Hilton vs.

Guyot
(1895)
FACTS: Guyot, a Frenchman, sued Hilton, an American, in a French court for the
recovery of a sum of money.
The French court rendered judgment in favor of
Guyot. Plaintiff brought the action to a US court to recover the sum of money
adjudged by the French court to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment of a foreign nations court entitled to full credit
and has a conclusive effect when sued to other nation.
HELD: No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty
from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law of one nation, as put
in force within its territory, whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by
judicial decree shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation
depends upon the comity of nations.
A foreign judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued upon another
nation, but is a prima facie evidence only of the claim.

Gemperle vs. Schenker

G.R. No. L-18164; January 23, 1967
Facts:
This case was the result of William Gemperles retaliatory act when
respondent spouses Paul and Helen Schenker filed a case against him for the
enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the
Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights
to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the increase
thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages. Petitioner alleged that the said
complaint tainted his name as a businessman. He then filed a complaint for
damages and prays for the retraction of statements made by Helen Schenker.
BLOG_SUMMARY_END
Summons was personally served to Helen Schenker but not to Paul
Schenker. Helen then filed an answer with a counterclaim, but Paul Schenker filed a
motion to dismiss arguing that the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person
since admittedly, he is a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, and has not
been actually served with summons in the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Paul
Schenker.
Ruling:
Yes, although as a rule, when the defendant is a non-resident and in an
accion in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired
only through voluntary appearance or personal service of summons. But this case is
an exception to the said rule. The Supreme ratiocinated:
We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through
service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from
said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband
aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her behest, in
her aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had
authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was,
also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case,
like the of the one at bar, which is consequence of the action brought by her on his
behalf.
Briefly, in an accion in personam where the defendant is a non-resident, substituted
service of summons does not apply. However, by way of exception, substituted
service of summons may be effected, if the following requisites are present:
1.

The summons is served to the spouse of the defendant

2.

The spouse must be residing in the Philippines

3.
The spouse is appointed as attorney-in-fact of the spouse defendant in a
previous case involving the non-resident spouse.
BELEN V. CHAVEZ, G.R. NO 175334 (2008)
FACTS: Spouses Pacleb (private respondents) filed an action for the enforcement of
a foreign judgment against spouses Belen (petitioners). The complaint alleged that
the Pacleb secured a judgment by default rendered by Judge John W. Green of the
Superior Court of the State of California, which ordered the spouses Belen to pay
$56,204.69 representing loan repayment and share in the profits plus interest and
costs of suit. The summons was served on the Belens address in Laguna, as was
alleged in the complaint, and received by Marcelo M. Belen.
1. Spouses Belen filed an answer alleging that they were actually residents of
California and that their liability had already been extinguished via a release
abstract judgment issued in the collection case abroad.
2. For failure to attend the pre-trial conference, the RTC ordered the ex parte
presentation of evidence for Pacleb.
3. Belen subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss citing the judgment of dismissal
issued by the Superior Court of California; however the MTD was dismissed
for failure to submit a copy of the judgment of dismissal
4. Spouses Pacleb, for their part, filed for the amendment of the complaint,
stating that they withdrew the complaint (in California) because of the
prohibitive cost of litigation.
5. For failure of spouses Belen to appear in the rescheduled pre-trial conference,
RTC declared Belen in default and allowed the presentation of ex parte
evidence. In the meantime, the counsel (Alcantara) of petitioners died
without the RTC being informed of such fact. The RTC ruled against Belen and
ordered them to pay Pacleb
6. A copy of the decision was sent to Atty. Alcantara but was returned with the
notation addressee deceased. A copy of the same was then sent to the last
known address of spouses Belen in Laguna. Atty. Culvera, the new counsel of
spouses Belen, filed a motion to quash the Writ of Execution as well as a
notice of appeal. The RTC denied the same.
7. Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari (Rule 65) alleging that CA
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash
the writ of execution and notice of appeal despite sufficient legal bases in
support thereof.
ISSUE: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners through
either the proper service of summons or the appearance of Atty. Alcantara on behalf
of petitioners
HELD: Yes. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is
acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their
voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. As a rule, if
defendants have not been summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their
person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. To be bound by a
decision, a party should first be subject to the courts jurisdiction.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary

for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a
resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
personal service of summons as provided under Sec 7, Rule 14 ROC. If he cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may
be made in accordance with Sec 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the
country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted
service set forth in Sec 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of
court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner
the court may deem sufficient.
In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who
does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal
service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible
if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not found
therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and
therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An exception
was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a non-resident was served
with summons through his wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and
who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed
by him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the first case.
CAB: the records of the case reveal that spouses Belen were permanent residents
of California. It has been consistently maintained that they were not physically
resent in the Philippines. Therefore, the service of summons in the petitioners
address in Laguna was defective and did not serve to vest in court jurisdiction over
their person. Nevertheless, the CA correctly concluded that the appearance of Atty.
Alcantara and his filing of numerous pleadings were sufficient to vest such
jurisdiction. By supplying the court with various documents that could only have
been supplied by spouses Belen, implied authorization could be gleaned from such.
In sum, there was voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The running of the fifteen-day period for appeal did not commence upon the service
of the RTC decision at the address on record of Atty. Alcantara or at the Laguna
address. It is deemed served on petitioners only upon its receipt by Atty. Culvera on
29 December 2003. Therefore, the filing of the Notice of Appeal on 06 January 2004
is within the reglementary period and should be given due course.

Pennoyer vs Neff
Brief Fact Summary. Defendant Neff was being sued by Mitchell in Oregon for
unpaid legal fees. A default judgment was entered against Defendant for his failure
to come to court or otherwise resist the lawsuit, despite the fact that he was not
personally served with process, nor was a resident of Oregon. Later, in an attempt
to collect upon his judgment, Mitchell attached land located in Oregon belonging to
Defendant, and had it sold to Plaintiff Pennoyer through a Sheriffs sale.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Proceedings in a court of law to determine the personal
rights and obligations of parties over whom the court has not jurisdiction are invalid
for want of due process of law.
ContentBox-Law
Facts. Mitchell, a lawyer, sued Defendant, his client, in Oregon state court for
unpaid legal fees. At the time Defendant was a non-resident of the state who was
not personally served with process. Constructive service was issued upon Defendant
by publication. Defendant did not come to court or otherwise resist the lawsuit, and
default judgment was entered against him. After the default judgment, Defendant
acquired 300 acres of land in Oregon. To satisfy his judgment against Defendant,
Mitchell had the sheriff seize and sell Defendants land. The land was purchased by
Plaintiff, who received a sheriffs deed as evidence of title. The sheriff then turned
the sale proceeds over to Mitchell. Shortly after the sheriffs sale, Defendant
discovered what had happened to his land and brought suit against Plaintiff to
recover the land. This appeal followed after Defendant lost his suit against Plaintiff.
Issue. Can judgments obtained against non-residents who fail to appear in court be
sustained by default judgments where service of process is accomplished solely
through publication (i.e. constructive service)?
Is constructive service sufficient notice to attach property within the forum state
owned by a non-resident?
Held. No. The personal judgment recovered in the state court of Oregon against
Plaintiff was without validity, and the decision of the Court of Appeals overturning
that judgment was affirmed.
When a suit is merely in personam (i.e. against a person), constructive service

through publication upon a non-resident is ineffective.

No state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory. However, a state may subject property within its boundaries to
the payments of its citizens, even when the land is owned by a non-resident,
without infringing upon the sovereignty of the state of residency of the landowner.
ContentBox-Law
Discussion. Here the Supreme Court of the United States is distinguishing between
suits in personam, and in rem. An in personam suit is a suit against a person, whose
purpose is to determine the personal rights and obligations of the defendant. An in
rem action, meanwhile, is an action where jurisdiction pertains to property. Thus the
court reasoned that constructive service is sufficient to inform parties of action
taken against any properties owned by them within the forum state, because
property is always in possession of the owner, and seizure of the property will
inform the owner of legal action taken against him.

International shoe co. vs Washington

Brief Fact Summary. Defendant was an out of state company that employed
salesmen within the state of Washington. Washington sued Defendant to recover
unpaid unemployment taxes and served Defendant in two ways: (1) by mail and (2)
by serving one of its salesmen within the state. Defendant appealed from a verdict
for Washington, claiming that Washington had no personal jurisdiction over
Defendant.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. In order for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over
a defendant, the defendant must have such minimum contacts with the state so
that exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.
Facts. International Shoe Co., Defendant, was a company based in Delaware with
an office in St. Louis, Missouri. Defendant employed salesmen that resided in
Washington to sell their product in the state of Washington. Defendant regularly
shipped orders to the salesmen who accepted them, the salesmen would display
the products at places in Washington, and the salesmen were compensated by
commission for sale of the products. The salesmen were also reimbursed for the
cost of renting the places of business in Washington. Washington sued Defendant
after Defendant failed to make contributions to an unemployment compensation
fund exacted by state statutes. The Washington statute said that the commissioner
could issue personal service if Defendant was found within the state, or by mailing it
to Defendant if Defendant was not in the state. The notice of assessment was
served upon Defendants salesperson and a copy of the notice was mailed to
Defendant. Defendant appeared specially, moving to set aside the order that
service upon the salesperson was proper service. Defendant also argued that it did
not do business in the state, that there was no agent upon which service could be
made, and that Defendant did not furnish employment within the meaning of the
statute. Defendant also argued that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and imposed a prohibitive burden of interstate

commerce. The trial court found for Washington and the Supreme Court of
Washington affirmed, reasoning that the continuous flow of Defendants product
into Washington was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Defendant
appealed.
Issue. Is service of process upon Defendants agent sufficient notice when the
corporations activities result in a large volume of interstate business so that the
corporation receives the protection of the laws of the state and the suit is related to
the activities which make the corporation present?
Held. Yes. Affirmed. The general rule is that in order to have jurisdiction with
someone outside the state, the person must have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. For a corporation, the minimum contacts required are
not just continuous and systematic activities but also those that give rise to the
liabilities sued on. Defendant could have sued someone in Washington. It was
afforded the protection of the laws of that state, and therefore it should be subject
to suit.
Dissent. The states power to tax should not be qualified by an ambiguous
statement regarding fair play and substantial justice.
Discussion. This decision articulates the rule for determining whether a state has
personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant via the minimum contacts test. In
general, International Shoe demonstrates that contacts with a state should be
evaluated in terms of how fair it would be to exercise jurisdiction over an absent
defendant.
---------------------------Mullane vs central Hanover bank and trust co.
Brief Fact Summary. Appellee, a bank located in New York, set up a trust covering
113 participants and sent notice by publication to all known and unknown
beneficiaries regarding Appellees application for judicial settlement of the trust, as
required under a New York statute. Upon first distribution of the trust, Appellee
would mail notice to known beneficiaries that could benefit from the interest or
principal. Appellant, guardian of the beneficiaries, appealed, arguing that notice by
publication alone violated the beneficiaries due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Notice must be reasonably calculated under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the action and give them an
opportunity to object.
Facts. Appellee, Central Hanover Bank & Trust, set up common fund pursuant to a
New York statute allowing the creation of common funds for distribution of judicial
settlement trusts. There were 113 participating trusts. Appellee petitioned for
settlement of its first account as common trustee. Some of the beneficiaries were
not residents of New York. Notice was by publication for four weeks in a local
newspaper. Appellee had notified those people by mail that were of full age and
sound mind who would be entitled to share in the principal if the interest they held

became distributable. Appellant was appointed as special guardian and attorney for
all persons known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had or might thereafter
have any interest in the income of the common trust fund. Appellee was appointed
to represent those interested in the principal. Appellant appeared specially,
objecting that notice by publication, permitted under the applicable statute was
inadequate to afford t
he beneficiaries due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and that therefore
jurisdiction was lacking.
Issue. Is notice by publication of a judicial settlement to unknown beneficiaries of a
common trust reasonable notice under the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Is notice by publication to all of the beneficiaries of a common trust whose
residences are known reasonable notice under the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Held. First issue: Yyes. Second issue: Nno.
Whether or not the action is in personam or in rem, the court can determine the
interests of all claimants as long as there is a procedure allowing for notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
There has to be notice and opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case. The claimants at issue could potentially be deprived of property here, as
the proposed disposition cuts off their rights to sue for negligent or illegal
impairments of their interests. In addition, the courts decision appoints someone
who, without their knowledge, could use the trust to obtain the fees and expenses
necessary for a sham proceeding.
There need not be personal service because the state has an interest in settling
trusts. Notice has to be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pending action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections. You do not have to notify all the beneficiaries when the
trust concerns many small interests. Sending notice to most of them will protect
their interests sufficiently.
The New York Banking Law, however, that does not require notice to all persons
whose whereabouts are known, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because contacting beneficiaries by mail at their last known address is
not particularly burdensome.
Discussion. The majoritys opinion illustrates that notice by publication will not
suffice only because it would be burdensome for the plaintiff to notify all parties
involved. If the plaintiff knows of a way to contact the parties, then the plaintiff
must bear that expense. Mailing notice to an address, if known, will suffice. Notice
by publication will suffice only if there is no practical way of knowing the identity or
location of the party.

Shaffer v. Heitner
SCOTUS - 1977 (433 U.S. 186)
Facts:
P (non-resident of DE) owned one share of stock in Greyhound, a business
incorporated in DE.
P filed a shareholder's derivative suit against Greyhound and its board of directors
(Ds) claiming that they should be held liable for letting Greyhound lose in a private
antitrust lawsuit.
The activities that led to that antitrust suit took place in OR.
P also filed motion for an order of sequestration of the DE property of the Ds. P
seized 82k shares of Greyhound stock even though none of the stock certificates
were physically in DE.
Ds moved to vacate the sequestration order and quash service of process.

Procedural History:
Lower court found for P.
DE Supreme Court affirmed, found for P.
SCOTUS reversed, found for D, no jurisdiction.
Issues:
Can a state obtain personal jurisdiction over a party if that party owns property in
that state?
Is quasi in rem jurisdiction subject to the "minimum contacts" analysis outlined in
International Shoe?
Holding/Rule:
A state cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over a party based on the single fact that
the party owns property in that state.
Quasi in rem jurisdiction is subject to the "minimum contacts" analysis outlined in
International Shoe.
Reasoning:
A state's interest in assuring the marketability of property within its borders and in
providing a procedure for resolution of disputes about that property would support
jurisdiction.
Property in a state may favor jurisdiction in cases where the suit arises out of
ownership and rights relating to that property.
In rem jurisdiction requires "minimum contacts" analysis as well.
The only role played by the property in this case is to provide the basis for bringing
the Ds into court. That property is not the subject matter of the litigation or the
underlying cause of action.
One who purchases shares of stock in a company cannot reasonably foresee being
haled into court in the state where the company is incorporated.

IDONAH PERKINS vs. ROXAS ET AL.GRN 47517, June 27, 1941

FACTS:
July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila against
the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of a sum consisting of
dividends which have been declared and made payable on shares of stock
registered in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the company, and
for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares to the

exclusion of all others. The company alleged, by way of defense that the
withholding of plaintiffs right to the disposal and control of the shares was due to
certain demands made with respect to said shares by the petitioner Idonah Perkins,
and by one Engelhard.
Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants petitioner,
Idonah Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah
Perkins and H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in
question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon. Summons by publication
were served upon the nonresident defendants Idonah Perkins and Engelhard.
Engelhard filed his answer. Petitioner filed her answer with a crosscomplaint in
which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against respondent Eugene
Perkins, from the SC of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the
sole legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in
question with all the cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company.
Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of the action, because the alleged judgment of the SC of
the State of New York is res judicata. Petitioners demurrer was overruled, thus this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the SC of
New York and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by
the respondent, Eugene Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action.
RULING:
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action
and of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in
authority specially conferred. In the present case, the amended complaint filed by
the respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the adjudication of title to certain
shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and the granting of
affirmative reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila.
Similarly CFI- Manila is empowered to adjudicate the several demands contained in
petitioners crosscomplaint.
Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the SC of the
State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment enforcing that New
York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized
by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of
Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila, to
adjudicate, settle and determine.
The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment
annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this
petitioners favor by the courts of the State of New York, which decision is res
judicata on all the questions constituting the subject matter of civil case and
argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the
proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the
petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the merits of the
controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not

to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the
tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the
course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment can be
reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner here
anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court and the rightful
exercise of its jurisdiction.
Petition denied.