ASSUMPTIONS/

ASSERTIONS

There is not the same risk of

quid pro quo corruption or
its appearance when money
flows through independent
actors [like parties or PACs]
to a candidate, because the
donor must by law cede
control over the funds.
- Chief Justice Roberts writing for the
majority, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434,
1452.

Buckley upheld aggregate

limits only on the ground
that they prevented
channeling money to
candidates beyond the
base limits. The absence
of such a prospect today
belies the Governments
asserted objective of
preventing corruption or its
appearance.
- Chief Justice Roberts writing for
the majority, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct.
1434, 1456.

Any effort to circumvent

individual contributions
limits by giving to multiple
recipients with an implicit
understanding as to how
they would spend the money
would be a transparent
violation of federal antiearmarking rules that the
Federal Election Commission
would pursue.
- Chief Justice Roberts writing for the
majority, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434,
1455

POST-DECISION RECORD

Even when money is not controlled by the candidate or her committee, the party or
PAC still take actions that create the appearance of quid pro quo. Some examples
include:
In May 2011, an executive at General Catalyst Partners, a venture capital firm,
contributed $10,000 to the New Jersey Republican State Committee. Then, in
December 2011, the Republican administration of the state outlined a plan to
commit up to $25 million of state pension funds to General Catalyst Partners, and
placed over $8 million in such funds with General Catalyst as of May 2014, creating
the appearance of quid pro quo.
In February 2011, Ohio authorized replacement of its Department of Development
with a private entity called JobsOhio, which would use a private sector approach to
help the state attract jobs and expand local companies. An analysis revealed that the
organizations that would be receiving grants from JobsOhio had contributed nearly
$500,000 to the Governors and the state Republican Partys campaign committees,
raising the specter of quid pro quo corruption.

While Justice Alito dismissed the use of Joint Fundraising Committees (JFCs) to
circumvent individual limits as wild hypotheticals, politicians frequently do in fact
create joint fundraising committees that take a single large check and distribute the
money to several distinct campaign and party committees, effectively allowing donors to
evade contribution limits. For example:
In 2016, Hillary Clintons presidential campaign used a JFC that raised several
donations of more than $300,000. The money was distributed to the campaign,
the DNC, and several state parties in accord with contribution limits. But the state
parties immediately sent the exact amounts they received to the DNC, in some cases
effectively allowing major donors to circumvent base limits on contributions to the
DNC.
Donald Trumps JFC with the RNC and state parties also took six-figure checks.
Money it distributed to the Connecticut Republican Party was transferred to the
RNC within minutes, to be spent in battleground states. Mitt Romneys presidential
campaign also reportedly used a JFC to move funds from party committees in safe
states to swing states in 2012.

Federal earmarking restrictions go almost entirely unenforced. The last time the FEC
found that a donor had the requisite intent to trigger the anti-earmarking rules was
in 2001. That case is the only reported instance of the FEC pursuing a violation.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1479 (Breyer, J. dissenting).