The American Society for Ethnohistory

A North Andean Status Trader Complex under Inka Rule

Author(s): Frank Salomon
Source: Ethnohistory, Vol. 34, No. 1, Inka Ethnohistory (Winter, 1987), pp. 63-77
Published by: Duke University Press
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A NorthAndeanStatusTraderComplex
underInkaRule
FrankSalomon, Universityof Wisconsin-Madison

Ecuadorand
of theInkaEmpire(northern
Abstract.In thenorthernmost
peripheries
MexiNarifo Province,Colombia),an aboriginalstatus-trading
complexresembling
canpochtecasurvivedthroughandafterInkarule.Politicallysponsoredtraderscalled
mindalaessuppliedaboriginallordswith sumptuarygoods, and sometimesredistributedwealth so as to build politicalinfluence.Inkas'partialtoleranceof this
complexmay reflectneed for accessto resourcesfromzonesradicallyresistantto
imperialrule.
Until fairly recently, there appeared to be good grounds for assertingthat
Tawantinsuyu,the Inkaempire, owed its immenseexpansivepotential to the
ease with which smallerpolities of an essentiallyuniformtype, similar to that
of the germinal Inka state, could be agglomeratedinto largerunits essentially
magnifyingan extant order.This appearedlikely both on ecological-economic
grounds (MurraI980) and on the basis of similaritiesin consciousstructural
models espoused by Inkaand Inka-dominatedgroups (Zuidema I964).
Newer evidence, however,suggests that Tawantinsuyuengulfed and incorporatedsome polities whose institutions differed fundamentallyfrom its
own. Tawantinsuyuprobably did after all resemble other empires, archaic
and modern, insofar as it faced the task of articulatinghuman heterogeneity
-the indispensiblesourceof its variedwealth, and consequentlyof its power
to command allegiance-while strivingalso for uniform, centralizedcontrol.
Regional studies force us to notice a contrast between the diversityof local
processes occurring at the empire's edges as it engaged and absorbed older
structures, and the rigidly formalistic, uniformitarianmodel of the empire
emanatingfrom its sacredcenterin Cuzco.
This essay inquires into a single facet of the way the contraryneeds of
imperial uniformizationand diversitywere brought to grips on an Inka fronEthnohistory 34:I (Winter I987). Copyright ? by the AmericanSociety for Ethnohistory. ccc oo14-I80o/87/$I.50.

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FrankSalomon

64

tier. The focus is on trade policy in the equatorial Andes (now northern
Ecuador and southernmostColombia). In absorbingthis area, the Inka invaders found economic institutionsdissimilar from those of the Inka heartland (Murra1975) and indeed rathermore similar to Mesoamericansystems
(Berdan 1975, 1977; Bedoian 1973; Castillo F. I97z;

Garibay K. 1961).

Furthersouth, Inka economy apparentlyrelied heavily on production from

zones at varied altitude (a "vertical archipelago"in Murra's terminology)
coordinatedby nonmarketredistributiveagencies.Sumptuaryas well as staple
goods moved in nonmarket conduits. But toward the equatorial frontier,
aboriginal polities entrusted procurementof exotic sumptuary goods to a
categoryof politically sponsoredstatus traderscalled mindaldeswhose techniques, including use of special-purposecurrencies,and whose functions,including reinforcementof the redistributiveprivilegeof dynasticrulers,resemble those of pochteca in Mexica domains (SalomonI978).
At a general level, the case raises questions common to all imperial
societies: the emerging local component of empire neither reproducesthe
preconquestform of organizationintegrally,nor does it wholly rework old
forms into the imperial image; but what constraintsand what logic of combinations brought about the particular forms we in fact find? Why were
certain local idiosyncrasiespreservedand not others?How far did preextant
social forms constrainthe evolution of empire, regeneratingdiversitybehind
the facadeof conformity?
Like most Ecuadorianevidence, ours comes from zones where the imperial frontierremainedconflictiveto the hour of Spanishinvasion.Imperialized local societiesenterour view in mid-overhaul,rapidlychanging;what we
are in a position to study is not a product but a process of empire. Earlier
studies (Salomon 1986: 187-218)

suggest that circa 1530 the Inka state was

promoting or suppressinglocal institutionswith a view to "driving"the internal forces of intraaboriginalhistory in directions that suited Inka ends.
Accordinglythe fate of status trading is studied underthe assumptionthat a
model of permanentbut regulateddisequilibriumfits the equatorialfacts.
On Comparisonsand Sources
In order to gain a clearer idea of the organizationalchanges the Inka state
imposed on equatorialgroupsin the courseof theirintegrationinto the empire,
data on two subregionswill be compared:one which was still in the earliest
stages of Inka penetrationat the time of the Spanish invasion, and one in
which Inka interventionhad advancedfurther.
The data for this inquiryare solely ethnohistorical,pending appropriate
archaeologicalstudy. They come from visitas or administrativefield studies,
made by Spanish administratorsduring the early colonial era for the purpose
of studying native resourcebases and native channelsof resourceallocation

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NorthAndeanStatusTrader
that might yield colonial revenues.Sources are noted, with short evaluative
comments, in the appendix. When such researchersapproachednative societies sufficiently early, or sufficiently far from the key points of Spanish
intervention,they repeatedlyfound Inka and even pre-Inka institutionsstill
active. The debris of routineadministrationand adjudicationhas yielded important clues to pre- or non-Inkaorganizationin variousparts of the Andean
world (Netherly 1978; Rostworowskide Diez Canseco 1981).
The Mindala Complex at and beyond the Margin of InkaGovernance:Pasto
The Pasto country (CarchiProvinceof modernEcuadorand the southernpart
of Narifo Province, Colombia) was the most distant and least consolidated
northern hinterland of Inka rule. The Inka presencethere apparentlycomprised only a string of outposts runningabout halfway north through Pasto
territoryand leaving a large part of Pasto population free of political intervention (Hernandez de Alba 1946; Moreno Ruiz 1971; R6moli 1977-78;
Uribe 1982). Pasto lords apparentlyruled numeroussmall, perhapsvillagelevel, polities, each enjoying considerableautonomy.Their communitiesexploited what Oberem (1978) terms a "microvertical"spectrumof tieredproductive zones on the steep slopes immediately around village centers. For
goods beyond "microvertical"reach, however,the Pasto villages dependedon
a varietyof economic exchangemechanismsnot reducibleto a "verticalarchipelago" model. They procuredcotton and gold through trading expeditions
to a neighboringlowland people, the Abades. They also practicedthe highly
unusual institution of dispatching certain Pasto families permanentlyto the
Abad villages, not as emissariesor specialists, but as permanentexpatriates
who eventuallyassimilatedAbad culturalnormsand retainedPasto affiliation
only throughtradeties. But for most importantimport goods-coca, seashell
wealth objects, and probablyred pepperand metal goods-they relied upon
two institutionseven more unlike those usually associatedwith Andean economic organization.
The first of these was the status trader complex known by the term
mindala. This word denoted a person authorizedto operateextraterritorially
as a politically sponsoredlong-distance trader.In each of at least twenty-one
Pasto population centers, the ruling house had at its command a corps of
status traders, who constituted a unique social category, neither common,
noble, servile, nor foreign. They were enumeratedfor tribute purposes as a
separatecorporatesector and paid a differenttributerateto their lords, being
exempt from collectivelabor and liable only for paymentof sumptuarygoods
for redistribution(usuallyfinishedgarmentsand bead wealth). The only Pasto
communitiesthat lackedmindalaeswere the ones dispatchedas expatriatesto
the Abad country.
The second strikingly non-Inka institution is the circulationof certain

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FrankSalomon

66

types of goods as currency-likewealth objects or special-purposecurrency.

This complex interlockedwith mindala operationsand with tribute. By following the path of such wealth objects throughseveraldomains of activity, it
becomes possible to appreciatesome fundamentalsof the Pasto economicpolitical system.
Pasto natives operated what Spanish observers called tiangueces (a
Nahuatlism used to refer to a native market), apparently independent of
Spanish interventionuntil well into the colonial era. At these markets,as well
as in the conduct of mindala transactionsoutside them, two types of wealth
objects, perhapsspecial currencies,figuredprominently.One was a polished
gold button, called chagual, which circulatedwidely through Colombia and
in the northernmostInka domains (Wassen 1955: 98; Salomon, in press).
The other was bead wealth, called chaquira; Cieza de Le6n, who passed
through the Pasto country in I547, described chaquiraas "long strands of
fine bone beads, white and red" (1962 [1553]: 99).

Like chaguales, bead wealth had a far-flungnorth Andean distribution.

At the western extreme, the categorychaquiraincludedprocessedSpondylus
shell beads, manufacturedin huge quantitieson the EcuadorianPacificshores
for export to, among other places, southern Peru (Marcos 1977-78) where
they were offered to the rain-givingdeities. At the easternextreme, in Amazonia, it was known as carato. Oberem (I97I: 171-72),

drawing on a 1577

missionaryexplorer'sreport, describestradeamong the AmazonianQuijos as

conducted through a unit of currencyconsisting of a string of twenty-four
bone beads. The value of each string was conventionallyequatedto one day's
labor or the right to spend one night with a woman. A whole necklace of
such stringswas equatedto a week'slabor, or to a political tributepaymentof
unspecifiedperiodicity.
In the Pasto country, commonersas well as nobles and specialistsused
chaquirato buy in the native marketplace.The conventionalunit of chaquira
in the Pasto region was what Spanish-speakerscalled a braza;its physicalsize
is unclear (the term sounds like modern braza, 'fathom,' but is more likely to
mean brazal, 'bracelet'). Its conventionalequivalences,however, are known.
Each unit was worth one-sixth the value of a cotton cloak, two-thirds the
value of a pound of cotton thread,or one-fourthof the value of a load of red
pepper.
In additionto its currencyfunction, bead wealth also had a political and
sumptuary function. Indeed its entire trajectorythrough society tended to
concentrateit in the handsof nativelords. The procurementof bead wealth at
its places of origin (probablythe Pacificlittoral and possibly also Amazonia)
was probably the duty of mindalaes. Bead wealth also accumulatedin the
hands of lords in the form of tributepayments, at the rateof one-half to one
brazaper tributaryper year. In early colonial times, bead wealth was so vital
to the region's economy that the Spanish burghersprivileged to rule over
Pasto Indiansalso chose to take their tributepartly in chaquira.

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NorthAndeanStatusTrader

67

The political role of mindalaes among the Pasto was not limited, however, to procurementof prestige goods; it extended to their redistributionas
well. In 1563, when the intraindigenouspolitics of the region had been but
little modified by Spanish intervention,a Pasto ethnic lord, don Hernando
Paspuel, turnedto Spanish authoritiesin exasperationat the successhis rival
don Cristobal Cuatin enjoyed in subvertingPaspuel'sdominion through the
agencyof one "don Juan Cuaya Mindala." The incident is illuminatinginsofar as it suggestshow status tradersworkedas political operatives.In part, the
offendedethnic lord'stestimony1says:
I, Don Hernando Paspuel, a chief (principal)of the town of Tuza, say
that a mindala of the said town of Tuza, whose name is Cuaya,with the
sponsorshipof Don Christobal (i.e., Cuatin), paramountchief (cacique
principal)of the said town, has interferedand is interferingin governing
the Indians under my dominion, which my father Chavilla left to me;
and for this purpose, he gives them and sends them many gifts of coca
and bead wealth (chaquira)and other things, to such a degree that he
has won over a great numberof Indians, from which cause I am greatly
and notoriouslyharmedand aggrieved.(Grijalva1937: 81-84)
Paspuel asked the Crown to enjoin Cuaya from doing anything to upset his
succession to noble prerogatives.This incident suggests that mindalaes, far
from being entrepreneurs,werepoliticaloperatives.Their choicesin disbursing
wealth were guided, not by a profit motive in commodity terms, but by the
political sponsors' interest in enmeshing subjects through ties of reciprocal
obligation. Such political behavior is understandablegiven the fluidity and
endemic small-scale rivalries of the north Andean political scene (ReichelDolmatoff 196I).

The Mindala Complex in EmergingInka Provinces:Otavalo and Quito

The aboriginal populations of Quito and surroundingPichincha Province,
Ecuador (called Panzaleos in much of the literature[Jijon 1941-47; Murra
1946]) and to an even greaterdegreethose of ImbaburaProvinceto the north
(called Cara, Caranqui,Otavalo, etc.) resisted Inka advanceswith ferocious
tenacity. Only after some seventeenyears of disastrouswarfaredid the rich
maize lands, lakeside fields, tuber-bearingslopes, and camelidpasturesof the
region come under Inka rule. The adjacentwestern and easternflanks of the
Andeancordilleras,heavilyforestedand settled by groupshostile to centralized
rule, had been penetratedonly incompletely when the Spanish arrived.By
I53z, the many small aboriginalvillages of the highlands (with populations
numberingfrom the low thousands to perhapsten thousand;Salomon 1986:
II7-zz) had been organizedas tribute-payingunits of the Inkastate. But the
edifice of Inka governancethere remainedsimplified and minimal compared
to that of more centralprovinces.

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FrankSalomon

68

In theseprovincesthe Spanishfound well-developedmindalacomplexes.

Like the status tradersof farthernorth, those of the communitiessurrounding
Quito and Otavalo constitutedcorporategroups with a unique jural status.
They did not belong to any of the ayllus (probablylocalized kindreds) into
which each polity was divided, but constituted, apparently,a nonlocalized
group entitled to dwell extraterritoriallyin the major centers of the region,
"barteringat the tianguez"(nativemarketplace)while making their homes in
the neighborhood reservedfor Inka lords and the nobility of surrounding
ethnic groups.The mindalaesof these provincesretainedunderInkarule their
exemption from the usual forms of subjectionto nativelords.2
The towns of the whole district formerlyusedto have(i.e., in Inkatimes)
their chieftain (cacique) in each town or neighborhood (parcialidad),
who governedthem in the mannerof a tyrant .... They obeyed and
respectedhim, and paid him tribute;and the Indians owned no more
than he would let them have, so that he was the lord of everythingthat
the Indianspossessed and of their women and sons and daughters,and
he made use of all of them as though they were his slaves, except the
merchantIndians, for these did not servetheir chiefs like the rest, but
only paid him a tributeof gold and cloaks and bead wealth of white or
red bones. (Paz Poncede Le6n I965 [I58z]: 236)
Mindalaes were exceptions to the normal regimen in another respect. They
alone of corporatesectorswere representedby a primus inter paresfrom their
own number-"mindala who has charge of the rest"-rather than by a
leaderwith a dynasticclaim.
None of these featurescontradictsthe regimenseen in the Pasto region.
But under the incipient, but apparentlysteady, Inka governanceof Otavalo
(Caillavet1985) and the more consolidatedInka governanceof Quito, there
was one strikingdeparture.Whereasamongthe Pasto almost all communities,
except the very smallest hamlets, had mindala corps of their own, in Quito
and Otavalo only the largest aboriginalpolities of a given district possessed
them. In Otavalo, only Otavalo proper(seatof the uncommonlystrongAngo
dynasty) and Cayambe (seat of the Puento dynasty) had them. In the Quito
area, only the large communityof Urin Chillo (probablymodern Sangolqui)
sponsored mindalaes residing in Quito. The Urin Chillo delegation is the
best documentedof all mindalacontingents.It consistedof twenty-six households, most headed by men marriedto one or severalwives (the incidenceof
polygamybeing higherthan among aboriginesgenerally)and accompaniedby
childrenand widowed or disabledelders. Some mindala householdsconsisted
of solitary"bachelor"men, but none of solitarywomen.
The mindala corps from Urin Chillo apparentlyhad a strong corporate
identity. Fifty years after the Spanish conquest it still held together,without
Spanish sponsorship,as a separatecollectivitywith a single area of residence

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69

North Andean Status Trader

in Quito. We do not know how people enteredmindalacareers,but it appears

that both hereditaryand nonhereditaryrecruitmenttook place, since some
but not all of the latermindalaescan be identifiedas offspringof earlierones.
Mindala careerswere certainly long, probably lifelong. It is not altogether
clear how gender affected mindala status. In rostersof mindalaes, only men
have the word mindala affixed to their names, but the roster is normally
labeled to signify that "all of these people are mindalaes,"without qualification. Today, the word mindala (with penultimatestress) means 'female petty
trader'and is neverused regardingmen.
What was the language of mindala operations?The word mindala is
almost certainlynot Quechua, since it does not appear in Quechua dictionaries, ancient or modern, of non-Ecuadoriandialects. Moreoverthe namesof
the mindalaes we know about are indigenous but not Quechua. They apparently belong to the now-extinct pre-Incaiclanguage of Quito, thought (on
admittedlyinadequateevidence)to belong to the Chibchanstock of languages
(LoukotkaI968: 245). Some examplesof these names are as follows:
Male mindalaes

Womenof the mindala population

Nynaquiza
Zinbafa
Tuna
Lacicpatin
Chumaguano
Zunbaguano

Choatilli
Choazanguil
Tango
Cayaquin
Chinbo Zinguil
Yngumen

Some names used among mindalaes are also attested in the non-mindala
population of their home community,both common and noble. It is therefore
unlikely that mindalaes belonged to a linguistic or ethnic group foreign to
that of theirsponsoringlords.
A Chibchan language would perhapshave been adequateas a traders'
lingua franca for the region where these specialists operated, since some of
the other languagesspoken there were also Chibchan (Loukotka1968: z5o).
But it is hard to imagine status tradersnot being acquaintedwith imperial
Quechua also, and indeed thereis reasonto think the interviewson which the
recordis based were conducted in Quechua. Hartmann (1979) attributesthe
introductionof Quechua to Ecuadorprimarilyto lingua franca use and only
secondarilyto imperial promulgation.It is altogetherpossible that mindala
networksconnectedwith long-distancetraderoutesfrom the southerncentral
Andes (Hartmann 1979: 292; Torero 1985) which may have been Quechua

vectors.
In Quito and Otavalo as in the Pasto region, mindalaes appearto have
specializedin the importationof extra-sierrangoods, usually of high prestige
and high unit value, from the lowlands and the transverseriver canyons.

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Frank Salomon

70

These included bead wealth, gold, silver, salt, coca, and finished garments.
Most of these appearto havecome from remote sites controlledby "foreign"
cultural groups. Not all of the mindala itinerarycan be reconstructed,but
some of its important points are known. Among them are certain cocaproducing irrigablevalleys (Amboqui, Pelileo); salt refineriesand fisherieson
the Pacificlittoral;inland salt springson cordilleranslopes (Tomavela,Tumbabiro [Caillavet 1979]); Ciscala on the northern coastal plain, thought to be

a "port of trade" where such maritime products as Spondylus beads were

probably available (Carranza1965 [1569]: 89); gold sources, probably in
modern Colombia; and silver sources, probably in a more southerly part of
the Andes. Part of the goods procuredwere handed over to the sponsoring
lord as tribute. The rest, apparently,was taken to the tianguez and by this
routeeventuallyreachedcommunitiesin the handsof commoners.
ImperialImpact on Mindalaes
The Inkapolicy of supervisingmarketplaceexchanges (Hartmann1971) was
only one facet of a complex system of interventions,incentives, and compulsions whose final goal appearsto havebeen the refashioningof diverseAndean
communities into an organizationaland ideological mold amenable to the
demanding system of pan-Andean exchanges which formed the armatureof
Inka rule (D'Altroyand Earle 1985; Golte I970). Other areasof intervention
included making productivespecialties more uniform in organization(Rowe
1982), and the constructionof "sacredgeographies"in the image of Cuzco,
with appropriate shrines (Salomon 1986: I74-80).

But the matter of regulating long-distance exchange specialists had a

particularstrategicimportance,becausetwo conflictingadvantageshad to be
balanced. On one hand, the persistenceof status traderscut against a pervasive patternvisible in Inka policy, namely, the "closing"of economic systems
by the creationof ecologically variedresourceassembliesunderdirect control
at each level of governance,so as to minimize dependenceon sourcesoutside
Inka control. This is visible in, for example, Inka policy regardingcontacts
betweenhighlandsubjectsand nearbytropicalforestpeoples (Hastings1982).
The mindalaes could hardlybe allowed to operateindefinitelywithout their
providinga rivalchannelto the state-administeredapparatusfor gatheringand
redistributingsumptuarygoods. On the other hand, some exotic sumptuary
goods desirable for political use came from tropical forest and maritime regions where Inka military control repeatedly and conclusively failed (Le6n
Borjade Szaszdi I964). Most importantamong these was the Pacificshore of
northernEcuador,which holds the best beds of Spondylus.In orderto assure
access to resourcesbeyond the reachof imperialorganization,specialistlongdistancetradersmight well havebeen consideredworthyof a working license.

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North AndeanStatusTrader

7I

This appears to be what occurred in at least one locale very far from
Quito, namely, the Valley of Chincha in southerncoastal Peru. Maria Rostworowski de Diez Canseco (1970: 171) has called attention to a remarkable
report of I57o-75(?)3:

[I]n this vast Valley of Chincha, there were six thousand merchants
(under Inka rule), and every one of them had a substantial fortune,
because even the ones who did the least business reckoned with five
hundred gold pesos, and many of them dealt in the range of two or
three thousand ducats. And in the course of buying and selling they
went from Chincha to Cuzco through the whole Collao (i.e., Bolivian
highlands), and others went to Quito and Puerto Viejo (i.e., the region
of modern Guayaquil,Ecuador), from which they used to bring a great
deal of chaquiraof gold and many costly emeralds,and they sold them
to the chiefs of Ica who were good friends to them and their closest
neighbors.
In the Chincha Valley,which Inkasruled for longerthan they ruled the Ecuadorian north, the position of the status tradersseems to have been stabilized
institutionallyfor the sake of guaranteeingimport supplies of certaingoods
whose expenditure in sacrifice and redistributionwas the very insignia of
political privilege.
In the case of Quito, policy seems to have been less permissive. If one
comparesthe situationin extraimperialparts of the Pasto country,whereeven
small villages commanded mindala corps, with that of the Otavalan and
Quito regions, one finds that in the latter, after only about thirty to forty
years of Inka domination, the mindala complex is much more restricted.In
each highland valley it seems that only one community commanded mindalaes, and that the corps it commanded was stationed at a place heavily
guardedby Inka forces. While it remainspossible that the monopolizationof
status trader corps in some regions resulted from intraaboriginalprocesses
(perhaps including stimulus effects of the nearby Inka centers) more than
from Inkaintervention,the overallassociationbetween increasingInkaactivity
and decreasingmindala activitymakesthis unlikely.
The Inka-regulatedmindalaes of Quito evidently prospered,but was
their circumscribedorbit a permanentconcessioncomparableto the Chincha
"merchant"complex?
It is too early to tell for certain. Nonetheless a southwardextension of
the comparativeinquiry suggests it was not. Among the next ethnic group
south from Quito, called the Puruha,Inka rule startedperhapstwenty years
earlierthan in Quito. There, we have no report of mindalaes as a corporate
group or any other category of similar function. (Admittedly,the record is
incomplete.) Neither are status tradersreported for Ecuadorianhighlanders

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Frank Salomon

7z

furthersouth. If therehad been status tradersin the region, the fourth or fifth
decade of Inka interventionmay have witnessed their suppressionor conversion to anotherspecialiststatus.
Conclusions
Why did this empiresometimes allow institutionscontradictoryto its normal
governanceto underlie local rule? The question seems hard if we imagine
imperialinterventionas an abruptcoerciveoverhaul,but less so if we suppose
that it often proceededby "driving"selected tendencies within preimperial
society.
The earliest stratum of documents suggests that the longer Inkas governeda region, the less numerousand the less independentstatus tradercorps
became. But it also indicates that the route to their diminution passed not
through suppression, but through supervisionand regulation. In part, this
policy can be explained as contributingto an overallhierarchicalunification.
Inkapolicy apparentlysought to aggregatesmall, mutuallyautonomousnorthernchiefdoms in a pyramidof multilevelintegration,interposinggreaterchiefs
(who servedas tributecollectors,redistributors,and indirect rulers)between
Tawantinsuyuand its vassals. Such multilayeredorganizationopened the way
to the erectionof bureaucraticallyrankedlordshipsand decimal-reckoneddemography,normal Inka measures.Pasto lacked this organization,and Quito
seems to haveacquiredit only underInkarule.
The Inkas appear to have layered chiefdoms and established ranked
relationsamong them not by simple fiat but by a set of interventionswhich
served to push the developmentof chiefdoms in a self-stratifyingdirection.
The favoringof a single chiefdom in any given small region with a mindala
monopoly (or fostering of a local tendency in that direction), while it may
have involved the suppressionof minor chiefs' tradercorps, may have been a
less disruptivealternativethan creatinga wholly artificialparamountcywithout local mandate.The holderof the mindala monopoly would in time come
to function in such a clearlyparamountfashion,becauseof his superiorability
to give out the goods that validatedstatus, as to become a "natural"occupant
of the slot Inkapoliticalpracticeneeded.The fact that the lordsendowed with
mindala monopolies (in, for example, Cayambe,Otavalo, and Sangolqui)did
flourishas virtual regionaloverlordsfar into the colonial erasuggeststhat the
Inkastrategyworkedeven aftereventsunseatedits Cuzco-basedsupervisors.
But to the degreethat traderoperationsreliedon ill-controlledlinks with
unconqueredpeoples, they seem at odds with uniformizationand the encouragement of dependencyon imperiallymanagedassets. The need to deal with
political and culturalheterogeneitymay have weighed in the reckoning,especially where treasuregoods enter.Aboriginallordsseem to havesought sumptuary goods from afar not just to managetheir own subjects,but to manage

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North AndeanStatusTrader

73

theirrelations(procurement,diplomacy,subversion)with rivalpolities.Lacking
far-flungcoercivepower, these small polities reliedon manipulativeexchanges.
Despite its incomparablygreatermight, an empirecould have benefited
by similar policy, especially in regions where coercion failed. Inka governors
may have left status-tradertrafficin place not so much for the sake of directly
feeding intraimperial"wealth finance" (D'Altroyand Earle I985)-after all
we have no evidence that Inkasdid expropriatestatus traders'wealth-as for
the sake of "driving"external political relationssomewhat as they "drove"
intraimperialones. It would be consistent with the Inka tendency toward
indirect and pseudoconservativeinitiatives at the margin of empire to let
tradercorps function as conduits into the exterior, whereby the goods (and
the ideas) with which Inkas investedcompliant vassalscould enter a web of
reciprocitiesbeyond Inka frontiers. Mindalaes of an Inka-dominatednoble
would function as imperialcat's-pawsinsofar as they impressedupon remote
partnersthe advantageof dealing with imperiallyconnectedlords. In intractable, but treasure-producing,regions like the equatorialcoast or Amazonia,
such cultural imperialismmay have proven the less costly and more effective
kind of imperialaggression.
Notes
I Theoriginaltext is as follows:
[D]onhermandopaspilprincipaldel pueode tuca.digoqueun mindaladel
dichopueo de tucaquese nonbracuayacon faborde don xpoval (Cuatin)
casiqueprincipaldel dichopueblose a entremetidoy entremeteen mandar
los yndiosde mi seforio,quemedexomi padrechavillay parael dichoefeto
les da y enbiamuchospresentesde cocay chaquiray otrascosas,hastatanto
que los a traidoensi muchacantidadde yndiosde que yo rrecibonotorio
dafio y agrauyo. . . [orthographic
and abbreviations
thusin
irregularities
edition].
Grijalva's
z Theoriginaltext is as follows:
Lospueblosde todoestecorregimiento
tenianantiguamente
en cadapueblo
o parcialidadsu caciqueque los gobernabaa manerade tirania. . . y le
obedeciany respetaban
y pagabantributo;y los indiosno teniancosaalguna
masde lo queel caciqueles queriadejar;de maneraqueerasefor de todo lo
quelos indiosposeiany de sus mujeresy hijosy hijas,y serviansede todos
elloscomosi fueransusesclavos,ecetode los indiosmercaderes,
queestosno
serviana sus caciquescomo los demassino solo pagabantributode oro y
mantasy chaquira
de huesoblancoo colorado.
3 Theoriginaltext is as follows:
Aviaen estegranvallede Chincha,seis mil mercaderes
y cadauno de ellos
teniarazonablecaudal,porqueel quemenostratoteniatratabaconquinientos pesosde oroy muchosde ellostratabancondos mily tresmilducados;y
con suscomprasy ventasibandesdeChinchaal Cuzcoportodoel Collao,y

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FrankSalomon

74

otros iban a Quito y a Puerto Viejo, de donde trajanmucha chaquirade oro

y muchas esmeraldasricas y las vendian a los caciques de Ica, que eran muy
amigos de ellos y eransus vecinos mas cercanos.
Appendix
The following are the manuscriptsourceson which the present work is based. A brief
evaluativenote follows each.
AF/Q (ArchivoFranciscano,Quito) Legajo 8 no. i:f. 8zr-iozr
Padron de los yndios parroquianosdesta yglesia de San Sebastian assi
158z?
anaconascomo tributariosy los demas que residenen esta parroquia.
This registerof "Indians"enrolledin a parish forming the heartof Incaic
Quito includes (amongother sectors)a list of the mindalaeswho formed
the corps from Urin Chillo a whole generationlater than the I559 corps
described in AGI/S Justicia 683 (below). It offers a valuable but hardto-interpretsample of florescent"Toledan"urbannativesociety.
AGI/S (ArchivoGeneralde Indias, Sevilla) Audienciade Quito 60:z
Tassacionde los tributosde los natualesde las ciudadesde San Joan de
I570/7I
Pasto y Almaguer de la governacion de Popayan hecha por el sefior
licenciado Garciade Valverdeoy de la Real Audiencia de San Francisco
del Quito Afo de MDLXX y MDLXXI afnoscon las ordenancas y
relacionesde la visita y otros autos a ellos tocantes.
This detailed "Toledan"visita treats villages barely within the northernmost Inkamarches,and many others beyond them. It includesinterviews
with witnesses to the earliest days of Spanish invasion;some of them depended upon intranativetrade circuits as tribute sources and described
them in detail. While demographicallyprecisethe visita lacks close record
of native lords'viewpoint.
AGI/S (ArchivoGeneralde Indias, Sevilla) Camara9zzA
1548/83 Dofa Leonor de Balenzuelamuger del capitan Rodrigo de Salazarcon
el fiscal y la comunidadde los indios del repartimientode Otavalo.
Fragmentsand summariesof the earliest ("Pizarran")visitas and tribute
quota records,whose originals have not come to light, are embedded in
this complex I583 litigation. Focusing markedly on native commerce,
they may err nonethelessin underrepresentingcommodities which failed
to interest Spaniards. The case deals with a rich and thickly settled
region north of Quito partly integratedinto the Inkaempire.
AGI/S (ArchivoGeneralde Indias, Sevilla)Justicia683
(Residencias tomadas del licenciado Juan de Salazar Villasante por
I563/65
Alonso Manuel de Anaya, juez de comisi6n, y el presidente Santillan
de la Audienciade Quito. (En las fojas 798r-874v contiene:)Visita de la
ecomienda de Francisco Ruiz hecha por Juan Mosquera y Cristobal de
San Martin por mandado del gobernadorGil RamirezDavalos (I559).
Among the documentsembeddedin the exit hearingsof the controversial
politician Salazar are interviewswith various native lords, and most importantly, a large early visita of six communities close to Quito. These

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North AndeanStatusTrader

75

form the most detailed and credible source known on Tawantinsuyu's

functioning in its northern peripheries. Compiled from native lords'
khipus (knot-cord records), it may err on the side of underestimating
population or resources.
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