PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN
(SPECIAL DIVISION), JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, JOSE JINGGOY
ESTRADA and ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, respondents.

On March 24, 2003, public respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan

denied petitioners Motion for Three Days Hearing Per Week whereby the Office
of the Special Prosecutor sought to hasten the trial before said court of Criminal
Cases Nos. 26558, 26565, and 26905, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al. Public respondent also denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration. Hence, petitioner through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor now comes to this Court in this petition for certiorari and mandamus
to assail the denial of its petition and to compel public respondent to conduct
three hearings of the cited cases each week.

Originally, public respondent conducted trial hearings twice a week, from 9:00
a.m. to 12:00 noon.[1] Later, on February 26, 2002, public respondent issued a
Resolution modifying this six-hours-per-week schedule. Public respondent
ordered that starting March 18, 2002, the cases would be heard thrice a week,
every Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon.[2]

Although this schedule could have expedited the proceedings, it was never
implemented. Shortly after the order was issued, private respondents former
President Joseph Estrada and Jose Jinggoy Estrada dismissed their counsel de
parte. Counsel de oficio had to be appointed and trial did not resume until April
17, 2002.[3]

Determined to expedite the prosecution of the cases, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor started insisting on additional hearing days. The newly-appointed
counsel de oficio, however, needed time to study the cases so the Office of the
Special Prosecutor opted instead to agree to private respondents proposition that
hearings be extended to five hours a day. The parties agreed that starting May 8,
2002, hearings shall be from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. twice a week or for a total of
ten hours per week. Criminal Case No. 26558, for Plunder, and Criminal Case
No. 26565, for Illegal Use of Alias, would be heard every Monday while Criminal

Case No. 26905, for Perjury, was to be heard every Wednesday. On April 22,
2002, public respondent issued an Order adopting the agreement as new trial
schedule. Thereafter, this schedule was consistently followed starting May 8,
2002.

When the longer hearings still did not result in expedited proceedings, the Office
of the Special Prosecutor filed on March 21, 2003, the abovementioned Motion
for Three Days Hearing Per Week.[4] The Office of the Special Prosecutor asked
public respondent to implement the schedule provided in the February 26, 2002,
Resolution.

On March 24, 2003, public respondent denied the motion.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for reconsideration of the denial,[6]
citing this Courts ruling in A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC and A.M. No. SB-02-10-J that
[t]he setting of the hearing of the plunder case three times a week is in order, not
only because the case is of national concern, but more importantly, because the
accused are presently detained.[7]

On May 13, 2003, this motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.[8] Hence,
this petition.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor relies on the following grounds:

Public respondent Sandiganbayan clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Order dated
March 24, 2003 and Resolution dated May [13], 2003 in Criminal Cases Nos.
26558, 26565, and 26905, considering that:

A. The Honorable Court, in its Decision dated January 16, 2003 in A.M. No. 0112-01-SC and A.M. No. SB-02-10-J has already mandated that holding of threeday-per-week hearings in the Plunder case.

B. The Honorable Court, in its earlier Resolution dated January 21, 2002 in A.M.
No. 02-1-07-SC entitled Re: Request of Accused Through Counsel for Creation
of a Special Division to Try the Plunder Case (SB Crim. Case No. 26558 and
related cases) has previously mandated the speedy trial of the Plunder and
related cases and has further mandated that said cases be heard, tried, and
decided with dispatch.

C. Public respondent Sandiganbayan, in issuing the questioned Order dated

March 24, 2003 and Resolution dated May [13], 2003, has not complied with the
clear mandates issued by the Honorable Court to hold three-day-per-week
hearings in the Plunder and related cases and to hear, try and decide with
dispatch said cases.

D. The law mandates continuous trial especially in detention cases.

E. National interest requires the speedy resolution of the Plunder case.

F. Public respondent Sandiganbayans questioned Order of March 24, 2003 and

Resolution dated May [13], 2002 would add to the undue delay caused by private
respondent Estradas in Plunder and related cases.

Essentially, for our resolution is the question, whether public respondent

Sandiganbayan, Special Division, committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering two trial days per week instead of three.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor argues that this Court has mandated in A.M.
No. 01-12-01-SC and A.M. No. SB-02-10-J that Criminal Case No. 26558, for
Plunder, be heard three times a week. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
likewise stresses that in A.M. No. 02-1-07-SC, this Court has directed public
respondent to hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder and all related
cases against former President Estrada and his co-accused. Considering that the

consolidation of Criminal Case No. 26905, for Perjury, and Criminal Case No.
26565, for Illegal Use of Alias, encroached into the hearing days for the Plunder
case, public respondent should not have refused to order more hearings days
per week. That public respondent refused to order more hearings per week was
grave abuse of discretion, according to the Office of the Special Prosecutor.[9]

The Office of the Special Prosecutor likewise laments public respondents failure
to consider that counsels for private respondents had been employing every bit
of dilatory technique they could imagine.[10]

The petition is devoid of merit.

Grave abuse of discretion, required as the sole ground for petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, has a defined meaning. It is the arbitrary or
despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility or the
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion
or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[11]

For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion,
the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.[12] Grave abuse of discretion
cannot be made gratuitously, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor does a
disservice to the fair and prompt administration of justice when that Office fails to
substantiate its charge.

The excerpts of this Courts decision in A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC and A.M. No. SB02-10-J -- on which the Office of the Special Prosecutor relies -- cannot support
its contentions. The issue discussed in the cited portion of A.M. No. SB-02-10-J
was limited to whether Justices Anacleto D. Badoy and Teresita Leonardo-De
Castro were administratively liable for misconduct for setting the hearing of the
plunder case three times a week, at one oclock in the afternoon, without prior
consultation with the defense counsel.

On that limited issue, this Court ruled as follows:

The setting of the hearing of the plunder case three times a week is in order, not
only because the case is of national concern, but more importantly, because the
accused are presently detained. Contrary to complainants assertions, the
continuous trial is in accordance with the mandate of the law. This Court, in
Administrative Circular No. 3-90 dated January 31, 1990, ordered all trial courts
to adopt the mandatory continuous trial system in accordance with Administrative
Circular No. 4 dated September 22, 1988 and Circular No. 1-89 dated January
19, 1989. It was adopted precisely to minimize delay in the processing of cases.
This delay was attributed to the common practice of piecemeal trial wherein
cases are set for trial one day at a time and thereafter the hearing is postponed
to another date or dates until all the parties have finished their presentation of
evidence. Section 2 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:

SEC. 2 Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.Trial once commenced

shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be
postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultations with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set
the case for continuous trial on weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the
earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire
period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.

Corollarily, the consultations referred to in the foregoing provisions does not

necessarily mean that the court has to secure first from the prosecution and
defense their approval before it can set the date of hearing. To rule otherwise is
to subject our trial system to the control of the parties and their counsel.

Complainants also assail respondents act of setting the hearing at one oclock in
the afternoon. Again, there is nothing irregular in it. The schedule of hearing is
regarded as a matter necessarily at the discretion of the trial judge. As a matter

of fact, a court may even hold night sessions, and a court of review will not
interfere unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of the power of
the judge and that injustice has been done. This is because the good of the
service demands more toil and less idleness, and the limitations imposed by law
are aimed to cut indolence and not the other way around.[13]

In so declaring the thrice-a-week schedule proper, this Court did not lay down an
inexorable trial schedule for public respondent to follow under all circumstances.
In fact, contrary to the contentions of the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
nowhere in said decision was it implied that the Court had fixed for public
respondent the number of hearing days to three per week. The question of how
many trial days per week should be set was not before the Court, and the Court
clearly did not make any pronouncement on that question.

Even if taken in the light of this Courts directive to public respondent to hear, try
and decide with dispatch the cases against private respondents, the decision
cannot be given the strained interpretation the Office of the Special Prosecutor
gives it. The directive did not remove from public respondent the discretion to
schedule trials in such number and at such times as may be proper. Notably, in
the same Resolution[14] containing the directive, this Court granted public
respondent the power to promulgate its own rules to emphasize public
respondents inherent power to control the trial of the cases before it.

Likewise it does not appear that in setting the cases to be heard twice a week,
public respondent violated Section 2, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court,[15] which
sets the limits to the discretion granted to trial courts on the matter of trial dates.
The requirement of continuous trial is satisfied if trial continues from day to day,
is held on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar, and, except as otherwise
authorized by this Court, is completed within 180 days from the first day of trial.

The Court notes that the trial schedule under the Order of April 22, 2002, allots a
total of ten hours per week, while the Resolution of February 26, 2002, which the
Office of the Special Prosecutor insists on, only allots a total of nine hours. The
assailed trial schedule was adopted with the express consent of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor. The Court cannot see how the assailed Order may cause

material injury to petitioners cause throughout subsequent proceedings. Nor can

the Court agree that the assailed Order can constitute an evasion on public
respondents part, or refusal to perform its positive duty enjoined by law. Denial of
the Motion for Three Days Hearing Per Week, of itself, is not proof that public
respondent exercised its power arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal hostility.

The determination of how many hearing days shall be devoted to trial rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court. There is no justifiable reason to interfere
with a trial courts scheduling of trial dates unless it clearly appears that the judge
abused its power and that injustice has been done.[16] Having failed to show that
public respondent has been guilty of grave abuse of discretion or that injustice
would result from the adoption of a schedule of ten hours per week, the writ of
certiorari sought by the Office of the Special Prosecutor cannot be granted.

The writ of mandamus likewise cannot issue. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor has not sufficiently shown that public respondent has the imperative
duty to conduct three hearings per week. Mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty.[17] It does not lie to control or
review the exercise of discretion.[18] It is unavailable to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of either. Of course, this rule admits of exceptions
as when there is grave abuse of discretion,[19] manifest injustice[20] or palpable
excess of authority.[21] But, as discussed above, none has been shown thus far
in this case. Worth stressing, the Office of the Special Prosecutor has not shown
how the assailed Order of public respondent can constitute an evasion or refusal
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED

for lack of merit. The assailed Order dated March 24, 2003, and the Resolution
dated May 13, 2003, of the public respondent Sandiganbayan, Special Division,
are AFFIRMED.

Testate Estate of Jose M. Valero, FLORA VALERO VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ

and ROSIE VALERO DE GUTIERREZ, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CARMEN VALERO-RUSTIA, respondentsappellees.

This is supposedly a case about collation. As factual background, it should be

stated that the spouses, Beatriz Bautista and Jose M. Valero, did not beget any
child during their marriage In 1951 Beatriz adopted Carmen (Carmencita)
Bautista. Jose wanted also to adopt her but because, by his first marriage, he
had two children named Flora Valero Vda. de Rodriguez and Rosie Valero
Gutierrez. he was disqualified to adopt Carmen. Jose manifested in the adoption
proceeding that he consented to the use by Carmen of his surname Valero. (See
Civil Case No. 12475, Manila CFI; Art. 338[1], Civil Code and art. 28, Child and
Youth Welfare Code.)

On September 18, 1964, Jose M. Valero donated to Carmen B. Valero (who was
already married to Doctor Sergio Rustia) his one-half proindiviso share
(apparently his inchoate share) in two conjugal lots, with the improvements
thereon, located at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Rizal, with an area of 1,500
square meters. His wife, Beatriz, consented to the donation. However, the deed
of donation was not registered.

On January 13, 1966, Jose M. Valero, who was then seventy-three years old,
executed his last will and testament wherein he enumerated the conjugal
properties of himself and his wife, including the two San Lorenzo Village lots. In
that will, he did not mention the donation. He devised to his wife properties
sufficient to constitute her legitime and bequeathed the remainder to his two
children, Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez.

About a month later, or on February 15, 1966, the Valero spouses, by means of a
deed of absolute sale, conveyed the San Lorenzo Village lots and the
improvements thereon to Carmen B. Valero-Rustia for the sum of one hundred
twenty thousand pesos. The sale was registered on the following day. Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 163270 and 163271 were issued to the vendee, Mrs.
Rustia.

On December 4, 1967 she mortgaged the two lots to the Quezon City
Development Bank as security for a loan of fifty thousand pesos (page 204,
Rollo).

Beatriz B. Valero died intestate on September 12, 1972, survived by her husband
and her adopted child. Her estate is pending settlement in Special Proceeding
No. 88896 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mrs. Rustia was named
administratrix of her adopted mother's estate.

More than a month later, or on October 18, 1972, Jose M. Valero died testate,
survived by his two children, Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez. His will was duly
probated in Special Proceeding No. 88677, also of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Lawyer Celso F. Unson, the executor, submitted an inventory wherein,
following the list of conjugal assets in the testator's will, the two San Lorenzo
Village lots were included as part of the testate estate.

That inclusion provoked Mrs. Rustia, the adopted child of Mrs. Valero, and Mrs.
Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez, the legitimate children of the testator, Jose M.
Valero, to file (through Mrs. Rustia's lawyer) in the testate proceeding a motion
for the exclusion of the two San Lorenzo Village lots from the testator's
inventoried estate.

Adduced as reason for the exclusion is the fact that since February 16, 1966 Mrs.
Rustia has been the registered owner of the lots as shown by two Torrens titles,
copies of which were attached to the motion.

The executor opposed the motion on the ground that the two lots were donated
to Mrs. Rustia and the donation would allegedly involve collation and the donee's
title to the lots. The executor revealed that he was informed by Mrs. Gutierrez
and Mrs. Rodriguez (supposed movants) that the two lots should be included in
the inventory. Thus, the issue of collation was prematurely raised.

The probate court in its order of August 9, 1973 excluded the two lots from the
inventory of the testator's estate but with the understanding "that the same are
subject to collation".

On December 4, 1973 or one hundred twelve days after Mrs. Rustia was served
with a copy of that order, she filed a motion for its reconsideration. She insisted
that she is the owner of the two San Lorenzo Village lots as indicated in the
Torrens titles. No one opposed that motion. At the hearing of that motion, Mrs.
Rustia's lawyer apprised the court that the executor informed him over the phone
that he was not opposing the motion.

The probate court in its order of December 14, 1973 ruled that the two lots were
unconditionally excluded from the inventory of Jose M. Valero's estate, meaning
"that they are not subject to collation". That order is the bone of contention in this
case.

Mrs. Rodriguez (without being joined by her sister, Mrs. Gutierrez) filed a motion
for the reconsideration of the order of December 14, 1973. She alleged that the
two San Lorenzo Village lots were really conveyed to Mrs. Rustia by way of
donation because the consideration for the sale was allegedly only one-fifth of
the true value of the lots. Mrs. Rodriguez further contended that the order of
August 9, 1973 was final in character.

In reply, Mrs. Rustia countered that the prior order was interlocutory and that in
1966 the true value of the two lots was around P120,000 and that their value
increased considerably in 1973 or 1974. Moreover, the relatively low price of the
sale could be attributed to the fact that Mrs. Rustia and her husband lived with
the Valeros and were taking care of them.

The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration. Mrs. Rodriguez and
Mrs. Gutierrez, in their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailed the
probate court's order declaring that the two lots were not subject to collation.

The Court of Appeals held that the order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was
interlocutory and that it could be changed or Modified at anytime during the
course of the administration proceedings.

It further held that it was immaterial whether the two lots were donated or sold to
Mrs. Rustia as "a mere subterfuge to avoid payment of the donor's and donee's
taxes". According to the Appellate Court, it was immaterial because under article
1061 of the Civil Code, only compulsory heirs are required to make collation for
the determination of their legitimes and, under section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court, only heirs are involved in questions as to advancement and Mrs. Rustia is
not an heir of the testator, Jose M. Valero (Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Valero Rustia,
CA-G. R. No. SP- 02944, August 28, 1974, per G. S. Santos, Gaviola, Jr. and De
Castro, JJ.).

From that decision, an appeal was made to this Court. The appeal was not given
due course. However, upon motion for reconsideration and over Mrs. Rustia's
opposition, the appeal was later allowed.

The appellants' only assignment of error is that the Court of Appeals should have
held that the probate court's order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was not
interlocutory but was a final and appealable order valid that the order of
December 14, 1973 modifying the order of August 3 is void.

We hold that the order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was not a final order. It
was interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the
San Lorenzo Village lots. The probate court in the exclusion incident could not
determine the question of title.

The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be
instituted by the parties (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970
Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71

SCRA 262, 266).

We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the probate court that
the two disputed lots are not subject to collation was a supererogation and was
not necessary to the disposition of the case which merely involved the issue of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of the testator's estate. The issue of
collation was not yet justifiable at that early stage of the testate proceeding. It is
not necessary to mention in the order of exclusion the controversial matter of
collation.

Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether Mrs.
Rustia's Torrens titles thereto are indefeasible are matters that may be raised
later or may not be raised at all. How those issues should be resolved, if and
when they are raised, need not be touched upon in the adjudication of this
appeal.

The intestate and testate proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the
deceased Valero spouses were consolidated, as ordered by the lower court on
November 21, 1974, so that the conjugal estate of the deceased spouses may be
properly liquidated, as contemplated in section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court
and Act No. 3176 (Pages 223 and 235-6, Rollo).

We have examined the expedientes of the two cases. We found that the
proceedings have not yet reached the stage when the question of collation or
advancement to an heir may be raised and decided. The numerous debts of the
decedents are still being paid. The net remainder (remanente liquido) of their
conjugal estate has not yet been determined. On the other hand, up to this time,
no separate action has been brought by the appellants to nullify Mrs. Rustia's
Torrens titles to the disputed lots or to show that the sale was in reality a
donation.

In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide
whether Mrs. Rustia's titles to the disputed lots are questionable. The
proceedings below have not reached the stage of partition and distribution when

the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be determined.

WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the orders of
the, lower court dated August 9 and December 14, 1973, excluding from the
inventory of Jose M. Valeros estate the two San Lorenzo Village lots now
registered in the name of Carmen B. Valero-Rustia, but we delete from that
decision and the two orders any ruling regarding collation which is a matter that
may be passed upon by the probate court at the time when it is seasonably
raised by the interested parties, if it is ever raised at all. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN.
BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEA, respondents.

At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed
soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion.1 A series of negotiations quelled the teeming
tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant
soldiers that evening.

In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident,"

petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with

coup detat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."

Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat
in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term
commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.3

Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with
the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests"4 (Omnibus Motion).
Among his requests were:

(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate
(whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session,
and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee
hearings, committee meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid
of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally held at the
Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City
(usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);

(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine
Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal
desktop computer and the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a
telephone line and internet access) in order that he may be able to work there
when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the
Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working area and the
related equipment and utility costs can be charged against the budget/allocation
of the Office of the accused from the Senate;

(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his
place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig City, at reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for
purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the

latter may be able to assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of his
duties as a Senator of the Republic;

(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or
opinions to the press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the
country and the public while at the Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his
duties as Senator to help shape public policy and in the light of the important role
of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks and balance between the
three (3) co-equal branches of Government;

(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his
custodians, to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and
other members of the media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his
comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of confinement at the Marine
Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there
are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in
session; and

(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of

the Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of
23 July 2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial
Center, Pasay City.5

By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus
Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in
paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three.7 The trial court just
the same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial
court, and for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning
the Senate staff, resource persons and guests from meeting with him or
transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct
respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and
guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate.

Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of
having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and guests9 at
the Marine Brig.

Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of

Staff, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navys Flag Officer-inCommand, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines Commandant,
Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding
Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obea (Obea).

Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since
November 30, 2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel10
the day before or on November 29, 2007.

Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as

against the above-named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in
relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
determination thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile,
against those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from
this Court.11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police officers
currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily
show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former
custodians.

Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in
his Motion for Reconsideration filed with the trial court:

I.

THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS

CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:

A.

UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS

ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE
INSTANT CASE, ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND,
THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

B.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2)
COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN
ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP
DETAT", A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL
OFFENSE;

C.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO

BEING ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY
SURRENDERED TO THE AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;

II.

GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE

MARINE BRIGS COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO
ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS;

III.

ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN

THEIR SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF
SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A
SENATOR;

- AND -

IV.

MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL

TREATMENT OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL
AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND
FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI.13

The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos,

petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was
already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a
motion similar to petitioners Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere
detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights
since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving
moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of
lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup detat which is regarded as a
"political offense."

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in

expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized
practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.

In sum, petitioners first ground posits that there is a world of difference between
his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of
filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the
inapplicability of Jalosjos.

A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in

Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion

perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.16
(Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.18

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup detat cases, both being

punishable by reclusion perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses

covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction
as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioners application for bail and
for release on recognizance was denied.20 The determination that the evidence
of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail21 or
imported from a trial courts judgment of conviction,22 justifies the detention of an
accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates
the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the
stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying
rationale of public self-defense23 applies equally to detention prisoners like
petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay, it is impractical to

between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the
maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not
constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention
rights more limited than those of the public.

draw a line
purpose of
forfeit their
makes their

The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is

deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of
liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him,
unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving
final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a
necessary consequence of arrest and detention.26 (Underscoring supplied)

These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the
extent that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical

movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one
month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow
accomplish legislative results.

The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does
not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the
presumption of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their
respective motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of
innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on
appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of
final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence
prevails.28

In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither
denied nor disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media
access to him should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on
Elections.29

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he
is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and
such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his
place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured
well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some
reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain
statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident,"30
proves that petitioners argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape
ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became
real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor

in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary
grant of bail.31 In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established
that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion.32

Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for
leeway because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano
Montano, who was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu
dignum is this Courts pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized
in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant
would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury."35 At
the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were non-bailable
where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the obvious reason that "one
who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to
flee."37 Petitioners petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on
Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out.

Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial courts findings, Esperon did
not overrule Obeas recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions.
Petitioner cites the Comment38 of Obea that he interposed no objection to such
request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-atArms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for
deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of
petitioners duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only
disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military installation
owing to AFPs apolitical nature.39

The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a

valid objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention.40 The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may
undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety
and prevent the escape of the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of
the detention officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding
on the trial court in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a

court.

Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him
to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as
Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing
him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying the
peoples will, repudiating the peoples choice, and overruling the mandate of the
people.

Petitioners contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public
official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a
prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor."42

The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in

nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases,43 the
Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not
obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioners electoral victory only signifies pertinently
that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison."44

In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,45 it is opportune to

wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice
of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the
Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of
law.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has

never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by
the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accusedappellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.46
(Underscoring supplied)

Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention
prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former
President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to
attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more
serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged
violation of the equal protection clause.

In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention

prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek
preferential treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or house
arrest,47 yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to
others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all

prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.48 That this
discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court
previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his
certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be
proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a
seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of
taking a complete turn-around,50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to
him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Petitioners position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests

alone, petitioners case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves.

Jaloslos succinctly expounds:

x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and

committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a
free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.51

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ATTY. FRANKLIN G. GACAL,

Complainant,
- versus JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 38, IN ALABEL,
SARANGANI,
It is axiomatic that bail cannot be allowed to a person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
without a hearing upon notice to the Prosecution. Any judge who so allows bail is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules, and is subject to appropriate
administrative sanctions.
Atty. Franklin Gacal, the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 1136-03 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani entitled People v. Faustino
Ancheta, a prosecution for murder arising from the killing of Felomino O.

Occasion, charges Judge Jaime I. Infante, Presiding Judge of Branch 38 of the

RTC to whose Branch Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled for arraignment
and trial, with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and evident
partiality, for the latters failure to set a hearing before granting bail to the accused
and for releasing him immediately after allowing bail.

Antecedents
On March 18, 2003, Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani issued a warrant for the arrest of Faustino
Ancheta in connection with a murder case. Judge Balanag did not recommend
bail. Ancheta, who had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arrested. Upon
review, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., affirmed the findings and recommendation of
Judge Balanag on the offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an
information for murder on April 21, 2003 (Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a
recommendation for bail in the amount of P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 113603 was raffled to Judge Infantes Branch.

On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta,
and another releasing Ancheta from custody.

On April 25, 2003, Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the twin orders issued by Judge
Infante, filed a so-called Very Urgent Motion For Reconsideration And/Or To
Cancel Bailbond With Prayer To Enforce Warrant Of Arrest Or Issue Warrant Of
Arrest Anew Or In The Alternative Very Urgent Motion For This Court To Motu
Prop[r]io Correct An Apparent And Patent Error (very urgent motion).

In the hearing of the very urgent motion on April 29, 2003, only Atty. Gacal and
his collaborating counsel appeared in court. Judge Infante directed the public
prosecutor to comment on the very urgent motion within five days from notice,
after which the motion would be submitted for resolution with or without the
comment. Ancheta, through counsel, opposed, stating that the motion did not
bear the conformity of the public prosecutor.

At the arraignment of Ancheta set on May 15, 2003, the parties and their counsel
appeared, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Barcelona, Jr., the assigned public
prosecutor, did not appear because he was then following up his regular
appointment as the Provincial Prosecutor of Sarangani Province. Accordingly, the
arraignment was reset to May 29, 2003.

On May 21, 2003, Judge Infante denied Atty. Gacals very urgent motion on the
ground that the motion was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public
prosecutor, and on the further ground that the private prosecutor had not been
authorized to act as such pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court.
Judge Infante directed that the consideration of the bail issue be held in
abeyance until after the public prosecutor had submitted a comment, because he
wanted to know the position of the public prosecutor on Atty. Gacals very urgent
motion having been filed without the approval of the public prosecutor.

On May 29, 2003, the public prosecutor appeared, but did not file any comment.
Thereupon, Atty. Gacal sought authority to appear as a private prosecutor. The
public prosecutor did not oppose Atty. Gacals request. With that, Atty. Gacal
moved for the reconsideration of the grant of bail to Ancheta. In response, Judge
Infante required the public prosecutor to file his comment on Atty. Gacals motion
for reconsideration, and again reset the arraignment of the accused to June 20,
2003.[2]

On June 4, 2003, the public prosecutor filed a comment, stating that he had
recommended bail as a matter of course; that the orders dated April 23, 2003
approving bail upon his recommendation and releasing the accused were proper;
and that his recommendation of bail was in effect a waiver of the public
prosecutors right to a bail hearing.

By June 20, 2003, when no order regarding the matter of bail was issued,
Atty. Gacal sought the inhibition of Judge Infante on the ground of his
gross incompetence manifested by his failure to exercise judicial power to
resolve the issue of bail.

In his motion for inhibition,[Atty. Gacal insisted that the issue of bail urgently
required a resolution that involved a judicial determination and was, for that
reason, a judicial function; that Judge Infante failed to resolve the issue of bail,
although he should have acted upon it with dispatch, because it was unusual that
several persons charged with murder were being detained while Ancheta was let
free on bail even without his filing a petition for bail; that such event also put the
integrity of Judge Infantes court in peril; and that although his motion for
reconsideration included the alternative relief for Judge Infante to motu proprio
correct his apparent error, his refusal to resolve the matter in due time constituted
gross ignorance of law.

Atty. Gacal contended that Judge Infante was not worthy of his position as a
judge either because he unjustifiably failed to exercise his judicial power or
because he did not at all know how to exercise his judicial power; that his lack of
judicial will rendered him utterly incompetent to perform the functions of a judge;
that at one time, he ordered the bail issue to be submitted for resolution, with or
without the comment of the public prosecutor, but at another time, he directed
that the bail issue be submitted for resolution, with his later order denoting that
he would resolve the issue only after receiving the comment from the public
prosecutor; that he should not be too dependent on the public prosecutors
comment considering that the resolution of the matter of bail was entirely within
his discretion as the judge; and that the granting of bail without a petition for bail
being filed by the accused or a hearing being held for that purpose constituted
gross ignorance of the law and the rules.

Finally, Atty. Gacal stated that Judge Infante and the public prosecutor were both
guilty of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for giving undue
advantage to Ancheta by allowing him bail without his filing a petition for bail and
without a hearing being first conducted.

On July 9, 2003, Judge Infante definitively denied Atty. Gacals very urgent
motion.

On August 5, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCAd) received from
the Office of the Ombudsman the indorsement of the administrative complaint
Atty. Gacal had filed against Judge Infante (CPL-M-03-0581 entitled Gacal v.
Infante, et al.), forwarding the records of the administrative case for appropriate
action to the Supreme Court as the exclusive administrative authority over all
courts, their judges and their personnel.

On August 21, 2003, then Court Administrator Prebitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a
Member of the Court) required Judge Infante to comment on the administrative
complaint against him, and to show cause within 10 days from receipt why he
should not be suspended, disbarred, or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a
member of the Bar for violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility pursuant to the resolution of the Court En Banc in
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC dated September 17, 2002.

On October 6, 2003, the OCAd received Judge Infantes comment dated

September 22, 2003, by which he denied any transgression in the granting of bail
to Ancheta, stating the following:

2. At the outset, as a clarificatory note, accused Faustino Ancheta is out on bail,

not because he applied for bail duly granted by the court but because he posted
the required bail since in the first place the Fiscal recommended bail, duly
approved by the Undersigned, in the amount of P400,000.00. Underscoring is
made to stress the fact that accused Ancheta had actually never filed an
application for bail. Perforce, the court had nothing to hear, grant or deny an
application/motion/petition for bail since none was filed by the accused.

3. Thus, the twin Orders dated April 23, 2003 are exactly meant as an approval of
the bailbond (property) posted by accused Ancheta, it being found to be complete
and sufficient. They are not orders granting an application for bail, as
misconstrued by private prosecutor. (Certified true machine copy of the twin
Orders dated April 23 marked as Annex-2 and 2-a are hereto attached)

4. On April 25, 2003, private complainant in the cited criminal case, thru counsel

(the Gacal, Gacal and Gacal Law Office), filed a Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration or in the alternative Very Urgent Motion for this Court to Moto
Propio Correct an Apparent Error, praying that the twin Orders dated April 23,
2003 be reconsidered. (Certified machine copy of the said urgent motion marked
as Annex 3 is hereto attached)

5. On April 29, 2003, during the hearing on motion, the private complainant and
his counsel (private prosecutor) appeared. The Fiscal was not present. The court
nonetheless ordered the Fiscal to file his comment/s on the said motion. The
accused thru private counsel in an open court hearing opposed the subject
motion inasmuch as the same bears no conformity of the Fiscal. In that hearing,
the court advised the private prosecutor to coordinate and secure the conformity
of the Fiscal in filing his motion. (Certified machine copy of the Order dated April
29, 2003, marked as Annex 4 is hereto attached.)

6. On May 15, 2003, the scheduled date for the arraignment of accused Ancheta,
the parties and private prosecutor appeared. Again, the 1st Asst. Provincial
Fiscal, Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., failed to appear who, being the next highest in rank
in their Office, was processing his application for regular appointment as
Provincial Fiscal of Sarangani Province. He was then the Acting Provincial Fiscal
Designate in view of the appointment of former Provincial Fiscal Laureano T.
Alzate as RTC Judge in Koronadal City. Due to the absence of the Fiscal and the
motion for reconsideration then pending for resolution, the scheduled
arraignment was reset to May 29, 2003, per Order dated May 15, 2003, (certified
machine copy of which marked as Annex 5 is hereto attached).

7. On May 21, 2003, the Undersigned resolved to deny for being pro forma the
pending motion for reconsideration. As held in the Order of denial, it was found
that the private prosecutor was not duly authorized in writing by the provincial
prosecutor to prosecute the said criminal case, nor was he judicially approved to
act as such in violation of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The bail issue, however, was held in abeyance until submission of the
comment thereon by the Fiscal as this Presiding Judge would like then to know
the position of the Fiscal anent to the cited motion without his approval. The
arraignment was reset to June 20, 2003. Again, the private prosecutor was orally
advised to coordinate and secure the approval of the Fiscal in filing his
motions/pleadings. (Certified machine copy of the Order dated May 21, 2003

marked as Annex 6 hereto attached)

8. On June 4, 2003, the Fiscal finally filed his Comment on the Very Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration filed by private complainant thru counsel (private
prosecutor). Consistently, the Fiscal in his comment recommended bail as a
matter of course and that he claimed that Orders dated April 23, 2003 approving
bail upon his recommendation are proper, waiving in effect his right for a bail
hearing. (Certified true machine copy of the Fiscals comment marked as Annex-7
is hereto attached).[10]

Under date of February 16, 2004, the OCAd recommended after investigation
that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that Judge
Infante be fined in the amount of P20,000.00,[11] viz:

EVALUATION: The 1987 Constitution provides that, all persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of
guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law (Sec. 13, Art. III).

ISSUE: Whether or not the judge erred when it grants

bail to the accused
YES

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, no person charged with
a capital offense or offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
shall be admitted to bail when the evidence is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution (Sec. 7, Rule 114).

With the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal
Procedure as a backdrop, the question is: Can respondent judge in granting bail
to the accused dispense with the hearing of Application for Bail?

The preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 03-61, entitled Benito M.

Occasion vs. Faustino Ancheta for Murder was conducted by Judge Gregorio R.
Balanag, Jr., of MCTC, Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani. Finding the existence of
probable cause that an offense of Murder was committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof, he transmitted his resolution to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, together with the records of the case, with No Bail Recommended.
Upon review of the resolution of the investigating judge by the OIC of the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sarangani, he filed the information for Murder
against accused Faustino Ancheta but a bail of P400,000.00 for the provisional
liberty of the latter was recommended. Relying on the recommendation of the
Fiscal, respondent judge granted the Application for Bail of the accused.

The offense of Murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period

to death (Art. 248, RPC). By reason of the penalty prescribed by law, Murder is
considered a capital offense and, grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can
be exercised only by respondent judge after the evidence is submitted in a
hearing. Hearing of the application for bail is absolutely indispensable before a
judge can properly determine whether the prosecutions evidence is weak or
strong (People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489). It becomes, therefore, a ministerial
duty of a judge to conduct hearing the moment an application for bail is filed if the
accused is charged with capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. If doubt can be entertained, it follows that the
evidence of guilt is weak and bail shall be recommended. On the other hand, if
the evidence is clear and strong, no bail shall be granted.

Verily, respondent judge erred when he issued an order granting the application
for bail filed by the accused (Annex C) based merely on the order issued by the
Fiscal (Annex A) recommending bail of P400,000.00 for the provisional liberty of
the accused without even bothering to read the affidavits of the witnesses for the
prosecution. Respondent judge cannot abdicate his right and authority to
determine whether the evidence against the accused who is charged with capital
offense is strong or not.

After the respondent judge has approved the property bond posted by the
accused, the complainant, as private prosecutor filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Cancel Bailbond or in the alternative, Very Urgent Motion
to Moto Proprio correct an Apparent Error. On the hearing of the Motion on 29
April 2003, the Fiscal was absent but he (the Fiscal) was given five (5) days from
receipt of the order within which to file his comment and, with or without comment
the incident is deemed submitted for resolution and, hearing of the Motion was
reset to May 15, 2003. But the Fiscal again failed to appear on said date and, the
arraignment of the accused was set on 29 May 2003. On 21 May 2003,
respondent judge resolved to deny the Motion on the ground that the private
prosecutor was not authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecutions Office
or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case, subject to the approval
of the court, pursuant to Sect. 5, Rule 110 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The need for an authority in writing from the Chief of the Prosecutions Office or
Regional State Prosecutor to the Private Prosecutor to prosecute the case,
subject to the approval of the court, contemplates of a situation wherein there is
no regular prosecutor assigned the court, or the prosecutor assigned, due to
heavy work schedule, cannot attend to the prosecution of pending criminal cases
to expedite disposition of the case. This provision of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not prevent the offended party who did not reserve, waive nor
institute separate civil action, from intervening in the case through a private
prosecutor.

Intervention of the offended party in Criminal Action Where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 11, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense (Sec.
16, Rule 110.

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives civil action, reserves the right to institute
it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action (Sec. 1 (a),
Rule 111 [Supra]).

The offended party in Criminal Case No. 1136-03 did not reserve his right to
institute separate civil action, he did not waive such right and did not file civil
action prior to the criminal action, so the offended party may under the law
intervene as a matter of right.

The authority to intervene includes actual conduct of trial under the control of the
Fiscal which includes the right to file pleadings. According to respondent judge,
he advised the private prosecutor to coordinate with the fiscal and secure his
approval in accord with the mandate of Section, 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule
of Criminal Procedure: On this point, respondent judge again erred. The right of
the offended party to intervene is conferred by law and the approval of the Fiscal
or even the court is not all necessary (Sec. 1 (a), Rule 111, [Supra]). Respondent
Judge, however, is correct when he stated that the motions filed by the private
prosecutor should be with the conformity of the Fiscal.

Respondent judges errors are basic such that his acts constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully recommended for the consideration of the

Honorable Court is the recommendation that the instant I.P.I. be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter and respondent Judge be held ordered to pay a fine
of P20,000.00.

On March 31, 2004,[12] the Court directed that the administrative case be
docketed as a regular administrative matter.

On December 01, 2004,[13] the Court denied Atty. Gacals ancillary prayer to
disqualify Judge Infante from trying Criminal Case No. 1138-03 pending
resolution of this administrative matter.

Ruling

We approve and adopt the findings and recommendation of the OCAd,

considering that they are well substantiated by the records. We note that

Judge Infante did not deny that he granted bail for the provisional
release of Ancheta in Criminal Case No. 1138-03 without conducting
the requisite bail hearing.

I
Bail hearing was mandatory
in Criminal Case No. 1138-03

Judge Infante would excuse himself from blame and responsibility by insisting
that the hearing was no longer necessary considering that the accused had not
filed a petition for bail; that inasmuch as no application for bail had been filed by
the accused, his twin orders of April 23, 2003 were not orders granting an
application for bail, but were instead his approval of the bail bond posted; and
that Atty. Gacals very urgent motion and other motions and written submissions
lacked the requisite written conformity of the public prosecutor, rendering them
null and void.

We cannot relieve Judge Infante from blame and responsibility.

The willingness of Judge Infante to rely on the mere representation of the public
prosecutor that his grant of bail upon the public prosecutors recommendation had
been proper, and that his (public prosecutor) recommendation of bail had in
effect waived the need for a bail hearing perplexes the Court. He thereby
betrayed an uncommon readiness to trust more in the public prosecutors
judgment than in his own judicious discretion as a trial judge. He should not do
so.

Judge Infante made the situation worse by brushing aside the valid
remonstrations expressed in Atty. Gacals very urgent motion thusly:

This Court is not unaware that the charge of murder being a capital offense is not
bailable xxx
xxxx
The phrase xxx application for admission to bail xxx is not an irrelevant but a
significant infusion in the cited rule (section 8), the plain import of which is that
bail hearing is preceded by a motion/petition for admission to bail filed by a
detained accused himself or thru counsel.
The peculiar feature of the instant case, however, is the absence of a
petition/motion for admission to bail filed by the herein accused. On the contrary,
it is the consistent position of the fiscal to recommend bail since the prosecution
evidence being merely circumstantial, is not strong for the purpose of granting
bail. xxx. This court believes that bail hearing, albeit necessary in the grant of bail
involving capital offense, is not at all times and in all instances essential to afford
the party the right to due process especially so, when the fiscal in this case was
given reasonable opportunity to explain his side, and yet he maintained the
propriety of grant of bail without need of hearing since the prosecution evidence
is not strong for the purpose of granting bail.

Further, while it is preponderant of judicial experience to adopt the fiscals

recommendation in bail fixing, this court, however, had in addition and in accord
with Section 6(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, evaluated the
record of the case, and only upon being convinced and satisfied that the
prosecution evidence as contained in the affidavits of all the prosecution
witnesses, no one being an eye-witness are merely circumstantial evidence, that
this court in the exercise of sound discretion allowed the accused to post bail.
xxxx
The convergence of the foregoing factors - absence of motion for admission to
bail filed by the accused, the recommendation of the fiscal to grant bail, the pro
forma motion of the private prosecutor for lack of prior approval from the fiscal
and this courts evaluation of the records sufficiently warrants the grant of bail to
herein accused.[14]

Judge Infante specifically cited judicial experience as sanctioning his adoption

and approval of the public prosecutors recommendation on the fixing of bail. Yet,
it was not concealed from him that the public prosecutors recommendation had
been mainly based on the documentary evidence adduced,[15] and on the public
prosecutors misguided position that the evidence of guilt was weak because only
circumstantial evidence had been presented. As such, Judge Infantes
unquestioning echoing of the public prosecutors conclusion about the evidence
of guilt not being sufficient to deny bail did not justify his dispensing with the bail
hearing.

Judge Infante apparently acted as if the requirement for the bail hearing was a
merely minor rule to be dispensed with. Although, in theory, the only function of
bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused at the time set for the
arraignment and trial; and, in practice, bail serves the further purpose of
preventing the release of an accused who may be dangerous to society or whom
the judge may not want to release,[16] a hearing upon notice is mandatory before
the grant of bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion.[17] With more
reason is this true in criminal prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, states that: No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of criminal action.

In Cortes v. Catral,[18] therefore, the Court has outlined the following duties of
the judge once an application for bail is filed, to wit:

1.
In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended);

2.
Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless or whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court
to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, id);

3.
Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;

4.
If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id); otherwise, the petition should be
denied. [emphasis supplied]

II
Judge Infante disregarded rules and guidelines
in Criminal Case No. 1138-03

Ostensibly, Judge Infante disregarded basic but well-known rules and guidelines
on the matter of bail.

1.
In case no application for bail is filed,
bail hearing was not dispensable

Judge Infante contends that a bail hearing in Criminal Case No. 1138-03 was not
necessary because the accused did not file an application for bail; and because
the public prosecutor had recommended bail.

Judge Infantes contention is unwarranted.

Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03,
a hearing should still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial
hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge
ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of

the crime. The Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its
evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.

The fact that the public prosecutor recommended bail for Ancheta did not warrant
dispensing with the hearing. The public prosecutors recommendation of bail was
not material in deciding whether to conduct the mandatory hearing or not. For
one, the public prosecutors recommendation, albeit persuasive, did not
necessarily bind the trial judge,[20] in whom alone the discretion to determine
whether to grant bail or not was vested. Whatever the public prosecutor
recommended, including the amount of bail, was non-binding. Nor did such
recommendation constitute a showing that the evidence of guilt was not strong. If
it was otherwise, the trial judge could become unavoidably controlled by the
Prosecution.

Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down
by the Supreme Court regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and
indispensable. He ought to have remembered, then, that it was only through such
hearing that he could be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for
the Prosecution was weak or strong.[21] Hence, his dispensing with the hearing
manifested a gross ignorance of the law and the rules.

2.
Public prosecutors failure to oppose
application for bail or to adduce evidence
did not dispense with hearing

That the Prosecution did not oppose the grant of bail to Ancheta, as in fact it
recommended bail, and that the Prosecution did not want to adduce evidence
were irrelevant, and did not dispense with the bail hearing. The gravity of the
charge in Criminal Case No. 1138-03 made it still mandatory for Judge Infante to
conduct a bail hearing in which he could have made on his own searching and
clarificatory questions from which to infer the strength or weakness of the
evidence of guilt. He should not have readily and easily gone along with the
public prosecutors opinion that the evidence of guilt, being circumstantial, was

not strong enough to deny bail; else, he might be regarded as having abdicated
from a responsibility that was his alone as the trial judge.

Judge Infantes holding that circumstantial evidence of guilt was of a lesser

weight than direct evidence in the establishment of guilt was also surprising. His
training and experience should have cautioned him enough on the point that the
lack or absence of direct evidence did not necessarily mean that the guilt of the
accused could not anymore be proved, because circumstantial evidence, if
sufficient, could supplant the absence of direct evidence.[22] In short, evidence
of guilt was not necessarily weak because it was circumstantial.
Instead, Judge Infante should have assiduously determined why the Prosecution
refused to satisfy its burden of proof in the admission of the accused to bail.
Should he have found that the public prosecutors refusal was not justified, he
could have then himself inquired on the nature and extent of the evidence of guilt
for the purpose of enabling himself to ascertain whether or not such evidence
was strong. He could not have ignored the possibility that the public prosecutor
might have erred in assessing the evidence of guilt as weak.[23] At any rate, if he
found the Prosecution to be uncooperative, he could still have endeavored to
determine on his own the existence of such evidence,[24] with the assistance of
the private prosecutor.

3.
Judge Infantes granting of bail without a hearing was
censurable for gross ignorance of the law and the rules

Every judge should be faithful to the law and should maintain professional
competence.[25] His role in the administration of justice requires a continuous
study of the law and jurisprudence, lest public confidence in the Judiciary be
eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct.[26]

In that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of
bail in capital offenses was inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law
and the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement.[27] He well knew
that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a

matter of judicial discretion,[28] and that the discretion lay not in the
determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation
and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecutions evidence of guilt against the
accused.[29] His fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the absence
of a petition for bail from the accused.[30] Consequently, any order he issued in
the absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of sound judicial
discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.[31]

III
Imposable Penalty

We next determine the penalty imposable on Judge Infante for his gross
ignorance of the law and the rules.

The Court imposed a fine of P20,000.00 on the respondent judge in DocenaCaspe v. Bugtas.[32] In that case, the respondent judge granted bail to the two
accused who had been charged with murder without first conducting a hearing.
Likewise, in Loyola v. Gabo,[33] the Court fined the respondent judge in the
similar amount of P20,000.00 for granting bail to the accused in a murder case
without the requisite bail hearing. To accord with such precedents, the Court
prescribes a fine of P20,000.00 on Judge Infante, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the offense or the commission of another serious offense will be
more severely dealt with.

WHEREFORE, we FIND AND DECLARE Judge Jaime I. Infante guilty of gross

ignorance of the law and the rules; and, accordingly, FINE him in the amount of
P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the
commission of another serious offense will be more severely dealt with.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator
for proper dissemination to all trial judges.

SO ORDERED.

Comendador v De Villa 200 SCRA 80 (1991)

"military members exempted from the right to bail
Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with
violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct
of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was
denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before
the court which was granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for
provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal they have taken before
the court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail
guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for
provisional liberty of petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the
presumption of respondents that bail does not apply among military men facing
court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court.

Issue: Whether or not military men are have the right to bail.

Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the
military as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus
the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to
bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the
military and national security considerations which may result to damaging
precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving
them the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing the government. Therefore
the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.

EDUARDO N. ASWAT, petitioner,

vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEJANDRO GALIDO, in his
capacity as Commander of the Southern Luzon
Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp
Guillermo Nakar, Lucena City, respondent.

In this Petition for Habeas Corpus, petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the
General Court-Martial which was convened by then respondent Brigadier
General Alejandro Galido 1 as Commanding General of the Southern Luzon
Command ("SOLCOM") to try petitioner for a specification (offense) committed
outside a military reservation or installation.

Petitioner Eduardo N. Aswat and victim Felix B. Nebres were both enlisted men
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP") respectively holding the ranks
Private First Class and Corporal. Aswat and Nebres were assigned to the
SOLCOM but Aswat was detailed as caretaker of Brigadier General Galido's
Baguio resthouse while Nebres was assigned to act as a personal driver of
Brigadier General Galido's wife. On 29 December 1988, petitioner was involved
in a shooting incident at Dominican Hills, Baguio City, which resulted in the death
of Nebres.

Records disclose that petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the Baguio City police
authorities and was briefly incarcerated at the Baguio City Jail until he was
transferred to a SOLCOM detention cell on 31 December 1988. Petitioner has
been detained at the SOLCOM Headquarters in Camp Guillermo Nakar, Lucena
City since then.

On 20 April 1989, petitioner was charged before a SOLCOM General CourtMartial ("SOLCOM-GCM") with violation of Article 94 of the Articles of War
("A.W."), the specification being homicide.

While the court-martial proceedings were going on, petitioner filed the instant
petition, contending: (1) that the specification of homicide with which he was
charged was committed outside a military installation and hence the offense was
cognizable by a regular, civilian court; (2) that he is entitled to be released on bail
as a matter of right pursuant to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution; and (3)
that he should be given his due base pay and other pay, aside from the
allowances he has been receiving, computed from the time of commencement of
his detention.

The Court en banc issued the writ of habeas corpus and required respondent to
make a return of the writ before the Third Division of the Court. 2 After hearing,
the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to require the parties to file their
memoranda in amplification of their respective oral arguments. 3

Petitioner seeks to make a distinction between offenses committed outside and

those committed inside a military installation or reservation. He assails the
jurisdiction of the SOLCOM-GCM, alleging that the specification of homicide was
committed in Baguio City and in an area outside any military installation or
reservation.

The distinction upon which petitioner anchors his argument was obliterated
sometime ago. As the law now stands, as long as the accused is subject to
military law, as defined under Article 2, A.W., 4 he shall be punished as a courtmartial may direct.

Art 94.Various Crimes.Any person subject to military law who commits any
felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinances which is
recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal
laws of the Philippines or under municipal ordinances, (A) inside a reservation of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (B) outside any such reservation when
the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be more than
one) is a person subject to military law, shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct: In imposing the penalties for offenses falling within this article, the
penalties for such offenses provided in the penal laws of the Philippines or in

such municipal ordinances shall be taken into consideration. 5 (Emphasis

supplied).

Article 94, A.W., in its original form, did refer only to offenses committed inside a
Philippine military reservation as falling within the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In
1948, however, R.A. No. 242 amended Article 94, A.W. by providing that offenses
committed outside a military reservation shall also be punished as a court-martial
may direct, but only "when the offended party (and each one of the offended
parties if there be more than one)" is similarly subject to military law. 6

There is no question that both petitioner and the deceased Nebres were subject
to military law at the time the latter was shot and killed.

Whether or not the accused can avail the right to

bail

NO

Moreover, when the petitioner asked for the affirmative relief of bail from the
SOLCOM-GCM, he in effect recognized the jurisdiction of the General CourtMartial. Hence, petitioner is properly deemed estopped to deny such jurisdiction.

Petitioner next contends that his right to bail is explicitly guaranteed in Section
13, Article III of the Constitution.

Although the right to bail applies to "all," the Court has very recently ruled that the
guarantee is not without any exception. In Comendador vs. De Villa, et al., 7 the

Court en banc, speaking through Mr. Justice Cruz, held:

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. No.
95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as
an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was
suggested in Arula, where We observed that the right to a speedy trial is given
more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as
follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military
men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate
within the framework of the democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of
firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities
and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent
elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political
system.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the
equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guarantee requires equal
treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where
the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused
officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military
are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they
are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.

Petitioner, as already noted, is a person subject to military law, and under Article

70, A.W., "any person subject to military law charged with crime or with a serious
offense under these article shall be placed in confinement or in arrest, as
circumstances may require."

Confinement is one way of ensuring presence during sessions of the General

Court-Martial; the more important reason underlying the authority to impose
confinement is the need to enable the proper military authority to instill discipline
with the command and thereby achieve command efficiency. By confining the
petitioner, petitioner's unmilitary conduct may be curtailed from spreading within
the ranks of the command. The necessity for such confinement is a matter
properly left to the sound discretion of petitioner's superior officers. In Domingo
vs. Minister of National Defense, 8 the Court en banc, speaking through Mr.
Justice Vasquez, held:

The petitioner is a person subject to military law facing charges before a general
court-martial, and his release from confinement pending the trial of the charges
against him is a matter that lies largely in the discretion of the military authorities.
They are undeniably in a better position to appreciate the gravity of said charges
and the feasibility and advisability of releasing him or relaxing the terms of his
confinement pending the trial and disposition of the case filed against him.

The authority of the respondent to order the arrest and confinement of the
petitioner flows from his general jurisdiction over his command. Petitioner being
assaigned to SOLCOM, he is directly under the command of then Brigadier
General Galido.

The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns his right to receive base pay and
other pay during the pendency of his detention. At present, petitioner is receiving
a monthly allowance of P540.00. 9

The law defines "pay" to include "base pay and all additional pay for the length of
service or type of duty such as longevity pay and flying pay," and distinguishes
"pay" from "allowances" which is limited to "quarters, subsistence, travel, and
such other allowances as may by law become payable to army personnel." 10

Concerning this issue, Section 18, Article 6 of R.A. No. 138, as amended,
provides:

Sec. 18.
An enlisted man awaiting trial by Court-martial or the result thereof,
is not entitled to receive pay as distinguished allowances until the result of the
trial is known; Provided, that any enlisted man who is placed on a full duty status
and performs regular duties while awaiting trial by court-martial, or the result
thereof, shall be entitled to receive all his pay and allowances for the period of
such duty unless the same shall have been lawfully forfeited by the approved
sentence of a court-martial prior to actual payment thereof to the enlisted man.
For the purposes of this section, the restoration to full duty status of enlisted men
awaiting trial by court-martial, or the result thereof, shall be as directed by the
Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense.' (as
amended by R.A. 1067). (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner, during detention, ceased to perform his ordinary military duties. His
continued detention necessarily restrains his freedom of work, and he cannot
carry out his normal military functions. There is no showing by petitioner that he
was placed on "full duty status" and performing "regular duties" pending trial. On
the premise of "no work no pay", petitioner cannot insist on his right to receive
base pay or any other pay while under detention. However, while petitioner is not
entitled to receive any base pay or any other pay during his detention, the law
expressly permits him to receive his regular and other allowances, if otherwise
entitled thereto, while under detention.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for Habeas Corpus
for lack of merit. No pronouncement to costs.

SO ORDERED.

De la Camara vs. Enage

Mayor de la Camara was arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan,
for his allegedparticipation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve
other laborers of the Tirador LoggingCo. 18 days later, the Provincial Fiscal of
Agusan filed cases of multiple frustrated murder and formultiple murder against
petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo. On January 14, 1969
anapplication for bail was filed by petitioner which was granted and the amount
was fixed at the excessiveamount of P1,195,200.00.
ISSUE:WON the amount of the bailbond is excessive

HELD:Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by

requiring a sum that isexcessive. So the Constitution commands. If there were no
such prohibition, the right to bail becomesmeaningless. Nothing can be clearer,
therefore, than that the amount of P1,195,200.00 is clearlyviolative of this
constitutional provision under the circumstances.

YAP VS CA
Facts:

Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for

misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of the case
were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending
appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of
P5,5 Milion on condition that he will secure a certification/guaranty from the
Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he
will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant. He
sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC.
He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively
denied him his right to bail. He also contested the condition imposed by the CA
that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty
of abode and travel.

Issues:

1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of

petitioner's right against excessive bail.

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and
right to travel.

Held:

1. Right to Bail

The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and

constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail. The purpose for bail is
to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required
by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner
is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the
amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of;
this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a
satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the
appellate court.

2. Liberty of abode and right to travel

The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by
petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by
the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail
bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the
questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing
abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so. (Yap vs
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001)

Manotok vs CA
Facts:

Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc., a stock brokerage house. He
was in US for a certain time. He went home to file a petition with SEC for
appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Pending
disposition of the case, the SEC requested the Commissioner of Immigration not
to clear Manotoc for departure, and a memorandum to this effect was issued by
the Commissioner. Meanwhile, six clients of Manotoc Securities Inc. filed
separate criminal complaints for estafa against Manotoc. Manotoc posted bail in
all cases. He then filed a motion for permission to leave the country in each trial
courts stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to
his business transactions and opportunities." His motion was denied. He also
wrote the Immigration Commissioner requesting the recall or withdrawal of the
latter's memorandum, but said request was also denied. Thus, he filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
judges' orders, as well as the communication-request of the SEC, denying his
leave to travel abroad. The same was denied; hence, he appealed to the

Supreme Court. He contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of

right, the courts which granted him bail could not prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.

Issue:
Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted
to bail from leaving the Philippines.

Held:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the
accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may
be placed beyond the reach of the courts. (Manotoc vs Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-62100, May 30, 1986)

Defensor-Santiago vs Vasquez
Facts:

Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e), Republic

Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
before the Sandiganbayan. An order of arrest was issued against her with bail for

her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
authorizing the Santiago to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of
P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but she asked for the cancellation of her
bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The
Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment. Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure
order against Santiago by reason of the announcement she made, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for
the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard University. She directly filed a "Motion
to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction" with the SC. She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold
departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over her person
as she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered. The hold
departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing. She
likewise argued that the hold departure order violates her right to due process,
right to travel and freedom of speech.

Issues:

1. Has the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Santiago?

2. Did the Sandiganbayan err when it issued the hold departure order without any
motion from the prosecution and without notice and hearing?
3. Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?

Held:

1. How the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused
either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court

thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The voluntary
appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail.
On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty
of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.

Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of

respondent court upon the filing of her "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as
having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes
of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the
bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that
by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody"
of said court. Santiago cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own
representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she
had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that
jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

2. The ex parte issuance of a hold-departure order was a valid exercise of the

presiding courts inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of
its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement
that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher
studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan
in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in
thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order. To reiterate, the hold
departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to
preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and
the person of the accused.

3. By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to the orders
and processes of the court, thus, he may legally be prohibited from leaving the
country during the pendency of the case.

Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds
herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may
legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.
Parties with pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from
the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass
upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since
they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or
implications thereof. (Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993),
G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993)

SILVERIO VS CA
Facts:

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised

Securities Act in Criminal Case of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time,
he posted bail for his provisional liberty.

More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of
the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to
issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he
had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in
postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the
Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioners passport or to deny his
application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner
from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Courts
finding that since the filing of the Information, the accused has not yet been
arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for

his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio,
Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and
permission of this Court. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an
accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel. A person facing
criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if
abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that An accused released on bail may
be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the
Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution
recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits
prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only
on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health, as
compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO [198 SCRA 130; G.R.

NO.79269; 5 JUN 1991]

Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on

October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private
respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987
Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not
entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996,
942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued
Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834
and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it
existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail,
which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the
court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof.
Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the
court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this
main condition of his bail. It was contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an
escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his
arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false
address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner
whose identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of
P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the
crime is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present
evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes
discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail
from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of

reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it
is not favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas
corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody,
whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be
released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the
jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which
can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver
would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs,
or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.