Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
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SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151866. September 9, 2004]
SOLEDAD
CARPIO, petitioner,
VALMONTE, respondent.
vs. LEONORA
A.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition for review is the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69537, [1] promulgated on 17
January 2002.[2] The appellate court reversed the trial courts
decision denying respondents claim for damages against petitioner
and ordered the latter to pay moral damages to the former in the
amount of P100,000.00.
Respondent
Leonora
Valmonte
is
a
wedding
coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her
services for their church wedding on 10 October 1996. At about
4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the
bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A,
several persons were already there including the bride, the brides
parents and relatives, the make-up artist and his assistant, the
official photographers, and the fashion designer. Among those
present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who
was preparing to dress up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite
carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from
the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant
where the reception was to be held. She paid the suppliers, gave
the meal allowance to the band, and went back to the suite. Upon
entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It
was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following
words to Valmonte: Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang
dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng
kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha. Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies
to search Valmontes bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the
room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces
of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag
were lost. The jewelry pieces consist of two (2) diamond rings, one
(1) set of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total
value of about one million pesos. The hotel security was called in to
help in the search. The bags and personal belongings of all the
people inside the room were searched. Valmonte was allegedly
bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard
throughout the evening. Later, police officers arrived and
interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and
fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all the time
Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner
kept on saying the words Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.
Valmontes car which was parked at the hotel premises was also
searched but the search yielded nothing.
A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from
Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted
to be circulated to the newlyweds relatives and guests to redeem
her smeared reputation as a result of petitioners imputations
against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus, on 20
February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 268. In
her complaint, Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay
actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.
Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having uttered
words or done any act to confront or single out Valmonte during the
investigation and claimed that everything that transpired after the
theft incident was purely a police matter in which she had no
participation. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
and for the court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her counterclaim.
The trial court rendered its Decision on 21 August 2000,
dismissing Valmontes complaint for damages. It ruled that when
petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was
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she uttered the words complained of, it was not shown that she did
so with malice and in bad faith.
In essence, petitioner would want this Court to review the
factual conclusions reached by the appellate court. The cardinal
rule adhered to in this jurisdiction is that a petition for review must
raise only questions of law,[3] and judicial review under Rule 45 does
not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of evidence unless
there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally
devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.[4] This Court,
while not a trier of facts, may review the evidence in order to arrive
at the correct factual conclusion based on the record especially so
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance
with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the
Court of Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken.[5]
Contrary to the trial courts finding, we find sufficient evidence
on record tending to prove that petitioners imputations against
respondent was made with malice and in bad faith.
Petitioners testimony was shorn of substance and consists
mainly of denials. She claimed not to have uttered the words
imputing the crime of theft to respondent or to have mentioned the
latters name to the authorities as the one responsible for the loss of
her jewelry. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
which merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.[6]
Respondent, however, has successfully refuted petitioners
testimony. Quite credibly, she has narrated in great detail her
distressing experience on that fateful day. She testified as to how
rudely she was treated by petitioner right after she returned to the
room. Petitioner immediately confronted her and uttered the
words Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. Nasaan ang dala mong
bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw ang kumuha. Thereafter, her body
was searched including her bag and her car. Worse, during the
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Q What did the defendant Mrs. Carpio tell the plaintiff, Mrs.
Valmonte?
A Ikaw yung nakita ko sa C.R. nawawala yung alahas ko.
Q When the defendant Mrs. Carpio said that to plaintiff
Mrs. Valmonte were there other people inside the
room?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were they able to hear what Mrs. Carpio said to Mrs.
Valmonte?
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Owing to the rule that great weight and even finality is given to
factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of
the trial court,[18] we sustain the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court that respondents claim for actual damages has not
been substantiated with satisfactory evidence during the trial and
must therefore be denied. To be recoverable, actual damages must
be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty and the courts
cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork.[19]
Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of moral
damages. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the
defendants wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury[20] in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
[21]
Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
moral damages may be adjudicated, courts are mandated to take
into account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess
damages according to their discretion. [22] Worthy of note is that
moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant, [23] or to
enrich a complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
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respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the
loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and
ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner
virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the
right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign
respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who
actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or
principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused
injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and
good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry
cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with
justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in
mind
but
to
prejudice
respondent. Certainly,
petitioner
transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for
which she should be held accountable.
Page
Manila
The Facts
Petitioner Eusebio Gonzales (Gonzales) was a client of PCIB
FIRST DIVISION
for a good 15 years before he filed the instant case. His account
EUSEBIO GONZALES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
The Case
and
Jocelyn
Panlilio
(spouses
Panlilio) for
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spouses Panlilio through the automatic debiting of their account
Page
with PCIB. But the spouses Panlilio, from the month of July 1998,
damages for the unjust dishonor of the check. [7] PCIB replied
well that the actual borrowers were the spouses Panlilio and he
never benefited from the proceeds of the loans, which were
30, 1998 in favor of Rene Unson (Unson) for PhP 250,000 drawn
against the credit line (COHLA). However, on October 13, 1998,
file the instant case for damages with the RTC, on account of the
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No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
about by the outstanding past dues of the REM loan and interests
for which Gonzales was solidarily liable with the spouses Panlilio to
REM loan. The trial court found no fault in the termination by PCIB
The Issues
was proper considering that the credit line under the COHLA had
already been terminated or revoked before the presentment of the
check.
Aggrieved, Gonzales appealed the RTC Decision before the
CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On September 26, 2007, the appellate court rendered its
Decision dismissing Gonzales appeal and affirming in toto the RTC
Decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision, dated December 10, 2001, in Civil Case No.
99-1324 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
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as
security;
and second,
whether
PCIB
properly
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PCIB is well aware and did not dispute the fact that Gonzales
is an accommodation party. It also acted in accordance with such
fact by releasing the proceeds of the loan to the spouses Panlilio
and likewise only informed the spouses Panlilio of the interest
dues. The spouses Panlilio, through their account [28] with PCIB, were
paying the periodic interest dues and were the ones periodically
informed by the bank of the debiting of the amounts for the
periodic interest payments. Gonzales never paid any of the periodic
interest dues. PCIBs Noceda admitted as much in his crossexamination:
ATTY. DE JESUS: [on Cross-Examination]
And there was no instance that Mr. Gonzales ever
made even interest for this loan, is it not, its always
Mr. Panlilio who was paying the interest for this loan?
NOCEDA:
Yes sir.[29]
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there was no proper written notice given by the bank. The record is
bereft of any document showing that, indeed, Gonzales was
formally informed by PCIB about the past due periodic interests.
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his COHLA. For failure to do so, the bank is liable to pay nominal
damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant
circumstances.[51] In this case, the Court finds that the grant of PhP
50,000 as nominal damages is proper.
Moreover, as We held in MERALCO v. CA,[52] failure to give
prior notice when required, such as in the instant case, constitutes
a breach of contract and is a clear violation of Art. 21 of the Code.
In cases such as this, Art. 2219 of the Code provides that moral
damages may be recovered in acts referred to in its Art. 21.
Further, Art. 2220 of the Code provides that [w]illful injury to
property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Similarly, every person
who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. [53] Evidently,
Gonzales is entitled to recover moral damages.
Even in the absence of malice or bad faith, a depositor still
has the right to recover reasonable moral damages, if the depositor
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, embarrassment, and
humiliation.[54] Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral
damages are certainly recoverable if they are the proximate result
of the defendants wrongful act or omission. The factual
antecedents bolstered by undisputed testimonies likewise show the
mental anguish and anxiety Gonzales had to endure with the threat
of Unson to file a suit. Gonzales had to pay Unson PhP 250,000,
while his FCD account in PCIB was frozen, prompting Gonzales to
demand from PCIB and to file the instant suit.
The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration within
the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo anteit must
always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be
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EN BANC
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informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were
nil.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article
21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends
that the same could not be adjudged against him because under
Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that
"the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,
or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under
the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly
acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This
Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the
lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
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THIRD DIVISION
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We declared:
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THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142943. April 3, 2002]
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners, vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco)
may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of
alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is
personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by
a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the February 1, 2000 Decision [1] and the April 10,
2000 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
49022. The decretal portion of the said Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision in Civil Case No. Q-95-23219
is hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint against defendantappellant MERALCO is hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs-appellees are
hereby ORDERED to pay defendant-appellant MERALCO the
differential billing of P193,332.00 representing the value of used
but unregistered electrical consumption.[3]
The assailed
Reconsideration.
Resolution
denied
petitioners
Motion
for
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals
in this wise:
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In sum, this Petition raises three (3) main issues which this
Court will address: (1) whether respondent observed the requisites
of law when it disconnected the electrical supply of petitioners, (2)
whether such disconnection entitled petitioners to damages, and
(3) whether petitioners are liable for the billing differential
computed by respondent.
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says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is
obeyed.[17]
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Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the
injured party in the position where it was before it was injured.
[26]
They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually
sustained and susceptible of measurement. [27] Except as provided
by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss as it has duly proven.[28]
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Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must
the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.[29]
A Approximately P50,000.00.[30]
Q Whereat?
A At our residence, we were supposed to have a dinner at
our residence.
Q What happened to this occasion?
A So when they disconnected our electric power we had to
get in touch with them and change the venue.
Q Which venue did you transfer your dinner for your
buyers?
Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral
damages may be recovered. One such case[34] is when the rights of
individuals, including the right against deprivation of property
without due process of law, are violated.[35]
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. [36]Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, such damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate results of the defendants
wrongful act or omission.[37]
Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of
moral damages: (1) there is an injury -- whether physical, mental or
psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a
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This Court agrees with the defendant regarding [its] right by law
and equity to protect itself from any fraud. However, such right
should not be exercised arbitrarily but with great caution and with
due regard to the rights of the consumers. Meralco having a virtual
monopoly of the supply of electric power should refrain from taking
drastic actions against the consumers without observing due
process. Even assuming that the subject meter has had history of
meter tampering, defendant cannot simply assume that the
present occupants are the ones responsible for such
tampering. Neither does it serve as a license to deprive the
plaintiffs of their right to due process. Defendant should have given
the plaintiffs simple opportunity to dispute the electric charges
brought about by the alleged meter-tampering, which were not
included in the bill rendered them. Procedural due process requires
reasonable notice to pay the bill and reasonable notice to
discontinue supply. Absent due process the defendant may be held
liable for damages. While this Court is aware of the practice of
unscrupulous individuals of stealing electric curre[n]t which causes
thousands if not millions of pesos in lost revenue to electric
companies, this does not give the defendant the right to trample
upon the rights of the consumers by denying them due process.[33]
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even to the extent of elevating the matter to this Court; [51] thus, an
award of P50,000 is considered sufficient.
Final Issue:
Billing Differential
Finally, this Court holds that despite the basis for the award of
damages -- the lack of due process in immediately disconnecting
petitioners electrical supply -- respondents counterclaim for the
billing differential is still proper. We agree with the CA that
respondent should be given what it rightfully deserves. The
evidence it presented, both documentary and testimonial,
sufficiently proved the amount of the differential.
Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had
been conducted by its experts, but it also established the amount
of P193,332.96 that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure
through which this amount was arrived at was testified to by
Meralcos Senior Billing Computer Enrique Katipunan. His testimony
was corroborated by documentary evidence showing the accounts
billing history and the corresponding computations. Neither do we
doubt the documents of inspections and examinations presented by
respondent to prove that, indeed there had been meter tampering
that resulted in unrecorded and unpaid electrical consumption.
The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with
Assumption of Mortgage[52] does not necessarily mean that they are
no longer liable for the billing differential. There was no sufficient
evidence to show that they had not been actually residing in the
house before the date of the said document. Lorna Quisumbing
herself admitted[53] that they did not have any contract for electrical
service in their own name. Hence, petitioners effectively assumed
the bills of the former occupants of the premises.
Finally, the CA was correct in ruling that the convincing
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by respondent,
was not controverted by petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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FIRST DIVISION
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xxx
The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer.
It also issued a temporary restraining order as prayed for,
and required the respondents to show cause why it should
not be converted to a writ of preliminary injunction. The
record shows that the respondents prayed for and were
granted an extension of fifteen (15) days to file their
answer through counsel, who, as the Court of Appeals was
later to point out, did not bother to indicate his address,
thus notice was sent to him through the individual
respondents xxx (However, no) answer was filed; neither
was there any show cause [sic] against a writ of
preliminary injunction. It was a certain Atty. Jose Fabia who
appeared in Vital-Gozon's behalf.
About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the
same Court a Supplemental/Amended Petition dated
February 2, 1989. The second petition described as one
for quo warranto aside from mandamus, added three
respondents including Dr. Jose Merencilla, Jr.; and
alleged inter alia that he (de la Fuente) had clear title to
the position in question [by] virtue of the final and
executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission; that
even after the Commission's judgment had become final
and executory and been communicated to Vital-Gozon,
the latter allowed Dr. Merencilla, Jr. as OIC Professional
Service to further usurp, intrude into and unlawfully hold
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(Atty. Fabia) did not set out his address in his motion
for extension;
6) the supplemental/amended petition subsequently
presented by de la Fuente, copy of which was sent to
Atty. Fabia, c/o Dr. Vital-Gozon; and
7) the Decision and Amendatory Decision sent to her
counsel on October 3, 1989.
To all these, her reaction, and that of the officials of the Department
of Health concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say the
least. Neither she nor the Health officials concerned accorded said
acts and events any importance. She never bothered to find out
what was being done to contest or negate de la Fuentes petitions
and actions, notwithstanding that as time went by, de la Fuentes
efforts were being met with success.
Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Vital-Gozon
merits relief from the final and executory Resolution of the Civil
Service Commission. This Court will not disturb that Resolution. It is
satisfied that no procedural or substantive errors taint that
Resolution, or its becoming final and executory.
The Court of Appeals then considered the evidence for private
respondent and the applicable law, thus:
Upon respondents continued refusal without justifiable
cause to implement the final resolution of the Civil Service
Commission upholding petitioners right to the position he
has been claiming with back salaries, transportation,
representation and housing allowances and other benefits
withheld from him, petitioner is entitled to the damages
he claims.Testifying in his own behalf petitioner declared
that he was greatly disturbed, shocked and frustrated
during the three months preceding the filing of his
petition; that he had sleepless nights and suffered from
mental anxiety, mental anguish, worry, tension and
humiliation when respondent ignored and disregarded the
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II
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. They may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants
wrongful act or omission.[32] The instances when moral damages
may be recovered are, inter alia, acts and actions referred to in
Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 of the Civil Code,
[33]
which, in turn, are found in the Chapter on Human Relations of
the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code. Relevant to the instant case,
which involves public officers, is Article 27,[34] which provides:
ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a
public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause,
to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and
other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
Article 27 must then be read in conjunction with Section 1 of Article
XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution, [35] which
provides:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
It is thus evident that under Article 27, in relation to Articles
2219 and 2217 of the Civil Code, a public officer, like petitioner
herein, may be liable for moral damages for as long as the moral
damages suffered by private respondent were the proximate result
of petitioners wrongful act or omission, i.e., refusal to perform an
official duty or neglect in the performance thereof.In fact, if only to
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16. For causing such mental suffering and anguish, etc.,[42] principal
respondent [herein petitioner] ought to and must be, in accordance
with the Civil Code, held personally answerable and liable to the
petitioner in the sum of not less than P100,000.00 as moral
damages, and another sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
by way of example or correction for the public good. [43] (emphasis
supplied)
In maintaining then that she was sued merely in her official
capacity, petitioner has either overlooked paragraph 16 or sought
to deliberately mislead this Court.
WHEREFORE, for utter failure to show that respondent Court
of Appeals committed reversible error in the challenged resolutions,
the instant petition is denied.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439
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EN BANC
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Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his copetitioners.
Sir:
CORTES, J.:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with
preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray
that respondent be directed:
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On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of
the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy
General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another
letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now
considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within
the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public
interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed
the instant suit.
Dear Compaero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it
contained serious legal implications, President &
General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to
me for study and reply your letter to him of June 4,
1986 requesting a list of the opposition members of
Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean
loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda
Marcos.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting
that 137 former members of the defunct interim and regular
Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were
granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.]
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the
Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the
petition was given due course and the parties were required to file
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distinguished from
contracts, agreements,
or treaties or whatever,
does the Gentleman
refer to the steps
leading to the
consummation of the
contract, or does he
refer to the contract
itself?
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SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976,
72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this
standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare
the list requested.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent
General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is
ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records
evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang
Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable
regulations as to the time and manner of inspection, not
incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY
FILM PRODUCTIONS, petitioners,
vs.
HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 82398 April 29, 1988
HAL MCELROY petitioner,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 and
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company, Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer
Productions), 1 envisioned, sometime in 1987, the for commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release, the histolic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie
producer Lope V. Juban who suggested th they consult with the
appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel V.
Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles
in the events proposed to be filmed.
The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution"
was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification
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mass media. The subject mater, as set out in the synopsis provided
by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the
individual life and certainly not to the private life of private
respondent Ponce Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the
life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his
immediate family, what we have here is not a film biography, more
or less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four
Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the
man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to
refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and
the constituent events of the change of government in February
1986.
3. The extent of the instrusion upon the life of private respondent
Juan Ponce Enrile that would be entailed by the production and
exhibition of "The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be limited
in character. The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands
the synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally described as
such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a
truthful historical account. Private respondent does not claim that
petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any
part of the private life of private respondent or that of any member
of his family.
4. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events,
clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were
taking place, private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and
Keeton have referred to as a "public figure:"
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by
his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by
adopting a profession or calling which gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs,
and his character, has become a 'public personage.'
He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be
included in this category are those who have
achieved some degree of reputation by appearing
before the public, as in the case of an actor, a
professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other
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II
In a Manifestation dated 30 March 1988, petitioner Hal McElroy
informed this Court that a Temporary Restraining Order dated 25
March 1988, was issued by Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 88-413, entitled
"Gregorio B. Honasan vs. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd., McElroy Film
Productions, Hal McElroy, Lope Juban and PMP Motion for Pictures
Production" enjoining him and his production company from further
filimg any scene of the projected mini-series film. Petitioner alleged
that Honasan's complaint was a "scissors and paste" pleading, cut
out straight grom the complaint of private respondent Ponce Enrile
in Civil Case No. 88-151. Petitioner Ayer Productions, in a separate
Manifestation dated 4 April 1988, brought to the attention of the
Court the same information given by petitoner Hal McElroy,
reiterating that the complaint of Gregorio B. Honasan was
substantially identical to that filed by private respondent herein and
stating that in refusing to join Honasan in Civil Case No. 88-151,
counsel for private respondent, with whom counsel for Gregorio
Honasan are apparently associated, deliberately engaged in "forum
shopping."
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No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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SECOND DIVISION
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city life yet near all facilities. Plans took shape when
they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and
determination, they bought a lot and built their
dream house ... for P31,000. The Arcadios are now
part of the friendly, thriving community of
BROOKSIDE HILLS... a beautiful first-class subdivision
planned for wholesome family living.
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Dear Sirs:
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful
advertisement in the Sunday Times where Saint Louis Realty
Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J.
Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.
St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of
Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) in the
issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement
with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading was
the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio
family and then below the photograph was the following write-up:
Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR.
AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their family
have been captured by BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used
to rent a small 2-bedroom house in a cramped
neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome
for the needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a
more pleasant place free from the din and dust of
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house of another Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramilprivate respondent) was mistakenly used as a
background for the featured homeowner's the
Arcadio family.
The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family
with their real house in the background, as was
intended all along.
Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should
have immediately published a rectification and apology. He found
that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter
lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his
income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover,
there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000
as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment, with Acting Presiding
Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan as ponente, and Justices Sixto A.
Domondon and Samuel F. Reyes concurring.
The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Realty committed
an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code
because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house
which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally,
was annoyed by that contretemps.
In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the Appellate Court
ignored certain facts and resorted to surmises and conjectures. This
contention is unwarranted. The Appellate Court adopted the facts
found by the trial court. Those factual findings are binding on this
Court.
St. Louis Realty also contends that the decision is contrary to law
and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity with the
rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by
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EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671
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nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil
law to solemnize marriages.
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child into his home and afford him or her protection and
support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child
away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to
stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more
frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a
married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of
advice given to a son.
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SECOND DIVISION
while her case was pending investigation the company placed her
under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days effective 9
October 1994 to 7 November 1994. Lexjuris
On 20 October 1994, while Cortez was still under preventive
suspension, another memorandum was issued by petitioner
corporation giving her seventy-two (72) hours to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her for allegedly failing
to process the ATM applications of her nine (9) co-employees with
the Allied Banking Corporation. On 21 October 1994 private
respondent also refused to receive the second memorandum
although it was read to her by a co-employee. A copy of the
memorandum was also sent by the Personnel Manager to private
respondent at her last known address by registered mail. Jurismis
Meanwhile, private respondent submitted a written explanation
with respect to the loss of the P1,488.00 and the punching-in of her
time card by a co-employee.
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to her former position with back wages computed from the time of
dismissal up to her actual reinstatement.[5]
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SECOND DIVISION
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The Court is also aware of the long settled rule that when the issue
is on the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally
disturb the findings of the trial court; however, its factual findings
may nonetheless be reversed if by the evidence on record or lack of
it, it appears that the trial court erred.[6] In this respect, the Court is
not generally inclined to review the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals unless its findings are erroneous, absurd, speculative,
conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or
contrary to the findings culled by the trial court of origin. [7] This rule
of course cannot be unqualifiedly applied to a case where the judge
who penned the decision was not the one who heard the case,
because not having heard the testimonies himself, the judge would
not be in a better position than the appellate courts to make such
determination.[8]
However, it is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who
heard the evidence was not the one who rendered the judgment
but merely relied on the record of the case does not render his
judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if the judge did not
have the fullest opportunity to weigh the testimonies not having
heard all the witnesses speak nor observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. Thus the Court generally will not find any
misapprehension of facts as it can be fairly assumed under the
principle of regularity of performance of duties of public officers
that the transcripts of stenographic notes were thoroughly
scrutinized and evaluated by the judge himself.
Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to
engender doubt as to the factual findings of the court a quo? We
find none. A painstaking review of the evidence on record
convinces us not to disturb the judgment appealed from. The fact
that the case was handled by different judges brooks no
consideration at all, for preponderant evidence consistent with their
claim for damages has been adduced by private respondents as to
foreclose a reversal. Otherwise, everytime a Judge who heard a
case, wholly or partially, dies or lives the service, the case cannot
be decided and a new trial will have to be conducted. That would
be absurb; inconceivable. Esmso
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Testifying that until that very afternoon of his meeting with Nestor
he never knew respondent, had never seen him before, and was
unaware of his business partnership with Florence, his subsequent
declarations on the witness stand however belie this lack of
knowledge about the business venture for in that alleged encounter
he asked Nestor how the business was going, what were the
collection problems, and how was the money being spent. He even
knew that the name of the business, Floral Enterprises, was coined
by combining the first syllables of the name Florence and Allem,
the name of Nestors wife. He said that he casually asked Nestor
about the rumor between him and Florence which Nestor denied.
Not content with such denial, he dared Nestor to go with him to
speak to his relatives who were the source of his information.
Nestor went with him and those they were able to talk to denied
the rumor. Kycalr
We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know
the truth about the rumor and why he was not satisfied with the
separate denials made by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront
Nestor face to face, invade the latters privacy and hurl defamatory
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