Karl Louis E.

Constantino

November 23, 2016

B.A. Political Science IV

POL SCI 17

1. What is the principle of condonation of elected public official? Do you agree or disagree with
this principle?

The principle of condonation is a doctrine that many other elected officials had invoked
since 1959. Under the doctrine, the administrative offenses of an elected official are already
deemed forgiven when the public decides to re-elect him or her for another term. This subject has
come into public awareness and intense scrutiny when Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, Jr. invoked
the condonation doctrine to stop his suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman in connection
with the alleged overpricing of the Makati City Hall Parking building. The Supreme Court first
introduced the condonation doctrine into our jurisprudence in the case of then Mayor Arturo
Pascual vs. The Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, G.R. L-11959, in 1959. The Court stated that a
reelected public official cannot be removed from his position for an administrative misconduct
committed during his prior term because his reelection assumes that the people have forgiven
him, and removing him from office overrules the will of the people. But is condonation legal or
unconstitutional? It is unconstitutional in a sense that it usurps the constitutional power of the
President to grant pardon in administrative cases in the Executive branch of government and it
violates the constitutional provision Article II, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution mandating
that the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.

First argument it usurps the constitutional power of the President to grant pardon in
administrative cases in the Executive branch of government. A common theory of the
condonation doctrine is that when the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed
that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. But this antagonizes the constitutional
provision of the President, not a local electorate that has the power to grant pardon in
administrative cases. This is proven in Article VII, Section 19 of the 1987 Constitution states that
except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction
by final judgment. It was believed previously that the power of the President to grant pardon
was limited to criminal cases, and it is for this erroneous belief that the condonation doctrine in
administrative cases was introduced into our jurisprudence in 1959. But the power of the
President to grant pardon in both criminal and administrative cases has been affirmed by the

Supreme Court. In Llamas vs. Orbos, on October 15, 1991, the Supreme Court ruled that the
President has the power also to grant pardon in administrative cases. The ruling in Llamas vs.
Orbos recognizing the constitutional power of the President to grant pardon in administrative
cases renders the condonation doctrine unconstitutional because the doctrine erroneously grants
that power to a parochial or local electorate.

Second argument, it violates the constitutional provision Article II, Section 27 of the
1987 Constitution mandating that the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. A public official
convicted of administrative misconduct puts into question his honesty, damaging his reputation,
and impairing his performance to his duties as a public official. His continued stay in office, or
preventing his suspension, as allowed in the principle of condonation, negates the purpose of the
constitutional provision to maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption. Indeed, unscrupulous politicians have used the
condonation doctrine as a legal shield to subvert the prosecution of graft and corruption.