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Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in
question is used in association with the word "lottery". With
the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the wellknown principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis
which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although
only insofar as the element of chance is concerned it is
only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with
the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery
is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must
the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there
is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to
eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift
enterprise" therein included.
We are the opinion that the court acted with grave abuse of
discretion if not in excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing the
case without any formal motion to dismiss.
December 31, 1980. Rep. Act 6236, the very law on which
respondents Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral
proceedings fails to supply any basis for respondents'
contention. It will be noted that while Rep. Act 2061 fixed the
time to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond
December 31, 1968, no similar provision is found in Rep. Act
6236 expressly 'extending the time limit for the reopening of
cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared public land.
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as
provided for by the Rep. Act 6236 makes no reference to
reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law, Rep. Act 2061,
expressly did. Under the legal maxim of statutory
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express
Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one
thing in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusion of others
not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable
legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the
natural workings of the human mind. 4 If Rep. Act 6236 had
intended that the extension it provided for applies also to
reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the
same way that it provided the extension of time to file
applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title. The intention to exclude the
reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands which
were declared public land in Rep. Act 6236 is made clearer by
reference to Rep. Act 2061 which includes the reopening of
cadastral cases, but not so included in Rep. Act 6236.
We hold, therefore, that the extension provided for by Rep.
Act 6236 which is the sole basis for filing the respondents
Aotes' petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings applies
only to the filing of applications for free patent and for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not
to reopening of cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a
proceeding entirely different from "filing an application for a
free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles."
Parenthetically, in setting aside the decision dated September
28, 1940, the respondent Judge has concluded that Rep. Act
6236 is applicable also to reopening of cadastral proceedings,
thereby, altering Rep. Act 6236. That cannot be done by the
judiciary. That is a function that properly pertains to the
legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga vs. Court
of Appeals: 5 "It has been repeated time and again that where
the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for
the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt
as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions
have consistently been to that effect. 6 Likewise, it is a
cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the terms of
the statute are clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is
called for, and the law is applied as written, 7 for application is
the first duty of courts, and interpretation, only were literal
application is impossible or inadequate. 8
People vs Estenzo
Malinias vs. Comelec
Respondent Aotes filed on February 23, 1972 a petition to
reopen the decision of the Cadastral Court under Rep. Act 931
as amended by Rep. Act 6236. Respondents Aotes claim that
since the time limit for filing applications for free patents and
applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete and
imperfect titles have been extended up to December 31, 1980,
the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until
The sole inquiry in the case at bar can be stated thus: Whether,
in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of
Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No.
6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit on nine the
memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would
empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal on
the ground of failure to Prosecute; or, whether it is mandatory
upon said Court to proceed to decide the appealed case on the
basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, the failure
of the appellant to submit a memorandum on time
notwithstanding.
The second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296,
otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as follows:
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on
the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city
or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may
submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so
requested ... . (Emphasis supplied).
The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for
doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the
submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the
parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter
may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And
as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the Parties, the
Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the
submission of said memorandum the appellant so chooses not
to submit the memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left
with no alternative but to decide the case on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal
courts. In other words, the Court is not empowered by law to
dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to
submit his memorandum, but rather it is the Court's
mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available
evidence and records transmitted to it.
As a general rule, the word "may" when used in a statute is
permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the
word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which
may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24,
1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the
Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case
either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to
it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or brief
with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on request.
Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
It is first contended by the appellant that the above provision
is mandatory, not only because it employs the word "shall",
which in its ordinary signification is mandatory, not
who brought and landed the said aliens, and knowing that the
Chinese aliens have no right to enter the country or
unlawfully conceals or harbors the said aliens. There is no
doubt that this is also liable and punishable for another
separate violation of said section 46 of Commonwealth Act
613."
Lincomcen vs. Foundation Specialist, Inc.
2. For Convenience of LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED
If any time before completion of work under the Contract it
shall be found by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED that
reasons beyond the control of the parties render it impossible
or against the interest of LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED to
complete the work, the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED at
any time, by written notice to the Contractor, may discontinue
the work and terminate the Contract in whole or in part. Upon
issuance of such notice of termination, the Contractor shall
discontinue the work in such manner, sequence and at such
time as the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED/Engineer may
direct, continuing and doing after said notice only such work
and only until such time or times as the LICOMCEN,
INCORPORATED/Engineer may direct. x x x 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
Unfortunately for LICOMCEN, this provision does not
support but enervates its theory of indefinite suspension. The
cited provision may be invoked only in cases of termination
of contract, as clearly inferred from the phrase "discontinue
the work and terminate the contract." And in statutory
construction implies conjunction, joinder or union.42 Thus, by
invoking GC-41, LICOMCEN, in effect, admitted that the
contract had already been terminated.
The termination of the contract was made obvious and
unmistakable when LICOMCENs new project consultant
rebidded the contract for the bored piling works for the
CITIMALL.43 The claim that the rebidding was conducted for
purposes of getting cost estimates for a possible new
design44 taxes our credulity. It impresses us as nothing more
than a lame attempt of LICOMCEN to avoid liability under
the contract. As the CIAC had taken pains to demonstrate:
Suspension of work is ordinarily understood to mean a
temporary work stoppage or a cessation of work for the time
being. It may be assumed that, at least initially, LCC had a
valid reason to suspend the Works on December 16, 1997
pursuant to GC-38 above-quoted. The evidence show,
however, that it has not ordered a resumption of work up to
the present despite the lapse of more than four years, and
despite the dismissal of the case filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman which it gave as reason for the suspension in the
first place. As such, LCCs suspension of the Works had
already lost its essential characteristic of being merely
temporary or only for the time being. To still consider it a
"suspension" at this point is to do violence to reason and
logic.
Perhaps because of this LCC came up with the assertion that
what we have is an "indefinite suspension." There is no such
term in the Construction Agreement or the Contract
Documents. In fact, it is unknown in the construction industry.
Construction work may either be suspended or terminated, but
of the trial courts are given great weight and highest degree of
respect by the appellate court considering that the latter is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.32
A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that
Teodulo possessed and occupied Lot No. 379 in the concept
of an owner. Since 1929, Teodulo cultivated the controverted
land, built his home, and raised his 11 children thereon. In
1957, he filed a homestead application over Lot No. 379 but
failed to pursue the same.33After his demise, all his 11
children, the youngest being 28 years old, 34 continued to till
the land. From 1929 to 1960, Santiago never challenged
Teodulos possession of Lot No. 379 nor demanded or
received the produce of said land. For 31 years Santiago never
exercised any act of ownership over Lot No. 379. And, in
1960, he confirmed that he is no longer interested in asserting
any right over the land by executing in favor of Teodulo a
quitclaim.
Indeed, all these prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated
the land as owner thereof since 1929. While the oral donation
in 1929 as well as the 1960 quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to
Teodulo are void for non-compliance with the formalities of
donation, they nevertheless explain Teodulo and his familys
long years of occupation and cultivation of said lot and the
nature of their possession thereof.
In Bautista v. Poblete,35 the Court sustained the registration of
a parcel of land in the name of the successors-in-interest of
the donee notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation
inasmuch as said donee possessed the property in the concept
of an owner. Thus
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid
because it involves an immovable property and the donation
was not made in a public document as required by Article 633
of the old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the
same Code (concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not
follow that said donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive
prescription when on the strength thereof the donee has taken
possession of the property adversely and in the concept of
owner.
It follows therefore that Teodulos open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of Lot
No. 379 for 30 years, or from 1929 to 1959 in the concept of
an owner, earned him title over the lot in accordance with Sec.
48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Considering that Lot No. 379
became the private property of Teodulo in 1959, Santiago had
no more right to sell the same to spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta in 1964. Consequently, the latter and herein
respondents did not acquire ownership over Lot No. 379 and
the titles issued in their name are void.
Interestingly, respondents adopted the theory that Santiago
acquired title over Lot No. 379 not from the April 21, 1925
Decision of the CFI of Tayabas which merely recognized his
rights over said lot, but from his more than 30 years of
possession since 1925 up to 1964 when he sold same lot to
their (respondents) predecessors-in-interest, the spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. On the basis of said
issued in their names are void, because of the legal truism that
the spring cannot rise higher than the source.37
Repeals
Villegas vs. Subido
2. Much less is reversal of the lower court decision justified
on the plea that the aforesaid provision in the Decentralization
Act had the effect of repealing what is specifically ordained in
the city charter. It has been the constant holding of this Court
that repeals by duplication are not favored and will not be so
declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended.
Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a
1908 decision. 13 It is necessary then before such a repeal is
deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory
provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter
be inconsistent with the former. 14 There must be a showing of
repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language
used in the latter statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An
inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.
What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative
purpose to repeal. 15
More specifically, a subsequent statute, general in character as
to its terms and application, is not to be construed as repealing
a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose
to do so is manifest. This is so even if the provisions of the
latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set
forth in the special act. This principle has likewise been
consistently applied in decisions of this Court from Manila
Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 16decided as far back as 1919. A
citation from an opinion of Justice Tuason is illuminating.
Thus: "From another angle the presumption against repeal is
stronger. A special law is not regarded as having been
amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to
repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus non
derogant. And this is true although the terms of the general act
are broad enough to include the matter in the special
statute. ... At any rate, in the event harmony between
provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is
impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute,
considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon
the part of the legislature. ... A general law is one which
embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any
subject or place naturally belonging to such class while a
special act is one which relates to particular persons or things
of a class.
Tac-an vs. CA
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the Acopiado
brothers fully understood the tenor of the Deed of Quitclaim
which they executed. But the Court of Appeals also found as a
fact that the Acopiado brothers are Non-Christians, more
specifically Subanons, and that each is married to a Subanon.
And because they are Non-Christians, the Court of Appeals
applied Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao
and Sulu which reads as follows: