University of Chicago Press

Philosophy of Science Association

Some Metaphysical Presuppositions of Science
Author(s): Haig Khatchadourian
Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul., 1955), pp. 194-204
Published by: University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
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SOME METAPHYSICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF SCIENCE

HAIG KHATCHADOURIAN

In order to determine what are the metaphysical presuppositions of science

(if any), we have to first define the terms 'presupposition' and 'metaphysics' or
'metaphysical'. We shall begin with the former.
Arthur Pap in his article Does Science Have Metaphysical Presuppositions?'
discusses two senses of the term. A presupposition may be (a) a necessary condition: p presupposes q, df = p implies q, i.e. not-q implies not-p. (b) a premise or
a rule (or a set of rules) of inference used in deriving a belief. Thus in this sense,
p presupposes q means that if q were false, then the belief in p would cease to be
grounded.
Logic is a presupposition of science in both senses of the term, while physics
may be said to presuppose geometry in the second sense, in the sense that "in
deriving physical laws from certain selected physical axioms, the physicist uses
the truths of Euclidean geometry ... as premises . . . n2
It is seen that the first sense of presupposition above is that of logical necessity
or logical implication: if p presupposes q, then p cannot be true when q is false.
If p presupposes q in the second sense, then it is only a matter of fact that p is
based on q and not necessarily so. In other words, p may still be true even if
q is false. For though, if q is false, p may as a matter of fact be groundless, i.e.
we will have no grounds for believing it to be true, still, there might be some
other ground from which p may be logically derived. Thus for instance, if
(physical) Euclidean geometry turns out to be false, it does not necessarily
follow that the physical propositions derived with its help will therefore be false.
From this it is seen that the important sense of 'presupposition' in asking
whether science has any metaphysical presuppositions or not, is the first.3 For
even if science does presuppose metaphysical principles in the second sense, if it
does not also presuppose them in the first sense, it may be possible for it to
discard them and find other grounds for its beliefs, etc. While if it presupposes
them in the first sense, it cannot discard them without at the same time destroying itself.
Hence in attempting to answer the main question in hand, we shall take
'presupposition' in the first, not in the second, sense, unless otherwise indicated.
With respect to the term 'metaphysics' or 'metaphysical', I shall content myself with stating what I mean by the term. This, however, is not arbitrary, but is
based on what I consider to be the general understanding of metaphysics under1 Readings in The Philosophy Of Science, (New York, 1953), edited by H. Feigl and M.
Brodbeck.
2 Ibid., p. 23.
3 There are other senses of 'presupposition' than the ones we have mentioned (for
instance, that 'p presupposes q' implies that if q is false, p is neither true nor false, though
it could still be meaningful). But these senses of the term are not relevant to our present

discussion.

194

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lying the traditional conceptions of it from Plato and Aristotle on-excluding

the Positivists, whose conception is radically different.
By 'metaphysical' I mean here "verifiable by reference to facts with the help
of logical principles", i.e. involving the use of scientific method, but
(1) Only so far as it consists of guided observation, hypothesis-formation and
verification by reference to facts. The experimental element in scientific method
cannot be used in metaphysics.4
(2) The above is to be understood as applying to those areas which science
does not and cannot investigate, because of the traditional delimitation of the
field of science, its aim, etc.
The second point above distinguishes metaphysics from the natural sciences,
which are experimental in nature (with the exception of astronomy). But it
does not distinguish it from those sciences in which experimentation is not in
general possible, such as astronomy, sociology, and history (if the natural
scientist is willing to concede to the latter two the name of "science"). In order
to do so, we have to consider (i) the nature of the problems, and (ii) the general aim, of metaphysics on the one hand and of these sciences on the other
hand.
(i) Each of the above sciences-and in general any science, whether amenable
to experimentation or not-has a conventionally delimited area of inquiry, an
aspect of the universe (animate or inanimate) different from although related to,
the other areas or aspects. Metaphysics on the other hand is concerned with
those aspects of reality which are not dealt with by any particular sciences,
namely, (a) the presuppositions (in both senses, but primarily in the first sense)
of the sciences as science, that is, in so far as they possess certain common features, and (b) certain very general and pervasive problems which arise from the
results of science, but which are not dealt with by any particular science, and
which require to be answered if our total experience, and scientific knowledge,
are to be made a systematic and unified whole.
(ii) Although individual scientists sometimes pursue scientific knowledge as
an end in itself and not as a means to practical ends, or as an end in itself as
well as a means to practical ends, modern society as a whole has been interested
primarily in the practical value of science: in the ability of science to control the
environment for our greater welfare, by means of its predictions of future
happenings.5 The metaphysician on the other hand is not concerned with prediction, but with obtaining a satisfactory account of our experiences as such.
4 The statement that metaphysical beliefs are verifiable by reference to facts and logical
principles, is to be taken with the proviso that there may be metaphysical principles (such
as perhaps the law of causality) which cannot be theoretically justified in this way, but
which are logically presupposed by scientific method, practice, etc. It is obvious that in
such a case these principles cannot be consistently rejected without at the same time
abandoning scientific method, practice, etc.-unless we shun altogether the problem of the
theoretical justification of scientific method, practice, and so on, as pedantic, useless or
purely academic!
5 Of course predictions of future happenings can also be, and are used, by scientists, in
order to verify a theory, i.e. for theoreticalpurposes.

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HAIG KHATCHADOURIAN

Metaphysics does have some predictive value, contrary to what is currently

supposed. But such predictive value as it has does not add up to much,6 due to
the very general and purely qualitative nature of its tenets and therefore of its
predictions.
Let us illustrate: If the metaphysician proves that the soul is immortal, this
involves the prediction that when I die, I shall still survive in some form or other.
But there is no need to take such a spectacular instance. If the metaphysician
shows that, say, we have some evidence for the trustworthiness of our memory in
general, it follows that if I now remember a childhood incident, this memory
has some prima facie credibility, although it may actually turn out to be utterly
false.
These are genuine cases of prediction. But they are a far cry from the predictions of science, with which we are all familiar.
To sum up: science and metaphysics differ in their aims, since the former is
purely theoretical (although it can be used predictively in a limited way), while
the latter is practical as well as theoretical, with heavy emphasis on the former
in actual practice.
In attempting to answer the question whether science has any metaphysical
presuppositions or not, we shall examine (1) Scientific Method, and (2) Scientific
beliefs, namely, the generally accepted laws, principles, and theories of science.
Finally, we shall try to determine whether (3) Scientific beliefs raise any questions
or problems which require to be answered by metaphysics in order to make our
total experience intelligible, i.e. problems which are metaphysical in nature, and
demand a metaphysical answer.
(1) (a) The public character of scientific investigation and verification presupposes the existence of other "selves"-in the minimal sense of loci of experience (or if you like, streams of consciousness)-like our own:
In practice, science, or more exactly, the scientist, operates as if other scientists
existed, which could make scientific investigations like those he is engaged in,
who can share in his discoveries, or in whose discoveries he can share, and who
can verify or falsify his results (and vice versa). Thus the practice of the scientist
in employing scientific method presupposes as a matter of fact the existence of
beings capable of experiencing qualitatively similar or identical experiences, and
of employing the same logical tools which he employs.
It might be said here that so far as the testimony of other scientists is concerned, a scientist is not interested in whether this testimony comes from a self
(and one like him) or an intelligent robot. The content of the testimony is what
matters. However, it is immediately seen that this supposed content vanishes
into thin air so far as our scientist is concerned, if the assumption we mentioned
is not made. Its significance as testimony depends on the assumption that it is
based on experiences and procedures essentially the same as those the scientist
himself has and uses.
The above presupposition is not one that science, as commonly understood,
investigates. Psychology, which is concerned with the type of phenomena we
6 Except

in so far as metaphysical doctrines have a bearing on human life.

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SOME METAPHYSICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF SCIENCE

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are talking about, merely attempts to discover how the individual comes to
recognize other minds in the process of its development; it does not concem
itself with the empirical justification of the belief.7
If it is conceded that there are empirical grounds for the belief in the existence
of other selves, the belief is empirical and at the same time, metaphysical in
nature. And as we have tried to show, it is presupposed (in the second sense) by
the scientist's practice.
Since this problem of the justification of the belief in other selves does not
seem open to experimental investigation, Psychology, striving as it does to
become more and more experimental, would not be concerned with it.
But all this concerns the scientist's practice. Logically speaking, scientific
method, in the sense of guided observation, the formulation of hypotheses, and
empirical verification, does not presuppose (in the first sense of the term) the
existence of other selves, etc. In other words, and more precisely, observation,
the formulation of hypotheses, and verification, are possible without appeal on
the part of the scientist to the results arrived at by other scientists. The public
character of verification and investigation is not a part of empirical verification
and investigation as such. A solipsistic8 scientist can very well proceed in scientific
investigation and verification unaffected by the existence or non-existence of
other selves (scientists). But since he cannot now appeal to the confirmation or
disconfirmation of his results by others, his results will have less weight than they
might otherwise have. However, this would be only a difference in degree, and
would not materially affect the scientist's position, assuming that he repeatedly
confirms or disconfirms his hypotheses.
However, if scientists think that the public character of investigation and
verification is an essential part of their method, they have to concede, if our
position is correct, the metaphysical presupposition we have mentioned, as a
presupposition of science itself, and in the first sense of the term 'presupposition'.
(b) The repeated confirmation or disconfirmation of a hypothesis, even in
the case of a solipsistic scientist, presupposes the reliability of the scientist's
memory-and therefore of memory in general-of (among other things) his
past confirmations. Nay, if memory cannot be trusted, no confirmation or disconfirmation whatever would be possible, even if all the confirming or disconfirming observations were made simultaneously, since the connection between
the hypothesis to be confirmed and the confirming or disconfirming observations would be severed in our thought, though not logically.
In the case of the non-solipsistic scientist, the belief in the existence of other
selves with qualitatively similar or identical experiences itself presupposes that
7That there are empirical grounds for this belief seems to me to be a fact. For, apart
from other considerations, it is difficult to see how every human child would come to behave
as if there were other selves (though the consciousnlessof the difference between selves and
not-selves is very dim in the child), and later on would consciously hold such a belief, if
there are no grounds in its experience which make it behave as it does and (later on) entertain the belief.
8 So far as other selves are concerned.

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HAIG KHATCHADOURIAN

observed recurrences in one scientist's experience obtain in the case of other

scientists, since such recurrences do as a matter of fact obtain in one scientist's
experience. More exactly, public verifiability presupposes the repeatability of
qualitatively similar or identical experiences or events in the case of other
selves, while future verification, whether public or not, presupposes the repeatability of qualitatively similar or identical experiences in the life of the
same scientist. (c) The use of probability-estimates as a basis for prediction
presupposes the existence of causal relations between events. This applies equally
to the a priori theory and to the empirical or frequency theory, of probability.
What I want to argue here, first, is that if the a priori theory is to be more
than a purely mathematical calculus of probabilities, i.e. if it is to apply to
matters of fact and have predictive significance, its data in any given case
must be empirical. Let us take, for instance, the classic example of tossing a
coin. The apriorist calculates that the probability of getting heads or tails is
0.5 because the coin has two sides, it is symmetrical, there is no wind blowing,
(say), the coin is not being tossed in any peculiar way, etc. In so doing, the
apriorist is really trying to discover what physical forces will be acting on the
coin when it is tossed. The Principle of Indifference, which the apriorist uses,
illustrates this point clearly. This principle states that "If two alternatives, 'P'
and 'Q', are symmetrically related to the whole body of the given data, then
'P' and 'Q' are, on those data, equiprobable."9 What is really meant by "two
alternatives are symmetrically related to the given data," is that the physical
forces acting on the coin in successive throws are almost equal, and that they
are constant; and hence, if say 'P' occurs once, 'Q' will probably'0 occur next.
If the wind is blowing, the two alternatives will not be equiprobable because
the force of the wind on the coin will be changing from moment to moment,
and therefore might "favour" the one rather than the other alternative. At any
rate, even if it does not actually "favour" one alternative, the important point
(for the probability-estimate) is that in such a case we would not know whether
or not it will "favour" the one rather than the other alternative, and therefore
would not know what the probability will be. And the reliability of the probability-estimate will depend on the extent of our knowledge of the causallyrelevant data in making the probability-estimate. Thus the general assumption
made by the apriorist is that every event has a cause, and the same causes always have the same effects; and vice versa.
If this interpretation of his theory is rejected by the apriorist, we might ask
him what the significance of his probability-estimates can be, then, and what
meaning can be attached to the term 'probability' when he says (say) that the
probability of getting heads in one throw of a coin is 0.5? For if his estimate is
9 Lewis, C. I., An Analysis of Knowledgeand Valuation, (La Salle, Illinois, 1950), Second
Printing, p. 266.
10If we knew all the forces acting on the coin in any given throw, we would be able to
predict with certainty which side will be up if we throw the coin. The coin is determined
to fall in one way in each throw, but we do not know how it is determined to fall.

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meant to tell us what will probably be the case, then the fact that the coin has
two sides has to have more than just a mathematical significance. And this
additional significance is empirical, and presupposes what we have said above.
In the empirical or frequency theory the probability of the occurrence of an
event is equated with the frequency of its occurrence as the number of total
instances increases indefinitely. But on what basis, it may be asked, can it be
held that the number of instances, however large, is at all indicative of a certain
probability of occurrence of the event? What justifies us, for instance, in assuming that in throws of a coin the probability of getting heads is 0.5 if we find that
as the number of throws increases, the difference between the frequency of
heads among the total number of throws and 0.5 is becoming increasingly
smaller? Obviously we cannot exhaust all the possible cases of throws of a coin
in order to find out what the final frequency of heads will be and thus equate
the probability with it. And even if we could do so, the predictive character of
probability-estimates, which constitutes the sole and entire significance of probability-estimates, will then vanish. If it is replied that the justification of taking
the frequency of heads in a number of throws to be 0.5 if we find that as the
number increases, the frequency more and more approaches 0.5, and this indicates that 0.5 is the limit toward which the frequency is tending, we can ask
again: What justifies us in holding that there is such a limit, and if there is one,
that it is 0.5? As Russell says:
If we toss a given coin repeatedly, and find that the number of heads, as we go on,
approaches continually nearer to the limit 12, that does not entitle us to assume
that this really would be the limit if we could make our series infinite. It may be,
for example, that, if n is the number of tosses, the proportion of heads does not
approximate strictly to M but to

I +i

nN

where N is a number much larger than any that we can reach in actual experiments. In that case, our inductions would begin to be empirically falsified just as
we were thinking they were firmly established. Or again, it might happen, with any
empirical series, that after a time it became utterly lawless, and ceased in any sense
to approach a limit."

In other words, it seems to me that frequency of throws is useless as a basis of

probability-estimates unless the frequency is taken as an indication of the
physical forces acting upon the coin (or of any other thing whose frequency of
occurrence we are estimating), such that if the frequency becomes increasingly
close to a certain fraction as the number of throws increases, we can validly
conclude that the forces acting on the coin, etc. are probablyl2 equal. From which
we can conclude, that if the conditions remain the same, the frequency will not
B., Human Knowledge,Its Scope And Limits, (New York, 1948), p. 358.
We can never be certain that they are, because our data are not perfectly reliable,
being limited.
11 Russell,

12

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HAIG KHATCHADOURIAN

become drastically different as we continue to make further throws. And the

question whether in any two moments the conditions are the same or different
is an empirical question.'3
Again, in predicting the probability of the occurrence of an event whose frequency of occurrence has not been actually observed, the empirical theory
judges the probability "by considering it (the event) as one instance in a classification of cases which are like the case in question in specified or specifiable
respects... M4 Thus for instance, the probability of getting heads in throws of
a one-cent coin, may be estimated by considering the observed frequency of
heads in throws of a coin which is like the one-cent coin, say the dime. But what
is the significance of this classification? Why is the likeness of other cases "in
specified or specifiable respects" taken as a basis for the probability-estimate?
The answer is that, whether we know it or not, we assume and presuppose that
if certain events are alike in certain features, (these being determined empirically
by science), then it is probable that they will occur in the same way, under the
same or similar conditions, i.e. that there are causal connections between the
event (due to its nature) and some other event or events (due to their nature).
It is to be noted that both the a priori and the empirical theories of probability
presuppose that all events are caused, and not merely that some events-those
which have been so far observed-are caused. For if only the latter is assumed,
we cannot validly take the observed frequency of occurrence of an event as a
basis for estimating the limiting frequency, and therefore the probability, of
that event (assuming that the number of instances observed is very large).
And the same applies to the a priori theory, as we have interpreted it, in estimating probability by an appeal to the causal factors involved in the situation.
But the assumption that all events are caused cannot be proved by appeal
to past instances of regular conjunction of events. In order to "prove" universal
causation, we have to assume (a) that regularly conjoined events are causally
connected, and (b) that the existence of causal connections in the case of some
events is a sufficient ground (or is any ground at all) for assuming that all other
events are similarly connected-a flagrant case of begging the question!
We might cut the Gordian knot by resorting to some axiom, such as the one
Russell mentions, namely,
an axiom to the effect that (in certain circumstances) a characteristic which is
present in all observed cases is present in a large proportion of all cases15
13 It is important to note that we are here looking for a justification of the use of frequency-estimates, which are empirical, as a basis for prediction. But we are not claiming
that the assumption that there are causal connections between the event we are predicting
and the prevailing conditions, alters in any way the actual procedure of estimating probability, or enables us to predict with a higher degree of probability than otherwise, or with
certainty.
14Lewis, C. I., An Analysis Of KnowledgeAnd Valuation, (La Salle, Illinois, 1950), p.
270.
15 Russell, B., Human Knowledge,Its Scope and Limits, (New York, 1948), p. 371.

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But it is immediately seen that this axiom does not fare better than the law of
causality, so far as verification by appeal to past experience is concerned.
(2) Do the laws and theories of science, specifically, or in their general character as laws and theories, presuppose any metaphysical principles?
The nature of this question, and therefore the answer to it, depends on how
we interpret the terms 'laws' and 'theories'. Broadly speaking, they may be
interpreted as empirical or non-empirical. It is with the former interpretation
in mind that we are raising the question, since it is the one interpretation which
makes the above a serious issue at all. If we interpret them as non-empirical
statements, like the Conventionalist, the question does not arise at all, since if
these laws and theories are only our way of comprehending the world, purely
conceptual schemes, and not empirical statements, there is no question about
their having any metaphysical presuppositions in our sense of the term 'metaphysics'-at least none about the sensible world.
Assuming for our discussion that scientific laws and theories are empirical
statements, my contention will be that in their general character as laws and
theories they presuppose (in the first sense of the term) the existence of at least
some causal connections between our experiences. We have already dealt with
this question in dealing with probability. However, let us consider it now from
a more general point of view.
Arthur Pap, in the article we have mentioned, denied that the law of causality,
"every event has a cause" is presupposed by science. He says:
Could it be said that any specific law, such as "a deficient supply of vitamin B
causes poor eyesight," presupposes this principle? Surely not, for "some events
are uncaused" is certainly consistent with "this event has a cause"16

This is perfectly true. But any specific law (if it is taken as an empirical statement) presupposes (in the first sense of the term) that some events have causes.
Thus "a deficient supply of vitamin B causes poor eyesight," presupposes "poor
eyesight has a cause (vitamin B deficiency)," which itself presupposes "some
things have a cause." And this is no less a metaphysical belief than "Every
event is caused".
If these laws and theories are construed as merely stating the existence of a
constant conjunction between observed events, as we have seen, they will lose
all predictive value (theoretically speaking, not in practice). Nothing can then
be justifiably inferred from them about future occurrences.
So much for laws and theories generically speaking. The question now arises
whether any laws or theories, specifically speaking, presuppose any metaphysical principles. Does the law of gravitation, say, the law of conservation of mass
and energy, the principle of relativity, etc. have any such presuppositions?
There are several difficulties which seem to face us in attempting to answer
this question. To begin with, when we speak of scientific laws and theories, are
16 Pap, A., "Does Science Have Metaphysical Presuppositions?", in Readings in The
Philosophy Of Science, edited by H. Feigl & M. Brodbeck, (New York, 1953), pp. 21-22.

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we to concern ourselves with any or every law and theory in any of the natural
sciences, or are we to limit ourselves to the most general and advanced, i.e. to
physical laws and theories? Secondly, where shall we draw the line between
simple "empirical generalizations" such as "all babies cry" and laws and theories? Thirdly, are we to construe them as statements about sense-perceptions?
Or about sensible objects? Or about an order of objects numerically distinct
from that of sensible objects? Finally, these so-called laws and theories are
always open to revision and modification, slight or drastic, and therefore there
is always the contingency attached to taking any one of them as the basis for a
general pronouncement about science.
Two main points may be noted in this connection:
(1) The interpretation of the nature of scientific laws and theories in general
is a philosophical and not a scientific matter. The scientist as scientist is not
concerned with the ontological status of his laws and theories. That applies to
whether they are to be interpreted as conventional schemes or as empirical
statements, and in the latter case whether they are statements about sense-data,
sensible objects, or an order of existents numerically distinct from the order of
sensible objects. For, once more, such interpretation of scientific laws and theories
does not affect scientific practice. Hence, in order to find out whether specific
scientific laws and theories have metaphysical presuppositions, we have to make
a long excursion into philosophy (metaphysics). And this really entails the
elaboration of a whole philosophy of science.
(2) But in order to interpret these laws and theories philosophically, we have
to make use of assumptions which are not themselves scientific. Thus it seems
to me that specific scientific laws and theories by themselves and as such, qua
scientific, statements, do not have metaphysical presuppositions (apart from
the one about causation, which we have already mentioned). But they, together
with the principles of logic and statements of a general nature about our experiences as sentient beings, raise certain problemswhich are metaphysical in nature
and demand a metaphysical answer, if these laws and theories, as well as our
experiences, are to become meaningful. In other words, these laws and theories
will then have metaphysical consequences.We shall presently see an instance of
this in the case of Einstein's theory of relativity, interpreted in a certain way.
With this, we come to the third part of this discussion.
(3) (a) The problem of the existence of an external world independently of our
perception of it:
If we assume that the perceptual experiences of other selves are qualitatively
similar to or identical with our own-which as we have tried to show is a presupposition of empirical verifiability as actually practised by scientists, the
problemarises for philosophy, though not for science itself,'7 of how this can be
made meaningful. The question is, does this justify the presumption that there
is an order of entities which is causally responsible for our perceptions and
17 In other words, this problem is not a scientific problem, and the answer we give to it
does not affect, one way or another, the actual practice of science.

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which accounts for their qualitative similarity or identity in the experience of

different individuals, and for their perceived order? In other words, that there
is a common, public world, which we experience in perception, or which is in
some manner responsible through its interaction with us, for our perceptions?
The same problem arises, interestingly enough, if we are "solipsistic" scientists (solipsistic with respect to the existence of other selves), provided that (i)
we do have recurring experiences which are qualitatively similar or identical,
and (ii) we verify our scientific theories at different times on the basis of these
experiences.
(b) The problem of the nature of our common world:
Further, if we posit such a common world as described above, the problem
arises whether it is of the same nature as, and is continuous with, our sense
perceptions. And here Einstein's theory of relativity and the atomic hypothesis,
if interpreted as physical descriptions (and not as models), would become of
moment. If we discover that our perceptions do not possess the features which
these scientific theories attribute to the physical world, does it not follow (it
may be asked"8)that our perceptions do not form a part of the physical world,
and must be relegated to a numerically distinct order of existence? And if this
question is answered in the affirmative, certain problems arise as to how the
physical world, which according to this view is qualitatively different from our
perceptions, can be known at all, since what we know directly is only our perceptions. And these problems lead to others, and so on.
On the other hand, if the common (external) world is construed non-dualistically, certain other epistemological and metaphysical problems arise (as well as
some which are common to both the dualistic and the non-dualistic views), which
in turn lead to other metaphysical and epistemological problems; and so on.
Thus, whatever stand we take in answering the above and related metaphysical
and epistemological questions, the fact remains, it seems to me, that the methods,
practice, and beliefs of science raise certain problems which lie outside the field
of science, some of which fall within the field of metaphysics.
To sum up: if what we have said in this paper is correct, it appears that science
is not, anid cannot be, self-sufficient, but requires, and must always require, to
be supplemented and interpreted by philosophy (including metaphysics); and
however much it may resent it, it cannot but rest on foundations which in the
final analysis it cannot call its own.
Duke University
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N.B. This article came to my attention only after I had finished writing mine. I was
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18
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