ITLE: Tanada v Tuvera

CITATION: L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136 SCRA 27

FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to
publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular
interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent
of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved.
The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said
petition for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein
is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering
the clause in Article 2 unless otherwise provided.
HELD:
Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the
publication requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified
for the law to become effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official
Gazette of all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to
provide the general public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate
actions and conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3

of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations
and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis
nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The
word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if
the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.

UMALI V. ESTANISLAO [209 S 446 (1992)] - Reiterating Tanada v. Tuvera, The clause "unless
it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen (15) day period shall be shortened or extended.

FARIAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Posted by kaye lee on 12:07 AM

G.R. 147387 December 10 2003 [En Banc]

FACTS:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.

Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in
expressed in its title.
The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting
of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for
office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering
them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the
subject matter of RA 9006.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the
Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of
the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an

act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope
of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not
received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it
cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of
the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the
members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of
Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting
their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision
repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest
G.R. No 127882

Facts :

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing
the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of
the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration,
development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of
mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval,
assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or
technical assistance agreements.

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two

newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No.
7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO)
No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This
was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the
DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from
receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and
void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and
null and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines,
Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.

Issue :

Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.

Ruling :
The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void:

(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:
Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for
purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral
processing permit.

(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said
section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement,

(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance
agreement;

(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance
agreement;

(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert
the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement;

(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial
and technical assistance agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing
provisions and cannot stand on their own:

(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical
assistance agreement.

Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance
agreement proposals;

Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;

The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a financial
and technical assistance agreement; and

Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors;

When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as
a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional, or connected, must fall with them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.