be
more a matter of political interests than strictly legal concerns.
But when adopted, legislation becomes lawthe authoritative
policy reflected by specific legislative text (and in some cases
by the lack of such text).
The prior comments are a prelude to emphasize two points.
First, since the words of a law may be chosen and approved in a
less-than-ideal deliberative process, an understanding of the
fundamentals of statutory construction, briefly reviewed here,
can be of critical importance during the initial law-creation
process. The drafting of legislation is the preparation of a legal
document. The ultimate purpose of legislative text to be given
the effect of law is not simply to communicate ideas or
information but to regulate behavior. As law, the wording of
legislation can carry enormous consequences. To properly
2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
J.B. Nachman Professor Of Law, Paul M. Herbert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
a1
Member Louisiana, Texas and District Of Columbia Bars, Chief Legislative Counsel, Louisiana Senate.
One reason why it is hard to teach people how to draft is that like all writing it looks easy. There is one
thing upon which almost everyone prides himself, and that is his writing. This is especially true of
lawyers. Not only do they underestimate the difficulties of writing but they tend to think of themselves
as individually accomplished. It is hard to sell a man a new suit when he considers himself already well
accoutered. I think that it isaccurate to say that legislative drafting is the most difficult form of legal
drafting. The basic problems are the same, but legislative problems are technically more complicated
and socially more important. Dickerson, How to Write A Law, 31 Notre Dame Law. 14 (1955), quoted in
Charles B. Nutting & Reed Dickerson, Cases and Materials on Legislation, (5th ed. 1978) at page 671.
See also, Reed Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting (2d ed. 1986); Jack Stark, The Art of the
Statute (1996); Revell, Enhancing the Legislative Process: The Value of the Legislative Drafter, 32
Statute L. Rev. 149 (2011).
Such knowledge is especially useful when time for drafting is very limited, as during committee
meetings or consideration of floor amendments.
End of Document
Search Details
Search
Query:
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Delivery Details
Date:
Delivered
By:
Gregory Marsiglia
Client ID:
NO CHARGE
20 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Legis. Law & Proc. 7:2 (2015 ed.)
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
Legislative Law And Procedure
Database updated November 2015
P. Raymond Lamonicaa0, Jerry G. Jonesa1
Chapter 7. Statutory Construction: Procedure and Process
7:2. Louisiana laws related generally to statutory construction
Statutory construction is not a simplistic, mechanical or
unthoughtful enterprise. Rather it is as difficult as any aspect of
principled lawyering, perhaps more difficult than most because
of the multifaceted aspects that seldom receive comprehensive
examination.
The starting point for statutory interpretation and construction
is the language of the law itself.1
Listed below for convenience and initial perspective are express
statutory provisions that the legislature itself has determined
are basic to the interpretation process. Some of these
provisions relate to simple mechanical issues (e.g. La. R.S. 1:7,
1:8, 1:10), while others involve important broad concepts
relating to the nature and source of law itself (e.g. La. C.C. arts.
1, 5, 6), and others relate directly to methods of interpretation
(e.g. La. C.C. arts. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13).
La. Civil Code Article 1The sources of law are legislation and
custom.
La. Civil Code Article 2Legislation is a solemn expression of
legislative will.
La. Civil Code Article 3Custom results from practice repeated
for a long time and generally accepted as having acquired the
force of law. Custom may not abrogate legislation.
La. Civil Code Article 4When no rule for a particular situation
can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to
proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made
to justice, reason, and prevailing usages.
La. Civil Code Article 5No one may avail himself of ignorance
of the law.
La. Civil Code Article 9When a law is clear and unambiguous
and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the
law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation
Act 826 of 2006. Acts 2006 No. 826, effective August 15, 2006,
amended La. R.S. 1:13 and La. R.S. 13:3712(A), and enacted La.
R.S. 13:3711 and La. R.S. 24:177, to read as follows:
La. R.S. 1:13:
13. Headings and ancillary information, not part of law
A. Headings to sections, source notes, and cross references
are given for the purpose of convenient reference and do not
constitute part of the law.
B. The keyword, one-liner, summary and adjoining
information, abstract, digest, and other words and phrases
not contained in the section or sections of the bill following
the enacting clause do not constitute part of the law.
La. R.S. 13:3711:
3711. Legislative journals; conclusively presumptive
The official journals of legislative proceedings, which are selfauthenticating under Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Code of
Evidence, shall be conclusively presumptive of the existence
and contents of the originals and of any act, transactions, or
occurrence of which said journals were made.
La. R.S. 13:3712(A):
3712. Copies as prima facie proof; judicial notice of
municipal and parochial ordinance
A.
(1) Certified copies of books, records, papers, or other
documents of the state of Louisiana and its departments,
boards, and agencies, and of its political subdivisions and
their departments, boards, and agencies, and which are
made self-authenticating under Chapter 9 of the Louisiana
Code of Evidence, shall be prima facie proof of the
existence and contents of the originals and of any act,
transactions, or occurrence or event as a memorandum of
which said books, records, papers, or documents were kept
or made.
(2) Audio or video recordings or electronic images of the
proceedings of either house of the Louisiana Legislature or
relevancy issues related to the attempted use of postenactment materials in determinations of legislative intent.
a0
J.B. Nachman Professor Of Law, Paul M. Herbert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
a1
Member Louisiana, Texas and District Of Columbia Bars, Chief Legislative Counsel, Louisiana Senate.
See the discussions and cases cited in 2:2, note 41, supra; 6:4, supra; and 7:10 and 7:11, infra.
See, e.g., Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 270276 (1975); Romero,
Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 Harv. J. on Legis. 211, 223225 (1994).
End of Document