RepublicofthePhilippines

SupremeCourt
Manila

THIRDDIVISION

VILMAG.ARRIOLAand
ANTHONYRONALDG.
ARRIOLA,
Petitioners,

versus

G.R.No.177703

Present:

YNARESSANTIAGO,J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,
CORONA,*

NACHURA,and

REYES,JJ.

JOHNNABORC.ARRIOLA,

Promulgated:
Respondent.

January28,2008
xx

DECISION

AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
[1]
[2]
assailingtheNovember30,2006Decision andApril30,2007Resolution oftheCourtof
AppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.93570.

Therelevantfactsareculledfromtherecords.

John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 030010 with the Regional
TrialCourt,Branch254,LasPiasCity(RTC)againstVilmaG.ArriolaandAnthonyRonaldG.

Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the
decedentFidel).RespondentisthesonofdecedentFidelwithhisfirstwifeVictoriaC.Calabia,
whilepetitionerAnthonyisthesonofdecedentFidelwithhissecondwife,petitionerVilma.

OnFebruary16,2004,theRTCrenderedaDecision,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,judgmentisherebyrendered:

1.OrderingthepartitionoftheparceloflandcoveredbyTransferCertificateofTitleNo.
383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C.
Arriola,VilmaG.ArriolaandAnthonyRonaldG.Arriolainequalsharesofonethird(1/3)each
withoutprejudicetotherightsofcreditorsormortgageesthereon,ifany

2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS is hereby

awardedtobereimbursedbythedefendantstotheplaintiff

3.Costsagainstthedefendants.

[3]
SOORDERED.

[4]
ThedecisionbecamefinalonMarch15,2004.

As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land covered by TCT No.
383714(subjectland),respondentsoughtitssalethroughpublicauction,andpetitionersacceded
[5]
[6]
to it. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of the subject land. The public
auctionsalewasscheduledonMay31,2003butithadtoberesetwhenpetitionersrefusedto
[7]
includeintheauctionthehouse(subjecthouse)standingonthesubjectland. This prompted
[8]
respondenttofilewiththeRTCanUrgentManifestationandMotionforContemptofCourt,
prayingthatpetitionersbedeclaredincontempt.

[9]
TheRTCdeniedthemotioninanOrder datedAugust30,2005,forthereasonthatpetitioners
werejustifiedinrefusingtohavethesubjecthouseincludedintheauction,thus:

Thedefendants[petitioners]arecorrectinholdingthatthehouseorimprovementerectedonthe
propertyshouldnotbeincludedintheauctionsale.

A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the evidence adduced during the ex
parte hearing clearly show that nothing was mentioned about the house existing on the land
subjectmatterofthecase.Infact,evenplaintiff's[respondent's]initiatoryComplaintlikewisedid

notmentionanythingaboutthehouse.Undoubtedlytherefore,theCourtdidnotincludethehouse
in its adjudication of the subject land because it was plaintiff himself who failed to allege the
same.Itisawellsettledrulethatthecourtcannotgivearelieftothatwhichisnotallegedand
prayedforinthecomplaint.

Tohold,asplaintiffargued,thatthehouseisconsideredaccessorytothelandonwhichitisbuilt
isineffecttoaddtoplaintiff's[a]rightwhichhasneverbeenconsideredorpasseduponduring
thetrialonthemerits.

Intheabsenceofanyotherdeclaration,obviousorotherwise,onlythelandshouldbepartitioned
in accordance to[sic] the aforementioned Decision as the house can not be said to have been
necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus, plaintiff can not be declared as a coowner of the same
housewithoutevidencethereofandduehearingthereon.

The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly pointed out, judgment must
standevenattheriskthatitmightbeerroneous.

WHEREFORE,theUrgentManifestationandMotionforContemptofCourtfiledbyplaintiffis
herebyDENIEDforlackofmerit.

SOORDERED.[10]

TheRTC,initsOrderdatedJanuary3,2006,deniedrespondent'sMotionforReconsideration.
[11]
[12]
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari
where he sought to have the RTC
Orderssetaside,andprayedthathebeallowedtoproceedwiththeauctionofthesubjectland
includingthesubjecthouse.

InitsNovember30,2006Decision,theCAgrantedthePetitionforCertiorari,towit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated August 30, 2005 and
January3,2006issuedbytheRTC,inCivilCaseNo.SCA030010,areREVERSEDandSET
ASIDE, and the sheriff is ordered to proceed with the public auction sale of the subject lot
coveredbyTCTNo.383714,includingthehouseconstructedthereon.

[13]
SOORDERED.
(Emphasissupplied.)

[14]
PetitionersfiledamotionforreconsiderationbuttheCAdeniedthesameinitsResolution
of
April30,2007.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the CA erred in holding that the RTC
committedgraveabuseofdiscretionindenyingthemotionforcontemptofcourt.

The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be modified for reasons other than those
advancedbypetitioners.

Thecontemptproceedinginitiatedbyrespondentwasoneforindirectcontempt.Section4,Rule
71oftheRulesofCourtprescribestheprocedurefortheinstitutionofproceedingsforindirect
contempt,viz:

Sec.4.Howproceedingscommenced.Proceedingsforindirectcontemptmaybeinitiated
motuproprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other
formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petitionwithsupportingparticularsandcertifiedtruecopiesofdocumentsorpapersinvolved
therein,anduponfullcompliancewiththerequirementsforfilinginitiatorypleadingsforcivil
actionsinthecourtconcerned.Ifthecontemptchargesaroseoutoforarerelatedtoaprincipal
actionpendinginthecourt,thepetitionforcontemptshallallegethatfactbutsaidpetitionshall
be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
(Emphasessupplied.)

Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for initiating an
indirectcontemptproceedingarea)thatitbeinitiatedbywayofaverifiedpetitionandb)thatit
should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. In
[15]
Regaladov.Go,
weheld:
As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that has
compliedwiththerequirementsforthefilingofinitiatorypleading,ismandatoryxxx:

This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for
commencingcontemptproceedings.Whilesuchproceedinghasbeenclassifiedas
specialcivilactionundertheformerRules,theheterogenouspracticetoleratedby
the courts, has been for any party to file a motion without paying any docket or
lawful fees therefore and without complying with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings,whichisnowrequiredinthesecondparagraphofthisamendedsection.

xxxx

Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by

orderoforaformalchargebytheoffendedcourt,allchargesshallbecommenced
by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefore and
shallbedisposedinaccordancewiththesecondparagraphofthissection.

xxxx

Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the
court already acquired jurisdiction, the rules direct that the petition for contempt be

treatedindependentlyoftheprincipalaction.Consequently,thenecessaryprerequisites
forthefilingofinitiatorypleadings,suchasthefilingofaverifiedpetition,attachment
ofacertificationonnonforumshopping,andthepaymentofthenecessarydocketfees,
mustbefaithfullyobserved.

xxxx

The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical language. In case
wheretheindirectcontemptchargeisnotinitiatedbythecourts,thefilingofaverifiedpetition
whichfulfillstherequirementsoninitiatorypleadingsisaprerequisite.Beyondquestionnowis
the mandatory requirement of a verified petition in initiating an indirect contempt proceeding.
Truly, prior to the amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion without
complyingwiththerequirementsforinitiatorypleadingswastoleratedbythecourts.Attheonset
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, such practice can no longer be
[16](Emphasisours.)
countenanced.

The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceeding initiated by
respondent.ThelatterdidnotcomplywithanyofthemandatoryrequirementsofSection4,Rule
71.HefiledamereUrgentManifestationandMotionforContemptofCourt,andnotaverified
petition.Helikewisedidnotconformwiththerequirementsforthefilingofinitiatorypleadings
suchasthesubmissionofacertificationagainstforumshoppingandthepaymentofdocketfees.
Thus,hisunverifiedmotionshouldhavebeendismissedoutrightbytheRTC.

It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked the infirmities in respondent's
unverified motion for contempt, in the end, it dismissed the motion, albeit on substantive
grounds.Thetroubleisthat,intheCAdecisionassailedherein,theappellatecourtcommitted
thesameoversightbydelvingintothemeritsofrespondent'sunverifiedmotionandgrantingthe
reliefsoughttherein.Thus,strictlyspeaking,theproperdispositionofthepresentpetitionought
to be the reversal of the CA decision and the dismissal of respondent's unverified motion for
contemptfiledintheRTCforbeingincontraventionofSection4,Rule71.
However,suchsimplisticdispositionwillnotputanendtothedisputebetweentheparties. A
seedoflitigationhasalreadybeensownthatwilllikelysproutintoanothercasebetweenthemat
a later time. We refer to the question of whether the subject house should be included in the
publicauctionofthesubjectland.Untilthisquestionisfinallyresolved,therewillbenoendto
litigationbetweentheparties.Wemustthereforedealwithitsquarely,hereandnow.

TheRTCandtheCAdifferedintheirviewsonwhetherthepublicauctionshouldincludethe
subject house. The RTC excluded the subject house because respondent never alleged its
[17]
existenceinhiscomplaintforpartitionorestablishedhiscoownershipthereof.
Ontheother

[18]
[19]
[20]
hand, citing Articles 440,
445
and 446
of the Civil Code, the CA held that as the
deceasedownedthesubjectland,healsoownedthesubjecthousewhichisamereaccessoryto
theland.Bothpropertiesformpartoftheestateofthedeceasedandareheldincoownershipby
hisheirs,thepartiesherein.Hence,theCAconcludesthatanydecisionintheactionforpartition
[21]
of said estate should cover not just the subject land but also the subject house.
The CA
furtherpointedoutthatpetitionersthemselvesimplicitlyrecognizedtheinclusionofthesubject
houseinthepartitionofthesubjectlandwhentheyproposedintheirletterofAugust5, 2004,
thefollowingswappingarrangement:

Sir:

Thankyouverymuchforaccommodatingusevenifweareonlypoorandsimplepeople.Weare
verymuchpleasedwiththedecisionofPresidingJudgeManuelB.Fernandez,Jr.,RTCBr.254,
LasPias,onthesharingofonethird(1/3)eachofalandcoveredbyTransferCertificateofTitle
No.383714(84191)inLasPiasCity.

However,topreservethesanctityofourhousewhichisourresidenceformorethantwenty(20)
years,wewishtorequestthatthe1/3shareofJohnNaborC.Arriolabepaidbythedefendants
dependingonthechoiceoftheplaintiffbetweenitem(1)oritem(2),detailedasfollows:

(1)Swapwitha500squaremeters[sic]lotlocatedatBarasRizalxxx.
(2)CashofP205,700.00xxx.

[22]
xxxx.

Weagreethatthesubjecthouseiscoveredbythejudgmentofpartitionforreasonspostulatedby
the CA. We qualify, however, that this ruling does not necessarily countenance the immediate
and actual partition of the subject house by way of public auction in view of the suspensive
proscriptionimposedunderArticle159ofTheFamilyCodewhichwillbediscussedforthwith.
Itistruethattheexistenceofthesubjecthousewasnot specificallyallegedinthecomplaintfor
partition.Such omission notwithstanding, the subject house is deemed part of the judgment of
partitionfortwocompellingreasons.

First,ascorrectlyheldbytheCA,undertheprovisionsoftheCivilCode,thesubjecthouseis
deemedpartofthesubjectland.TheCourtquoteswithapprovaltherulingoftheCA,towit:

The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August 30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the house
constructedonthesubjectlotwasnotallegedinthecomplaintanditsownershipwasnotpassed
uponduringthetrialonthemerits,thecourtcannotincludethehouseinitsadjudicationofthe

subject lot. The court further stated that it cannot give a relief to[sic] which is not alleged and
prayedforinthecomplaint.

Wearenotpersuaded.

TofollowtheforegoingreasoningoftheRTCwillineffectrendermeaninglessthepertinentrule
onaccession.Ingeneral,therighttoaccessionisautomatic(ipsojure),requiringnoprioract
on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the improvements including the
housewerenotallegedinthecomplaintforpartition,theyaredeemedincludedintheloton
which they stand, following the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of
judicial partition in this case includes the house which is permanently attached thereto,
otherwise,itwouldbeabsurdtodividetheprincipal,i.e.,thelot,withoutdividingthehouse
[23]
whichispermanentlyattachedthereto.
(Emphasissupplied)

[24]
Second,respondenthasrepeatedlyclaimedthatthesubjecthousewasbuiltbythedeceased.
Petitionersnevercontrovertedsuchclaim.Thereisthennodisputethatthesubjecthouseispart
of the estate of the deceased as such, it is owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties
[25]anyoneofwhom,underArticle494[26]oftheCivilCode,may,atanytime,demand
herein,
the partition of the subject house.[27] Therefore, respondent's recourse to the partition of the
subject house cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere technical omission of said common
propertyfromthecomplaintforpartition.

Thatsaidnotwithstanding,wemustemphasizethat,whilewetreatthesubjecthouseaspartof
the coownership of the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by public
auctionatthistime.Itbearsemphasisthatanactionforpartitioninvolvestwophases:first,the
declarationoftheexistenceofastateofcoownershipandsecond,theactualterminationofthat
stateofcoownershipthroughthesegregationofthecommonproperty.[28]Whatissettledthus
farisonlythefactthatthesubjecthouseisunderthecoownershipoftheparties,andtherefore
susceptibleofpartitionamongthem.
WhetherthesubjecthouseshouldbesoldatpublicauctionasorderedbytheRTCisanentirely
differentmatter,dependingontheexactnatureofthesubjecthouse.

RespondentclaimsthatthesubjecthousewasbuiltbydecedentFidelonhisexclusiveproperty.
[29] Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years.[30] Taken together,
these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the
contemplationoftheprovisionsofTheFamilyCode,particularly:

Article152.Thefamilyhome,constitutedjointlybythehusbandandthewifeorbyanunmarried
headofafamily,isthedwellinghousewheretheyandtheirfamilyreside,andthelandonwhich
itissituated.

Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiariesactuallyresidestherein,thefamilyhomecontinuestobesuchandisexemptfrom
execution,forcedsaleorattachmentexceptashereinafterprovidedandtotheextentofthevalue
allowedbylaw.(Emphasissupplied.)

OnesignificantinnovationintroducedbyTheFamilyCodeistheautomaticconstitutionof
thefamilyhomefromthetimeofitsoccupationasafamilyresidence,withoutneedanymorefor
thejudicialorextrajudicialprocessesprovidedunderthedefunctArticles224to251oftheCivil
CodeandRule106oftheRulesofCourt.Furthermore,Articles152and153specificallyextend
thescopeofthefamilyhomenotjusttothedwellingstructureinwhichthefamilyresidesbut
alsotothelotonwhichitstands.Thus,applyingtheseconcepts,thesubjecthouseaswellasthe
specificportionofthesubjectlandonwhichitstandsaredeemedconstitutedasafamilyhome
by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a
familyresidence20yearsback.[31]

Itbeingsettledthatthesubjecthouse(andthesubjectlotonwhichitstands)isthefamilyhome
ofthedeceasedandhisheirs,thesameisshieldedfromimmediatepartitionunderArticle159of
TheFamilyCode,viz:

Article159.The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary,andtheheirscannotpartitionthesameunlessthecourtfindscompellingreasons
therefor.Thisruleshallapplyregardlessofwhoeverownsthepropertyorconstitutedthefamily
home.(Emphasissupplied.)

ThepurposeofArticle159istoavertthedisintegrationofthefamilyunitfollowingthedeathof
itshead.Tothisend,itpreservesthefamilyhomeasthephysicalsymboloffamilylove,security
andunitybyimposingthefollowingrestrictionsonitspartition:first,thattheheirscannotextra
judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarriedheadofthefamily,orforalongerperiod,ifthereisstillaminorbeneficiaryresiding
therein and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods
unlessthecourtfindscompellingreasonstherefor.Nocompellingreasonhasbeenallegedbythe
partiesnorhastheRTCfoundanycompellingreasontoorderthepartitionofthefamilyhome,
either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as
suggestedbytheparties.

More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the
familyhomeregardlessofitsownership.Thissignifiesthatevenifthefamilyhomehaspassed
bysuccessiontothecoownershipoftheheirs,orhasbeenwilledtoanyoneofthem,thisfact
alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the
protectioncastuponitbythelaw.Therightsoftheindividualcoownerorownerofthefamily
home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family
home.

Set against the foregoing rules, the family home consisting of the subject house and lot on
whichitstandscannotbepartitionedatthistime,evenifithaspassedtothecoownershipof
[32]
hisheirs,thepartiesherein.DecedentFideldiedonMarch10,2003.
Thus,for10yearsfrom
said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary
residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no
compellingreasonexistsforthecourttootherwisesetasidetherestrictionandorderthepartition
oftheproperty.

[33]
TheCourtruledinHonradov.CourtofAppeals
thataclaimforexceptionfromexecutionor
forcedsaleunderArticle153shouldbesetupandprovedtotheSheriffbeforethesaleofthe
property at public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject
housealthoughforadifferentreason.

Torecapitulate,theevidenceofrecordsustaintheCArulingthatthesubjecthouseispartofthe
judgment of coownership and partition. The same evidence also establishes that the subject
house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the
family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition
cannotbesanctioneduntilthelapseofaperiodof10yearsfromthedeathofFidelArriola, or
untilMarch10,2013.

Itbearsemphasis,however,thatinthemeantime,thereisnoobstacletotheimmediatepublic
auctionoftheportionofthesubjectlandcoveredbyTCTNo.383714,whichfallsoutside the
specificareaofthefamilyhome.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisPARTLYGRANTEDandtheNovember30,2006Decisionand
April30,2007ResolutionoftheCourtofAppealsareMODIFIEDinthatthehousestandingon
the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co
ownership of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G.
Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction within the period provided for in
Article159oftheFamilyCode.

Nocosts.

SOORDERED.

MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice

RENATOC.CORONAANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

RUBENT.REYES
AssociateJustice


ATTESTATION

IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbefore
thecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson,ThirdDivision

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
attestation,itisherebycertifiedthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedin
consultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

*InlieuofJusticeMinitaV.ChicoNazario,perSpecialOrderNo.484datedJanuary11,2008.
[1]
PennedbyAssociateJusticeHakimS.AbdulwahidwiththeconcurrenceofAssociateJusticesAndresB.Reyes,Jr.andMariflorP.
PunzalanCastillorollo,p.96.
[2]
Id.at115.
[3]
Rollo,p.28.
[4]
CADecision,id.at98.
[5]
SeeRTCOrderdatedAugust30,2005,id.at33.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Rollo,p.20.
[9]
Surpanote5.

[10]
Rollo,pp.3435.
[11]
Id.at49.
[12]
Rollo,p.51.
[13]
Id.at105.
[14]
Id.at115.
[15]
G.R.No.167988,February6,2007,514SCRA616.
[16]
Id.at632634,636seealsoLandBankofthePhilippinesv.Listana,Sr.,455Phil.750,758759(2003).
[17]
Supranote5.
[18]
Article 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is
incorporatedorattachedthereto,eithernaturallyorartificially.
[19]
Article445.Whateverisbuilt,plantedorsownonthelandofanotherandtheimprovementsorrepairsmadethereon,belongtothe
owneroftheland,subjecttotheprovisionsofthefollowingarticles.
[20]
Article446.Allworks,sowingandplantingarepresumedmadebytheownerandathisexpense,unlessthecontraryisproved.
[21]
CADecision,rollo,p.100.
[22]
Rollo,pp.102103.
[23]
CADecision,rollo,p.104.
[24]
MotionforReconsideration,id.at36PetitionforCertiorari,id.at51.
[25]
Generosav.PanganValera,G.R.No.166521,August31,2006,500SCRA620,628.
[26]
Article494.Nocoownershallbeobligedtoremaininthecoownership.Eachcoownermaydemandatanytimethepartitionof
thethingownedincommon,insofarashisshareisconcerned.
[27]
BravoGuerrerov.Bravo,G.R.No.152658,July29,2005,465SCRA244,266DeGuiav.CourtofAppeals,459Phil.447,464
(2003).

[28]Maglucotawv.Maglucot,385Phil.720,730(2000).
[29]
Supranote24.
[30]
Petition,rollo,p.6.
[31]
SpousesVersolav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.164740,July31,2006,497SCRA385,392.
[32]
RTCDecision,rollo,p.26.
[33]
G.R.No.166333,November25,2005,476SCRA280.