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K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017 URN 1306 URN 1306 XIII K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT
K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017
URN 1306
URN 1306
XIII K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CAMELOT
Criminal Appeal
No. ______
/2017
State of Erehwon...……………………………………………………………………………Petitioner
Elizabeth Bennet……………………………………………………………………………Respondent
MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER

K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

TABLE OF CONTENTS

URN 1306

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

3

 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

ISSUES RAISED ............................................................................................................................

6

 

WRITTEN PLEADINGS

7

I.

SECTION 421-A IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BE

7

II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REINSTATE BENNET’S CONVICTIONS UNDER

SECTIONS 351-A, 421-A, AND 210-B OF THE CAMELOT PENAL

9

  • A. Bennet’s Actions Support Her Conviction Under Section 351-A of the Camelot Penal

Code, As She Intentionally Promoted Enmity Between Various

10

  • 1. Bennet’s actions were directed to definable groups and communities, and therefore

fall within the purview of

12

  • 2. Bennet’s Conviction Should Be Reinstated Because She Acted With the Intent to

Promote Enmity Between Groups and Disrupt Public

12

  • 3. Bennet’s Conviction Under 351-A Was Proper Because Her Actions Resulted in

Civil Unrest and Public

14

  • B. The Facts in the Record Readily Support Bennet’s Conviction of Sedition Under

Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal

15

  • 1. Bennet’s Conviction Under 421-A Should Be Reinstated Because She Possessed

Bona Fide Intent to Incite Disaffection Towards the

17

  • 2. Bennet’s Conviction Under 421-A Should Be Upheld Because Her Actions Had the

Tendency of Promoting Violence Towards the

18

  • C. Bennet’s Conviction Should Be Upheld Under 210-B Because She Conspired with

Other Hogwarts Party Members to Commit The Offenses Detailed in 351-A and

19

  • 1. Bennet engaged in an agreement to further criminal objectives with Fun Toosh,

Rebello Gonsalves, and other members of the Hogwarts

20

  • 2. Bennet possessed the requisite mens rea to be found guilty of criminal conspiracy 21

  • 3. Bennet committed an actus reus by encouraging her supporters to destroy the

 

21

III.

THE DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD BE IMPOSED BECAUSE IT IS AN

APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT FOR THE OFFENSE OF SEDITION AND THE FACTS

 

OF THIS

22

PRAYER .......................................................................................................................................

26

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

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CONSTITUTIONS

Indian Const. art. 19

STATUTES

  • 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012)

  • 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2012)

Camelot Pen. Code § 210-B

Camelot Pen. Code § 241-A

Camelot Pen. Code § 351-A

Indian Pen. Code § 121

Indian Pen. Code § 124A

Indian Pen. Code § 153A

CASES

Abrams v. United States, 210 U.S. 616 (1919) (USA)

American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (USA)

Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, Cri App No. 86 of 2011 (Chh) (Unreported)

(India)

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 (India)

Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India)

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969) (USA)

Cline v. State, 204 Tenn. 251 (Ten. 1958) (USA)

DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (USA)

Debi Saran v. The State, 1995 (1) SCR 344 (USA)

Debi Soren and others v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254 (India)

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (USA)

Dr. Vinayak Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 266 ELT 193 (India)

Gopel Vinayak Godse v. The Union of India & Ors., AIR 1971 BOM 56 (India)

Hemalatha v. Govt of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 AP 375 (India)

Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (USA)

Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895) (USA)

Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975) (USA)

Ingraham v. United States, 360 U.S. 672 (USA)

Joy Cherian v. Sub Inspector Of Police, Crl. MC. No. 4381 of 2010 (Kerala High Court,

26/3/2015) (India)

Kali Charan Sharma v. Emperor, AIR 27 All 649 (1927) (India)

Kanhaiya Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 1362, 02 Mar. 2016 (India)

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India)

Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India)

Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (USA)

Mathuri and ors v. State of Punjab, 1964 AIR 986 (India)

Md. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 8 SCC 65 (India)

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Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (USA)

Mulcahy v. R, [1868] LR 3 HL 306 (UK)

P. Hemalatha v. The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 AP 375 (India)

Queen Empress v. Balquanqaddhar Tilak, (1897) ILR 22 Bom 112 (India)

R v. Curr [1968] 2 QB 944 (UK)

R v. Collins, [1973] QB 100 (UK)

Ramnaresh and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257 (India)

Santosh Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498 (India)

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (USA)

See United States v. Berberian, 851 F.2d 236 (Cal. 1988) (USA)

State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi, AIR 1952 SC 329 (India)

State of Maharashtra v. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed, 1994 SCC, Supl. (1) 579 (India)

State of W.B. v. Mohammed Khalid, 1995 AIR 785, 1995 SCC (1) 684 (India)

Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 (India)

United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (USA)

United States v. Jimenez Reico, 537 U.S. 270 (2003) (USA)

United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908, 921 (2d Cir. 1957) (USA)

United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1994) (USA)

Yakub Radul Azak Memon v. State of Masharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 396 (India)

MISCELLANEOUS

Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, U. PENN. L. REV. 1941. 624.

Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences and Executions (2015).

Congressional Research Service, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends

(Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.

Law Commission of India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty (Aug. 2015),

http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report262.pdf.

NOLOS PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY (1 st ed. 2009)

RUSSELL ON CRIME, Vol. 1 (11 th ed. 1964).

Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 1.5 (2d ed.)

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

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On June 1, 2015, a protest broke out in the famous grounds of Erehwon, during which

30,000 people began shouting slogans and burning public property. These destructive actions

resulted from a speech by Elizabeth Bennet (“Bennet” or “Respondent”), a leader of the

Hogwarts Party, a minority political party in Camelot largely dominated by students. In her

speech, Bennet called for the listeners to take action, overthrow the government, and break it to

pieces:

This cannot be tolerated! We must rise in rebellion against these dirty

leeches on our mind and its thinking process. These corrupt people

who have sold our country now want us to pawn our minds. This will

not happen, brothers and sisters! Together, we will overthrow the

government! Break the government to pieces, if need be, to uphold the

ideals contained in our beloved constitution. We will be the divine

destruction which shall vaporize the deep seated root and ensure our

beloved country has a more refreshing start! I am ready to lay down

my life for you my beloved fatherland! Are you ready too?

Thirty thousand people attended this speech, including 3,000 Hogwarts Party members.

The day after Bennet’s speech, 200,000 people gathered near the Parliament and the iconic

Camelot gate and remained there for two days in protest. Moreover, thousands of people

harassed government officials by tracking government quarters in Erewhon and giving them

teddy bears to mock their loyalty to the current Camelot government.

The beginning of this political turmoil started in April 2015. Immediately after the

Camelot and Erehwon elections in which Bennet was elected to Parliament, she tweeted a picture

of herself with the Genghiztan flag. Because Camelot has long standing acrimony and engaged

in two wars with Genghiztan, this photo upset many people. Therefore, Mr. K.F. Panda

(“Panda”), the Chief Minister of Erehwon, asked for a public apology from Bennet to ease the

tensions. He also tweeted that Bennet and the Hogwarts party had forgotten the blood shed by

Camelot soldiers in the Genghiztan wars. Instead of apologizing, however, Bennet created a new

campaign in late May 2015 entitled “Mock and Shame the Pseudo-Nationalist Government.”

The Prime Minister of Camelot, Mr. Puddy Jedi, issued a statement on June 4, 2015,

three days after Bennet’s speech, attempting to ease tensions of Camelot and asking both Bennet

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and Panda to restrain from raising any more tensions in the country. However, the following

day, as a result of the public discord and destruction caused by Bennet’s speech, a complaint was

filed against Bennet and two other members of the Hogwarts Party under Sections 421-A, 351-A,

and 210-B of the Camelot Penal Code and a First Information Report (“FIR”) was registered.

Panda held a press conference calling for justice, affirmative action, and the need to restore faith

in a strong nation.

Despite Bennet and the Prime Minister’s attempts to call into question the

constitutionality of Section 421-A by quoting Jawaharlal Nehru and Gandhi, a final report was

filed and the Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons to all the accused. The trial court

found all the accused guilty for violating Sections 421-A, 351-A, and 210-B of the Camelot

Penal Code. Bennet was sentenced to death for her violation of Section 421-A. Bennet appealed

and the High Court of Erehwon acquitted her of all charges. This Court granted the State’s

Petition by Special Leave.

ISSUES RAISED

I.

Whether Section 421-A is constitutional and should be upheld?

II.

Whether the State made out the offenses under Sections 421-A, 351-A, and 210-B of

the Camelot Penal Code against Elizabeth Bennet under the facts of this case?

III.

Whether the death sentence is an appropriate punishment for the offense of sedition

and should be imposed in this case?

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It is humbly submitted that,

  • I. SECTION 421-A IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BE UPHELD. This Hon’ble Court should uphold Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code as

constitutional and re-instate Bennet’s convictions because it imposes reasonable restrictions on

speech intended to protect the existence of the democracy itself. As an initial matter, it is unclear

specifically which rights the Camelot Constitution protects. However, even assuming does it

protect the freedom of speech and expression, Section 421-A is still constitutional because the

fundamental right to free speech is not without limits. With the right of the individual to speak

his mind comes the power of the government to impose reasonable restrictions on this right. 1

For example, the Indian Constitution, which guarantees its citizens the right to free expression,

specifically limits this right by allowing the government to impose “reasonable restrictions” in

the interests of the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order,

decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement. 2 Similarly,

Justice Holmes noted in a seminal U.S. Supreme Court case that even the “most stringent

protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing

a panic.” 3 Thus, it is important to look at the goals of the restriction and the interests it protects

before declaring a statute unconstitutional merely because it places any limits on speech.

Security of the state is an important government interest that justifies some restrictions on

speech. “Every State, whatever its form of Government, has to be armed with the power to

punish those who, by their conduct, jeopardise the safety and stability of the State, or disseminate

such feelings of disloyalty as have the tendency to lead to the disruption of the State or to public

disorder.” 4 For this reason, several democratic countries, including the United States and India,

have sedition statutes that are still in effect. 5 In fact, the Indian Supreme Court, in reviewing a

statute with striking similarity to Camelot’s Section 421-A upheld its sedition statute,

recognizing the importance of national security and public order. 6 The Court interpreted Section

124A to criminalize only conduct that intends to incite violence or public disorder and concluded

  • 1 See, e.g., Indian Const. art. 19, cl. 2; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

  • 2 Indian Const. art. 19, cl. 2.

  • 3 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

  • 4 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India).

  • 5 Indian Pen. Code § 124A; 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2012).

  • 6 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India).

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that the statute strikes the “correct balance between individual fundamental rights and the interest

of public order.” 7 Since this landmark decision in Kedar Nath Singh v. Bihar, several individuals

have been convicted under Indian Penal Code Section 124A. 8 In 2011, the High Court of

Chhattisgarh, reiterated the Supreme Court’s decision in Kedar Nath and affirmed the conviction

of petitioner under Section 124A for possessing minutes, documents, and pamphlets of an

organization advocating a rebellion against the government. 9

Similarly, in upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2385, which prohibits individuals from advocating

overthrow of the government, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “No one could conceive that it is

not within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended to overthrow the government by force

and violence.” 10 The court upheld the statute because it aimed to prohibit advocacy, not peaceful

political discussion, and therefore, it did not violate the U.S. Constitution. 11 These decisions

highlight that democracies consistently uphold sedition statutes similar to Section 421-A.

Moreover, when interpreting any statute, courts favor interpretations that avoid

constitutional issues. 12 This is commonly known as the canon of constitutional avoidance or

constitutional doubt. 13 In Kedar Nath, the court noted, “It is well settled that if certain provisions

of law construed in one way would make them consistent with the Constitution, and another

interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former

construction.” 14 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court explained federal courts’ duty is to interpret

statutes in a way that does not violate the constitution. 15 “[W]here an otherwise acceptable

construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the

statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of

Congress.” 16

  • 7 Id.

  • 8 See, e.g., Dr. Vinayak Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh , 2011 (266) ELT 193 (Chhattisgarh High Court);

Hemalatha v. Govt of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 AP 375 (India); Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh , Cri App No. 86 of 2011 (Chh) (Unreported) (India).

  • 9 Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh , Cri App No. 86 of 2011 (Chh) (Unreported).

    • 10 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951).

    • 11 Id.

    • 12 See Congressional Research Service, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends at 23 (Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97 -589.pdf.

    • 13 Id.

    • 14 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India).

    • 15 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502 (1951).

    • 16 DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).

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This Court should uphold Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code as constitutional

because it places reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech in order to protect the vital

government interest of ensuring public order. Section 421-A(a) prohibits words or

representations that bring or attempt to bring “hatred or contempt or excites or attempts to excite

disaffection” towards the government. 17 This language is almost identical to that of Indian Penal

Code Section 124A. The Indian Supreme Court has consistently upheld Section 124A’s

constitutionality and this Court should do the same here. Additionally, Section 421-A(c)

prohibits anyone from exciting someone to overthrow the government. 18 This subsection is

similar to the U.S. statute which has also been upheld in order to protect the democracy. This

Court should do the same. A government unable to protect itself against sedition would be

reduced to anarchy. 19 Therefore, Camelot’s sedition statute also includes Section 421-A(b),

which prevents showing the government has been misled in its measures. 20 Given Camelot’s

relatively recent independence and establishment as a democracy, 21 the nation’s security is

especially important and Section 421-A should be declared constitutional on its face.

At the very least, however, the Court should interpret Section 421-A narrowly to avoid

constitutional issues. Parliament intended to punish those who threaten the peace and safety of

Camelot, a valid legislative goal. If this court finds a broader interpretation of Section 421-A

would be unconstitutional, it should follow the court’s approach in Kedar Nath, in which the

court interpreted Section 124A to only reach words intended to incite violence or public disorder.

Even under a narrow interpretation, such as this, Bennet’s actions still fall within the permissible

grounds of the statute and this Court should reverse her acquittals.

II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REINSTATE BENNET’S CONVICTIONS UNDER

SECTIONS 351-A, 421-A, AND 210-B OF THE CAMELOT PENAL CODE.

The Camelot Supreme Court should overturn the High Court’s acquittal of Bennet

because the facts in the record provide ample grounds to reinstate her convictions. Bennet’s

speech and actions demonstrate that she had clear intent to promote enmity among the citizens of

Erehwon and Camelot, and she ultimately succeeded in her goal. Not only did Bennet’s speech

create hatred among the citizens of her country, it also promoted disaffection towards the

  • 17 Camelot Pen. Code § 241-A(a).

  • 18 Camelot Pen. Code § 241 -A(c).

  • 19 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951).

  • 20 Camelot Pen. Code § 241 -A(b).

  • 21 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 1.

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government itself. Additionally, Bennet furthered her disruptive plans by criminally conspiring

with other members of the Hogwarts party. It is therefore imperative that the Camelot Supreme

Court reinstates her convictions under Sections 421-A, 351-A, and 210-B of the Camelot Penal

Code.

  • A. Bennet’s Actions Support Her Conviction Under Section 351-A of the Camelot

Penal

Code,

As

She

Intentionally

Promoted

Enmity

Between

Various Communities.

The ability to openly exchange ideas and opinions is the hallmark of a democratic

society. Yet most democracies, even those with constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech,

impose certain limitations to ensure that overreaching rhetoric, imbued with prejudice, vitriol,

and malignant intent, does not threaten the wellbeing of its members. Section 351-A of the

Camelot Penal Code represents one such measure, and given the facts of the present case, it is

clear that Bennet’s actions exemplify the type of conduct that 351-A seeks to prevent:

incitement, masked as ‘political discourse.’ It is therefore imperative that the Camelot Supreme

Court reinstates the High Court’s conviction first because Bennet intentionally promoted enmity

between different groups of people, second because she possessed a bona fide intent to commit

actions that prejudice harmony between different communities, and third because she succeeded

in causing unrest among different groups of people.

Camelot Penal Code Section 351-A is broken into three subsections, covering conduct

ranging from inspiring hatred between communities, prejudicing public tranquility, and using

violence to create fear among communities—all with the aim of maintaining harmony across

Camelot’s various communities. 22 Like Camelot, many common law countries have also enacted

legislation in an attempt to cultivate peace and unity across diverse facets of society. The U.S.

Supreme Court, for example, has confirmed the need to curtail certain types of speech. In

Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court ruled that the government may punish public speech in cases

where the statements are intended to incite or produce imminent lawless action, and that such

acts were indeed likely to occur. 23 The U.S. Supreme Court has also upheld certain convictions

where the defendants’ words or expressions were determined to pose an “imminent danger” to

other people. 24

22 See Camelot Pen. Code § 351 -A. 23 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969). 24 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 210 U.S. 616 (1919) (holding that convictions were warranted where defendants tossed flyers out of windows across New York City in an attempt to incite others to take up arms against

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Further, India has enacted a statute that bears striking resemblance to Section 351-A of

the Camelot Penal Code. 25 In interpreting this law, the Indian Supreme Court has declared that a

showing of mens rea, 26 or intent to incite, is required when determining if an individual is guilty

of promoting enmity among different groups. 27 Similar mens rea requirements also appear in

judgments from the United States and England. 28

In order to demonstrate that an individual intended to cause discord or promote enmity

among different groups, courts consider the circumstances surrounding the questionable speech

or actions. 29 A few strongly worded statements taken out of context cannot sufficiently

demonstrate mens rea. 30 In the case of Manzar Sayeed Khan, the Indian Supreme Court made a

determination of the petitioner’s intent by considering the overall language of the book and the

circumstances in which the book was written, not just the questionable passages. 31

Some Indian High Courts have gone as far as to declare that a clear showing of intent is

not necessary to convict someone under the public enmity statute, so long as there is a showing

that the questionable language used was of a “nature calculated to promote feelings of enmity or

hatred,” such that a person “must be presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act.” 32

That is, a court may infer the existence of mens rea simply because a reasonable person would

have known that their actions or statements were likely to cause discord. 33 Indeed, the Allahabad

High Court applied identical reasoning in the case of Kali Charan Sharma v. Emperor, and

found that although the author claimed he had no offensive intent, the overall language of the

war efforts); Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding that leaflets directing young men to fight the war draft posed a “clear and present danger” to society).

  • 25 See Indian Pen. Code § 153A.

  • 26 The Latin phrase “mens rea” is translated to mean “guilty mind,” or “criminal intent in committing an act.” Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary.

  • 27 “The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed.” Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India). See also Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. (1997) 7 SCC 431 (India); Joy Cherian v. Sub Inspector Of Police, Crl. MC. No. 4381 of 2010 (Kerala High Court, 26/3/2015) (India); Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab , (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).

  • 28 See, e.g. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (first U.S. case to advocate the “intent standard” for incitement cases); R v Curr [1968] 2 QB 944 (UK) (holding that the inciter must intend the others to engage in the behavior constituting the offense); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 50.

  • 29 Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr , (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India).

  • 30 Id.

  • 31 Id. See also Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India) (examining all circumstances surrounding petitioner’s isolated remarks and finding an overall absence of intent or malicious aim]; Debi Soren and others v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254 (India) (viewing petitioners’ comments in context of political goals revealed no intent to create enmity).

  • 32 Gopel Vinayak Godse v. The Union of India & Ors., AIR 1971 BOM 56 (1970) (India).

  • 33 See id.

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book was of such a nature that enmity between Hindus and Muslims would be the “inevitable

consequence,” thereby supporting conviction under Section 153A. 34 Further, under the standard

articulated in Gopal Vinyak Godse, the “natural or probable consequences” of speech may be

considered in light of the class of people towards whom the language was directed in addition to

“the state of feelings between the different classes or communities.” 35

  • 1. Bennet’s actions were directed to definable groups and communities, and therefore fall within the purview of 351-A.

Bennet’s actions fall within the ambit of Section 351-A of the Camelot Penal Code

because they were directed to discrete, definable groups of individuals. Subsection (1) of

Camelot Penal Code 351-A prohibits any words that promote enmity, hatred, or ill-will towards

groups characterized by “religion, race…or any grounds whatsoever.” 36 As such, different

political parties could readily be encompassed by Section 351-A’s catchall phrase, “or any

grounds whatsoever,” as they are themselves distinct groups. Here, the factual record

demonstrates that Bennet’s inflammatory statements inspired enmity between the Hogwarts

Party, the Crouching Tiger Party, the Vanity Fair Party, and their respective supporters, thereby

subjecting her actions to the scrutiny of 351-A. 37

  • 2. Bennet’s Conviction Should Be Reinstated Because She Acted With the Intent to Promote Enmity Between Groups and Disrupt Public Tranquility.

The facts in the record clearly demonstrate that Bennet acted with the intent and purpose

of promoting enmity between her followers, the Hogwarts Party, and the other political parties

within Camelot. Global precedent mandates a showing of mens rea in order to sustain a

conviction under incitement or hate-speech statutes, which can be determined by considering all

circumstances surrounding the questionable acts. 38 An examination of Bennet’s inflammatory

remarks, within in the overall context of her deliberately contrarian campaign, reveals a

definitive intent to create tension among different communities. First, unlike the case of Balwant

Singh, Bennet’s comments cannot be considered “casual slogans,” that were only raised “a few

  • 34 Kali Charan Sharma v. Emperor, AIR 27 All 649 (1927) (India).

  • 35 Gopel Vinayak Godse v. The Union of India & Ors., AIR 1971 BOM 56 (1970) (India).

  • 36 Camelot Pen. Code § 351 -A.

  • 37 See generally Statement of Facts, Moot Problem.

  • 38 Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr , (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India); Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. (1997) 7 SCC 431 (India); Joy Cherian v. Sub Inspector Of Police, Crl. MC. No. 4381 of 2010 (Kerala High Court, 26/3/2015) (India); Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India); Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten , 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); R v Curr [1968] 2 QB 944 (UK).

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times.” 39 Rather, Bennet made public, provocative statements on behalf of the Hogwarts party

on at least four separate occasions. 40 Moreover, the entirety of Bennet’s campaign, entitled

“Mock and Shame the Pseudo-Nationalist Government,” is a flagrant indication of her intent to

create public humiliation on the part of her opponents. 41 Thus, the present case is readily

distinguishable from other cases, like those of Manzar Sayeed Khan and Debi Soren, where the

petitioners’ questionable writings or remarks were isolated, and a thorough examination of

overall context revealed no underlying goal to promote hatred.

Further, Bennet’s mens rea is evidenced by the fact that she continued promoting public

enmity even after being publicly warned by the Prime Minister of Camelot himself. 42 By issuing

a press statement in which he asks Bennet not to continue “raising tensions in the country,” he is

unequivocally putting Bennet on notice that her actions have caused disharmony and promoted

hatred. 43 In spite of this, Bennet declared that the “Hogwarts Party will continue its struggle.” 44

Ultimately, Bennet’s intent to promote enmity is demonstrated by examining her own

declarations, imbued with violent mens rea: “[w]e must rise in rebellion against these dirty

leeches on our mind and its thinking process…[t]ogether we will overthrow the government!

Break the government to pieces, if need be… [w]e will be the divine destruction which shall

vaporize the deep seated rot…” 45 Indeed, her language indicates an “us versus them,” mentality,

urging fellow members of the Hogwarts Party to rise in revolt.

However, even in the event that this Court finds Bennet lacked a clear showing of mens

rea, she is nevertheless culpable under 351-A because her statements and actions were of such a

nature that she should have known that they would result in hatred and chaos. In the case of

Gopal Vinayek Godse, the Bombay High Court noted that if speech or writing is so patently

inflammatory that a reasonable person should have assumed that discord would result, malicious

  • 39 Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).

  • 40 See Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2 (endorsing the sentiment that the current governments are ‘a bunch of useless war-mongers, and then expressing statements suggesting Camelot’s citizens were inferior to Genghiztan’s); 3 (referring to members of the government and opposing political parties as “dirty leeches on our minds and its thinking process,” and as “corrupt” while advocating to overthrow them); 5 (declaring that the Hogwarts party will “continue its struggle).

  • 41 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2.

  • 42 Id. at 4.

  • 43 Id.

  • 44 Id. at 5.

  • 45 Id. at 3.

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intent may be inferred. 46 Similarly here, Bennet, an educated woman, must have known that her

statements would disrupt harmony and promote enmity across political lines. No reasonable

individual, for instance, could genuinely believe that creating a campaign entitled “Mock and

Shame the Pseudo-Nationalist Government” would not create ire and tension among her

followers and the people the campaign was attempting to mock. 47 Moreover, any educated

citizen of Camelot, let alone a political leader, would be aware of the country’s acrimonious and

bellicose history with Genghiztan. 48 By publicly deriding her fellow countrymen, declaring that

Genghiztan’s citizens are healthier, more hard-working, and better educated than Camelot’s,

Bennet must have known that her statements were of a nature to inspire disharmony, particularly

among the soldiers who risked their lives to defend Camelot. 49

Here, the facts demonstrate that Bennet intended her statements to result in public unrest.

Moreover, even if this Court finds that there was not sufficient evidence to support a clear

showing of mens rea, Bennet’s culpability under 351-A may nevertheless be inferred from the

brazen nature of her actions.

  • 3. Bennet’s Conviction Under 351-A Was Proper Because Her Actions Resulted in Civil Unrest and Public Disharmony.

Bennet not only intended to commit the offenses outlined in section 351-A, she

succeeded in doing so. Subsection (1)(a) of 351-A proscribes words that promote or attempt to

promote disharmony or feelings of hatred between different groups or communities. 50 Here,

Bennet clearly violated this provision when she publicly praised Genghiztan at the expense of

Camelot’s citizens, as this likely resulted in feelings of ill will between the Hogwarts Party and

all soldiers who fought bravely to defend Camelot against Genghiztan. 51 The entirety of her

speech on the Grounds of Erehwon can also be seen as promoting enmity between the Hogwarts

Party and any politician currently working for Camelot’s government. 52 Additionally, subsection

(1)(b) proscribes acts that are prejudicial to, or are likely to disturb public tranquility. 53 Bennet’s

rally, in which 30,000 people gathered on hallowed ground in Erehwon and proceeded to attack

  • 46 Gopel Vinayak Godse v. The Union of India & Ors., AIR 1971 BOM 56 (1970) (India).

  • 47 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2.

  • 48 Id. at 1.

  • 49 Id. at 2.

  • 50 Camelot Pen. Code § 351 -A(1)(a).

  • 51 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2.

  • 52 See id.

  • 53 See Camelot Pen. Code § 351 -A(1)(b).

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and burn public property, easily falls within the realm of this provision. 54 The rally and its

subsequent results further violate subsection (1)(c), which prohibits the organization of any

movement in which participants are likely to use criminal force or violence, causing fear and

insecurity among different groups. 55 Bennet’s charge to the Hogwarts Party, resulting in a mob

of 200,000 56 members staked outside the Parliament of Camelot, in addition to the stalking of

Camelot government officials to shame them for their alleged “childish support,” readily qualify

as acts that inspire fear and insecurity under subsection (1)(c). 57

United States precedent has imposed more stringent requirements in determining if

speech or actions may be considered incitement. In the present case, Bennet’s actions meet this

heightened standard. Under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brandenburg, an individual

must not only intend for his statements to disrupt public harmony, the statements must actually

result, or be very likely to result, in the imminent disruption of harmony. 58 Here, the factual

record clearly demonstrates that “soon thereafter” Bennet made her inflammatory rally speech,

members of the Hogwarts Party mobilized the public to riot, shouting slogans and attacking and

burning public property. 59 As such, Bennet’s intent to create public unrest was accomplished

after her speech, resulting in clear violations of subsections (a) through (c) of section 351-A.

  • B. The Facts in the Record Readily Support Bennet’s Conviction of Sedition Under Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code.

In the Indian Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Kedar Nath, it emphasized the notion

that citizens of a democratic society are entitled to criticize their governments with an ultimate

goal of enacting positive change. 60 Statements that encourage violent governmental overthrow,

however, do not further this goal, and should be restricted as necessary to maintain the safety and

security of the State. The factual record of this case provides ample evidence that Bennet’s

statements were not made with the aim of enacting positive, lawful change within the Camelot

government. Rather, Bennet’s sedition conviction under Section 421-A should be reinstated first

because she possessed the requisite mens rea to be found guilty of sedition, second because she

  • 54 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 3.

  • 55 See Camelot Pen. Code § 351 -A(1)(c).

  • 56 The record is unclear. There was a minimum crowd of 200,000 but the record indicates it could have been as many as 2,000,000 people.

  • 57 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 3.

  • 58 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969).

  • 59 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 3.

  • 60 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955 (India).

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effectuated this intent and successfully excited disaffection towards the government of Camelot,

and third because her statements were directed to the government in its entirety.

Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code proscribes words that bring, or attempt to bring

disaffection or hatred towards the government or show that the government is mistaken in its

measures. 61 Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, outlining the offense of sedition, is nearly

identical to Section 421-A in the Camelot Penal Code. 62 In interpreting their respective

statutory offense of sedition, the Indian Supreme Court has declared that a finding of mens rea is

imperative to support a conviction. 63 Echoing the Bombay High Court’s sentiments in Queen-

Empress v. Balquanquaddhar Tilak, the Indian Supreme Court has declared, “if a man excites or

attempts to excite feelings of disaffection, great or small, he is guilty under the section.” 64

The Supreme Court in Kedar Nath declared that “tendency to disturb public order” is also

crucial for conviction under India’s sedition law. 65 This understanding is said to derive from

English law, which similarly holds that a “tendency to create tumult or disorder is an essential

element of sedition.” 66 The United States has similarly echoed this sentiment in Brandenburg v.

Ohio and Schneck v. United States, where the Supreme Court articulated that words must not

only be spoken with the intent to incite hatred, they must be likely to result in imminent

violence. 67

In determining whether particular statements were indeed made with the intent to excite

disaffection or contempt towards the government, precedent dictates that courts should consider

“the circumstances of each particular case and the manner and the occasion in which they are

mentioned.” 68 For example, in The State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi the Indian Supreme Court

considered a scenario in which certain individuals distributed pamphlets that included language

allegedly advocating for governmental overthrow. 69 In addition to the offending passage, the

  • 61 Camelot Pen. Code § 421 -A.

  • 62 See Indian Pen. Code § 124A. 63 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955 (India).

  • 64 Queen Empress v. Balquanqaddhar Tilak, (1897) ILR 22 Bom 112 (India); Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955 (India).

  • 65 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955 (India).

  • 66 RUSSELL ON CRIME, Vol. 1 at 229; R v. Collins, [1973] QB 100 (UK).

  • 67 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969).Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)

  • 68 P. Hemalatha v. The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh , AIR 1976 AP 375 (India). See also State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi, 1952 AIR 329 (India); Debi Soren and ors. v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254 (India).

  • 69 "Labourers, raise now the cry of revolution. The heavens will tremble, the Universe will shake and the flames of revolution will burst forth from land and water. You who have been the object of exploitation, now dance the fearful dance of destruction on this earth; truly, labourers, only total destruction will create a new world order and that will

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Supreme Court viewed the entire pamphlet and considered the fact that the materials were

distributed to highly impressionable audiences of laborers. 70 The Court ultimately determined

that the overall language and circumstances surrounding the pamphlets did support conviction. 71

Finally, in the context of sedition statutes, courts have differentiated politicians from the

government itself. “[T]he expression ‘the Government established by law"’ has to be

distinguished from the persons for the time being engaged in carrying on the administration.

‘Government established by law’ is the visible symbol of the State. The very existence of the

State will be in jeopardy if the Government established by law is subverted.” 72 The severity of

sedition is characterized by its nature as an offense against the State; similarly disapprobative

comments against a few individuals would be far less likely to put the security and safety of an

entire nation at risk. 73

  • 1. Bennet’s Conviction Under 421-A Should Be Reinstated Because She Possessed Bona Fide Intent to Incite Disaffection Towards the Government.

Global legal precedent has firmly established the need to demonstrate mens rea in order

to support a sedition conviction, and the factual record here demonstrates that Bennet did posses

the requisite intent. Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code proscribes words that bring or

attempt to bring hatred towards the government, or show that the government is mistaken. 74 In

order to determine whether Bennet intended to bring the government into contempt, the

circumstances surrounding her statements must be considered. Here, she is seen chastising the

Camelot government publicly on multiple occasions, declaring that they are drunk on power,

narrow-minded, and intellectually lazy. 75 These statements do not appear in isolation, however:

her entire political campaign is entitled “Mock and Shame the Pseudo-Nationalist Government,”

which is plainly indicative of her intent call the government and its measures into disrepute,

violating 421-A. Further, and perhaps most egregious, Bennet addressed a crowd of 30,000,

comprised mainly of students, commanding them to take up arms against the government, to

bring happiness to the whole world." 1952 AIR 329.

  • 70 See id.

  • 71 See id.

  • 72 Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chattisgarh, Crim App . No 86 of 2011 (India); Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955 (India).

  • 73 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955 (India).

  • 74 Camelot Pen. Code § 421 -A.

  • 75 See Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2, 3, 5.

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“break it to pieces,” and to be its “divine destruction.” 76 It is significant that Bennet directs her

statements to impressionable young adults, because as demonstrated in the case of Shailabala

Devi, it is important to consider the audience being addressed in determining whether there was

mens rea. Just as laborers the were found to be susceptible to the distribution of pamphlets in

Shailabala Devi, the students here are young, and likely more open to radical ideals. 77

Considering the circumstances surrounding Bennet’s comments, it is clear that she possessed

definitive intent to bring the government into contempt.

It is also significant to note that Bennet’s statements all reference the government

generally, and at no point makes mention of any politician. As such, it is easily understood that

Bennet’s statements were directed at the “the Government established by law,” not any particular

individual. 78 Had these actions been aimed at specific people working in a governmental

capacity, Camelot’s sedition statute may not have applied. 79 Here, however, Bennet is

unequivocally addressing the entire government, thus subjecting her to punishment under 421-A.

  • 2. Bennet’s Conviction Under 421-A Should Be Upheld Because Her Actions Had the Tendency of Promoting Violence Towards the Government.

Here, Bennet not only made inflammatory statements with the intent to inspire contempt

against the government, she succeeded in doing so. The Indian Supreme Court and the House of

Lords have held that the acts or speech in question must have the “tendency to disturb public

order.” 80 The U.S. Supreme Court has further held that words spoken with the intent to incite

hatred must also be likely to result in imminent violence. 81 Bennet’s actions meet all the above

standards, because “soon after” she publicly castigated the Camelot government at the rally on

the Grounds of Erehwon, attendees began to attack and burn public property. 82 Moreover,

thousands of people also began stalking members of the government with the ultimate aim of

deriding them for their allegedly “childish” behavior. 83 Bennet’s statements therefore not only

had a “tendency” to disturb public order, they did result in violence and destruction. Ultimately,

  • 76 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 3.

  • 77 State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi. 1952 AIR 329 (India).

  • 78 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955 (India).

  • 79 Camelot Pen. Code § 421 -A.

  • 80 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955 (India); R v. Collins, [1973] QB 100 (UK).

  • 81 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969).Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)

  • 82 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 3.

  • 83 See Id.

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the offenses under 421-A have clearly been made out against Bennet, as the facts demonstrate

she intended to bring the government into contempt, and with her statements she succeeded in

creating violence and public disorder.

  • C. Bennet’s Conviction Should Be Upheld Under 210-B Because She Conspired with Other Hogwarts Party Members to Commit The Offenses Detailed in 351-A and 421-A.

Even in the event that this Hon’be Court finds that the offenses in 421-A and 351-A have

not been made out against Bennet, it should still find that there were ample facts to convict her of

conspiracy to commit those offenses under 210-B. Here, Bennet’s conviction of criminal

conspiracy should be reinstated because first she made a conscious agreement with other

members of the Hogwarts Party to engage in criminal behavior, second because, as discussed in

Parts II.A.2 and II.B.1 supra, she possessed the requisite mens rea to commit the offenses laid

out in 351-A and 421-A, and third because she committed an actus reus in furtherance of these

objectives.

Camelot Penal Code Section 210-B indicates that an individual may be found guilty, and

punished severely, if they conspire to commit an offense punishable by death or life

imprisonment. 84 Most common law countries require prosecutors to prove a series of elements

in order to convict someone of criminal conspiracy: 85 there must have been an understanding

between multiple people, with the objective being an illicit goal, and the individuals then must

act in some way to further or enable the conspiracy. 86 It is commonly understood that a

conspiracy requires an agreement. 87 The highest courts in the U.S. and U.K. have continually

held that the essence of a conspiracy is “an agreement to commit an unlawful act.” 88 An

agreement does not need to be formal or in writing: any indication that there was a “meeting of

the minds” is sufficient. 89 Given the inherent difficulty in finding concrete proof of an

  • 84 Camelot Pen. Code § 210 -B.

  • 85 See Iannelli v. U.S., 420 U.S. 770; See American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); Mathuri and ors v. State of Punjab, 1964 AIR 986 (India).

  • 86 Mulcahy v. R, [1868] LR 3 HL 306 (UK)

  • 87 United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975). See also Ingram v. U.S., 360 U.S. 672 (“conviction for conspiracy under federal conspiracy statute cannot be sustained unless there is proof of an agreement to commit [the charged offense]”); Mulcahy v. R, [1868] LR 3 HL 306 (UK).

  • 88 United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that conspiracy should be found only the agreement reflects a specific intent to comm it a crime); Mulcahy v. R, [1868] LR 3 HL 306 (UK).

  • 89 See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765 (1984); American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).

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agreement, courts use circumstantial evidence as proof. 90 Thus, in order to prove the existence of

a criminal agreement, courts must examine all relevant facts and circumstances to draw an

inference. 91

The accused individual must have also possessed a mens rea to be found guilty of

conspiracy. 92 The mens rea element of this offense is characterized by “specific intent,” 93 which

means that the accused cannot merely plan to engage in general lawless action: they must intend

to commit a particular offense. 94 Moreover, an individual must commit an actus reus 95 in

furtherance of the ultimate criminal goal. Indeed, “no one is punished for the harboring merely

of a criminal intent. There must be an act giving adequate expression to the intent.” 96 Thus, the

actus reus element, or the “overt act,” requires proof of some action undertaken with the goal of

effectuating the objective of the conspiracy. A qualifying act may be something as brazen as

attempting to execute the crime itself, or something less obvious, like preemptively purchasing

the materials needed to commit the offense. 97 The Indian Supreme Court has noted that, in order

to determine whether an act was motivated by a conspiracy, a court must take into consideration

“all relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge [of] the natural consequences”

of the action. 98

  • 1. Bennet engaged in an agreement to further criminal objectives with Fun Toosh, Rebello Gonsalves, and other members of the Hogwarts Party.

Bennet did not act alone when she planned to promote enmity among groups, or incite

hatred towards the government: she had the support of Mr. Rebello Gonsalves, Mr. Fun Toosh,

and the entire Hogwarts Party. The record indicates that Bennet was not the only one charged

with the offenses in 421-A, 351-A, and criminal conspiracy. In fact, she was arrested, tried, and

  • 90 See American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); Mathuri and ors v. State of Punjab, 1964 AIR 986 (India) (assessing criminal intent behind an act by considering unlawful conduct was the “dominant intention which prompted the entry.”)

  • 91 Id.

  • 92 United States v. Jimenez Reico, 537 U.S. 270, 274-75 (2003); State of W.B. v. Mohammed Khalid, 1995 AIR 785, 1995 SCC (1) 684 (India); State of Maharashtra v. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed, 1994 SCC, Supl. (1) 579 (India). 93 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973).

  • 94 See id. (holding that speeches made at a protest that advocate rioting did not amount to specific intent because they amounted to “nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time”).

  • 95 Actus reus,” translated from Latin, means “guilty act.” Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary.

  • 96 Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, U. PENN. L. REV. 1941. 624, 628.

  • 97 See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908, 921 (2d Cir. 1957) (defendants convicted of criminal conspiracy for tax evasion after they were found altering IRS statements); See United States v. Berberian, 851 F.2d 236 (Cal. 1988) (evidence that defendant purchased only nonexplosive components of bomb still resulted in conspiracy conviction).

  • 98 Mathuri and ors v. State of Punjab , 1964 AIR 986 (India).

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found guilty along with Rebello Gonsalves and Fun Toosh, both members of the Hogwarts

Party. 99 The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that an agreement need not be formal, and can be

merely a “meeting of the minds;” 100 the Indian Supreme Court has also held that circumstantial

evidence may be used to prove the existence of such a scheme. 101 It can therefore be presumed

that Bennet’s speech, planned rally, and subsequent disruptive protests were accomplished with

the help of these two individuals, in addition to the rest of the Hogwarts Party. 102 The

circumstances surrounding their joint arrest and the overall nature of Bennet’s political regime,

which relied on the support and dedication of her followers, points directly to an understanding

among Hogwarts Party members, thereby constituting an “agreement.” 103

  • 2. Bennet possessed the requisite mens rea to be found guilty of criminal conspiracy

As discussed throughout this Memorial, and particularly in Parts II.A.2 and II.B.1 supra,

all of Bennet actions have been characterized by deliberation and intent, proving that she

possessed the necessary mens rea to be found guilty not only of the offenses outlined in 421-A

and 351-A, but also conspiring to commit these acts under 210-B.

  • 3. Bennet committed an actus reus by encouraging her supporters to destroy the government.

Bennet is guilty of conspiring to promote enmity and commit sedition because she took

affirmative steps to effectuate discord. Common law precedent requires that an individual

knowingly act in some way to further the objective of a crime in order to be found guilty of

conspiracy. 104 Here, Bennet’s statements at the rally readily meet this requirement. By standing

in front of tens of thousands of supporters and vocally encouraging the overthrow of the

government, Bennet acted affirmatively with the aim of both promoting enmity between

different groups of people, and bringing the government into contempt. 105 Indeed, these acts

were crucial to the successful execution of her planned uprising.

99 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 5-6.

  • 100 See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765 (1984); American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).

  • 101 Dr. Vinayak Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2011) 266 ELT 193 (India).

  • 102 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 5-6.

  • 103 See generally Statement of Facts, Moot Problem 2-6.

  • 104 See Cline v. State, 204 Tenn. 251 (Ten. 1958); Yates, 354 U.S. 254 (1957).

  • 105 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 3.

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As such, this Hon’ble Court must find that, at minimum, Bennet conspired to commit the

offenses outlined in sections 351-A and 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code because she not only

schemed with others to help realize her intended civil unrest, but she also acted with the

deliberate aim of achieving this goal.

III. THE DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD BE IMPOSED BECAUSE IT IS AN

APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT FOR THE OFFENSE OF SEDITION AND

THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

The death sentence is an appropriate punishment for the offense of sedition and should be

imposed in this case because Bennet was the mastermind behind a plan that threatened the safety

of Camelot. The only way to ensure that she will be prevented from inciting violence and

anarchy in the future is to sentence her to death. Though the death sentence is considered an

“extreme” punishment, it maintains widespread use throughout countries across the world. 106

Ninety-six countries still have the death penalty as a possible punishment for certain crimes,

including both the United States and India. 107 In fact, in 2015 alone, the United States executed

28 people and sentenced 52 more to death. 108 Though India executed only one individual in

2015, 75 people were sentenced to death. 109 Further, after a comprehensive review of the use of

the death penalty in India, the Law Commission of India did not recommend abolishing the death

penalty completely. 110 In fact, it concluded that there was still great concern for abolishing the

death sentence for terrorism-type offenses that affect national security. 111 These statistics

indicate the death penalty is still widely used in democracies and is a necessary punishment for

some crimes, especially for offenses that affect national security.

Sedition, in particular, is a serious offense and imposition of the death sentence is

therefore appropriate for some offenders. In India, sedition is classified as an offense against the

state, similar to treason. 112 “Sedition is a crime against society, nearly allied to that of treason,

and it frequently precedes treason by short interval.” 113 Though death is not a punishment for

  • 106 Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences and Executions at 65 (2015).

  • 107 Id.

  • 108 Id. at 13.

  • 109 Id. at 25.

  • 110 Law Commission of India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty, at 217 (Aug. 2015),

http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report262.pdf.

  • 111 Id.

  • 112 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India).

  • 113 Id.

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sedition in either India or the United States, it is for treason, 114 indicating that crimes against

society that threaten the security of the nation are serious offenses for which an extreme

punishment is appropriate.

In deciding which cases fit the extreme category justifying the death penalty, it is

important to look at the nature of the crime and any aggravating circumstances. 115 In India,

courts have not been consistent in determining which factors make a case so exceptional as to

warrant the death penalty. 116 However, several themes from various decisions indicate that age,

the nature of the crime, level of planning, and possibility of reform are factors to consider. 117

The most recent execution in India was that of Yakub Radul Azak Memon, one of the men

responsible for the 1993 Mumbai bombings. 118 In sentencing him to death, the court considered

aggravating factors such as his significant role in planning the attack, that it was an act of

terrorism, and that he chose a crowded area with lots of victims. 119

Additionally, age and education are other sentencing factors courts consider before

imposing the death penalty. The younger the offender, the less likely the death sentence seems

appropriate. 120 Similarly, courts may consider less-educated offenders as less culpable. For

example, in Memon v. State, the court considered the working-class and low education levels of

the ten appellants who planted the explosives as mitigating factors, indicating they were not

masterminds but rather “subservient minions.” 121

These factors are also relevant to the likelihood of reform. If an offender seems likely to

reform his ways, the death sentence does not seem like an appropriate punishment. In Bariyar v.

State, the Indian Supreme Court noted that the death penalty is allowed when other options are

foreclosed, meaning the “sentencing aim of reformation can be said to be unachievable.” 122 The

  • 114 Indian Pen. Code § 121; 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012).

  • 115 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 684 (India).

  • 116 See Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC. 767 (India); see also Law Commission of India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty, at 109-10 (Aug. 2015),

http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report262.pdf.

  • 117 Yakub Radul Azak Memon v. State of Masharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 396 (India); Law Commission of India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty, at 109-10 (Aug. 2015), http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report262.pdf.

  • 118 Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences and Executions at 30 (2015).

  • 119 Yakub Radul Azak Memon v. State of Masharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 396 (India).

  • 120 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 684 (India); Ramnaresh and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257 (India). Law Commission of India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty, at 122-23 (Aug. 2015),

http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report262.pdf.

  • 121 Yakub Radul Azak Memon v. State of Masharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 396 (India).

  • 122 Santosh Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498 (India).

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URN 1306

court in Md Mannan v. State echoed this consideration when it affirmed the defendant’s death

sentence because the accused was a “menace to society and shall continue to be so and he cannot

be reformed.” 123

Finally, in addition to aggravating factors, it is also important to consider the penological

goals of punishment. The main justifications for punishment are rehabilitation, deterrence, and

incapacitation. 124 When rehabilitation is not possible, as noted above, the accused cannot be

returned to society. 125 In that case, sometimes the death sentence is the only way to fully achieve

the goals of deterrence and incapacitation. Deterrence aims to prevent individuals from offending

through fear of punishment. 126 This is strengthened when the punishment is death because

human beings fear dying. 127 Incapacitation attempts to remove dangerous offenders from

society. 128 The Supreme Court of India has recognized this need to incapacitate certain offenders

completely: “Whenever some infection some infection is spread in a limb, effort is made to cure

the same by giving antibiotics orally and if that does not work, by following second line of

treatment. Sometimes it may require surgical intervention also. However, if the infection results

in infecting the limb to the extent that it becomes gangrene, amputation is the only treatment.” 129

Though the Law Commission of India cast doubt on the death penalty’s effectiveness for

deterrence or incapacitation, it did not recommend abolishment for all crimes. 130 This indicates

that the death penalty still serves deterrence and incapacitation benefits beyond that of life

imprisonment. Thus, while the death sentence is an extreme penalty, certain circumstances and

penological goals still justify its use in some cases.

It is important for Camelot to maintain the option of the death sentence for sedition and it

is an appropriate punishment for Bennet under the facts of this case. First, as established above,

Bennet is guilty of the offense of sedition, a serious crime against the nation of Camelot, a newly

independent country. Her speech to overthrow the government clearly falls within the sedition

statute and comes close to treason, a crime for which other countries have imposed the death

  • 123 Md. Mannan v . State of Bihar, (2011) 8 SCC 65 (India).

  • 124 See, e.g., Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 1.5 (2d ed.).

  • 125 Md. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 8 SCC 65 (India).

  • 126 Law Commission of India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty, at 76 (Aug. 2015),

http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report262.pdf.

  • 127 Id.

  • 128 See, e.g., Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 1.5 (2d ed.).

  • 129 Kanhaiya Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 1362, 02 Mar. 2016 (emphasis added).

  • 130 Law Commission of India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty, at 213 (Aug. 2015),

http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report262.pdf.

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sentence. Camelot must be able to protect itself and prevent anarchy. Thus, it is necessary to

keep the death sentence as a possible punishment for extreme cases such as the present case.

Second, there many aggravating factors here that make the death sentence appropriate.

Bennet is an educated, politically-savvy adult, with great influence over others as a government

official. She is not part of the lower strata of society like the ten appellants sentenced to life

imprisonment in Memon v. State. In contrast, rather than being a mere subservient minion, she

was the mastermind and main participant in advocating overthrow of the government. She chose

a well-known and historic place where she knew lots of people would gather. 131 As the leader of

a political party made up mainly of students, 132 she used her influence to manipulate these

young, malleable minds to cause public disorder and rebel. Merely planning and assisting in the

attack was enough to sentence the defendant to death in Memon and therefore Bennet’s

incitement is sufficient to warrant the death sentence here. The fact that no one died on June 1,

2015, does not mean nothing could have happened or could still happen as a result of Bennet’s

advocacy for violent rebellion. Like the defendant in Md Mannan v. State, she is a menace to

society with no hope of reform. 133 She had multiple chances to apologize and ease tensions.

However, even after the complaint was filed, she continued gave a press conference, 134

indicating she feels no remorse or call to reform. All of these factors mandate the death sentence.

Finally, imposing the death sentence here is the only way to fully achieve important

penological goals. Bennet incited a crowd of 30,000 people. An additional minimum of 200,000

people then protested the government. 135 The only way to deter her followers and other

members of the Hogwarts Party from picking up where Bennet left off is to sentence her to

death. Moreover, life imprisonment would not serve the same goal of incapacitation as the death

sentence here because, as evidenced by her press conference after the FIR, Bennet can still speak

out to rebel against the government from prison. She has been given multiple chances to reform,

has not, and now amputation is the only logical treatment.

In conclusion, this Court should reverse the High Court’s acquittals, re-instate Bennet’s

convictions, and impose the death sentence for the offense of sedition.

  • 131 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2.

  • 132 Id. at 1.

  • 133 Md. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 8 SCC 65 (India).

  • 134 Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 5.

  • 135 Id. at 3. The record is unclear but suggests that it could have been as many as 2,000,000 people.

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PRAYER

URN 1306

Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is

humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:

  • 1. Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code is constitutional on its face;

  • 2. The State has made out the offenses against Bennet under Sections 421-A, 351-A, and 210-B of the Camelot Penal Code and her convictions are re- instated; and

  • 3. The death sentence is an appropriate punishment for the facts of this case and should be imposed.

And pass any other order, direction, or relief that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the

interests of justice, equity and good conscience.

All of which is humbly prayed,

URN – 1306

Counsels for the Petitioner.

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