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manajemen, mereka termasuk skala sub lainnya mengenai fitur prosedural dari
sistem keselamatan (misalnya, pelatihan, audit, kepatuhan, komunikasi). Hal ini
sering disajikan sebagai daftar yang diperoleh secara empiris, berdasarkan temuan
menunjukkan bahwa mereka memprediksi penting
safety outcomes such as accident rate (e.g., Niskanen, 1994; Ostrom, Wilhelmsen,
& Kaplan, 1993). To enhance discriminant validity, I propose that measures of safety
climate should only include those procedural features indicative of managerial
commitments, hence serving as concrete indicators of the true priority of safety (in
addition to direct, unmediated assessment of managerial commitments or
priorities). This is akin to the use of artifacts, stories, and ceremonies in identifying
basic assumptions and values (Schein, 1992), except that here I suggest retaining a
single focus relating to the overriding priority of safety. Climate indicators can be
subdivided into universal versus industry specific items. Some indicators of safety
priority refer to universal features in that they are applicable to all industries where
safety is a relevant issue. These include procedural features such as the (real)
status of safety officer, effect of safe conduct on personnel decisions, investment in
safety devices and safety training, and timely communication of safety information
(e.g., Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Glennon, 1982; Zohar, 1980).Other indicators
relate to industry-specific features for example, efficacy of the permit- to-work
system in nuclear plants (Lee, 1996), appropriateness of safety procedures under
changing conditions aboard offshore oil installations (Mearns, Flin, Gordon, &
Fleming, 19981, and insistence on universal precautions against bloodborne
pathogens in health care clinics (DeJoy, Murphy, & Gershon, 1995). This means that
safety climate measures may include three item classes: unmediated perceptions of
(real) managerial commitment or direct assessment of relative priorities, mediated
assessment through universal indicators, and assessment based on industry specific
indicators. The first two classes allow unlimited, between unit comparisons, but the
third increases measurement sensitivity for within unit and within industry
comparisons. A subset of items in each class may relate to situations in which
safety and production come into overt conflict, identified here as acid-test
indicators. That is, it is assumed that employees will pay particular attention to
managerial action in such situations, thus providing the clearest indication of true
priorities. Management action when there is strong pressure to meet production
deadlines, or when the required safety devices cost more than a few hundred
dollars, will be assigned greater weight by employees in assessing true priorities.
Another classification of climate items concerns levels of analysis. A climate survey
may include company level and group level items relating to commitments and
resultant indicators of upper and lower level managerial practices. This agrees with
the idea that referent objects of climate perceptions should be adjusted to the level
of analysis. Thus, organization-level climate indicators should refer to issues such as
financial expenditure on safety devices, reducing production speed in favor of
safety, and personnel decisions based on safety criteria. Group level indicators,
however, should refer to issues such as supervisory monitoring and rewarding
mungkin termasuk tingkat perusahaan dan item tingkat kelompok yang berkaitan
dengan komitmen dan indikator yang dihasilkan dari praktek manajerial tingkat atas
dan bawah. Ini setuju dengan ide bahwa benda referen persepsi iklim harus
disesuaikan dengan tingkat analisis. Dengan demikian, indikator iklim organisasitingkat harus mengacu pada isu-isu seperti pengeluaran keuangan pada perangkat
keselamatan, mengurangi kecepatan produksi dalam mendukung keselamatan, dan
personil keputusan berdasarkan kriteria keamanan. indikator tingkat kelompok,
bagaimanapun, harus mengacu pada isu-isu seperti pemantauan pengawasan dan
praktik bermanfaat, pembinaan individual dari anggota kelompok, dan kesediaan
untuk mengganggu produksi untuk memperbaiki bahaya keamanan. Oleh karena
itu, meskipun isi dari beberapa item mungkin bervariasi antara tindakan iklim yang
berbeda, tergantung pada lingkungan kerja karyawan dan tingkat analisis, sub skala
harus mempertahankan tema yang mendasari tunggal prioritas keselamatan sejati.
Secara default, ini berarti bahwa variabel lain yang diketahui mempengaruhi hasil
keselamatan harus dimasukkan sebagai variabel independen dalam model teoritis
dan pengukuran.
Boundary Stipulations for Safety Climate
This exposition of the safety climate construct can clarify relevant boundaries and
explain consequences of inadvertently crossing them. When subscales refer to
features of safety systems that are not related to safety priority or any other
designated issue, conceptual ambiguity will arise. For example, when climate
subscales relate to supervisory satisfaction, knowledge, and support (Safety
Research Unit, 1993); workers skills, abilities, and motivation (Niskanen, 1994); or
optimism, self esteem, and risk taking (Geller, Roberts, & Gilmore, 1996) conceptual
ambiguity will result, because they are not connected to any focal issue, including
assessment of safety priority (apart from being individual level variables). Such
variables can be included in safety models in which climate is only one variable,
among others that are equally independent. This distinction is especially relevant
for risk perception items, often used in climate measures (Flin et al., 2000). Risk
assessment should be included in measures of safety climate where subscale items
relate to risk resulting from management action or inaction in other words, as an
indicator of relative priorities rather than technological hazards (which vary
between subunits regardless of climate levels). Otherwise, it should be an
independent variable in safety models. Similarly, items asking for assessment of the
overall likelihood of being injured on the job over a period of 12 months (e.g.,
Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991) should be avoided in samples where likelihood of
injury might be markedly influenced by factors over which management has little
control. Second, if climate is an emergent property related to organization level or
group level properties, then individual level variables should not be included in
measurement instruments because this would create conceptual ambiguity,
especially if used by many authors as in safety climate measurement. (For
discussions of levels issues see Dansereau & Alutto, 1990; Glick & Roberts, 1984;
House et al., 1995; Klein et al., 1994; Rousseau, 1985). For example, Williamson,
Feyer, Cairns, and Biancotti (1997) devised a 62 item safety climate questionnaire
designed to represent the different measures of safety climate published over the
years. Though half the items in this scale refer to top management commitment
and company level pro cedures, the other half includes individual level items
referring to personal beliefs (e.g. , Accidents will happen no matter what I do7,)and
safety attributions (e.g., When I have worked unsafely it has been because I was
not trained properly). Although the latter may have important safety implications,
they ought to be independent (individual level)variables rather than components of
safety climate. This has important implications for statistical analysis, requiring
hierarchical linear models instead of single level regression models ( Hofmann &
Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 2000a).
Ketentuan batas untuk Keselamatan Iklim
eksposisi ini dari konstruk iklim keselamatan dapat memperjelas batas-batas yang
relevan dan menjelaskan konsekuensi dari tidak sengaja melintasi mereka. Ketika
sub-skala mengacu pada fitur sistem keselamatan yang tidak berhubungan dengan
prioritas keamanan atau masalah lain yang ditunjuk, ambiguitas konseptual akan
timbul. Misalnya, ketika sub-skala iklim berhubungan dengan kepuasan
pengawasan, pengetahuan, dan dukungan (Keselamatan Unit Penelitian, 1993);
keterampilan, kemampuan, dan motivasi pekerja (Niskanen, 1994); atau optimisme,
harga diri, dan pengambilan risiko (Geller, Roberts, & Gilmore, 1996) ambiguitas
konseptual akan menghasilkan, karena mereka tidak terhubung ke setiap masalah
fokus, termasuk penilaian prioritas keselamatan (selain menjadi variabel tingkat
individu). variabel tersebut dapat dimasukkan dalam model keamanan di mana
iklim hanya satu variabel, antara lain yang sama-sama mandiri. Perbedaan ini
sangat relevan untuk item persepsi risiko, sering digunakan dalam tindakan iklim
(Flin et al., 2000). penilaian risiko harus dimasukkan dalam langkah-langkah iklim
keamanan di mana item subskala berhubungan dengan risiko yang dihasilkan dari
tindakan manajemen atau tidak bertindak dengan kata lain, sebagai indikator
prioritas relatif daripada bahaya teknologi (yang bervariasi antara subunit terlepas
dari tingkat iklim). Jika tidak, itu harus menjadi variabel independen dalam model
keamanan. Demikian pula, item meminta penilaian dari kemungkinan keseluruhan
terluka pada pekerjaan selama 12 bulan (misalnya, Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991)
harus dihindari dalam sampel mana kemungkinan cedera mungkin nyata
dipengaruhi oleh faktor-faktor yang manajemen memiliki sedikit kontrol. Kedua, jika
iklim adalah properti muncul terkait dengan tingkat organisasi atau sifat tingkat
grup, maka variabel tingkat individu seharusnya tidak dimasukkan dalam instrumen
pengukuran karena ini akan menciptakan ambiguitas konseptual, terutama jika
digunakan oleh banyak penulis seperti dalam pengukuran iklim keselamatan.
(Untuk diskusi masalah tingkat melihat Dansereau & Alutto, 1990; Glick & Roberts,
1984; Rumah et al, 1995;. Klein et al, 1994;. Rousseau, 1985). Misalnya, Williamson,
Feyer, Cairns, dan Biancotti (1997) menyusun 62 item kuesioner iklim keselamatan
yang dirancang untuk mewakili ukuran yang berbeda dari iklim keselamatan
diterbitkan selama bertahun-tahun. Meskipun setengah item dalam skala ini
mengacu pada komitmen manajemen puncak dan tingkat perusahaan cedures pro,
setengah lainnya termasuk item tingkat individu mengacu pada keyakinan pribadi
(misalnya, "Kecelakaan akan terjadi tidak peduli apa yang saya do7,) dan atribusi
keselamatan (misalnya," ketika saya telah bekerja dengan tidak aman sudah karena
saya tidak terlatih dengan baik "). Meskipun yang terakhir mungkin memiliki
implikasi penting tentang keselamatan, mereka harus mandiri (tingkat individual)
variabel daripada komponen iklim keselamatan. Ini memiliki implikasi penting untuk
analisis statistik, membutuhkan model linear hirarkis bukan model regresi tingkat
satu (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 2000a).
Another boundary stipulation concerns the fact that meaningful aggregation
requires homogeneity of perceptions within the chosen unit of analysis. Otherwise,
the calculated mean scores might be thought to reflect climate level when, in fact,
there is no climate at all (i.e., no consensus). This may be true of companies or
installations in which management is inconsistent with regard to safety issues,
resulting in little agreement among employees. For example, management might
emphasize safety under normal operating conditions but deemphasize it when
production of key products falls behind schedule. Such wavering will result in
reduced agreement among employees. Disregarding this criterion, as in most
published research, reinforces the use of variables for which there is little reason to
expect consensus to begin with (e.g., perceived risk in a technologically diverse
organization). (For exceptions see Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 2000a.) If
homogeneity statistics are included, it should be possible to assess which climate
variables warrant aggregation and proceed accordingly. For example, in a study
designed to improve supervisory safety practices, it turned out that (contrary to
expectations) safety climate factors failed to meet criteria of homogeneity, hence
the resulting perceptions were not considered as group climate variables (Zohar,
2000~).This highlights the importance of considering both climate parameters in
other words, level and strength.
Conclusion
The ideas presented in this chapter have conceptual and methodological
implications. Methodologically, climate measurement research should in clude the
ongoing search for perceptual cues or indicators used by workers to assess the
relative priority of safety. As noted, such indicators may be either universal or
industry specific and relate to different hierarchical levels. It is probable that some
will provide more sensitive or reliable assessment of climate level, and that certain
combinations will result in better measurement instruments. Research designed to
identify new, potentially better climate indicators might require several research
strategies. One strategy involves organization and group level comparisons
between high and low accident companies. A recent review of the literature
identified a heterogeneous list of procedural variables associated with lower
accident rates (Shannon, Mayr, & Haines, 1997), some of which have not been
incorporated in the available scales. They include speed of hazard correction,
completeness of accident investigation, monitoring unsafe behavior, composition
and scope of duties of joint safety committees, and regularity of safety retraining.
Other variables identified in this review should be excluded, however, despite their
demonstrated discriminatory power (e.g., empowerment of workforce, good labor
relations, and workforce seniority). Another strategy involves qualitative data
collection techniques such as focus group discussions.
Penetapan batas lain menyangkut fakta bahwa agregasi bermakna membutuhkan
homogenitas persepsi dalam unit yang dipilih dari analisis. Jika tidak, nilai rata-rata
dihitung mungkin dianggap mencerminkan tingkat iklim ketika, dalam
kenyataannya, tidak ada iklim sama sekali (yaitu, tidak ada konsensus). Ini mungkin
benar dari perusahaan atau instalasi di mana manajemen tidak konsisten berkaitan
dengan masalah keamanan, sehingga kesepakatan kecil di antara karyawan.
Misalnya, manajemen mungkin menekankan keselamatan pada kondisi operasi
normal tetapi deemphasize ketika produksi produk utama jatuh di belakang jadwal.
kegoyahan tersebut akan menghasilkan kesepakatan berkurang antara karyawan.
Mengabaikan kriteria ini, seperti dalam penelitian yang paling diterbitkan,
memperkuat penggunaan variabel yang ada sedikit alasan untuk mengharapkan
konsensus untuk memulai dengan (misalnya, persepsi risiko dalam organisasi
teknologi yang beragam). (Untuk pengecualian lihat Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996;.
Zohar, 2000a) Jika statistik homogenitas disertakan, itu harus mungkin untuk
menilai mana variabel iklim menjamin agregasi dan melanjutkan sesuai. Sebagai
contoh, dalam sebuah studi yang dirancang untuk meningkatkan praktek-praktek
keselamatan pengawasan, ternyata (bertentangan dengan harapan) faktor iklim
keselamatan gagal memenuhi kriteria homogenitas, maka persepsi yang dihasilkan
tidak dianggap sebagai variabel iklim kelompok (Zohar, 2000 ~). ini menyoroti
pentingnya mengingat kedua parameter iklim dengan kata lain, tingkat dan
kekuatan.
Kesimpulan
Ide-ide yang disajikan dalam bab ini memiliki implikasi konseptual dan metodologis.
Metodologis, penelitian pengukuran iklim harus di clude pencarian yang sedang
berlangsung untuk isyarat persepsi atau indikator yang digunakan oleh pekerja
untuk menilai prioritas relatif aman. Sebagaimana dicatat, indikator tersebut dapat
berupa atau universal industri tertentu dan berhubungan dengan tingkat hirarki
yang berbeda. Besar kemungkinan bahwa beberapa akan memberikan penilaian
yang lebih sensitif atau dapat diandalkan dari tingkat iklim, dan bahwa kombinasi
tertentu akan menghasilkan instrumen pengukuran yang lebih baik. Penelitian yang
dirancang untuk mengidentifikasi baru, indikator iklim berpotensi lebih baik
mungkin memerlukan beberapa strategi penelitian. Salah satu strategi melibatkan
organisasi dan tingkat kelompok perbandingan antara perusahaan kecelakaan tinggi
dan rendah. Sebuah tinjauan baru-baru literatur mengidentifikasi daftar heterogen
variabel prosedural terkait dengan tingkat yang lebih rendah kecelakaan (Shannon,
Mayr, & Haines, 1997), beberapa di antaranya belum tergabung dalam skala yang
tersedia. Mereka termasuk kecepatan koreksi bahaya, kelengkapan penyelidikan
kecelakaan, pemantauan perilaku yang tidak aman, komposisi dan lingkup tugas
komite keselamatan bersama, dan keteraturan pelatihan ulang keselamatan.
variabel lain yang diidentifikasi dalam ulasan ini harus dikeluarkan, namun,
meskipun kekuatan diskriminatif mereka menunjukkan (misalnya, pemberdayaan
tenaga kerja, hubungan kerja yang baik, dan tenaga kerja senioritas). Strategi lain
melibatkan teknik pengumpulan data kualitatif seperti diskusi kelompok terfokus.
This was used, for example, in the development of an offshore oil-platform climate
scale (Cox & Cheyne, 2000) in which employees were asked to discuss what they
understood by the terms safety and safety culture. Subscales were based on
issues identified in the focus groups, together with themes highlighted in other
offshore and generic climate measures. This resulted in identification of various
safety-climate indicators such as: There is a good communication here about
safety issues which affect me, I do not receive praise for working safely, and
Sometimes I am not given enough time to get the job done safely. Note that these
markers are universal, since they do not relate safety to unique attributes of
offshore installations. An additional strategy for uncovering relevant indicators is
derived from the often-encountered discrepancy between formally espoused and
enforced safety policies. Employees at various organizational levels are asked to
recall incidents where it became clear to them that management action diverged
from formally espoused policies (Zohar & Luria, 2001). This strategy is based on the
assumption that employees recall personally meaningful episodes and that their
descriptions of these episodes reveal perceptual cues to which they attend in
assessing true priorities. For exam- ple, a foreman in a metal processing plant
reported that it took several days and repeated appeals to replace a workers wornout safety gloves because of management concern that gloves were being replaced
too often. This contradicted managements formally declared drive to improve
safety records. A worker in another work group in the same company reported that
metal debris was left around an electric jig-saw (a safety hazard) until a safety audit
by government inspectors was due, at which time it was removed. The contrast
between ongoing tardiness and sudden activity re- vealed the managerial hypocrisy
to this worker. These incidents suggest that ease of replacing protective equipment,
or whether housekeeping is genuine or forced, could be safety-climate indicators in
some industries. This methodology could also help to identify acid-test indicators,
because policy discrepancies often arise when safety and production are in direct
conflict. For example, a foreman in a food processing plant reported that, during the
week before a major holiday, when demand was at its peak, he was pressured to
clear clogged pipes in an oven in which temperature exceeded the safety level for
such an operation by 30C. This was contrary to the companys own rules. Bending
safety rules because of work pressure might thus be an acid-test indicator. This
could be refined with situation- anchored rating scales of levels of work pressure to
must be established. Recent at- tempts at integrating leadership and safety climate
suggest a mediation model whereby, in contexts wherej ob performance has direct
safety implica- tions, the quality of leader-member interaction influences leader
commit- ment to members welfare, in turn influencing safety-climate perceptions in
the group and, ultimately, safety behavior of group members. This means that
leadership style is an antecedent of safety-climate level. The model is based on
evidence suggesting that closer, higher quality relationships increase leaders
commitment to members welfare (Bass, 1990). In situa- tions involving heightened
risk of injury, welfare also covers members physical well-being, as reported by
Hofmann and Morgeson (1999). Commit- ment to subordinates safety, and the
practices with which it is being expressed, provide the targets for climate
perceptions, establishing the link
138 DOVZOHAR
between leadership style and safety climate. The mediating role of safety climate
has been supported in two recent studies (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2000;
Zohar, 2000b). They demonstrated that transformational and constructive
leadership (but not corrective leadership-in other words, management-by-exception)
predicted injury rate, with safety climate as mediator. This suggests that
relationships between leadership dimensions and safety climate should be further
explored, including investigation of moderator variables likely to influence this
relationship (e.g. , consistency of managerial practice, which is likely to influence
climate strength). The relationship between safety climate and motivation also
presents research opportunities. As noted previously, safety behavior of employees
poses a managerial challenge because of employees bias against safe con- duct
under regular job conditions. The negative value function for safe behavior can be
modified by introducing short-term rewards that outweigh immediate costs, for
which one readily available resource is leader-member exchange. An effective
supervisor who is also committed to safety will observe whether work is performed
properly, including the use of protective gear, and express approval or disapproval
immediately afterward (Komaki, 1998). If this is done uniformly and consistently to
all group members and in all situations, subordinates will infer a high safety priority,
resulting in high (and strong) safety climate and as a consequence high safety
motiva- tion. Because supervisory contingencies are known to influence members
motivation and behavior (Komaki, 1998), this obviates the need to include external
contingencies characteristic of most behavior-based safety inter- ventions (see
reviews in Krispin & Hantula, 1996; McAfee & Winn, 1989; OHara, Johnson, & Beehr,
1985). Hence, interventions that improve super- visory safety practices might offer
a new strategy whose distinctive feature is that supervisory practice is modified to
introduce change in safety climate and motivation on the shop floor. The viability of
this approach, identified as supervision-based safety, was tested recently by Zohar
(2002c), who provided evidence indicating that improved supervisory safety
practices resulted in significant and stable changes in safety climate scores, minor
injury rates, and earplug use. Future research should identify additional ways for
inducing such change, taking advantage of the robust motivational and behavioral
outcomes afforded by the law of effect. Given the human and economic cost of
occupational accidents, this and other lines of research suggested previously should
be considered not only as an intellectual but also as a societal challenge.