Saguisag vs Executive Secretary

Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators,
questioned before the SC the constitutionality of EDCA
(Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement
entered into by the executive department with the US and
ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall
provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH
territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the
right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may
undertake the following types of activities within the Agreed
Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined
training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities;
and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the
parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement
as medium of agreement with US violated the constitutional
requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves
foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose entry into
the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by
the Senate. The Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also
expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional
ratification.
Issue 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the
requirements
of
legal
standing
in
assailing
the
constitutionality of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act,
petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the requirement of
having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show
that the act affects a public right. But here, aside from
general statements that the petitions involve the protection
of a public right, and that their constitutional rights as
citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to make any

specific assertion of a particular public right that would be

violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do
so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court
as citizens suits that would justify a disregard of the
aforementioned requirements.
Issue 2:
W/N the petitioners have legal standing as
taxpayers
No.
Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is
neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it directed at the
disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging
the act must specifically show that they have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money,
and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to
this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A
reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has
been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of
disbursement.
Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international
agreement is an institutional prerogative granted by the
Constitution to the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured
party would be the Senate as an institution or any of its
incumbent members, as it is the Senates constitutional
function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of the
petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing
to maintain the suit.

Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review

over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise
matters of transcendental importance which justify setting
aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge
raised here is rooted in the very Constitution itself,
particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a
stricter mechanism required before any foreign military
bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country.
Such is of paramount public interest that the Court is
behooved to determine whether there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Executive Department.
Brion Dissent
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners
satisfied the requirement of legal standing in asserting that a
public right has been violated through the commission of an
act with grave abuse of discretion. The court may exercise its
power of judicial review over the act of the Executive
Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement for
Senate concurrence not because of the transcendental
importance of the issue, but because the petitioners satisfy
the requirements in invoking the courts expanded
jurisdiction.
Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for
concurrence by the Senate violates the Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for
concurrence because it is in the form of a mere executive
agreement, not a treaty.
Under the Constitution, the
President is empowered to enter into executive agreements
on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such
agreement is not the instrument that allows the entry of such
and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or
treaty.

EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it

merely
involves
adjustments
in
detail
in
the
implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These are existing
treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have
already been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have
thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under Art
XVIII, Sec 25.
Because of the status of these prior
agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.
De Castro Dissent
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct
from the VFA and the MDT. Whether the stay of the foreign
troops in the country is permanent or temporary is
immaterial because the Constitution does not distinguish.
The EDCA clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases,
troops or facilities in the country. Hence, the absence of
Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an invalid
treaty.

Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his
administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy.
The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus
plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of
government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign
funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead
of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens
under the DAP was that if a certain government project is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the

funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive.

Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by
the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other
priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and
portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted
by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds
from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed
funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the
GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada
made an expos claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for
voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of
the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that
the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It
turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded;
to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M
for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions
was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
rule which provides that no money shall be paid out of the

Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by

law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws
particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions
thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order
292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as
impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are
constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to
the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is
applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive
and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate
the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn
from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law
would have been required. Funds, which were already

appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via

the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents power to
refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable
national government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar
because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of
funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were
unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the
heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed
by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however,
such transfer or realignment should only be made within
their
respective
offices.
Thus,
no
cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP,
this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for
the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also
contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in
the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were
within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar
as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated
to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because
they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to
such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was
being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of

savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other

instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the
statutory definition of savings was not complied with under
the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further,
savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year.
But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from
certain projects in the middle of the year and then being
declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the
DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as
money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds
may only be used if there is a certification from the National
Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have
exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the
legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The
DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to
reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more
harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone.
The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what
they received especially so that they relied on the validity of
the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of
the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good
faith.
Belgica vs Ochoa

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No.
209251.

and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the

Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known
as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from
Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority
Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the
pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations
Act (GAA).

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the
following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken
down to P40 million for hard projects (infrastructure
projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million
for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance,
livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of
funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the
realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the
legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not
included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel
comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976,

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by

allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers,
headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by
Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear
that government funds are being used in legit existing
projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit
was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the
results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several
others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is
constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is
constitutional.
HELD:
I.
No,
the
congressional
pork
barrel
system
is
unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the
following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates
the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on
the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA

to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may

implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats
happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted,
the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their
PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then
called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was
constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend
where their pork barrel funds go).

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual

legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money
should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of
legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely
lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it)
collectively and not lodged in the individual members.
Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Congress can delegate the power to the individual member
of Congress.

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the

PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of
the legislator concerned.

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the

power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he
may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already
being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is
approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which
he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the
president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA again,
Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the
President useless.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress
alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative
power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and
initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power
cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate
further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but
this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy
in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage
their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils
(LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and
policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF,
particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can
either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer)
meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on
local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under

the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of
a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the
presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because
it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes
from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not
from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which
created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as
amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter,
provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among
others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall
form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource development and
for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a
part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General
Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of
Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation
contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the
case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Senate of the Philippines vs Executive Secretary

Ermita
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about
the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced.
This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to
investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged
overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee
issued invitations to certain department heads and military
officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads
cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that
need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise
sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted
the said requests for they were sent belatedly and
arrangements
were
already
made
and
scheduled.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior
officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of
the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the
executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in
the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by
the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such
hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were
invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to

except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing

proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For
defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries without her
approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved
from their military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is
alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress
to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To
determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC
sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of
the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is
expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly
and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must
be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour.
The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative
power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a
supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the

members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in

the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid
of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour,
whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid
of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of
the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in
aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance
was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and
22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to
each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of
which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation,
while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question
hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their
basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry,
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of
the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a coequal branch of government which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom.
The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to

appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For

under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be
applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in
aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to
respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such
inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently
made, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it
has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative
as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as
a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping
with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of
legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory
for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong
Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by
the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being
qualified
as
representatives
for
marginalized
or
underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against
COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse

of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set
in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the
Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as
the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two
aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must
use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in welldefined political constituencies. It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized

and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,

urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack welldefined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong
to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, or that represent those who lack welldefined political constituencies, either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy
for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed,
as has always been the practice, from participating in the
party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional
prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties
can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see
parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit
indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to
work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the

marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack

well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they
were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their
intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in
order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and
multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that
the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers;
and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved
for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list
system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and
underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined
political constituencies. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The
common denominator however is that all of them cannot,
they do not have the machinery unlike major political
parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative
districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national
election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized
representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other
cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower
house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation
should not be understood to include only labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors
that by their nature are economically at the margins of
society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act

7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral

representation groups of professionals, which are not per se
economically marginalized but are still qualified as
marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-

defined political constituencies as they are ideologically

marginalized.