Max Albone

Professor Mark Major

PLSC 405
13 December 2016
Critical Review Essay
PART I: Defense of the Resolution
The expansion of the powers of the presidency over the past century has sparked a
normative debate on what the role of a president should be. Therefore, I plan to add to this debate
by arguing for strong executive that can unilaterally control policymaking in the United States.
First, I argue that American system of separation of powers in unnecessary an obsolete due to the
ability of the President to control and create policy without action by Congress. Next, because
Congress and the Judiciary often bolster the power of the President at the expense of other
institutions, I contend that it is both essential and inevitable that the President is the centerpiece
of the American political system. Finally, as a nationally elected official, the President plays a
legitimate, democratic, and productive role in the policymaking process. For a number of
reasons, I believe that the American system of separated and shared powers is now obsolete, that
it is necessary and inevitable for the President to act as the cornerstone of the American political
system, and that the President represents and legitimate and productive policymaker.
The separation of powers, as well as the system of checks and balances, put into place by
the Framers is now outdated and unnecessary. This is because the president is now able to create
policy without the involvement of the other branches of government. For example, the President
has a number of advantages that allow him to conduct foreign policy largely independent of the
influence of Congress. In Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, the author indicates that the

presidents access to information on foreign policy far surpassed that of the Congress, because
the President has access to numerous advisors and the intelligence community (Howell 2005,
423). Furthermore, despite efforts by Congress to reign in the Presidents control over foreign
policy, Presidents have largely ignored legislation designed to check the use of executive orders,
agreements and war powers (Howell 2005, 424-425). Presidents have also increasingly made use
of confidential national security directives to conduct foreign policy without the guidance, or
even knowledge, of Congress (Howell 2005, 425). Moreover, Presidents have, to a great extent,
assumed the war making power that was supposed to be the responsibility of Congress. Although
Congress has declared war only five times since the adoption of the Constitution, the United
States has been involved in vastly more military engagements. In Clinton, the Constitution, and
the War Power, David Gray Adler points out that, in recent years, Presidents have taken an
absolutist approach to the war power (Adler 2000, 46). In particular, the author uses Clintons
assertion that he could determine the extent, duration, and direction of war as an example of how
Presidents have taken responsibility for war (Adler 2000, 46). Further, the author emphasizes the
unwillingness of Congress to take on its responsibility for war making (Adler 2000, 47). Not
only can the president conduct foreign policy largely independent of Congress, but also the
President is able to create domestic policy without the cooperation of Congress in creating
legislation. Howell points out that Presidents have access to a crucial tool to combat
Congressional inaction. This tool is the ability of the President to place into effect executive
orders and unilateral directives (Howell 2005, 426). This is because executive orders carry the
weight of law unless they are overturned by either Congressional legislation or court rulings.
Furthermore, there are a number of problems with Congresss primary check on executive
orders. For example, presidential executive orders do not always require additional

appropriations, appropriations require lower threshold for passage in Congress, and Presidents
may redistribute funds to more controversial programs (Howell 2005, 427-428). As a result of
the unilateral policy powers and considerable advantages of the President in policymaking, the
separation of powers instituted by the Framers is now obsolete and entirely unnecessary.
Not only is the separation of powers an unnecessary institution, but also it is crucial and
unavoidable that a strong executive must be at the center of the American policymaking process.
It believes it to be both important and inevitable for a number of reasons. For example, Congress
has greatly neglected many of its responsibilities in recent years; therefore, it is necessary that
some institution must assume their responsibility. In When Congress Checks Out, Ornstein and
Mann indicate that Congress, in recent years, has shown considerably little interest in reigning in
presidential power through oversight and the power of the purse (Ornstein and Mann 2006, 6).
Therefore, administrations, such as the Bush Administration, have shown contempt for Congress
as they use executive power to unilaterally implement their own policies (Ornstein and Mann
2006, 7). Consequently, the President now must lie as the central figure responsible for
policymaking due to Congresss abdication of its duties. Moreover, Crenson and Ginsburg find
that the courts have consistently supported the expansion of presidential powers in How the
Courts Reinforce Presidential Power. For example, the authors state that the courts have refused
to rule against the delegation of legislative power to the President since the New Deal (Crenson
and Ginsburg 2007, 345). Finally, more often than not, courts have ruled in favor of the president
in cases involving executive privilege, appointment and removal power, and executive orders
(Crenson and Ginsburg 2007, 347-350). Because Congress has neglected many of its
responsibilities, it has delegated many of its legislative powers to the President, and the courts

consistently support the expansion of presidential power, I believe it is both necessary and
inevitable that the President be the central figure in policymaking in the United States.
Finally, as well as a strong executive serving as the centerpiece in American
policymaking, I believe that the President plays a legitimate, democratic, and productive role in
the policymaking process. Since the President and Vice President are the only two nationally
elected officials, the President, as a leader, represents the entire United States more than any
other elected official (Howell and Moe 2006, 149). Furthermore, President are able to provide
more articulate leadership than other institutions. This is because legislation produced by
Congress contains so many provisions that are necessary to pass bills in a process with so many
veto points (Howell and Moe 2006, 149). Consequently, not only do Presidents represent
legitimate and democratic leadership, but also play a productive role in providing clearer
direction for policy. In fact, Congress is unable provide solutions to problems that plague the
modern day United States, because Congress in comprised of 535 members that are concerned
with reelection (Howell and Moe 2006, 148). While Congress is adept at providing individual
districts with benefits, the President represents a more effective leader in creating effective
problem-solving policy. Therefore, I believe that the President should take a larger role in the
policymaking process.
I believe that it is important for the United States to have a strong executive that can
unilaterally implement policy. This is because the sharing of powers, which the Framers built
into the United States government, is outdated and unnecessary. Presidents can effectively create
policy without consideration of Congress or the courts. Furthermore, it is both necessary and
inevitable that the President is the centerpiece of policymaking in the United States, because
Congress has neglected many of its duties to a large extent. Therefore, the President, with

support from the courts and Congress, has expanded his policymaking powers. Lastly, the
presidency represents the most legitimate, democratic, and productive policymaking institution
in the United States government.

PART II: Critical Analysis of Why the Resolution is Problematic

The notion of a strong executive that can unilaterally create policy and that goes
unchecked by other branches of government is problematic for a number of reasons. As Clinton
Rossiter stated, strong Presidents are dangerous unless they pursue policy through constitutional
means and implement policies that are unmistakably supported by the public. The separation of
powers within the United States government is essential to the healthy functioning of
democracies, because the absence of shared powers can have dangerous consequences.
Furthermore, it is unnecessary for a strong executive to be the central figure in the American
political system, because effective policy is the result of cooperation and compromise. Lastly,
despite being a nationally elected official, the president does not represent a democratic or
legitimate policymaker. A strong unchecked executive is problematic for the United State
political system for a variety of reasons.
First, the idea of an executive that has the ability to unilaterally create policy is
problematic because the separation of powers in the federal government is essential to the
effective functioning of democracy. In Clinton, the Constitution, and the War Powers, David
Gray Adler states that it is very concerning that the war making power has largely been usurped
by the presidency. This shift in the separation of powers has strayed dangerously far from the
vision of the founders, who gave the war-making power explicitly to the legislative branch. Adler

contends that the Framers saw the importance of placing the executive within the rule of law. In
this pursuit, the Framers entrusted Congress with the war-making power in order to ensure that
the combined wisdom of Congress would be represented in the decision to use military force
(Adler 2000, 46). However, this check on totalitarian aspirations of executives has been largely
eliminated by the presidency. Without this check on a Presidents power, there is the possibility
that Presidents could hurry into ill-advised and dangerous military conflicts on their own
authority (Adler 2000, 46). Therefore, the separation of powers implemented by the Framers is
an important guard against abuses of power by executives that wish to use unilateral power.
Furthermore, Ornstein and Mann illustrate the potential problems with the failure of separation
of powers to operate effectively in When Congress Checks Out. The failure of Congress to
provide effective oversight can lead to policy lapses, mismanagement of agencies, and even
corruption (Ornstein and Mann 2006, 8). For example, the failure of Congressional oversight to
bring about a balance of power led to the abuse of executive power in the form of the illegal
NSA surveillance program (Ornstein and Mann 2006, 9). Therefore, far from being unnecessary
and obsolete, the separation of powers is an important safeguard against abuses of power by the
President and executive branch.
Not only is it important to have shared powers within the federal government, but also it
is unnecessary for a strong executive to serve as the centerpiece of the American political
institution. This is because the American political system relies on cooperation of its institutions
for the creation and implementation of good policy. For example, legislation must undergo a
complex process in which it is referred to committees and subcommittees in which numerous
amendments can be made (Wood 2015, 154). While this process may lead to the death of many
bills and perhaps confusion in policy, it ensures that interbranch deliberation leads to better

policy than would be possible absent this process (Wood 2015, 155). Therefore, if a strong
executive were the centerpiece of the political system and he were able to implement his policies
unilaterally, then these policies would lack the collective wisdom that is provided by the
legislative process in Congress (Wood 2015, 155). Furthermore, Howell points out the problems
that occur, when strong executives exercise unilateral power in Unilateral Powers: A Brief
Overview. When strong Presidents use unilateral powers, they view the other branches of
government as threats to their policy goals rather than allies in achieving meaningful policy
(Howell 2005, 427). The ability of Presidents to work cooperatively with Congress to produce
meaningful policy is evident in Julian Zelizers book The Fierce Urgency of Now. In this book
Zelizer illustrates how Lyndon Johnson was not the sole factor contributing the passage of the
Great Society legislation. Rather, among other factors, Johnson was able to work with a
favorable Congress to bring about meaningful change through the legislative process. Because
the American political system is designed to produce meaningful policy through deliberation and
cooperation, it is not necessary for a strong executive to act as the central political figure.
Lastly, not only is it unnecessary for presidents to act as the cornerstone of the American
political system, but also the President does not serve as a legitimate, democratic, and productive
policymaking official. This is because the President is elected through an inherently
undemocratic process. In Electing the President, Robert Dahl indicates the democratic flaws in
the Electoral College. First, Dahl points out that it is possible to lose the popular vote, but still
win the election. In fact, this has happened a number of times in United States Presidential
elections (Dahl, 80). Furthermore, one third of presidents won the elections with minority of the
popular vote (Dahl, 80-81). Finally, Dahl states that the Electoral College is inherently
undemocratic due to its unequal representation of voters. Because the Electoral College is based

upon the number of seats each state has in both chambers of Congress, it over represents voters
in small states (Dahl, 81). Even when Presidents are able to garner a sizeable majority of the
popular vote, they are unable to claim a mandate from the public to implement their policies. In
Myth of the Presidential Mandate, Dahl argues that the policy preferences of voters are not
conveyed in election results. Therefore, only opinion surveys can provide evidence for a
presidential mandate (Dahl 1990, 363). Since surveys cannot be conducted and made public in a
timely manner to warrant claims of a presidential mandate, it is inappropriate for Presidents to
claim a responsibility to implement his policies on behalf of the electorate. Because the President
is elected in an inherently undemocratic fashion and because voters are unable to communicate
their policy preferences in a timely manner, Presidents do not play a legitimate, democratic, and
productive role in policymaking.
In sum, the concept of a strong executive with unilateral ability to create policy due to a
lack of separation of power is problematic for several reasons. First, separation of powers is a
necessary aspect of the political system to guard against potential abuses of power by the
executive. Next, the collective knowledge and cooperation of the three branches of government
is essential to the process of producing meaningful policy. Therefore, a strong executive acting as
the central component of the political system is neither necessary nor prudent. Finally, the
President does not represent a legitimately and democratically elected leader that can produce
productive policy. This is due to the Electoral College system, which is a democratically flawed
electoral system.

Works Cited
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Howell, William G., and Terry M. Moe. "Resolved, Congress Should Be Required to Vote up or
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Ornstein, Norman J., and Thomas E. Mann. "When Congress Checks Out." Foreign Affairs 85.6
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Zelizer, Julian E. The Fierce Urgency of Now: Lyndon Johnson, Congress, and the Battle for the
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