Elective local official, terms if office and term limit

1987 Constitution, A10S8

o Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
LGC S43
o Section 43. Term of Office. (a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be
three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except
that of elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local
elections immediately following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June
30, 1992.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for
three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday
of May 1994.
David vs. COMELEC
o issue: How long is the term of office of barangay officials?
o Petitioner:
contend that under Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 6653, approved on May 6, 1988, (t)he term of
office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years x x x. This is reiterated in Republic Act
No. 6679, approved on November 4, 1988, which reset the barangay elections from the second
Monday of November 1988 to March 28, 1989 and provided in Sec. 1 thereof that such fiveyear term shall begin on the first day of May 1989 and ending on the thirty-first day of May
1994.
further aver[7] that although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective
officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to barangay officials because
(1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while RA 7160 is a general
law which applies to all other local government units;
(2) RA 7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of
barangay officials is concerned;
(3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution fixes the term of elective local
officials at three years, the same provision states that the term of barangay officials shall be
determined by law; and
(4) thus, it follows that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials any
term, except three years; otherwise, there would be no rhyme or reason for the framers of the
Constitution to except barangay officials from the three year term found in Sec. 8 (of) Article
X of the Consti
conclude (1) that the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion when it
promulgated Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887(COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887
fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities
related thereto)
o Respondent:
defends its assailed Resolutions and maintains that the repealing clause of RA 7160 includes
all laws, whether general or special, inconsistent with the provisions of the Local Government
Code, citing this Courts dictum in Paras vs. Comelec[8] that the next regular election involving
1

the barangay office is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled in May
1997.
Furthermore, RA 8250 (the General Appropriations Act for 1997) and RA 8189 (providing
for a general registration of voters) both indicate that Congress considered that the barangay
elections shall take place in May, 1997, as provided for in RA 7160, Sec. 43 (c).[9]
Besides, petitioners cannot claim a term of more than three years since they were elected under
the aegis of the Local Government Code of 1991 which prescribes a term of only three years.
o As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.:
deny the petitions because
(1) the Local Autonomy Code repealed both RA 6679 and 6653 not only by
implication but by design as well;
(2) the legislative intent is to shorten the term of barangay officials to three years;
(3) the barangay officials should not have a term longer than that of their
administrative superiors, the city and municipal mayors; and
(4) barangay officials are estopped from contesting the applicability of the three-year
term provided by the Local Government Code as they were elected under the
provisions of said Code.
Issue:
1. Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679?
2. Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional?
3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA 7160?
ruling
o clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term to Three Years
- RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict
between two laws,the later enactment prevails. (Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant
.)
- During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the voters actually and
directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads (as in the Code).
- In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, Congress appropriated the amount of P400
million to coverexpenses for the holding of barangay elections this year. Likewise, under Sec.
7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held
immediately after the barangay elections in 1997. These are clear and express
contemporaneous statements of Congress that barangay officials shall be elected this May,
inaccordance with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.
- In Paras vs. Comelec, this Court said that the next regular election involving the barangay
office concerned is barely 7 months away, the same having been scheduled in May, 1997.
This judicial decision ispart of the legal system of the Philippines (NCC 8).
- RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. It
specifically and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that the term of office of barangay
officials shall be for three years. It is a special provision that applies only to the term of
barangay officials who were elected on the second Monday of May1994. With such
particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law.
o Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution
- The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for
barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body,
without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion
to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. It must be remembered
that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The petitioners have
miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the unconstitutionality they aver.
2

Constitutional Commission on how long the term of barangay officials is:As may be
determined by law; more precisely, as provided for in the Local Autonomy Code (Sec 43-c
limits their term to 3 years).
o Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year Terms
- Barangay officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for
and were elected to,under the law governing their very claim to such offices: namely, the LGC.
- Petitioners belated claim of Ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994
is unacceptable because under NCC 3, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
-

Elective local officials, qualifications

LGC s39
o Section 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized
cities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component
cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must
be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be
at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more
than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
RA 9164 S7
o Sec. 7. Section 428 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 428. Qualifications. - An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be a Filipino citizen,
a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at least one (1) year
immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but less than eighteen (18) years of age on the
day of the election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, and must not have
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
- On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his COC for the office of
Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R.
Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified
from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of
the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the
Second Division of the Comelec granted Lees petition.
- The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May
8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held
on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution
of the Second Division.
3

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes was issued showing that Fivaldo garnered the highest number of votes.
the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene
for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in
the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June
30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995
proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00
in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition
for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization
in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995)
(of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock
in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as
governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,
the Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy said position of governor.

constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.[4] This was stressed in the decision of this Court in Zaldivar v.
Estenzo.[5] Quoting from its prior decisions, this Court held:
In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be
fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so
may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods
that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly
and honest elections.
o [I]t is easy to understand why no interference whatsoever with the performance of the Commission
on Elections of its functions should be allowed unless emanating from this Court. Thus: It is easy to
realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to
arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on
Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotenc

o Issues:
1. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to
his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon NO!
2. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence? -NO!
o Ruling:
-

the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an

elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term
of office to which he has been elected and not on the date of his election, if not when
the certificate of candidacy is filed. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance
to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since
Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day the term of office of
governor (and other elective officials) began he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities
thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his
native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and
meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law
was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it
should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should
such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the
certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications unless
otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence should thus be
possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time
he is proclaimed and at the start of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing
this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or
purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship
4

173

batangas, pending the determination of civil case no. 3442 for the annulment of ordinance no. 05, resolution no.
345 and comelec resolution no. 2987.
-

HELD:
Section 7, Article IX A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that: SEC. 7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided by
this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The Court ruled that What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers. Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the
conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely
as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may
not be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said
resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Relationship with lower courts

(Comelec vs Datuimam)
Facts:
o the Commission on Elections sent telegrams to election officials in Lanao del Sur ordering them to
delete Barangay Sumbago from the list of barangays in the Municipality of Bayang on the ground
that it had not been legally created. Accordingly, the officials refused to accept for filing certificates
of candidacy of those seeking office in Barangay Sumbago in the May 9, 1994 barangay elections.
o However, barangay officials seeking reelection brought suit Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bayang
to stop implementation of the COMELEC directive.
o Respondent, who had been designated acting judge of that court, issued a temporary restraining
order on April 9, 1994 and, after hearing, rendered a decision on May 2, 1994 granting
injunction. He held that a mere telegram order of the COMELEC cannot prevail over Executive
Order No. 108, dated December 24, 1986, of then President Corazon C. Aquino which listed
Sumbago among the barangays duly created in Region XII.
o By virtue of the temporary restraining order of respondent judge, the Election Officer of Bayang,
Lanao del Sur allowed the filing of certificates of candidacy for barangay positions in
Sumbago. However, upon being informed of the issuance of the order, the COMELEC issued
Resolution, directing election officials to disregard the temporary restraining order and delete
Barangay Sumbago from the list of barangays in the Municipality of Bayang, Lanao del Sur, as
previously ordered.
o the COMELEC referred the present case to this Court for appropriate [disciplinary] action against
respondent. The COMELEC contended that, in taking cognizance of the case, respondent
showed patent ignorance of the law because he had no power to issue an injunction against the
COMELEC, especially considering the status and rank of the issuing court in relation to that of the
COMELEC
Issue:
o The issue in this case is whether respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law for issuing
an injunction against the COMELEC. We think he is, although, as will presently be explained, there
are mitigating factors which should be considered in his favor.
Held:
o First of all, because of their subordinate status and rank vis-a-vis the COMELEC, lower courts cannot
issue writs of injunction enforceable against the COMELEC. More importantly, respondent ought to
have known that, since its creation, the COMELEC has been accorded full discretion given its
172

qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the
start of his term.
We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been
suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue
thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of
the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political
status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced
to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred
(Marcos time, na force siyag migrate), his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the
date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given
' up his U. S. nationality.
Note: It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to
this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or
when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship
as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed
instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August
17, 1994 (the time he filed his application for repatriation), his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of
course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is
not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. Indeed,
decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for
that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial
or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res
judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion
demands."
An objection was raised that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the
candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39,
apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification,
that he be a "registered voter." And, under the law a "voter" must be a citizen of the
Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered
one if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
SC: The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement.
If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election
consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have
made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It
therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification
distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It
also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification
(aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that
the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to
govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local
Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not
require him to vote actually. Hence, registration not the actual voting is the core of
5

this "qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to
ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern
and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized and was not disputed that he
"was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been
sustained as valid by judicial declaration x x x In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct
on May 8, 1995."
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly maintained that "Mr.
Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in
1987,1988,1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was
questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed
to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8,1995.
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to
be elected.
o This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country
to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
Consistently, we have held:
o "x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted)."
o The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference
to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the
sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the
possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to
resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely
sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the
majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately
create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
o In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have
refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to
his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections.
Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of
repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running
for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings
over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic
role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled
against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order
to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only
to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt
about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land,
and sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him
three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of
candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated
tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs
6

HELD:
We find the petition without merit. The case at bar is an election protest involving the position of Governor,
Eastern Samar. [32] It is within the original jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in division. [33]
Admittedly, petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration of the divisions resolution or final decision. In like manner,
a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion
for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The prerequisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within the jurisdiction of the Comelec
in division can not dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution or final order of
the Division of the Commission on Elections because the case would not reach the Comelec en banc without such
motion for reconsideration having been filed and resolved by the Division.
The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a
motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. [37] In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election
cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en
banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed for prematurity. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to
a party's cause of action and a dismissal based on that ground is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of
action.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for prematurity.
(Salva vs Makalintal)
FACTS:
The petitioners filed with the RTC a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang
Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for annulment of Ordinance No.
05 and Resolution No. 345 both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987.
Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao,
Municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite.
Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto exercised by the
governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the Governor of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly,
as it was not shown that the essential requirements regarding the attestations or certifications of several government
agencies were obtained. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and regulations
governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the
abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.
The trial court denied the petition saying that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the
COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court. The petitioners contend that when the COMELEC
exercises its quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, its acts are subject to the
exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to
scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners submit that the conduct of a plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No.
05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature but simply ministerial or administrative in
nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction to enjoin the comelec from implementing its resolution no.
2987, series of 1998, which provided for the rules and regulations for the conduct of the plebiscite scheduled on
february 28, 1998 to decide on the abolition of barangay san rafael and its merger with barangay dacanlao, calaca,
171

This is correct. It is now settled that in providing that the decisions, orders and rulings of COMELEC "may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari" the Constitution in its Art. IX, A, 7 means the special civil action
ofcertiorari under Rule 65, 1. 2 Since a basic condition for bringing such action is that the petitioner first file a
motion for reconsideration, 3 it follows that petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal to his present action.
Petitioner argues that this requirement may be dispensed with because the only question raised in his petition is a
question of law. This is not correct. The questions raised by petitioner involve the interpretation of constitutional
and statutory provisions in light of the facts of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore, not pure questions
of law.
Moreover, that a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a petition
forcertiorari is clear from the following provisions of the Constitution:

speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming
intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of
81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court
of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life
of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, singlemindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He
therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And
in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most
certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
Labo vs. COMELEC
o Facts:

Art. IX, C, 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable.
Id. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Conformably to these provisions of the Constitution all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies,
must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, 7, "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari."
(Ambil vs Comelec)
Facts:
Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T. Ramirez were candidates for the position of Governor,
Eastern Samar, during the May 11, 1998 elections.[3] On May 16, 1998, the Provincial Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected Governor, Eastern Samar, having obtained 46,547 votes, the
highest number of votes in the election returns.
On June 4, 1998, respondent Ramirez who obtained 45,934 votes, the second highest number of votes, filed with
the Comelec, an election protest[4] challenging the results in a total of 201 precincts.[5] The case was assigned to the
First Division (formerly Second), Commission on Elections.
Comelec 1st division ruled in favor of respondent Ramirez who was declared winner by a margin of 1,176 votes.
On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, through Commissioner Julio F. Desamito, issued an order setting
the promulgation of the resolution in the case on June 20, 2000, at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Without waiting for the promulgation of the resolution, on June 19, 2000, petitioner interposed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. 9829) acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
170

In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed
a petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen
hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an
Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian;
that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an
Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage
with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even
if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which
should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.

o ISSUES:
-

1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.

2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can
replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.

HELD:
o 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized
as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was
his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He
did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he
was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship
when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian
citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or
repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress none of this happened.
o Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not
overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply
by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian).
The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia,
or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over
them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
o 2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should
be declared the mayor by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second
highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
7

proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality
of the legal votes cast in the election.
SK officials, qualifications and disqualifications
Sec. 10 RA 10742
o SEC. 10. Qualifications. An official of the Sangguniang Kabataan, either elective or appointee, must
be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, a resident of the
barangay for not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, at least eighteen
(18) years but not more than twenty-four (24) years of age on the day of the elections, able to read
and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, must not be related within the second civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity to any incumbent elected national official or to any incumbent elected
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official, in the locality where he or she seeks to be
elected, and must not have been convicted by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.
Garvida vs. Sales
o Facts:
In 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) of a barangay in Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacy was opposed by her rival
Florencio Sales, Jr. on the ground that she is over 21 years old (21 years old, 9 months at the
time of the filing). Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she be admitted as a candidate
and the SK elections went on. Sales, in the meantiume, filed a petition to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of Garvida. When the elections results came in, Garvida won with a vote of 78,
while Sales got 76. Garvida was eventually proclaimed as winner but had to face the petition
filed by Sales.
Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
provides that candidates for the SK must be at least 15 years of age and a maximum age of 21
years. Garvida states that the LGC does not specify that the maximum age requirement is
exactly 21 years hence said provision must be construed as 21 years and a fraction of a year
but still less than 22 years so long as she does not exceed 22 she is still eligible because she
is still, technically, 21 years of age (although she exceeds it by 9 months).
(Comelec Resolution No. 2824) the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a
qualified voter and an elective official. Thus:
"Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. -- To be qualified to register as a voter in the SK elections, a person
must be:
a) a citizen of the Philippines;
b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day, that is, he must have
been born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive;
"Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. -- An elective official of the SK must be:
a) a qualified voter;
b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and
c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or English
o ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement.
o HELD:
No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates for SK must be:
Filipino citizen;
8

Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate
remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions
Held:
We hold that certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. Section 7, Article IX(A) of the 1987 Constitution
states that if "unless provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof." We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered
in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.[19] Contrariwise, administrative orders of the
COMELEC are not, as a general rule, fit subjects of a petition for certiorari. The main issue in the case at bar is
whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered a manual count of the 1998 Sulu local
elections. A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation
to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election x x x." The issue is not only legal but one of
first impression and undoubtedly suffused with significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the
petitioner, the private respondent and the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough
considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
(Reyes vs RTC)
FACTS:
Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo Comia were candidates for the position of
Sanggunian Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992 elections. On May 13, 1992, during the
proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, private respondent moved for the exclusion of certain election
returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in the counting in favor of petitioner Aquiles Rees votes for Reyes
only, considering that the was another candidate (Epitacio Reyes) bearing the same surname. Without resolving his
petition, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed on the same day petitioner as the eight winning candidate.
On June 1, 1992, private respondent filed an election protest before the trial court. Municipal Board of
Canvassers file its answer in which it admitted that it had made a mistake in crediting private respondent with only
858 votes when he was entitled to 915 votes in the Statement of Votes. On June 23, 1992, trial court rendered its
decision annulling the proclamation of petitioner and declaring private respondent as the eight winning candidate
for the position of councilor.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC and in addition filed a petition for mandamus and
prohibition in the CA. The CA dismissed the petition because of the petitioner's pending appeal in the COMELEC.
On the other hand, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed the petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had
failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period.
Hence this instant petition, petitioner contends that the COMELEC's First Division committed grave abuse
of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether this petition for certiorari would prosper?
HELD: NO.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the COMELEC, raises a fundamental question. He contends that the filing of
the present petition, without petitioner first filing a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc,
violates Art. IX, A, 7 of the Constitution 1 because under this provision only decisions of the COMELEC en banc
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

169

was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a
review, is well known in remedial law.
Withal, as already stated, the legislative construction of the modified pertinent constitutional provision is to the
effect that the actuations of the Commission are final, executory and even inappealable. While such construction
does not exclude the general certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which inheres in it as the final guardian of
the Constitution, particularly, of its imperious due process mandate, it correspondingly narrows down the scope and
extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished
from review. We are of the considered opinion that the statutory modifications are consistent with the apparent
new constitutional intent. Indeed, it is obvious that to say that actuations of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari technically connotes something less than saying that the same "shall be subject to
review by the Supreme Court", when it comes to the measure of the Court's reviewing authority or prerogative in
the premises.

(Loong vs Comelec)
FACTS: {Same facts pero different ruling ni depending on the topic based sa syllabus}
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC
Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the
election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation
where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of
ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the
suppliers of the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by
misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the
automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated
machines failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates
and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay
Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting
discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement.
Some recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong
AND Jikiri).

Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received
by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were rejected by the automated machines.
These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the
wrong sequence code.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and
recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day,
COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata..
The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s
recommendation and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute
Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the
procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.

COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.

ISSUE:

168

an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months;

15 but not more than 21 years of age; and
duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list.
The provision is clear. Must not be more than 21 years of age. The said phrase is not equivalent
to less than 22 years old. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on
election day. If such was the intention of Congress in framing the LGC, then they should have
expressly provided such.
A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum
age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK
official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is no
further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age (member vs
elective). On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK
official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The addition of the phrase "on the day of
his election" is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on
election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective
official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction
is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective
SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est
ratio.[31] The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the
legislature intended a distinction or qualification.[32]
The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of age on
the day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
In fact the term "qualified voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.Since a
"qualified voter" is not necessarily an elective official, then it may be assumed that a "qualified
voter" is a "member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code does not provide
that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day
of the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires
insofar as it sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the day of
the election.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on
the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months
nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. One
born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day
after his birth -- the last day of the year.[35] In computing years, the first year is reached after
completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day
cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle
goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day
cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles.
After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is
the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It
means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a
year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not
equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state
that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.
The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more
than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official reaches
the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve
the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected. According to Senator Pimentel,
the youth leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st birthday."[40] Conversely, the SK
9

official must not have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] together
with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old
is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must therefore be exactly
21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK official on the
day of his election.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she
registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and
nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old.
When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and
was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for
elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and
6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996
Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and
if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible.[41]
In the same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he
is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement
directory, nor will it validate his election.[42] The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility
Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he should be declared
as the SK Chairman, is this a valid contention?
No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated candidate, though
obtaining the second highest number of vote, is not deemed to have been elected by
reason of the winners eventual disqualification/ineligibility. He cannot be declared as
successor simply because he did not get the majority or the plurality of votes the
electorate did not choose him. It would have been different if Sales was able to prove
that the voters still voted for Garvida despite knowing her ineligibility, this would have
rendered her votes stray.
Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by the SK member
who obtained the highest number of votes, should the SK member obtaining such vote
succeed Garvida?**
(**Not to be confused with Sales situation Sales was a candidate for SK
chairmanship not SK membership.)
The above argument cant be considered in this case because Section 435 only applies when
the SK Chairman refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily
resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without
leave for more than three (3) consecutive months. Garvidas case is not what Section 435
contemplates. Her removal from office by reason of her age is a question of eligibility. Being
eligible means being legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen. Ineligibility, on the
other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes
for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for
succession of the SK Chairman.

Elective Local Officials, disqualifications

LGC S40
o Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
10

order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
1987 Constitution Article VIII, Section 5(1)
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
Certiorari Jurisdiction of the SC
(Aratuc vs Comelec)
Facts:
Petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of respondent Comelec. A supervening panel
headed by Comelec had conducted hearings of the complaints of the petitioner therein alleged irregularities in the
election records. In order for the Commission to decide properly, it will have to go deep into the examination of the
voting records and registration records and it will have to interview and get statements from persons under oath
from the area to determine whether actual voting took place. The Comelec then rendered its resolution being
assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass.
Issue:
Whether the Comelec committee committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
Held:
Now, before discussing the merits of the foregoing contentions, it is necessary to clarify first the nature and extent
of the Supreme Court's power of review in the premises. The Aratuc petition is expressly predicated on the ground
that respondent Comelec "committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in eight
specifications. In other words, the petition invokes the Court's certiorari jurisdiction, not its appellate authority of
review.
While under the Constitution of 1935, "the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to
review by the Supreme Court" (Sec. 2, first paragraph, Article X) and pursuant to the Rules of Court, the petition
for "certiorari or review" shall be on the ground that the Commission "has decided a question of substance not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way not in accord with law or the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court" (Sec. 3, Rule 43), and such provisions refer not only to election contests but even
to pre-proclamation proceedings, the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat differently thus: "Any decision, order
or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from his receipt of a copy thereof" (Section 11, Article XII c), even as it ordains that the Commission shall "be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial and city officials" (Section 2 (2)).
Correspondingly, the Election Code of 1978, which is the first legislative construction of the pertinent
constitutional provisions, makes the Commission also the "sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies" and
further provides that "any of its decisions, orders or rulings (in such controversies) shall be final and executory", just
as in election contests, "the decision of the Commission shall be final, executory and inappealable." (Section 193)
It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency to
enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional body charged
with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be
presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission
"subject to review by the Supreme Court". And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that
the Commission's actuations be instead "brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot insist that there
167

 The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result
in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second
sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of
canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and members of the House of
Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of
canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is consistent with and
complements the authority of the COMELEC under the Constitution to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power
to "decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections."
We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter
and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality.
We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without
due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that
COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it
rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations.
Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it was merely
exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of canvassers.
o We cannot accept public respondent's argument.
o Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation,
COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the
COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint
election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies
and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections,
register political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission,
prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any
other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of
its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision
over all personnel involved in the conduct of election.
o However, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the
existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate ofA canvass requires the COMELEC to act
as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their
allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this
issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where
a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve
the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is
deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the
requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent.

Judicial review
1987 Constitution Article IX-A, Section 7
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
166

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Dual citizenship
o Constitution A4S5
SECTION 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law.
o LGC S40 (D)
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
Valles vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an
Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for
governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she
is an Australian.
o ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
o Held:
A)
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as
opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of
place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at
that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts
by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April
11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at
the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez,
is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
11

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship,
was subsequently retained under the 1973[4] and 1987[5] Constitutions. Thus, the herein
private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a
Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases
without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and
void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the
Commission for proper referral to a Division.
Soller v COMELEC
o Refer sa taas
o Petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest.(Soller vs. COMELEC,339 SCRA
685)
Quasi- Judicial Powers

B)
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino
citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention,
petitioner cited private respondents application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR)
and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her
of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign
country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces
in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in
her husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express.
Petitioners contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit.
the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.[8] As
held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of
registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship.
The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of
assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the
most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another
country has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that
respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
C)
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual
citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of
Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
12

Sandoval v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas
legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998.
After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner
the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day.
Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's
proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass
and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass
and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election
returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns.
The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation
as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order.
ISSUES:
1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98- 206

SPC No. 98-143 an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District Board of Canvassers for Malabon and Navotas
with Prayer for the Nullification of the Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as Congressman."
SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation as congressman.
2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.
RULING:
On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by private
respondent. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an
exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the
presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases. It
states: "Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and
Members of the House of Representatives. For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President,
Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters
relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the
certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate
canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in
the certificate of canvass or election returns before it."
165

 Julian Lallave, Jr. won the 1996 SK Elections of Brgy Ican, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, garnering a
total of 46 votes over Marivic Zarate who garnered 45 votes.
Unsatisfied with the proclamation by the Barangay Board of Canvassers, Zarate filed an
election protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that three or more votes that read
JL should not have been credited in favor of Lallave. Zarate further stated that the votes
bearing JL were stray votes and that there was no candidate with the name or nickname of
JL.
The Municipal Trial Court rendered it decision in favor of petitioner Zarate, declaring 8 of the
original 46 votes invalid.
Lallave appealed to the Commission on Elections theorizing that the votes reading JL
should be credited in his favour considering that such initials sufficiently identify him as the
candidate and that the votes bearing Julian, Jr de Real, Notno Lallave, and Nono de
Real should have been credited as well being his nickname and middlename, respectively.
The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a division of the Commission but was, instead,
submitted to the Commission en banc.The COMELEC en banc annulled the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court and declared Lallave as the elected SK chairman.
o Ruling:
the appeal interposed by the private respondent to the Commission on Elections from the
decision of the Trial Court of origin in subject election case, was not referred to a division of
the Commission but was, instead, submitted to the Commission En Banc, which decided
against the petitioner in the Resolution of April 24, 1997. Such recourse by the private
respondent transgressed Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution which
expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
In Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections, and companion cases (212 SCRA 307, 313-314 [1992]),
this Court said:
It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that
election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be
heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc,
does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance. In the
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are classified as
Special Cases and, in compliance with the above provision of the Constitution, the
two (2) Divisions of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear and decide
these Special Cases. Rule 27 thereof governs Special Cases; specifically, Section 9 of
the said Rule provides that appeals from rulings of the Board of Canvassers are
cognizable by any of the Divisions to which they are assigned and not by the
commission en banc.
A motion to reconsider the decision or resolution of the Division concerned may be filed
within five (5) days from its promulgation. The Clerk of Court of the Division shall, within
twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner of such
fact; in turn, the latter shall certify the case to the Commission en banc. Thereafter, the Clerk
of Court of the Commission shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution
of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification.
164

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
Again, petitioners contention is untenable. In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the
Court clarified dual citizenship as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the
same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing
situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary
consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state,
the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx
20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify
her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual
citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate
of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.The filing of a certificate
of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification
as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is
a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath,
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian
citizenship.
Mercado vs. Manzano
o Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However,
his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.
he Commission on Elections division declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said
elective position because under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding
dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
Comelec en banc: the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and
declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May
11, 1998 elections.
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the
age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport
as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered
himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
13

renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer
had U.S. citizenship.
o ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
o Held:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec.
20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Dual Citizenship
Dual allegiance
arises when, as a result of the concurrent -refers to the situation in which a person
application of the different laws of two or simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
more states, a person is simultaneously loyalty to two or more states. While dual
considered a national by the said states.[9] citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
For instance, such a situation may arise when the result of an individuals volition.
a person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus -With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV,
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
and without any voluntary act on his part, is national interest and shall be dealt with by
concurrently considered a citizen of both law.
states. Considering the citizenship clause
(Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible
for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or
mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino
mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers country such children are
citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of
the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
-There may be other situations in which a
citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of
another state; but the above cases are clearly
possible given the constitutional provisions
on citizenship.
Petitioner argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of
renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private
respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he
reached the age of majority.
Sc: by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
14

Issue
W/N the COMELEC was without jurisdiction or had acted in excess of its jurisdiction in having directed the
proclamation of Respondent IMPERIAL notwithstanding that the objections he had raised on appeal had not yet
been resolved, in violation of Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code? NO.
Ruling
It is inaccurate for Petitioner SALAZAR to contend that the COMELEC had failed to rule on his objections
on appeal based on alleged irregularities since COMELEC implicitly resolve the case thru its Resolution lifting
the suspension of proclamation. For, if the COMELEC First Division felt that Petitioner Salazar's objections
were valid, it would not have lifted the suspension of the proclamation. It cannot be said, therefore, that the
proclamation that the COMELEC (First Division) had authorized was void for being in violation of Section
245 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Some of the irregularities enumerated as having attended the voting were vote buying, fake bills and open
balloting, which are proper grounds in an election contest but may not, as a rule, be invoked to declare a
failure of election (Section 6, Omnibus Election Code). Neither are they proper issues in a pre-proclamation
controversy as enunciated in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In fact, Petitioner SALAZAR's alternative relief was for COMELEC to order a recount of the votes cast,
which again, is more properly the subject of an election protest. The COMELEC (First Division) cannot be
faulted, therefore, in ruling in its 5 June 1989 Resolution that Petitioner SALAZAR, if so minded, could file a
regular protest with the COMELEC.
Petitioner SALAZAR cannot justifiably argue that the COMELEC was devoid of jurisdiction to do so, the
matter of jurisdiction, meaning the light of a tribunal to act in a particular case, being governed by law.
Moreover, in the Resolution of the COMELEC of 21 October 1988, the case was remanded to the First
Division "for hearing and final disposition."
And, as far as the "hierarchical courtesy" owing this Court is concerned, it only need be pointed out that this
Court did not issue any order restraining the COMELEC from enforcing its 21 October 1988 Resolution,
which it would have done had it believed, as Petitioner SALAZAR would have wanted it to, that the
proceedings below had to be suspended during the pendency of this case or that Respondent IMPERIAL
should be enjoined from discharging the functions of the office of Mayor of Legaspi City.
In his Supplemental Petition, Petitioner SALAZAR further challenges the validity of the 5 June 1989
Resolution of the COMELEC (First Division) on the ground that his Motion for Reconsideration should
have been resolved by the COMELEC pursuant to:
o Section 3, Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution. It suffices to state, however, that said Resolution
dismissing the Petition for lack of interest due to the failure of Petitioner Salazar or his counsel to
appear for hearing, is not a Decision nor of such a nature that a motion for the reconsideration thereof
would call for resolution by the COMELEC.
Lastly, Petitioner SALAZAR's attack against the 5 June 1989 COMELEC Resolution that it has made the
Petition before this Court moot and academic is of no practical significance since this Court has arrived at the
same conclusion as the COMELEC that the proper recourse for him is an election protest, and has concluded
that no violation of Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code has been committed by the COMELEC.
Garvida v. sales
o Refer previous case
o Sc: The following cases must be decided in Division before they may be heard en bnc on motion for
reconsideration:
Petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy.
Zarate vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
163

 Nevertheless, the resolution of this second issue is not decisive in the disposition of
the instant case. What we considered here is the fact that the respondent COMELEC
First Division committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction
in admitting the belatedly filed answer with counter protest of private respondent
Espinosa.
Subject of motion for reconsideration
Salazar vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
In the January 18, 1988 local elections, Petitioner Jesus V. SALAZAR and respondent Benjamin S.
IMPERIAL were candidates for Mayor of Legaspi City.
During the canvass, Petitioner SALAZAR objected the admission of 165 election returns that were allegedly
obtained from massive irregularities committed by or on behalf of Respondent IMPERIAL. The CBC of
Canvassers (CBC) overruled the objections.
On January 25, 1988, Petitioner SALAZAR filed SPC No. 88-265, asking the COMELEC to order a recount
of the votes cast, or to annul the affected returns; and in either case, to set aside the appealed rulings of the
Board.
Three days thereafter, Respondent IMPERIAL filed his answer denying the alleged irregularities and
contending that Petitioner SALAZAR's proper recourse was an election protest to ventilate the alleged
wholesale irregularities, none of which had ever been reported to the authorities previously.
On January 31, 1988, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 88-412 (SPC No. 88-265) suspending the
effects of proclamation of respondent Benjamin S. Imperial and directing in the meantime the CBC Legaspi
City to submit its comment on its alleged violation of Sec. 245 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881).
On February 5, 1988, the CBC proclaimed the city officials except for the position of Mayor.
Three days thereafter, Respondent IMPERIAL filed before the COMELEC a Petition to declare the said
proclamation a nullity and impugned the integrity of 20 election returns.
Subsequent to the reorganization of COMELEC, or on February 26, 1988, the First Division of the
COMELEC promulgated a Minute Resolution, lifting or setting aside the order, which suspended the private
respondents proclamation, and ordering CBC to reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate for City
Mayor.
Petitioner SALAZAR moved for reconsideration before the COMELEC.
In the meantime, on March 2, 1988, CBC proclaimed Respondent IMPERIAL as the duly elected Mayor of
Legaspi City, stating that the addition of the election returns from the 20 precincts still to be canvassed will
not affect the outcome of the results of the election for mayor.
SALAZARs petition was denied on October 21, 1988.
On January 27, 1989, Petitioner SALAZAR filed this petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolution
of the COMELEC First Division, dated 26 February 1988.
At the hearing of 3 March 1989, the First Division dismissed the petition before it for lack of interest,
Petitioner SALAZAR's counsel having failed to appear. Upon reconsideration prayed for by the latter, the
hearing was reset to 18 May 1989. One of the reasons advanced for seeking reconsideration was that
considering the pendency of this petition, propriety demanded that COMELEC refrain from further
proceedings so as not to render the issues herein moot and academic.
On 5 June 1989, the COMELEC First Division denied reconsideration and held that "after the proclamation
of the winning candidate, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. It then decreed to consider the
alternative relief prayed for by petitioner in his petition "to order a recount of the votes cast," and advised
him to file a regular protest with the Commission within 10 days from receipt of the order.
162

citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998,

contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR
NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY
SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A
FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL
SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT
I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES
PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL
RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT
THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance
contained in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute
renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners
contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon
private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance
to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status
as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its
laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is
of no moment.
Furthermore, Manzanos oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with
the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced
his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
Labo vs. COMELEC (refer above)
roseller de guzman vs comelec
o facts:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying
ROSELLER DE GUZMAN (petitioner) from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007
elections.
Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual
citizenship under RA 9225. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine
citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, qualified to run as
vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

15

 Petitioner invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections and Mercado v.

Manzano, that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy,
containing an oath of allegiance, constituted as a renunciation of his foreign citizenship
o Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija
in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American Citizenship in accordance
with RA 9225.
o Ruling:
petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his
American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:
1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides
that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the oath of allegiance.
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine
citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there is no
question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance
on September 6, 2006. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an
additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Contrary to petitioners claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto
amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our rulings in the
cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225
provides for more requirements. ( Court held that Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires the
twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship)
the Court ruled that a candidates oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his
Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar
to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal
and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to
emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to
run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
petitioners Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2)
of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce
his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections.
16

the protest, persist and can not be cured by the omission on the part of the protestee-petitioner
to seek a reconsideration of the order dated July 26, 1995.
As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to the COMELEC en banc, this
Court finds the respondent COMELEC First Division correct when it held in its order dated
February 28, 1996 that no final decision, resolution or order has yet been made which will
necessitate the elevation of the case and its records to the Commission en banc. No less than
the Constitution requires that the election cases must be heard and decided first in division
and any motion for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the commission en
banc. Apparently, the orders dated July 26, 1995, November 15 1995 and February 28, 1996
and the other orders relating to the admission of the answer with counter-protest are issuances
of a commission in division and are all interlocutory orders because they merely rule upon an
incidental issue regarding the admission of Espinosas answer with counter-protest and do not
terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave something to be done before it is finally
decided on the merits.[19] In such a situation, the rule is clear that the authority to resolve
incidental matters of the case pending in a division, like the questioned interlocutory orders,
falls on the division itself, and not on the Commission en banc.
Section 5 (c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of procedure explicitly provides for this,
Section 5. Quorum; Votes required. xxx
(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall
be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division
which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order. (italics provided)
Furthermore, a look at section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of procedure confirms that
the subject case does not fall on any of the instances over which the Commission en banc can
take cognizance of. It reads as follows:
Section 2. The Commission en banc.- The Commission shall sit en banc in cases
hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a
majority of the members of a commission, or in all other cases where a division is not
authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the members of a Division,
an interlocutory matter or issue relative an action or proceeding before it is decided to
be referred to the commission en banc.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy is one of the cases
specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the
Commission may sit en banc. Neither is it shown that the present controversy a case
where a division is not authorized to act nor a situation wherein the members of the
First Division unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the commission en
banc. Clearly, the Commission en banc, under the circumstances shown above, can not
be the proper forum which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory orders can
be referred to.
In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed grave abuse
of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders
relative to an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of
the instances mentioned in section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the commission en
banc as this is not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
161

because it was filed way beyond the reglementary period of five (5) days as provided for under
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Respondent COMELEC First Division, however, issued an order [6] dated July 26, 1995
admitting Espinosas answer with counter-protest and requiring his lawyer to submit a
supplemental pleading specifying the numbers of counter-protested precincts listed in the
answer with counter protest.
Comelec First Division, through its order dated September 23, 1995, admitted the said
compliance, required Espinosa to make a cash deposit of P 40,150.00 for the 73 counterprotested precincts
Kho filed a motion to resolve [7] alleging that he filed a motion to expunge as a result of
Espinosas failure to answer the election protest within the legal period. Since, this motion to
expunge had not yet been acted by the Commission, he accordingly, prayed for its resolution.
Acting on the said motion, however, the COMELEC First Division, by its September 26, 1995
order,[8] dismissed the motion to resolve holding that Espinosas answer with counter-protest
which was mailed on June 15, 1995 was filed within the five (5) day reglementary period.

Kho filed a motion for reconsideration [9] of the orders dated September 23 and 26, 1995.

Espinosa, on the other hand, filed his opposition thereto arguing that the questioned
interlocutory orders dated September 23 and 26, 1995 were mere incidental orders which
implemented the earlier order dated July 26, 1995. He asserted that the failure on the part of
Kho to seek a first a reconsideration of this July 26, 1995 order which admitted the answer
with counter-protest is a fatal and an irreversible procedural infirmity.

the COMELEC First Division, through its November 15, 1995 order,[10] held that since Kho
did not attempt to file a motion for reconsideration of the July 26, 1995 order, such order can
not now be disturbed. The subsequent orders of September 23 and 26, 1995 that carried out
the July 26, 1995 order should not be set aside to prevent unnecessary delay in the proceedings
of the case.

o Issue:

WON COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess
of jurisdiction in admitting the belatedly filed answer with counter-protest of Espinosa, and in
refusing to elevate the case to the Commission en banc upon the pretext that the COMELEC
First Division issued mere interlocutory orders

o Held:
It is clear from the records that private respondent Espinosa filed his answer with counter
protest way beyond the reglementary period of five (5) days provided for by law
there is no question that the answer with counter protest of Espinosa was filed outside the
reglementary period provided for by law. As such, the COMELEC First Division has no
jurisdictional authority to entertain the belated answer with counter protest much less pass
upon and decide the issues raised therein. It follows therefore that the order of July 26, 1995
which pertains to the admission of the answer with counter protest of Espinosa as the other
consequent orders implementing the order of admission issued by the COMELEC First
Division are void for having been issued without jurisdiction. Even if petitioner Kho did not
file a motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 26, 1995 admitting the answer with
counterprotest, the jurisdictional infirmity, brought about by the late filing of the answer to
160

Sobejana-Condon vs. COMELEC

o FACTS:
The petitioner (condon) is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents
on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing
to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as
the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." The application was approved
and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December
5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that
she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
petitioner sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections for the position of ViceMayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M.
Bautista, (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions
for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly
sought the petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she
is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
RTC: trial court held that the petitioners failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225
rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner herself
during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath.
The law clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath.
COMELEC: sustained RTC
o Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce her
Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
o Ruling:
Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to renounce her Australian
citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic, thus:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
o "I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the
laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
17

 Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino citizenship and
all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain
conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:
o Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing
laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
o Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December
5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
o a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to
the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn
before an officer authorized to administer oath.
o The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its
categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective
public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the
renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly
executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and
unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
o The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be deemed a formal requirement only with
respect to the re-acquisition of ones status as a natural-born Filipino so as to override the effect
of the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship.
Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court to believe, those
who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public office has the option of
executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation.
o In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire
their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.The rule applies to
all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to
whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right
to run for public office.
18

and appreciation of ballots and/or election returns, all that is required is to reconvene the board of
canvassers to rectify the error.
It has original jurisdiction on all matters relating to election returns.
It has the direct control and supervision over the municipal board of canvassers, hence, it has authority
to direct the latter to reconvene and continue the proclamation of the rightful winner.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC En Banc has the power to order the correction.
Held: Yes.

1. Under Sec. 7, Rule 27, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the board may motu proprio or upon
verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties, correct the
errors committed, (a) where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in
the tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (3)
there was a mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement
of votes by precinct.
The above provision applies even if the proclamation of a winning candidate has already been
made as in the case at bar in which the validity of the proclamation is precisely in question.
2. Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and
annul the proclamation.
Since the Statement of Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and of the proclamation,
any error in the statement ultimately affects the validity of the proclamation.
An election protest over which the RTC has original jurisdiction presupposes a valid proclamation.
3. The making of the correction in their computation is an administrative capacity of the Municipal Board
of Canvassers under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Statement of Votes is merely tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as
reflected in the election returns.
HENCE, the COMELEC En Banc has authority to resolve any question pertaining to the proceedings
of the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Interlocutory Orders
Kho v. COMELEC
o Facts:
petitioner Kho, a losing candidate in the 1995 gubernatorial elections in Masbate, filed an
election protest[1] against private respondents Espinosa to set aside the proclamation of the
latter as the Provincial Governor of Masbate and to declare him instead the winner in the
elections.
Summons[2] was then issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC, for brevity) to
Espinosa on June 1, 1995 requiring him to answer to Khos petition of protest within five (5)
days from receipt thereof.
It appears that Espinosa received the summons on June 6, 1995,[3] but, he filed his answer with
counter protest only on June 15, 1995.[4] When Kho received the answer with counter-protest
to Espinosa on June 24, 1995, he filed on the same date a motion to expunge the said pleading
159

 As can be gleaned from the proceedings aforestated, petitioner's petition with the COMELEC
was not referred to a division of that Commission but was, instead, submitted directly to the
Commission en banc. The petition for certiorari assails the trial court's order denying the motion
to dismiss private respondent's election protest. The questioned order of the trial court is
interlocutory because it does not end the trial court's task of adjudicating the parties'
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other.[7] In our view, the
authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like the
questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the COMELEC and not on the
COMELEC en banc. Note that the order denying the motion to dismiss is but an incident of
the election protest. If the principal case, once decided on the merits, is cognizable on appeal
by a division of the COMELEC, then, there is no reason why petitions for certiorari relating to
incidents of election protest should not be referred first to a division of the COMELEC for
resolution. Clearly, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
petitioner's petition in the first instance.
Canicosa case just refer above
Baytan (refer above case, I love you sa nag digest! <3
Correction of manifest errors
Torres v Comelec
Correction of Manifest Error
Facts:
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanza, Cavite, issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation
of the Winning Candidates for Municipal Councilors. Petitioner was proclaimed as the fifth winning candidate
for councilor with 12,055 votes.
The same Municipal Board of Canvassers requested the COMELEC for correction of the number of votes
garnered by petitioner. The letter-request from the former stated that the votes intended for Mr. Dimaala in
the sub-total as reflected in the Statement of Votes by precinct was erroneously added to Mr. Torres for a
total of 934 votes. Mr. Torres should have been number 10 in the winning column with 11,121 votes while
Mr. de Peralta should have been number 5 with 11,610 votes.
In an En Banc resolution, COMELEC granted the letter-request for the correction. It ordered the Municipal
Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim de Peralta as the eighth winning councilor.
Petitioners contention:
The subject matter which was the correction of votes garnered by him, properly falls within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers had no legal personality to file the action motu proprio before
the COMELEC for correction.
Corrections are allowed only when there has been no proclamation yet.
Once the Municipal Board of Canvassers has declared and proclaimed the winners in an election its
functions are finished and its existence is terminated.
Comelecs contention:
The proclamation of petitioner was flawed from the beginning for being tainted with clerical error or
mathematical mistake in the addition of votes.
When what is involved is PURELY mathematical and/or mechanical error in the operation of the
adding machine committed by the BoC but does not involve any opening of ballot boxes, examination
158

Remember: ang common doctrine in De Guzman and Condon cases is, Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in
accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run
for and thus hold an elective public offiice.
Macquiling vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of
his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010
local and national elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration
dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."To further
bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computergenerated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his
US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
COMELEC First division:
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it as
one for disqualification. The First Division disagreed with Arnados claim that he is a
Filipino citizen. The Court ruled that Arnados act of consistently using his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.
Petitioner Casan Macode (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan,
and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections,
intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified
Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is
not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as
the winner
COMELEC EN BANC:
In favour of Arnado
o Issue:
whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made
o held:
19

I: The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary
act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the
Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after
performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public
office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008
when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit
of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run
for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless
of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when,
after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his
foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country
before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to
determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009,
the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at
any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation
of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the
foreign country which granted the citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an
act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who
is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not
divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.

20

A motion to reconsider the decision or resolution of the Division concerned may be filed
within five (5) days from its promulgation. 3 The Clerk of Court of the Division shall, within
twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner of such
fact; in turn, the latter shall certify the case to the Commission en banc. 4 Thereafter, the Clerk
of Court of the Commission shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution
of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification. 5
Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases
without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and
void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the
Commission for proper referral to a Division.
Soller vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for mayor of the municipality
of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 14, 1998, the
municipal board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner Ferdinand Thomas Soller duly
elected mayor.
private respondent Angel Saulong filed with the COMELEC a "petition for
annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return". Subsequently , private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, an
election protest against petitioner
Petitioner also moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction,
COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent.
the trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
said motion was denied. Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition
for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondent's election protest.
, the COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner's suit.
o Issue:
whether or not public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in not ordering the dismissal of private respondent's election protest.
o Held:
section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution reads:
"The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be
decided by the Commission en banc."
Thus, in Sarmiento vs. COMELEC[5] and in subsequent cases,[6] we ruled that the COMELEC,
sitting en banc, does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including
pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of
the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by
it in the first instance is null and void.
157

supplies in that province, was charged with having opened three boxes containing
official ballots for distribution among several municipalities in violation of the
instructions of the Commission which enjoin that the same cannot be opened except
in the presence of the division superintendent of schools, the provincial auditor, and
the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party, and the
Citizens' Party, for he ordered their opening and distribution not in accordance with
the manner and procedure laid down in said resolutions. And because of such violation
he was dealt as for contempt of the Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In
this sense, the Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for
contempt, and so its decision is null and void.

OEC A7 S52E
o Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:
o E. Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure and with the
same penalties provided therein. Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or
ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt thereof.

Jurisdiction of En banc or division

1987 Constitution A9C S3
o SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission
en banc.
Sarmiento v. COMELEC
o Facts:
Petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions above specified as having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took
cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of its
Divisions.
o Held:
Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc
it is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that election cases
include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and
decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not
have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.
In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are classified
as Special Cases 1 and, in compliance with the above provision of the Constitution, the
two (2) Divisions of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear and decide
these Special Cases. 2 Rule 27 thereof governs Special Cases; specifically, Section 9 of
the said Rule provides that appeals from rulings of the Board of Canvassers are
cognizable by any of the Divisions to which they are assigned and not by the
Commission en banc.
156

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position.
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through
a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens
by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere
filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed
not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnados act of
consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This
does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for
he in fact did. It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts
which effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for
any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier
renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign
citizen, to hold any public office.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant
civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to ones flag and country. While those who acquire
dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving
of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic
and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public
office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
Fugitives from justice
Marquez vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in
the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying
for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which
dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent
Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal
charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property
21

was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los
Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed,
has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.
COMELEC dismissed the petition
o ISSUE: Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and
to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his
arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and
is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an
elective local office.
o Held:
The law needs no further interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No.
7160, is rather clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged flee to avoid prosecution.
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in criminal cases
here and abroad are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement
deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp.
vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an
enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or
regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who has been convicted by final
judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private
respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as such term must be interpreted and applied in
the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC
outrightly dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of
facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this
unresolved factual matter.
Permanent residents in foreign country
Caasi v. CA
o FACTS:
Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the local
elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner,
Mateo Caasi, on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private
respondent was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident
of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but
he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green
card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic
medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident
of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on
February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections
on May 18,1987.
o Issue:
22

from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this
Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well
taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
Masangkay vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
On 24 October 1957, Benjamin Masangcay then provincial treasurer of Aklan
designated to take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election
forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different municipalities
of the province with several others, was charged before the Comelec with contempt
for having opened 3 boxes containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities
of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission
embodied in its resolution promulgated on 2 September 1957, and its unnumbered
resolution dated 5 March 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence
of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the
authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens
Party, as required, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code
and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Masangcay et.al. complied with the summons issued
by the Comelec to appear and show cause why they should not be punished for
contempt on the basis of the charge. On 16 December 1957 the Commission rendered
its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged and
sentencing each of them to suffer 3 months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500,
with subsidiary imprisonment of 2 months in case of insolvency, to be served in the
provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the
constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the Comelec
as well as its members the power to punish acts of contempt against said body under
the same procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court in that the portion of said section which grants to the Commission and
members the power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the
principle underlying the separation of powers that exists among the three departments
of our constitutional form of government.
o Issue: Whether or not Comelec may punish Masangcay for contempt
o Held:
No. Under the law and the constitution, the Comelec has not only the duty to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try,
hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the
elections. The Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within
the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an
administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as
controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction.
The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty which inherently
is administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasijudicial function of the Commission. In the same case, we also expressed the view that
when the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to
punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature,
the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the
charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise
of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to
be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the
different municipalities. In fact, Masangcay, who as provincial treasurer of Aklan was
the one designated to take charge of the receipt, custody and distribution of election
155

that an ocular inspection be made by all members of the Commission of all the samples
before the final award be made. An ocular inspection was conducted by the
COMELEC of all the samples that were submitted. The Commissioners noted that
Acme submitted the lowest bid and that it should be awarded the contract. Filipinas
filed an Injunction suit with the Court of First Instance of Manila, and also applied for
a writ of preliminary injunction. After hearing petitioner's said application, the
respondent Judge in an order denied the writ prayed for. Public respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the
nature of the suit, and that the complaint stated no cause of action. The Judge
dismissed the case and denied the motion for reconsideration of Filipinas

Issue:
Held:
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180, approved June 21,
1947, the election law then enforced) provided that, "(a) any controversy submitted to
the Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it within fifteen days
counted from the time the corresponding petition giving rise to said controversy is
filed," and that, "any violation of any final and executory decision, order, or ruling of
the Commission shall" constitute contempt of court Likewise, the same section
provided that, "any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of
Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Similarly, Section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296), as
amended, provides that, "final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the
Commission on Elections ..." fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court by way of certiorari. Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
prescribed the manner of appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court from a final ruling
or decision of the Commission on Elections, among other administrative bodies.
Hence it has been consistently held 9 that it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of
First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions,
orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and
enforcement of election laws.
We are however, far from convince that an order of the COMELEC awarding a
contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted
in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which
is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated
by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by
certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or
proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission
granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy
before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented
evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of
the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in
relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding
the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions
over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be
deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being
non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC
154

1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United
States.
2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to
the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
o Held:
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance
at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt
with by law.
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant
to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of
a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application
for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State)
which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila
before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein
regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer
was, "Permanently."
On the back portion of his green card:
Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and
work in the United States."
Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile
and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his
children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there
permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's)
visa.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating the entering into a
country with the intention of residing in it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence. As
shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the term "immigrant."
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 (refer above) Constitution is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired
the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure"
as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881)
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for
mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant
of the United States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who
is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did
not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior
to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified
to run for any elective office"
23

 Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1)
year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate
for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code).
Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United
States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his
return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality
on January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of
excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess
dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast
their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The
assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such
entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public
duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country
of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent
resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such
immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that
he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on
January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence,
his election thereto was null and void.
Omnibus Election Code, s12 and s68
o Section 68
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party
is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having:
a. given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions;
b. committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
c. spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
d. solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
e. violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person
who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
o Section 12
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty.
Vacancy in elective local offices, grounds
Vacancy in elective local offices, how filed
24

this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted
of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC
En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by
such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which
affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division.
Carlos vs. Angeles
o Ruling:
Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
(Emphasis ours).
Consequently, both the Supreme Court and Comelec have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of
general jurisdiction (regional trial courts) in election cases involving elective municipal
officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
the case
OEC Article 7, Section 52 (d)
o Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:
D. Summon the parties to a controversy pending before it, issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or hearing before it,
and delegate such power to any officer of the Commission who shall be a member of
the Philippine Bar. In case of failure of a witness to attend, the Commission, upon
proof of service of the subpoena to said witnesses, may issue a warrant to arrest witness
and bring him before the Commission or the officer before whom his attendance is
required.
Any controversy submitted to the Commission shall, after compliance with the requirements
of due process, be immediately heard and decided by it within sixty days from submission
thereof. No decision or resolution shall be rendered by the Commission either en banc or by
division unless taken up in a formal session properly convened for the purpose.
The Commission may, when necessary, avail of the assistance of any national or local law
enforcement agency and/or instrumentality of the government to execute under its direct and
immediate supervision any of its final decisions, orders, instructions or rulings.
Contumacy Powers (contumacy meaning: stubborn refusal to obey or comply with authority, especially a court
order or summons.)
o Filipinas Engg v Ferrer
Facts:
In preparation for the national elections, the Commissioners of the COMELEC issued
an "INVITATION TO BID CALL No. 127", calling for the submission of sealed
proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 11,000 units of voting booths with
specifications and descriptions. Among the seventeen bidders who submitted
proposals in response to the invitation were the petitioner, Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop, and the private respondent, Acme Steel Manufacturing Company. The
COMELEC Bidding Committee Chairman and Members submitted their
Memorandum on the proceedings taken pursuant to the invitation to bid which stated
that Acme's bid had to be rejected because the sample it submitted was made of black
iron sheets, that were painted, and therefore not rust proof or rust resistant and that it
was also heavy (51 kilos in weight). The Committee instead recommended that
Filipinas be awarded the contract to manufacture and supply the voting booths, but
153

 However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On
June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the
same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013.
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET
has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
o Issue:
o Held:
the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is
duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution:
o Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x
o As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction over
a candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives,
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?
o The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins.
o From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office.
petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the
term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only "at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election."28 Thus, until such time, the
COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made
(1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here,
although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it
was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the
required oath of office was indeed complied.
More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy that before
the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already
finally disposed of the issue of petitioners lack of Filipino citizenship and residency
via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the
COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioners qualifications to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representative. We will inexcusably disregard
152

LGC of 1991, Section 45(c)

Section 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. (a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic succession provided above do not apply shall be
filled by appointment in the following manner:
(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang
bayan;
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of the
sangguniang barangay concerned.
(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which the sanggunian
member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last
vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come
from the same political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the
unexpired term of the vacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of
membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned are conditions sine qua
non, and any appointment without such nomination and certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall
be a ground for administrative action against the official responsible therefore.
(c) In case or permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong to any political
party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified
person to fill the vacancy.
(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy
shall be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the organization concerned.

Date of election
1987 Constitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 1, 5
SECTION 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
SECTION 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
LGC S42
25

o Section 42. Date of Election. - Unless otherwise provided by law, the elections for local officials shall
be held every three (3) years on the second Monday of May.
RA 7166, S1 AND S2
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR SYNCHRONIZED NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS AND FOR
ELECTORAL REFORMS, AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Section 1. Statement of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to synchronize elections so that there shall be simultaneous
regular elections for national and local officials once every three (3) years.
Sec. 2. Date of Elections. - In accordance with the policy hereinbefore stated, there shall be an election for President,
Vice-President, twenty-four (24) Senators, all elective Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective
provincial, city and municipal officials on the second Monday of May, 1992. Thereafter, the President and VicePresident shall be elected on the same day every six (6) years; while the Senators, elective Members of the House of
Representatives and all elective provincial, city and municipal officials shall be elected on the same day every three (3)
years, except that with respect to Senators, only twelve (12) shall be elected.
RA 9164, S1
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN
ELECTIONS, AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE "LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991", AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Date of Election. - There shall be synchronized barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections which shall
be held on July 15, 2002. Subsequent synchronized barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections shall be held on the
last Monday of October and every three (3) years thereafter.
Adjustment of period of pre-election requirements
RA 6646, s29
AN ACT INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL REFORMS IN THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Sec. 29. Designation of Other Dates for Certain Pre-elections Acts. - If it should no longer be reasonably
possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, the Commission shall
fix other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishment of the activities so voters shall not be deprived
of their right of suffrage.
RA 8436, S28
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED
ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN
SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Sec. 28. Designation of other dates for certain pre-election acts. - If it shall no longer be reasonably
possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, the Commission shall
fix other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishment of the activities so voters shall not be deprived
of their suffrage.
26

the Commission on Elections is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioner's appeal
and for not ruling that all the four questioned votes should have been credited to him under
the equity of the incumbent rule in Section 211(2) of the Omnibus Election Code.
The Commission on Elections was obviously of the opinion that it could not entertain the
petitioner's appeal because of the provision in Section 9 Rep. Act No. 6679 that the decision
of the regional trial court in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay
elections "on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable."
While supporting the dismissal of the appeal, the Solicitor General justifies this action on an
entirely different and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution, providing that the Commission on Elections shall:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials,
and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
His submission is that municipal or metropolitan courts being courts of limited jurisdiction,
their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the Commission on Elections under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision rendered
by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, should have been appealed directly to
the Commission on Elections and not to the Regional Trial Court of Abra.
Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision
of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed
to the regional trial court, must be declared unconstitutional.
we hold that the petitioner's appeal was validly made to the Commission on Elections under
its "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests. . . involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." Its decision was in turn also properly elevated
to us pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7, of the Constitution, stating that "unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof."
Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution that "decisions, final
orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable" applies only to questions of fact
and not of law. That provision was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its authority
to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the
Constitution.
The issue the petitioner was raising was one of law, viz., whether he was entitled to the
benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent rule, and so subject to our review.
Reyes vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to
Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the
petitioner, on the ground that it contained material representations.On March 27, 2013, the
COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC,
petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225.
She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her MR.
151

 WON the COMELECs appellate jurisdiction is only limited to decided barangay

election cases
o Held:
There is no merit in petitioners argument that Rule 28, Section 1 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure limits the COMELECs jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in
election cases to issues related to elections, returns and qualifications of elective
municipal and barangay officials. Said provision, taken together with the succeeding
section, undeniably shows that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with
the COMELEC whenever a judge hearing an election case has acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
the Court had in a subsequent issuance, A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC[15](which amended, among
others, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court), clearly provided that:
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional
trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied.)
from the foregoing, this Court recognizes the COMELECs appellate jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari against all acts or omissions of courts in election cases. Indeed,
in the recent case of Galang v. Geronimo,[16] the Court had the opportunity to rule that a
petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral
protest was within the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
Galang doctrine: it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari involving acts of the municipal trial courts in such election contests.
Flores vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
In an election held in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, on March 28, 1989, the
Petitioner Roque Flores was deemed to have the highest number of votes for a
kagawad position, which was proclaimed by the board of canvassers. During the 1982
elections, he was voted as punong barangay in accordance with Section 4 of Rep. Act
6679.
However, private respondent Nobelito Rapisora, herein private respondent, who
placed second in the election with 463 votes, or one vote less than the petitioner
,protested the election before The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, contending
that the ballot in question which only indicated Flores should be declared stray votes
and should not be divided equally to the other candidate who has the same surname.
He further stated that in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4
questioned votes should be counted in his favor by virtue of the equity of incumbent
rule, which states, in the event that there would be 2 or more candidates having the
same full name, if the ballot only states such full name, the vote would be entitled to
the incumbent. For that reason, the lower court sustained the private respondents
contention and afterwards declaring him as the punong barangay.
Flores appealed to RTC but was denied
Flores went to COEMLEC, but his appeal was dismissed on the ground that the public
respondent had no power to review the decision of the regional trial court.
o Issue:
WON the COMELEC is correct in denying the petition of Flores for it has no
jurisidiction to review over barangay election contest?
o Held:

150

Akbayan vs. COMELEC

o Facts:
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the
extension of the registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has
already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be
allowed a special 2-day registration.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued
COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth
alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now
disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no
registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth
however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise
of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters
registration if the original period is not observed.
o Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
extension of the voters registration. No.
o Held:
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all
absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other
rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our
Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect,
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT
LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN
THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE
WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTIONS. NO LITERACY,
PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE
IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE.
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration.
Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the
minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration
Act of 1996.
the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration
is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election
27

process. Thus, contrary to petitioners argument, registration cannot and should not be
denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the
significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly,
in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the
act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could
be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which
is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.
The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section
8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days
before the regular election. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is
explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.

petitioners invoke the so called standby powers or residual powers of the COMELEC, as
provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29, Republic Act No. 6646[7] and adopted
verbatim in Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436,[8] thus:
SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts - If it
should no longer be possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for
certain pre-election acts, the Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to
ensure accomplishments of the activities so voters shall not be deprived of their right
to suffrage.

On this matter, the act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act.
Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, registration, as a process, has its own specific definition,
precise meaning and coverage, thus:
a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for
registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality
wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon
approval by the Election Registration Board;
At this point, it bears emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by
herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far
from contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. True enough, both
provisions, although at first glance may seem to be at war in relation to the other, are in a more
circumspect perusal, necessarily capable of being harmonized and reconciled.
Note: R.A. 8189, SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The Personal filing
of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the
Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election. (Emphasis Ours)
Similarly, every new statute should be construed in connection with those already
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand
together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.[10] Interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, which means that the best method of
interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with other laws.
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the
present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying
28

2. Senate Electoral Tribunal;

3. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
4. Commission on Elections; and
5. Regional Trial Courts.
o This order of preference dictated that the ballot boxes and other election materials in Bulacans
provincial election contest, had to be transferred to the SET when the latter needed these materials
for its revision of ballots. The transfer to the SET, however, did not mean that the Bulacan
provincial election contest at that time already submitted for decision had to be suspended
o With the COMELEC retaining its jurisdiction over the Bulacan provincial election contest,
the legal effect of the physical transfer of the ballots and other election materials to the
SET for purposes of its own revision becomes a non-issue, given the arrangement between
the COMELEC and the SET, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2812, to
coordinate and make arrangements with each other so as not to delay or interrupt the
revision of ballots being conducted, all for the purpose of the expeditious disposition of
their respective protest cases.
o As the petitioner argues and the COMELEC candidly admits, there is no specific rule
which allows the COMELEC to conduct an appreciation of ballots outside its premises
and of those which are outside its own custody.[27] But while this is true, there is likewise
nothing to prohibit the COMELEC from undertaking the appreciation of ballot side by
side with the SETs own revision of ballots for the senatorial votes, in light especially of
the COMELECs general authority to adopt means to effect its powers and jurisdiction
under its Rules of Procedure.Section 4 of these Rules states:
Sec. 4. Means to Effect Jurisdiction. - All auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry into effect its powers or jurisdiction may be employed by the
Commission; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such power or
jurisdiction is not specifically provided for by law or these rules, any suitable
process or proceeding may be adopted.
Ceriaco vs. Nuez
o Facts:
Ceriaco Bulilis (Bulilis) was proclaimed winner of the elections for punong barangay of
Barangay Bulilis, Ubay, Bohol. He won over respondent Victorino Nuez (Nuez) by a
margin of four (4) votes.
Nuez filed an Election Protest[1] (for judicial recount and annulment of proclamation)
with the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ubay, Bohol.
Bulilis: denied the allegations in the protest and praying for its dismissal on the ground
that the MCTC had no jurisdiction since the protest failed to implead the Chairman
and the Members of the Board of Election Inspectors who were purportedly
indispensable parties
(Judge Garces) granted Nuezs motion to present evidence ex parte
Counsel for Bulilis filed a motion for reconsideration on November 10, 2010, asserting
the lack of proper notice to him of the preliminary conference
Bulilis filed a petition for certiorari in RTC.
RTC: dismissed the petition on the ground that it is the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) that has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in
election cases involving municipal and barangay officials.
Bulilis contends that the petition for certiorari that he filed with the RTC was not an
election case (i.e., not relating to elections, returns or qualifications of elective officials),
but one imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MCTC judge in his
issuance of an interlocutory order. He further claims that the COMELECs appellate
jurisdiction is only limited to decided barangay election cases
o Issue:
149

The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements
are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable
at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented
during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations in
deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of
decision-making.Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which
must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the
conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on
substantial evidence.[18]
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of
a quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due
process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a
decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is
based.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasijudicial body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights
and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must
state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based.. hence his opportunity to be
heard is satisfied.
On the issue that he was not notified that ballots and election materials whose possession
and custody have been transferred to the SET, SC ruled that the contested proceedings at
the SET (contested proceedings) are no longer part of the adversarial aspects of the election
contest that would require notice of hearing and the participation of the parties. In other
words, what took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the COMELEC, as
a quasi-judicial body, in the course of appreciating the evidence presented and deciding
the provincial election contest on the merits. These deliberations are no different from
judicial deliberations which are considered confidential and privileged.
To conclude, the rights to notice and to be heard are not material considerations in the
COMELECs handling of the Bulacan provincial election contest after the transfer of the
ballot boxes to the SET; no proceedings at the instance of one party or of COMELEC
has been conducted at the SET that would require notice and hearing because of the
possibility of prejudice to the other party. The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to
notify either party of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the
provincial election contest.In the context of our standard of review for the petition, we
see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by
the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the appreciation of
ballots this deliberation entailed
the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election contest, as the
petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and
other election materials to the SET. The Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC
jurisdiction over election protests involving provincial officials. The COMELEC in this
case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election
contest, as well as over the parties. After its jurisdiction attached, this jurisdiction cannot
be ousted by subsequent events such as the temporary transfer of evidence and material
records of the proceedings to another tribunal exercising its own jurisdiction over another
election contest pursuant to the Constitution. This is the rule of adherence of jurisdiction
the COMELEC, vowing to the reality that only a single ballot exists in an election for national and
local officials, saw it fit to lay down the rule on the order of preference in the custody and revision of
ballots and other documents contained in the ballot boxes. The order, in terms of the adjudicatory
tribunal and as provided in COMELEC Resolution No. 2812, runs:
1. Presidential Electoral Tribunal;
148

the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration
shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election.
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue that respondent COMELEC
may validly and legally conduct a two-day special registration, through the expedient of the
letter of Section 28 of R.A. 8436. To this end, the provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would
come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the
available period prior to election day. In more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A. 8436
is, to our mind, anchored on the sound premise that these certain pre-election acts are still
capable of being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of election
and the conduct of other related pre-election activities required under the law.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown
in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election
matters because the additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be
screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then
entered into the computerized voters list; and then they will have to reprint the voters
information sheet for the update and distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections
would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In
short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters
are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths pleading was attached
any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the
fact that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth
et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register
on time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and
not those who slumber on their rights.

Nature of barangay elections

Omnibus Election code, sec. 38
o Sec. 38. Conduct of elections. - The barangay election shall be non-partisan and shall be conducted
in an expeditious and inexpensive manner.
No person who files A certificate of candidacy shall represent or allow himself to be represented as a
candidate of any political party or any other organization; and no political party, political group,
political committee, civic, religious, professional, or other organization or organized group of whatever
nature shall intervene in his nomination or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or give aid or
support, directly or indirectly, material or otherwise favorable to or against his campaign for election:
Provided, That this provision shall not apply to the members of the family of a candidate within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity nor to the personal campaign staff of the candidate
which shall not be more than one for every one hundred registered voters in his barangay: Provided,
however, That without prejudice to any liability that may be incurred, no permit to hold a public
meeting shall be denied on the ground that the provisions of this paragraph may or will be violated.
Nothing in this section, however, shall be construed as in any manner affecting or constituting an
impairment of the freedom of individuals to support or oppose any candidate for any barangay office.
29

 Occena vs. COMELEC

o Facts:
this petition for prohibition seeks the declaration as unconstitutional of Sections 4 and 22 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982, insofar as
it prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of May 17, 1982 "from representing or
allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party ... or prohibits a political
party, political group, political committee ... from intervening in the nomination of a candidate
in the barangay election or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support
directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election
The legal provisions in question read as follows:
SEC. 4. Conduct of elections. The barangay election shall be, non-partisan and shall be conducted
in an expeditious and inexpensive manner.
No person who filed a certificate of candidacy shall represent or allow himself to be represented as a
candidate of any political party or any other organization; and no political party, political group,
political committee, civic religious, professional or other organization or organized group of whatever
nature shall intervene in his nomination or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or give aid or
support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election:
Provided, That this provision shall not apply to the members of the family of a candidate within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity prior to the personal campaign staff of the candidate
which shall not be more than one for every one hundred registered voters in his barangay: Provided,
further, That without prejudice to any liability that may be incurred, no permit to hold a public meeting
shall be denied on the ground that the provisions of this paragraph may or will be violated.
Nothing in this section, however, shall be construed as in any manner affecting or constituting an
impairment of the freedom of individuals to support or oppose any candidate for any barangay office.
SEC. 22, Penalties. Violations of this Act shall constitute prohibited acts under Sec. 178 of the
1978 Election Code and shag be prosecuted and penalized in accordance with the provisions of said
code.
The petitioner contends
(a) That the ban on the intervention of political parties in the election of barangay officials is violative
of the constitutional guarantee of the right to form associations arid societies for purposes not contrary
to law.
(b) That the ban is incompatible with a democracy and a parliamentary system of government.
o Issue: whether or not it is unconstitutional.
o Held:
The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law is neither absolute
nor illimitable; it is always subject to the pervasive and dominant police power of the state and
may constitutionally be regulated or curtailed to serve appropriate and important public
interests. (Gonzales vs. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835: Imbong vs. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28). Whether
30

judgment.[13]Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character,

particularly with respect to election contests, COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial
branch of government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the constitutional
sense;[14] hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and
enforcement, is quasi-judicial.
Consistent with the characterization of its adjudicatory power as quasi-judicial, the judicial
review of COMELEC en banc decisions (together with the review of Civil Service
Commission decisions) is via the prerogative writ of certiorari, not through an appeal, as the
traditional mode of review of quasi-judicial decisions of administrative tribunals in the exercise
the Courts supervisory authority. This means that the Court will not supplant the decision of
the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body except where a grave abuse of discretion or any other
jurisdictional error exists.
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or
quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations,[16] quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. xxx
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial. "Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative
proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party
at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process,
we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[17] A formal or trialtype hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of
COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a
hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or
denial of due process.
147

o Facts:
petitioner and the respondent vied for the position of Governor of the Province of Bulacan in
the May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate and assumed
the office of Governor.
The respondent seasonably filed an election protest with the COMELEC, which was raffled
to the Second Division
the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those involved in the
provincial election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) n connection with the
protest filed by Aquilino Pimentel III against Juan Miguel Zubiri.
the petitioner moved to suspend further proceedings. .
The COMELECs Second Division denied the petitioners motion ruling that the COMELEC
has plenary powers to find alternative methods to facilitate the resolution of the election
protest; thus, it concluded that it would continue the proceedings after proper coordination
with the SET
Allegedly alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election
contest within the SET premises without notice to him and without his participation, the petitioners
counsel wrote the SET Secretary
the petitioner argues that the proceedings before the COMELEC in election protests are
judicial in nature and character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due process specifically, (a)
opportunity to be heard and (b) that judgment be rendered only after lawful hearing apply.
The petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due process element
of the right to have judgment only after lawful hearing is absent. There is no way, he claims,
that a judicial proceeding held without notice to the parties could be described as a lawful
hearing, especially a proceeding which has as its subject matter the sovereign will of an entire
province.
o Issue:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion on the alleged conduct of
proceedings in the election protest following the completed revision of ballots at the
SET premises without notice to and without the participation of the petitioner
o Held:
we note that the petitioner has claimed that COMELEC exercises judicial power in its action
over provincial election contests and has argued its due process position from this view. We
take this opportunity to clarify that judicial power in our country is vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.[10] This exclusive grant of authority
to the Judiciary is reinforced under the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which further states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.. ., thus
constitutionally locating the situs of the exercise of judicial power in the courts.
Based on Section 2, Article IX(C) of the Constitution lists the COMELECs powers and
functions, the COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional administrative
agency and its powers are essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election
laws),[11] quasi-judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of regional,
provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other lower
ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the
promulgation of its rules of procedure).
The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other
than a court, vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise
of its jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature;[12] it receives
evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of
the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and renders
146

a restriction imposed is constitutionally permissible or not depends upon the circumstances

of each case.
Examining Section 4 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982, be it noted that thereunder, the
right to organize is intact. Political parties may freely be formed although there is a restriction
on their activities, i.e., their intervention in the election of barangay officials on May 17, 1982
is prescribed. But the ban is narrow, not total. It operates only on concerted or group action of
political parties. Members of political and kindred organizations, acting individually, may
intervene in the barangay election. As the law says: "Nothing (therein) ... shall be construed as
in any manner affecting or constituting an impairment of the freedom of individuals to support
or oppose any candidate for any barangay office." Moreover, members of the family of a
candidate within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as well as the personal
campaign staff of a candidate (not more than 1 for every 100 registered voters in Ms barangay)
can engage in individual or group action to promote the election of their candidate.
Reasons for the ban:
1. Aside from the narrow character of the restriction thus impose, the limitation is
essential to meet the felt need of the hour. Explaining the reason for the non-partisan
character of the barangay election when he sponsored Parliamentary Bill 2125 which
later became BP Blg. 222, Minister of State for Political Affairs Leonardo B. Perez said
o Mr. Speaker, we must not lose sight of the fact that the barangay is the basic
unit not only of our social structure but also of our political structure. As much
as possible, we believe that it would be a more prudent policy to insulate the
barangays from the influence of partisan politics.
o ve seen the salutary results of the non-partisan election of the members of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971. We all recall, Mr. Speaker, that the election
of Concon delegates was non-partisan and, therefore, when history will judge
that Constitutional Convention, it can be safely stated that Constitutional
Convention did not belong to any political party because it was chosen under
a non-partisan method; that it was a constitutional convention that was really
of the people, for the people and by the people. So we should not be concerned
and our attention should not be focused on the process but on the after effects
of the process. We would like to say later on, Mr. Speaker, that the barangays,
although it is true they are already considered regular units of our government,
are non-partisan; they constitute the base of the pyramid of our social and
political structure, and I think that in order that base will not be subject to
instability because of the influence of political forces, it is better that we elect
the officials thereof through a non-partisan system.
2. There are other reasons for insulating the barangay from the divisive and debilitating
effects of a partisan political campaign. The Barangay Captain and the Barangay
Council, apart from their legislative and consultative powers, also act as an agency for
neutral community action such as the distribution of basic foodstuff and as an
instrument in conducting plebiscites and referenda. The Barangay Captain, together
with the members of the Lupon Tagapayapa appointed by him, exercises
administrative supervision over the barangay conciliation panels in the latter's work of
settling local disputes. The Barangay Captain himself settles or helps settle local
controversies within the barangay either through mediation or arbitration. It would
definitely enhance the objective and impartial discharge of their duties for barangay
officials to be shielded form political party loyalty. In fine, the ban against the
participation of political parties in the barangay election is an appropriate legislative
response to the unwholesome effects of partisan bias in the impartial discharge of the
duties imposed on the barangay and its officials as the basic unit of our political and
social structure.
31

 3. equality of chances may be better attained by banning all organization support.

o The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in advantages
because of their machinery and other facilities, which, the individual candidate
who is without any organization support, does no have.
o The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with
others or join any existing organization. A person may run independently on
his own merits without need of catering to a political party or any other
association for support. And he, as much as the candidate whose candidacy
does not evoke sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be
afforded equal chances. As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga,
this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued with
patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their
services if elected.
The petitioner argues that in a democracy, all elections necessarily must be partisan. This is
not so. For in a representative democracy such as ours, there is merely a guarantee of
participation by the people in the affairs of government thru their chosen representatives,
without assurance that in every instance concerted partisan activity in the selection of those
representatives shall be allowed, unless otherwise mandated expressly or impliedly by the
Constitution. Nor does a parliamentary system of government carry the guarantee that
elections in all levels of government shall be partisan. Under the Constitution, there is an
implicit guarantee of political party participation in the elections for President and members
of the Batasang Pambansa. For the outcome of the elections for President determines the
subsequent accreditation of political parties.
Postponement of election, grounds.
Omnibus election code, s5
o Sec. 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and
after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard,
shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
RA 7166 s4
o Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. - The postponement,
declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of
the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of
its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the
casting of votes or on the day of the election.
o In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1)
year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the
vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the
vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the succeeding regular election.
RA 6679 S2
o AN ACT TO AMEND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6653 TO POSTPONE THE BARANGAY
ELECTIONS TO MARCH 28, 1989, PRESCRIBING ADDITIONAL RULES GOVERNING
THE CONDUCT OF BARANGAY ELECTIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
32

the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it.
That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the election, returns
and qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be
effective under the 1987 Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has
already been abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress.
Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 171. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the
COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional,
provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and
barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and
regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election
protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general
power granted it by the Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution has substantially retained the COMELEC's purely administrative
powers, namely,
the exclusive authority to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall;
to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections;
to deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities for election
purposes;
to register political parties and accredit citizens' arms; to file in court petitions for
inclusion and exclusion of voters and prosecute, where appropriate, violations of
election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1), (3)-(6)], as well as its rule-making power.
In this sense, and with regard to these areas of election law, the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code are fully applicable, except where specific legislation provides otherwise. But
the same cannot be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide
election contests. This has been trimmed down under the 1987 Constitution.
Whereas the 1973 Constitution vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987
Constitution, while lodging in the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city
officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and
barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate
and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17].
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET
to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only
on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the
Constitution itself.
Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period
prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the
case.
Roces vs. HRET
o Facts:
Mendoza vs. COMELEC
145

protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to
the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
Order: revocation by the COMELEC of petitioner's proclamation is hereby SET ASIDE.
Lazatin vs. HRET
o Facts
Petitioner (lazatin) and private respondent (timbol) were among the candidates for
Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the elections of May 11, 1987.
During the canvassing of the votes, private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain
election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections,
he brought his case to the Commission on Elections.
the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of
the winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, SUBSEQUENTLY, the
COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of
votes and to proclaim the winner.
petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect.
Private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners proclamation
void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from
assuming office.
The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assume office
on June 30, 1987.
the COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio.
Petitioner challenged the COMELEC resolution before this Court in a petition
entitled "Carmelo F. Lazatin v. The Commission on Elections, Francisco R. Buan, Jr. and Lorenzo G.
Timbol," docketed as G.R. No. 80007 (mao ni ang case prior ani). In a decision promulgated
on January 25, 1988, the Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's
proclamation.
Subsequently, (Wala ma kontento si timbol ni file siya didto sa HRET) private respondent
filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground that it had been filed
late, citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
However, the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of
the HRET Rules.
On the basis of the foregoing Rule, the protest should have been filed within fifteen
(15) days from November 22, 1987, or not later than December 7, 1987. However, on
September 15, 1987, the COMELEC acting upon a petition filed by the Protestant
(private respondent herein), promulgated a Resolution declaring the proclamation void
ab initio. This resolution had the effect of nullifying the proclamation, and such
proclamation was not reinstated until Protestant received a copy of the Supreme
Court's decision annulling the COMELEC Resolution on January 28, 1988. For all
intents and purposes, therefore, Protestee's (petitioner herein) proclamation became
effective only on January 28, 1988, and the fifteen-day period for Protestant to file his
protest must be reckoned from that date.
Protestant filed his protest on February 8, 1988, or eleven (11) days after January 28.
The protest, therefore, was filed well within the reglementary period provided by the
Rules of this Tribunal.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioner has come to this
Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest filed by private respondent.
o Issue:
whether or not private respondent's protest had been seasonably filed.
o Held:
144

SEC. 2. When for any serious cause such as rebellion, insurrection, violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia, and any analogous causes of such nature that the holding of a
free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any barangay, the Commission on
Elections motu proprio or upon sworn petition of ten (10) registered voters of a *barangay, after
summary proceedings of the existence of such grounds, shall suspend or postpone the election therein
to a date reasonably close to the date of the election that is not held or is suspended or postponed, or
which resulted in a failure to elect, but not later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause
for such suspension or postponement of the election or failure to elect, and in all cases not later than
ninety (90) days from the date of the original election.
Montesclaros v. COMELEC
o Facts:
the Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang
Kabataan and limited its membership to youths at least 15 but no more than 21 years of age.
On 18 February 2002, Antoniette VC Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC that SK
elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002.
COMELEC Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote to the House of Representatives and the
Senate on 20 February 2002 inquiring on the status of pending bills on SK and Barangay
elections and expressed support to postpone the SK election on November 2002.
On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill
4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age to at least 15
but no more than 18 years of age. This was approved by the Senate and House of
Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002 respectively and signed by the President on
19 March 2002.
The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary restraining order seeking the
prevention of postponement of the SK election and reduction of age requirement on 11 March
2002.
o Issue:
Whether or not the proposed bill is unconstitutional.
o Held:
the Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[21]
In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners
are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15,
2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to
petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual
controversy requiring judicial intervention.
Petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the
membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill
is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and
imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect,
violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill
constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory
opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be
exercised in vacuo.[22] The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states
33

 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed
bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
The Court has no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress
should enact into law. The judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws does not
include the power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to
compel Congress by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to
vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do so would destroy the delicate
system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal,
coordinate and independent branches of government.
Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the
original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths
less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age
requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Every law passed by
Congress is always subject to amendment or repeal by Congress. The Court cannot restrain
Congress from amending or repealing laws, for the power to make laws includes the power to
change the laws.[24]
The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote or be voted for
in an election that is limited under RA No. 9164 to youths at least 15 but less than 18 years
old. A law is needed to allow all those who have turned more than 21 years old on or after
May 6, 2002 to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Youths from 18 to 21 years old
as of May 6, 2002 are also no longer SK members, and cannot participate in the July 15, 2002
SK elections. Congress will have to decide whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners
remedy is legislation, not judicial intervention.
Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. A party must
show that he has been, or is about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which he
is lawfully entitled.[25] A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or
future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.[26]
In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who
were at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this
right is limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18
years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group. Not falling
within this classification, petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer
qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a
personal and substantial interest in the SK elections.
This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time petitioners filed this petition,
RA No. 9164, which reset the SK elections and reduced the age requirement for SK
membership, was not yet enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed
to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant petitioners
prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections necessitates
assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court will
34

Treasurer were unsecured, i. e., without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals; and, (f)
there was delay in the delivery of election returns.
Clearly, all these matters require the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative
functions. Section 2, Art. IX-C, of the 1987 Constitution grants extensive administrative
powers to the COMELEC with regard to the enforcement and administration of all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. Likewise, Sec. 52 of BP Blg.
881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, states:
Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to
the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration
of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free,
orderly and honest elections x x x x
Quite obviously, it is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers
that the COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide cases first by Division and then,
upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is
jurisdictional. In the instant case, as aforestated, the issues presented demand only the
exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions.
Canicosa alleged that he was credited with less votes than he actually received. But he did not
raise any objection before the Municipal Board of Canvassers; instead, he went directly to the
COMELEC. He now claims, after the COMELEC en banc dismissed his petition, that it was
error on the part of COMELEC to rule on his petition while sitting en banc.
SC already ruled the Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained
by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In making the correction in computation,
the MBC will be acting in an administrative capacity, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC. Hence, any question pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC may be raised
directly to the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide
questions affecting elections.
we categorized the issue concerning registration of voters, which Canicosa cited as a ground
in his petition for declaration of failure of election, as an administrative question. Likewise,
questions as to whether elections have been held or whether certain returns were falsified or
manufactured and therefore should be excluded from the canvass do not involve the right to
vote. Such questions are properly within theadministrative jurisdiction of
COMELEC, [14] hence, may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC en banc without having
to pass through any of its divisions.
Lazatin v. COMELEC
o Facts:
Petitioner filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his
proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties
of Congressman of the First District of Pampanga. The petitioner claims that the House
Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests.
o Issue:
Whether House Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election
contests.
o Held:
The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the
Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such,
and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral
protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The
alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC
itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the
143

of the body would be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's
refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the case to another division cannot
be justified by any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his wounded
protestations of innocence and proved the motives of the Second Division when it rendered
its decision.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. 15 To bolster that requirement, we have
held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 16 The litigants are entitled to no less than
that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall
give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They
must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be
equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with
a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are
not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The
judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed,
on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Order: were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic,
this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated
July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.
Canicosa vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
Ricardo Boy Canicosa and Severino Lajara were candidates for Mayor in Calamba, Laguna
during the 8 May 1995 elections. Lajara was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers.
On 15 May Canicosa filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Declare Failure of Election and
to Declare Null and Void the Canvass and Proclamation because of alleged widespread frauds
and anomalies. However, the COMELEC en bancdismissed the petition on the ground that the
allegations therein did not justify a declaration of failure of election
Canicosa insists that it was error on the part of COMELEC sitting en banc to rule on his
petition. He maintains that his petition should have first been heard by a division of
COMELEC and later by the COMELEC en banc upon motion for reconsideration, pursuant
to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the Constitution
o Issue: W/N a COMELEC division should have first heard the petition before deciding on it
en banc on a motion for reconsideration.
o Held:
The provision cited by Canicosa applies only when the COMELEC acts in the exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions and not when it merely exercises purely
administrative functions. To reiterate, the grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition
are that: (a) the names of the registered voters did not appear in the list of voters in
their respective precincts; (b) more than one-half of the legitimate registered voters
were not able to vote with strangers voting in their stead; (c) he was credited with less
votes than he actually received; (d) the control data of the election returns was not
filled up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought to the Office of the Municipal
142

not strike down a law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and
adequately argued.
The 1987 Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of enforcing and administering all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. Petitioners failed to prove that the
Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the
postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections. The evidence cited by petitioners even
establish that the Comelec has demonstrated an earnest effort to address the practical
problems in holding the SK elections on May 6, 2002. The presumption remains that the
decision of the Comelec to recommend to Congress the postponement of the elections was
made in good faith in the regular course of its official duties. Hence no grave abuse of
discretion.
Postponement of election, jurisdiction
Benito v. comelec
o Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were two (2) of eight (8) candidates vying for the position
of municipal mayor in Calanogas, lanao del Sur during the May 11, 1998 elections. The election
in the first three (3), namely precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A are the subject of BENITO's
petition to declare failure of elections filed before the respondent COMELEC.1wphi1.nt
On the day of the election, voting started peacefully at the polling place. Shortly before noon,
however, it was interrupted when some thirty(30) armed men appeared at the school premises
and fired shots into the air. Petitioner alleged that the ballot boxes and other election materials
were taken to the municipal hall by the military forces providing security. From then on, the
voting allegedly never resumed, even when voters who had not yet cast their ballots returned
to their respective polling places after the lawless elements had left.
However, private respondent avers that voting in fact resumed when the armed men left at
about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. There were no further untoward incidents until voting
closed at 3:00 o'clock. As proof, private respondent submitted a "Final Incident Report.
After counting, these results emerged:
CANDIDATE

NO. OF VOTES

Ibrahim Pagayawan

927

Zaipal Benito

879

Amoran Macaborod

524

Jabbar Maruhom

(no data available)

Private respondent won over petitioner by forty-eight (48) votes and was proclaimed as Mayor
of Calanogas
On the other hand, the total votes cast for the three (3) excluded precincts numbered fortyone (41) only, which is broken down as follows:

35

PRECINC
T

NO.
OF VOTES CAST
REGISTERED
VOTES

15A

177

6A/6A1

225

19

17A

188

21

Petitioner filed petition

to
declare failure of election
and to call a special
elections in precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A He also filed a separate petition for the annulment
of the proclamation of private respondent.
Comelec denied Benitos petition and confirmed the proclamation of the private respondent.
o Issue:
Who has the power to postpone elections.
W/N the Comelec erred in denying Benitos petition to declare a failure of election?
o Ruling:
It is the COMELEC en banc which has the exclusive power to postpone, to declare a failure of
election, or to call a special election.[8] In relation thereto, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code[9] provides
SEC. 6. Failure of Election.If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of
the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably
close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
there are two (2) pre-conditions must exist before a failure of election may be declared, thus:
(1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts due to force majeure, violence or
terrorism; and (2) the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election.
The cause of such failure may arise before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the
election.

The Commission gives more weight to the report made by Captain Manquiquis whose final
report to the Commission says that the voting resumed an hour after the firing occured which
disrupted the voting in all the five precincts clustered in Disimban Elementary School. His
final report dated 11 May 1998 confirms that no failure of elections in the five precincts
occured. This is buttressed by the fact that counsels of petitioner and all other parties and
candidates during the counting did not question the counting of votes for precincts 2A/2A1
and 13A whose polling place were also in the same school. This fact gives us the impression
that indeed voting in all the five precincts resumed after peace and order was re-established in
Disimban Elem. School. There was no objection raised to the count of votes in the said two

TOTAL

590

41

36

the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation, if one has
been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.
The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should
receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the
Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term
should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective
office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is
claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term should be given a consistent
meaning and understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article
XII-C of the Constitution.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to
specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
"returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the
election returns and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding
against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his
certificate of candidacy.
All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they
applied to the members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section
3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided by it only en banc.
We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided
by the Commission on Elections, only by division as a general rule except where the case was
a "contest" involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and
decided en banc.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en
banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective
could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had
been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-theproclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates which has
resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the
election. The respondent's theory would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation
proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in
division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the
Commission en banc.
After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to rectify in time
the proclamation summarily and not very judiciously made by the division.
in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation controversies in Section
175, supra, the law was obviously referring to the body sitting en banc.
Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier
attention by the respondent Commission on Elections is due process of law, that ancient
guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free society. Commissioner
Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner
of the private respondent, he obstinately insisted on participating in the case, denying he was
biased. 14
Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at the
time, and the particular relationship between Commissioner Opinion and MP Pacificador,
(kani si Opinion, ni apil ni siyag sign sa katong comelec resolution july 23 proclaiming
Pacificador as winner) one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision
141

constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly and honest elections. A more assertive
stance could have averted the Sibalom election eve massacre and saved the lives of the nine
victims of the tragedy.
Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election
returns, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to prevent the impending
proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein. 1 Specifically, the petitioner charged
that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud,
tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching
of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of respondent Pacificador." 2 the petitioner
claimed the election returns were not placed in the ballot boxes but merely wrapped in cement
bags or Manila paper.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial
board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation
of the winning candidate until further orders. 3 On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division
ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to
the outcome of the case before the Commission
on July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition
which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of
Antique.
o Issue:
Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its
decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?
o Held:
the applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973
Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election
cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members
of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless
otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days
from the date of their submission for decision.
SC believes that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa
and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to
hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising
before the proclamation of the winners.
NOTE: all election contests, without any distinction as to cases or contests, involving members of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa fall under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc pursuant to
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution.
It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called "preproclamation controversies" is a relatively recent innovation in our laws, having been
introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code.
Section 175 thereof provided:
Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission shall be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and
executory. It may, motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order
140

precincts during the counting of votes at the counting center. So why a selective objection to
the three precincts herein? Even candidate Macaborod did not object to the count of the other
two precincts namely 2A/2A1 and 13A. If votes for precincts 2A/2A1 and 13A were counted,
the same must also be done for precincts 6A/6A1, 15A, and 17A notwithstanding the fact
that only very few voters cast their votes. The disruption of voting in all these precincts was
caused by the same act: firing guns to intimidate all the voters therein to stop them from
casting their votes. If voters in these precincts really wanted to vote ,they could have done so
after the cessation of the terroristic acts. In precinct 15A, at 11:45 A.M., only one vote was
cast therein. Lack of interest may have been the problem herein that the cause alluded to by
petitioner.
After a careful consideration of the parties submissions, we find that the COMELEC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in denying BENITOs petition to declare a failure to election and
to call a special election. It is indeed odd that petitioner singles out only precincts 15A, 6A/6A1
and 17A as the subjects of his petition when there were two (2) other precincts in the same
school.[18] It was only in his reply with memorandum[19] did he signify his lack of objection to
a declaration of failure of election in precincts 2A/2A1 and 13A, as prayed for by candidate
Amoran Macaborods answer with counter-petition.[20] Likewise, he never objected to the
inclusion of the two (2) other precincts during the canvassing and counting of votes.
Petitioner attempts to overcome the oversight by alleging that he had no opportunity to object
thereto because his counsel, Atty. Hussein N. Mambuay, was not present, allegedly because
the latter did not possess the prescribed identification for lawyers. In this regard, we have
reviewed the record and we concur with private respondent that this claim of petitioner
appears to be a mere afterthought. Petitioner never raised this particular issue in his earlier
pleadings filed with the COMELEC. Be that as it may, his counsel should have exercised more
prudence in securing beforehand his proper identification papers.
In a sense, petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis--vis the
number of registered voters in the subject election precincts. However,
[t]here can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has
been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be
accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires
that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a
winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual
number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned
precincts cast their votes, the same must still be respected.

Basher vs. COMELEC

o Facts:
Petitioner Hadji Rasul Batador Basher and Private Respondent Abulkair Ampatua were both
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur
during the May 12, 1997 barangay election. The election was declared a failure and a special
one was set for June 12, 1997. Again, the election failed and was reset to August 30, 1997. Chief
According to the Comelec, the voting started only around 9:00 p.m. on August 30, 1997
because of the prevailing tension in the said locality. Election Officer Diana DatuImam
reported that she was allegedly advised by some religious leaders not to proceed with the
election because "it might trigger bloodshed." She also claimed that the town mayor, "being
37

too hysterical, yelled and threatened me to declare [a] failure of election in Maidan."
Subsequently, the armed followers of the mayor pointed their guns at her and her military
escorts, who responded in like manner towards the former. The parties were then pacified at
the PNP headquarters. With the arrival of additional troops, the election officer proceeded to
Maidan to conduct the election starting at 9:00 p.m. until the early morning of the following
day. The holding of the election at that particular time was allegedly announced "over the
mosque."[4]
Results of the election: private respondent 250 votes; petitioner 15 votes; and Baulo Abdul
Razul, a third candidate 10 votes.[5] Private respondent was proclaimed winner.
Petitioner then filed a Petition before the Comelec praying that the election be declared a
failure. Alleging that no election was conducted in the place and at the time prescribed by law,
petitioner narrated that there was a dispute that day (August 30, 1997) among the candidates
regarding the venue of the election in the lone voting precinct of the barangay. In order to
avoid bloodshed, they ultimately agreed that no election would be conducted. Accordingly,
the election officer turned over for safekeeping the ballot box containing election
paraphernalia to the acting station commander (OIC) of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The following day, petitioner and the third candidate were surprised to learn that the election
officer had directed the Board of Election Tellers to conduct the election and to fill up the
election returns and certificates of canvass on the night of August 30, 1997 at the residence of
the former mayor. Petitioner also stated that no announcement to hold the election at the
former mayors house that night was ever made
o Issue:
1. Whether or not the election held at around 10:00 oclock in the evening of August 30, 1997
after the Acting Election Officer had verbally declared or announced a failure of election in
Precinct No. 12, Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur is contrary to law, rule and
jurisprudence;
"2. Whether or not the election held at the residence of an Ex-mayor far from the designated
Polling Place of Precinct No. 12, Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur is legal or valid;
In the main, the crucial question that needs to be addressed is whether the "election" held on
the date, at the time and in the place other than those officially designated by the law and by
the Comelec was valid
o Held:
the Comelec points out that a failure of election requires the concurrence of two conditions,
namely (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even
if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would
have affected the result of the election. It ruled that these requirements were not met.
However, the SC did not agree. The peculiar set of facts in the present case show not merely
a failure of election but the absence of a valid electoral exercise. Otherwise stated, the disputed
"election" was illegal, irregular and void. Esmmis
I. Election Situs Was Illegal
First, the place where the voting was conducted was illegal. Section 42 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides that "[t]he chairman of the board of election tellers shall
designate the public school or any other public building within the barangay to be used
as polling place in case the barangay has one election precinct x x x." Petitioner, citing
an Affidavit[13]supposedly executed by the members of the Board of Election Tellers
(BET) for Barangay Maidan, alleges that the election of officials for said barangay was
held at the residence of former Mayor Alang Sagusara Pukunun, which is located at
38

Instead of dismissing the petition for purely technical reasons, the COMELEC correctly
considered the merits thereof.
Certainly, such rule of suspension is in accordance with the spirit of Section 6, Article
IX-A of the Constitution which bestows upon the COMELEC the power to
promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of
its offices to attain justice and the noble purpose of determining the true will of the
electorate.[31]
Judicial powers
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over regional, provincial, and city election contests and appellate
jurisdiction over municipal and barangay election contests.
Constitution A9C S2(2)
o SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Javier v. comelec
o Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but
the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power.
On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head
when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's
men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
The incident naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear
among the electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition
candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation,
the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of
the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was
proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to
this Court, arguing that the proclamationwas void because made only by a division and not by
the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the
strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner
was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. (still the SC, continued to decide with
the case, to seek justice)
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of elections
in other provinces dominated by the KBL. Terrorism was a special feature, as demonstrated
by the killings previously mentioned, which victimized no less than one of the main
protagonists and implicated his rival as a principal perpetrator.
What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the
Commission on Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter of record that
the petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the electoral body
did was refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its
139

 The Constitution has vested to the COMELEC broad powers, involving not only the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections,
but also the resolution and determination of election controversies.[20] It also granted the
COMELEC the power and authority to promulgate its rules of procedure, with the primary
objective of ensuring the expeditious disposition of election cases.[21]
Concomitant to such powers is the authority of the COMELEC to determine the true nature
of the cases filed before it. Thus, it examines the allegations of every pleading filed, obviously
aware that in determining the nature of the complaint or petition, its averments, rather than
its title/caption, are the proper gauges.[22]
This was what the COMELEC did when it treated respondents questioned petition in EPC
No. 2001-06 (captioned as an election protest) as a case for correction of manifest errors. The
COMELEC found that the averments therein actually call for the rectification of apparent
errors in the Statement of Votes in Precinct No. 29-A-1 of Castillejos, Zambales
The fact that petitioner prayed for annulment of respondents proclamation in his petition is
immaterial and does not change the nature of the instant petition.The prayer in a pleading
does not constitute an essential part of the allegations determinative of the jurisdiction of a
court. The question of jurisdiction depends largely upon the determination of the true nature
of the action filed by a party which, in turn, involves the consideration of the ultimate facts
alleged as constitutive of the cause of action therein (Bautista vs. Fernandez, L-24062, April 30,
1971). The prayer for relief, although part of the complaint, cannot create a cause of action,
hence it cannot be considered a part of the allegations on the nature of the cause of action
In any event, petitioner is estopped from questioning the issue of jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. Not only did she actively participate in the proceedings before the First Division,
but she also sought affirmative relief by filing her Answer with Counter-Protest wherein she
asked that all the precincts in the 3 municipalities in the First District be placed under
protest.[26] It is certainly not right for a party taking part in the proceedings and submitting his
case for decision to attack the decision later for lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal because the
decision turned out to be adverse to him

we ruled in Bince, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections[30] that:

Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident
alone will not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on
substantial grounds.Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on
a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the peoples will,
cannot be countenanced.
Thus, the COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained
respondents petition by suspending its own Rules of Procedure. This is clearly allowed
under Section 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:

Section 4. Suspension of the Rules. In the interest of justice and in order to obtain
speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or
any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission. (Underscoring
supplied)
Election contests involve public interest. Technicalities and procedural barriers should
not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true
will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials Laws (and rules) governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice
of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In an election case, the
court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the
real candidate elected by the electorate
138

Barangay Pandarianao, instead of the officially designated polling precinct at Cagayan

Elementary School. If this allegation were true, such "election" cannot be valid, as it
was not held within the barangay of the officials who were being elected.
II.Voting Time Was Likewise Irregular
the law provides that "[t]he casting of votes shall start at seven o'clock in the morning
and shall end at three o'clock in the afternoon, except when there are voters present
within thirty meters in front of the polling place who have not yet cast their votes, in
which case the voting shall continue but only to allow said voters to cast their votes
without interruption."[15] Section 22, Article IV of Comelec Resolution No. 2971 also
specifies that the voting hours shall start promptly at 7:00 a.m. and end at 3:00 p.m. of
the same day. Msesm
However, the "election" for Barangay Maidan officials was supposed to have been
held after 9:00 p.m. of August 30, 1997 until the wee hours of the following day.
Certainly, such schedule was not in accordance with law or the Comelec Rules. The
Comelec erred in relying on the second sentence of Section 22, Article IV of Comelec
Resolution 2971, which states that "[i]f at three o'clock [in the afternoon], there are
still voters within thirty meters in front of the polling place who have not cast their
votes, the voting shall continue to allow said voters to cast their votes without
interruption." This sentence presupposes that the election commenced during the official
time and is simply continued beyond 3:00 p.m. in order to accommodate voters who are
within thirty meters of the polling place, already waiting for their turn to cast their
votes. This is clearly the meaning and intent of the word continue -- "to go on in a
specified course of action or condition."
The strained interpretation espoused by the Comelec encourages the conduct of
clandestine "elections," for it virtually authorizes the holding of elections beyond
normal hours, even at midnight when circumstances could be more threatening and
conducive to unlawful activities. On a doctrinal basis, such nocturnal electoral practice
discourages the people's exercise of their fundamental right of suffrage, by exposing
them to the dangers concomitant to the dead of night, especially in far-flung barangays
constantly threatened with rebel and military gunfires
III.Election Date Was Invalid
the Comelec scheduled the special election on August 30, 1997. Any suspension or
postponement of an election is governed by Section 2 of RA 6679,[17] which states that
"[w]hen for any serious cause such as rebellion, insurrection, violence, terrorism, loss
or destruction of election paraphernalia, and any analogous causes of such nature that
the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any
barangay, the Commission on Election motu proprio or upon sworn petition of ten (10)
registered voters of a barangay, after summary proceedings of the existence of such
grounds, shall suspend or postpone the election therein to a date reasonably close to
the date of the election that is not held or is suspended or postponed, or which resulted
in a failure to elect, but not later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause
for such suspension or postponement of the election or failure to elect, and in all cases
not later than ninety (90) days from the date of the original election." Kycalr
Election Officer Diana Datu-Imam of Tugaya, Lanao del Sur practically postponed
the election in Barangay Maidan from the official original schedule of 7:00 a.m. to 3:00
p.m. of August 30, 1997 to 10:00 p.m. of August 30, 1997 until the early morning of
August 31, 1997. She attempted to justify her postponement of the election by citing
threats of violence and bloodshed in the said barangay. Allegedly because of the
tension created by armed escorts of the municipal mayor and the military, Datu-Imam
39

declared a failure of election in order "to ease their aggression." However, as election
officer, she has no authority to declare a failure of election. Indeed, only the Comelec
itself has legal authority to exercise such awesome power. An election officer alone, or
even with the agreement of the candidates, cannot validly postpone or suspend the
elections. Calrky
IV. Election Postponement Was Invalid
Fourth, Datu-Imam did not follow the procedure laid down by law for election
postponement or suspension or the declaration of a failure of election. She narrated
the circumstances surrounding her declaration as follows:[18]
o "When I returned to [as]certain the situation in Maidan, the Mayor, being too
hysterical, yelled and threatened me to declare [a] failure of elections in Maidan.
When I insisted to personally confirm the probable cause of bloodshed (at
Maidan), his armed followers/escorts pointed their guns to me and my escorts.
Likewise my military escorts pointed their guns to the mayor and his men 'Man
to Man'. The Datus and religious leaders pacified us at the PNP Headquarters.
o "After a couple of hours, the military officers and I agreed to adapt another
strategy just to pursue with the elections in Maidan [by] hook or by crook.
Considering that they forcibly took away from us the ballot box containing
paraphernalia of Maidan, I didn't have any recourse but give them. I turnedover the ballot box to the Acting Chief of Police, Malik Bantuas with proper
receipt, taking away from the box the CEF 2 & 2-A, declaring verbally a failure
of elections in Maidan just to ease their aggression and so that we could pullout of the place freely."
It clearly appears from the very report of Datu-Imam to the Comelec that she did not
conduct any proceeding, summary or otherwise, to find out whether any of the legal
grounds for the suspension or postponement or the declaration of failure of the
election actually existed in the barangay concerned.
V. Notice was irregular
As can be gleaned easily from the above report, the electorate of Barangay Maidan was
not given due notice that the election would push through after 9:00 p.m. that same
day. Apparently, the election officer's decision to hold the election on the night of
August 30, 1997 was precipitate. Only after additional military troops had arrived at
their site in a nearby barangay about 8:30 p.m. did the election officers proceed to
Barangay Maidan. Arriving at Maidan, they allegedly proceeded to conduct the election
"after announcing it over the mosque."
Such abbreviated announcement "over the mosque" at such late hour did NOT
constitute sufficient notice to the electorate. Consequently, not the entire electorate or
even a respectable number could have known of the activity and actually participated
therein or voluntarily and discerningly chosen not to have done so. Slx
Indeed, the Court in Hassan v. Comelec[20] held that the notice given on the afternoon
of the election day resetting the election to the following day and transferring its venue
was "too short." We said that "[t]o require the voters to come to the polls on such
short notice was highly impracticable. x x x It is essential to the validity of the election
that the voters have notice in some form, either actual or constructive, of the time,
place and purpose thereof.[21] The time for holding it must be authoritatively designated
in advance."[22]
In the case at bar, the announcement was made only minutes before the supposed voting. If
one-day notice was held to be insufficient in Hassan, the much shorter notice in the
present case should all the more be declared wanting. It should in fact be equated with
"no notice
40

altered and reduced to only 4. Thus, he lost 38 votes. This 4 votes appeared in the Statement
of Votes by Precinct (Statement No. 2114713[7]). When the ZambalesProvincial Board of
Canvassers canvassed the Certificates of Canvass of Votes from the three municipalities in the
First District, respondents total votes were recorded only as 14,093, instead of 14,131 (14,093
+ 38) votes. The missing 38 votes, if counted in his favor, would have been sufficient to have
him proclaimed the third member of the Provincial Board of the First District of Zambales.
Petitioner, in her answer with counter-protest,[8] denied respondents allegations. By way of
special and affirmative defenses, petitioner alleged inter alia that respondent, who was then an
incumbent member of the Provincial Board of Zambales, has exercised his influence in all the
precincts in San Marcelino, Zambales, thereby crediting him with more votes than he actually
received.
COMELEC 1ST Division
granted respondents petition for the correction of manifest errors; b) directed the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Subic, Zambales to reconvene and effect the
necessary corrections in the Statement of Votes by Precinct to reflect therein the actual
number of votes obtained by respondent in Precinct No. 29-A-1; c)annulled
petitioners proclamation, being based on an erroneous and/or incomplete canvass of
election returns; and d) ordered petitioner to immediatelyvacate her post as the third
member of the Provincial Board, First District of Zambales, and to cease and desist
from discharging the duties and functions of that office.
despite the fact that petitioner actively participated in the July 16, 2001 hearing, she filed a
motion for reconsideration[15] of the September 5, 2001 Resolution hat the COMELEC is
without authority/jurisdiction to treat respondents petition for election protest as a case for
correction of manifest errors and justify such act by suspending its own Rules of
Procedure.Even assuming it has authority to do so, still such conversion is no longer possible
because respondents questioned petition was filed beyond the reglementary period. Under
Section 1, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for an election protest
must be filed within 10 ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election, and under
Section 5, Rule 27 of the same Rules, a petition for correction of manifest errors must be filed
not later than five (5) days following the date of proclamation. Since petitioner was proclaimed
on May 18, 2001, respondent should have filed his petition for correction of manifest errors
within 5 days from said date, or on or before May 23, 2001. It was only on May 25, 2001, or 2
days late, that he filed his petition with the COMELEC. She claimed that the First Division
acted with grave abuse of discretion.
COMELEC en banc
Denied petitioenrs mR and affirmed comelec 1st divisions resolution. Resolution
partly reads:
o A comparison of the Election Return for Precinct No. 29-A-1 and of the
Statement of Votes by Precinct for the Municipality of Castillejos shows
that there was indeed a manifest error in the copying of the figures from
the Election Return to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. The fortyone (41) votes garnered by petitioner in Precinct No. 29-A-1, as
canvassed by the MBC of Castillejos, was reduced to four (4) in the
Statement of Votes by Precinct. Thus, it is but right for this Commission
to order the necessary correction in order to reflect the true will of the
people of the Municipality of Castillejos.

o Issue:
WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
o Held:
The petition must fail.
137

the trial court issued an order admitting it, and without Gatchalian's specific prayer, directed
the revision of ballots in the precincts enumerated in Gatchalian's Counter-Protest and
Construction
Aruelo filed with the trial court a Motion to Reconsider As Well As To Set Aside "Answer
with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim" Filed Out of Time by Protestee.
The trial court, denied Aruelo's motion and forthwith scheduled the constitution of the
revision committee.
o Issue:
WON Gatchalians answer was filed on time
o Held:
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the
respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to
the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian
filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of
particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure;
hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give
Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.
SC did not agree
Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are
governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to
proceedings before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain
pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice
and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
Private respondent received a copy of the order of the Regional Trial Court denying his motion
for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section 1 (b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules
of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his
motion for a bill of particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had until August 11, 1992 within
which to file his answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed by him on
August 11, 1992 was filed timely.
Suspension of rules of procedure
Llana vs. COMELEC
o FACTS:
petitioner Loretta Dela Llana and respondent Rizalino Pablo, Jr. were among the candidates
for Provincial Board Member, First District of Zambales. The First District, which comprised
the municipalities of Subic, Castillejos and San Marcelino, is allotted three (3) seats in the
Provincial Board.
On May 18, 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed the three (3) winning
candidates. Included was herein petitioner, being the third duly elected member of the
Provincial Board.
Respondent ranked fourth, having garnered a total of 14,093 votes,[5] or 24 votes less than that
obtained by petitioner.
Contesting the election and proclamation of petitioner, respondent, on May 25, 2001, initially
filed with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department, COMELEC, an election
protest[6] docketed as EPC Case No. 2001-6.Respondent alleged that when the Municipal
Board of Canvassers for the Municipality of Castillejos (MBC-Castillejos) canvassed the
election returns from various precincts, the 42 votes he obtained in Precinct No. 29-A-1 was
136

Failure of election, grounds

OEC S6
o Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
RA 7166 S4
o Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. - The postponement,
declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of
the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of
its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the
casting of votes or on the day of the election. In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate
or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission
shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than
ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate,
the special election shall be held simultaneously with the succeeding regular election.
Mitmug vs. COMELEC
o FACTS:
o Issue:
o Held:
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing of a
verified petition to declare a failure to elect, notices to all interested parties indicating therein
the date of hearing should be served through the fastest means available. 18 The hearing of the
case will also be summary in nature. 19
Based on the foregoing, the clear intent of the law is that a petition of this nature must be
acted upon with dispatch only after hearing thereon shall have been conducted. Since
COMELEC denied the other petitions 20which sought to include forty-three (43) more
precincts in a special election without conducting any hearing, it would appear then that there
indeed might have been grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitions. However, a closer
examination of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Sec. 2, Rule 26, thereof which
was lifted from Sec. 6, B.P. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines, indicates otherwise. It reads
Sec. 2. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes the election in any precinct has not been held on the date fixed,
or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or
after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns
or in the custody of canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in
any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably
close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
41

 Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two
(2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the
date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in failure to
elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. 21
In the case before us, it is indubitable that the votes not cast will definitely affect the outcome
of the election. But, the first requisite is missing, i.e., that no actual voting took place, or even
if there is, the results thereon will be tantamount to a failure to elect. Since actual voting and
election by the registered voters in the questioned precincts have taken place, the results
thereof cannot be disregarded and excluded. 22 COMELEC therefore did not commit any
abuse of discretion, much less grave, in denying the petitions outright. There was no basis for
the petitions since the facts alleged therein did not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the
relief sought. For, the language of the law expressly requires the concurrence of these
conditions to justify the calling of a special election. 23
Indeed, the fact that a verified petition is filed does not automatically mean that a hearing on
the case will be held before COMELEC will act on it. The verified petition must still show on
its face that the conditions to declare a failure to elect are present. In the absence thereof, the
petition must be denied outright.
Considering that there is no concurrence of the two (2) conditions in the petitions seeking to
declare failure of election in forty-three (43) more, precincts, there is no more need to receive
evidence on alleged election irregularities.
Instead, the question of whether there have been terrorism and other irregularities is better
ventilated in an election contest..
There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been
defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect.
After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered
voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected
by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. 25Thus, even if less
than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their votes, the same must still be
respected. There is prima facie showing that private respondent was elected through a plurality
of valid votes of a valid constituency.
Canicosa vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates for mayor in
Calamba, Laguna, during the 8 May 1995 elections. After obtaining a majority of some 24,000
votes
Lajara was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Canicosa filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Declare Failure
of Election and to Declare Null and Void the Canvass and Proclamation because of alleged
widespread frauds and anomalies in casting and counting of votes, preparation of election
returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying, unregistered voters voting, and delay in
the delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer. Canicosa particularly averred that: (a) the names of the registered voters
did not appear in the list of voters in their precincts; (b) more than one-half of the legitimate
registered voters were not able to vote with strangers voting in their stead; (c) he was credited
with less votes than he actually received; (d) control data of the election returns was not filled
up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer were
unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals; and, (f) there was delay in the
delivery of election returns.
COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition on the ground that the allegations therein did not
justify a declaration of failure of election
42

statutory provisions, and the hospitable scope afforded such grant of authority so clear
and unmistakable in recent decisions
Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special Civil Action No. 465 before the
court a quo are matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. As a matter
of fact, the specific allegations in the petition therein of violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v)
and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code provide a stronger basis and reason for
the application of the Zaldivar doctrine. At most, the facts in the latter case do not illustrate as
clearly the announced doctrine as the facts in this case do. In Zaldivar, no specific provision of
the Revised Election Code then in force was alleged to have been violated. What was sought
to be enjoined was the alleged wielding by Zaldivar, then a municipal mayor, of the power, by
virtue of his office, to appoint special policemen or agents to terrorize voters into supporting
the congressional candidate of his choice. In holding that the then Court of First Instance did
not have jurisdiction over the case, this Court considered the constitutional power of the
Commission on Elections to have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the con
conduct of elections and to exercise all other functions which may be conferred by law. We
likewise relied on the provisions of the Revised Election Code vesting upon the COMELEC
(a) direct and immediate supervision over municipal, city and provincial officials designated
by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections and (b) authority to suspend them
from the performance of such duties for failure to comply with its instructions, orders,
decisions or rulings and recommend to the President their removal if found guilty of nonfeasance, malfeasance or misfeasance in connection with the performance of their duties
relative to the conduct of elections
The challenged order of respondent Judge of 10 April 1992 in Special Civil Action No. 465 is
SET ASIDE and said Civil Case is hereby ordered DISMISSED, without prejudice on the
part of the private respondent to file, if he is so minded, the appropriate complaint for an
election offense pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Aruelo jr. v. CA
o Facts:
Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the office of the
Vice-Mayor.
Gatchalian won over Aruelo by a margin of four votes
the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Balagtas,
Bulacan.
Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition docketed as SPC No.
92-130, seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent alteration
and tampering" of votes in the tally sheets and the election returns. AND ALSO Aruelo filed
with the Regional Trial Court, a petition protesting the same election. Aruelo, however,
informed the trial court of the pendency of the pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC.
On June 10, 1992, Gatchalian was served an Amended Summons from the trial court, giving
him five days within which to answer the petition. Instead of submitting his answer, Gatchalian
filed on June 15, 1992 a Motion to Dismiss claiming that: (a) the petition was filed out of time;
(b) there was a pending protest case before the COMELEC;
The trial court, issued an order denying Gatchalian's Motion to Dismiss and ordering him to
file his answer to the petition within five days from notice, otherwise, "a general denial shall
be deemed to have been entered
Gatchalian submitted before the trial court his Answer with Counter-Protest and
Counterclaim,

135

(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury
warrants and similar devices. During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before
a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works
exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future
delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds.
The court ruled that Comelec has jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections. The 1987 Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power to
promulgate such rules and regulations as provided in Section 2 of Article IX-C. Moreover, the
present Constitution also invests the Comission with the power to investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election law, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

o Held:
Section 6 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, reads:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result
of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation
of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Clearly, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared,
namely:

the present Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules
and regulations. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article IX-C thereof reads as follows:

o (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

o (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; or

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. (Emphasis supplied).
The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. It is thus clear that
its incorporation into the present Constitution took into account the Commission's power
under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), which was already in force
when the said Constitution was drafted and ratified, to:
Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other
laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer, . . . . 16
Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory
authority to grant the Commission broader and more flexible powers to effectively perform
its duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making
power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time. Indeed,
the present Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission on Elections committed
to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, 17 and to serve as the guardian
of the people's sacred right of suffrage the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful
change of government and in achieving and promoting political stability.
Zaldivar Doctrine:
Zaldivar vs. Estenzo, 9 decided by this Court on 3 May 1968, had squarely resolved the
issue above posed. Speaking through then Associate Justice Enrique Fernando (who
later became Chief Justice), this Court explicitly ruled that considering that the
Commission on Elections is vested by the Constitution with exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the
assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court over a case involving the enforcement of
the Election Code "is at war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing
134

o (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.
None of the grounds invoked by Canicosa falls under any of those enumerated.
Canicosa bewails that the names of the registered voters in the various precincts did not appear
in their respective lists of voters. But this is not a ground to declare a failure of election. The
filing of a petition for declaration of failure of election therefore is not the proper remedy.
Canicosa complains that the election returns were delivered late and the ballot boxes brought
to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor self-locking
metal seals. These bare allegations cannot impel us to declare failure of election. Assuming
that the election returns were delivered late, we still cannot see why we should declare a failure
to elect. The late deliveries did not convert the election held in Calamba into a mockery or
farce to make us conclude that there was indeed a failure of election.
In fine, the grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition do not fall under any of the instances
enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. In Mitmug v. Commission on Elections [6] we
ruled that before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
election, at least two (2) conditions must concur: (a) no voting has taken place in the precincts
on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in
failure to elect; and, (b) the votes that were not cast would affect the result of the
election. From the face of the instant petition, it is readily apparent than an election took place
and that it did not result in a failure to elect.
Batabor v. COMELEC
o Facts:
43

 July 15, 2002 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, Hadji Rasul Batabor, petitioner,
and Mocasim Abangon Batondiang, private respondent, ran as opposing candidates for the
position of Punong Barangay in Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur. It was petitioners
re-election bid being then the incumbent Punong Barangay.
The result of the election shows that private respondent won as Punong Barangay, garnering
123 votes, as against petitioners 94 votes, or a difference of 29 votes.
In due time, private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay
Maidan.
Bewailing the outcome of the election, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition to
declare a failure of election in Precincts 3A, 4A and 5A of Barangay Maidan. The petition
alleges that during the election, the voting started at around 8:30 oclock in the morning. It was
temporarily suspended during the lunch break and was to resume at 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon of that day. But after lunch, the Chairwoman of the Board of Election Inspectors
(BEI) of Precincts 3A, 4A and 5A suddenly tore all the unused official ballots. Thus, the
voting was not continued. The BEI then padlocked the ballot boxes. At that time, petitioner
was not present. Despite the note of Election Officer Taha Casidar directing the BEI to
resume the voting, the latter did not allow the remaining voters to vote. Thus, petitioners
relatives and followers, numbering more than 100, were not able to cast their votes.
In his comment, private respondent averred that petitioners allegations are not supported by
substantial evidence
o ISSUE:
WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying his petition to declare failure of election.
o ruling:
two (2) conditions must exist before a failure of election may be declared: (1) no voting has
been held in any precinct or precincts due to fraud, force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2)
the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of such
failure may arise before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.
The familiar rule, as applied to this case, is that grave abuse of discretion exists when the
questioned act of the COMELEC was exercised capriciously and whimsically as is equivalent
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Such exercise of judgment must be done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.[7] It is not sufficient that the COMELEC, in the exercise
of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave.[8]
We find that the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners petition alleging a failure of election. While the alleged 100 votes of petitioners
relatives and supporters, if cast during the election, are sufficient to affect its result, however,
he failed to prove that the voting did not take place in precincts 3A, 4A and 5A. As found by
the COMELEC, the Statement of Votes and the Certificate of Canvass of Votes show that
out of the 316 registered voters in the questioned precincts, at least 220 actually voted. This
simply shows that there was no failure of election in the subject precincts. Moreover,
petitioners allegation that the voting was not resumed after lunch break, preventing 100 of his
relatives and followers to vote, is better ventilated in an election contest.
Sardea vs COMELEC
44

On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil Action No. 465) before
the court a quo against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting
certain public works projects as it violates the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because although they were initiated few
days before March 27, 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed
engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are preconditions for the
commencement of any public works project. The questioned projects are classified into two
(2) categories: (a) those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for the
maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls and
the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting
of fifteen (15) projects which include the construction of Human Development Center,
various Day Care cum Production Centers and waterworks systems; the extension and
renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and laboratory equipment; and the
rehabilitation of office and equipment.
On the same day, respondent Judge issued the question which reads:
It appearing from the verified petition in this case that great and irreparable damage
and/or injury shall be caused to the petitioner as candidate and taxpayer, such damage and
injury taking the form and shape occasioned by the alleged wanton, excessive, abusive
and flagrant waste of public money, before the matter can be heard on notice, the
respondents are hereby Temporarily Restrained from pursuing or prosecuting the
projects
In the same order, he directed the petitioners to file their Answer within 10 days from receipt
of notice and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction for April 24, 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. They contend that the case principally involves an alleged
violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the
Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court.
o Issue:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action
No. 465.
o Held:
The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link the private
respondent's principal grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section
261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular emphasis
on the last two (2) paragraphs which read:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters.
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any public official or employee including
barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five
days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:
133

demands more than "bare suspicion" and can never be "left to presupposition, conjecture,
or even convincing logic"
o The task of the COMELEC as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election
offense complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a
complaint for an alleged commission of an election offense. A complainant, who in effect
accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election offense, has
the burden, as it is his responsibility, to follow through his accusation and prove his
complainant.

Duty to report
1978 constitution A9C S2(9)
o SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
o Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

Legislative Powers
Rule-making power, laws and regulations
1978 constitution A9C S2(1)
o SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
o (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
OEC S52C
o Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:
C. Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws
which the Commission is required to enforce and administer, and require the payment of legal
fees and collect the same in payment of any business done in the Commission, at rates that it
may provide and fix in its rules and regulations.
Rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission to implement the provisions of this
Code shall take effect on the sixteenth day after publication in the Official Gazette or in at
least daily newspapers of general circulation. Orders and directives issued by the Commission
pursuant to said rules and regulations shall be furnished by personal delivery to accredited
political parties within forty-eight hours of issuance and shall take effect immediately upon
receipt.
In case of conflict between rules, regulations, orders or directives of the Commission in the
exercise of its constitutional powers and those issued by any other administrative office or
agency of the government concerning he same matter relative to elections, the former shall
prevail.
Gallardo vs. Tabamo
o Facts:
132

o Facts:
On May 12, 1992, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon,
convened at the Municipal Hall and canvassed the first batch of election returns for the just
concluded May 11, 1992 elections in that municipality.
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 13, 1992, while the canvassing of the election
returns was going on, some sympathizers of petitioner Edwin Sardea, a defeated mayoralty
candidate of LAKAS-NUCD, "stormed the municipal building" and "destroyed . . . all election
materials and paraphernalia including, among others, the copies of election returns furnished
to respondent Board . . ." (p. 86, Rollo).
On May 14, 1992, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers convened and assessed the
extent of the damage wrought by the demonstrators. It discovered that the election returns in
the possession of the MTC Judge of Mauban were intact, so it ordered the retrieval of said
election returns for use in the canvass.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened on May 18, 1992, informed the parties that it
would continue the canvassing of the election returns based on the copies from the MTC of
Mauban.
Atty. Romeo Devera, counsel of LAKAS-NUCD, objected. Later, he filed a petition in behalf
of petitioner Edwin Sardea to stop the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers on the ground
that it had no authority from the COMELEC to use the copies of the election returns obtained
from the MTC of Mauban.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers overruled Attorney Devera's objection and denied
Sardea's petition to stop the proceedings, citing the directive dated May 15, 1992 of the
Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Adolfo Ilagan. The directive was based on the authority
given by Acting Executive Director Resurreccion Bora of the COMELEC, "to order the
Municipal Trial Court Judge of Mauban, Quezon to make available the copy of election
returns, etc., in his possession for the use of the Municipal Board of Canvassers"
petitioners filed Special Action Case No. SPA 92-331, seeking to declare a failure of election
in Mauban, Quezon, based on the grounds that:
I. The attendant facts and circumstance constitute substantial grounds to declare a
failure of election in Mauban, Quezon.
II. Respondent Board gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in canvassing the impugned election returns without prior authority from
the Honorable Commission
o Issue:
whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying the petition to declare a
failure of election
o held:
we held that the pre-conditions for declaring a failure of election are: "(1) that no voting has
been held in any precinct or precincts because of force mejeure, violence or terrorism, and (2)
that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections. The language of the
law clearly requires the concurrence of the[se] two circumstances to justify the calling of a
special election."
The destruction and loss of the copies of the election returns intended for the Municipal Board
of Canvassers on account of violence committed on May 13, 1992 is not one of the causes
that would warrant the declaration of a failure of election because voting actually took place
as scheduled on May 11, 1992 and other valid election returns still existed. Moreover, the
incident did not affect the result of the election.
The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost care and
only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of the
law had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to
45

distinguish and what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result
whatsoever, or that the great body of the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation
and threats from exercising their franchise
Declaration of failure of election, jurisdiction
Benito vs. COMELEC
o See case above
o It is the COMELEC en banc which has the exclusive power to postpone, to declare a failure of election,
or to call a special election.[8] In relation thereto, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code[9]
Loong vs comelec
o Facts:
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu.
Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight
of
the
elections
in
Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of
discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in
the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in
an erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately
communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the
automated machine.
After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by misalignment of
the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing wrong
with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a
consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them correctly.
Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the militarypolice officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who attended were petitioner
Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates
for governor.) The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the
misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some recommended a shift to manual count
(Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri).
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working
well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were
rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul
and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong sequence code.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en
banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire
Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747
ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation
and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued
Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute
Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.
COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998
o Issue:
46

o
o

malpractices. Discerning the rationale for this grant of prosecutorial powers to the
Comelec, we already had occasion to rule, thus:
The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and
administer all laws relative to conduct of election and the concomitant authority
to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason.
The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC
is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which
would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.[37]
This constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec finds statutory
expression under Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
SEC. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized
legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to
prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event
that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months
from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of
the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted
Insofar as the prosecution of election offenses is concerned, therefore, the COMELEC
is the "public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the [Omnibus
Election] Code before the competent court." This constitutional and statutory mandate
for Comelec to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election law translates, in
effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving
election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the
Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest
should be issued.[39]
For the effective investigation and prosecution of cases of election offenses and in the
exercise by the Comelec of its quasi-legislative power under Section 6, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution, the Comelec Rules of Procedure were promulgated, providing, among
others, the guidelines pertinent to election offenses. Among others:
. . . (c) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not
submit counter-affidavits within the ten-day period, the investigating
officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the
complainant.
The Comelec, whenever any election offense charge is filed before it, must have first,
before dismissing the same or filing the corresponding information, conducted the
preliminary investigation proper of the case. At this initial stage of criminal prosecution,
the primordial task of the Comelec is the determination of probable cause, i.e., whether or
not there is reason to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and,
therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment
of trial[40] or as the Comelec Rules of the Procedure phrase it, whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
The determination of probable cause in any criminal prosecution, is made indispensable
by the Bill of Rights which enshrines every citizen's right to due process, the presumption
that he is presumed innocent.
Petitioner KILOSBAYAN must have necessarily tendered evidence, independent of and
in support of the allegations in its letter-complaint, to prove probable cause. It certainly
131

 1987 Constitution A9C S2(6)

o SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
o (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion
of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
OEC S265
o Sec. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this
Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on
any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the
office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted.
RA 9369, S43
o AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED "AN ACT AUTHORIZING
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN
THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY,
CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881, AS AMENDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND
OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES"
o SECTION 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as follow:
"SECTION 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and
prosecute the same."
Kilosbayan vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
A complaint was filed against private respondents, alleging that Countrywide Development
Fund (CDF) were use for electioneering purposes. Kilosbayan alleges that DILG-NCR
collaborated with Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc.
(PYHSDFI), the former approving allotment to the latter 70M allegedly use to buy medical
and sports equipment that was distributed few days before election and stopped at the day of
election.
Comelec investigators submitted the dismissal of the complaint for lack of evidence to prove
probable cause. Kilosbayan provided news clippings, regarding alleged use of funds resulting
from the said transaction of DILG-NCR and PYHSDFI and arguments to support its claims.
The new paper clippings was regarded as hearsay.
Kilosbayan filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that they are not responsible for the
production of evidence by using public funds, it is the COMELEC who should search the
evidence by using public funds and with the help of other agencies of the government as the
constitution gave them the responsibility to prosecute election offenses. The motion was
denied, thus this petition to compel COMELEC to prosecute the private respondents
o Issue: Whether the COMELEC can be compelled to produce evidence despite the complainants
failure to prove probable cause. No.
o Held:
o Section 2 (7) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Comelec shall
exercise the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
130

1.whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction in ordering a manual count.
2.Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it is
proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.
o Ruling:
1. The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well
established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata
The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing
wrong the automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the
National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a grossly
erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count,
a
travesty
of
the
sovereignty
of
the
electorate
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting
is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in
the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the
will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual
counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election
which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the
Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.
2. COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforseen circumstances that threaten to subvert
the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may
even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken
under very difficult circumstances. Even more, we cannot order a special election unless demanded
by exceptional circumstances. Thus, the plea for this Court to call a special election for the
governorship of Sulu is completely off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of
election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:
"Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed,
or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure
or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall on the
basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect."
To begin with, the plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this
Court. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code should be read in relation to Section 4 of R.A. No. 7166
which provides:
"Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. - The postponement,
declaration of failure of elections and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6, and
7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission en banc by a majority vote of
its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after casting
of votes or on the day of the election."

47

The grounds for failure of election - force majeure, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes - clearly
involve questions of fact. It is for this reason that they can only be determined by the COMELEC en
banc after due notice and hearing to the parties. In the case at bar, petitioner never asked the
COMILEC en banc to call for a special election in Sulu. Even in his original petition with this Court,
petitioner did not pray for a special election. His plea for a special election is a mere afterthought. Too
late in the day and too unprocedural. Worse, the grounds for failure of election are inexistent. The
records show that the voters of Sulu were able to cast their votes freely and fairly. Their votes were
counted correctly, albeit manually. The people have spoken. Their sovereign will has to be obeyed.
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special
election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the right of private
respondent to equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been
proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties.
Carlos vs. Angeles
o Facts:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, Jose Carlos was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of
Valenzuela over Antonio Serapio. Serapio filed an election protest challenging
the results and the case was assigned to Judge Angeles of the RTC of Caloocan
(because of the inhibition of all the judges of the RTC in Valenzuela). The final tally
showed that Carlos won over a margin of 17,007 votes. However, the trial court set
aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of significant badges of fraud
namely:
1. The keys turned over by the City Treasurer to the court did not fit into the
padlocks of the ballot boxes that had to be forcibly opened;
2. Seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any ballot and two (2) ballot boxes out
of the seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any election returns;
3. Some schools where various precincts were located experienced brownouts
during the counting of votes causing delay in the counting although there was no
undue commotion or violence that occurred;
4. Some of the assigned watchers of protestant were not in their posts during the
counting of votes.
On the basis of the foregoing badges of fraud, the trial court declared that there was enough
pattern of fraud in the conduct of the election for mayor in Valenzuela. The court held that
the fraud was attributable to the protestee who had control over the election paraphernalia
and the basic services in the community such as the supply of electricity.

the trial court set aside the proclamation of protestee Jose Emmanuel Carlos by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers and declared protestant Antonio M. Serapio as the duly elected mayor of
Valenzuela City

o Issue:
Whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when the
court set aside the proclamation of petitioner and declared respondent Serapio as the duly
elected mayor of Valenzuela City despite its finding that petitioner garnered 83,609 valid votes
while respondent obtained 66,602 valid votes, or a winning margin of 17,007 votes. (ni stick
rakos jurisdiction)
o Held:
48

equally and impartially within the area in which the newspaper is

circulated.
Section 92. Comelec Time. The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be
allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area
of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the
franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge,
during the period of the campaign.

o Issue:
Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be under
Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods.
o Held:
it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was
the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the
possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms
of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take
a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A.
6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would
be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a
leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646
can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods
are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved
in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
It was once held where the constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election
propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police
power of the state "to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and
of the denial of equal protection of the laws." The evil sought to be prevented in an election
which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are
taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in
favor of specific persons for some office. In other words, the electorate is asked to vote for
or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not
absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for
or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec
radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely bar
petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may
express his view

Power to investigate and prosecute

129

countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress

incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental
rights of our people
Media practitioners during plebisicte
Sanidad vs. Comelec
Facts:
On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January
1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws,
promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper
columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or
announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the plebiscite campaign
period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television
time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
It is alleged by petitioner:
o that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution.
o Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the
news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and
necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or
subject about which he writes. Petitioner believes that said provision of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his
constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and further imposes
subsequent punishment for those who may violate it because it contains a
penal provision
COMELEC:
o that the questioned provision of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is not violative
of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.
Rather it is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise
and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article
IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution
o It is stated further by respondent that Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar
petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against
the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the
act through the Comelec space and airtime. This is provided under Sections
90 and 92 of BP 881:
Section 90. Comelec Space. Commission shall procure space in at least
one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city:
Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication
shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or
city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can
announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge
128

Assuming for the nonce that the trial court was correct in holding that the final tally of valid
votes as per revision report may be set aside because of the significant badges of fraud, the
same would be tantamount to a ruling that there were no valid votes cast at all for the
candidates, and, thus, no winner could be declared in the election protest case.In short,
there was failure of election.
In such case, the proper remedy is an action before the Commission on Elections en banc to
declare a failure of election or to annul the election.[33] However, the case below was an election
protest case involving an elective municipal position which, under Section 251 of the Election
Code, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the appropriate regional trial court.[34]
Nonetheless, the annulment of an election on the ground of fraud, irregularities and violations
of election laws may be raised as an incident to an election contest. Such grounds for
annulment of an election may be invoked in an election protest case. However, an election
must not be nullified and the voters disenfranchised whenever it is possible to determine a
winner on the basis of valid votes cast, and discard the illegally cast ballots. In this case, the
petitioner admittedly received 17,007 valid votes more than the protestee, and therefore the
nullification of the election would not lie. The power to nullify an election must be exercised
with the greatest care with a view not to disenfranchise the voters, and only under
circumstances that clearly call for such drastic remedial measure.[35]
More importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election.[37]
See Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code

RA 7166 provides that:

Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections.-- The postponement,
declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in
Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by
the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. The causes
for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of
votes or on the day of the election. (Emphasis supplied)

It is the Commission (Comelec) sitting en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to
declare a failure of election.[38]
In a petition to annul an election under Section 6, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, two conditions must be averred
in order to support a sufficient cause of action. These are: (1) the illegality must affect more than 50% of
the votes cast and (2) the good votes can be distinguished from the bad ones. It is only when these two
conditions are established that the annulment of the election can be justified because the remaining votes do
not constitute a valid constituency.[39]
We have held that: To declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must occur: first, no voting has taken
place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there were voting, the election nevertheless
resulted in a failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. [40] Neither
of these conditions was present in the case at bar.
More recently, we clarified that, Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there
are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting
and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
49

election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes.[41]
Thus, the trial court in its decision actually pronounced a failure of election by disregarding and setting aside
the results of the election. Nonetheless, as herein-above stated, the trial court erred to the extent of ousting
itself of jurisdiction because the grounds for failure of election were not significant and even nonexistent. More importantly, the commission of fraud can not be attributed to the protestee
Postponement or failure of election in Barangay elections, grounds
OEC Article 6 section 45
o Sec. 45. Postponement or failure of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence,
terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous
causes of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible
in any barangay, the Commission, upon a verified petition of an interested party and after due notice
and hearing at which the interested parties are given equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the
election therein for such time as it may deem necessary.
o If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or otheranalogous causes, the election in
any barangay has not been held on the date herein fixed or has been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting therein and such failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission, on the basis of a verified petition of an interested party, and
after due notice and hearing, at which the interested parties are given equal opportunity to be heard
shall call for the holding or continuation of the election within thirty days after it shall have verified
and found that the cause or causes for which the election has been postponed or suspended have
ceased to exist or upon petition of at least thirty percent of the registered voters in the barangay
concerned.
o When the conditions in these areas warrant, upon verification by the Commission, or upon petition
of at least thirty percent of the registered voters in the barangay concerned, it shall order the holding
of the barangay election which was postponed or suspended.

Special Election
1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 9
-

Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be
called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Omnibus Election Code, Section 7

-

Sec. 7. Call of special election. - (1) In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or
more before a regular election, the Commission shall call a special election to be held within sixty days after
the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
50

undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all,
the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not
leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information
obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable
ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and
confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.
For instance, a specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only
professional survey groups may be allowed to conduct the same. Pollsters may be kept
at a reasonable distance from the voting center. They may be required to explain to
voters that the latter may refuse to be interviewed, and that the interview is not part
of the official balloting process. The pollsters may further be required to wear
distinctive clothing that would show they are not election officials.[48] Additionally,
they may be required to undertake an information campaign on the nature of the
exercise and the results to be obtained therefrom. These measures, together with a
general prohibition of disruptive behavior, could ensure a clean, safe and orderly
election.
Overbroad
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them.
Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is
without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly,
the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting
centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview
voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving
that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create
disorder or confuse the voters. Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the
collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information
and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey
questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained,
candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be
deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election-day and other
factors on voters' choices.
Violation of Ban Secrecy
The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity
and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek
access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter
identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official
ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing
marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the
ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who
have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their
respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in
accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be
achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of
whom they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore,
the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary.
Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored
127

for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN
to undertake the exit survey.
Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining
Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and desist,
until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued
pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media
without any difficulty or problem.
ABS-CBN: The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid
exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press
COMELEC:
1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to
promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect,
preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."
2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence
the voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and
cause confusion as to who are the winners and the losers in the election," which in
turn may result in "violence and anarchy."
3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of
the ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of
Section 2, Article V of the Constitution and relevant provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code. It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by
petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its
police power," such as in the present case.
4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present
danger to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an
exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting
interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that
the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by
the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present
danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process."
o Issue: W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can absolutely ban exit polls
o Held:
The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute
an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban
them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the
contrary, exit polls -- properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools in eliminating the
evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by
the Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit
polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.
Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of electoral processes
Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or
participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be
representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or
group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the
official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to
who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data
gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the
integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from
the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot
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(2) In case of the dissolution of the Batasang Pambansa, the President shall call an election which shall not
be held earlier than forty-five nor later than sixty days from the date of such dissolution.
The Commission shall send sufficient copies of its resolution for the holding of the election to its provincial
election supervisors and election registrars for dissemination, who shall post copies thereof in at least three
conspicuous places preferably where public meetings are held in each city or municipality affected.

RA 7166, Section 4
-

Section 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. - The postponement, declaration of
failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus
Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. The
causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day
of the election.
In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy
not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy.
However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the
succeeding regular election.

Fixing Date of Special Election

(Panganiban v Comelec)
Facts:
Petitioner asserts that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by
insisting on holding special elections on July 18 and 25, 1998 more than thirty (30) days after the failure to elect. In
support of his cause, petitioner insists on a strict compliance with the holding of special elections not later than
thirty (30) days after failure to elect pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that:
"SEC. 6. Failure of elections. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes
the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the
failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a
verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of
the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect."
Petitioner argues that the above-quoted provision is mandatory because of the word "shall." He further asserts that
the prescribed time frame actually `delimits' COMELEC's authority to call for a special election and that instead, the
power to call for a special election after the 30th day now resides in Congress.
Issue:
WON petitioners interpretation of the law is correct.
Held: No!
Section 2 (1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC
all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
51

credible elections. Pursuant to this intent, this Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of the COMELEC's
powers in conducting elections.
In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: 1.] it should not be later than thirty (30)
days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect; and,
2.] it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in the failure to
elect. The first involves a question of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances
of a case. Thus, the holding of elections within the next few months from the cessation of the cause of the
postponement, suspension or failure to elect may still be considered "reasonably close to the date of the election not
held."
In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be faulted for tardiness. The dates set for the special elections were actually
the nearest dates from the time total/partial failure of elections was determined, which date fell on July 14, 1998, the
date of promulgation of the challenged Omnibus Order. Needless to state, July 18 and 25, the dates chosen by the
COMELEC for the holding of special elections were only a few days away from the time a total/partial failure of
elections was declared and, thus, these were `dates reasonably close' thereto, given the prevailing facts herein.
Notice of Special Election
(Hassan vs Comelec)
Facts:
Due to threats of violence and terrorism in the area there was failure of elections in six out of twenty-four precincts
in Madalum. Because of this, several special elections were scheduled but the same also failed. Finally, a Special
Election was scheduled on May 29, 1995 which was pushed through already. However, petitioner Hadji Nor Basher
L. Hassan filed a petition with the COMELEC assailing the validity of the May 29 re-scheduled special elections on
the ground that Notices in the transfer of venue of the voting was sent only on the "night" of May 28, 1995 and
only to a "few" but not to all concerned.
Issue:
WON the Comelec complied with the notice requirement for the conduct of Special election

done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not
necessarily be the owner thereof.
The expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the posting of
election campaign materials on the vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent to
the operation of the PUV. Surely, posting a decal expressing support for a certain
candidate in an election will not in any manner affect the operation of the PUV as
such. Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the posting of
an election campaign material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to
operate, but a regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle.
Accordingly, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the
constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. The posting of election
campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is
not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership it has nothing
to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the
supposed captive audience may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. Here, the
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on
PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages
contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if
they find the same unbearably intrusive. Hence, the doctrine is not applicable.
(Take note: in National Press Club v. COMELEC,18 while the Court upheld the constitutionality of a prohibition on the selling or
giving free of charge, except to the COMELEC, of advertising space and commercial time during an election period, it was emphasized
that the grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, is limited to
ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply among candidates. Further, in Social Weather Stations, Inc. v.
COMELEC,19 the Court, notwithstanding the grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC under Section 4, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, declared unconstitutional a regulation prohibiting the release of election surveys prior to the election since it
"actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper
columnists, radio and [television (TV)] commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers."20)

Held:
Notwithstanding, the notice given on the afternoon of May 28 resetting the special elections to May 29 and
transferring the venue of the elections 15 kilometers away from the farthest barangay/school was too short resulting
to the disenfranchisement of voters. Out of the 1,546 registered voters in the five (5) precincts only 328 actually
voted.
Comelec argued that petitioner, his followers or the constituents must be charged with notice of the special
elections to be held because of the failure of the two (2) previous elections. But the SC did not agree. To require the
voters to come to the polls on such short notice was highly impracticable. In a place marred by violence, it was
necessary for the voters to be given sufficient time to be notified of the changes and prepare themselves for the
eventuality.
It is essential to the validity of the election that the voters have notice in some form, either actual or constructive of
the time, place and purpose thereof. The time for holding it must be authoritatively designated in advance. The
requirement of notice even becomes stricter in cases of special elections where it was called by some authority after
the happening of a condition precedent, or at least there must be a substantial compliance therewith so that it may
fairly and reasonably be said that the purpose of the statute has been carried into effect. The sufficiency of notice is
determined on whether the voters generally have knowledge of the time, place and purpose of the elections so as to
give them full opportunity to attend the polls and express their will or on the other hand, whether the omission
resulted in depriving a sufficient number of the qualified electors of the opportunity of exercising their franchise so
as to change the result of the election.
52

Exit polls- An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for
the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom
they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced
to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling
individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the
recent May 11, 1998 elections.
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
o Facts:
COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS
CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The
Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that
ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV
coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for
national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be
broadcasted immediately. The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with
the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement
125

enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation utilities
during an election period. Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, thus provides:
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation
and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation
or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Nevertheless, the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the
COMELEC over franchises and permits to operate, though seemingly unrestrained,
has its limits. Notwithstanding the ostensibly broad supervisory and regulatory powers
granted to the COMELEC during an election period under Section 4, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, the Court had previously set out the limitations thereon. In Adiong,
the Court, while recognizing that the COMELEC has supervisory power vis--vis the
conduct and manner of elections under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
nevertheless held that such supervisory power does not extend to the very freedom of
an individual to express his preference of candidates in an election by placing election
campaign stickers on his vehicle.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory
and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As worded,
Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and
regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization "of all franchises or permits for
the operation," inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The COMELECs
constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not extend to the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit
to operate the same.1wphi1
o there is a marked difference between the franchise or permit to operate
transportation for the use of the public and the ownership per se of the
vehicles used for public transport. Thus, in Tatad v. Garcia, Jr.,21 the Court
explained that:
What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the
coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility.
While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the
public, they do not by themselves constitute a public utility. What
constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve
the public x x x.
The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the
operation of a public utility. However, it does not require a franchise
before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so
long as it does not operate them to serve the public.
o in law, there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public utility
and the ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public.
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and
separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own
said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely,
one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to
serve the public. The devotion of property to serve the public may be
124

From the foregoing, it is not difficult for us to rule that there was insufficiency of notice given as to the time and
transfer of the polling places. The low turnout of voters is more than sufficient proof that the elections conducted
on that day was vitiated. A less than a days notice of time and transfer of polling places 15 kilometers away from
the original polls certainly deprived the electors the opportunity to participate in the elections.
(Tolentino vs Comelec)
Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate passed a
Resolution calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the
regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election.
The resolution further provides that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.
After canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with the
first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of
Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of the Comelec Resolution No. 01005 contending that COMELEC is without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position
to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial
candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular
elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters
Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly
required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes
cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two
separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.
Issue:
WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi:
(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix
the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is
considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election
is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of
special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there
was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void. However, petitioners
failed to prove that sufficient number of voters have been misled.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special
Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the
candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our
election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of election, if
necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.
53

In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy
shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the
call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that
the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so.[28] This is because the right and duty
to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority[29] and the
law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.[30]
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some
authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the
giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special
election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the
special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in
February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs
failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely
implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said
resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by
former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed
to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.
Special Election after failure of election
Omnibus Election Code Section 6
-

Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.

RA 7166, Section 4
-

Section 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. - The postponement, declaration of
failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus
Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. The
causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day
of the election.
In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy
not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy.
However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the
succeeding regular election.

Special Election after failure of election, requisites

54

o Issue:
whether Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f),of Resolution No. 9615,
which prohibits the posting of any election campaign or propaganda material, inter alia, in
PUVs and public transport terminals are valid regulations.
o Held:
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly
infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the
prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport
terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in
their property, and convince others to agree with them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election
campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries
with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner
thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of
PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing
their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the
revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.
It is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that freedom of speech and of the
press enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights. The rationale is that the
preservation of other rights depends on how well we protect our freedom of speech
and of the press.12 It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls
all the more for utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.13
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech,
or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards,16 is
constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the
following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within the constitutional power
of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth,
the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.17
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations
since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted.
However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy
all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
It is conceded that Resolution No. 9615, including the herein assailed provisions,
furthers an important and substantial governmental interest, i.e., ensuring equal
opportunity, time and space among candidates aimed at the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections. It is further conceded that the governmental
interest in imposing the said prohibition is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. However, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the
COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely
no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals.
The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
No. 9615is not within the COMELECs constitutionally delegated power of supervision or
regulation. It is not disputed that the COMELEC has the power to supervise or regulate the
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can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather

than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of
such evils
o This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in 5.4.
Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate bogus survey
results calculated to mislead voters. Candidates can have their own surveys
conducted. No right of reply can be invoked by others. No principle of equality
is involved. It is a free market to which each candidate brings his ideas. As for
the purpose of the law to prevent bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether
the Government can deal with this natural-enough tendency of some voters.
Some voters want to be identified with the winners. Some are susceptible to
the herd mentality. Can these be legitimately prohibited by suppressing the
publication of survey results which are a form of expression? It has been held
that [mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities,
but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital
to the maintenance of democratic institutions.[18]
To summarize then, we hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought
to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of
expression
1-UTAK v. COMELEC The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in
any democracy. It includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a particular
candidate. The right to express ones preference for a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to
free speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a candidate carries
with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.
o Facts:
On February 12, 2001, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9006, otherwise known as the "Fair Elections
Act", was passed. Section 9 thereof provides:
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. The COMELEC may authorize political
parties and party-list groups to erect common poster areas for their candidates in not
more than ten (10) public places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like,
wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit election propaganda: Provided that the
size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its
equivalent.
Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect
common poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall
not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its equivalent.
Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent
of the owner thereof, and in public places or property which shall be allocated
equitably and impartially among the candidates.
in 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 providing rules that would implement
Sec 9 of RA 9006 or the Fair Elections Act. One of the provisions of the Resolution provide
that the posting of any election propaganda or materials during the campaign period shall be
prohibited in public utility vehicles (PUV) and within the premises of public transport
terminals. 1 UTAK, a party-list organization, questioned the prohibition as it impedes the right
to free speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
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(Lucero vs Comelec)
Facts:
Lucero lost to Ong by 204 votes in the 1992 elections for the position of district representative of the 2nd legislative
district of Northern Samar. The tally, however, did not include the results of the following:
Precinct No. 7 Illegible
Precinct No. 13 Snatched ballots; no election held
Precinct No. 16 Missing election returns
In light of this failure, Lucero moved for the COMELEC to suspend the proclamation of Ong and to hold a special
election for Precinct No. 13. Acting on Luceros urgent manifestation, COMELEC directed PBC to desist from
reconvening until further orders. Ong moved to lift the suspension in which Lucero opposed. COMELEC en banc
issued a resolution ordering the Provincial Election Supervision (PES) of Northern Samar to bring the ballot boxes
from Precinct 7 and 16 to the Commission wherein the keys thereof shall be turned over to the PES who shall in
turn give the keys for each ballot boxes to the duly authorized representatives of Lucero and Ong. The Court issued
a TRO against the implementation of the above-mentioned resolution and eventually ordered the COMELEC to
cease and desist from implementing the same. Acting on motions for reconsideration and clarication respectively
led by COMELEC and Lucero, the Court modied its decision and instead ordered to re-raffle the case to
COMELEC.
In 1994, COMELEC en banc issued the assailed resolution ordering a re-tabulation of the votes including the
results of Precinct 16 and the COMELEC-copy of the results for Precinct 7, a special election for Precinct 13, and
a recount of Precinct 7 conditioned upon the results of Precinct 13.
Both Lucero and Ong contested the said resolution:
Lucero the count of ballots in Precinct 7 must be unconditional because the election returns therefrom are
invalid
Ong COMELEC has no authority to order the correction and to call for a special election almost two (2) years
after the regular election
Issue:
W/N a special election could be held 1 year and 10 months after the regular election
Held: Yes!
There are, therefore, two requisites for the holding of special elections under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code, viz., (1) that there is a failure of election, and (2) that such failure would affect the results of the election. The
parties admit that the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 was due to ballot-box snatching and do not dispute
the finding of the COMELEC as to the necessity and inevitability of the holding of a special election in said
precinct, even if the result of Precinct No. 7 should be based on the questionable "Comelec Copy" of its election
returns.
The two requirements then for a special election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code have indeed been
met.
In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be not later than thirty
days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect, and
(2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect.
The first involves questions of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a
case. In the instant case, the delay was not attributable to the poor voters of Precinct No. 13 or to the rest of the
55

electorate of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar. The delay was, as stated in the opening paragraph
of this ponencia, primarily caused by the legal skirmishes or maneuvers of the petitioners which muddled simple
issues. Considering then that the petitioners themselves must share the blame for the delay, and taking into account
the fact that since the term of office of the contested position is only three years, the holding of a special election in
Precinct No. 13 within the next few months may still be considered "reasonably close to the date of the election not
held."
Comparison between Special Elections of President, Vice-President and Special Election under Section 6 of
Omnibus Election Code (Giapil ko lang ni kay murag gamit):
First, the special election in the former is to fill permanent vacancies in the Office of the President, Vice President,
and Members of Congress occurring after the election, while the special election under the latter is due to or by
reason of a failure of election.
Second, a special election under Section 6 would entail minimal costs because it is limited to only the precincts
involved and to the candidates who, by the result of the election in a particular constituency, would be affected by
the failure of election. On the other hand, the special election for the Offices of the President, Vice President, and
Senators would be nation-wide, and that of a Representative, district-wide.
Third, Section 6, when specifically applied to the instant case, presupposes that no candidate had been proclaimed
and therefore the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar would be unrepresented in the
House of Representatives until the special election shall ultimately determine the winning candidate, such that if
none is held, they would have no representation until the end of the term. Under the aforesaid constitutional and
statutory provisions, the elected officials have already served their constituencies for more than one-half of their
terms of office.
Fourth, if the law had found it fit to provide a specific and determinate time-frame for the holding of a special
election under Section 6, then it could have easily done so in Section 4 of R.A. No. 7166.
Calling of Special Election, jurisdiction
(Benito vs Comelec)
FACTS:
Benito and private respondent Pagayawan were 2 of 8 candidates vying for the position of municipal mayor in
Calanogas, Lanao del Sur during the May 11, 1998 elections. 5 precincts clustered in the Sultan Disimban
Elementary School were met with violence when some 30 armed men appeared at the school premises and fired
shots into the air. This sowed panic among the voters and elections officials, causing them to scatter in different
directions. It happened before noon at the day of election. A spot report reported the incident.
Both parties are contending contrary facts. Petitioner alleged that the voting never resumed even after the lawless
elements left. On the other hand, private respondent alleged that voting resumed when the armed men left around 1
pm in the afternoon. Petitioner is only asking, however, a declaration of failure of elections on the first three
precincts, not with the entire five precincts. During the counting, the ballots from the three precincts were
excluded. Nevertheless, the winner was the private respondent. And even if the votes from the three excluded
precincts were added, private respondent still emerged as the winner.
Petitioner then filed a petition to declare failure of election and to call a special election. COMELEC however
denied the petition and affirmed the proclamation.
Issue:
WON the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in not holding Special Election
HELD: Petition Dismissed.
56

Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution, which gives the
COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the
operation of media of communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure like
5.4. For as we have pointed out in sustaining the ban on media political advertisements, the
grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 is limited to ensuring equal opportunity,
time, space, and the right to reply as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the
use of such media facilities for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of 5.4?
The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United
States v. OBrien:
o [A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.[8]
o This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from
content-neutral regulations and is said to have become canonical in the review
of such laws.[9] It is noteworthy that the OBrien test has been applied by this
Court in at least two cases.[10]
o Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated
to the suppression of free expression. Moreover, even if the purpose is
unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be
invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is
necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question.
o Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the OBrien test because the causal
connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such
interest not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. By prohibiting the
publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such
publication might undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually
suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of
opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio
and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers.In effect,
5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring
personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom
of expression means that the government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.[
o Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the
suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only
incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the OBrien test, namely,
that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental
interest. As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure
on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, junking of weak or losing
candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called dagdagbawas. Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be
attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim
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have appropriate judicial remedies available, so long at least as this Court sits.
Until such time, however, the Comelec is entitled to the benefit of the
presumption that official duty will be or is being regularly carried out.
In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary
other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office.
Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular
candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates
themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
SWS vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social
research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: Surveys
affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to
justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the
results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before
the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical
nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable
danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on
politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing
and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend
that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys,
which are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as
necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous
and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the
publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational
connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral
process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is
narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of
freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last
15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as
it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.
o Issue: Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom
of speech, expression and the press.
o Held:
we hold that 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of
speech, expression, and the press
To be sure, 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press by
prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed
periods of fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before
a local election. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech,
expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity.
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It is the COMELEC en banc which has the exclusive power to postpone, to declare a failure of election, or to call a
special election.
After a careful consideration of the parties' submissions, we find that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in denying BENITO's petition to declare a failure to election and to call a special election. It is indeed
odd that petitioner singles out only precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A as the subjects of his petition when there were
two (2) other precincts in the same school. In this regard, we have reviewed the record and we concur with private
respondent that this claim of petitioner appears to be a mere afterthought. Petitioner never raised this particular
issue in his earlier pleadings filed with the COMELEC.
In a sense, petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis--vis the number of
registered voters in the subject election precincts. However, there can be failure of election in a political unit only if
the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded
respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered voters must
cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes,
regardless of the actual number of ballots cast.
The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost care and only under
circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of the law had been so fundamental or so
persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to
arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that the great body of voters have been prevented by violence,
intimidation and threats from exercising their franchise.
PART II
SUFFRAGE
Suffrage, defined
(Nolasco vs Comelec)
Facts:
A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for alleged performing
acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code giving money to influence, induce
or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions: for committing acts of terrorism to enhance
his candidacy, and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is allowed by the law.
The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was decided against
Blanco.
A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as
intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him.
Issues:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor
Held:
Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan.
If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned
shall ipso facto become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice
governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the
second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall ipso facto become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice
mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other
sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined in this Article.
57

The candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner
in case the winning candidate is disqualified. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received
the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a
second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances.
The dispute at bar involves more than the mayoralty of the municipality of Meycauyan, Bulacan. It concerns the
right of suffrage which is the bedrock of republicanism. Suffrage is the means by which our people express their
sovereign judgment. Its free exercise must be protected especially against the purchasing power of the peso. As we
succinctly held in People v. San Juan, "each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign
will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the
starting level of its expression and application, every assumption must be indulged in and every guarantee adopted
to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen's free choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free
and orderly exercise of the right of suffrage, is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process."

(People vs San Juan)

Facts:
"That on or about the 12th day of November, 1963 (election day), at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning at the
polling place at the City Central School, Ormoc City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused CLAUDIA SAN JUAN and SEVERO SAN JUAN, conspiring, cooperating,
confabulating and helping with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with the use of
force, prevent the complaining witness GENEROSA PILAPIL from exercising her right to freely enter the polling
place of Precinct No. 1 in order to vote.
Issue:
Whether the indictment sufficiently avers all the essential elements of the proscribed act.
Held:
Section 133 of the Revised Election Codes a violation of which is denominated as a serious election offense by
section 138 of the same Code, provides:
"Order of Voting.- The voters shall have the right to vote in order of their entrance into the polling place. The
voters shall have the right to freely enter the polling place as soon as they arrive unless there are were than forty
voters waiting inside, in which case they have the right to enter in the order of their arrival as those who are inside
go out, which the latter shall immediately do after having cast their votes."
Indeed, each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of
republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression
and application, every assumption must be indulged in ad every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested
exercise of the citizen's free choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of
the right of suffrage, is to inflict the ultimate indignity or the democratic process. As numerous as they are insidious
are long-standing techniques of terror and intimidation that have been conceived by man in derogation of the right
of suffragewhich we have repeatedly and unqualifiedly condemned. When the legislature provided in section 133
of the Revised Election Code an explicit and unequivocal guarantee of a voters free access to the polling place, it
could have intended no purpose other than to maintain inviolate the right to vote by safeguarding the voter against
all manner of unauthorized interference and travesty that surveys of fear can devise. Every unlawful obstacle, by
whatever means or method, inter posed to the free entry of a voter into the polling place to cast his vote, strikes at
the very heart of the right of suffrage.
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rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information
campaigns and forums among candidates.
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which
enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be
taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision
applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during the election period."
In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without
regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly
an important value.
One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the
Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law."
The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the
operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or
whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media
operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations
during election periods.
In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the character and
extent of the limitations resulting from the particular measure being assayed upon freedom
of speech and freedom of the press are essential considerations. It is important to note
that the restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press of Section
11 (b) is circumscribed by certain important limitations:
1. Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability.
By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11
(b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods.
2. Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section 11 (b)
shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including
purchase and sale disguised as a donation, 4 of print space and air time for
"campaign or other political purposes. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any
way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of
news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications,
political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does
not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters
or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as
such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for
particular candidates covertly paid for by candidates for political office. We
read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of
particular candidates.
3. Section 11 (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the
Comelec of print space or air time, which space and time Comelec is then
affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge,
among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the province or
city served by the newspaper or radio or television station. Some of the
petitioners are apparently apprehensive that Comelec might not allocate
"Comelec time" or "Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis among the
several candidates. Should such apprehensions materialize, candidates who are
in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations effected by Comelec will
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 To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these
grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for
failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood to
mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered. This is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied.
PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election
and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that is
not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941.From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap
in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. The Court cannot and do not
address matters over which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the
legislature; to do so will offend the principle of separation of powers.If a gap indeed exists,
then the present case should bring this concern to the legislatures notice.
Power to supervise or regulate franchises, transportation
1987 Constitution A9C S4
o SECTION 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
NPC vs. COMELEC
o Facts:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented
from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who
are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming
May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed
of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued
by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the
prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles
out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular
content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of
1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to
provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant toelection Issue.
Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges thefreedom of speech of candidates,
and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those
appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and
television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of
information concerning candidates and Issue in the electionthereby curtailing and limiting the
right of voters to information and opinion.
o Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional. Constitutional.
o Held:
The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of
media of communication and information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision
or regulation" has been spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of "equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable
118

Thus, we hold that the information here satisfies the requirements for the legal sufficiency of an indictment lodged
under section 133 of the Revised Election Code.
Constitutional Basis of Suffrage
1987 Constitution, Artivle V, Sections 1 and 2
-

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in
the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance
of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the
Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

Nature of Suffrage
1973 Constitution, Article V, Section 4
-

Section 4. It shall be the obligation of every citizen qualified to vote to register and cast his vote.

Omnibus Election Code, Sections 4, 261(y)(1), 264

-

Sec. 4. Obligation to register and vote. - It shall be the obligation of every citizen qualified to vote to register
and cast his vote.
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
o (y) On Registration of Voters:
(1) Any person who, having all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a voter, fails
without justifiable excuse to register as a voter in an election, plebiscite or referendum in which he is
qualified to vote.
Sec. 264. Penalties. - Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall be punished with
imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to probation. In
addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of
the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which shall be enforced after
the prison term has been served. Any political party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less
than ten thousand pesos, which shall be imposed upon such party after criminal action has been instituted in
which their corresponding officials have been found guilty.
In case of prisoner or prisoners illegally released from any penitentiary or jail during the prohibited
period as provided in Section 261, paragraph (n) of this Code, the director of prisons, provincial warden,
keeper of the jail or prison, or persons who are required by law to keep said prisoner in their custody shall, if
convicted by a competent court, be sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period
if the prisoner or prisoners so illegally released commit any act of intimidation, terrorism of interference in
the election.
Any person found guilty of the offense of failure to register or failure to vote shall, upon conviction,
be fined one hundred pesos. In addition, he shall suffer disqualification to run for public office in the next
succeeding election following his conviction or be appointed to a public office for a period of one year
following his conviction.

Suffrage for overseas absentee voters

RA 9189, Section 5(d)
-

Sec. 5. Disqualifications. - The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
59

o D. An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless
he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later
than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also
state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the
cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
(Macalintal vs Comelec)
Facts:
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
(R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:
That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in
absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it
dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals argument is correct.
HELD: No.
There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines
within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident
are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating
his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a
voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an
absentee voter.
Suffrage for local absentee voters
EO 157, March 30, 1987
-

PROVIDING FOR ABSENTEE VOTING BY OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT

WHO ARE AWAY FROM THE PLACE OF THEIR REGISTRATION BY REASON OF OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS ON ELECTION DAY
WHEREAS, under the electoral law now in force the rule is that a person has to be physically present in the
polling place whereof he is a registered voter in order to be able to vote;
WHEREAS, the only exception is that established by Section 169 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which allows
members of the board of election inspectors to vote in the polling place where they are assigned on election
day, under certain conditions;
WHEREAS, there are other persons who, by reason of public functions and duties, are assigned on election
day in places other than their place of registration, and under existing rules, are thus unable to vote;
WHEREAS, the democratic principle requires the broadest participation in electoral and similar exercises by
persons who have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote;
WHEREAS, government officials and employees who are assigned to places other than their place of
registration must not be deprived of their right to participate in electoral exercises;
60

d. A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated
in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their
sector.
e. A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share
similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interest or concerns
f. A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Groups which cannot be registered as political parties
(see ab0ve)
Grounds for cancellation of registration
(see above)
RA 7941 S6(8)
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. - The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
1.
2.
3.
4.

It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
It is a foreign party or organization;
It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
6. It
declares
untruthful
statements
in
its
petition;
7. It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
8. It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two percentum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.
Phil. Guardians brotherhood v. COMELEC
o Facts:
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions.Among the partylist organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes
cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.
o ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.
o HELD: COMELEC's decision is annulled.
The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it:
(a)fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections;OR
(b)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
The word OR is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing
from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies ,as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of
the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
117

necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the
COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it,
as an incident of its power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the
COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing
authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions.
It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of
nomination for candidates to local elective posts.[18] In simple terms, it is the LP president who
certifies the official standard bearer of the party.
The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that will redound
to the benefit of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered
political parties that have to be carried out through their leaders. The resolution of the
leadership issue is thus particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly conduct of
the elections.
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary
between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The
discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property
within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the
state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that
party members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may
have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract
among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated
have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process
issue against the government or any of its agencies.
But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in
membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct
its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca
v. Mula,[24] the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public
interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also
consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according
to the free choice of the people.[25]
To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld
Roxas election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion
from the party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs
performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same
cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion
is for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC
cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its power over political parties.

Political Party, defined

RA 7941
a. A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
b. A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.
c. It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of
at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
116

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. Any person who by reason of public functions and duties, is not in his/her place of registration on
election day, may vote in the city/municipality where he/she is assigned on election day: Provided, That
he/she is a duly registered voter.
Sec. 2. Thirty (30) days before the election, the appropriate head of office shall submit to the Commission
on Elections a list of officers and employees of the office who are registered voters, and who, by reason of
their duties and functions, will be in places other than their place of registration, and who desire to exercise
their right to vote, with the request that said officers and employees be provided with application forms to
cast absentee ballots in their place of assignment.
The list and the request shall be under oath.
Sec. 3. Upon verification by the Commission on Elections that the persons included in the list are qualified
voters, it shall transmit the exact number of application forms to the head of the office making the request.
Sec. 4. The application forms shall be returned only accomplished to the Commission on Elections not
later than April 25, 1987.
Sec. 5. Upon verification of the applications, the Commission shall transmit the exact number of absentee
ballots to the appropriate head of the government office for distribution to the applicants.
Sec. 6. The head of the office shall prepare a sworn report on the manner of distribution of the absentee
ballots, indicating therein the number of ballots transmitted to each province, the names of the persons to
whom the absentee ballots are delivered, and the serial numbers of ballots. It shall be accompanied by a
certificate of eligibility to vote absentee for each particular voter.
Sec. 7. For the purpose of the 1987 congressional election, the absentee voters shall vote only for
candidates for senator.
Sec. 8. The voters who cast absentee votes shall vote one week before election day. They shall do so by
delivering to the Commission on Elections Regional Director, or the Provincial Election Supervisor or the
City or Municipal Election Registrar of the place of their assignment ballot within two security envelopes,
the one containing the absentee ballots indicating only that it is an envelope of the Commission on
Elections, and the other envelope indicating the name of the absentee voter and his/her affidavit number.
Sec. 9. The Commission on Elections official concerned to whom the absentee vote is delivered shall
immediately transmit by the fastest means available to the Commission on Elections the special Commission
on Elections absentee ballot within two security envelopes so that the same are in the central office of the
Commission one day before the elections.
The transmittal letter shall indicate the names of the persons who cast the absentee votes, their voters'
affidavit numbers and their certificates of eligibility to vote absentee.
Sec. 10. The Commission on Elections shall canvass the votes cast by absentee voters and shall add the
results of the same to the votes reported throughout the country.
Sec. 11. The Commission shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement this Executive
Order.
61

Sec. 12. Section 169 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall remain in force and effect, and shall continue to
govern the voting privilege of members of the Board of Election Inspectors. All laws, orders, issuances,
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly. lawphi1.net
Sec. 13. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Omnibus Election Code, Section 169
-

Sec. 169. Voting privilege of members of board of election inspectors. - Members of the board of election
inspectors and their substitutes may vote in the polling place where they are assigned on election day:
Provided, That they are registered voters within the province, city or municipality where they are assigned:
and Provided, finally, That their voting in the polling places where they are not registered voters be noted in
the minutes of the board of election inspectors.

RA 7166, Section 12
-

Section 12. Absentee Voting. - Absentee voting as provided for in Executive Order No. 157 dated March
30, 1987 shall apply to the elections for President, Vice-President and Senators only and shall be limited to
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police and other government
officers and employees who are duly registered voters and who, on election day, may temporarily be
assigned in connection with the performance of election duties to place where they are not registered voters.

RA 10380, Local Absentee Voting for media

-

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. The State shall ensure the free exercise of the right of suffrage by all
citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law.?r?l??
Section 2. Local Absentee Voting for Members of Media. The Commission on Elections shall extend the
right to vote under the local absentee voting system provided under existing laws and executive orders to
members of media, media practitioners, including the technical and support staff, who are duly registered
voters and who, on election day, may not be able to vote due to the performance of their functions in
covering and reporting on the elections: Provided, That they shall be allowed to vote only for the positions
of President, Vice President, Senators and Party-List Representative.
Section 3. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Commission on Elections shall, within thirty (30) days
from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate the implementing rules and regulations which shall include a
system of accreditation and verification of the members of media, media practitioners, the technical and
support staff, who are qualified to avail of local absentee voting.
Section 4. Appropriations. The initial funding of this Act shall be charged against the current year's
appropriations or from any available savings of the Commission on Elections. Thereafter, such amount as
may be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.
Section 5. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act shall be declared unconstitutional or
invalid, other provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 6. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, resolutions, rules and
regulations, other issuances, and parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
62

Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent
Drilons term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were supposedly
qualified to vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons associated with
petitioner Atienza sought to clarify their membership status and raised issues regarding the
composition of the NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas
II (Roxas) as the new LP president. Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza,
the incumbent party chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some members,
like petitioner Defensor, were given the status of guests during the meeting. Atienzas allies
allegedly raised these issues but respondent Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and
railroaded the proceedings and that there expulsion from the party was a violation on their
constitutional right on due process. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from
the party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their
constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and
the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them
from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent
of administrative proceedings and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid
down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations
o HELD:
Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its jurisdiction when
it ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality of their
expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership
controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings of the Court, they claim, categorically
upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party leadership disputes.[15]
But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the validity of the
expulsion of petitioners Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO
assembly that elected respondent Roxas as LP president. Given the COMELECs finding as
upheld by this Court that the membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP
Constitution, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the party validly expelled petitioners
cannot affect the election of officers that the NECO held.
While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members belong to their faction,
they did not specify who these members were and how their numbers could possibly affect
the composition of the NECO and the outcome of its election of party leaders. Atienza, et al.
has not bothered to assail the individual qualifications of the NECO members who voted for
Roxas. Nor did Atienza, et al. present proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then
assembled. In other words, the claims of Atienza, et al. were totally unsupported by evidence.
Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party
impacts on the party leadership issue or on the election of respondent Roxas as president so
that it was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the
circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion was purely a membership
issue that had to be settled within the party. It is an internal party matter over which the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are
generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC
may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by
the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections[16] that the COMELECs powers
and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of
the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court
also declared in another case[17] that the COMELECs power to register political parties
115

organization, a mere movement to hasten the achievement of the goals, and firmly established the gains of
the New Society, and so he cannot be said to have changed political party. 7
o Held:
We are satisfied that the COMELEC correctly adjudged its sufficiency to support its
conclusion that petitioner was disqualified from running as NP candidate for the position of
Mayor of Taytay, Rizal, by reason of violation of the constitutional provision expressly
prohibiting "turncoatism", 4 as well as PD 1661 against "guest candidates."
After Our ruling in Evasco and Gabatan, and finding striking similarity in the evidence upon
which We based Our finding of the existence of compliance with the substantial evidence
requirement for which We upheld the challenged resolutions of the COMELEC in those cases,
particularly the act of "resigning" from the KBL, in whose municipal committees they were
active members, an act obviously unnecessary unless petitioners feel that in joining the KBL
then, had taken to a distinct political aggrupation from the NP which remained as a distinct,
in dependent and active political party in the elections of 1978, for which COMELEC
accredited NP separately from the KBL, the conclusion seems inevitable that KBL had always
been a political party. Consequently, one who actively identified himself with the KBL, without
any reservation that he keeps intact his full status as an NP member, had joined the KBL as a
distinct aggrupation and ceased thereafter to be an NP. Double affiliation is intolerable under
a party system which is the very essence of the parliamentary form of government We have
adopted and have just started firmly to established.
The COMELEC's determination of whether the KBL was a political party from the inception
of its existence, distinct and separate from the NP is undoubtedly an exercise of its
constitutional power of administering the laws relative to the conduct of elections. This power
is exclusive. Unless its exercise is tainted with error correctible by certiorari which usually takes
the form of lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion, We should not disturb
the orders, resolutions or other acts of the COMELEC.
We must, therefore, declare that the Resolution of the COMELEC of January 19, 1980,
disqualifying petitioner and cancelling his certificate of candidacy suffers from no reversible
error or infirmity.
Atienza vs. COMELEC
o FACTS:
On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal
Party (LP), announced his partys withdrawal of support for the administration of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a
number of party members denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made the
announcement without consulting his party.
On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local
autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all
positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP
president. Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the partys
electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council
(NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP
Constitution, party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on
November 30, 2007.
On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution partially granting respondent
Drilons petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new
election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the
others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with
the Salonga Constitution.
114

Section 7. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Suffrage for Disabled and illiterate voters
1987 Constitution, Article V, Sections 2(1) And 2
-

Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance
of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the
Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

RA 10366, Section 11
-

SEC. 11. Assistance in the Accomplishment of the Ballot. A person with disability or senior citizen who is
illiterate or physically unable to prepare the ballot by himself or herself may be assisted in the preparation of
his or her ballot by a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree, or if he or she has
none, by any person of his or her confidence who belongs to the same household, or by any member of the
BEls. For this purpose, the person who usually assists the person with disability or senior citizen, such as a
personal assistant, a caregiver or a nurse shall be considered a member of his or her household: Provided,
That no voter shall be allowed to have an assistor on the basis of illiteracy or physical disability unless it is so
indicated in his or her registration record. Nevertheless, if the physical inability to prepare the ballot is
manifest, obvious, or visible, said voter shall be allowed to be assisted in accomplishing the ballot by a
qualified assistor, even if not stated or indicated in the registration record: Provided, further, That the
assistor must be of voting age.

The assistor shall hind himself or herself in a formal document under oath to fill out the ballot strictly in
accordance with the instructions of the voter and not to reveal the contents of the ballot prepared by him or
her, and shall prepare the ballot for the voter inside the voting booth. Except for the members of the BEIs,
no assistor can assist for more than three (3) times. Any violation of this provision shall constitute an
election offense punishable under Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.

RA 8189, Section 14
-

Section 14. Illiterate or Disabled Applicants. Any illiterate person may register with the assistance of the
Election Officer or any member of an accredited citizens arms. The Election Officer shall place such
illiterate person under oath, ask him the questions, and record the answers given in order to accomplish the
application form in the presence of the majority of the members of the Board. The Election Officer or any
member of an accredited citizens arm shall read the accomplished form aloud to the person assisted and ask
him if the information given is true and correct The accomplished form shall be subscribed by the applicant
in the presence of the Board by means of thumbmark or some other customary mark and it shall be
subscribed and attested by the majority of the members of the Board.

The attestation shall state the name of the person assisted, the name of the Election Officer or the member
of the accredited citizens arm who assisted the applicant, the fact that the Election Officer placed the
applicant under oath, that the Election Officer or the member of the accredited citizens arm who assisted
the applicant read the accomplished form to the person assisted, and that the person assisted affirmed its
truth and accuracy, by placing his thumbmark or some other customary mark on the application in the
presence of the Board.

63

The application for registration of a physically disabled person may be prepared by any relative within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity or by the Election Officer or any member of an accredited
citizens arm using the data supplied by the applicant. The fact of illiteracy or disability shall be so indicated
in the application.

Voters Registration, defined

RA 8189, sections 3(a)(g), 15 and 20
-

Section 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:

a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a
qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the
same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board;
g) Election Registration Board refers to the body constituted herein to act on all applications for
registration;
Section 15. Election Registration Board.There shall be in each city and municipality as many as Election
Registration Boards as there are election officers therein. In thickly populated cities/municipalities, the
Commission may appoint additional election officers for such duration as may be necessary.
The Board shall be composed of the Election Officer as chairman and as members, the public school
official most senior in rank and the local civil registrar, or in this absence, the city or municipal treasurer.
In case of disqualification of the Election Officer, the Commission shall designate an acting Election Officer
who shall serve as Chairman of the Election Registration Board. In case of disqualification or nonavailability of the Local Registrar or the Municipal Treasurer, the Commission shall designate any other
appointive civil service official from the same locality as substitute.
No member of the Board shall be related to each other or to any incumbent city or municipal elective
official within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. If in succeeding elections, any of the newly
elected city or municipal officials is related to a member of the board within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, such member is automatically disqualified to preserve the integrity of the Election
Registration Board.
Every registered party and such organizations as may be authorized by the Commission shall be entitled to a
watcher in every registration board.
Section 20. Approval and Disapproval of Application. The Election Officer shall submit to the Board all
applications for registration filed, together with the evidence received in connection therewith. The Board
shall, by majority vote, approve or disapprove the applications.
Upon approval, the Election Officer shall assign a voters identification number and issue the corresponding
identification card to the registered voter. If the Board disapproves the application, the applicant shall be
furnished with a certificate of disapproval stating the ground therefor. In cases of approval or disapproval,
any aggrieved party may file a petition for exclusion or inclusion, as the case may be, with the proper
Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court as provided for in this Act.

(Yra vs Abano)
Facts:
Respondent Maximo Abano is a native of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the proper age, he transferred to Manila to
study. While temporarily residing in Manila, Abano registered as a voter there. Shortly after qualifying as amember
of the bar and after the death of his father, Abano returned to Meycauayan to live there. From May 10, 1927, up to
present, Abano has considered himself a resident of Meycauayan. When 1928 elections were approaching, he made
an application for cancellation of registration in Manila dated April 3, 1928, but his application for cancellation was
rejected by the City officials for the reason that it was not deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928.
Nevertheless Abano presented himself as a candidate for Municipal president of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections
64

bar) shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may,
after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders,
decisions or rulings of the COMELEC.
Unavoidably, the COMELEC, prior to making its recommendation, must first satisfy itself that there
indeed has been an infraction of the law, or of its directives issued conformably therewith, by the
person administratively charged. It also stands to reason that it is the COMELEC, being in the best position
to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform or have performed in their duties, that should
conduct the administrative inquiry.
Observe, nevertheless, that the COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action
but that it is the executive department to which the charged official or employee belongs which has the
ultimate authority to impose the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detract from, but is congruent
with, the general administrative authority of the department of government concerned over its own personnel.
Power to register political parties and party-list
1987 Constitution, A9C, S2(5)
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms of the Commission
on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or
candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.
Santos vs. COMELEC
o FACTS:
The COMELEC in its challenged resolution, on a petition seeking petitioner's disqualification
filed by above-named private respondents, as NP candidate for Mayor of Taytay, Rizal, found
that " ... Santos changed his political party affiliation from the KBL as shown by the aforesaid
letter-resignation dated January 2, 1980 , wherein he was 'tendering my resignation
as MEMBER, Mun. Com. (Position) Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, Taytay, Rizal,' to the NP, his
present affiliation with the NP having been expressly admitted by him; that the NP, thru its
Acting President Jose J. Roy, initially revoked/withdrew the NP nomination in favor of Mr.
Manuel Santos and other candidates ... because they were members of good standing of the
KBL as of January 2, 1980 ... and in view also of 'the provisions of the Constitution against
turncoatism' and the provisions 'of recent Presidential Decree against Guest Candidates' (Exh.
G); and that the NP revoked respondent Santos' designation as Municipal Chairman of the
NP in the Municipality of Taytay (Exhs. 3 & 4), although later said respondent Santos was
chosen as the NP official candidate for Mayor of said municipality (Exh. 6), thereby violating
Section 10, Article XII (C) of the Constitution and Presidential Decree No. 1661, as amended.
Petitioner Santos, however, comes up with the contention that he has always been an NP and has never ceased
to be such, even when he joined the KBL and became a member of the KBL Municipal Committee of Taytay,
Rizal. He alleges with stress that KBL is not a political party when he joined it, but a mere umbrella
113

On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning
candidate for a congressional seat to represent the Second District of Davao City in the House of
Representatives.
Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning the
validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of
"unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass." Still pending is an administrative charge, the case now
before us, instituted in the COMELEC against the City Board of Canvassers, including herein petitioner, for
"Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross, Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service."
Petitioner moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him on the ground that he is the City
Prosecutor of Davao City. His office belongs to the executive branch of the government, more particularly to
the Department of Justice. As such, he is under the administrative jurisdiction of the said department and not of
respondent COMELEC. The COMELEC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
WON the petitioner is correct
Held: No!
The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually all encompassing
when it comes to election matters. In respect particularly to sanctions against election offenses, we quote:
"SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
"(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized or the imposition
of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision."
Additionally, Section 52, Article VII, of the Omnibus Election Code, provides:
"SEC. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and
honest elections, and shall:
"a. Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees,
including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government
required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMP Cadets
eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders.
"The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph from the
performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its
instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission,
the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such officers or employees
who may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation or failure."
It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner, taken cognizance of by, and still pending
with, the COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city
prosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and
control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law
enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the
conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and employees of government
carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided that upon the COMELEC's
recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (the Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at
112

and was elected by popular vote to that office. Petitioner Marcos Yra assails the elgivility of Abano on the ground
that he had not been a resident of Meycauayan for at least one year previous to the election.
Issue:
Is the non-elegibility of the respondent to hold a municipal office for the reason that he was not a qualified voter
in his municipality, connoting that he was not a qualified elector therein, sufficient to nullify his election?
Held: No!
One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy is that he must be a duly
qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term qualified when applied to a voter does not
necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not need
to register as an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of
the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the
Municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be voted for.
Furthermore, the law of Kentucky provides that no person shall be eligible to any office who is not at time of his
election a qualified voter of the city and who has not resided therein three years preceding his election. It was said
that the act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a
qualified voter. One may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer the
right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right. The distinction is between a qualified elector and
the respondent is such, and a registered qualified elector and the respondent is such although not in his home
municipality. Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. It
should not be forgotten that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their choice to be their local chief
executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate should be respected.
System of Continuing registration
RA 8189, Section 8
-

Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application of registration of
voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No
registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

Period of Registration
(Akbayan-Youth vs Comelec)
Facts:
Petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a
special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to
petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the
respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.
Acting on the petition, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 denying the request to conduct a two-day
additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC can be compelled to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period
between the COMELEC's imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections
Held: The petition is bereft of merit.
65

The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment
of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution,
statute books and other repositories of law.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
xxx

Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:

"SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES NOT
OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND
WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE
PLACE WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTIONS. NO LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE
REQUIREMENT SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE."
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural
requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be
qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is
obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
"Voter's Registration Act of 1996."
Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is
part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to
petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory
requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State
may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting
honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities
could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one which is not
indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
On the legal score, Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, which provides a system of continuing registration, is explicit, to wit:
"SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The Personal filing of application of registration of voters
shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall,
however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and
ninety (90) days before a special election."

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any
other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the
Government would be warranted only before the elections and only to ensure free, honest, orderly, peaceful and
credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There is nothing
in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a pinched and niggardly
interpretation of the authority of the Comelec to appoint as its deputies, officials or employees of other
agencies and instrumentalities of the government. The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of
election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an important sense, more important than
the maintenance of physical order in election precincts. Without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and
their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair
investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would
simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the Comelec had a bureaucracy many times larger than what it actually has.
Omnibus Election Code, Article VII, Section 52(b)
Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the powers and functions conferred
upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:
(b) During the period of the campaign and ending thirty days thereafter, when in any area of the country there are
persons committing acts of terrorism to influence people to vote for or against any candidate or political party, the
Commission shall have the power to authorize any member or members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
the National Bureau of Investigation, the Integrated National Police or any similar agency or instrumentality of the
government, except civilian home defense forces, to act as deputies for the purpose of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly and honest elections.
5. Recommendatory power

(Kabataan Partylist vs Comelec)

1987 Constitution, Article IX (c), Section 2(7) and (8)

FACTS:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan Party-List, seeks to extend the voters registration for the May 10, 2010
national and local elections from October 31, 2009, as fixed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8514, to January 9,
2010 which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of Section 8 of R.A. 8189 which reads: "The personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election."

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of
any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.

On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the
power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections; that Section 29 of
R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election acts which include voters
registration; and that the October 31, 2009 deadline was impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations,
citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.

Facts:

66

(Tan vs Comelec)
Petitioner, as incumbent City Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May 1992
synchronized national and local elections.
111

After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49,
Cataingan, Masbate, three criminal complaints. However, respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio proprio
dismissed the three (3) informations giving the following justification:
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines says:
'Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C). The Commission on Election shall exercise the following powers and functions:
x x x; investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions,
constituting election frauds offenses, malpractices.'
The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Big. 881) says:
'Sec. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the
same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government; Provided,
however, that in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the
complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Sec. 182, 1978, EC; and Sec. 66, B.P. 697)'
Consistently, and lately, in Corpu[s], et al. vs. Tanodbayan of the Philippines, et al, No. 62075, April 15, 1987, our
Supreme Court rules:
'An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to
place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any
person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether
the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and
not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the
same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all embracing power over the conduct of election.'
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, inasmuch as the election offense was not investigated and
prosecuted by the COMELEC, the case is motu proprio dismissed."[
Hence, the instant Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to fix the voter's registration beyond the prohibitive period set
forth by R.A. 8189.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
It held that the right of every Filipino to choose its leaders and participate to the fullest extent in every national or
local election is so zealously guarded by Article V of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during office hours,
except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. The Court
is bound to respect the determination of Congress that the 120 day or 90 day period, as the case may be, was
enough to make the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections and COMELEC's rule making
power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter's registration under R.A. 8189. R.A.
6646 and R.A. 8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix other period for pre-election activities only if the same
cannot be reasonable held within the period provided by law. However, this grant of power, is for the purpose of
enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage -- the common underlying policy under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646
and R.A. 8436.
In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that continuing voter's registration cannot be
reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189.
With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The court explained that if the petitioners had
only filed their petition, and sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive period, the prayer would have been
granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.
As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution fixing voters registration for the May 10, 2010
national and local elections on October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.
Registration, jurisdiction

Issue:

RA 8189, Section 15

WON the respondent judge is correct

Held: No!
Section 265 of this Code reads as follows:
"Sec. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the
same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing,
the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Sec. 182, 1973 EC; and Sec. 66, B.P. 697)" (Italics supplied)
We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation
of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the same time authorizes the
Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be compelled to carry out all its
functions directly and by itself alone:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
110

Section 15. Election Registration Board. There shall be in each city and municipality as many as Election
Registration Boards as there are election officers therein. In thickly populated cities/municipalities, the
Commission may appoint additional election officers for such duration as may be necessary.
The Board shall be composed of the Election Officer as chairman and as members, the public school
official most senior in rank and the local civil registrar, or in this absence, the city or municipal treasurer.
In case of disqualification of the Election Officer, the Commission shall designate an acting Election Officer
who shall serve as Chairman of the Election Registration Board. In case of disqualification or nonavailability of the Local Registrar or the Municipal Treasurer, the Commission shall designate any other
appointive civil service official from the same locality as substitute.
No member of the Board shall be related to each other or to any incumbent city or municipal elective
official within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. If in succeeding elections, any of the newly
elected city or municipal officials is related to a member of the board within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, such member is automatically disqualified to preserve the integrity of the Election
Registration Board.
67

Every registered party and such organizations as may be authorized by the Commission shall be entitled to a
watcher in every registration board.
Registration, qualifications, disqualifications, procedure

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be createdThe number of Members apportioned to the province out
of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increases, is geographically
located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made
within one hundred and twenty days before the election.

1987 Constitution, Article V, Section 1

Background of this Ordinance:

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in
the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Omnibus Election Code, Section 118

-

Sec. 118. Disqualifications. - The following shall be disqualified from voting:

(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one year,
such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty: Provided, however, That
any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon
expiration of five years after service of sentence.
(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or tribunal of having
committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition,
violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored to
his full civil and political rights in accordance with law: Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote
automatically upon expiration of five years after service of sentence.
(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

RA 8189, Sections 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14

-

Section 9. Who may Register. All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who are at
least eighteen (18) years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in
the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election, may
register as a voter.
Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his
occupation, profession, employment in private or public service, educational activities, work in the military
or naval reservations within the Philippines, service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National
Police Forces, or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law, shall not be
deemed to have lost his original residence.
Any person, who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or period of residence
but, who, on the day of the election shall possess such qualifications, may register as a voter.

Section 10. Registration of Voters. A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a
precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a
voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission
in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the
qualifications of a voter.
The application shall contain the following data:
a) Name, surname, middle name, and/or maternal surname;

The records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to resolve several prejudicial issues before authorizing
the first congressional elections under the 1987 Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the members of
the House of Representatives would be elected by district or by province; who shall undertake the apportionment of
the legislative districts; and, how the apportionment should be made.[14] Commissioner Davide, Jr., offered three
(3) options for the Commission to consider: (1) allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2)
empower the COMELEC to make the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the power by way of an
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the
correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one
assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, section 3 of
the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one
legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of
members (not municipalities.)
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the
municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the
Third District of Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an imbalance
in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This
imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as
his legal vehicle. The issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies
with Congress. Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion,
thus: "Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section."
4. Power to deputize other governmental agencies
1987 Constitution, Article IX (c), Section 2(4)
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(People vs Basilla)
Facts:
After the May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate, complaints for violations of Section 261 of the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Big. 881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate against the private
respondents.

b) Sex;
68

109

allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the
great objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with
its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court
should not interfere."

c) Date, and place of birth;

d) Citizenship;

(Montejo vs Comelec)

e) Civil status, if married, name of spouse;

Facts:

f) Profession, occupation or work;

Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of
Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of
equality of representation.

g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;

h) Exact address with the name of the street and house number for location in the precinct maps
maintained by the local office of the Commission, or in case there is none, a brief description of his
residence, sitio, and barangay;

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is
composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San
Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.

i) A statement that the applicant possesses all the qualifications of a voter;

Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1
enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran,
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein.

j) A statement that the applicant is not a registered voter of any precinct; and
k) Such information or data as may be required by the Commission.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. (The
conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a
consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran. A
further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population
of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of
Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and
other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it
transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to
the 3rd district of Leyte.

The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and legible
rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four (4) identification size copies of his latest
photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election Officer shall inform him of
the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it that the
accomplished application contains all the data therein required and that the applicants specimen signatures,
fingerprints, and photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the voters application.
-

Issue:

a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of not less than one (1)
year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any
person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon
expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence;

Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment is valid or not.
Held:

b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having
committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition,
violation of the firearms laws or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and
political rights in accordance with law: Provided, That he shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon
expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; and

Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the
major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after
the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative
districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power
of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled
"Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different
Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area." Said ordinance states that:
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the
reapportionment herein made.
108

Section 11. Disqualification. The following shall be disqualified from registering:

c) Insane or incompetent persons declared as such by competent authority unless subsequently declared by
proper authority that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.
-

Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. Any registered voter who has transferred
residence to another city or municipality may apply with the Election Officer of his new residence for the
transfer of his registration records.

69

The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements of notice and hearing and the
approval of the Election Registration Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon approval of the application
for transfer, and after notice of such approval to the Election Officer of the former residence of the voter,
said Election Officer shall transmit by registered mail the voters registration record to the Election Officer
of the voters new residence.
-

Section 13. Change of Address in the Same City or Municipality. Any voter who has changed his address in
the same city or municipality shall immediately notify the Election Officer in writing. If the change of
address involves a change in precinct, the Board shall transfer his registration record to the precinct book of
voters of his new precinct and notify the voter of his new precinct All changes of address shall be reported
to the office of the provincial election supervisor and the Commission in Manila.
Section 14. Illiterate or Disabled Applicants. Any illiterate person may register with the assistance of the
Election Officer or any member of an accredited citizens arms. The Election Officer shall place such
illiterate person under oath, ask him the questions, and record the answers given in order to accomplish the
application form in the presence of the majority of the members of the Board. The Election Officer or any
member of an accredited citizens arm shall read the accomplished form aloud to the person assisted and ask
him if the information given is true and correct The accomplished form shall be subscribed by the applicant
in the presence of the Board by means of thumbmark or some other customary mark and it shall be
subscribed and attested by the majority of the members of the Board.
The attestation shall state the name of the person assisted, the name of the Election Officer or the member
of the accredited citizens arm who assisted the applicant, the fact that the Election Officer placed the
applicant under oath, that the Election Officer or the member of the accredited citizens arm who assisted
the applicant read the accomplished form to the person assisted, and that the person assisted affirmed its
truth and accuracy, by placing his thumbmark or some other customary mark on the application in the
presence of the Board.
The application for registration of a physically disabled person may be prepared by any relative within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity or by the Election Officer or any member of an accredited
citizens arm using the data supplied by the applicant. The fact of illiteracy or disability shall be so indicated
in the application.

Residence

whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c)
narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the
guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with
respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the
basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private property.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the principal message in the twin
tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy.
Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the present law Section 3.3 of
Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 if applied to this case, will not pass
the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance from the
intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be
read by the general public and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of
speech with political consequences.
Powers not given
Pungutan vs Abubakar
Respondent Abubakar and the other candidates filed a petition alleging that in the towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and
Luuk, no elections were in effect held in view of massive violence, terrorism and fraud. The respondents named
therein, including now petitioner Pugutan, answered to the effect that the elections were duly held in the abovementioned municipalities and denied the allegation as to the existence of massive fraud, terrorism and serious
irregularities.
After reciting the relevant facts, respondent Commission concluded that the elections in said municipalities were
just as bad if not worse than the elections in Karomatan, Lanao del Norte. Actually no elections were held in said
municipalities as the voting was done by persons other than the registered voters while armed men went from
precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots and dictated how the election returns were to be prepared. The same
reasons which compelled the Commission to reject the returns from Karomatan and to consider said returns as no
returns at all or spurious or manufactured returns not one notch above returns prepared at gunpoint compel us with
much greater justification to find that the returns from Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk are spurious returns or
manufactured returns and no returns at all and that the elections in said municipalities are sham.
Hence, this petition.
Held: (Wa ko kasabot hanu gibutang ni sya under sa topic na Powers not given)

(Romualdez vs RTC)
Facts:
Philip G. Romualdez is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and a son of a former governor of Leyte Benjamin
Kokoy and sole nephew of First lady Imelda Marcos. He served as a barangay captain of the said place during
snap election in 1986.
He fled the country and went to U.S. and sought asylum, took special studies in the development of Leyte-Samar
with International business studies as well.
When Romualdez came back in the Philippines and run in National Congress the Commission on Election allowed
him to vote and have him registered on precinct 9 of Tolosa, Malbog Leyte where he had resided.

What is contemplated in the law is that the electors in the exercise of their free will can go to the polls and exercise
their right of suffrage, with the boards of inspectors crediting each candidate with the votes duly obtained after an
honest count. It is on that basis that election returns are to be made. Where no such election was in fact held as
was found by respondent Commission with respect to the four towns, it is not only justified but it is its clear duty to
stigmatize the alleged returns as clearly spurious and manufactured and therefore bereft of any value.
Clearly, there was care and circumspection to assure that the constitutional objective of insuring that an election be
"free, orderly and honest" be realized. If, under the circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion were arrived at,
then certainly there is a frustration of such an ideal. Moreover, this Court has not displayed any reluctance in
yielding the imprimatur of its approval to the action taken by respondent Commission in the discharge of its
constitutional function of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.

However, Advincula filed a petition questioning the registration of Romualdez to the said Municipality in MTC. The
former allege that Romualdez was not a resident of the said municipality because he leave the country and resided in
U.S. Massachussets. He just recently arrive here and didnt acquired 1 year residency here yet.

As was so well put by Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos: "The Commission on Elections is a
constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In
the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in
the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be

70

107

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their
pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech. Political speech enjoys preferred protection
within our constitutional order.

The MTC denied the petition of Advincula in the Registration of Romuladez on the said precinct and the right to
suffrage. But the RTC reverse the discretion and disqualified the voter registration of Romualdez favoring the
petitioner.
The respondent prayed that the MTCs discretion over questioning his right to suffrage will be affirmed.

Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable, the current controversy is
within the exceptions to the principle: (b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (g) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; or (k) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

ISSUE:

The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First, petitioners allege that the assailed
issuances violated their right to freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church and state. This is a
purely legal question. Second, the circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency of judicial intervention
considering the issue then on the RH Law as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of
administrative remedies in this case would be unreasonable.

Ruling:

Substantial Aspect
COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the
power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have
the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a noncandidate in this case.
Respondents cite Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with
the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
In Sanidad v. COMELEC, we held that the evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility
that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space
or radio or television time. This court found that [m]edia practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates, thus, their right to expression during
this period may not be regulated by COMELEC.
Similar to the media, petitioners in the case at bar are neither franchise holders nor candidates.
When private speech amounts to election paraphernalia
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or
who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a
social issue that the public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent
with the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those
that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which will not amount to an election
paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who
do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a
106

Whether or not Romualdez voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as
used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention".[19] "Domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends
to return.[20] That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established during the early 1980's to be at Barangay
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In
order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.[21] In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at
the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.[22]
The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly caused great
apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and welfare of the members of their
immediate families. Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is
understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be described as "voluntary", or as
"abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these terms are used in applying the concept of "domicile by
choice".
We have closely examined the records, and we find not that much to convince us that the petitioner had, in fact,
abandoned his residence in the Philippines and established his domicile elsewhere.
Deactivation, reactivation and cancellation of registration
RA 8189, section 27, 28, 29
-

Section 27. Deactivation of Registration. The board shall deactivate the registration and remove the
registration records of the following persons from the corresponding precinct book of voters and place the
same, properly marked and dated in indelible ink, in the inactive file after entering the cause or causes of
deactivation:
a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one (1)
year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any
person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon
expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence as certified by the clerks of courts of the
Municipal/Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan;
b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having
caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion,
sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless
restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law; Provided, That he shall regain his right to
vote automatically upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence;
71

c) Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent unless such disqualification has
been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent;
d) Any person who did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections as shown by their
voting records. For this purpose, regular elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections;
e) Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and
f) Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.
For this purpose, the clerks of court for the Municipal/Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial
Courts and the Sandiganbayan shall furnish the Election Officer of the city or municipality concerned at the
end of each month a certified list of persons who are disqualified under paragraph (a) hereof, with their
addresses. The Commission may request a certified list of persons who have lost their Filipino Citizenship
or declared as insane or incompetent with their addresses from other government agencies.
The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a certified list of those persons whose
registration were deactivated and the reasons therefor, and furnish copies thereof to the local heads of
political parties, the national central file, provincial file, and the voter concerned.
-

Section 28. Reactivation of Registration. Any voter whose registration has been deactivated pursuant to the
preceding Section may file with the Election Officer a sworn application for reactivation of his registration
in the form of an affidavit stating that the grounds for the deactivation no longer exist any time but not later
than one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
The Election Officer shall submit said application to the Election Registration Board for appropriate action.
In case the application is approved, the Election Officer shall retrieve the registration record from the
inactive file and include the same in the corresponding precinct book of voters. Local heads or
representatives of political parties shall be properly notified on approved applications.

By agreeing to submit his position paper for the resolution of the appeal, petitioner effectively agreed to dispense
with the formality of a hearing, the purpose or objective of which was better subserved by the submission of the
position papers where the parties could incorporate all that they wanted to place on record; a formal hearing may
not adequately achieve such purpose because of the time constraints, the unpreparedness of counsel, the emotions
of the moment and the distracting atmosphere.
Having thus made such findings, it was well within the power of the Commission, through the First Division, to
determine what must be done to ascertain the elusive "true and genuine results of the votes casts (sic) for provincial
and municipal candidates in Madamba."
(Diocese of Bacolod vs Comelec)
Facts:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on
the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH Law
referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject
of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH)
Team Buhay with acheck mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those
who voted against it form Team Buhay.
COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.

Section 29. Cancellation of Registration. The Board shall cancel the registration records of those who have
died as certified by the Local Civil Registrar. The Local Civil Registrar shall submit each month a certified
list of persons who died during the previous month to the Election Officer of the place where the deceased
are registered. In the absence of information concerning the place where the deceased is registered, the list
shall be sent to the Election Officer of the city or municipality of the deceaseds residence as appearing in
his death certificate. In any case, the Local Civil Registrar shall furnish a copy of this list to the national
central file and the proper provincial file.

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case
through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order.

The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a list of those persons who died whose
registrations were cancelled, and furnish copies thereof to the local heads of the political parties, the national
central file, and the provincial file.

Procedural Aspect

RA 10367, Section 7
-

Callar report on that ground. Petitioner purposely omitted such argument because he knew only too well that the
Callar report is an official act of an officer of the COMELEC made after an investigation conducted in the
performance of a lawful official duty. It thus enjoys the presumption of regularity.[24] Besides, by the parties'
compliance with the aforesaid paragraph (e), Section 8, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitioner
was estopped from objecting to the admission in evidence of the Callar report, in effect leaving to the PBC -- and
then the First Division of the COMELEC on appeal -- the determination of the factual issue concerning the validity
of the COC in question.

Section 7. Deactivation. - Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated pursuant to this Act.

RA 8189, Section 18, 20, 32, 33, 34

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Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec violated the petitioners right to freedom of expression
Held:
Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies because
petitioners should have first brought the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or any of its divisions.
The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable
relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the election offense against
petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right.
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The PBC unanimously decided not to include in the count/canvass the Certificate of Canvass of Madamba said
having been substituted and spurious. This ruling is based primarily on the Investigation Report of Atty. Clarita
Callar who was directed by the Chairman of the PBC to investigate the Madamba incident.

Section 18. Challenges to Right to Register. Any voter, candidate or representative of a registered political
party may challenge in writing any application for registration, stating the grounds therefor. The challenge
shall be under oath and be attached to the application, together with the proof of notice of hearing to the
challenger and the applicant.
Oppositions to contest a registrants application for inclusion in the voters list must, in all cases, be filed not
later than the second Monday of the month in which the same is scheduled to be heard or processed by the
Election Registration Board. Should the second Monday of the month fall on a non-working holiday,
oppositions may be filed on the next following working day. The hearing on the challenge shall be heard on
the third Monday of the month and the decision shall be rendered before the end of the month.

Section 20. Approval and Disapproval of Application. The Election Officer shall submit to the Board all
applications for registration filed, together with the evidence received in connection therewith. The Board
shall, by majority vote, approve or disapprove the applications.
Upon approval, the Election Officer shall assign a voters identification number and issue the corresponding
identification card to the registered voter. If the Board disapproves the application, the applicant shall be
furnished with a certificate of disapproval stating the ground therefor. In cases of approval or disapproval,
any aggrieved party may file a petition for exclusion or inclusion, as the case may be, with the proper
Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court as provided for in this Act.

Section 32. Common Rules Governing Judicial, Proceedings in the Matter of Inclusion, Exclusion, and
Correction of Names of Voters.

Petitioner filed an appeal to the comelec. Instead of assigning the appeal and the related cases to a Division
pursuant to pertinent provisions of its Rules,[10] the COMELEC en banc took cognizance thereof and set the case
for hearing on 6 August 1992. At the said hearing, the parties, through their respective counsels, upon suggestion of
the COMELEC en banc, agreed to submit their respective Position Papers.
Taking heed of Our Resolution of 6 August 1992 in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections, et al. (G.R. No.
105628) and companion cases, the COMELEC raffled the case. And the First Division got it. On 18 September
1992, the First Division promulgated a joint Resolution in these consolidated cases affirming the PBC's ruling.
On 23 September 1992, petitioner filed a Motion For Reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc promulgated the
challenged Resolution[20] affirming the Resolution of the First Division and finding the errors imputed to the latter
to be without merit. As to the report of Atty. Callar, the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of North Cotabato,
the COMELEC held that the same was prepared in the performance of official duty, per instruction of COMELEC
Regional Director Teresita Llaban, and is therefore presumed to have been performed with regularity. The
COMELEC further stated that it "would be so absurd for this Commission to have its field personnel perform their
task and at the same time question their actuations."
Issue:
WON the Comelec deprived the petitioner due process when it resolved the appeal from the ruling of the PBC of
Lanao del Sur without any semblance of a hearing to assess the factual findings of said PBC and merely on the basis
of the report of Atty. Callar who was never interviewed, questioned or interrogated by the COMELEC.

a) Petition for inclusion, exclusion or correction of names of voters shall be filed during office hours;
b) Notice of the place, date and time of the hearing of the petition shall be served upon the members of the
Board and the challenged voter upon filing of the petition. Service of such notice may be made by sending a
copy thereof by personal delivery, by leaving it in the possession of a person of sufficient discretion in the
residence of the challenged voter, or by registered mail. Should the foregoing procedures not be practicable,
the notice shall be posted in the bulletin board of the city or municipal hall and in two (2) other conspicuous
places within the city or municipality;
c) A petition shall refer only to one (1) precinct and implead the Board as respondents;
d) No costs shall be assessed against any party in these proceedings. However, if the court should find that
the application has been filed solely to harass the adverse party and cause him to incur expenses, it shall
order the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses;
e) Any voter, candidate or political party who may be affected by the proceedings may intervene and present
his evidence;
f) The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no case rendered upon a stipulation of facts.
If the question is whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day set for hearing
shall be prima facie evidence that the challenged voter is fictitious; and
g) The petition shall be heard and decided within ten (10) days from the date of its filing. Cases appealed to
the Regional Trial Court shall be decided within ten (10) days from receipt of the appeal. In all cases, the
court shall decide these petitions not later than fifteen (15) days before the election and the decision shall
become final and executory.

Held:
We find no merit in the petition.
Before the subject cases were raffled off to the First Division, the parties, upon the suggestion of the
COMELEC en banc, agreed to submit the appeals on the basis of their position papers. Petitioner
extensively discussed in his position paper the issues raised and the evidence to support the latter's thesis that the
COC in question is clean, clear, authentic and duly signed and executed. Thus, the factual issue raised at that point
was whether the questioned COC is spurious or not -- a question which must be resolved on the basis of the
evidence adduced by the parties before the PBC pursuant to paragraph (e), Section 9, Rule 27 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
The records do not disclose that the petitioner had moved before either the COMELEC en banc or its First
Division that he be allowed to present new evidence on the ground that he was deprived of due process by the
PBC. In any case, he could not have done that because the PBC had in fact allowed him to present his evidence.
That he was not allowed to cross-examine Atty. Callar did not in any way whittle down the validity of the
proceedings of the PBC for paragraph (e), Section 8, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that:
"(e) Where evidence is to be offered, reception thereof shall be done summarily. Oral testimonies shall be dispensed
with and the parties shall be required to present their affidavits or counter-affidavits within twenty-four (24) hours
from the presentation of the written objection. The evidence adduced shall form part of the proceedings of the
Board."
The PBC faithfully complied with the mandate of this provision; moreover, the parties voluntarily and
unconditionally observed the same by submitting their evidence which included the affidavits of their respective
witnesses.
It is precisely for this reason, and his awareness of the legal consequences thereof, that the petitioner carefully
avoided characterizing the Callar report as "hearsay". Nowhere in his pleadings are We to find any objections to the
104

Section 33. Jurisdiction in Inclusion and Exclusion Case. The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective
cities or municipalities. Decisions of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the
aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise,
said decision shall become final and executory. The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten
(10) days from the time it is received and the decision shall immediately become final and executory. No
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
73

Section 34. Petition for Inclusion of Voters in the List. Any person whose application for registration has
been disapproved by the Board or whose name has been stricken out from the list may file with the court a
petition to include his name in the permanent list of voters in his precinct at any time except one hundred
five (105) days prior to a regular election or seventy-five (75) days prior to a special election. It shall be
supported by a certificate of disapproval of his application and proof of service of notice of his petition
upon the Board. The petition shall be decided within fifteen (15) days after its filing.
If the decision is for the inclusion of voters in the permanent list of voters, the Board shall place the
application for registration previously disapproved in the corresponding book of voters and indicate in the
application for registration the date of the order of inclusion and the court which issued the same.

(Kabataan partylist vs comelec)

2) G.R. No. 105725 SPC No. 92-323

3) G.R. No. 105727 SPC No. 92-288
4) G.R. No. 105730 SPC No. 92-315
5) G.R. No. 105771 SPC No. 92-271
6) G.R. No. 105778 SPC No. 92-039
7) G.R. No. 105797 SPC No. 92-153
8) G.R. No. 105919 SPC No. 92-293
9) G.R. No. 105977 SPC No. 92-087

FACTS:

Issue:

RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new
voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of
biometric technology.
RA 10367 likewise directs that registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit
themselves for validation. Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated x x x.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013. Among others,
the said Resolution provides that: the registration records of voters without biometrics data who failed to submit
for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections shall be deactivated.
Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation
requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related
thereto.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional requirement of
literacy and property.
2.
Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on October 31, 2015 violates
Section 8 of RA 8189.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.

Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first
referring them to any of it Divisions.
Held:
The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals
of petitioners in the above mentioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3,
subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending
before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.
A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of
its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in order. However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that
all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office
involved. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions commenced at noon of
June 30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and such a resolution would only be an exercise in futility.
Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular
elections protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions
have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed suspended by the
pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court.

The Court held that biometrics validation is not a qualification to the exercise of the right of suffrage,
but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate.

(Pangarungan vs Comelec)

The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The process of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to
vote.

Petitioner and the private respondent were candidates for the Office of the Provincial Governor of Lanao del Sur in
the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992.

Thus, although one is deemed to be a qualified elector, he must nonetheless still comply with the
registration procedure in order to vote.
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other
substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution -that is, one which propagates a socio74

Facts:

During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass for provincial offices by the Provincial Board of Canvassers
(PBC) of Lanao del Sur,[6] private respondent objected to the inclusion of Certificate of Canvass of the
Municipality of Madamba, Lanao del Sur; petitioner opposed this move. Consequently, both parties submitted their
evidence to the PBC.
103

(Domino vs Comelec)

economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a persons ability to intelligently cast his vote and to
further the public good -the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.

Facts:
Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative district
of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1
year and 2 months.
Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino,
contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the
province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of
representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency
requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voters
Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.

SECOND ISSUE: No
Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:
System of Continuing Registration of Voters. x x x No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regularelection and ninety (90) days before a special election.
The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive period beyond
which voter registration may no longer be conducted. The subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to
conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period which may not be reduced, but may be
extended depending on the administrative necessities and other exigencies.
Inclusion and exclusion proceedings
RA 8189, Sections 24, 32, 33, 34 and 35

Issue:
Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner

Held:
DOMINO's contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of merit.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction
over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after
election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate
facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes[38] and provided further that the
winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office.[39]
It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as
provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives.[40]
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate.[41] A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be
considered a member of the House of Representatives.
In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional District of the
Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of
the election ordering the suspension of DOMINO's proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes.
This resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying
DOMINO as candidate for the position.
Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional
District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representative.
Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his
ineligibility as a candidate.
(Sarmiento vs Comelec)
This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of Respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in the following Special Cases:
1) G.R. No. 105628 SPC No. 92-266

Section 24. National Central File.There shall be a national central file under the custody of the Commission
in Manila consisting of the third copies of all approved voter registration records in each city or
municipality. It shall be compiled by precinct in each city/municipality and arranged alphabetically by
surname so as to make the file a replica of the book of voters in the possession of the Election Officer.
Thereafter a national list shall be prepared following the alphabetical arrangements of surnames of voters.
There shall be a national file consisting of the computerized voters list (CVL), both in print and in diskette,
submitted by the Election Officers in each city and municipality concerned, under the custody of the
Commission in Manila.
The computerized voters list shall make use of a single and uniform computer program that will have a
detailed sorting capability to list voters alphabetically by the precincts where they vote, by the barangays,
municipalities, cities or provinces where they reside and by their voters identification number (VIN)

1987 Constitution, Article IX (C), Section 2(3)

-

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
o (3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.

(Pungutan vs Abubakar)
Facts:
The Comelec excluded from the canvass for the election of delegates for the lone district of the province of Sulu
the returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for
being spurious or manufactured and therefore no returns at all. Unless set aside then, petitioner Abdulgafar
Pugutan, who otherwise would have been entitled to the last remaining seat for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, there being no question as to the election of the other two delegates,[3] would lose out to respondent
Benjamin Abubakar. Petitioner would thus dispute the power of respondent Commission to exclude such returns
as a result of oral testimony as well as the examination of the fingerprints and signatures of those who allegedly
voted as the basis for the holding that no election in fact did take place.
Issue:
WON the Comelec has the power to disregard and annul the alleged returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56
precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious or manufactured.
Held: The Comelec has such power.

102

75

The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee of the utmost significance. It is a right without which
the principle of sovereignty residing in the people becomes nugatory. How such a right is to be exercised is
regulated by the Election Code. Its enforcement under the Constitution is, as noted, vested in respondent
Commission. Such a power, however, is purely executive or administrative. So it was characterized by the Chief
Justice in Abcede vs. Imperial: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department although independent of the
President to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely
'administrative questions.'
It becomes obvious then why the right to vote, a denial of which should find redress in the judiciary as the guardian
of constitutional rights, is excluded from the authority vested in respondent Commission. If the exclusion of the
returns from the four towns in Sulu involved a question as to such a right, then, clearly, what the Commission did
was beyond its competence. Such is not the case however. What is deemed outside such a sphere is the
determination of whether or not a person can exercise or is precluded from exercising the right of suffrage. Thus,
the question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters is properly judicial. As to whether or not an election
has been held is a question of a different type. It is properly within the administrative jurisdiction of respondent
Commission. If, as is our decision, no such voting did take place, considering the massive irregularities that
attended it in the four towns, then the exclusion of the alleged returns is not tainted by infirmity. In that sense, the
second issue raised by petitioner that in so acting the respondent Commission exceeded its constitutional power by
encroaching on terrain properly judicial, the right to vote being involved, is likewise to be resolved against him.
(Domino vs Comelec)
Facts:
DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the
Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he
seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election.
However, private respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy alleging that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much
less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he
has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. In his defense, DOMINO presented before the COMELEC the
decision of the exclusion proceeding in MTC declaring him as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of
Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission
on Elections
Held:
The decision of the MTC is not final and binding to the Comelec.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to
deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the
competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the
certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of
DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction, does
not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the
issue of compliance with the residency requirement.
76

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
(Lambino vs Comelec)
Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of
Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameralpresidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate
to implement the initiative petitions.
Held:
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The
third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to
"[A]mendments to this Constitution."
The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of
the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose
revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only
amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the
people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments.
In this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions
of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
3. Power to decide all questions affecting elections
1987 Constitution, Article IX (c), Section 2(3)
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
101

Revision defined
1987 Constitution, Article XVII, Section 1
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
(Lambino vs Comelec)
Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of
Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameralpresidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate
to implement the initiative petitions.
Held:
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The
proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people
should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.

The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the
factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than
the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although
the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised
including the questions of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in
or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily caries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential
to the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded
therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion
or inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.[13] In this sense,
it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the
proceeding.[14] Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter's political
status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.[15]
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a
resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from Precinct
No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is
not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident
of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the
right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the
precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power
to order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for it is the function of the
election Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189.[17] The only effect of the decision of
the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the Election Registration Board, upon
receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter's registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter
the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file.
Nature of voters registration records
RA 8189, section 41
-

Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the UnicameralParliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can
answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be
undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature
sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating
the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the
Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or revisions.
The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an
initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the
proposed changes.
Amendment defined

Section 41. Examination of Registration Records. All registration records/computerized voters list in the
possession of the Election officer, the Provincial Election Supervisor, and the Commission in Manila shall,
during regular office hours, be open to examination by the public for legitimate inquiries on election related
matters, free from any charge or access fee.
Law enforcement agencies may, upon prior authorization and subject to regulations promulgated by the
Commission, have access to said registration records should the same be necessary to and in aid of their
investigative functions and duties.

RA 10367, Section 9
-

Section 9. Database Security. - The database generated by biometric registration shall be secured by the
Commission and shall not be used, under any circumstance, for any purpose other than for electoral
exercises.

Comelec Minute Resolution no. 13-1132, October 17, 2013

This pertains to the Memorandum dated October 12, 2013 of Executive Director Jose M. Tolentino, Jr. relative to
the requests of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and the Office of the President (OP) for voters' registration data.
The Memorandum of Executive Director Tolentino reads:
"Pending for appropriate action by the Office of the Executive Director (OED) are two (2) requests for voters'
registration data coming from the:

1987 Constitution, Article XVII, Section 1

100

77

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) - for use in the applications for Tax Identification Numbers with the Bureau of
International Revenue, Legazpi City, Albay, in connection with the consolidation of titles to properties acquired by
the BSP; and
Office of the President (OP) - to facilitate the sending of notices and reminders to former officers and employees of
the OP pertaining to cash advances that remain unliquidated to date.
OP's request was filed with the office of the Chairman, and forwarded to the OED which, however, could not act
favorably thereon because said request does not fall under any of the conditions prescribed for the issuance of
voter's information, namely:
The voter himself, or his duly authorized representative, requests for the same;
An Order is issued by a court or tribunal requiring such information; or
The information shall be used in a formal investigation conducted by a law enforcement agency, whose request
must specify the purpose/details thereof.
While, generally, the Commission En Banc may provide exemptions to the above conditions, complicating the
matter is BSP's request filed directly with our Information Technology Department, which sought clarification from
the OED if the same may be acted upon favorably due to the proscription under Section 9 of Republic Act No.
10367 (Mandatory Biometrics Laws) that 'the database generated by biometric registration shall be secured by the
Commission and shall not be used under any circumstance for any purpose other than for electoral exercises.'
As the existing policy on requests for voter's registration data was adopted prior to the passage of RA 10367,
Minute Resolutions Numbered 09-0595 and 12-0469 - which allow law enforcement agencies to request for voter's
registration data in connection with their official investigative functions - will have to be declared ineffective in
order to comply with RA 10367.
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that:
Minute Resolutions Numbered 09-0595 and 12-0469 be declared ineffective, and a new Resolution be promulgated
prescribing that requests for voter's registration data may be granted only if:

Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore invalid, on two main
grounds: (1) that the resolution approved the Petition for Recall albeit same was signed by just one person in
violation of the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the number of signatures supporting and petition for
recall; and (2) that the resolution scheduled the recall election within one (1) year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay
Elections.
Issue:
WON the call of recall election is proper
Held:
Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that recall of any elective x x x municipal x
x x official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be
recalled was elected. The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall proceedings: only a petition of at
least 25% of the total number of registered voters, may validly initiate recall proceedings. We take careful note of
the phrase, petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) and point out that the law does not state that the petition
must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters; rather, the petition must be of or by, at least 25% of the
registered voters, i.e., the petition must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters. This is understandable, since the signing of the petition is statutorily required to be undertaken
before the election registrar or his representative, and in the presence of a represetantive of the official sought to be
recalled, and in public place in the x x x municipality x x x.[17] Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet
contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters, the petition must contain the names
of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose behalf only one person may sign the petition in the
meantime.
We cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition by a number of people less than the foregoing
25% statutory requirement, much less, the filing thereof by just one person, as in the instant case, since this is
indubitably violative of clear and categorical provisions of subsisting law.

After due deliberation, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the foregoing
recommendation of Executive Director Jose M. Tolentino, Jr. as follows:

Our legislators did not peg the voter requirement at 25% out of caprice or in a vacuum. They knew that this is the
requirement under a majority of the constitution and recall statutes in various American states to the same extent
that they were aware of the rationale therefor. While recall was intended to be an effective and speedy remedy to
remove an official who is not giving satisfaction to the electorate regardless of whether or not he is discharging his
full duty to the best of his ability and as his conscience dictates,[18] it is a power granted to the people who, in
concert, desire to change their leaders for reasons only they, as a collective, can justify. In other words, recall must
be pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a small percentage of disenchanted
electors. Otherwise, its purposes as a direct remedy of the people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few
among them whose selfish resort to recall would destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of
government.

To set aside Minute Resolutions Nos. 09-0595 and 12-0469; and

Referendum defined

That requests for voter's registration data may be granted only if:

RA 6735, Section 3(c)

The voter himself, or his duly authorized representative, requests for the same; or

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

An Order is issued by a court or tribunal exclusively for use in electoral cases pending before it.

(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for
the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

The voter himself, or his duly authorized representative, requests for the same; or
An Order is issued by a court or tribunal exclusively for use in electoral cases pending before it.
The subject requests of the BSP and the OP be denied.
Respectfully submitted."

RESOLVED, moreover, to advise the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and the Office of the President (OP) that
the Commission is constrained to deny their requests for voters' registration data, in view of the proscription under
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10367, entitled: "An Act providing for Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration",
which reads:

78

c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted
by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
99

RA 9244, Section 3
SEC. 3. All pending petitions for recall initiated through the Preparatory Recall Assembly shall be considered
dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.

"Section 9. Database Security. - The database generated by biometric registration shall be secured by the
Commission and shall not be use, under any circumstance, for any purpose other than for electoral exercises."
Let the Executive Director implement this Resolution.

Comelec Resolution no. 7505, June 6, 2005 (To be searched)

SO ORDERED.

(Paras vs Comelec)

Annulment of list of voters

Facts:

RA 8189, Sections 33 and 39

Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995, A petition
for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC resolved to approve
the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioners opposition, COMELEC
deferred the election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the
petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary
hearing, the court dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date
January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The
petitioner argues the pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: no recall shall take place within one
(1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was set on
the first Monday of May 1996.

Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local
Government Code.
Held:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. Paras interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not accord with the
intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it
was held that the regular local election refers to an election where the office held by the local elective official
sought to be recalled.
(Angobung vs Comelec)
Facts:
Petitioner won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local elections of 1995.
Private respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said elections.
Sometime in early September, 1996, private respondent filed with the Local Election Registrar, a Petition for
Recall[3] against petitioner. Subsequently said petition was forwarded to the main office of COMELEC in Manila,
for approval.
Acting on the petition, Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson submitted to the COMELEC En
Banc, a Memorandum recommending approval of the petition for recall filed by private respondent and its signing
by other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of the total number of registered voters as required by
Section 69(d) of the Local Government code of 1991.
In turn acting on the abovementioned Memorandum of Deputy Executive Director Joson, the COMELEC en banc
issued the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951.

98

Section 33. Jurisdiction in Inclusion and Exclusion Case. The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective
cities or municipalities. Decisions of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the
aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise,
said decision shall become final and executory. The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten
(10) days from the time it is received and the decision shall immediately become final and executory. No
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Section 39. Annulment at Book of Voters. The Commission shall, upon verified petition of any voter or
election officer or duly registered political party, and after notice and hearing, annul any book of voters that
is not prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act or was prepared through fraud, bribery,
forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any similar irregularity, or which contains data that are
statistically improbable. No order, ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed within
ninety (90) days before an election.

(Ututalum vs Comelec)
Petitioner Ututalum and private respondent, Arden S. Anni, were among the candidates in the last 30 May 1987
Congressional elections for the Second District of Sulu. The election returns from Siasi showed that Petitioner
Ututalum obtained four hundred and eighty-two (482) votes while respondent Anni received thirty-five thousand
five hundred and eighty-one (35,581) votes out of the thirty-nine thousand eight hundred and one (39,801)
registered voters (pp. 13, 187, ). If the returns of Siasi were excluded, Petitioner Ututalum would have a lead of
5,301 votes.
During the canvass of votes, Petitioner Ututalum, without availing of verbal objections, filed written objections to
the returns from Siasi on the ground that they "appear to be tampered with or falsified" owing to the "great excess
of votes" appearing in said returns. He then claimed that multiplying the 42 precincts of Siasi by 300 voters per
precinct, there should have been only 12,600 registered voters and not 36,663 voters who cast their votes, thereby
exceeding the actual authorized voters by 23,947 "ghost voters." He then prayed for the exclusion from the canvass
of any election returns from Siasi.
Issue:
WON the election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the results
Held:
It is our considered view, however, that given the factual setting, it can not justifiably be contended that the Siasi
returns, per se, were "obviously manufactured" and, thereby, a legitimate issue in a pre-proclamation controversy. It
is true that in Lagumbay vs. COMELEC, relied upon heavily by Petitioner Ututalum, this Court ruled that the
returns are obviously manufactured where they show a great excess of votes over what could have been legally cast.
The Siasi returns, however, do not show prima facie that on the basis of the old List of Voters, there is actually a
great excess of votes over what could have been legally cast considering that only 36,000 persons actually voted out
of the 39,801 voters. Moreover, the Lagumbay case dealt with the "manufacture" of returns by those charged with
79

their preparation as shown prima facie on the questioned returns themselves. Not so in this case which deals with
the preparation of the registry list of voters, a matter that is not reflected on the face of said returns.

(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be
composed of the following:

Basically, therefore, petitioner's cause of action is the padding of the Siasi List of Voters, which, indeed, is not a
listed ground for a pre-proclamation controversy.

(1) Provincial level. - All mayors, vice-mayors, and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities;

As pointed out in Espaldon vs. COMELEC, L-78987, 25 August 1987:

"Padded voters list, massive fraud, and terrorism are clearly not among the issues that may be raised in a preproclamation controversy. They are proper grounds for an election protest."
But petitioner insists that the new Registry List should be considered and applied by the COMELEC as the legal
basis in determining the number of votes which could be legally cast in Siasi. To allow the COMELEC to do so
retroactively, however, would be to empower it to annul a previous election because of the subsequent annulment
of a questioned registry in a proceeding where petitioner himself was not a party. This cannot be done.
Besides, the List of Voters used in the 1987 Congressional elections was then a validly existing and still
unquestioned permanent Registry List. Then, it was the only legitimate roster which could be used as basis for
voting. There was no prior petition to set it aside for having been effected with fraud, intimidation, force, or any
other similar irregularity in consonance with Section 145 of the Omnibus Election Code.[1] That list must then be
considered conclusive evidence of persons who could exercise the right of suffrage in a particular election.
Moreover, the preparation of a voters' list is not proceeding before the Board of Canvassers. A pre-proclamation
controversy is limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers, not the Board of Election Inspectors
and such challenges should relate to specified election returns against which petitioner should have made specific
verbal objections, but did not.
(Sarangani vs Comelec)
This case involves two rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, signed by only two of its members. The
rulings excluded Certificates of Canvass from the municipalities of Wao and Bubong on the ground that they were
manufactured and falsified. Consequently, the COMELEC directed an investigation to be conducted on the two
members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for any culpable violation of the election laws which they might
have committed by the following acts: (1) their failure to appear on the scheduled hearings/meetings in the instant
cases after the suspension of the canvass despite their assurances and legal duty to do so; (2) their having issued the
alleged written rulings excluding the COCs from Wao and Bubong without giving the Vice-Chairman the
opportunity to participate and take part in the deliberations; and (3) their unprecedented act of deliberating and/or
issuing the written rulings by themselves and of clandestinely submitting or turning over the said rulings to the
Office of the COMELEC Secretary for promulgation without setting any hearing or giving notice to the ViceChairman and/or to the herein parties.
The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the COMELEC during its investigation that the alleged tampering and
falsification in the Certificates of Canvass were duly accounted for and did not affect the integrity of the ballot.
In a pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not required to look beyond or
behind the election returns which are on their face regular and authentic. Where a party seeks to raise issues the
resolution on which would necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which are prima facie
regular, the proper remedy would be a regular election protest and not a pre-proclamation controversy.

(2) City level. - All punong barangay and sanggunian barangay members in the city;
(3) Legislative District level. - In case where sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all elective
municipal officials in the district; and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod members are elected by district, all
elective barangay officials in the district; and
(4) Municipal level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality.
(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a public place and initiate a
recall proceedings against any elective official in the local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or
municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the
preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose.
(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may also be validly initiated upon petition of
at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned
during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected.
(1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his representative, and in the presence of
a representative of the petitioner and a representative of the official sought to be recalled and, and in a public place
in the province, city, municipality, or barangay, as the case may be, shall be filed with the COMELEC through its
office in the local government unit concerned. The COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall cause the
publication of the petition in a public and conspicuous place for a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more
than twenty (20) days, for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness of the petition and the required
percentage of voters.
(2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall announce the
acceptance of candidates to the position and thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name
of the official sought to be recalled.
Section 71. Election on Recall. - Upon the filing of a valid resolution or petition for recall with the appropriate local
office of the COMELEC, the Commission or its duly authorized representative shall set the date of the election on
recall, which shall not be later than thirty (30) days after the filing of the resolution or petition for recall in the case
of the barangay, city, or municipal officials. and forty-five (45) days in the case of provincial officials. The official or
officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the
pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
Section 72. Effectivity of Recall. - The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and
proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the
election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is
thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.
Section 73. Prohibition from Resignation. - The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to
resign while the recall process is in progress.
Section 74. Limitations on Recall. -

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Composition, qualifications and terms of office

(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.

1987 Constitution, Article IX (C), sections 1(1) and (2)

80

97

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the
Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural
requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the most
fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to send notices
of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings. 2) Whether or not the
procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal
protection of the law.

Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Held:

(Cayetano vs Monsod)

1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive
right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone
a single mode, of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for
Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective
mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of
recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted
discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the
former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal
reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish
the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman
of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in
Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and
component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not
apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the
preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned.
Considering their number, the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec.
69 of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the
people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as
representatives of the people.
By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political party affiliation.
Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to
the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating
against local officials belonging to the minority. Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation
of the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that
notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The
law also requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a
public place. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid
resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.
Local Government Code of 1991, sections 69, 70, 71, 72, 73 and 74
Section 69. By Whom Exercised. - The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered
voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit
to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
96

Issue: Whether the respondent does not possess the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and
the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the
petition is DISMISSED.
(Brillantes vs Yorac)
The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate Commissioner Haydee
B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had
been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d'etat attempt.
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal
matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines
violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting
Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.
Issue:
81

Whether or not the President has the power to designate an acting chairman of the Comelec
Held:
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
"independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the
Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own
proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions,
orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article
IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That
discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. No
cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as
Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time
and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be
estopped from challenging its withdrawal.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill
the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This is still a government of laws and
not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for presidential action.
The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the
participation of the President, however well-meaning.
Disabilities, inhibitions and disqualifications
1987 Constitution, Article IX (A), Section 2
-

Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or
control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be
financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by
the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Independence
1987 constitution Article IX(A), sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
-

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission,
the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or
control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be
financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by
the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Section. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure.
Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with
law.
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
82

alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For
following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative
to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be
"ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign
there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal
itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people
must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise,
it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen
the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.[19]
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in
their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially
explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present
favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or
their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.
(Garcia vs Comelec)
Facts:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as
formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the gubernatorial position
of Bataan.

95

of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing
signing stations.
On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago
argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented
by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for
three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two latter
forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically
made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.

1987 Constitution Article IX(C), Sections 1 and 2

-

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so whether
the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative
HELD:
RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately
inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate.
Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional
action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the
cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such
right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.
(Lambino vs comelec)
Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of
Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameralpresidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate
to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.
Held:
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a
people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based
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Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice
before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.

Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination
of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to
uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be
refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted,
shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to
other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

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(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition
of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its directive, order, or
decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal,
or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories. It shall be
in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the
Commission.
Sec. 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the
country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.

Omnibus Election Code, Article VII, Section 52

Sec. 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the
total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the
Commission.

- Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections, and shall:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5)
years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

Powers and functions

(a) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees,
including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government
required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT
cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders.
The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph from the
performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with
its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the
Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such
officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation or failure.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

(b) During the period of the campaign and ending thirty days thereafter, when in any area of the country
there are persons committing acts of terrorism to influence people to vote for or against any candidate or
political party, the Commission shall have the power to authorize any member or members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Integrated National Police or any similar
agency or instrumentality of the government, except civilian home defense forces, to act as deputies for the
purpose of ensuring the holding of free, orderly and honest elections.

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at
the top of every page of the petition.

(c) Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the
Commission is required to enforce and administer, and require the payment of legal fees and collect the
same in payment of any business done in the Commission, at rates that it may provide and fix in its rules
and regulations.
Rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission to implement the provisions of this Code shall take
effect on the sixteenth day after publication in the Official Gazette or in at least daily newspapers of general
circulation. Orders and directives issued by the Commission pursuant to said rules and regulations shall be
furnished by personal delivery to accredited political parties within forty-eight hours of issuance and shall
take effect immediately upon receipt.
In case of conflict between rules, regulations, orders or directives of the Commission in the exercise of its
constitutional powers and those issued by any other administrative office or agency of the government
concerning the same matter relative to elections, the former shall prevail.
(d) Summon the parties to a controversy pending before it, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and
take testimony in any investigation or hearing before it, and delegate such power to any officer of the
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c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an
autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per
centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is
composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city
should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the
petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which
every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least
ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.
(Santiago vs Comelec)
Facts:
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term
Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and
dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers
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The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph from the performance
of his duties relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions,
orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the
corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such officers or employees who
may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation or failure.
Comelec control, grounds, implications, duration
Comelec resolution no. 9583, Dec. 18, 2012 (wa ko nani giapil kay kinda taas sya. For info about this, pls search
nalang sa net)
2. Power to conduct plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall

Commission who shall be a member of the Philippine Bar. In case of failure of a witness to attend, the
Commission, upon proof of service of the subpoena to said witnesses, may issue a warrant to arrest witness
and bring him before the Commission or the officer before whom his attendance is required.
Any controversy submitted to the Commission shall, after compliance with the requirements of due process,
be immediately heard and decided by it within sixty days from submission thereof. No decision or resolution
shall be rendered by the Commission either en banc or by division unless taken up in a formal session
properly convened for the purpose.
The Commission may, when necessary, avail of the assistance of any national or local law enforcement
agency and/or instrumentality of the government to execute under its direct and immediate supervision any
of its final decisions, orders, instructions or rulings.

1987 Constitution, Article XVII, Section 4

(e) Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure and with the same penalties
provided therein. Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall
constitute contempt thereof.

Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days
after the approval of such amendment or revision.

(f) Enforce and execute its decisions, directives, orders and instructions which shall have precedence over
those emanating from any other authority, except the Supreme Court and those issued in habeas corpus
proceedings.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on
Elections of the sufficiency of the petition

(g) Prescribe the forms to be used in the election, plebiscite or referendum.

Plebscite defined

RA 6735, section 3(e)

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the
people.
Initiative defined
1987 Constitution, Article XVII, Sections 1 and 2
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote
of three-fourths of all its Members; or (2) A constitutional convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once
every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
RA 6735, Sections 3(a), (f), 4 and 5
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitutions or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
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(h) Procure any supplies, equipment, materials or services needed for the holding of the election by public
bidding: Provided, That, if it finds the requirements of public bidding impractical to observe, then by
negotiations or sealed bids, and in both cases, the accredited parties shall be duly notified.
(i) Prescribe the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, taking into account the
situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose: Provided, That the Commission shall
notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas affected by the
use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of
the use of such devices.
(j) Carry out a continuing and systematic campaign through newspapers of general circulation, radios and
other media forms to educate the public and fully inform the electorate about election laws, procedures,
decisions, and other matters relative to the work and duties of the Commission and the necessity of clean,
free, orderly and honest electoral processes.
(k) Enlist non-partisan group or organizations of citizens from the civic, youth, professional, educational,
business or labor sectors known for their probity, impartiality and integrity with the membership and
capability to undertake a coordinated operation and activity to assist it in the implementation of the
provisions of this Code and the resolutions, orders and instructions of the Commission for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections in any constituency. Such groups or organizations shall function
under the direct and immediate control and supervision of the Commission and shall perform the following
specific functions and duties:
A. Before Election Day:
1. Undertake an information campaign on salient features of this Code and help in the dissemination of the
orders, decisions and resolutions of the Commission relative to the forthcoming election.
2. Wage a registration drive in their respective areas so that all citizens of voting age, not otherwise
disqualified by law may be registered.
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3. Help cleanse the list of voters of illegal registrants, conduct house-to-house canvass if necessary, and take
the appropriate legal steps towards this end.
4. Report to the Commission violations of the provisions of this Code on the conduct of the political
campaign, election propaganda and electoral expenditures.
B. On Election Day:
1. Exhort all registered voters in their respective areas to go to their polling places and cast their votes.
2. Nominate one watcher for accreditation in each polling place and each place of canvass who shall have
the same duties, functions and rights as the other watchers of political parties and candidates. Members or
units of any citizen group or organization so designated by the Commission except its lone duly accredited
watcher, shall not be allowed to enter any polling place except to vote, and shall, if they so desire, stay in an
area at least fifty meters away from the polling place.
3. Report to the peace authorities and other appropriate agencies all instances of terrorism, intimidation of
voters, and other similar attempts to frustrate the free and orderly casting of votes.
4. Perform such other functions as may be entrusted to such group or organization by the Commission.
The designation of any group or organization made in accordance herewith may be revoked by the
Commission upon notice and hearing whenever by its actuations such group or organization has shown
partiality to any political party or candidate, or has performed acts in excess or in contravention of the
functions and duties herein provided and such others which may be granted by the Commission.
(l) Conduct hearings on controversies pending before it in the cities or provinces upon proper motion of
any party, taking into consideration the materiality and number of witnesses to be presented, the situation
prevailing in the area and the fund available for the purpose.
(m) Fix other reasonable periods for certain pre-election requirements in order that voters shall not be
deprived of their right of suffrage and certain groups of rights granted them in this Code.
Unless indicated in this Code, the Commission is hereby authorized for fix the appropriate period for the
various prohibited acts enumerated herein, consistent with the requirements of free, orderly, and honest
elections.
Powers and functions classified
(Filipinas Engg Machine Shop vs Ferrer)
Facts:
In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then respondent COMELEC issued an
INVITATION TO BID calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 11,000
units of voting booths.

Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC
Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the
election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation
where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of
ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the
suppliers of the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by
misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the
automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated
machines failed to read them correctly.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and
recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation.
Issue:
WON the Comelec has the power to order for the shift to manual counting
Held:
A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the
broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for
it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well established that
the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata The technical experts of
COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. They
traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with
the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu
would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate.
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not
machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent
the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal
interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work.
Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the
result of an election.
Omnibus Election Code, Article VIII, Section 52(a)

Among the seventeen bidders who submitted proposals in response to the said INVITATION were the herein
petitioner, Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop, (Filipinas for short) and the private respondent, Acme Steel
Manufacturing Company, (Acme for short).

Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the powers and functions conferred
upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:

The respondent COMELEC Bidding Committee Chairman and Members submitted their Memorandum stating
that Acme's bid had to be rejected because the sample it submitted was "made of black iron sheets, painted, and
therefore not rust proof or rust resistant," and that, "it is also heavy - 51 kilos in weight." The Committee instead
recommended that Filipinas be awarded the contract to manufacture and supply the voting booths, but that an
"ocular inspection be made by all members of the Commission of all the samples before the final award be made."

(a) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including
members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to
perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets eighteen years of age
and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders.

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SPC No. 98-143 an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District Board of Canvassers for
Malabon and Navotas with Prayer for the Nullification of the Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as
Congressman."
SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation as congressman.

After an ocular inspection of all the samples submitted was conducted by the COMELEC Commissioners, and after
the Commissioners noted that Acme submitted the lowest bid, the COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the
contract (for voting booths) to Acme, subject to the condition, among others, that "(Acme) improves the sample
submitted in such manner as it would be rust proof or rust resistant.

2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.
RULING:
On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by private respondent.
The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an exception, however,
to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential, vicepresidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases. It states:
"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Members
of the House of Representatives. For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and
Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as
the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio
or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns before it."
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result
in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second
sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass
or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and members of the House of Representatives
for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay
the proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of
the COMELEC under the Constitution to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to "decide, except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections."
We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter
and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality.
We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without
due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that COMELEC
set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the
questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations.
Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC
was not merely performing an administrative function. The resolution of the adverse claims of private
respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass
requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the
veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of
this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where a
power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the
exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasijudicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of
procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent.

On October 16, 1969, Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as
Civil Case No. 77972, against herein public respondents COMELEC Commissioners, chairman and members of the
Comelec Bidding Committee, and private respondent Acme.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the COMELEC
dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid
Held:
The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative
to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall
decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number of location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other
election officials. x x x The decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court." (Section 2, Article X, 1935 Philippine Constitution, which was then in force)
It has been consistently held9 that it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive
jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of
elections and enforcement of election laws.
An order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals
submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and
directly appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and
decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered
in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the Commission on Elections may
either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently
administrative and sometimes ministerial in character.
The order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before
it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was
issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation
to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the
conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by
the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said
order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising
from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
(Baytan vs Comelec)
Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on their way to register for the May 1998
elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite
City, who led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18.Upon realizing that their residence is situated
within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28 not Barangay 18, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and

(Loong vs Comelec)
Facts:
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registered anew. Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to former COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio
O. Joson requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous registration. Petitioners Voters Registration Records
were forwarded to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, for evaluation, who, subsequently,
recommended filing an information for double registration against petitioners. The COMELEC affirmed Ravanzos
resolution. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which, was denied by COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
recommending the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite clear and convincing evidence on
record that they had no intention of committing said election offense
Held: The Petition is without merit.
It is well- settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the sound
discretion of the COMELEC. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC, absent a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the exclusive power of the COMELEC to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same.
There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in different precincts without canceling
their previous registration. Aside from this, the COMELEC found certain circumstances prevailing in the case
sufficient to warrant the finding of probable cause. The COMELEC also pointed out that since double
registration is malum prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential.
Under Sec. 2, Art. IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial
powers. The administrative powers are found in Sec 2. (1), (3) to (9) of Art IX-C. The Constitution does not
provide on whether these administrative powers shall be exercised by the COMELEC en banc or in division. The
COMELEC en banc therefore can act on administrative matters, and this had been the practice under the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. The prosecution by the COMELEC of violations of election laws is an administrative power.
The COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly
requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in
division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the
Court in Canicosa,[23] that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then upon motion for
reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers.
The COMELEC is empowered in Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution to prosecute cases of
violations of election laws. The prosecution of election law violators involves the exercise of the COMELECs
administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc can directly approve the recommendation of its Law
Department to file the criminal information for double registration against petitioners in the instant case. There is
no constitutional requirement that the filing of the criminal information be first decided by any of the divisions of
the COMELEC.

The COMELEC was organized under Commonwealth Act No. 607 enacted on August 22,1940. The power
to enforce our election laws was originally vested in the President and exercised through the Department of
Interior. According to Dean Sinco,[29] the view ultimately emerged that an independent body could better
protect the right of suffrage of our people. Hence, the enforcement of our election laws, while an executive
power, was transferred to the COMELEC.
From a statutory creation, the COMELEC was transformed to a constitutional body by virtue of the 1940
amendments to the 1935 Constitution which took effect on December 2, 1940. COMELEC was generously
granted the power to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections x x x."[30]
Then came the 1973 Constitution. It further broadened the powers of COMELEC by making it the sole
Judge of all election contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the national
legislature and elective provincial and city officials.[31] In fine, the COMELEC was given judicial power
aside from its traditional administrative and executive functions.
The 1987 Constitution quickened this trend of strengthening the COMELEC. Today, COMLEC enforces
and administers all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda
and recalls. Election contests involving regional, provincial and city elective officials are under its exclusive
original jurisdiction. All contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials are under its appellate
jurisdiction.[32]
Our decisions have been in cadence with the movement towards empowering the COMELEC in order that
it can more effectively perform its duty of safeguarding the sanctity of our elections.

Administrative Powers
1. Power to enforce administer election laws
1987 Constitution, Article IX (c), Section 2(1)
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
(Sandoval vs Comelec)
FACTS:

History of functions

Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas
legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal certificates of
canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner
took his oath of office on the same day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the
annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to
suspend the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded
with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of
19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The
Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as
void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order.

(Loong vs Comelec)

ISSUES:

In sum, the second sentence of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable in administrative
cases, like the instant case where the COMELEC is determining whether probable cause exists to charge petitioners
for violation of the provision of the Election Code prohibiting double registration.
Indeed, the COMELEC acted in accordance with Section 9(b), Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure
governing the prosecution of election offenses in meeting en banc in the first instance and acting on the
recommendation of Investigating Officer Ravanzo to file charges against petitioners.

1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98- 206
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