THE 2013 JUSTICE P.N.

BHAGWATI
INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION ON HUMAN RGIHTS

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

THE PEACE PALACE,

THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

THE CASE CONCERNING CONTROL OF WEAPONS & RESTORATION

OF DEMOCRACY AND PEACE
STATE OF FENIA
(APPLICANT)
V.

STATE OF MURKEY
(RESPONDENT)

MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................II

MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES............................................................IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................................................IX
STATEMENT OF ISSUES..............................................................X
STATEMENT OF FACTS..............................................................XI
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS.......................................................XIV
PLEADINGS............................................................................... 1
I. THE KASSAD GOVERNMENT CAN REPRESENT FENIA BEFORE THIS
COURT AS THE RIGHTFUL LEGAL AUTHORITY OF THE STATE........1
A.

THE FAIZAL KASSAD REGIME MEETS THE INTERNATIONAL LAW REQUIREMENT OF

EFFECTIVE CONTROL FOR LEGITIMACY OF GOVERNMENTS.................................1

1) Under international custom, a government exercising effective control is entitled to

represent the State..............................................................................................1
2) The Kassad government exercises effective control..........................................2
3) In any case, International Law in itself does not distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate governments....................................................................................3
B.

NOTWITHSTANDING EFFECTIVE CONTROL, THE KASSAD GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO BE

SUPPORTED BY THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY................................................3

1) The Kassad government has expressed willingness to perform its international

obligations..........................................................................................................3
2) The Kassad government hasnt violated its peoples right to political participation or
self-determination so as to render it illegitimate................................................4
3) In the alternative, Murkey is precluded from raising claims pertaining to human rights
violations as it comes to Court with unclean hands........................................5
C.

THE KASSAD GOVERNMENT HAS IMPLIED RECOGNITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY............................................................................................................5

II.MURKEY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

CARRIED OUT BY THE FORCES DEPLOYED BY IT..........................6
1) The activities of the FFA are directly attributable to the State of Murkey.........7
2) The armed activities of the FFA have consistently violated various human rights norms.
9
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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

B. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN FENIA CONSTITUTES A NON-INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT................................................................................................................9

ARMED

C. MURKEY IS IN GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.. . .10

III.MURKEYS INTERVENTION IN FENIA CONSTITUTES ILLEGAL USE
OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW...................................12
A. MURKEY

CANNOT RAISE THE DEFENCE OF HAVING RESORTED TO HUMANITARIAN

INTERVENTION.....................................................................................................12

1) There is no established customary right of pure humanitarian intervention....13

2) No such right has evolved subsequent to the Kosovo intervention.................15
B. MURKEY

DID NOT RECEIVE SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORISATION TO INTERVENE, IN WHAT

WAS CLEARLY AN INTERNAL MATTER OF FENIA...................................................15

C. MURKEY CANNOT INTERVENE IN FENIA BECAUSE IT DOES NOT HAVE THE CONSENT OF THE
VALID STATE AUTHORITIES OF FENIA....................................................................16
D. MURKEY CANNOT INTERVENE IN FENIA BECAUSE IT DOES NOT HAVE THE CONSENT OF THE
VALID STATE AUTHORITIES OF FENIA....................................................................16
E. THE

DOCTRINE OF PRO-DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION CANNOT JUSTIFY MURKEYS

ACTIONS................................................................................................................17

IV.4. FENIA HAS NOT VIOLATED ITS GENERAL OBLIGATION NOT TO

USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS.......................................................18
A. FENIA
18

DID NOT VIOLATE THE TREATY OF

MCCW

AS IT WAS ACTING IN SELF-DEFENCE.

1) Murkeys acts of deploying forces in Fenia amounted to an armed attack......18

2) Fenia is justified in using chemical loaded rockets in self-defense.................19
3) In any event, self- defense under customary international law can be invoked even
without an armed attack................................................................................... 19
B. THE STATE OF NECESSITY PRECLUDES THE WRONGFULNESS OF FENIAS ACTS...21
PRAYER FOR RELIEF.................................................................22

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

TREATISES
Akehursts Modern Introduction to International Law (1997)..................................................1
B. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford U. Press, 2000).................3
Brownlie, International Law And The Use Of Force By States (Oxford Clarendon Press 1963)12
D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1958)...............20
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Anders Wedburg trans. 1961).................2, 18
Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law(Cambridge U. Press 1949).................2
Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 8th ed, (Clarendon Press, 1955)....................................2
M. S. McDougal and F. P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (Cambridge U. Press
1961)....................................................................................................................................20
Micheal Byers & Simon Chesterman, You, the People :- Pro Democratic Intervention in
International law, in G. Fox & Brad Roth, Democratic Governance and International Law ( Oxford
U. Press, 2000).....................................................................................................................17
Shaw, International Law 5th ed. (Cambridge U. Press,2003)...............................................13
T. Gill & D. Fleck, The Handbook of The International Law of Military Operations (Oxford University
Press 2010).....................................................................................................................16, 17

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 3rd ed (Cambridge University Press, 2001)19
JOURNAL ARTICLES
Antonio Cassese, Ex Injuria Ius Oritur,10(1) EJIL 23 (1999).................................................13
David Wippman, Change and Continuity in Legal Justification for Military Intervention in Internal
Conflict, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 435 (1996).............................................................15
Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 56
BYIL189 (1985).............................................................................................................16, 17
Jean dAspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38 N.Y.U.J. Intl l. & Pol. 877
(2006).....................................................................................................................................1
Mageira, Governments, MPEPIL (2011)...................................................................................3
Max Planck, Effectiveness MPEPIL (2008)..............................................................................4
Nolte, Intervention by Invitation, MPEPIL........................................................................16, 17
Ratliff, UN Representation Disputes, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1207, (1999)..........................................1
Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force 53 U.Chi.L.Rev (1986)....14
Stefan Talmon, The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice, 12 E.J.I.L. 727 (2001)
................................................................................................................................................6
Stephen M. Schwebel, Clean Hands in the Court, 31 Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 74 (1999)
................................................................................................................................................5
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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

Villani, The Security Councils Authorisation of Enforcement Action by Regional Organisations, MAX
PLANCK YBUNL 535 (2002).............................................................................................13
Wolfrum v. Phillip, The Status of Taliban, Max Planck UNYB 561 (2002)..............................4
UN DOCUMENTS
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res. 56/83, UN GAOR,
Fifty-Sixth Session, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2001)...............................................................7
Commentary on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001).........21
J. Crawford, The International Law Commissions articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text
and Commentaries (2002)...................................................................................................16
U.N.Doc.A/56/PV.45..................................................................................................................2
U.N.Doc.A/62/PV.9, 19..............................................................................................................1
U.N.Doc.A/RES/2625..............................................................................................................13
U.N.Doc.A/RES/2758................................................................................................................1
U.N.Doc.A/RES/38/7...............................................................................................................13
U.N.Doc.A/RES/44/240...........................................................................................................13
U.N.Doc.S/1997/958................................................................................................................13
UNGA Res 2793 [1971] UN Doc A/L.647/Rev.1....................................................................14

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

UNSC SCOR [11 December 1978] UN Doc S/12962.............................................................14
UNSC SCOR [4 December 1971] UN Doc S/10416...............................................................14
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
Charter of the United Nations (1945) 1 UNTS VI.............................................................15, 19
Genocide Case, Preliminary Objections, 1996 ICJ General List No. 91, Memorial, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 41.....................................................................................................................1
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1996), 999 UNTS 171............4
Statute of the I.C.J. [1945] 1 UNTS 993 [ICJ Statute]......................................................13, 14
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 12, 1948), G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810.............................................................................................4
CASES OF THE ICJ AND PCIJ
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz.
v. Yugo. ), 2007 I.C.J. 1...........................................................................................................1
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz.
v. Yugo.), Preliminary Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 1................................................................6, 8
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
U.S.A.), 1986 ICJ Rep 14..................................................................................13, 17, 19, 20
Corfu Channel Case , 1949 ICJ 4.............................................................................................12

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 1996 I.C.J. 226........18
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 4
(June 27).............................................................................................................................7, 9
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3 14
DECISIONS OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS
)Russian Indemnity Claims Case (Russia v. Turkey) UNRIAA, vol. XI (Sales No. 61.V.4) (1912) 21
Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v France) (Arbitration Tribunal )UNRIAA, vol. XIV (Sales No.
65.V.4) (1953)......................................................................................................................21
Tinoco Concessions (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rico), 1 U.N. R.I.A.A 369 (1923)................................1
MISCELLAENOUS
6 UNCIO Documents, where it is noted that the use of arms in legitimate self defence remains
admitted and unimpaired......................................................................................................20
Group

of

77,

Declaration

of

the

South

Summit

[2000].<http://www.g77.org/doc/Declaration_G77Summit.htm>.......................................15
How is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International Humanitarian Law? International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Opinion Paper, March 2008 page-3............................9
J. Stone, Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression (1958).
..............................................................................................................................................20

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

Stefan Talmon, The Difference between Rhetoric and Reality: <<Why an Illegitimate Regime May Still
be a Government in the Eyes of International Law http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-difference-betweenrhetoric-and-reality-why-an-illegitimate-regime-may-still-be-a-government-in-the-eyes-ofinternational-law/>>.............................................................................................................3

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE PRESENT DISPUTE HAS BEEN BROUGHT BEFORE THIS COURT PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 36(2) AND 40(1) OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I.
II.

Whether the Kassad Government has the right to represent Fenia before this Court.
Whether Murkey is responsible for the human rights violations carried out by the forces
deployed by it.

III.

Whether Murkeys intervention in Fenia constitutes illegal use of force under

international law.

IV.

Whether Fenia has violated its general obligation not to use chemical weapons.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Fenia is a country in Western Asia which gained independence in 1946. In 1970, Al-Kassad,
who belonged to Khurab Socialist Jamaath Party (KSJP), took over as the President of Fenia in a
bloodless military overthrow. The Provisional Orders of his Jamaath party nominated a 173-member
legislature known as the People's Council, in which the Jamaath Party took majority of seats while the
remaining seats were divided among minor parties. In March 1971, a national referendum confirmed
Kassad as President of Fenia. The Fenian constitution went into effect in March 1973 and was followed
by parliamentary elections for the People's Council. The 1973 Constitution officially defines Fenia as a
secular socialist state with Islam recognized as the majority religion. In 1990s, Fenia's participation in
the Developed Countries-led multinational coalition and the multilateral Southwest Asia Peace
Conference in Madrid marked a dramatic watershed in Fenias relations with other Khurab states and
the Western world.

Al-Kassad died on 10th June 2000 and was immediately succeeded by his son Faizal kassad who
was elected President by referendum garnering 97.29% of the vote. In early 2011 Fenia was hit hard by
drought which deteriorated the countrys standard of living and increased poverty. Around the same
time, the phenomenon of Khurab spring spread across the Khurab world, including Fenia, which began
to experience civil war. The severe escalation of protests, unrest and confrontations warranted actions
by the police and security forces in the form of blockades, prevention of tent encampments and brutal
security crackdown. Many senior and lower level military officers who defected from the Fenian Army
grouped together to form fighting units. As they received funds and supplies from foreign nations they
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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

became well-equipped and organized. On 29th July 2011,The Fenian Free Army (FFA) was formed by
a group of defectors with Hussein Shahgar as their Head. On 23rd August, a coalition of antigovernment groups known as the Fenian National League (FNL) was formed with Mr. Syed Anwar as
their leader. The FFA, which became the main opposition Army, grew in strength to 40,000 by June
2012 and resorted to arms against the regime in the name of freedom and democracy and protection of
civilians. The government forces struggled against FFA which fired on civilians in the city, as well as
throughout the country.

By the end of October, Syed Anwar and Hussein Shahgar pleaded for international aid from the
other and neighboring countries. The Republic of Murkey is a country located to the north of Fenia. It
successfully became a country with Nuclear Weapons and other modern weapons of mass destruction.
Murkey decided to directly address its self-claimed injustice in Fenia. It did so by giving military
support to FFA and by allowing the rebel army to operate its command and headquarters from the
country's southern Hayati province close to the Fenian border, and its field command from inside Fenia.
The FFA started often launching attacks into Fenias northern towns and cities, while using the Murkish
side of the border as a safe zone and supply route.

In response to these developments made against Fenian Government, foreign ministry spokesman
Jabbar Bagwan in July 2012 explicitly stated the use of chemical weapons as an option against
"external aggression" but assured that the regime would not use these same weapons against domestic
Fenian opposition forces in the dispute. The External Minister of Murkey, Mr. S. Jahangir, issued an
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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

official warning to the State of Fenia that any attempt to use chemical weapons against Murkey would
result in a war between the two states.

On 22nd June, a Murkish F-4 fighter jet was shot down in international airspace by the Habbas
forces after entering Fenian airspace. Faizzal Kassad expressed regret over the incident. However,
Murkish Prime Minister Rebecca Tod vowed retaliation. She stated that the rules of engagement of the
Murkish Armed Forces had changed and that Murkey would support Fenian people in every way until
they got rid of the bloody dictator and his gang.

Overwhelmed by the support the opposition and FFA received from Murkey, Fenian opposition rejected
the UN-brokered peace plan as they were unwilling to negotiate with President Faizal Kassad or
members of his regime. A U.N. resolution that would have added sanctions against the Fenian
government was vetoed by Koviet Union and Rhina which showed the divide in international opinion
towards the conflict. This international inaction by the international community members enraged
Murkey to deploy its armed forces in the villages surrounding border between Fenia and Murkey. The
UN observers reported that the Murkish armed forces have gained control of all four border
checkpoints between Fenia and Jiraq.

Upon the diplomatic intervention by the State of Zabrael, a Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Control
of Weapons (MCCW) was entered into by Fenia and Murkey wherein they decided to refrain from the
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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

use of weapons of any kind and to cooperate with each other in the maintenance of peace and security.
Negotiations were held between the Fenia and Murkey which did not result into any agreement. Fenia
decided to bring the matter to the International Court of Justice.
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

I. Faizal Kassads government is the legitimate government of Fenia and thus has the right to
represent Fenia before the Court because it fulfils the international requirement of effective control,
continues to be supported by the presumption of legitimacy and has implied recognition at the
international level. The government fulfils the criterion of effective control as it passes the effective
control test and exercises effective control over Fenia. The Kassad government has expressed its
willingness to fulfil its international obligations and has not violated the Fenian peoples right to self
determination, and is therefore supported by the presumption of legitimacy. As Fenia is party to several
bilateral and multilateral treaties, and in addition, in the absence of express de-recognition at the
international level, it enjoys implied recognition.
II. It is further submitted that Murkey is responsible for the human rights violations carried out
by the forces deployed by it as the wrongful conduct of the Free Fenian Army is directly attributable to
Murkey and has also violated International Humanitarian Law. Murkey is liable for the wrongful
conduct of the FFA as this conduct is directly attributable to it under the effective control test and this
conduct constitutes a breach of existing international obligations. Furthermore, the situation in Fenia is
that of an armed conflict and as such Murkey is duty bound to follow the rules of war and it is
submitted that it is in grave violations of the same and International Humanitarian Law.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

III. Murkey is in violation of the international principle on the prohibition of use of force under
Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter. Murkey is precluded from raising the defence of humanitarian
intervention as there is no existing customary or evolved right of pure humanitarian intervention.
Secondly, it did not have SC authorisation to intervene in the internal matters of Fenia, nor the required
consent of the valid state authorities in Fenia; and in also, the doctrine of pro-democratic intervention
is not justified in this case.
IV. Fenia has not violated its obligation not to use chemical weapons. Fenia has not violated the
MCCW as it was acting under self defence to Murkeys armed attack and even in the alternative,
under customary international law, self defence can be invoked in the absence of an armed attack.
Secondly, the state of necessity in Fenia precludes its wrongfulness.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

PLEADINGS

I. THE KASSAD GOVERNMENT CAN REPRESENT FENIA BEFORE

THIS COURT AS THE RIGHTFUL LEGAL AUTHORITY OF THE
STATE.
Only a legitimate government may speak for and bind a state in International Law.1
As a result, this Court may only exercise jurisdiction over claims submitted by a states
legitimate government.2 It is submitted that the Faizal Kassads regime is the legitimate
authority in Fenia and has the right to represent Fenia before the Court.
A.

THE FAIZAL KASSAD REGIME MEETS THE INTERNATIONAL LAW REQUIREMENT OF

EFFECTIVE CONTROL FOR LEGITIMACY OF GOVERNMENTS.

1) Under international custom, a government exercising effective control is entitled to

represent the State
The most widely accepted approach of legitimacy recognizes governments that satisfy
the effective control test, that is, they exercise effective control over the territory they
purport to govern and possess the concomitant ability to fulfil international obligations on its
behalf.3 This approach has further been endorsed by the UN General Assembly in a number
1 Jean

dAspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38 N.Y.U.J. Intl

l. & Pol. 877, 878 (2006).

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide

(Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. ), 2007 I.C.J. 1.
2

Tinoco Concessions (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rico), 1 U.N. R.I.A.A 369 (1923); Genocide Case,
Preliminary Objections, 1996 ICJ General List No. 91, Memorial, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
41; Ratliff, UN Representation Disputes, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1207, 1226 (1999); Akehursts
Modern Introduction to International Law 82 (1997).
3

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

of cases such as the Peoples Republic of China4 Thailands Chulanont Government5 and
Pakistans Musharraf government6 satisfying the requirements of both, state practice and
opinion juris for the formation of custom regarding the same. Fenia therefore submits that
governments with effective control may represent the States. A national legal order begins to
be valid as soon as it has become- on the whole- efficacious; and it ceases to be valid as soon
as it loses this efficacy.7
2) The Kassad government exercises effective control.
A government needs a reasonable prospect of permanency, a sufficient degree of
stability and the habitual and willing obedience of the bulk of the population to meet the
test of effective control.8 The stability of the Kassads government is evidenced by the fact

U.N.Doc.A/RES/2758.

U.N.Doc.A/62/PV.9, 19.

U.N.Doc.A/56/PV.45.

Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 220-21 (Anders Wedburg trans. 1961)
[Hans Kelsen].
7

Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 88 (Cambridge University Press

1949); Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 8th ed, (1955).
8

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

that the administrative machinery of Fenia was in their control with occupying 87 seats in the
Fenian legislature. Shortly after the Jamaath party assumed power the Fenian constitution
went into effect9. In addition to that Jamaath party has been ruling from 1970 to till date with
Faizal Kassad succeeding Al-Kassad in 2000 by an unopposed referendum. 10 This shows that
the regime enjoys a reasonable prospect of permanency as well as popular will and support of
its people. Further habitual obedience by the bulk of the population can be seen by the fact
that the territory under Kassad is home to the entire Fenian population. The Jamaath party
fulfils the additional indicia of effective control like discharging governmental functions,
maintaining control over the capital city11 and remaining within the national territory.
Therefore the Kassad regime exercises effective control over Fenia.
3) In any case, International Law in itself does not distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate governments.
International law does not distinguish between illegitimate regimes and lawful
governments. Legitimacy is a political concept and not a legal term of art. In fact,

Compromis para 13.

10 Compromis,

11 B.

para 20.

Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law 183-84 (Oxford University

Press, 2000); Hersch Lauterpacht, supra note at 93-94.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

international law does not provide any criteria for defining and determining legitimacy. If
consent of the people or a democratic mandate were indeed such criteria, many governments
in the world would have to be downgraded to illegitimate regimes.12
B.

NOTWITHSTANDING EFFECTIVE CONTROL, THE KASSAD GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO

BE SUPPORTED BY THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY.

The Kassad government has expressed willingness to perform its international

obligations.

An unwillingness to comply with international obligations may serve as a ground to

deny a government the right of representation. 13 For example, the Taliban was denied
representation, as it used the territory of Afghanistan for terrorism despite several binding SC
resolutions.14 In the present factual matrix, Fenia has never shown its unwillingness to
comply with any international obligations.

12

Stefan Talmon, The Difference between Rhetoric and Reality: <<Why an Illegitimate

Regime May Still be a Government in the Eyes of International Law

http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-difference-between-rhetoric-and-reality-why-an-illegitimateregime-may-still-be-a-government-in-the-eyes-of-international-law/>>

13 Mageira,

Governments, MPEPIL 18 (2011).

14 Wolfrum v. Phillip,

The Status of Taliban, Max Planck UNYB 561, 581-2 (2002).

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

4) The Kassad government hasnt violated its peoples right to political participation
or self-determination so as to render it illegitimate.
Governments may be denied right of representation if they commit violations of
peremptory norms.15 The right of self-determination is a right guaranteed under the number of
international instruments.16 Article 1 of the ICCPR grants all people the right to freely
determine their political status.17 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
interpreted similar language in the American Convention on Human Rights to affirm the
citizens right to be free from coercion when making electoral decisions. Elections were
conducted in Fenia and representation was given to other parties (apart from the Jamaath
party) as well.18 Elections were held to establish local councils and parliamentary elections
were also held for the Peoples Council.19 Further, the Fenian constitution declares Fenia to be

15 Max

Planck, Effectiveness MPEPIL 10 (2008).

16 Universal

Declaration of Human Rights art. 14 (Dec. 12, 1948), G.A. Res. 217A, at 71,

U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1996), 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]

17 Id

art.1.

18 Compromis,

para 13.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

a secular socialist state.20 This is clear evidence to show that Fenia has always respected its
peoples right to political participation and self-determination.
5) In the alternative, Murkey is precluded from raising claims pertaining to human
rights violations as it comes to Court with unclean hands.
The principle of clean hands is a principle of equity where under the court refuses
relief to an applicant whose conduct in regard to the subject-matter of the litigation has been
improper; whereby he is disallowed to take advantage of his own wrong.21 Murkey has
provided military support to the FFA- the rebel group in Fenia and also allowed FFA to use its
field command in Fenia.22 The FFA started launching attacks into Fenias northern towns and
cities. This has resulted in various human rights violations. This implies that Murkeys
conduct with regard to the subject-matter of the litigation, here being human rights violations
is improper and hence it is precluded from raising any claims pertaining to Fenias human
rights violations.
19 Compromis,

para 13.

20 Compromis,

para 13.

21 Stephen

M. Schwebel, Clean Hands in the Court, 31 Studies in Transnational Legal Policy

74, 78 (1999).

22 Compromis,

para 28.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

C.

THE KASSAD GOVERNMENT HAS IMPLIED RECOGNITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY.

In the Genocide case, this Court deferred to the General Assembly and the
international community in determining that Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovc was the
legitimate representative of the Bosnian Government, noting that the Izetbegovic government
had been seated by the General Assembly and had been signatories to international treaties. 23
Likewise, in the Anastasiou case, the European Court of Justice deferred to the European
Union and its members position that the Clerides government was the sole legitimate
government of the Republic of Cyprus in finding that only the Clerides government was
empowered to issue agricultural certificates.24 Fenia is a party to the U.N. Charter, The
Statute of the I.C.J. and various other international instruments. 25 Fenias 1990 participation
in the Developed Countries-led multinational coalition and in the multilateral Southwest Asia
Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991 shows Fenias accredition to international
organizations and conference.26 This shows implied recognition of the Kassad government in
23 Application

of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide

(Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), Preliminary Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 1[Genocide Case].

24 Stefan Talmon,

The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice, 12 E.J.I.L.

727, 736 (2001).

25 Compromis,

para 36.

26 Compromis,

para 18.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

the international community. Moreover, there has been no express de-recognition of the
Kassad regime in the international community.
II.
MURKEY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE FORCES DEPLOYED BY IT.
A MURKEY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE FFA.
Any international wrongful act entails the responsibility of a state and the key
components of establishing a wrongful act are attribution to the said country and breach of an
existing international obligation.27 It is contended that in this particular scenario, Murkey has
committed an internationally wrongful act, that of violating the human rights of the civilians
of Fenia through the activities of the FFA.
1

The activities of the FFA are directly attributable to the State of Murkey.

Attribution is the first essential condition in order to prove that the wrongful conduct
of a state entails international responsibility; and the general rule is that the only conduct
attributed to the State at the international level is that of its organs of government, or of others
including private persons and non-state entities who have acted under the direction,
instigation or control of those organs, i.e., as agents of the State.28

27 Articles

on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res. 56/83,

UN GAOR, Fifty-Sixth Session, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2001), art 8 [hereinafter ASR]

28 Id,

art. 4.,11.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

The FFA in this particular case is a group of persons acting under the direction and
control of the Murkey government and thus the acts of the FFA are attributable to the
defendant state.29 It is contended that Murkey is herein responsible for the human rights
violations of the FFA as it exercised effective control over the activities of the FFA.
The doctrine of effective control was established in The Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua case30 and laid down three standards for its applicability:
(1) whether the state has issued instructions to those persons;
(2) whether the state has directed the persons to do something; or
(3) whether the state has exercised control over those persons.
The three standards are not cumulative; rather they are disjunctive- hence all need not
be applicable to a particular situation to satisfy the test. The Effective Control test is now
considered part of customary international law, which is one of the sources recognized as law

29 Id.

30

art. 8.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.U.S.), Merits,

1986 ICJ Rep. 4 (June 27), paras 109, 115, pp 62, 64-65 [Nicaragua].

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

by the CEGHRC31 since it recognises as sources of law those mentioned in Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Murkey has unlawfully intervened in Fenia by aiding, abetting and directing the FFA
by giving military aid to the insurgent groups, by allowing the violent rebel army to operate
its command and headquarters and especially by allowing the insurgent rebel army to operate
from within Fenia through Murkeys field command.32
The doctrine of effective control applies in this case by the sheer fact that, the
violations carried out by the FFA could not have been possible had it not been for Murkeys
aid, support, direction and control and the effective control from Murkey very well existed
when the human rights violations took place.

6) The armed activities of the FFA have consistently violated various human rights
norms.
The laws of war seek to minimize unnecessary pain and suffering during wartime,
particularly by protecting civilians and other noncombatants from the hazards of armed
conflict. They address the conduct of hostilitiesthe means and methods of warfareby all
sides to a conflict. A fundamental principle is that parties must distinguish at all times
between combatants and civilians. Civilians and civilian objects may never be the object of
attacks. Warring parties are required to take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to

31 Genocide case para

398.

32 Compromis para 28
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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

civilians and civilian objects and not to conduct attacks that would disproportionately harm
civilians or fail to discriminate between combatants and civilians.
D. THE

CURRENT SITUATION IN
CONFLICT.

FENIA

CONSTITUTES A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED

Common article 3 of the Geneva Convention 1949 applies to "armed conflicts not of
an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties".
Within the meaning of the Common article 3, non-international armed conflicts are those in
which one or more governmental armed groups are involved. The hostilities may occur
between governmental armed forces and non-governmental armed groups or between such
groups only. 33 The International Court of Justice has opined that Common Article 3 represent
customary international law in both international and non-international armed conflict. 34
Thus, hostilities between the Fenian armed forces and pro-government Habbas
militias on one side, and the Free Fenian Army and other opposition armed groups on the
other amounts to a non-international (internal) armed conflict under international law. It is
regulated by Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which sets forth
minimum standards for the proper treatment of people within a warring partys control
namely civilians and wounded and captured combatants, and customary laws of war,
concerning the methods and means of warfare.

33 How

is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International Humanitarian Law?

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Opinion Paper, March 2008 page-3

34 Nicaragua, at 118-120.
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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

E. MURKEY IS IN GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.
All parties to an armed conflictboth states and non-state armed groupsare
responsible for complying with the requirements of international humanitarian law. That is,
each party must respect and ensure respect for the laws of war by its armed forces and other
people or groups acting on its orders or under its direction or control. This obligation does not
depend on reciprocityparties to a conflict must respect the requirements whether or not the
opposing side abides by them.
Serious violations of international humanitarian law that are committed with criminal
intentthat is, deliberately or recklesslyare war crimes. War crimes, listed in the grave
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions and as customary law in the International
Criminal Court (ICC) statute and other sources, include a wide array of offenses, including
deliberate, indiscriminate, and disproportionate attacks harming civilians, hostage taking,
using human shields, and imposing collective punishment, among others. Individuals also
may be held criminally liable for attempting to commit a war crime, as well as assisting in,
facilitating, aiding or abetting a war crime.
Thus, the FFA and by chain of command, Murkey is responsible for violation of
Common Article III of the Geneva Concentions and the customary rules of IHL and the laws
of war.
Direct attacks on civilians and civilian objects, as discussed above, are prohibited.
The laws of war also prohibit indiscriminate attacks. Indiscriminate attacks are those that
strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. Examples of
indiscriminate attacks are those that are not directed at a specific military objective or that use
weapons that cannot be directed at a specific military objective. Prohibited indiscriminate
attacks include area bombardment, which are attacks by artillery or other means that treat as a
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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located
in an area containing a concentration of civilians and civilian objects.
Military commanders must choose a means of attack that can be directed at military
targets and will minimize incidental harm to civilians. If the weapons used are so inaccurate
that they cannot be directed at military targets without imposing a substantial risk of civilian
harm, then they should not be deployed. The FFA by deploying rockets on unarmed civilians
is thus in grave violation of IHL.35
The State of Murkey is also in grave violation of the right to life of Fenian citizens as
stated under Article 6 (1) of the ICCPR which provides that every human being has the
inherent right to life. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. It is the supreme right
from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the
life of the nation.
Thus Murkey is responsible for its international wrongful acts carried out by the FFA
under its effective control constituting a breach of International Humanitarian Law.
III.

MURKEYS INTERVENTION IN FENIA CONSTITUTES ILLEGAL

USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter proscribes all use of force, irrespective of the
motivation behind it.36 This is supported by the travaux, as the text of Article 2(4) at the

35Compromis

36 Corfu

para 36.

Channel Case, 1949 ICJ 4, 109.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

Dumbarton Oakes Conference read as a complete prohibition on the use of force. 37 The
rejection of the New Zealand amendment proposing a narrower view of Article 2(4) bolsters
this position.38 The Applicant submits that Murkey has acted in contravention of Article 2(4)
of the UN Charter, a recognized jus cogens obligation and that its conduct cannot be justified
under any exceptions to the same.
A MURKEY

CANNOT RAISE THE DEFENCE OF HAVING RESORTED TO HUMANITARIAN

INTERVENTION.

The view that humanitarian intervention is not inconsistent with the purposes of the
UN is untenable as the maintenance of peace overrides all other obligations in international
law.39 Moreover, the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention is at odds with the SCs

37 Brownlie,

International Law And The Use Of Force By States 266 (Oxford Clarendon

Press 1963).

38 ibid.

39 Antonio

Cassese, Ex Injuria Ius Oritur,10(1) EJIL 23, 24(1999).

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

monopoly over the use of force under the Charter.40 Frequently cited instances of prodemocratic intervention, including Grenada (1983), Panama (1989) and Sierra Leone (1997)
have been widely condemned as unlawful.41 Moreover, States have an inalienable right
against intervention directed at imposing a political system.42
1

There is no established customary right of pure humanitarian intervention.

Customary International Law comprises of state practice an objective requirement

that encompasses any acts from which views about customary law may be inferred, 43 which

40 Villani,

The Security Councils Authorisation of Enforcement Action by Regional

Organisations, MAX PLANCK YBUNL 535, 552(2002).

41 U.N.Doc.S/1997/958; U.N.Doc.A/RES/44/240;

42 U.N.Doc.A/RES/2625; Nicaragua,

43 Statute

U.N.Doc.A/RES/38/7.

at paras 191-2.

of the I.C.J. [1945] 1 UNTS 993 [ICJ Statute], Article 38(1)(b); Shaw,

International Law [5th edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003], p.80.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

(cumulatively) must be settled, widespread and consistent, 44 and opinio juris, a subjective
element that requires State practice to be consciously accepted as law.45 It is submitted that
the instances in which a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention have been claimed over
the last half century, in particular, Indias 1971 intervention in East Pakistan, Vietnams 1978
intervention in Kampuchea and Tanzanias 1978 intervention in Uganda, constitute
insufficient State practice to amount to a new rule of customary law as each was severely
contested by the generality of the international community.46 The interventions in Sierra
Leone (1997) and Bangladesh (1971) have been regarded as being politically motivated. 47
44 North

Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark), 1969 ICJ

Rep3 at para.77.

45 Supra

note,43.

46 UNSC

SCOR [4 December 1971] UN Doc S/10416; UNGA Res 2793 [1971] UN Doc

A/L.647/Rev.1; UNSC SCOR [11 December 1978] UN Doc S/12962.

47 Schachter, In

Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U.Chi.L.Rev, 144

(1986).

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

The absence of opinio juris is indicated by the fact that, notwithstanding variously asserted
humanitarian motives, in each case the formal legal justification proffered was self-defence
7) No such right has evolved subsequent to the Kosovo intervention.
The 1999 military intervention in Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has not since created a customary rule of pure humanitarian action. It did not
represent sufficiently settled State practice as it was either condemned or its legality
repudiated by a clear majority of the international community.48 Thus, it is submitted by the
Applicant that Murkey cannot hereby justify its conduct behind a fictitious veil of a right of
humanitarian intervention.
F.

MURKEY DID NOT RECEIVE SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORISATION TO INTERVENE, IN

WHAT WAS CLEARLY AN INTERNAL MATTER OF FENIA.
Measures involving the use of force must be authorized by the Security Council in

response to a threat to international peace and security, unless consent of the recognized
government is obtained.49 Indeed, the Council remains extremely reluctant to authorize
intervention against the will of a sitting government or to rely on humanitarian motives as the
basis for installing a particular government or defeating a particular party to an internal

48 Group

of 77, Declaration of the South Summit

[2000].<http://www.g77.org/doc/Declaration_G77Summit.htm> accessed 6 January 2009.

49 Charter

of the United Nations (1945) 1 UNTS VI, Article- 42 [UN Charter].

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

conflict.50 Thus, Murkeys conduct remains outside the purview of the exceptions to Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
G. MURKEY

CANNOT INTERVENE IN FENIA BECAUSE IT DOES NOT HAVE THE CONSENT

OF THE VALID STATE AUTHORITIES OF FENIA.

Consent is generally recognized as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act

which would otherwise be illegal under international law.51 This also applies to military
intervention. 52 in general circumstances. However, States cannot intervene at the invitation of
a government in a civil war even if such government retains effective control. 53 In the present
case, not only has the Kassads government not called for intervention but the FFA, which
may claim to have effective control cannot, even if assumed that it does indeed possess the

50 David Wippman,

Change and Continuity in Legal Justification for Military Intervention

in Internal Conflict, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 435, 47174 (1996).

51 J.

Crawford, The International Law Commissions articles on State Responsibility:

Introduction, Text and Commentaries, 163-65 (2002) [Crawfords commentary on ASR].

52 T. Gill & D. Fleck, The Handbook of The International Law of Military Operations 230
(Oxford University Press 2010) [Gill & Fleck].

53 Nolte, Intervention by Invitation, MPEPIL para 6.; Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of
Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 56 BYIL189, 214-221(1985). [Beck].

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

same, intervene in what clearly constitutes a civil uprising in the State of Fenia. Thus, Fenia
submits Murkeys intervention in the present instance is unlawful.
H. MURKEY

CANNOT INTERVENE IN FENIA BECAUSE IT DOES NOT HAVE THE CONSENT

OF THE VALID STATE AUTHORITIES OF FENIA.

Consent is generally recognized as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act

which would otherwise be illegal under international law.54 This also applies to military
intervention. 55 in general circumstances. However, States cannot intervene at the invitation of
a government in a civil war even if such government retains effective control. 56 In the present
case, not only has the Kassads government not called for intervention but the FFA, which
may claim to have effective control cannot, even if assumed that it does indeed possess the
same, intervene in what clearly constitutes a civil uprising in the State of Fenia. Thus, Fenia
submits Murkeys intervention in the present instance is unlawful.
I. THE

DOCTRINE OF PRO-DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION CANNOT JUSTIFY

ACTIONS.

MURKEYS

It is submitted that Pro-democratic intervention has been marked with extremely

scanty or inadequate state practice so as to give it the status of a legally binding principle. It
is far from clear how a non-democratic regime, even one established by a violent coup detat
54 Crawfords commentary on ASR,

163-65.

55 Gill & Fleck Supra note,52 .

56 Beck Supra note 53 .;.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

could in itself constitute a threat to international peace and security sufficient to invoke
Chapter VII of the UN Charter57 or sanction unilateral intervention. Indeed, in the Nicaragua
case the Court refused to contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of
intervention by one State against another on the ground that the latter has opted for some
particular ideology or political system.58 Thus, Murkey cannot rely on the doctrine of Prodemocratic intervention to justify its conduct.

IV.

FENIA HAS NOT VIOLATED ITS GENERAL OBLIGATION NOT TO

USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
A

FENIA DID NOT VIOLATE THE TREATY OF

DEFENCE.

MCCW

AS IT WAS ACTING IN SELF-

Under certain conditions set by international law a State acting unilaterally (or in
association) may respond with lawful force to unlawful force or the imminent threat of
unlawful force.59 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter regards the right to self-defense as an
inherent right droit naturel. The court in the case concerning the Legality of the threat of use

57 Micheal Byers

& Simon Chesterman, You, the People :- Pro Democratic Intervention

in International law, in G. Fox & Brad Roth, Democratic Governance and International Law
261 (2000).

58 Nicaragua at para 133.

59 Hans

Kelsen, 339.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

of Force held that every State has the right to resort to self-defense in accordance with
Article-51 of the U.N. Charter when its survival is at stake.60
1

Murkeys acts of deploying forces in Fenia amounted to an armed attack.

Under the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly

Relations and Co-operation among States every State has the duty to refrain from organizing
or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands . . . for incursion into the
territory of another State
In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice held that it may be
considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely
action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also the dispatch of armed
bands or irregulars into the territory of another State.61 When the international community
showed a divided opinion on the Fenian conflict, Murkey deployed its armed forces in the
villages surrounding the borders of Fenia and Murkey.62 These forces thus posed a threat of
armed attack.
60 Legality

of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 1996 I.C.J. 226, at

263.

61 Nicaragua at

para 103.

62 Compromis,

para 31.

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

8) Fenia is justified in using chemical loaded rockets in self-defense.
Self-defence is regarded as a permissible form of armed self-help. 63 Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter grants Member States to use force in response to an armed attack. 64 Thus
Fenias acts of indulging in Chemical loaded rockets attacks on the Army bases established
on the Fenia-Murkey borders, where Murkey has stationed its forces constitutes an act of
self-defense.
9) In any event, self- defense under customary international law can be invoked even
without an armed attack.
There is a strong school of thought maintaining that Article 51 only highlights one
form of self-defence (namely response to an armed attack), and that it does not negate other
patterns of legitimate action in self-defence vouchsafed by customary international law.65 This
view is somewhat strengthened by an examination of the travaux preparatoires of the Charter

63 Yoram Dinstein,

War, Aggression and Self-Defence 160 (3rd Edition Cambridge University

Press, 2001)

64 U.N. Charter, Article-51 Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. ].

65 D. W. Bowett,

Self-Defence in International Law 18792 (Oxford Clarendon Press 1958);

M. S. McDougal and F. P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 23241
(Cambridge U. Press 1961); J. Stone, Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United
Nations Theories of Aggression 44 (1958).

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

which seem to underline the validity of use of force in legitimate self-defence. 66 approach has
gained the support of Judge Schwebel who, in his Dissenting Opinion in the Nicaragua case,
rejected a reading of the text which would imply that the right of self-defence under Article
51 exists if, and only if, an armed attack occurs. 67 The court held that Article 51 of the
Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a natural or inherent right of self-defence
and it is hard to see how this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its present
content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter.It cannot therefore be held that
Article 51 is a provision which subsumed and supervenes customary international law. 68
Thus even assuming, the stationing of Murkish troops did not constitute armed attack, Fenias
resort to self-defense is still valid by virtue of its existence as a part of customary
international law.
J.

THE STATE OF NECESSITY PRECLUDES THE WRONGFULNESS OF FENIAS ACTS.

A state of necessity arises where there is an irreconcilable conflict between an

essential interest on one hand and an obligation of the State invoking necessity on the other.69
66 6

UNCIO Documents, where it is noted that the use of arms in legitimate self defence
remains admitted and unimpaired.

67 Nicaragua,

68 Id,

at 347. .

94.

69 Commentary on

the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 80 (2001).

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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

It was held in the Russian Indemnity case that the obligation for a State to execute treaties
may be weakened if the very existence of the State is endangered, if observation of the
international duty is ... self-destructive.70 It is submitted that Fenias acts of indulging in
chemical loaded rockets attack were undertaken in a state of necessity. The arbitral tribunal in
the Rainbow Warrior arbitration held that article-25allegedly authorizes a State to take
unlawful action invoking a state of necessity.71 Thus Fenias acts, which violate its
obligations of refraining from use of chemical weapons is precluded from any wrongfulness
since its acts were undertaken under a state of necessity.

70)Russian

Indemnity Claims Case (Russia v. Turkey) UNRIAA, vol. XI (Sales No. 61.V.4),
p. 421, at p. 443 (1912).

71 Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v France) (Arbitration Tribunal )UNRIAA, vol.

XIV (Sales No. 65.V.4), p. 159, at p. 254 (1953).
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MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

For the foregoing reasons the State of Fenia respectfully requests the Court to adjudge
and;
i)

DECLARE that the Kassad government can represent Fenia before this Court
as the legitimate, legal authority.

ii)

DECLARE that the State of Murkey is responsible for the human rights
violations carried out by the forces deployed by it.

iii)

DECLARE that Murkeys intervention in Fenia constitutes illegal use of

force and CALL for immediate cessation of the same.

iv)

DECLARE that Fenia has not violated its general obligations related to use of
chemical weapons.

---x---x---x--Signed by
Agents for the Applicant

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