01 Labor 2 Jan 26

LABOR RELATIONS LAW
I.
INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW
2
2
A. Definitions/classification
B. 1. Justification: Social Justice
B. 2. Foundation or basis: Police power of the State
B. 3. Ultimate goal: Industrial Peace
C. 7 Cardinal rights of workers; Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 3. par. 1 and 2
D. Management prerogative: Rule
Univ. of Immaculate Concepcion Inc. vs. SOLE ...............................................................................3

E. Balancing of Interests
II. STATE POLICY: WORKER EMPOWERMENT - LABOR RELATIONS
A. Voluntary/Democratic Method of Dispute Settlement
Estate of Nelson R. Dulay vs. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc. ............................................................5

B. Trade Unionism
C. Worker enlightenment
D. Adequate machinery for expeditious dispute settlement
Nueva Ecija Electric Coop. Employees Association President Rodolfo Jimenez et al. vs. NLRC ....7
Alexander Reyes vs. Hon. Trajano & Tri-Union Employees Union ...................................................8
Kapatiran vs. Hon. Calleja ................................................................................................................9
Pan-Am World Airways, Inc. vs. Pan-Am Employees Association ..................................................10
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard rep. by Pres. Alfie Alipio vs. BLR and Hanjin Heavy
Industries and Construction Co.......................................................................................................11
C. Covered Employees/Workers
13
FEU-Dr. NRMF, Inc. vs. Hon. Trajano............................................................................................. 13

Holy Child Catholic School vs. Hon. P. Sto. Tomas ........................................................................ 14
Tagaytay Highlands Intf Golf Club Inc. vs. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PGTWO......... 15
Manila Electric Co. vs. SOLE..........................................................................................................16
D. Excluded Employees/Workers
18
Paper Industries Corp. vs. Hon. Laguesma.................................................................................... 18

AD Gothong Manufacturing vs. Confesor ....................................................................................... 19
Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery vs. Asia Brewery Inc. ............................20
Pepsi-Cola vs. SOLE ......................................................................................................................21
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union vs. Standard Chartered Bank ..................................22
CENECO vs. DOLE ........................................................................................................................ 22
International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Hon. Calleja .......................................................23
Singer Sewing Machine Corp. vs. Hon. Drilon ...............................................................................26
E. Party Protested
27
Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz ..................................................................................................27

F. Sanctions for Violation of Right
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LABOR RELATIONS LAW

I.
INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW
A. Definitions/classification
1. Labor law 2. Labor standards - sets out the minimum terms, conditions and benefits of employment that employers
must provide or comply with and to which employees are entitled as a matter of legal right.
3. Labor relations - defines the status, rights and duties, as well as the institutional mechanisms, that
govern the individual and collective interactions between employers, employees and their
representatives.
4. Welfare legislation
B. 1. Justification: Social Justice

A. Const. Art. II, Sec. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
B. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments.
C. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
D. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate
in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to
its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments,
and to expansion and growth.
B. 2. Foundation or basis: Police power of the State

B. 3. Ultimate goal: Industrial Peace
A. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 3. par. 3. x x x
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. x x x
C. 7 Cardinal rights of workers; Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 3. par. 1 and 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Self-organization
Collective bargaining and negotiations
Right to peaceful concerted activities including the right to strike, in accordance with law
Security of tenure
Human conditions of work
Living wage
Right to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law
A. Labor: a primary social economic force;

Const. Art. II, Sec. 18 The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.
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D. Management prerogative: Rule

A. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 3, par. 3 & 4
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
B. Private sector: plays and indispensable role; Const. Art. II, Sec. 20
The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.
Univ. of Immaculate Concepcion Inc. vs. SOLE

Facts:
There was a collective bargaining negotiation between the University and its Union, UIC Teaching and NonTeaching Personnel and Employees Union
The Union, which was the certified union of all rank and file employees of the school submitted a CBA to
the University but left the issue of inclusion or exclusion of several positions in the bargaining unit.
(Secretaries, registrars, accounting personnel, and guidance counselors)
The matter was later submitted for voluntary arbitration which ruled for their exclusion. Pending resolution
of the reconsideration, the union filed a notice of strike before the NCMB of Davao on the ground of
bargaining deadlock and ULP.
Within the 30-day cooling-off period between the parties, two Union members were dismissed by the
University. Consequently, the Union went on a strike.
SOLE then assumed jurisdiction and ordered the employees to return to work and the parties to cease and
desist from committing any acts that might exacerbate the situation
Subsequently, the VA denied the Unions MR.
University gave the covered employees two choices:
To resign from the Union and remain a confidential employee of the University, or;
Resign from their confidential positions and remain a member of the Union.
Employees remained steadfast in their position that they could remain confidential employees and
members of the Union. Consequently, they were terminated from employment.
Another notice of strike was filed pursuant to the termination of the employees reasoning that such
termination was a violation of the order of the SOLE.
SOLE issued order reiterating the first order and added that the termination of such employees be
suspended pending the determination of the legality thereof. + reinstatement.
Univ. moved to reconsider reasoning that the SOLE order was rendered nugatory by the VA resolution
excluding the positions from the bargaining unit. SOLE denied MR: VA resolution did not authorize Univ. to
terminate employees.
2nd and 3rd MR were also denied. Certiorari. Referred to CA.
CA: denied petition. MR also denied.
Issue: W/N SOLE, after assuming jurisdiction, may order an employer to reinstate employees who have been
terminated even though they are not part of the bargaining unit? YES.
Petitioner contention: SOLE has no jurisdiction over employees who are not members of the bargaining unit.
> NO
Holding:
St. Scholasticas College vs. Torres: SOLE has authority to assume authority to assume jurisdiction over a
labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, the authority to assume jurisdiction over the said
labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases
over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.
WRT the contention of the petitioner, while management prerogative is recognized by the Court, in PAL vs.
NLRC, the Court held that management prerogative is not absolute but is subject to certain exceptions. One
of these exceptions is when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes involving
industries indispensable to the national interest under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.
Here, SOLE did not exceed in her jurisdiction when she ordered the University to suspend the effect of the
termination of the employees. As the ratio behind the law is to curb the exacerbation of the labor dispute to
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the further detriment of the national interest. It was for the maintenance of the status quo between the
parties.
The Universitys act of suspending and terminating union members and the Unions act of filing another
Notice of Strike after this Office has assumed jurisdiction are certainly in conflict with the status quo ante. It
even became the reason for the second notice of strike by the employees. This, in no way, helps the early
resolution of a labor dispute. Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise to
further contentious issues or increase the tensions between the parties should be considered an act of
exacerbation and should not be allowed.
Ruling: CA affirmed.
E. Balancing of Interests
A. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 3, par. 4
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II. STATE POLICY: WORKER EMPOWERMENT - LABOR

RELATIONS
A. Voluntary/Democratic Method of Dispute Settlement
A. 1987 Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 3., par. 3 (supra.)
B. Labor Code, Art. 218 (211) A (a). DECLARATION OF POLICY
A. It is the policy of the State:
(a) To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including
voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes;
C. Labor Code, Art. 218 (211) B
To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employers and
employees by means of agreements freely entered into through collective bargaining, no court or
administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages, rates of pay, hours of work or
other terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided under this Code.
Estate of Nelson R. Dulay vs. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc.

Facts:
Nelson R. Dulay was employed by General Charterers, Inc. (GCI), subsidiary of Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc.
He initially worked as an ordinary seaman and later as a bosun on contractual basis.
25 days after the completion of his contract in 2000, he died due to renal failure, secondary to septicema. At
the time of his death, he was a member of Associated Marine Officers and Seamans Union of the Philippines
(AMOSUP), GCIs collective bargaining agent.
His widow, Merridy Jane, claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure of the CBA of
AMOSUP. However, such claim was later declared deadlocked because the petitioners refused to grant the
benefits she sought.
She later filed a complaint before the NLRC GenSan Regional Arbitration Board against GCI for death and
medical benefits and damages.
Subsequently, Nelsons brother received a sum of 20k pursuant to Art. 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a
certification releasing GCI from further liabilities. However, Merridy claims that she was entitled to 90K USD
pursuant to the CBA and the 20K should only be considered as an advance payment.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that NLRC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because of the
lack of EER between GCI and Nelson at the time of his death. They also claim that they were not liable for
death benefits because they should only be liable for such in case of death during the term of the contract
pursuant to POEA contract. They only admitted to liability under Art. 20 (A) 2 but averred that such was
already discharged.
LA: for Merridy Jane. 90K USD less 20K
NLRC: affirmed.
CA: referred to NCMB VA for resolution of the CBA provision applicable.
Issue: W/N LA has jurisdiction? NO.
Holding:
While RA 8042 is a special law governing OFWs, there is no specific provision under it that provides for
jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved grievances regarding the interpretation or implementation of a CBA.
Sec. 10 of RA 8042, contrary to the claim of the petitioner, simply speaks, in general, of claims arising out of
an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. while Labor Code
provisions are very specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements.
Here, the special law speaks in general, while the general statute treats in particular. So to speak, the
specific law shall prevail.
Moreover, the Court agreed with the petitioner that the law between the parties shall be the CBA entered into.
In the present case, the CBA states that in case of dispute or conflict in the interpretation of the CBA, such
shall be resolved through negotiation, conciliation or voluntary arbitration. Clearly, the parties intended to
bring the such matter to voluntary arbitration.
Same is in consonance with Rule VII, Section 7 of the present Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by Republic Act No.
10022: OFWs with collective bargaining agreements, the case shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in
accordance with Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code.
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Same is true with the provision in the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels, promulgated by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA)
Consistent with this constitutional provision, Article 211 of the Labor Code provides the declared policy of the
State [t]o promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including
voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes.
Ruling: Petition DENIED. CA affirmed.
B. Trade Unionism
A. 1987 Const. Art III, Sec. 8.
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
B. Labor Code, Art. 218 (211) A (b) (c)
(b) To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy and the
promotion of social justice and development;
(c) To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement
C. Labor Code, Art. 219 (212) (g)
"Labor organization" means any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for
the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of
employment.
D. DO 40-03 Book V, Rule VI, Sec. 1
E. Labor Code, Art. 285 (269) (a) par. 2
C. Worker enlightenment
A. Labor Code, Art. 218 (211) A (d)
To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as union members and
as employees
B. Art. 250 (241) (p)
It shall be the duty of any labor organization and its officers to inform its members on the provisions of
its constitution and by-laws, collective bargaining agreement, the prevailing labor relations system and
all their rights and obligations under existing labor laws.
C. Art. 292 (277) (a)
All unions are authorized to collect reasonable membership fees, union dues, assessments and fines
and other contributions for labor education and research, mutual death and hospitalization benefits,
welfare fund, strike fund and credit and cooperative undertakings.
D. Adequate machinery for expeditious dispute settlement

A. Const. Art. III, Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
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Nueva Ecija Electric Coop. Employees Association President Rodolfo Jimenez et

al. vs. NLRC
FACTS:
Petitioners were permanent employees of respondent Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative (NEECO I). They
were members of petitioner NEECO I Employees Association, a labor organization established for the
mutual aid and protection of its members.
Respondent NEECO I is an electric cooperative under the general supervision and control of the National
Electrification Administration (NEA). The management of NEECO I is vested on the Board of Directors.
On February 7, 1987, the Board of Directors adopted Policy No. 333, which set the guidelines for NEECO
Is retirement benefits. On October 28, 1987, all regular employees were ordered by NEECO I to
accomplish Form 87, which were applications for either retirement, resignation, or separation from service.
On October 5, 1991 and February 28, 1992, the applications of Petronilo Baguisa and Ever Guevarra,
respectively, were approved. They were paid the appropriate separation pay.
Subsequently, some union members were promoted. Later, an apprehension in the labor association was
caused and were considered as harassment threatening the union members and circumventing their
security of tenure.
On February 29, 1992, to strengthen and neutralize managements arbitrary moves, the union held a snap
electionof officers.
On March 3, 1992, petitioner labor association passed a resolution withdrawing the applications for
retirement of all its members.
On March 4, March 17, and April 7, 1992, petitioners Ernesto Marin, Reynaldo Fajardo and Victorino Carillo
were compulsorily retired by management. They received their separation pay under protest on March 16,
March 18, and April 15, 1992, respectively.
On August 21, 1991, Erdie Javate was terminated from employment allegedly due to misappropriation of
funds and dishonesty. He was not paid separation or retirement benefits.
The following year, petitioners and Erdie filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages before the
NLRC Regional Arbitration branch in San Fernando alleging that they were singled out for being union
officers. They also claim that the acceptance of the money was did not constitute an estoppel or waiver
because their acceptance was attended with vehement objection.
LA: Illegal dismissal.
NLRC: Modified. Deleted award for moral and exemplary damages and costs
MR, denied. SC. Rule 65.
ISSUE: W/N the award of moral and exemplary damages proper?
HOLDING: YES
To warrant an award of moral damages, it must be shown that the dismissal of the employee was attended
by bad faith, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
Here, LA has ruled that there was ULP. Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional rights of workers and
employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management,
including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom
and mutual respect; and disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor
management relations.
SC ruled, however, that the moral and exemplary damages were excessive and thus reduced it.
There was illegal dismissal. individual petitioners are entitled to reinstatement from the time they were
illegally dismissed, until they were reinstated on March 16, 1993. For that period they are likewise entitled
to backwages minus the amount petitioners were forced to receive as retirementpay.
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Alexander Reyes vs. Hon. Trajano & Tri-Union Employees Union

FACTS:
Two labor unions, TriUnion Employees Union Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and
Agriculture (TUEUOLALIA) and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS), were
contesting the right to be the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.
Of 240 voters, 141 were from the Iglesia ni Kristo community, which prohibits its members from joining or
forming labor unions on religious grounds. These 141 votes were considered CHALLENGED and were
excluded from the final count on the ground that they were not members of any union and refused to
participate in previous certification elections.
These 141 employees protested alleging that it was not fair and that their votes were not included and thus
the result did not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees. TUEUOLALIA won.
Med-Arbitrator found no merit in INK contention so he certified TUEUOLALIA.
Appeal to BLR: contention - disenfranchised overwhelming majority; did not attain majority 51% of votes.
ISSUE: W/N the votes of the INK members should be included?
HOLDING: YES.
Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the "right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining." This is made plain by no less
than three provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Art. 243 of LCP: All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in
religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the
right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for
purposes of collective bargaining
Art. 248 (a): ULP for an employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization.
Art. 249 (a): ULP for a labor organization to "restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to
self-organization xx.
LCP IRR: Section 1, Rule II (Registration of Unions), Book V (Labor Relations) reiterate Art. 243 of LCP.
The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine which
of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in concerted activities with coworkers for
purposes of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and
protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests.
Right to self-organization extends even to their right not to join, affiliate with, or assist The right to form or
join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is
self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one
should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right.
Rule on certification issued by CIR: 2 labor unions, 3 choices including no union; 1 labor union, do you
want to be represented by this union? y/n
That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense of the term, do have
the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well as the fact that when they voted that
the employees in their bargaining unit should be represented by NO UNION," they were simply exercising
that right of self-organization, albeit in its negative aspect.
Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor
organization may take part in a certification election.
No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to
exercise the right in past certification elections.
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Kapatiran vs. Hon. Calleja

FACTS:
Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division (TUPAS Local Chapter No. 1027 or TUPAS) and Meat and
Canning Division New Employees and Workers United Labor Organization (NEW ULO) were contesting to
be the bargaining agent of daily wage rank and file employees of the Universal Robina Corporation-Meat
and Canning Division.
From 1984 to 1987, TUPAS has been the SEBA of URC-M&CD with a 3-year CBA.
Within the 60-day freedom period prior to the expiration of the CBA, TUPAS filed a notice of strike which
means it was pressuring the company to renew or extend the CBA.
About a couple of weeks after the filing of notice of strike, the NEW ULO was registered. Most of which
were members of the INK sect.
A few days later, TUPAS staged a strike which caused URD to file for an injunction against the strike
resulting to an agreement to return to work and for the parties to negotiate a CBA.
The nest day, NEW ULO filed for a petition for certification election before the BLR claiming that they have
the majority number of daily wage rank and file employees
TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition for being defective in form and that the members of the NEW ULO
were mostly members of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect which three (3) years previous refused to affiliate with
any labor union.
Subsequently, MedArbiter ordered the holding of a certification election within 20 days.
TUPAS appealed before the BLR. In the meantime, they were able to negotiate a 3-year CBA with URC
and was signed. BLR then denied their appeal.
TUPAS filed for MR alleging GAD on the part of the BLR Officer-in-Charge.
ISSUE: W/N there was GAD on the part of Hon. Calleja in dismissing their petition
HOLDING: NO.
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union: upholding the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO
sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that
sect from forming their own union. The public respondent correctly observed that the recognition of the
tenets of the sect x x x should not infringe on the basic right of self-organization granted by the constitution
to workers, regardless of religious affiliation.
The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-day freedom period of
the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union, NEW ULO, to challenge TUPAS claim to
majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification election on October 13, 1987 before TUPAS old
CBA expired on November 15, 1987 and before it signed a new CBA with the company on December 3,
1987. As pointed out by MedArbiter Abdullah, a certification election is the best forum in ascertaining the
majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers themselves can freely choose their bargaining
representative thru secret ballot. Since it has not been shown that this order is tainted with unfairness, this
Court will not thwart the holding of a certification election (Associated Trade Unions [ATU] vs. Noriel, 88
SCRA 96).
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Pan-Am World Airways, Inc. vs. Pan-Am Employees Association

FACTS:
Aug 25 1965: union filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor
Aug 28: union declared and maintained a strike against the herein petitioner
Sept 17: President of the Philippines certified the strike to the respondent Court of Industrial Relations as
being an industrial dispute affecting the national interest, the parties being called to a conference on
September 20
Union: its members would not resume the performance of their duties unless its officers were likewise
included in the return-to-work order.
Panam: agreeable to having the workers return to work but not the five officials of respondent Union.
alleged that the strike was illegal, being offensive to a no-strike clause of an existing collective
bargaining agreement the result being that the officials could, as the responsible parties, be liable for
dismissal.
Judge Bugayong issued an order requiring petitioner to accept the five union officers pending resolution on
the merits of the dispute involved in the strike.
MR = denied; Hence
Issue: WON CIR committed grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to accept the five union officers
pending resolution on the merits of the dispute involved in the strike NO
Considering that the case at bar was certified by the President, with CIR exercising its broad authority of
compulsory arbitration, the discretion it possesses cannot be so restricted and emasculated that the mere
failure to grant a plea to exclude from the return-to-work order the union officials could be considered as
tantamount to a grave abuse thereof
If the CIR is granted authority to find a solution in an industrial dispute and such solution consists in
ordering of employees to return back to work, it cannot be contended that the CIR does not have the
power or jurisdiction to carry that solution into effect.
of what use is its power of conciliation and arbitration if it does not have the power and jurisdiction to
carry into effect the, solution it has adopted.
if CIR has the power to fix the terms and conditions of employment, it certainly can order the return of the
workers with or without backpay as a term or condition of the employment.
it is the basic premise under which a regime of collective bargaining was instituted by the Industrial
Peace Act that through the process of industrial democracy, with both union and management equally
deserving of public trust, labor problems could be susceptible of the just solution and industrial peace
attained.
Implicit in such a concept is the confidence that must be displayed by management in the sense of
responsibility of union officials to assure that the two indispensable elements in industry and
production could-work side by side, attending to the problems of each without neglecting the common
welfare that binds them together
The record is bereft of slightest indication that any danger, much less one clear and present, is to be
expected from their return to work.
Necessarily, the union officials have the right to feel offended by the fact that, while they will be paid
their salaries in the meanwhile they would not be considered as fit persons to perform the duties
pertaining to the positions held by them. Far from being generous such an offer could rightfully, be
considered insulting.
The greater offense is to the labor movement itself, more specifically to the right of self-organization.
There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions to take
care of their interests vis-a-vis their employers. Their freedom organizations would be rendered nugatory
if they could not choose their own leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain for them.
If petitioner were to succeed in their unprecedented demand, the laborers in this particular union would
thus be confronted with the sad spectacle of the leaders of their choice condemned as irresponsible,
possibly even constituting a menace to the operations of the enterprise.
That is an indictment of the gravest character, devoid of any factual basis.
What is worse, the result, even if not intended, would be to call into question their undeniable right to
choose their leaders, who must be treated as such with all the respect to which they are legitimately
entitled.
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Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard rep. by Pres. Alfie Alipio vs. BLR
and Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co.
FACTS:
Samahan, through its authorized representative, Alfie F. Alipio, filed an application for registration of its
name Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard with the DOLE. Attached was a list of its
officers and members, attendees of meeting and their Constitution and By-Laws. It stated that they had 120
members
On February 26, 2010 (DOLE Pampanga), issued the corresponding certificate of registration in favor of
Samahan.
On March 15, 2010, respondent Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. Philippines (Hanjin)
filed a petition with DOLE-Pampanga praying for the cancellation of registration of Samahans association
on the ground that its members did not fall under any of the types of workers enumerated in the second
sentence of Article 243 (now 249).
Hanjin opined that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural workers, self-employed, and those without
definite employers may form a workers association.
On March 18, 2010, Hanjin filed a supplemental petition, adding the alternative ground that Samahan
committed a misrepresentation in connection with the list of members and/or voters who took part in the
ratification of their constitution and by-laws in its application for registration. It further posited that 1/3 of the
members of the association had definite employers and the continued existence and registration of the
association would prejudice the companys goodwill.
On March 26, 2010, DOLE Pampanga called for a conference, wherein Samahan requested for a 10-day
period to file a responsive pleading. No pleading, however, was submitted. Instead, Samahan filed a motion
to dismiss.
DOLE: for Hanjin. Samahan failed to adduce evidence that 63 of its members were also employed by
Hanjin even though they claim that all of its members are.
BLR: Reversed. No misrepresentation. Kami mga manggagawa SA Hanjin Shipyard not of
MR, denied. Certiorari rule 65 before CA.
CA: Affirmed BLR. To drop Hanjin Shipyard from name. They also could not register as a workers
association but instead should have formed a union because the place of work is not a rural one nor was it
shown that the members of the association were ambulant, intermittent or itinerant.
ISSUE 1: W/N they were entitled to form an association?
HOLDING: YES. Right to self-organization includes right to form a union,
workers association and labor management councils
More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes unionism. Workers, however, can also form and
join a workers association as well as labor management councils (LMC). As mandated by the Consti under
Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution
Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
and the Labor Code: Art. 3. and Art. 246 (now 252).
self-organization includes the right to form, join or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective
bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for
the same purpose for their mutual aid and protection.
The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends two notions, to wit:
(a) the liberty or freedom, that is, the absence of restraint which guarantees that the employee may act
for himself without being prevented by law; and
(b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an
association.
the law expressly allows and even encourages the formation of labor organizations. A labor organization is
defined as any union or association or employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of
collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. A labor
organization has two broad rights: (1) to bargain collectively and (2) to deal with the employer concerning
terms and conditions of employment.
A union refers to any labor organization in the private sector organized for collective bargaining and for
other legitimate purpose, while a workers association is an organization of workers formed for the mutual
aid and protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining.
End goal of employee representation is not collective bargaining but employee participation itself, in
whatever form it may be, bargaining or no bargaining, union or no union.
Any labor organization which may or may not be a union may deal with the employer. This explains why a
workers association or organization does not always have to be a labor union and why employer-employee
collective interactions are not always collective bargaining.
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Art. 255 of the LCP: right to participate in policy and decision-making processes of the establishment where
they are employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For this
purpose, workers and employers may form Labor Management Councils.
Requirement: EER (common with unionism)
In contrast, the existence of employer-employee relationship is not mandatory in the formation of workers
association. What the law simply requires is that the members of the workers association, at the very least,
share the same interest. The very definition of a workers association speaks of mutual aid and protection.
ISSUE 2: W/N they have the right to choose to form or join a union or association?
HOLDING: YES. Right to choose whether to form or join a union or workers association belongs to workers
themselves.
The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from
exercising the said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right
granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right.
The right to self-organization, however, is subject to certain limitations as provided by law.
Labor Code specifically disallows managerial employees from joining, assisting or forming any labor
union.
Supervisory employees, allowed but not allowed to join those for rank and file employees.
Government employees, but not for collective bargaining; only for protection of rights.
The Court cannot subscribe either to Hanjins position that Samahans members cannot form the
association because they are not covered by the second sentence of Article 243 (now 249).
There is also nothing in DO No. 4003, Series of 2003 which provides that workers, with definite employers,
cannot form or join a workers association for mutual aid and protection.
ISSUE 3: W/N there was misrepresentation?
HOLDING: NO.
If the unions application is infected by falsification and like serious irregularities, especially those appearing
on the face of the application and its attachments, a union should be denied recognition as a legitimate
labor organization.
Here, however, no deliberate or malicious intent to commit misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The
use of such words KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard in the preamble of the constitution
and bylaws did not constitute misrepresentation so as to warrant the cancellation of Samahans certificate
of registration. Hanjin failed to indicate how this phrase constitutes a malicious and deliberate
misrepresentation. Neither was there any showing that the alleged misrepresentation was serious in
character. Misrepresentation is a devious charge that cannot simply be entertained by mere surmises and
conjectures.
ISSUE 4: W/N dropping the word Hanjin from the associations name infringe on Samahans right to selforganization?
HOLDING: NO.
The policy underlying the prohibition in Section 18 of the Corporation Code against the registration of a
corporate name which is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation
or which is patently deceptive or patently confusing or contrary to existing laws, is the avoidance of
fraud upon the public which would have occasion to deal with the entity concerned, the evasion of legal
obligations and duties, and the reduction of difficulties of administration and supervision over corporations.
For the same reason, it would be misleading for the members of Samahan to use Hanjin Shipyard in its
name as it could give the wrong impression that all of its members are employed by Hanjin.
Section 9, Rule IV of D.O. No. 4003, Series of 2003: The change of name of a labor organization shall not
affect its legal personality. All the rights and obligations of a labor organization under its old name shall
continue to be exercised by the labor organization under its new name.
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Thursday, 26 January 2017
C. Covered Employees/Workers
1987 Const., Art. III, Sec. 8
1987 Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 3
Book V, Rule II, Sec. 2
1. Rule:
Art. 254 (Art. 244) Coverage and employees' right to self-organization. All persons employed in
commercial, industrial and charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not,
shall have the right to self-organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.
Ambulant intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any
definite employers may form labor organizations for the purpose of enhancing and defending their interests
and for their mutual aid and protection. (underscoring supplied).
Book V, Rule II, Sec. 2
FEU-Dr. NRMF, Inc. vs. Hon. Trajano

July 31, 1987 | Paras, J.
FACTS:
Far Eastern University-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Memorial Foundation, Inc., has a work force of about 350 rank
and file employees, majority of whom are members of private respondent Alliance of Filipino Workers.
On February 13, 1986, AFW filed a Petition for Consent and/or Certification Election with The Ministry of
Labor and Employment. FEU opposed on the ground that a similar petition is pending in the SC.
AFW admitted that:
As early as 1976, they had filed a similar petition before the MOLE, but it was denied by the MED
Arbiter and MOLE Secretary pursuant to Art 244 of the Labor Code, which stated that, as employees of
a non-stock, non-profit medical institution, they cannot form, join or organize a union.
They filed a petition for certiorari with the SC assailing the constitutionality of Art 244 of the LC
That on May 1, 1980, pending the resolution of that petition, Batasang Pambansa 70 was enacted
amending Art 244, thus granting even employees of non-stock, nonprofit institutions the right to form,
join, and organize labor unions of their choice; and In the exercise of such right, private respondent filed
another petition for certification election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
On April 17, 1986, the Med Arbiter issued an Order granting the petition, declaring that a certification
election be conducted to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file
employees of the petitioner
RD affirmed Order. He said that the issue of constitutionality of Art. 244 has been rendered moot by BP 70
Hence, this petition for certiorari and seeking to annul and set aside the decision of respondent Director.
ISSUE: W/N respondent Director gravely abused his discretion in granting the petition for certification election,
despite the pendency of a similar petition before the Supreme Court? NO.
At the time private respondent filed its petition for certification election, Art. 244 of the Labor Code was
already amended by BP blg. 70
Under the amended Art 244 of the Labor Code, there is no doubt that rank and file EEs on non-profit
medical institutions (such as Petitioner) are now permitted to form, organize and join labor unions of their
choices. Since AFW had complied with the requisites provided by law for calling a certification election, it
was incumbent upon respondent Director to conduct such certification election.
Any judgment which may be rendered in the petition for certiorari pending before the SC will NOT
constitute res judicata in the petition for certification under consideration in the former, respondent
questioned the constitutionality of Art 244 before its amendment, and in the latter, respondent invokes the
same article already amended. (Requisites of res judicata: identity of parties, identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for arising from same facts, identity of particulars)
2. Government Corporate employees
Art. 254 (244)
Const., Art. XI-B, Sec. 2(1)(5)
CS Circular EO 180
Book V, Rule II, Se. 2, par. 1
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3. Supervisory Employees
Art. 255 (245)
Art. 219 (b)
Book V, Rule I, Sec. 1 (xx), (hh), (nn)
Holy Child Catholic School vs. Hon. P. Sto. Tomas

July 23, 2013 | Peralta, J.
FACTS:
A petition for certification election was filed by private respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis
Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor Union (HCCS-TELUPIGLAS) alleging the
following:
a) the HCCS is a private educational institution duly registered and operating under Philippine laws;
b) there are approximately 120 teachers and employees comprising the proposed appropriate
bargaining unit; and
c) HCCS is unorganized, there is no collective bargaining agreement or a duly certified bargaining
agent or a labor organization certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the proposed
bargaining unit within one year prior to the filing of the petition.
Holy Child opposed this petition. They contend that under Art. 245 of the LC, private respondent is an
illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election,
it is a parochial school with a total of 156 employees, only 98 of which are teachers.
members of private respondent do not belong to the same class; it is not only a mixture of managerial,
supervisory, and rank-and-file employees as 3 are vice-principals, 1 is a department head/supervisor,
and 11 are coordinators but also a combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel as 27 are
non-teaching personnel.
HCCS-TELUPIGAS, on the other hand, countered that petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that some
of the employees included in the petition for certification election holds managerial and supervisory
positions. Assuming they did, Section 11 (II), Rule XI of DOLE Department Order (D.O.) No. 9, Series of
1997, provided for specific instances in which a petition filed by a legitimate organization shall be dismissed
by the Med-Arbiter and that mixture of employees is not one of those enumerated.
Further, they contend that questions pertaining to qualifications of employees may be threshed out in
the inclusion-exclusion proceedings prior to the conduct of the certification election, under the same DO
the will of petitioners employees should be respected as they had manifested their desire to be
represented by only one bargaining unit.
Med-Arbitrator Daquigan denied PIGLAS request on the ground that the unit the union sought to represent
is inappropriate because it lacks the community or mutuality of interest.
SOLE: reversed Med-arbiters decision; ordered two certification elections, one among the non-teaching
personnel and another among the teaching personnel. MR by Holy Child was denied.
CA: Affirmed DOLE Secretarys decision. There is no improper comingling of members in the union.
Conduct of two separate decisions is proper. MR denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: W/N the commingling of supervisory employees and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization
affect the legitimacy of the Labor Union? NO.
Employer had no standing to oppose the petition for certification election under the bystander rule
It has been consistently held in a number of cases that a certification election is the sole concern of the
workers, except when the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor
Code, as amended, but even after such filing its role in the certification process ceases and becomes
merely a bystander. Any uncalled for concern from the employer mat give rise to the suspicion that it is
batting for a company union. The employees bargaining representative should be chosen free from any
extraneous influence of the management, hence, the hands-off approach.
The mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees was first prohibited in RA 875, Sec. 3 which
states that Individuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of employees under their supervision but may form separate organizations of their own..
However, there is nothing in the said law (or jurisprudence) that affects the legitimacy of the labor union.
Under Section 15, the only instance when a labor organization loses its legitimacy is when it violates its
duty to bargain collectively; but there is no word on whether such mingling would also result in loss of
legitimacy.
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The absence of any provision on the effect of the disqualification of one of its organizers upon the
legality of the union may be construed to confine the effect of such ineligibility only upon the
membership of the supervisor. In other words, the invalidity of membership of one of the organizers
does not make the union illegal, where the requirements of the law for the organization thereof are,
nevertheless, satisfied and met.
However, the Labor Code did not adopt the said provision. The LC provision closest to Sec. 3 is Article
290, which is deafeningly silent on the prohibition against supervisory employees mingling with rankand-file employees in one labor organization. This can be construed as an obvious repeal of Sec. 3.
R.A. No. 6715 restored the prohibition against the questioned mingling in one labor organization in Art
245: Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rankand-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own However,
R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect any violation of the prohibition would bring about on
the legitimacy of a labor organization.
In Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PTGWO, the court
said that any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot
affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such
mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the
Labor Code.
ISSUE: W/N the petition for certification election should have been dismissed on the ground that private
respondent is not qualified to file such petition for its failure to qualify as a legitimate labor organization due to
lack of mutuality of interest? NO.
a bargaining unit has been defined as a "group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less
than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicated to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under
the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
In determining the proper collective bargaining unit and what unit would be appropriate to be the collective
bargaining agency, the Court provided for several factors to consider:
will of employees (Globe Doctrine);
Affinity and unity of employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions;
prior collective bargaining history; and
employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees.
Indeed, the purpose of a certification election is precisely to ascertain the majority of the employees choice
of an appropriate bargaining unit to be or not to be represented by a labor organization and, if in the
affirmative case, by which one.
However, review under Rule 45 is limited to the determination of whether the CA correctly resolved the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the SOLE, not on the basis of whether
the latter's decision on the merits of the case was strictly correct. Whether the CA committed grave abuse
of discretion is not what is ruled upon but whether it correctly determined the existence or want of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the SOLE.
Tagaytay Highlands Intf Golf Club Inc. vs. Tagaytay Highlands Employees UnionPGTWO
January 22, 2003 | Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS:
THEU-PTGWO filed a petition for certification election. THIGCI opposed THEUs petition for certification
election on the grounds that:
1. the list of union members submitted included the names and signatures of supervisors, resigned,
terminated and absent without leave (AWOL) employees, as well as employees of The Country
Club, Inc., a corporation distinct and separate from THIGCI;
2. that 71 out of 192 signatories to the petition were actual rank-and-file employees;
3. some of the signatures were secured through fraudulent and deceitful means
THEU asserted that it is a legitimate labor organizations and that Section 5, Rule V of said Department
Order provides that the legitimacy of its registration cannot be subject to collateral attack, and its
cancellation is needed to stop them to enjoy the rights of labor organizations.
Med Arbiter ordered the holding of the certification election. Issues on the list of members should be raised
in exclusion and inclusion pre-election conference, and fraudulent and deceitful manner of getting signature
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in a petition for cancellation of union registration in DOLE regional director. Also there are no proof i.e. job
description to support their claim.
DOLE Secretary reversed the decision on the ground that there is a clear absence of community or
mutuality of interests, it finding that THEU sought to represent two separate bargaining units (supervisory
employees and rank-and-file employees) as well as employees of two separate and distinct corporate
entities.
Upon MR, DOLE Undersec under the authority of the SOLE ordered the invalid names removed but since it
is a local chapter with 20% representation, it remains a valid labor organization. As for resigned and AWOL
employees, it should be raised in exclusion inclusion proceedings in the pre-election conference. CA
denied petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N supervisory employees are allowed to join rank-and-file unions? NO.
But, while Article 245 expressly prohibits supervisory employees from joining a rank-and-file unions, it does
not provide what would be the effect if a rank-and-file union counts supervisory employees among its
members, or vice-versa.
Toyota held that a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no
labor organization at all, and the subsequent case of Progressive Development Corp. Pizza Hut v.
Ledesma held that a legitimate labor organization status is needed before acquisition of rights i.e. petition
for certification election. Thus, it becomes necessary, therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing
a certification election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization whenever the status of the
labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor Code.
As for the lack of mutuality of interest argument of petitioner, it, at all events, does not lie given, as found by
the court a quo, its failure to present substantial evidence that the assailed employees are actually
occupying supervisory positions. List of employees and ranks is not enough. As this Court put it in PepsiCola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor: The mere fact that an employee is designated
manager does not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd situation where one
can be given the title just to be deprived of the right to be a member of a union.
Labor Organization cannot be subject to collateral attack
After a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral
attack. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section
5 of Rule V, Book IV of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code (Implementing Rules) which section
reads: Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers association shall be deemed
registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration.
Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in
an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.
Also, the inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless
such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in
Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
Signatures obtained thru fraud, false statement and misrepresentation
For this issue, THIGC should file a petition for cancellation of the certificate of registration, and not to
intervene in a petition for certification election.
For alleged withdrawal of union members participation, the best forum to determine retraction is in the
certification election itself where they can freely express their choice.
4. Aliens
Art. 284 (269)
Art. 285 (270)
Book V, Rule II, Sec. 2 par. 1 3rd sentence
5. Security Guards
EO 111
Manila Electric Co. vs. SOLE

May 20, 1991 | Medialdea
FACTS:
Staff and Technical Employees Association of Meralco (STEAM-PCWF), a labor organization of staff and
technical employees of Meralco, filed a petition for certification election, seeking to represent regular
employees of Meralco, among those are the non-managerial employees in the Patrol Division and Treasury
Security Services Section who are automatically removed from the bargaining unit, pursuant to Art. I, Secs.
2-3 of the existing Meralco Employees Workers Association CBA (MEWA CBA).
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Meralco moved for dismissal. As regards those in the Patrol Division and Treasury Security Service
Section, it maintains that since these employees are tasked with providing security to the company, they
are not eligible to join the rank and file bargaining unit, pursuant to Sec. 2(c), Rule V, Book V of the then
IRR of the LC (1988).
Med-Arbiter ruled that having been excluded from the existing CBA for rank and file employees, these
employees have the right to form a union of their own, except those employees performing managerial
functions. With respect to those employees who had resented their alleged involuntary membership in the
existing CBA, the Med-Arbiter stated that the holding of a certification election would allow them to fully
translate their sentiment on the matter, and thus directed the holding of a certification election.
Meralco appealed.
MEWA filed and appeal-in-intervention, alleging among others that the Order of the Med-Arbiter is null and
void for being in violation of Art. 245, LC. STEAM-PCWF opposed this.
With the enactment of RA 6715 and its IRR, STEAM-PCWF renounced its representation of the employees
in Patrol Division, Treasury Security Services Section and rank-and-file employees in Pay Grades I-VI.
Secretary of Labor affirmed with modification the Order of the Med-Arbiter.
In questioning the Secretary of Labor's directive allowing security guards (Treasury/Patrol Services
Section) to be represented by respondents, Meralco contends that this contravenes the provisions of the
recently passed RA 6715 and its IRR (specifically par. 2, Sec. 1, Rule II, Book V) which disqualifies
supervisory employees and security guards from membership in a labor organization of the rank and file.
ISSUE: W/N security guards in the Patrol Division and Treasury Security Service Section can join a union?
YES.
Par. 2, Sec. 1, Rule II, Book V of the IRR of RA 6715:
Sec. 1. Who may join unions.
Supervisory employees and security guards shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization
of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own;
The above provision is similar to Sec. 2(c), Rule V, Book V of the IRR of RA 6715:
Sec. 2. Who may file. Any legitimate labor organization or the employer, when requested to bargain
collectively, may file the petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor-organization shall contain, among others:
(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless circumstances otherwise
require; and provided further, that the appropriate bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees shall
not
include supervisory employees and/or security guards;
Both rules, barring security guards from joining a rank and file organization, appear to have been carried
over from the old rules which implemented then Art. 245, LC:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of security personnel to join any labor organization. Security guards and other
personnel employed for the protection and security of the person, properties and premises of the
employer shall not be eligible for membership in any labor organization.
EO 111 (1986) was issued which eliminated the disqualification of security guards. What was retained was
the disqualification of managerial employees, renumbered as Art. 245. (previously Art. 246).
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to joint any labor organization. Managerial employees are
not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.
With the elimination, security guards were thus free to join a rank and file organization.
RA 6715 (1989) was passed. Sec. 18 thereof amended Art. 245, LC:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory
employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist, or form separate labor organizations of their own.
The second sentence of Art. 245 embodies an amendment disqualifying supervisory employees from
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees. It does not include security guards in
the disqualification.
The IRR of RA 6715, therefore, insofar as they disqualify security guards from joining a rank and file
organization are null and void, for being not germane to the object and purposes of EO 111 and RA 6715
upon which such rules purportedly derive statutory moorings.
While therefore under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining a labor organization of the
rank and file, under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or that of the
supervisory union, depending on their rank. By accommodating supervisory employees, the Secretary of
Labor must likewise apply the provisions of RA 6715 to security guards by favorably allowing them free
access to a labor organization, whether rank and file or supervisory, in recognition of their constitutional
right to self-organization.
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We are aware however of possible consequences in the implementation of the law in allowing security
personnel to join labor unions within the company they serve. The law is apt to produce divided loyalties in
the faithful performance of their duties. Economic reasons would present the employees concerned with
the temptation to subordinate their duties to the allegiance they owe the union of which they are members,
aware as they are that it is usually union action that obtains for them increased pecuniary benefits.
Thus, in the event of a strike declared by their union, security personnel may neglect or outrightly abandon
their duties, such as protection of property of their employer and the persons of its officials and employees,
the control of access to the employer's premises, and the maintenance of order in the event of
emergencies and untoward incidents.
It is hoped that the corresponding amendatory and/or suppletory laws be passed by Congress to avoid
possible conflict of interest in security personnel.
D. Excluded Employees/Workers
1. Managerial Employees
Paper Industries Corp. vs. Hon. Laguesma

April 12, 2000 | De Leon, Jr. J.
FACTS:
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) is engaged in the manufacture of paper and timber
products, with principal place of operations at Tabon, Surigao del Sur.
Of its over 9000 employees, 944 were supervisory and technical staff employees, more or less 487 of
whom are signatory members of PICOP-Bislig Supervisory and Technical Staff Employees Union
(PBSTSEU)
On Aug. 9, 1989, PBSTSEU instituted a Petition for Certification Election to determine the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP for CBA purposes.
Initial hearing set on Aug. 18, 1989 but it was reset to Aug. 25, 1989 at the instance of PICOP, as it
requested a 15-day period within which to file its comments and/or position paper. But PICOP failed to file.
Meanwhile, Federation of Free Workers (FFW) and Associated Labor Union (ALU) filed their petitions for
intervention.
On Sept. 4, 1989, Med-Arbiter issued an Order granting the petitions for intervention filed by FFW and ALU.
On the same day, an order was issued setting the holding of a certification election among PICOPs
supervisory and technical staff employees in Tabon, Surigao del Sur with 4 choices, namely: PBSTSEU,
FFW, ALU and no union.
On Sept. 21, 1989, PICOP appealed the Order which set the holding of the election saying that Med-Arbiter
committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding the case without giving PICOP the opportunity to file its
comments/answer, and that PBSTSEU had no personality to file the petition for certification election.
SOLE issued a Resolution which upheld the Med-Arbiters Order, with modification allowing the supervising
and staff employees in Cebu, Davao and Iligan City to participate in the certification election.
During the pre-election conference on Jan. 18, 1990, PICOP questioned and objected to the inclusion of
some section heads and supervisors in the list of voters whose positions it averred were reclassified as
managerial employees in the light of the decentralization and reorganization program effected by it.
Under the Revised Organizational Structure of the PICOP, the company was divided into 4 main
business groups: Paper Products Business, Timber Products Business, Forest Resource Business and
Support Services Business
A VP or AVP heads each group
A division manager heads the divisions comprising each business group
A department manager heads the departments comprising each division
Section heads and supervisors, now called section managers and unit managers, head the sections
and independent units, respectively, comprising each department
PICOP advanced the view that considering the alleged present authority of these section managers and
unit managers to hire and fire, they are classified as managerial employees, and hence, ineligible to form or
join any labor organization under Art 245 of the Labor Code.
Furthermore, PICOP claims that no malice should be imputed against it for implementing the
decentralization program only after the petition for certification election was filed inasmuch as the same
is a valid exercise of its management prerogative, and that said program has long been in the drawing
boards of the company, which was realized only in 1989 and fully implemented in 1991.
Lastly, PICOP stresses that it could not have conceptualized the decentralization program for the only
purpose of thwarting the right of the concerned employees to self-organization.
ISSUE: W/N the section heads and supervisors are managerial employees? NO
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In Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma, Court elucidated on the term managerial employees.
Managerial employees are ranked as follows:
Top Managers - have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and operational
policies
Middle Managers - same as Top Managers
First Line Managers - task is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file
employees of an organization
Under this distinction, managerial employees therefore fall into 2 categories, namely: managers per se
composed of Top and Middle Managers, and the supervisors composed of First Line Managers.
Thus, the mere fact that an employee is designated manager does not ipso facto make him one.
Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee, for it is the job description
that determines the nature of employment.
Here, upon review of the job description of the concerned supervisory employees and section heads
indisputably show that they are NOT actually managerial but only SUPERVISORY employees since they
do not lay down company policies.
PICOPs contention that the subject section heads and unit managers exercise the authority to hire and fire
is ambiguous and quite misleading for any authority they exercise is not supreme but merely advisory in
character.
Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies inasmuch as any action taken by them on matter
relative to hiring, promotion, transfer, suspension and termination of employees is still subject to
confirmation and approval by their respective superior.
THUS, where such power, which is in effect RECOMMENDATORY in character, is subject to evaluation,
review and final action by the department heads and other higher executives in the company, the same,
although present, is not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.
Finally, the fact that PICOP voiced out its objection to the holding of the certification election, despite the
numerous opportunities to ventilate the same, only after Laguesma affirmed the holding thereof, simply
bolstered the conclusion that PICOP raised the issue to prevent and thwart the concerned section heads
and supervisory employees from exercising their right.
Needless to stress, no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections, for it is a statutory
policy that should not be circumvented.
ISSUE: W/N PICOP was denied due process, when the DOLE disregarded the documentary evidence
it has submitted? NO.
No denial of due process by Undersecretary when he denied to allow PICOP to present additional evidence
on the implementation of its program so much as in the appeal before him, PICOP even then had already
submitted voluminous supporting documents, position papers and exhibits that dealt with the main thesis it
relied upon. What the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be head. PICOP has long harped on its
contentions and these were dealt upon and resolved in detail by Undersecretary Laguesma.
AD Gothong Manufacturing vs. Confesor

November 16, 1999 | GONZAGA-REYES, J.
FACTS:
A.D. Gothong Manufacturing Corporation Employees Union-ALU filed petition for certification election in its
bid to represent the unorganized regular rank-and-file employees of A. D. Gothong Manufacturing
Corporation excluding its office staff and personnel.
The Company opposed the petition as it excluded office personnel who are rank and file employees.
In the inclusion-exclusion proceedings, the parties agreed to the inclusion of Romulo Plaza and Paul
Michael Yap in the list of eligible voters on condition that their votes are considered challenged on the
ground that they were supervisory employees.
Med-Arbiter: Plaza and Yap are rank-and-file employees.
Secretary of Labor: Affirmed
Petitioner argues that Plaza and Yap are supervisors who are disqualified to join the proposed bargaining
unit for rank-and-file employees.
Respondent, on the other hand, claim that they are rank-and-file employees. Plaza claimed that he was a
mere salesman based in Cebu, and Yap argued that he is a mere expediter whose job includes the
facilitation of the processing of the bills of lading of all intended company shipments.
ISSUE: W/N Yap and Plaza were rank-and-file employees - YES. Med-Arbiter and Secretary of Labor Affirmed.
Two principal groups of employees under the Labor Code: managerial and rank-and-file.
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Art. 212 (m) - Managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively
recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical
in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the
above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.
Elements to be a member of the managerial staff:
primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies
customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment in the performance of his
functions
regularly and directly assists in the management of the establishment
does not devote more than twenty percent of his time to work other than those described above
Franklin Baker Company v. Trajano: The test of supervisory or managerial status depends on whether a
person possess authority to act in the interest of his employer in the matter specified in Article 212 (k) of the
Labor Code and Section 1 (m) of its Implementing Rules and whether such authority is not merely routinary
or clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
Evidence does not prove that Yap and Plaza recommended any managerial action which would require
independent judgment.
2. Confidential Employees
Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery vs. Asia Brewery Inc.

August 3, 1010 | Villarama, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc. (ABI) is engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of beer, shandy,
bottled water and glass products. ABI entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), effective for
five (5) years from August 1, 1997 to July 31, 2002, with Bisig at Lakas ng mga Manggagawa sa AsiaIndependent (BLMA-INDEPENDENT), the exclusive bargaining representative of ABIs rank-and-file
employees.
On October 3, 2000, ABI and BLMA-INDEPENDENT signed a renegotiated CBA effective from August 1,
2000 to 31 July 2003. Under it, it was stipulated that the bargaining unit shall be comprised of all regular
rank-and-file daily-paid employees of the COMPANY. However, certain positions shall be excluded from the
bargaining unit.
ABIs management stopped deducting union dues from eighty-one (81) employees, believing that their
membership in BLMA- INDEPENDENT violated the CBA. BLMA-INDEPENDENT claimed that ABIs actions
restrained the employees right to self-organization and brought the matter to the grievance machinery.
As the parties failed to amicably settle the controversy, BLMA-INDEPENDENT lodged a complaint before
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
Voluntary Arbitrator sustained the BLMA-INDEPENDENT after finding that the records submitted by ABI
showed that the positions of the subject employees qualify under the rank-and-file category because
their functions are merely routinary and clerical, not managerial or supervisory.
CA: Reversed.
BLMA-INDEPENDENT filed a motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, a certification election was held on August 10, 2002 wherein petitioner Tunay na
Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia (TPMA) won.
Petitioner filed with the CA an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the decision and intervention, with
attached petition signed by the union officers. Both motions were denied by the CA.
ISSUE: W/N THE 81 EMPLOYEES ARE EXCLUDED FROM AND ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR INCLUSION IN
THE BARGAINING UNIT AS DEFINED IN SECTION 2, ARTICLE 1 OF THE CBA. YES
Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization
to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those
who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to
managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.
The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join any labor organization is similar to the
inhibition for managerial employees because if allowed to be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be
assured of their loyalty in view of evident conflict of interests and the Union can also become company
denominated with the presence of managerial employees in the Union membership. Having access to
confidential information, confidential employees may also become the source of undue advantage. Said
employees may act as a spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.
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Here, Job descriptions of these secretaries/clerks reveals that their assigned duties and responsibilities
involve routine activities of recording and monitoring, and other paper works for their respective
departments while secretarial tasks such as receiving telephone calls and filing of office correspondence
appear to have been commonly imposed as additional duties.
Respondent failed to indicate who among these numerous secretaries/clerks have access to confidential
data relating to management policies that could give rise to potential conflict of interest with their Union
membership.
While it may be argued that quality control extends to post-production phase -- proper packaging of the
finished products -- no evidence was presented by the respondent to prove that these daily- paid checkers
actually form part of the companys Quality Control Staff who as such were exposed to sensitive, vital and
confidential information about [companys] products or have knowledge of mixtures of the products, their
defects, and even their formulas which are considered trade secrets.
Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons
who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two (2)
criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee
that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the
supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from
bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management
policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by theconfidential
employee rule.
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The prohibited acts are
related to the workers right to self organization and to the observance of a CBA. For a charge of unfair
labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that ABI was motivated by ill will, bad faith, or fraud, or was
oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course,
that social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety resulted x x x
Considering that the herein dispute arose from a simple disagreement in the interpretation of the CBA
provision on excluded employees from the bargaining unit, respondent cannot be said to have committed
unfair labor practice that restrained its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, nor have
thereby demonstrated an anti-union stance.
Pepsi-Cola vs. SOLE

August 10, 1999 | Purisima, J.
FACTS:
June 1990 Pepsi Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a petition for certification election
seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi Cola
July 12, 1990 Med Arbiter granted the petition, explicitly saying that it was an affiliate of Union de Obreros
Estivadores de Filipinas (Federation) together with two rank-and-file employee unions (PEUP and PCLU)
July 23, 1990 Pepsi filed petition to set, aside, cancel and/or revoke charter with Bureau of Labor
Relations on the grounds that: 1) Union members were managers and 2) Supervisors union cannot affiliate
with a federation whose members include rank-and-file union of the same company.
ISSUE: W/N a supervisors union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two (2) rank and file unions
are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code? NO.
The limitation set forth in Art 245 is not confined to a supervisor wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The
prohibition extends to a supervisors local union applying for membership in a national federation the
members of which include local unions of rank and file employees.
The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors will be comingling with
those employees whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit
ISSUE: W/N confidential employees can join the labor union of the rank and file? NO.
A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling,
or care and protection of the employers property.
While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any
labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly
disqualified.
Rationale: In the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of
the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interest are well protected. The employer
is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union members.
If confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could
be governed by their own motives rather than the interest of the employers.
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Test to determine w/n an employee is a confidential employee: What is essential is the nature of the
employees function and not the nomenclature or title given to the job which determines whether the
employee has rank and file or managerial status, or whether he is a supervisory employee.
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union vs. Standard Chartered Bank

April 22, 2008 | Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner and the Standard Chartered Bank (Bank) began negotiating for a new Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) in May 2000 as their 1998-2000 CBA already expired. Due to a deadlock in the
negotiations, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike prompting the Secretary of Labor and Employment to
assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
SOLE issued an order directing the parties to execute their CBA effective April 2001 to March 30, 2003
incorporating all those theyve agreed upon and dismissing the claim of ULP.
MRs were filed; both were dismissed.
ISSUE: W/N the scope for exclusions should be revised? YES!
The CBA provisions in dispute are the exclusion of certain employees from the appropriate bargaining unit
and the adjustment of remuneration for employees serving in an acting capacity for one month.
Petitioner sought the exclusion of only the following employees from the appropriate bargaining unit
all managers who are vested with the right to hire and fire employees, confidential employees, those
with access to labor relations materials, Chief Cashiers, Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex
Department and one Human Resources (HR) staff.
The disqualification of managerial and confidential employees from joining a bargaining unit for rank and
file employees is already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. While Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the
ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has
extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of
work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise
privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.
NATU v. Torres: Bank cashiers are confidential employees having control, custody and/or access to
confidential matters, e.g., the branch's cash position, statements of financial condition, vault combination,
cash codes for telegraphic transfers, demand drafts and other negotiable instruments, pursuant to Sec.
1166.4 of the Central Bank Manual regarding joint custody, and therefore, disqualified from joining or
assisting a union; or joining, assisting or forming any other labor organization.
Golden-Farms v. Ferrer-Calleja: Radio and telegraph operators, having access to confidential information,
are confidential employees, as they may become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act
as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.
Phillips Industrial Devt. v. NLRC: Personnel staff, in which human resources staff may be qualified, are
confidential employees because by the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential
capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the
field of labor relations.
3. Worker-Members Cooperative
CENECO vs. DOLE

September 13, 1991 | Regalado, J.
FACTS:
Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CENECO) entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
CENECO Union of Rational Employees (CURE), a labor union representing its rank-and-file employees,
providing for a term of three years retroactive to April 1, 1987 and extending up to March 31, 1990
Before expiration of the CBA, CURE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiations be conducted for a new
collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
CENECO denied CURE's request on the ground that, under applicable decisions of the Supreme Court,
employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join a
union.
Prior to the submission of the proposal for CBA renegotiation, CURE members approved Resolution No. 35
whereby it was agreed that 'all union members shall withdraw, retract, or recall the union members'
membership from Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. in order to avail (of) the full benefits under the
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existing Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by and between CENECO and CURE, and the
supposed benefits that our union may avail (of) under the renewed CBA.
However, the withdrawal from membership was denied by CENECO on the grounds that the basis of
withdrawal is not among the grounds covered by Board Resolution No. 5023, dated November 22, 1989
and that said request is contrary to Board Resolution No. 5033 dated December 13, 1989,
Because of this, CURE filed a petition for direct recognition or for certification election, supported by 282 or
72% of the 388 rank-and-file employees in the bargaining unit of CENECO.
CENECO filed a motion to dismiss: there are legal constraints to the filing of the certification election, citing
the ruling laid down in Batangas I Electric Cooperative Labor Union vs. Romeo A. Young , that "employees
who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join unions for
purposes of collective bargaining agreement, for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his coowners.
Med-Arbiter Serapio issued an order: granting petition for certification election and directing the holding of a
certification election between CURE and No Union
CENECO appealed to DOLE which issued assailed order: directly certifying CURE as the exclusive
bargaining rep of the rank-and-file employees
Petitioner contention: CENECO avers that the med-arbiter has no jurisdiction to rule on the issue of
withdrawal from membership of its employees in the cooperative which, it claims, is properly vested in the
NEA which has control and supervision over all electric cooperatives.
ISSUE: W/N employees of CENECO may withdraw membership from the cooperative in order to join a labor
union for purposes of negotiating a new CBA? YES
Under Article 256 of the Labor Code, to have a valid certification election at least a majority of all eligible
voters in the unit must have cast their votes. It is apparent that incidental to the power of the med-arbiter to
hear and decide representation cases is the power to determine who the eligible voters are. In so doing, it
is axiomatic that the med-arbiter should determine the legality of the employees' membership in the union.
In the case at bar, it obviously becomes necessary to consider first the propriety of the employees'
membership withdrawal from the cooperative before a certification election can be had.
Lastly, it is petitioner herein who is actually questioning the propriety of the withdrawal of its members from
the cooperative. Petitioner could have brought the matter before the NEA if it wanted to and if such remedy
had really been available, and there is nothing to prevent it from doing so. It would be absurd to fault the
employees for the neglect or laxity of petitioner in protecting its own interests.
Nowhere in the cited Batangas case is it stated that member-employees are prohibited from withdrawing
their membership in the cooperative in order to join a labor union
Article I, Section 9 of the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of CENECO: any member may withdraw
from membership upon compliance with such uniform terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe ;
What is prescribed: upon withdrawal, member is merely required to surrender member certificate and he is
to be refunded his membership fee less any obligation
There being no other condition or requirement imposed upon withdrawing member, no just cause for
petitioner s denial of the withdrawal from membership of those who are also members of the union
Membership in the cooperative is on voluntary basis, withdrawal therefrom cannot be restricted
unnecessarily the right to join an organization necessarily includes equivalent right not to join
The right of employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal from the
cooperative must be allowed: resignation of member-employees is an expression of their preference for
union membership over that of membership in the cooperative
Policy of State to afford full protection to labor and to promote primacy of free collective bargaining
mandates that employees right to form and join unions be accorded highest consideration
Membership in an electric cooperative which just vests in the member a right to vote during the annual
meeting is too trivial as compared to the primordial and more important constitutional right of employee to
join a union of his choice
390 employees represent very small percentage of cooperative s total membership (44,000); withdrawal of
negligible number would not adversely affect business concerns and operations of CENECO
4. Employees of International Organization
International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Hon. Calleja

September 20, 1990 | Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS:
This case is a consolidation of 2 petitions for certiorari involving the validity of the claim of immunity by the
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International Rice Research Institute, Inc.
(IRRI) from the application of Philippine labor laws.
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ICMC Case:
As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's
communist rule confronted the international community.
Because of this, an Agreement was forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for processing Indo-Chinese refugees
for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan
ICMC, one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center,
is an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines.
On 14 July 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members
employed by ICMC
ICMC opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with the
United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.
Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
BLR reversed and ordered certification of election. At that time, ICMC's request for recognition as a
specialized agency was still pending with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEFORAF).
Subsequently, ICMC was granted the status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic
privileges and immunities by the government, through DEFORAF.
ICMC then sought immediate dismissal of the certification election invoking the immunity expressly
granted but the same was denied by respondent BLR Director who, again, ordered the immediate
conduct of a pre-election conference.
Petition for certiorari.
IRRI Case:
The Philippine Government and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations signed a Memorandum of
Understanding establishing the International Rice Research Institute. It was intended to be an
autonomous, philanthropic, tax-free, non-profit, non-stock organization.
By virtue of PD No. 1620, promulgated on 19 April 1979, IRRI was granted the status, prerogatives,
privileges and immunities of an international organization.
The Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (OLALIA), is a legitimate labor
organization with an existing local union, the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI (Kapisanan,
for short).
On 20 April 1987, the Kapisanan filed a Petition for Direct Certification Election with Region IV, Regional
Office of DOLE.
IRRI opposed the petition invoking Pres. Decree No. 1620 conferring upon it the status of an
international organization and granting it immunity from all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings
under Philippine laws.
Med-Arbiter Garcia: Dismissed the Petition for Certification.
BLR Director Calleja: Authorized the calling of a certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of IRRI. She relied on Article 243 of the Labor Code, as amended and Article XIII, Section 3
of the 1987 Constitution, and held that "the immunities and privileges granted to IRRI do not include
exemption from coverage of our Labor Laws."
Secretary of Labor: Set aside the BLR Director's Order, dismissed the Petition for Certification Election,
and held that the grant of specialized agency status by the Philippine Government to the IRRI bars
DOLE from assuming and exercising jurisdiction over IRRI.
Kapisanan filed this Petition for Certiorari.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
(ICMC case) ICMC in its defense cites: (1) its Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine
Government giving it the status of a specialized agency, (2) the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of Specialized Agencies, and (3) Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land.
Intervenor DEFORAF upholds ICMC'S claim of diplomatic immunity and seeks an affirmance of the
DEFORAF determination that the BLR Order for a certification election among the ICMC employees is
violative of the diplomatic immunity of said organization.
(IRRI CASE) Kapisanan contends that Article 3 of Pres. Decree No. 1620 granting IRRI the status,
privileges, prerogatives and immunities of an international organization, invoked by the Secretary of
Labor, is unconstitutional in so far as it deprives the Filipino workers of their fundamental and
constitutional right to form trade unions for the purpose of collective bargaining as enshrined in the
1987 Constitution.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
(ICMC CASE) Calleja and the Solicitor General cites State policy and Philippine labor laws to justify its
assailed Order, particularly, Article II, Section 18 and Article III, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution and
Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, as amended. In addition, she contends that a certification
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election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary, fact-finding character. It is not a
suit against ICMC its property, funds or assets, but is the sole concern of the workers themselves.
(IRRI Case) Secretary of Labor contends that given IRRIs status, DOLE does not have jurisdiction over
it. (The Solgen asked that he be excused for filing a comment because of his stand in the earlier ICMC
case.)
ISSUE: W/N the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunites to ICMC extends to immunity from the application
of Philippine labor laws.
The Court held that diplomatic immunity has, in fact, been granted ICMC and IRRI.
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine Government and ICMC provides that
ICMC shall have a status "similar to that of a specialized agency." The specialized agencies, their
property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of
legal process except insofar as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is,
however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
IRRI is similarly situated, Pres. Decree No. 1620, Article 3, is explicit in its grant of immunity from any
penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived
by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer
of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction.
There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to international
organizations:
international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by
any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are
responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are
represented
no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common
international funds;
the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the facilities for
the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by
the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their
international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and
interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department
of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of
international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by
the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered
performance of their functions.
ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which
are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, 14 Article III, Section 8, 15 and Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, relied on by the BLR Director
and by Kapisanan.
But they are not without recourse or remedy. For ICMC employees, whenever there are disputes to be
settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of
settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the
specialized agency is a party."
Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in fact, there
had been organized a forum for better management-employee relationship as evidenced by the formation
of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein "both management and employees
were and still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between
IRRI and its employees."
The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case
they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond
the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot
be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a series of events in the collective
bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably
involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and administrative proceedings."
Petition for Certication Election in both cases were dismissed.
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5. Non-employees
Singer Sewing Machine Corp. vs. Hon. Drilon

January 24, 1991 | Gutierrez, J.
FACTS:
SINGER MACHINE COLLECTORS UNION-BAGUIO (SIMACUB) filed a petition for direct certification as
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all collectors of the Singer Sewing Machine Company, Baguio City
branch.
The Company opposed the petition mainly on the ground that the union members are actually not
employees but are independent contractors as evidenced by the collection agency agreement which they
signed.
Med-Arbiter: There exists an employer-employee relationship between the union members and the
Company. The petition for certification election was granted.
Sec of Labor: Affirmed.
MR: Denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:
a) DOLE has no jurisdiction over the case since the existence of employer-employee relationship is at
issue;
b) Right of the Company to due process was denied when the evidence of the union members being
commission agents was disregarded by the Labor Secretary;
c) There exists no employer-employee relationship;
d) Commission agents are not employees but are independent contractors.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS:
The provisions of the Collection Agency Agreement belie the Company's position that the union members are
independent contractors. They "perform the most desirable and necessary activities for the continuous and
effective operations of the business of the Company" (Art. 280 LC). The termination of the agreement by the
Company pending the resolution of the case before the DOLE "only shows the weakness of the Companys
stand" and was "for the purpose of frustrating the rights of the members of the union to self-organization and
collective organization.
ISSUE: W/N the union members are employees of the Company and have the right to self-organization? NO,
they are independent contractors and, thus, have no right to organize for purposes of bargaining.
If the control test is not satisfied, there exists no employer-employee relationship. If the union members are
not employees, no right to organize for purposes of bargaining, nor to be certified as such bargaining agent
can ever be recognized.
The following elements are generally considered in the determination of the employer-employee
relationship; "(1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power
of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct although the latter is the most
important element
The Collection Agency Agreement defines the relationship between the Company and each of the union
members who signed the contract.
The Company relies on the stipulations in the agreements which provides that a collector is designated
as a collecting agent" who is to be considered at all times as an independent contractor and not
employee of the Company.
The union members rely on other features to strengthen their position that the collectors are
employees. They quote paragraph 2 which states that an agent shall utilize only receipt forms
authorized and issued by the Company. They also note paragraph 3 which states that an agent has to
submit and deliver at least once a week or as often as required a report of all collections made using
report forms furnished by the Company.
The nature of the relationship between a company and its collecting agents depends on the circumstances
of each particular relationship. Not all collecting agents are employees and neither are all collecting agents
independent contractors. The collectors could fall under either category depending on the facts of each
case.
The Agreement confirms the status of the collecting agent in as an independent contractor not only
because he is explicitly described as such but also because the provisions permit him to perform collection
services for the company without being subject to the control of the latter except only as to the result of his
work.
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The requirement that collection agents utilize only receipt forms and report forms issued by the Company
and that reports shall be submitted at least once a week is not necessarily an indication of control over the
means by which the job of collection is to be performed. The agreement itself specifically explains that
receipt forms shall be used for the purpose of avoiding a co-mingling of personal funds of the agent with
the money collected on behalf of the Company.
The monthly collection quota is a normal requirement found in similar contractual agreements and is so
stipulated to encourage a collecting agent to report at least the minimum amount of proceeds. Paragraph 5,
section b gives a bonus, aside from the regular commission every time the quota is reached. As a
requirement for the fulfillment of the contract, it is subject to agreement by both parties.
The assumption of jurisdiction by the DOLE over the case is justified as the case was brought on appeal by
the Company itself. Hence, the Company submitted itself as well as the issue of existence of an
employment relationship to the jurisdiction of the DOLE which was faced with a dispute on an application
for certification election.
Since the union members are not employees of the Company, they are not entitled to the constitutional
right to join or form a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. Accordingly, there is no
constitutional and legal basis for their "union" to be granted their petition for direct certification.
E. Party Protested
Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz
June 30, 1972 | Fernando, J.
IMPORTANT PEOPLE
Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works Inc (respondent), Mactan Workers Union (petitioner), Associated
Labor Union (intervenor)
FACTS
1. Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works Inc (CSEWI) in Lapu-Lapu City employed laborers and
employees belonging to 2 rival unions. 72 of these workers are affiliated with the Mactan Workers
Union and the rest were members of the intervenor Associated Labor Union (ALU).
2. Nov 28, 1964 CSEWI and the ALU entered into a CBA w/c provided that in Art XIII, the company
agreed to a profit-sharing bonus to the workers to be taken from 10% of the net profits derived from
direct operation of the shipyard and shop in Lapulapu and after deducting the income tax and the
bonus to the General Managers, Board of Directors, Corporate Secretary etc.
3. Such bonus was to be payable in 2 installments, the 1st would be payable in March and the 2nd
would be payable in June. The bonus would also be given to the workers and itll be ALUs duty to
furnish the company the receipts signed by the workers entitled to receive the bonus w/in a 60 day
period.
4. If a worker doesnt want to accept the said bonus, the ALU shall return the money received as profit
sharing to the company w/in 60 days from the receipt from the union.
5. In the year 1965, the first installment was given to ALU for distribution and subsequently the 2nd
installment was also delivered. However, the members of Mactan failed to receive their shares from
the 2nd installment because they did not go to the office of ALU to collect their shares.
6. After the stipulated 60 day period, the uncollected shares were then sent back to the corporation,
hence they filed a case w/ the RTC. Subsequently, the RTC ordered ALU to deliver to members of
Mactan their corresponding share.
7. Hence the appeal by the intervenors.
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. W/N the RTC erred in ordering ALU to give to the members of Mactan their share NO
a. All the RTC did was to see that the enforcement of the agreement between the parties
would be complied with. The terms of the CBA constitute law between the parties and those
who are entitled to the benefits can invoke its provisions.
b. The benefits of a CBA extend to the laborers and employees in the collective bargaining
unit. This means that the worker is entitled to the benefits even if he/she is not part of a
certain labor organization. A contrary view would be a form of discrimination.
c. United Restaurors Employees and Labor Union v Torres: the labor union that gets the
majority vote as the bargaining representative doesnt act for its members alone. It
represents all the employees in such a bargaining unit.
d. Bargaining units are the instrumentalities through w/c the welfare of the workers may be
promoted and fostered. It is the raison detre of labor unions.
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DISPOSITIVE PORTION
RTC decision affirmed
Digest from: Gab Mamauag
F. Sanctions for Violation of Right
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LABOR RELATIONS LAW

B. 1. Justification: Social Justice

B. 2. Foundation or basis: Police power of the State

B. 3. Ultimate goal: Industrial Peace

C. 7 Cardinal rights of workers; Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 3. par. 1 and 2

D. Management prerogative: Rule

Univ. of Immaculate Concepcion Inc. vs. SOLE ...............................................................................3

II. STATE POLICY: WORKER EMPOWERMENT - LABOR RELATIONS

A. Voluntary/Democratic Method of Dispute Settlement

Estate of Nelson R. Dulay vs. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc. ............................................................5

D. Adequate machinery for expeditious dispute settlement

FEU-Dr. NRMF, Inc. vs. Hon. Trajano............................................................................................. 13

Paper Industries Corp. vs. Hon. Laguesma.................................................................................... 18

Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz ..................................................................................................27

Mac Tongson | D2019

LABOR RELATIONS LAW

B. 1. Justification: Social Justice

B. 2. Foundation or basis: Police power of the State

C. 7 Cardinal rights of workers; Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 3. par. 1 and 2

A. Labor: a primary social economic force;

Mac Tongson | D2019

D. Management prerogative: Rule

Univ. of Immaculate Concepcion Inc. vs. SOLE

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II. STATE POLICY: WORKER EMPOWERMENT - LABOR

Estate of Nelson R. Dulay vs. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc.

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