The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the

constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on
the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied
therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank
and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them
by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as
ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the
Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the
meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept
given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear
in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all
lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with
power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by
Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the
recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice
and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures,
through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives
of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with
minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its
Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis
of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the
Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the
Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide
sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the
integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the
integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as
possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On
August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were
orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all
parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant
developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong
nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission
on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the
Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September
17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as
follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under
such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out
of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the
purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same
purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the
Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an
inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that
"the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the
Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the
Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would
be constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's
constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the
nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by
the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in
issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege,
moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his
client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and
takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of
justice, as an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is
far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with
the lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective
action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized
body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just
that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body;
and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by
integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual
dues to the Integrated Bar.

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform,
pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the
public, and publish information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and
adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the
legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it,
and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting
officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of
local practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up
lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack
competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to
obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for
practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the
country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees
schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and
duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide
involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems
that afflict the nation.

3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any
manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the
Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said
member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become
unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for
which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free
speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us
to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of
war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The
right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the
Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper
work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their
public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in
the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power
by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time
Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new
benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the
integration of the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability
and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United
States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline
among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3)
better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of
the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7)
establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9)
better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities
to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary

1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues
in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial
support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of
the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative
regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to
regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the
purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it
follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without
means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation
does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the
integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member
that might result from his required payment of annual dues.

DIGEST: IN RE: IBP

FACTS:
Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled An Act Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds Therefore was passed in September 1971,
ordaining Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. The Supreme
Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972, the
Commission earnestly recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted
all comments on the proposed integration.
ISSUES:
1
Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?
2
Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?
3
Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?
RULING:
In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the
Commission to integration in this wise: Integration of the Philippine Bar means
the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney
as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The term Bar refers to the collectivity of
all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or
unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to
do so; the State. Bar integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government
authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition
of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the
rule of law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its
power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Indeed, the power to integrate is an
inherent part of the Courts constitutional authority over the Bar.
The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of
association and of speech, as well as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer,
i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax. The Court held:
1
Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not
compel a lawyer to become a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. All that it does is to provide an official national

consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the
Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of
integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will
be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be
possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its
affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar
integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience
in England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the
Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the
other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional
consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved
the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official
statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national
poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the
Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have
turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar
integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per
cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and
lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other
expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not
a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position
thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on
the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per
cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06
per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide
demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the
mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section
13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16,
1973.

work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law
who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what is loosely described as business
counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of
this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work
will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
Justice Padilla dissenting:
Monsod did not practice law. Justice Padilla emphasized the following criteria in
determining what constitutes practice of law:
1. Habituality. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding
ones self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or
in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging
for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term practice of law (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal
and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. Peoples Stockyards State Bank,
176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806
citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R.
356-359)

organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of

which every lawyer is already a member. The lawyer too is not compelled
to attend meetings, participate of activities, etc. The only compulsion is the
payment of annual dues. Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer
to be a member of an integrated bar, the court held that such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the state
2
Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues
paid b the lawyer may be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer
opposes. To rule otherwise would make every government exaction a free
speech issue. Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his objections to
positions taken by the integrated bar.
3
The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely
for purposes of regulation.
As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey
showed an overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.
CAYETANO vs MONSOD
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on
Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Monsods appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does
not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that
the chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at
least ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:
1
Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2
Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.
3
Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics
and held various positions in various foreign corporations.
4
In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various
local corporations until 1986.
5
In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What
constitutes practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court
appearances. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

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Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal
Problems in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The
Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a clients problem no
matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are
specialists in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and
family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and
attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the
jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of
Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public
the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether
such is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such
practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The
services it offered include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal
Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term practice of law.
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity
which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such
as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in
the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).
Monsod did not habitually practice law. It may be granted that he performed
activities which are related to the practice of law like drafting legal documents and
giving legal advice, but he only did so as isolated incidents.
Justice Gutierrez dissenting:
Monsod did not practice law save for the one year he spent in his fathers law office.
The Chairman of the COMELEC should have engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is
active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental,
seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be engaged in an activity for ten years requires
committed participation in something which is the result of ones decisive choice. It
means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged
to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if their main occupation is selling real
estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working
in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past,
they happened to pass the bar examinations?
There is nothing in Monsods track record which will show that he Monsod has
given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation
as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers
working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he
was the one adviced and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
Ulep vs The Legal Clinic
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according
to Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot
afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint
against The Legal Clinic because of the latters advertisements which contain the
following:
SECRET MARRIAGE?

He also stated that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens petition as the Court
wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not
surrender his lawyers certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to.
Almacen then asked that he may be permitted to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.
He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed
because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every
petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out
its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide only
those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the courts denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned
in the Court of Appeals opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said
criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the
courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal
condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should
have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing
party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be
entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his
client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.
IN RE: CUNANAN
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in
1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.

person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyers
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote
divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which
their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way
of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal byproduct of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome
result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed
forms of advertisement:
1
Advertisement in a reputable law list
2
Use of ordinary simple professional card
3
Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization
IN RE: VICENTE ALMACEN
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost
in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the
opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing
of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of
Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion
for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the
Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as
unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his
lawyers certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his
profession when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to
the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons
why and that he became one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.

Bar Matter No. 702 (In the Matter of Petition to authorize Sharia'h District Court
Judges to Appoint Shari'a Lawyers as Notaries Public, Atty. Royo M. Gampong,
petitioner)
Petitioner Royo M. Gampong, a Bachelor of Laws (LIB) graduate of Notre Dame
University who was admitted to the Philippine Shari'a Bar on October 7, 1991, filed
the instant petition praying that this Court, after due notice and hearing, issue an
order authorizing all Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers who
possess the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as notaries public within
their respective jurisdictions.
On the theory that Shari'a District Courts are co-equal with the regular Regional Trial
Courts in the hierarchy of the Philippine Judicial System, petitioner claims that by
analogy, Shari'a District Court Judges may be authorized to appoint the members of
the Philippine Shari'a Bar. Petitioner further argues that, being a special member of
the Philippine Bar and a practicing Shari'a lawyer, notarial work is indispensable and
imperative in the exercise of his profession; therefore, he is qualified to be appointed
as notary public by Shari'a District Judge. Petitioner likewise claims that Shari'a
lawyers cannot be appointed as notaries public in their places of residence and in
cities and other pilot centers where Shari'a courts are established because the RTC
Executive Judges in Cotabato and Maguindanao require them to secure certifications
from the IBP Secretary that there are no practicing lawyers in the place where they
are applying. Thus, Shari'a lawyers lose their chance to be appointed as notaries
public because of the policy of the IBP chapters in Region 12 to appoint regular IBP
members practically in all municipalities and provinces.
The petition is denied.
The appointment, qualification, jurisdiction and powers of notaries public are
governed by the provisions of the Notarial Law embodied in Sections 231 to Section
241, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code, Section 232 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Executive Order No. 41, May 11, 1945
provides:
Section 232. Appointment of notaries public. Judges of Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) in the respective may appoint as many notaries public as
the public good requires, and there shall be at least one for every municipality in
each province. Notaries public in the City of Manila shall be appointed by one of the
judges of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila to be
chosen by the judges of the branches of said court" (Words in parenthesis supplied)
Strictly speaking, Shari'a District Courts do not form part of the integrated judicial
system of the Philippines. Section 2 of the Judiciary Reorganization Acts of 1980
(B.P. Blg. 129) enumerates the courts covered by the Act, comprising the integrated
judicial system. Shari'a Courts are not included in the enumeration notwithstanding
that, when said B.P. Blg. 129 took effect on August 14, 1981, P.D. No. 1083
(otherwise known as "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines") was

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in
any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades
shall be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar
examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced
in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of
1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an
indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to
take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that
for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken
down was based under the following reasons:
1
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar
from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was
very close to the end of World War II;
2
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
3
The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to
determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess
of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The
rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not
designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and
4
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough
votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953.
Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to
the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to
Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
BM 702

to be given by the Supreme Court for admission to special membership in the

Philippine Bar to practice law in the Shari'a courts.
The authority thus conferred by the Notarial Law upon judges of the Court of First
Instance, now the Regional Trial Court, in their respective provinces to appoint
notaries public cannot be expanded to cloth the judges of the Shari'a District Court
with the same statutory authority. The authority to appoint notaries public
contemplated under Section 232 of the Notarial Law and the corresponding
supervising authority over them authorized under Section 248 thereof require the
qualifications and experience of an RTC Judge.
It must be made clear in this regard that since a person who has passed the Shari'a
Bar Examination does not automatically become a regular member of the Philippine
Bar, he lacks the necessary qualification to be appointed a notary public. Section 233
of the Notarial Law provides for the qualifications for appointment as notary public,
thus:
Section 233. Qualifications for Appointment. To be eligible for appointment as
notary public, a person must be a citizen of the Philippines (or of the United States)
and over twenty-one years of age. He must, furthermore, be a person who has been
admitted to the practice of law or who has completed and passed in the studies of law
in a reputable university or school of law, or has passed the examination for the
office of the peace or clerk or deputy clerk of court, or be a person who had qualified
for the office of notary public under the Spanish sovereignty.
In the chartered cities and in the capitals of the provinces, where there are two or
more lawyers appointed as notaries public, no person other than a lawyer or a person
who had qualified to hold the office of notary public under the Spanish sovereignty
shall hold said office.
In municipalities or municipal districts where no person resides having the
qualifications herein before specified or having them, refuses to hold such office,
judges of first instance may appoint other persons temporarily to exercise the office
of notary public who have the requisite qualifications or fitness and morality.
In an En Banc resolution of the Court dated August 5, 1993, in Bar Matter No. 681
"Re: Petition to Allow Shari'a Lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular
courts," this Court categorically stated that a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar
Examination is only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not a full-fledged
member thereof even if he is a Bachelor of Laws degree holder. As such, he is
authorized to practice only in the Shari'a courts.
Only a person duly admitted as members of the Philippine Bar in accordance with
the Rules of Court are entitled to practice law before the regular courts. Section 1,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of
this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

already in force. The Shari'a Courts are mentioned in Section 45 of the Act only for
the purpose of including them "in the funding appropriations."
The fact that judges thereof are required by law to possess the same qualifications as
those of Regional Trial Courts does not signify that the Shari'a Court is a regular
court like the Regional Trial Court. The latter is a court of general jurisdiction, i.e.,
competent to decide all cases, civil and criminal, within its jurisdiction. A Shari'a
District Court, created pursuant to Article 137 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, is a
court of limited jurisdiction, exercising original only over cases specifically
enumerated in Article 143 thereof. In other words, a Shari'a District Court is not a
regular court exercising general jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 232 of the
Notarial Law.
The fact, too, that Shari'a Courts are called "courts" does not imply that they are on
equal footing or are identical with regular courts, for the word "court" may be
applied to tribunals which are not actually judicial in character, but are quasi-judicial
agencies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Boards, Bureau of Patents,
Trademark and Technology, Energy Regulatory Board, etc. 1
Moreover, decisions of the Shari'a District Courts are not elevated to this Court by
appeal under Rule 41, or by petition for review under Rule 45, of the Rules of Court.
Their decisions are final "whether on appeal from the Shari'a Circuit Court or not" 2
and hence, may reach this Court only by way of a special civil action under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, similar to those of the National Labor Relations Commission,
or the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 3
Furthermore, the qualifications for appointment as a judge of a Shari'a District Court
are different from those required of a judge of a Regional Trial Court under Section
15 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which provides:
Section 15. Qualifications No person shall be appointed Regional trial Court
Judge unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years
of age, and, for at least ten years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
requirement.
In case of Shari'a Court judges, on the other hand, a Special Bar Examination for
Shari'a Courts was authorized by the Supreme Court in its En Banc resolution dated
September 20, 1983. Those who pass said examination are qualified for appointment
for Shari'a court judges and for admission to special membership in the Philippine
Bar to practice law in the Shari'a courts pursuant to Article 152, in relation to Articles
148 and 158 of P.D. No. 1083. Said Article 152, P.D. No. 1083 provides, thus:
Art. 152. Qualifications. No person shall be appointed judge of the Shari'a Circuit
Court unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years
of age, and has passed an examination in the Sharia' and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)

also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation

(NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his
consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice
President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauyas letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him.
One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of attorney, which only
regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, attorney, by the assertion that it is lexically
synonymous with Counsellors-at-law. a title to which Sharia lawyers have a
rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of attorney because counsellor is
often mistaken for councilor, konsehal or the Maranao term consial, connoting
a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney
Held:
He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauyas use of the title of Attorney, this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Sharia courts.
While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted
to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counsellors, in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The
title of attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in
the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction
CUI vs CUI
Facts:
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the
spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of
charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons. It acquired
corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial
management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to such

This Court further emphasized in its resolution in Bar Matter 681, that:
In order to be admitted as member of the Philippine Bar, the candidate must pass an
examination for admission covering the following subjects: Political and
International Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Civil Law and Taxation; Mercantile
Law; Criminal Law; Remedial Law; and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (Sec.
11, Rule 138) Further, in order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
bar examination, he must have obtained a general average of 75% in all the
aforementioned subjects without failing below 50% in any subject (Sec. 14, Rule
138). On the other hand, the subjects covered by the special bar examination for
Shari'a courts are: (1) Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and Customary laws (Adat); (2) Persons,
Family Relations and Property; (3) Successions, Wills/Adjudication and Settlement
of Property; (4) Procedure in Shari'a Courts (See Resolution dated September 20,
1983).
It is quite obvious that the subject matter of the two examinations are different. The
Philippine Bar Examination covers the entire range of the Philippine Laws and
jurisprudence, while the Shari'a Bar Examination covers Muslim personal laws and
jurisprudence only. Hence, a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination,
who is not a lawyer, is not qualified to practice law before the regular courts because
he has not passed the requisite examinations for admission as a member of the
Philippine Bar. However, the Shari'a bar lawyer may appear before the Municipal
Trial Courts as agent or friend of a litigant, if appointed by the latter for the purpose
but not before the Regional Trial Courts as only duly authorized members of the Bar
may conduct litigations in the latter court (Sec. 34, Rule 138).
Considering, therefore that a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination is
only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not a full-fledged member thereof
even if he holds a Bachelor of Laws Degree, he is not qualified to practice to
qualified to practice law before the regular courts. As a general rule, a Shari'a
Lawyer is not possessed of the basic requisite of "practice of law" in order to be
appointed as a notary public under Section 233 of the Notarial Law in relation to
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition to authorize Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint
Shari'a Lawyers as notaries public in their respective jurisdiction is DENIED.
ALAWI vs ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, They
were classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawis agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was

he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is

recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his
admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll
of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment
were wiped out.
When may a non-lawyer litigate in court?
Reiterating a previous article that I had posted on the same subject matter, in the case
of FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs. ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO
and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007, the Philippine
Supreme Court interpreted, clarified and implemented:
(a) Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
(b) Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice, and
(c) Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule).
The basic question was whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an
inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering
his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case
without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
Section 1 of Rule 138-A provides that a law student who has successfully completed
his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme
Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted
by the legal clinic of the law school.
Section 2 of the said Rule provides that the appearance of the law student authorized
by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by
the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En
Banc clarified that the said Rule, however, is different if the law student appears
before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In

persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them.

(embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons
of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna
Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of
Antonio Cui pursuant to a convenio entered into between them that was embodied
on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the
convenio or of his brothers assumption of the position.
Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio,
demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not
complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
HELD
Antonio should be the Hospicios administrator.
Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred
pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be,
applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a
civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one
who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar,
not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a
member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution,
about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.
The term titulo de abogado means not mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying
one for the practice of law. A Bachelors degree alone, conferred by a law school
upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to
exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of
compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has
successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university,
officially approved by the Secretary of Education.
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the
works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a
license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the
office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was
disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that

Issue:
Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar
when he gave up his Philippine citizenship
Ruling:
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall
be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates
the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]. Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he)
shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice.
IN RE EPIFANIO MUNESES
(Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship)
B.M. No. 2112
Keywords:
Petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses became a lawyer in 1966 but acquired American
citizenship in 1981 Restored citizenship in 2006 by virtue of RA 9225
A Filipino
lawyer who re-acquires citizenship remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar but
must apply for a license or permit to engage in law practice.
On June 8, 2009, petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.

inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the
supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides that in the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of
a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
The phrase "in the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is
subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section
34 of Rule 138.
In Section 34 of Rule 138, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a
party litigant, is expressly allowed, while Rule 138-A provides for conditions when a
law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the
courts.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a nonlawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student.
As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a
law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the
supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
B.M. 1678, Dacanay
Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until
he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments.
He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical
aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that
day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and
now intends to resume his law practice.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED,

subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by
the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
NARAG vs NARAG
FACTS:
Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his paramour
who was once his student in tertiary level. The administrative complaint of
disbarment was filed by her wife, Mrs. Julieta Narag. Respondent filed motion to
dismiss because allegedly the complainant fabricated the story as well as the love
letters while under extreme emotional confusion arising from jealousy. The case took
an unexpected turn when another complaint was filed, the wife as again the
complainant but now together with their seven children as co-signatories. After
several hearings, the facts became clear, that the respondent indeed abandoned his
family as against morals, based on testimonial evidences. In addition, the assailed
relationship bore two children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality and for having violated and
the Code of Ethics for Lawyers culpable for disbarment.
HELD:
YES. Respondent disbarred.
RATIO:
The complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for the members of
the law profession.
Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but
a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were violated.
OLBES vs DICIEMBRE
FACTS:
Complainants were government employees. Through respondent, Lourdes
renewed a loan application from Rodela Loans Inc., in the amount of P10,000.00.
She issued and delivered 5 PNB blank checks, which served as collateral for the
approved loan as well as for the future loans. Lourdes paid respondent P14,874.37
intended to the loan plus surcharges, penalties, and interests, for which the latter
issued a receipt. Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up

Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but lost his privilege to practice law
when he became a American citizen in 1981. In 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003 by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C. He intends to retire in the Philippines and
if granted, to resume the practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar
and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof
means termination of the petitioners membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege
to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in
Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of
law, the OBC required, and incompliance thereof, petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the
Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of
annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator,
UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with
the MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding
that the petitioner has met all the qualifications, the OBC recommended that the
petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce evidence that would
certify that he has reformed and have become a responsible member of the
community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for
truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to
certify he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The court also ordered
that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished to the family/relatives of Raul
Camaligan.

the blank checks entrusted to him by writing on those checks amounts that had not
been agreed upon at all and deposited the same checks which were dishonored upon
presentment because the account is already closed. Thereafter, he filed a criminal
case against complainants for estafa and for violation of B.P. 22. Thus, complainants
filed a verified petition for the disbarment of Atty. Deciembre and charged the
respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar.

Diao v Martinez 7 SCRA 745 3.29.63

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent lawyer is guilty of gross misconduct and

violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

FACTS: 2 years after passing the Bar exam, a complaint was filed against Diao on
false representation of his application to the Bar examination that he has the requisite
academic qualification. The Solicitor General made an investigation and
recommended to strike the name of Diao off the rolls of attorney because contrary to
the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education.
I: WON Diao may continue to practice the law profession.
RULING: The court held that his admission to the bar was under the pretense that he
had acquired a pre-legal education, an academic requirement before one could take
the bar exam. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses is thereby
revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such
examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law, taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. His name
thus was stricken out from the Rolls of Attorneys.

HELD: YES.
Respondent lawyer violated Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for he seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the
blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite
full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been
paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for
his material gain. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional
misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from,
and highly unbecoming a member of the bar. His propensity for employing deceit
and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to
the detention of one petitioner is loathsome.
Respondent is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

FACTS: Hernandez is a Filipino citizen who have a degree of Juris Doctor from
Columbia Law School in New York and passed the bar examinations in the same
City in 1990. He is currently taking bar subjects in Ateneo Law School and taking a
5 month bar review course there. He now asks the court to allow him to take the bar
exam in the Phils.

In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar
applicant. Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused the death of
Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with homicide through reckless imprudence after
he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2 years imprisonment where he applied for
a probation thereafter which was granted by the court with a 2 yr probation. He took
the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to
allow him to take the attorneys oath of office averring that his probation was already
terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period
before it was terminated.

ISSUE: WON the S.C. may allow him to take the bar exam in the Phils.

ISSUE: WON Argosino may take oath of office.

RULING: Yes, he may be allowed to take the bar because there were some instances
in the past where a Filipino studied law in a foreign law school and were allowed to
take the bar in the Philippines. However, the court held this time that in the following

RULING: The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar
members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general
public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of

Re: Application of A.M. Hernandez July 27, 1993

the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.

year, applicants for the Bar must study in a local law school in the Phils. And must
present certifications required by Section 5 and 6 of Rule 138 to be able to take the
bar. Such certification however is not issued to foreign law school graduates
therefore anyone who wants to take the bar in the country should study in any of the
law schools in the Phils. to be able to take the bar exam.
AGUIRRE vs. RANA

FACTS:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna,
charged Simplicio Villanueva with the crime of Malicious Mischief, before the
Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by
counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the
same case was represented by City AttorneyAriston Fule of San Pablo City, having
entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he
would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of
absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance
of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the
accused.

FACTS: Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. Respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate and filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May
2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented
himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan,"
and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan. Furthermore, respondent also
signed as counsel for Emily Estipona-Hao on 19 May 2001 in the petition filed
before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. On 21 May 2001, one day before the
scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition
for Denial of Admission to the Bar. On 22 May 2001, respondent was allowed to take
the lawyers oath but was disallowed from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is
cleared of the charges against him.

ISSUE:

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent shall be denied Admission to the Bar.

PEOPLE vs VILLANUEVA

RULING: Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent
called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice
law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice
law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that
can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license. True, respondent here passed
the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in

A barrister (also known as barrister-at-law or bar-at-law) is a type of lawyer in

common law jurisdictions who works at higher levels of court.[1] Barristers mostly
specialise in courtroom advocacy and litigation. Their tasks include taking cases in
superior courts and tribunals, drafting legal pleadings, researching the philosophy,
hypothesis and history of law, and giving expert legal opinions. Often, barristers are
also recognised as legal scholars.
Barristers are distinguished from solicitors, who have more direct access to clients,
and may do transactional-type legal work. It is mainly barristers who are appointed
as judges, and they are rarely hired by clients directly. In some legal systems,
including those of Scotland, South Africa, Scandinavia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh,
and the British Crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, the
word barrister is also regarded as an honorific title.
In a few jurisdictions, barristers are usually forbidden from "conducting" litigation,
and can only act on the instructions of a senior solicitor, who performs tasks such as
corresponding with parties and the court, and drafting court documents. In England
and Wales, barristers may seek authorisation from the Bar Standards Board to
conduct litigation. This allows a barrister to practise in a 'dual capacity', fulfilling the
role of both barrister and solicitor.
In some countries with common law legal systems, such as New Zealand and some
regions of Australia, lawyers are entitled to practise both as barristers and solicitors,
but it remains a separate system of qualification to practise exclusively as a barrister.
HONORABLE PECULIARITIES OF FILIPINO ENGLISH
Around 15 years ago, my mother exposed her quirky patrician side when she got into a petty
argument with her in-laws. My family was then preparing for the golden wedding anniversary
of my lolo and lola, and my uncles and aunts were drafting an invitation letter. The draft
invitation read We cordially invite you to the golden wedding anniversary of Atty. Enrique
Claudio and Dr. Victoria Claudio.
Mom, always concerned with proper etiquette, objected to the use of the title Atty. Unlike
Dr., she claimed, Atty. was not a proper honorific, but one invented by title-obsessed
Pinoys. Mom argued valiantly, but my uncles and aunts prevailed.
I was thinking of this incident the other day, so I did some research on commonly-used
professional titles in the Philippines like Atty., Arch., and Engr. True enough, my
mother, Prof. Dr. Sylvia Estrada-Claudio, MD, PhD (titles are really funny), was right. Miss
Manners (Judith Martin) guide to proper etiquette does not include these three in her list of
accepted English honorifics. Moreover, if you look through the two most reputable English
dictionaries (Oxford and Merriam Webster), you will note the absence of these words. The less
reputable dictionary.com includes atty., but defines it as an abbreviation and not a title meant
to precede a name. All sources, however, list Ms., Mr., Mrs., Fr., and Dr.
So why did Pinoys invent titles for professionals?

Whether or not the isolated appearance of Atty. Fule as private prosecutor constitutes
practice of law.
RULING:
No. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as ah
agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his
services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City
Attorney of Sail Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because
the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. As such, there
could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule us
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case.
Furthermore, the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than
an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment
for such services. Thus, the appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. And, it has never been
refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate
supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complaint in the case at bar who
is a relative. Decision affirmed.

Don and Doa, however, are not professional titles like Atty. So we still need to ask why we
ended up inventing titles that reflect ones educational status.
I suspect the answer lies in the fundamental contradiction of the American colonial project.
The Americans who occupied the Philippines justified their actions through the rhetoric of
benevolent assimilation. In other words, they were only subjugating Filipinos in order to
teach them values like American egalitarianism.
The contradiction here is obvious. How can you teach egalitarianism through a system
(colonialism) that is inherently anti egalitarian? Consider that in order to successfully
subjugate a people, a colonizer must manufacture a desire for his culture and his society (a
desire we now call colonial mentality). In the case of the Philippines, this is exactly what the
Americans did.
The power of American colonialism lay in its emphasis on education an education that
supposedly exposed Filipinos to the wonders of the American way of life. Through
education, the American colonial state bred a new elite of Filipinos trained in a new, more
modern, American system. People with advanced degrees like law or engineering were at
the apex of this system. Their prestige, as such, not only rested on their purported intelligence,
but also their mastery of the colonizers way of life.
This, I suspect, is the source of the magical and superstitious attachment we have to attorneys,
architects and engineers. The language we use is still haunted by our colonial experience. We
linguistically privilege professionals because our colonizers made us value a certain kind of
white-collar work.
I must say though: if titles are meant to represent what societies value, we should make up
new ones. Two come to mind: Trp. for Trapo and Cque. for Cacique. We routinely elect
them, so we must value them.
Oh, but wait, I forgot these people already have a title: Hon. Cong. for honorable
congressman. And that, for many reasons (not least of which is the assertion of being
honorable), is the most absurd title yet. - See more at:
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/200340/opinion/the-honorable-peculiarities-offilipino-english#sthash.i8rrAM7l.dpuf

Personally, I dont see the need for excessive and insecure claims to higher education. An
Atty., for me, conjures images of either a juvenile lawyer/frat boy who beats people up
simply because he can or a cutthroat goon who defends everyone from plunderers to warlords
(Dont get me wrong, Im not saying there arent wonderful Attys. The image just bothers
me). In contrast, an attorney who refers to ones self as Mr. or Ms. conjures a man/woman
of understated class and humble restraint.
I find it surprising that Filipino English would create new titles, given that our English is
based on the supposedly democratic English of the Americans.
Unlike the case of British colonies like India or Malaysia, the English taught to Filipinos was
the egalitarian English of the New World. American English, as conceptualized by Noah
Webster, was a language rid of the superfluities and class distinctions of British English.
Webster sought to simplify the language from spelling to pronunciation. Unpronounced Us
were dropped (as in the case of colour becoming color), and Ss that sounded like Zs became
Zs (as in the change from organise to organize). Webster also despised the upper-class
English habit of clipping syllables (as in the case of mi-li-ta-ry being pronounced as mi-litry).
For Webster, a standardized American English would allow all Americans to speak and write
the same language. The British spoke different Englishes (from the Queens English, the
Scottish brogue to cockney), which created what the fictional Professor Henry Higgins in My
Fair Lady called verbal class distinctions. You could tell a rich Brit from a poor one based
on how he/she spoke. American English, on the other hand, would reflect the sense of equal
opportunity at the center of the American dream. For Webster, all Americans would speak the
same dialect regardless of their class origins.
Websters linguistic impulse naturally dovetailed with American Republicanism, which, in
challenging British courtly governance, also challenged British courtly titles. America is not
known for having lords and ladies.
So if Filipino English is based on American English, why is it more hierarchical? Why the
fetish for professional titles like Atty., Arch., and Engr.? I have not conducted documentary
research on this topic, but allow me to offer some hypotheses.
A simple answer would be that the Americans who colonized the Philippines encountered
lowland societies that already used Iberian linguistic class markers like Don and Doa.