ORGANIZATIONALBEHAVIORAND HUMANPERFORMANCE32, 262-274 (1983)

A Bayesian Model of Group Polarization

ROBERT E BORDLEY

General Motors Research Labs

The group polarization hypothesis states that individual attitudes tend to
become more extreme, "more polarized," as a result of group discussion.
The hypothesis was developed as a generalization of the well-known risky
shift effect: the fact that individuals tend to make riskier decisions after group
discussion than before group discussion. The group polarization hypothesis is
supported by much experimental evidence. The principles of Bayesian decision theory are used to model how individual attitudes will change after group
discussion. The model predicts the group polarization effect. Thus (1) it is
shown that the group polarization effect can be viewed as arising from individual rationality, (2) a model of how much individual attitudes change after
group discussion is derived.

INTRODUCTION
Much research has established that group discussion changes individual
attitudes in systematic ways. Thus Stoner (1968) had six persons at a time
respond as individuals to a series of story problems called "choice-dilemma" items (Kogan & Wallach, 1964). The subject's task was to advise
the fictitious character of each item about how much risk he/she should
take in facing a given decision dilemma. For example, consider the following item:
George, a competent chess player, is participating in a national chess tournament.
In an early match, he draws the top-favored player in the tournament as his opponent. George has been given a relatively low ranking in view of his performance
in previous tournaments. During the course of his play with the top-favored man,
George notes the possibility of a deceptive though risky maneuver which might
bring him a quick victory. At the same time, if the attempted maneuver should
fail, George would be in an exposed position and defeat would almost certainly
follow.
Imagine that you are advising George. Check the lowest probability of success
that you consider acceptable for George to attempt the risky maneuver.
George should attempt the play if the chances are at least:
_ _
1 in 10 that the play would succeed
_ _
2 in 10 that the play would succeed
3 in 10 that the play would succeed
4 in l0 that the play would succeed
_ _
5 in 10 that the play would succeed
_

Requests for reprints should be sent to Dr. Robert E Bordley, Societal Analysis Department, General Motors Research Labs, Warren, MI 48090.
262
0030-5073/83 $3.00
Copyright 1983by AcademicPress, Inc.
All rights of reoroductionin any formreserved.

BAYESIAN MODEL OF POLARIZATION

_ _
_ _

6 in 10 that the
7 in 10 that the
8 in 10 that the
9 in 10 that the
George should
succeed.

263

play would succeed

play would succeed
play would succeed
play would succeed
attempt the play only if the play is certain (10 in 10) to

After marking their individual responses to all the items, the participants
then assembled as a group and discussed each item until they agreed on
a group response to each item. In general the group response was more
risky than that of the individuals.
This particular effect was called the "risky shift" and was followed by
many more studies and experiments. However, in different contexts, one
could demonstrate a "shift to greater caution." It has been found that
items which elicit initially relatively risky responses led to even more
risky responses after group discussion. Conversely, items which initially
elicit relatively cautious responses led to even more cautious responses
after group discussion (see Teger & Pruitt, 1967).
What this suggests is that group discussion tends to make subjects
whose initial attitudes might have been risky or cautious even more risky
or cautious. Thus their attitudes become more extreme or polarized. Myers
and Lamm (1976) called this finding the "Group Polarization Hypothesis: . . . . The average postdiscussion response will tend to be more extreme in the same direction as the average of the prediscussion responses."
This paper will develop a model of attitude change from group discussion. The first section of the paper sets up George's situation as a Bayesian decision problem. This means that a subject will determine the lowest
chances he accepts for George's problem by considering the underlying
utilities and subjective probabilities.
Bayesian decision theory I predicts that the subjective probabilities asi Much recent experimental evidence argues against the empirical validity of Bayesian
decision theory. Thus in " W h o Accepts Savage's Axiom?" (to name one of many such
articles), Slovic and Tversky argue that indivduals in experimental settings do not appear
to obey Savage's "sure-thing" principle. In response to these comments, some economists
argue that Bayesian decision theory should not be judged on the basis of the validity of its
axioms but on the basis of how useful its implications are. Thus, if Bayesian theory leads
to successful models of individual economic behavior, we might conclude that Bayesian
theory--though not an accurate description of human behavior--is nevertheless a useful
theoretical tool.
This answer is not fully satisfying. Some recent work has developed more sophisticated
models of human behavior based on Bayesian theory. (Thus see Domencich & McFadden
(1975).) In my opinion, answers to the present objections to Bayesian theory will arise from
such more complex developments of Bayesian theory. In the meantime, this'paper develops
certain empirical implications of Bayesian theory; these empirical implications will be qualitatively consistent with certain well-known psychological phenomena. Hence in a sense,
this paper demonstrates the usefulness of Bayesian theory as a theoretical tool in the context
of group behavior.

264

R O B E R T F. B O R D L E Y

sessed after group discussion should differ from the subjective probabilities assessed prior to group discussion. If these subjective probabilities
differ in the ways specified by Supposition 1 of Section 1, then Section
1 shows that we can predict the risky shift in George's problem. In fact
we can predict the risky and cautious shifts implied by the Group Polarization Hypothesis, in general.
Thus Supposition 1 specifying how subjective probabilities after group
discussion differ from subjective probabilities prior to group discussion
implies the empirical risky and cautious shifts in the Group Polarization
Hypothesis. The second section derives a formula relating the postdiscussion subjective probabilities to the prediscussion subjective probabilities. This is derived from Bayesian rationality conditions.
The third section shows that this formula implies Supposition 1. Thus
this paper shows that the risky shifts and cautious shifts can be deduced
from the principles of Bayesian decision theory and that the Group Polarization Phenomenon can be viewed as the result of individual Bayesian
rationality in group discussion. The fourth section discusses the application of this formula to a problem somewhat more complicated than
George's. This shows that the formulas I derive enable us to estimate not
only the direction of the shifts but also the magnitude.
1. GEORGE'S PROBLEM

In George's situation, there are four possible occurrences:

1. George tries
v(m)).
2. George tries
tim)).
3. George does
(denoted by v(o)).
4. George does
ignated by f(o)).

the risky maneuver and wins the game (denoted by

the risky maneuver and loses the game (denoted by
not try the risky maneuver but still wins the game
not try the risky maneuver and loses the game (des-

Suppose that individual k is asked to advise George. Let uk(v(m)), uk(v(o)),

uk(f(m)), and Uk(f(o)) be individual k's utilities for the four different eventualities. Let pk(v(m)) and pkff(m)) be individual k's subjective probability
that George will win the game if he tries the maneuver and that George
will lose the game if he tries the maneuver. Similarly let pk(v(o)) and
pk(f(o)) be individual k's subjective probability that George will win the
game if he does not try the maneuver and that George will lose the game
if he does not try the maneuver.
We assume individual k is rational in the sense of Bayesian decision
theory. Then the individual would advise George to try the maneuver if
and only if uk (try) 1> Uk (not try), i.e.,

265

BAYESIAN MODEL OF POLARIZATION

pk(v(m)) Uk(V(m)) + pk(f(m))uk(f(m)) >! pk(V(O))Uk(V(O))

+ pk(f(o))u~q~o)).

(1.1)

We assume that individual k is pragmatic so that the utility of winning

given that George tries the maneuver is the same as the utility of winning
given that George does not try. Likewise the utility of losing does not
depend upon whether George tried or not. (Section 4 considers a case in
which we drop this assumption.) If individual k is pragmatic in this sense,
then ul,(v(m)) = uk(v(o)) = u~(v) and uk(f(m)) = Uk(((O)) = ul,(D.
Assuming an individual acts so as to maximize his expected utility
means that his subjective probabilities obey the laws of probability. Hence
if George can either win or lose--there is no stalemate--we have p~(f(m))
= 1 - p k ( v ( m ) ) and pkff(o)) = 1 -- pk(v(o)). So (1.1) becomes

p/,(v(m))

(uk(v) -

uz:(f)) + uk (f) >-

p~(v(o)) (u,(v) -- u~q)) + U~ (f).

(1.2)

Since the utility of winning exceeds the utility of losing, this becomes
p k ( v ( m ) ) ~ pk(V(O)).

(1.3)

In other words, individual k advises George to try the maneuver if and

only if there is a greater chance of George winning if he tries the maneuver
than if he does not try it.
In the experiment, individual k is asked to check the lowest probability
of success he is willing to accept and still advise George to take the risk
and try the maneuver. Suppose we assume that individual k's verbal
estimates of probability accurately reflect his subjective probabilities.
Suppose that individual k says that he will require r in 10 chances of
success before advising George to try the maneuver. Then we know that
r
r- 1
1-o >~ pk(v(o)) >1 1----o-

(1.4)

Thus the lowest probability individual k is willing to accept depends

upon individual k's subjective probability pk(v(o)).
Now suppose individual k joins a group of other individuals and discusses the problem. Let p~ (v(o)) be the individual's probability assessment after the group discussion.
Consider the following Supposition (which will be proved later).
Supposition 1

(a) If Pk (v(o)) is small, then p~(v(o)) will tend to be even smaller.

(b) If pk(v(o)) is large, then p~ (v(o)) will tend to be even larger.
(What "small" and "large" mean will be clarified in later sections.)

266

ROBERT F. BORDLEY

Let us assume the supposition is true. Then, since George is rated as

worse than his opponent, Pk (v(o)) will be small. Thus p~ (v(o)) will be
even smaller. Hence from (1.4), individual k will be willing to accept a
lower value of r before advising George to try the risky maneuver. Thus
after the discussion, individual k will appear to be more risk-inclined than
he was before the discussion.
Consider a slightly different problem. Suppose George is rated as better
than his opponent. Then p~ (v(o)) will tend to be large. Thus using Supposition 1, p~ (v(o)) will be even larger. Hence, after the discussion, individual k demands a higher value of r before he accepts the risk. Thus
individual k will appear to be more cautious after the group discussion.
George's problem and this second slight modification of George's
problem are representative of the types of situations which have revealed
the phenomena of "risky shift" and "cautious shift." We see that if we
view the individuals as rational in the sense of Bayesian decision theory,
then Supposition 1 implies the risky shifts and cautious shifts observed
in the literature and conjectured by the Group Polarization Hypothesis.
If we can show that Supposition 1 follows from certain group consistency conditions, we will have shown that the Group Polarization Hypothesis can be predicted from such considerations alone. Hence we do
not need to postulate any change in the risk-aversiveness of the individuals. Under this model, what is really happening is a change in the perceived probability of different events.
The next section derives a model relating p~(v(o)) to p~ (v(o)). This
model is essentially an adaptation of a formula for relating the subjective
probability of a decision maker after consulting a group of experts to his
subjective probability prior to consulting that group of experts.
2. THE EFFECT OF GROUP DISCUSSION
Suppose n individuals are involved in the experiment. Let individual k
(k = 1,2 . . . . n) have subjective probability Pk (E) for event E prior to
entering a group discussion. In the case of George, E could be the event
"George does not try the risky maneuver but wins the game."
Individual k enters a group discussion with the other (n - 1) individuals. He hears their opinions, feelings, ideas, and other information. After
the discussion, his subjective probability for event E becomes ply(E).
The problem of relating p~ (E) to Pk (E) is very complicated if we do
not place any limitation on what affects individual k's subjective probability. Thus this paper makes a very important assumption. We assume
that the influence individualj has on individual k's subjective probability
assessment--this includes all the opinions, feelings, facts, and other information which individual j communicates to individual k---can be summarized by individualj's initial subjective probability for event E, pj (E). 2
There are some circumstances under which this assumption seems rea-

BAYESIAN MODEL OF POLARIZATION

267

sonable. 3 Thus suppose our situation involves very few " h a r d f a c t s " or
an unmanageably large n u m b e r of " h a r d facts" (so that it is difficult to
decide which facts to pay attention to). In these cases, individuals must
rely heavily upon intuition in making their judgments, an intuition which
is not easily " e x p l a i n e d " in the actual group discussion. In a sense then,
the only information which individuals can communicate is how confident
they feel about event E occurring or not occurring. And that is just information about their subjective probabilities.
George's problem seems to be such a situation. Thus it seems reasonable to use this assumption in George's case. We formalize the assumption as
The probability-pooling assumption. The information which the group
discussion gives individual k can be summarized by the n-1 subjective
probabilities P l (E) . . . . , P k - 1 (E), Pk + 1 (E), . . . , Pn (E).
With the probability-pooling assumption, we can think of individual k
as consulting a group of (n - 1) individuals about the probability of event
E. In group discussion, the (n - 1) individuals give individual k the
assessments Pl (E) . . . . , P~ - 1 (E), Pk + 1 (E), . . . , Pn (E). Given these
assessments, individual k revises his own probability p~ (E). Thus the
problem becomes a problem of pooling probability assessments. (See
Winkler (1968, 1981), Morris (1974, 1977), Bordley (1982).)
Without loss o f generality, we c o m b i n e individual k's a s s e s s m e n t ,
Pk (E), with the (n - 1) other assessments to form the vector of n assessments: (171 (E) . . . . , Pn (E)). Individual k's problem is to aggregate
these estimates to form his own final estimate, p~ (E).
The argument is presented in Bordley (1982). We review the key steps
here:
(A) First we make the continuity assumptions needed to write p~ (E)
as some f u n c t i o n F of (191 (E) . . . . .
p~ (E)). Thus we get p~ (E) =
F(pl, , P~)(B) We then make certain assumptions of noninteraction--these are
similar to separability assumptions used in additive value theory. We find
p~(E)

F (j=~1 gj(pj(E)))

where gl . . . . g~ are monotonic functions.

(C) We m a k e similar assumptions to get aggregation functions for
p~ (not E) and p~ (E/A) for some event A. The weights assigned different
experts will probably change depending upon whether we are concerned
with event E, the complement of E, or E conditioned on event A.
(D) We make certain assumptions from Bayesian probability theory
about how p~ (E), p~ (not E), and p~ (E/A) relate.

268

ROBERT F. BORDLEY

This gives us our formula. It has the form

n

j= l \Po(E) ]
p*k(E) =

(2.1)

j= \ p o ( E ) ]
1

po(E) + l--[ --~

j=l

~ /

( 1 - po(e))

where wl, w, are weights which individual k assigns to each one of

the individuals in the group (wk is the weight he assigns to himself) and
where Po (E) is a threshold probability which satisfies all the rules of
probability.
Formula (2.1) is equivalent (if all probabilities are between 0 and 1) to

Lk(G ) = j~lWjLj.=
where

Jr

)
1 - j=l~WJ

L0

(2.2)

(p~(E) )
Lk(G) = log

1 -p-~E)

'

Lj

= log 1 ; ~e)/'

L0

=log 1-700(a/"

Thus this formula says that the logarithm of the odds assessed by individual k after the group discussion is the weighted sum of the log-odds
assessed by each individual prior to the group discussion plus some constant.
If information is defined according to information theory as
I(E) = - log (p(E))
then the log-odds, L(E) = /(not E) - I(E). We could refer to the logodds as the net information favoring the occurrence of event E.
With that interpretation, Eq. (2.2) says that the net information favoring
event E which individual k carries out of the discussion with him is a
weighted sum of the net information which each individual carried into
the discussion with him plus some correction constant.
Now consider the weights. The weight ws.reflects the importance which
individual k attaches to j's opinion. It is a function of
(1) How accurate individualj's opinions have been in the past: Has he
been confident and then been wrong?

269

BAYESIAN MODEL OF POLARIZATION

(2) How biased individual j ' s opinions tend to be: Does individual j
tend to overstate what he knows? Does he tend to overqualify his judgments?
(3) How much the information which individual j ' s opinion reflects is
similar to the information other individuals have.
What is the sum of the weights? Suppose we assume that every individual in the group has some positive weight, wj > 0. Thus in particular
n

Ewj> 0.

j=l

j#k

Now Wk is the weight individual k assigns to himself. If we assume that

weight is one--the individual does not give his information less weight
than he did prior to group discussion--wk = 1. Hence

~wi= w~+
j=l

wj>l.
j=l

j#k

This leads us to one final, but crucial, assumption.

T h e W e i g h t s A s s u m p t i o n : Enj= 1 w j > 1. The Weights Assumption coupled with formula (2.1) lead to the risky shift and cautious shift effects.
But the Weights Assumption is based upon the idea that the individual
learns more about the event in question from the group discussion than
he knew previously. Through comparing how certain he feels about the
event with how certain other people feel about the event, his own feeling
of certainty in the event occurring changes.
The next section shows how formula (2.1) with the Weights Assumption
leads to the Group Polarization Phenomenon. The succeeding section
then illustrates the power of formula (2.1) in predicting the extent of the
effect in different circumstances.

3. THE GROUP POLARIZATION EFFECT

This section shows that formula (2.1) with the Weights Assumption
implies Supposition 1. (Supposition 1, of course, predicts the behavior
described by the Group Polarization Hypothesis.) First recall formula
(2.2):
=

,-

j=l

Define vj = wj/E'~=lwi. Thus wj = (Enj=lWj) (vj) (with Enj=lWj # 0). Then

we can rewrite (2.2) as
(Lk(G) -

Lo) =

vj (Lj -

Lo

(3.1)

270

ROBERT F. BORDLEY

Thus the difference between Y, vjLj and Lo is magnified by the factor

E wj to get the difference between Lk (G) and Lo. Hence if E vjLj - Lo is
- e < 0, Lk(G) - Lo is - ( E wj) e < - e < 0. Likewise if E vjLj - Lo is
+ > 0 , thenLk(G) - Lois + ( E w j ) > > 0 .
Thus if E~j= lvjLj < Lo, then L~ (G) will be even further less than Lo
(for Enj= lwj > 1). Likewise if E~= lvjLj > Lo, then Lk (G) will be even
larger than Lo (for E~= lwj >1).
Hence we compare Lk (G) with an average of the L~ . . . . . Ln's (where
the weights, vj, used in that weighted average are such that vi/vj = wi/wj;
as a result, the relatiVe importance of different individuals in the weighted
average is the same as the relative importance of individuals in the group
discussion leading to Lk (G)). We find that L~ (G) is smaller than the
average for events where the weighted average is small. We find that
Lk (G) is larger than the average for events where the weighted average
is large. Since we can transform the L's back into subjective probabilities,
this result is equivalent to Supposition 1. Supposition 1 in turn leads to
the phenomena described by the Group Polarization Hypothesis. Thus
formula (2.1) does imply the risky shift and cautious shift phenomena
observed in numerous psychological experiments.
4. A FINAL ILLUSTRATION
The problem of George and the chess game illustrates many aspects of
the group polarization effect. However, in that illustration, we assumed
that George was pragmatic--that the value of winning was the same,
whether he won by the risky maneuver or by playing safe and that the
value of losing was the same, whether he lost by the risky maneuver or
by playing safe. But there are many situations in which this is not the
case.
Thus suppose we have a doctor debating whether or not to perform
some surgery. His patient is unconscious and the doctor cannot get advice
from the patient or any of his family. He can only consult (n - 1) of his
professional colleagues who have some familiarity with the patient's condition. The patient can either recover or die.
Define:
Pk (v(m))
Pk (v(o))

uk (v(m))
u~ ff(m))

to be the doctor's perceived probability of the patient

recovering given the doctor conducts the surgery;
to be the doctor's perceived probability of the patient
recovering given the doctor does not conduct the surgery;
to be the doctor's utility for the patient recovering after
having surgery done;
to be the doctor's utility for the patient dying after having
surgery done;

BAYESIAN MODEL OF POLARIZATION

Uk (V(O))
uk 0C(O))

271

to be the doctor's utility for the patient recovering when

no surgery is done;
to be the doctor's utility for the patient dying when no
surgery is done.

The doctor will choose surgery if and only if

p~ (v(m)) u~ (v(m)) + (1 - p~ (v(m))) uk ff(m))/> Pk (v(o)) uk (v(o))
+ (1 - P k (v(o))) u~ if(o)).
Define a = (uk (rio)) - Uk (f(m)))/(uk (v(m)) -- Uk (tim))). We could view
the constant " a " as a measure of the " c o s t " of surgery. Define b =
(u~ (v(o)) - Uk (f(O)))/(Uk (v(m)) -- u~ (f(m))). We could view " b " as a
measure of the relative stakes of surgery. Thus if Uk (v(m)) - Uk (f(m)) is
large relative to uk (v(o)) -- uk (riO)), then success and failure make a
larger difference for the doctor when the doctor conducts surgery than
when he does not conduct surgery.
Since the cost of surgery is certainly positive, the constant, a, will be
positive. Since success or failure often makes more of a difference to the
doctor when he conducts surgery, the constant, b, is less than 1.
After manipulating the expected utility formula and simplifying, we get
Pk (v(m)) >i b Pk (v(o)) + a.

The minimum probability of success which the doctor would accept for
surgery before conducting it is initially
b Pk (V(O)) + a.

Thus the higher the cost of surgery, a, and the smaller the difference
success or failure makes to the doctor when he conducts surgery versus
when he does not (i.e., the larger b is), the higher that minimum probability is.
After consulting his colleagues, Pk (v(o)) changes to p~ (v(o)). Thus
the minimum probability of success changes by
b (p~(v(o)) - pk(v(o))).
We can view this as a measure of the. magnitude of the shift. If the
probability of the patient living is small, we know it will tend to be a
risky shift, i.e., the doctor will tend to risk the operation. If the probability of the patient living is large, the doctor will tend to avoid the operation.
If we can estimate the weights which the doctor would assign to his
colleagues in formula (2.1) and know the assessments his colleagues have
for the .patient surviving (pj (v(o)), j = 1 . . . . .
k - 1, k + 1 . . . . .
n),
then we can predict what p~ (v(o)) will be. If we know how the doctor
feels about what is at stake in the operation, we can estimate b. This
allows us to estimate the magnitude of the shift.

272

ROBERT F. BORDLEY

SUMMARY
This paper presented a model of how individual decisions change as a
result of group d~scussion. The change occurred because the individual
updated his subjective probabilities. The resulting formula was based upon
assumptions of individual rationality. The formula was
t/

W'

;=q \po(E) /

po(E)

p~(~ =
\po(E) /

po(E) + J=~ (]

p-~/

(1 - po(E))

This formula had a number of implications about how the subjective

probability assessed after a group discussion was related to the subjective
probability assessed prior to group discussion. This implied a number of
phenomena: the risky shift phenomena and the cautious shift phenomena
now described under the Hypothesis of Group Polarization. Thus this
paper has
(1) illustrated how the risky shift and cautious shift can be viewed as
the result of individual rationality operating in discussion groups;
(2) developed a model of individual opinion change from group discussion which, in principle, allows us to predict the direction and magnitude of opinion shift.
Although this is a Bayesian model of risky shift, it is not the only possible
Bayesian model. In this model, we argued that the risky shift resulted
from the information-pooling aspects of group decision making. Eliashberg and Winkler (1981) presented a different model in which the risky
shift resulted from the pooling of individual utilities. Further testing is
needed to determine whether a Bayesian model is correct and, if so,
which Bayesian model is correct.
REFERENCES
Abelson, R. P. Comments on Group shift to caution at the race track. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, 9, 517-521.
Abelson, R. E The statistician as viper: Reply to McCauley and Stitt. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, 9, 526-527.
Bell, R & Jamieson, B. Publicity of initial decisions and the risky shift phenomena. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 1970, 6, 329-345.
Belovicz, M. W., & Finch, E E. Comments on The risky shift in group betting. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1971, 7, 81-83.
Bordley, R. E Studies in mathematical group decision theory. Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1979.
Bordley, R. E, & Wolff, R. W. Aggregation of individual probability estimates. Management Science, 1981, 27, 8, August 1981.

BAYESIAN MODEL OF POLARIZATION

273

Bordley, R. E A multiplicative formula for aggregating probability assessments. Management Science, 1982.
Brown, R. Social psychology. New York: Free Press, 1965.
Debreu, G. Topological methods in cardinal utility theory. In K. Arrow, S. Karlin, & P.
Suppes (Eds.), Mathematical methods in the social sciences, 1959. Stanford: Stanford
Univ. Press, 1960. Pp. 16-26.
Dion, K., & Miller, N. An analysis of the familiarization explanation of the risky shift.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1971, 7, 524-533.
Domencich, T. A., & McFadden, D. Urban travel demand: A behavioral analysis. New
York: North Holland, 1975.
Eliashberg, J., & Winkler, R. L. Risk sharing and group decision making. Management
Science, 1981, 27, 11.
Fishburn, P. Utility theory for decisionmaking. New York: Wiley, 1970.
Hoyt, G., & Stoner, J. Leadership and group decisions involving risk. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1968, 4, 275-284.
Keeney, R., & Raiffa, H. Decisions with multiple objectives: Preferences and values tradeoffs. New York: Wiley, 1976.
Kogan, N., & Wallach, M. A. Risk-taking: A study in cognition and personality. New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964.
Kogan, N., & Wallach, M. A. Risky shift phenomena in small decisionmaking groups: A
test of the information-exchange hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1967, 3, 75-84.
Lambert, R. Risky shift in relation to choice of metric. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 1972, 8, 315-318.
Lamm, H. Will an observer advise higher risk-taking after hearing a discussion of the
decision problem? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, 467-471.
Lamm, H., & Kogan, N. Risk-taking in the context of intergroup negotiation. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1970, 6, 351-363.
Mackenzie, K. D. Risk as a value and risky shift. Organizational Behavior and Human
Performance, 1970, 5, 125-134.
Madaras, G. R., & Bern, D. S. Risk and conservatism in group decision-making. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 1968, 4, 350-365.
Marquis, D. Individual responsibility and group decisions involving risk. Industrial Management Review, 1962, 3, 8-23.
McCauley, C., & Stitt, C. Reply to Abelson's comment on Group shift to caution at the
race track. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, 9, 522-525.
Morgan, C. P., & Aram, J. D. The preponderance of arguments in the risky shift phenomena. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1975, 11, 25-34.
Morris, P. A. Decision analysis: Expert use. Management Science, 1974, 20 131-164.
Morris, P. A. Combining expert judgements: A Bayesian approach. Management Science,
1977, 23, 679-693.
Myers, D., & Lamm, H. The group polarization phenomenon. PsychologicaIBulletin, 1976,
83, 602-627.
Pruitt, D., & Teger, A. "Reply to Belovicz and Finch's comment on The risky shift in
group betting. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1971, 7, 84-86.
Rem, Y. Personality and group decisions involving risk. The Psychological Record, 1964,
14, 37-45.
Rem, Y. Social attitudes and risk-taking. Human Relations, 1964, 17, 259-265.
Rein, Y. Leadership attitudes and decisions involving risk. Personnel Psychology, 1965,
18, 423-430.
Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. Who accepts Savage's axiom? Behavioral Science, 1974, 19, 6.
Stoner, J. A. Risky and cautious shifts in group decisions: The influence of widely held
values. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1968, 4, 442-459.

274

ROBERT F. BORDLEY

Teger, A. I., & Pruitt, D. G. Components of group risk-taking. Journal of Experimental

Social Psychology, 1967, 3, 189-205.
Vidmar, N. Group composition and the risky shift. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1970, 6, 153-166.
Vinokur, X. Review and theoretical analysis of the effects of group processes upon individual and group decisions involving risk. Psychological Bulletin, 1971, 76, 231-250.
Wallach, M. A., & Kogan, N. The roles of information, discussion and consensus in group
risk-taking. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 1-19.
Wallach, M. A., Kogan, N., & Bern, D. J. Group influences on individual risk-taking.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1962, 65, 75-86.
Wallach, M. A., Kogan, N., & B e m , D. J. Diffusion of responsibility and level of risktaking in groups. Journal of Abnorma( and Social Psychology, 1964, 68, 263-274.
Wallach, M. A., Kogan, N, & Burt, R. Can group members recognize the effects of group
discussion upon risk-taking? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1965, 1,
379-395.
Winkler, R. L. The consensus of subjective probability distributions. Management Science,
1968, 15, B61-B75.
Winkler, R. L. Combining probability distributions from dependent information sources.
Management Science, 1981, 27, 479-488.
RECEIVED: January 29, 1982