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Rule 117 Motion to Quash

Case 1. Antone v Beronilla. Dec 8, 2010

Petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint for
Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla before the OCP-Pasay City. She
alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been
legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with
one Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
Prosecution filed the corresponding Information.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent
moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense.
He informed the court that his marriage with petitioner was declared
null and void by the RTC on April 26, 2007; and that such decree has
already been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on 2007.
He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and void
from the beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak
of. Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the Information
do not constitute the crime of bigamy.

2. Since the petition assails the trial courts dismissal of the criminal
information for bigamy filed against private respondent Leo Beronilla,
the petition, if at all warranted, should be filed in behalf of the People
of the Philippines by the Office of the Solicitor General, being its
statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases.
3. There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the dismissal
of the subject criminal case is tantamount to an acquittal based on
the trial courts finding that the first essential element of bigamy,
which is a first valid marriage contracted by private respondent is
1. W/N the petition is infirm in form and substance Yes but still
given due course
2. W/N respondents right against double jeopardy has been violated
3. W/N the trial court acted with gad when it sustained respondents
motion to quash - YES

The court quashed the Information.

1. We are convinced that this petition should be given due course

despite the defect in the pleading and the question of legal standing
to bring the action.

Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari before the CA, petitioner

alleged that the Pasay City trial court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and
denied her motion for reconsideration.

The defect being merely formal and not jurisdictional, we ruled that
the court may nevertheless order the correction of the pleading, or
even act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that
xxx strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice xxx may be served.

CA dismissed the petition, saying that:

There is likewise no dispute that it is the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG) which has the authority to represent the government
in a judicial proceeding before the Court of Appeals.

The present petition xxx is fatally infirm in form and substance for the
following reasons:
1. The verification is defective as it does not include the assurance
that the allegations in the petition are based on authentic records.

As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:

(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments,

bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General
and appear or represent the Government in cases involving
their respective offices, brought before the courts and
exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with
respect to such cases.
We took exceptions, however, and gave due course to a number of
actions even when the respective interests of the government were
not properly represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.
2. Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same
is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid
arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted
or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without
his express consent.
The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case
as (a) respondent has not yet entered his plea to the charge when he
filed the Motion to Quash the Information, and (2) the case was
dismissed not merely with his consent but, in fact, at his instance.
The granting of a motion to quash anchored on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.
3. This motion is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
Information, for which reason, the court cannot consider allegations
contrary to those appearing on the face of the information.
The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the
marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and void from the
beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final and
executory and duly registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact
contrary to that alleged in the Information that a first valid marriage

was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a subsequent

marriage. This should not have been considered at all because
matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
*Under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because,
by then, the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise
stated, this Court declared that a person, who contracts a
subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous one, is guilty of bigamy.

Case 2. People v Romualdez. July 23, 2008

We find that the allegation of damage and prejudice to the

Government in the amount of P5,806,709.50 representing
the accused's compensation is without basis, absent a
showing that the accused did not actually render services for
his two concurrent positions.

The Ombudsman charged Romualdez before the Sandiganbayan
with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The Information reads: (paraphrased)

The SB found no merit in his prescription argument.

Accused Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, provincial governor of Leyte,

did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad
faith, cause undue injury to the Government in the following manner:
using his influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to
foreign countries, particularly China, Saudi Arabia and USA, knowing
fully well that such appointment and/or assignment is in violation of
the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission
is incompatible with his position as Governor, thereby allowing
himself to collect double compensation to the damage of the govt in
the amount of P5.8M.

SB denied Peoples MR: even if the accused's appointment was

contrary to law or the constitution, it is the appointing authority that
should be responsible therefor because it is the latter who is the doer
of the alleged wrongful act

Romualdez moved to quash the information on two grounds, namely:

(1) that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the
offense with which the accused was charged; and (2) that the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription. He
argued that the acts imputed against him do not constitute an offense
because: (a) the cited provision of the law applies only to public
officers charged with the grant of licenses, permits, or other
concessions, and the act charged receiving dual compensation
is absolutely irrelevant and unrelated to the act of granting licenses,
permits, or other concessions; and (b) there can be no damage and
prejudice to the Government considering that he actually rendered
services for the dual positions of Provincial Governor of Leyte and
Ambassador to foreign countries.
To support his prescription argument, Romualdez posited that the
15-year prescription under Section 11 of R.A. 3019 had lapsed since
the preliminary investigation of the case.
The SB granted the motion to quash:

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, imputing gad
on the part of the SB in quashing the information.
1. W/N the SB committed gad in quashing YES
2. W/N the charges against private respondent have already
prescribed - YES
1. The determinative test in appreciating a motion to quash under
this rule is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is,
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish
the essential elements of the offense as defined by law without
considering matters aliunde.
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his
functions; and

3. His action caused undue injury to any party, including the

government, or gave a private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference.
The information sufficiently alleged the elements of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019. The SB had committed grave abuse of discretion by
premising its quashal of the information "on considerations that either
not appropriate in evaluating a motion to quash; are evidentiary
details not required to be stated in an Information; are matters of
defense that have no place in an Information; or are statements
amounting to rulings on the merits that a court cannot issue before
2. Private respondent was charged with violations of Rep. Act No.
3019 committed "on or about and during the period from 1976 to
February 1986". However, the subject criminal cases were filed with
the Sandiganbayan only on 5 November 2001, following a
preliminary investigation that commenced only on 4 June 2001. The
time span that elapsed from the alleged commission of the offense
up to the filing of the subject cases is clearly beyond the fifteen (15)
year prescriptive period provided under Section 11 of RA 3019.

Case 3. People v Garfin. March 29, 2004

Private respondent Serafin Saballegue was charged with violation of
Section 22(a) of RA 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security
while being the proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and
fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums
due for his employee to the SSS in the amount of P6,533
representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from
January 1990 to December 1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty
per month for late remittance in the amount of P11,143,
computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands by
letter in violation of the above-cited provisions of the law, to
the damage and prejudice of the SSS and the public in
Case was raffled to RTC-Naga, presided by Judge Garfin. Accused
pleaded not guilty. Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the information was filed without the
prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required
under Section 4, Rule 112.
Prosecutor Tolentino also contends that having been duly designated
to assist the City Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of
all SSS cases by the Regional State prosecutor as alter ego of the
Secretary of Justice in Region V, then that authority may be given to
other than the City Prosecutor.
RTC granted motion to dismiss. The Information will readily show
that it has not complied with this rule as it has not been approved by
the City Prosecutor. This Court holds that the defendants plea to
the Information is not a waiver to file a motion to dismiss or to quash
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. By express provision of the rules
and by a long line of decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the People contending that

as a special prosecutor designated by the regional state prosecutor
to handle SSS cases within Region V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is
authorized to file the information involving violations of the SSS law
without need of prior approval from the city prosecutor.
RTC denied MR.
1. W/N the prior written authority and approval of the city or
provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is necessary in filing
the information at bar - YES
2. W/N lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or chief
state prosecutor in the filing of an information is a defect in the
information that is waived if not raised as an objection before
arraignment - NO
1. Under PD 1275, the powers of a Regional State Prosecutor are as
Sec. 8. The Regional State Prosecution Office: Functions of
Regional State Prosecutor. - The Regional State Prosecutor
shall, under the control of the Secretary of Justice, have the
following functions:
b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all
provincial and city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of
provinces and cities comprised within his region.
The power of administrative supervision is limited to the authority of
the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations
of such agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day
activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct
of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to

determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the

department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper
performance of official functions.
This is distinguished from the power of supervision and control which
includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate.
The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power
of administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no
power to direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from
handling certain cases.
Petitioner cannot lean on the cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In
those cases, the special prosecutors were acting under the directive
of the Secretary of Justice. They were appointed in accordance with
In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by
the Secretary of Justice to Regional State Prosecutor Turingan to
investigate and/or prosecute SSS cases filed within his territorial
2. Rule 117, Sec 9:
The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion
to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to
allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of
any objections except those based on the grounds provided
for in paragraphs (a), (b)*, (g), and (i) of section 3 of this
*The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds: xxx (b) That the
court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3:

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an

investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on
the part of the filing officer prevents the court from acquiring
jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law while jurisdiction over the case is invested by the
act of plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the complaint or
information. Hence, while a court may have jurisdiction over the
subject matter, like a violation of the SSS Law, it does not acquire
jurisdiction over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the
filing of the information.
An information, when required by law to be filed by a public
prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. Otherwise, the court
does not acquire jurisdiction.

Case 4. Perez v Sandiganbayan. Sept 26, 2006

The Ombudsman filed an Information against petitioners Salvador
Perez (Pangasinan Mayor) and Juanita Apostol (Municipal
Treasurer) for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019:
conspiring and confederating with one another, committing
the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage
of their official functions, and through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the
purchase of one (1) computer unit costing P120k acquisition
by personal canvass which is in violation of Secs. 362 and
367 of R.A. 7160, thereby causing undue injury to the
Municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan.
Prior to arraignment, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation alleging the discovery of new
evidence which will change the outcome of the case if presented and
appreciated. The alleged newly discovered evidence consists in the
reassessment by the auditors of the Commission on Audit (COA)
that, though the prices between the subject computer and that
canvassed by the COA are different, such difference is "not really
that material."
SB initially denied the motion but upon MR granted petition.
Office of the Special Prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation.
Assistant Special Prosecutor Warlito F. Galisanao prepared a
Memorandum dated 23 October 2003, recommending the withdrawal
of the Information.
However, Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio chose the
action "DO NOT CONCUR" by drawing two lines on the action "I
CONCUR," and wrote the following marginal note:

I am, instead adopting the enclosed memorandum of Pros. Chua

dated Jan. 22, 2004 recommending that in the meantime, further
fact-finding be conducted, and an administrative case be filed
against accused Apostol, after withdrawing the Information for viol. of
Sec. 3(e) R.A. 3019.
On the other hand, Ombudsman Marcelo wrote a marginal note
saying the resolution of the case is deferred. There are two modes of
violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019, to wit: a) causing undue injury or
b) giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. OSP
should study whether the accused, assuming arguendo that there
was no overprice, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to the seller of the subject computer. Kindly submit your
recommendation soonest.
Assistant Special Prosecutor III Warlito F. Galisanao recommended
an amendment of the Information, instead of a withdrawal thereof.
Acquisition of the unbranded computer set was questionable
on the following grounds:
1. There was no public bidding and the mode of procurement
was by canvass.
2. Under Sec. 367 of the Local Government Code,
procurement through Personal Canvass requires approval of
the Committee on Awards. There was no committee
approval to speak of in this case because none has been
The canvass made on all the stores/suppliers were done by
accused Treasurer Juanita Apostol and attested by Mayor,
Salvador Perez.
Xxx Gave supplier unwarranted benefits xxx
SB granted motion to amend the Information.

W/N there is a denial of due process when the Special Prosecutor
filed the Amended Information without authority from or the approval
of the Ombudsman YES
Under the present constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul
Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)
and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latters
authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the
prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to
do so by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue
subpoena, which he still claims under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is
now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may, however,
retain it in the Special Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is
ordered to investigate.
RA 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989
1) expressly included the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the
2) gave the Special Prosecutor the power, under the supervision and
control and upon the authority of the Ombudsman, to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and to perform such other duties
assigned to it by the Ombudsman;
3) granted the Ombudsman the powers to:
Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of the Government, the investigation of such cases.

Ombudsman Marcelos order, however, to "(k)indly submit your

recommendation soonest," is another matter. The marginal note did
not indicate to whom the recommendation should be submitted.
There being no express delegation of the power to prosecute, we are
constrained to go back to our main query: Is there an implied
delegation of the power to prosecute under Republic Act No. 6770,
such that Special Prosecutors are presumed to have been delegated
such power, in the absence of a prohibition from the Ombudsman?
Republic Act No. 6770 provides:
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the
supervision and control and upon the authority of the
Ombudsman, have the following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea-bargaining agreements; and
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the
Doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply. only applies to
Chief Executive.
Ombudsman would be severely hampered from exercising his power
of control if we are to allow the Special Prosecutor to authorize the
filing of informations in the first instance. This is because while the
Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case
has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer
the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that
the informations may not be dismissed, without the approval of the
said court.

Case 5. People v Laggui. March 16, 1989

2. the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue that

he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, and

Eliseo F. Soriano is a minister of the "Church of God in Jesus Christ,
the Pillar and Ground of the Truth in the Philippines. The offended
party, Lolita Hizon, became interested in Soriano's religious group
and became a member thereof.
Soriano confided to Hizon his worries about his indebtedness of
P250k to Dr. and Mrs. Zoilo Pangilinan. The obligation was secured
by a mortgage on the congregation's property.

3. the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank

for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

Hizon agreed to help and gave Soriano P250k cash in exchange for
a post-dated check in the same amount. His check was undated.

W/N the information was fatally defective NO

When Hizon went back from her US trip, she asked why the check
bore no date. Soriano told her to date it "July 18, 1984" so he would
have sufficient time to fund it. When Hizon deposited the check on
that date, the drawee bank dishonored it because Soriano's account
with it had been closed as of July 10, 1984.

The presence of the first and third elements of the offense

constitutes prima facie evidence that the second element exists. The
maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is legally
presumed from the dishonor of his check for insufficiency of funds.

Respondent RTC Judge Laggui ruled that the accused could not be
convicted of a violation of BP 22 because the information failed to
allege that he knew, when be issued the check, that he would not
have sufficient funds for its payment in full upon its presentment to
the drawee bank. In the opinion of the trial judge, the information did
not charge an offense, hence, he dismissed it. Convicted the
accused of estafa.
The accused appealed the estafa case to the CA which reversed and
acquitted Soriano.
The State filed the instant petition assailing the dismissal of the
allegedly defective information.
The elements of the offense are:
1. the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply
to account or for Value,


The gravamen of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing
a bum check a malum prohibitum an act.
However, although its decision is erroneous, that decision may not
be annulled or set aside because it amounted to a judgment of
acquittal. It became final and executory upon its promulgation. The
State may not appeal that decision for it would place the accused
twice in jeopardy.

Case 6. People v Honrales. Aug 25, 2010

Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent
Jonathan Honrales.
ACP of Manila issued a resolution on Oct 28, 2002, recommending
the filing of Information for parricide against respondent. An
Information for parricide was filed against respondent.
RTC Judge Soriaso ordered respondents arrest.
Respondent moved to reconsider the resolution of the ACP. In view
of this, ACP moved to defer RTC proceedings.
Respondent filed a motion to recall warrant of arrest. Public
prosecutor opposed.
RTC deferred proceedings. It, however, denied the motion to recall
the arrest warrant since deferment of proceedings does not impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective.

imprudence resulting in parricide in its stead. City Prosecutor Garcia

approved the Resolution.
ACP filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the information for
While the Motion to Withdraw Information was still pending, an
Information for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Parricide was filed
against respondent before the MeTC.
Determined to have respondent prosecuted for parricide, petitioner
heirs filed a petition for review with the DOJ questioning the
downgrading of the offense.
On February 17, 2004, petitioner heirs filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion to Defer Proceedings with the RTC to give time to the DOJ
Secretary to resolve their petition for review.
March 17, DOJ dismissed petitions for review. Petitioners moved to

RTC ordered the reinvestigation of the case.

April 14, RTC of Manila issued an Order holding in abeyance the

resolution of the pending incidents in the parricide case in view of the
said motion for reconsideration.

Heirs of the victim (petitioners) moved before the OCP for the
inhibition for the reinvestigation and prayed that the case be
remanded to the court for trial.

May 14, DOJ denied MR.

ACP denied petitioners motion and set the case for continuation of
the hearings. Petitioner heirs moved that the hearing be suspended
on the ground that they have filed a petition for review before the

Respondent promptly filed with the RTC a Manifestation with

Reiteration to Resolve the Motion to Withdraw Information.

Respondents counsel objected in view of the presence of their

witness Michelle Luna. Thus, the hearing proceeded. After the
hearing, petitioner heirs moved for the cancellation of the December
10, 2003 hearing and filed a formal motion to that effect.
Later on however, ACP issued a resolution, setting aside the October
28, 2002 Resolution and recommending the withdrawal of the
information for parricide and the filing of an information for reckless

Petitioners again filed a petition for review with the DOJ on June 14,
which was dismissed with finality on July 14.

Respondent was arraigned before the MeTC and pleaded guilty to

the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide. He was
Respondent filed with the RTC a motion seeking to dismiss the
parricide charges against him. He cited his arraignment and
conviction by the MeTC as grounds for the dismissal of the case
against him.

Petitioner heirs filed with the MeTC a motion to nullify the

proceedings. They claimed that they were denied procedural due
process since October 11, 2004 was not the agreed date for
respondents arraignment but October 18, 2004. They also argued
that the Information before the MeTC was invalid.
OP dismissed petitioner heirs appeal of the DOJ Resolution.
Judge Soriaso inhibited herself from the case. It was raffled to Judge
Judge Barrios ruled that the Information for parricide found itself
without a supporting resolution and thus its withdrawal was
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. Though it found that Judge
Barrios failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of
the case and thus abdicated his judicial power and acted as a mere
surrogate of the Secretary of Justice, it ruled that the remand of the
case to the RTC would serve no useful purpose since it may result in
the reopening of the parricide case which would violate respondents
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
W/N the remand of the parricide case to the trial court will violate
respondents constitutional right against double jeopardy NO
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the withdrawal
of the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest
without making an independent assessment of the merits of the case
and the evidence on record.
double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1)
a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has
been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d)
when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has

been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise

terminated without his express consent.
In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for
reckless imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal case for
parricide was still pending before the RTC.
However, once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the
Information is filed, it is there retained. Therefore, as the offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in parricide was included in the charge
for intentional parricide pending before the RTC, the MeTC clearly
had no jurisdiction over the criminal case filed before it, the RTC
having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the exclusion of all
other courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent.

Case 7. Quiambao v People. Sept 17, 2014

Petioners Quiambao and Pilapil are the President and the Corporate
Secretary, respectively, of Strategic Alliance Development
Corporation (STRADEC).
Criminal Case Nos. 89723-24:

The private respondents thereafter sought reconsideration but it was

denied by the RTC-Branch 154. Thus, they brought an appeal to this
Court via petition for review on certiorari (docketed as G.R. No.
180416) raising pure questions of law.
The MTCs Orders dated June 18, 2007 and September 17, 2007
MTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 89724 on June 18, 2007 (Order
of Dismissal), pursuant to the RTC-Branch 154s Order.

The private respondents, Bonifacio C. Sumbilla and Aderito Z.

Yujuico, both directors and officers of STRADEC, filed before the
OCP Pasig a criminal complaint for violation of Section 74 of BP 68
against the petitioners and a certain Giovanni Casanova, then
accountant of STRADEC.

Upon learning that a petition for certiorari had been filed before SC,
the MTC issued an Order recalling the Order of Dismissal and
reinstating the criminal information in Criminal Case No. 89724.

Petitioners were charged with 2 Informations for violation of Sec 74

of BP 68. These cases were raffled to MTC Judge Ongpauco-Cortel.


Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of

Probable Cause and to Defer the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest
Pending Determination of Probable Cause with MTC.
The MTCs Orders dated May 8, 2006 and August 16, 2006
Criminal Case No. 89723 was dismissed. The court set the
arraignment of the petitioners on October 9, 2006.
The petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the RTC seeking the
partial annulment of the MTCs Orders dated May 8, 2006 and
August 16, 2006.
The petitioners were arraigned on January 29, 2007.
The RTC Branch-154s Order dated June 4, 2007
RTC-Branch 154, through Judge Abraham B. Borreta granted the
Petition holding that there was no probable cause to hold the
petitioners for trial. Consequently, it directed the MTC to dismiss
Criminal Case No. 89724 for want of probable cause.

Hence, the petitioners filed the present petition.

1. W/N MTCs order of revival placed petitioners in double jeopardy NO

We note, at the outset, that the legal question before us revolves
around the MTCs Order of Revival dated September 17, 2007.
However, after going deeply into the roots of the controversy, we find
that the real root of the issue stems back to the jurisdictional faux
pas committed early on by the MTC whenit issued its prior Order of
Dismissal dated June 18, 2007.
The MTC acted without jurisdiction when it issued the Order of
Dismissal dated June 18, 2007.
Being the subject of a pending review (GR 180416), the RTC Order
directing the MTC to dismiss Criminal Case No. 89724 for want of
probable cause was therefore not yet final and executory.
Until after the appeal of the defendant shall have been resolved by
this Court with finality, and its records transmitted to the court of
origin, the judgment, award or order appealed from cannot be

executed, enforced, much less, modified by the court of origin. Once

the case has been appealed and given due course by this Court, the
lower court or the court of origin could no longer take cognizance of
the issue under review. It cannot execute the judgment appealed
from because to do so would constitute encroachment on the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
In the present case, the MTCs Order of Dismissal is a jurisdictional
error that must be struck down as flawed for having been issued
without jurisdiction.
Moreover, the jurisdiction over the issue of probable cause in
Criminal Case No. 89724 had already been acquired by this Court.
From the moment the case had been elevated to us, the MTC no
longer had authority to further act on the issue which was pending
Like the Order of Dismissal, the Order of Revival that followed should
be declared null and void.
There is no double jeopardy because the MTC, which ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case, is not a court of competent
The fifth requisite that the accused be acquitted or convicted, or
the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent is absent.
Lower court hereby DIRECTED to await the resolution of G .R. No.
180416 before taking any action on the criminal proceedings.

Case 8. Villalon v Chan. Sept 24, 2014

On May 6, 1954, the respondent Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio
Chua in a civil ceremony.
The respondent claimed that her husband Leon Basilio Chua and the
present petitioner, Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and the same
During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio Chua,
this time under the name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly
contracted a second marriage with Erlinda Talde (other petitioner).
Amelia, who was then living in the United States and could not
personally file a case for bigamy in the Philippines, requested Benito
Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence the criminal proceedings
against the petitioners. On September 13, 2003, a verified complaintaffidavit alleging the commission of the crime of bigamy was filed
with the OCP Antipolo.
Information was filed with RTC. Petitioners pleaded not guilty.
During pre-trial, Atty. Apollo V. Atencia appeared in behalf of Amelia.
On February 20, 2006, Atty. Atencia formally filed his entry of
appearance as private prosecutor, with the conformity and under the
control and supervision of Assistant City Prosecutor Gerardo P.
Leoardo filed an omnibus motion with the RTC seeking to disqualify
Atty. Atencia. He argued that Amelia could not be represented in the
bigamy case because she was not a party to the case.
RTC granted Leonardos omnibus motion.
Upon the petition of Amelia, CA issued a TRO enjoining further
proceedings on the case.
Despite the TRO issued by the CA, trial of the bigamy case
proceeded with the presentation of the prosecutions evidence, to

which Leonardo filed a demurrer to evidence. In an order dated

September 5, 2006, the RTC dismissed the bigamy case for failure of
the prosecution to prove the petitioners guilt.
Amelia filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. CA
granted Amelias petition and annulled the RTCs March 3, 2006
resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia from participation in the case,
and its September 5, 2006 order that dismissed the bigamy case
against the petitioners.
Also, the CA ruled that the offended party could be deprived of the
right to intervene in the criminal case only when he or she expressly
waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute one. The CA
found no such waiver.
1. W/N petitioners right against double jeopardy were violated - NO
RTC issued its September 5, 2006 order in defiance of the TRO
issued by the CA. RTCs September 5, 2006 order was actually
without force and effect and would not serve as basis for the
petitioners to claim that their right against double jeopardy had been
Atty. Atencia should not have been disqualified
Section 16 of Rule 110 expressly allows an offended party to
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the
recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal
CA found no such waiver from or reservation made by the
respondent. The fact that the respondent, who was already based
abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the Philippines
reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution
of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the petitioners.

Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and should not have
disqualified, Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case

Case 9. People v De Grano. June 5, 2009

On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed
against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the RTC Batangas
against Joven de Grano, Armando de Grano, and Estanislao Lacaba;
together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho, Domingo
Landicho, and Leonardo Genil, who were at-large.

Respondents then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration praying

that they be acquitted based on the ff grounds:
1. The Honorable Court erred in basing the decision of
conviction of all accused solely on the biased,
uncorroborated and baseless testimony of Teresita Duran,
the common-law wife of the victim;
2. The Honorable Court erred in not giving exculpatory
weight to the evidence adduced by the defense, which was
amply corroborated on material points;

Xxx shoot EMMANUEL MENDOZA with firearms, inflicting

upon him eight gunshot wounds and causing his death
thereby, thus committing the crime of MURDER xxx

3. The Honorable Court erred in not finding that the failure

of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence renders the
position of the defense unrebutted;

Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded not guilty to the crime.

Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the
prosecutions evidence was not strong.

4. The Honorable Court erred in adopting conditional or

preliminary finding of treachery of the Supreme Court in its
Resolution dated July 12, 1999; and

Case was transferred to RTC Manila because one of the accused

was the incumbent Mayor of Laurel, Batangas at the time when the
crime was committed.

5. The Honorable Court erred in rendering a verdict [sic] of

conviction despite the fact that the guilt of all the accused
were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Before transferring the case, the trial court deferred the resolution of
respondents motion for bail and allowed the prosecution to present
evidence. Thereafter, the hearing of the application for bail ensued.
RTC Manila found that evidence to prove treachery and evident
premeditation was not strong, thus granted bail.

RTC acquitted Joven and Armando, and downgraded the conviction

of Domingo and Estanislao from murder to homicide.

Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which was
denied. SC granted the petition and set aside the decision of the CA
together with the Order of the RTC granting bail to the
respondents. The RTC was also ordered to immediately issue a
warrant of arrest against the accused. As a result, Estanislao was rearrested, but Joven and Armando were not.

A day after filing the petition, the private prosecutor sought the OSGs
conformity in a letter. OSG instructed the private prosecutor to
secure the necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the

RTC found the accused guilty of the offense charged. Only

Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the
other respondents.

Petitioner, through ACP Cesar Glorioso, filed a petition for certiorari

under Rule 65 before the CA.

The petition was dismissed outright by the CA on the grounds that it

was not filed by the OSG and that the assailed Orders were only
photocopies and not certified true copies.
CA also denied MR and opined that the rule on double jeopardy
prohibits the state from appealing or filing a petition for review of a

judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the case. It

added that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case,
the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
1. W/N CA committed gad when it dismissed the petition for certiorari
on the ground of double jeopardy YES, with respect to Joven,
Armando and Domingo
Respondents contention that there is no showing of any subsequent
participation of the OSG in the petition before the CA does not hold
water. In the letter dated January 18, 2004, the OSG instructed the
private prosecutor to secure the necessary endorsement from the
DOJ for it to pursue the case. In its 1st Indorsement dated March 15,
2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed the petition to the
Solicitor General for his conformity. When the CA denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration for its outright dismissal of the petition,
the OSG filed motions for extension of time to file the present
petition. Moreover, the OSG filed a Comment on respondents Motion
for Reconsideration. Thus, any doubt regarding the endorsement,
conformity, and participation of the OSG in the petitions is dispelled.
*Petitioners recourse of certiorari was correct because RTC acted
with gad
1. Under Sec 6, Rule 120, the accused who failed to appear without
justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules
against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of
judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of
court to avail of these remedies.
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only
Estanislao Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without
surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven,
Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for

Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only

failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it
also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint
Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who
were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a motion
for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao.
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double
jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had
acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction
is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not
However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no
Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the
promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction
over his person.
For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against double
jeopardy applies.

Case 10. Suero v People. Jan 31, 2005

Petitioner Andres Suero was accused together with another accused
[Aquilina B. Granada], of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document in an Information before the RTC:
That on or about February 12, 1992 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused-public officers, being then the Administrative
Officer and Property Inspector, respectively, of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
Region XI, Davao City, with salary grades below grade 27,
while in the performance of their official duties, and taking
advantage of their official positions, in conspiracy with one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified an undated
Inspection Report affixing their signatures thereto, making it
appear that various furniture purchase[d] from, and delivered
by Business International Wood Products under Delivery
Receipt Nos. 9758, 9759, 9760 and 9761, in the total
amount of P1,033,450.00, have all been delivered and duly
inspected, thereby justifying the release of the payment to
Business International Wood Products in the aforesaid
amount, when in truth and in [f]act, no such complete
delivery was made and inspected, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
Thereafter, petitioner was arraigned.

3019 for falsification of documents; and therefore, it is preferred that

the Sandiganbayan takes precedence over all other cases including
the instant case involving the same accused similarly situated.
Meanwhile, SB acquitted the accused.
Respondent Ombudsman sent a letter to the Clerk of Court of
respondent RTC judge Carpio, expressing their decision in refiling
the herein enclosed information and request that the same be
entered in the docket of the criminal case with a new case number
assigned to it.
New Information was filed.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information, which was denied
by respondent judge.
1. W/N the prosecution of petitioner for falsification of a public
document would place him twice in jeopardy NO
Petitioner claims that his acquittal by the anti-graft court constitutes a
bar to the present case under the doctrine of double jeopardy.
We hold that the instant case does not constitute double jeopardy, for
which the following requisites must concur: (1) the first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense as that in the first.

Trial commenced but was later suspended when the court granted
the Joint Motion to Suspend further Proceedings filed by the accused
and respondent Ombudsman through Special Prosecutors
Humphrey Monteroso and Leonardo Tamayo.

The test for the third element is whether one offense is identical with
the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or
whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of

The motion stated that both the accused were also the accused in a
pending case in the Sandiganbayan for violation of Sec 3(e) of RA

Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court further provides:

SECTION 5. When an offense includes or is included in

another. -- An offense charged necessarily includes that
which is proved, when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint
or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged
is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part
of those constituting the latter.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of falsification of a public
document, provided for in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code,
and those of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 shows that there is
neither identity nor exclusive inclusion between the offenses. For
falsification of a public document to be established, the following
elements must concur:
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary
2. That he takes advantage of his official position;
3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the
following acts:
a. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature or rubric;
b. Causing it to appear that persons have participated
in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
c. Attributing to persons who have participated in an
act or proceeding statements other than those in fact
made by them;

d. Making untruthful statements in a narration of

e. Altering true dates;
f. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning;
g. Issuing in authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document when
no such original exists, or including in such copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original;
h. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the
issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book
x x x.
On the other hand, to hold a person criminally liable under Section
3(e) of RA 3019, the following elements must be present:
(1) That the accused are public officers or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them;
(2) That said public officers commit the prohibited acts
during the performance of their official duties or in relation
to their public positions;
(3) That they cause undue injury to any party, whether the
Government or a private party;
(4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and

(5) That the public officers have acted with manifest

partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
It is undisputed that the two charges stem from the same transaction.
However, it has been consistently held that the same act may give
rise to two or more separate and distinct offenses. No double
jeopardy attaches, as long as there is a variance between the
elements of the offenses charged.
For there to be double jeopardy, the elements of one offense should
-- like the ribs of an umbrella -- ideally encompass those of the other.
The elements of a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 fall outside
the realm of those of falsification of a public document and vice
versa. At most, the two offenses may be considered as two conjoined
umbrellas with one or two common ribs. Clearly, one offense does
not include the other.
Furthermore, Sandiganbayan did not in any way rule on the validity
or the falsity of the questioned documents.

Case 11. People v Torres. Sept 22, 2014


Case 12. Torres v Aguinaldo. June 28, 2005


Case 13. Co v New Prosperity Plastic Products. June 30, 2014


Case 14. Los Banos v Pedro. April 22, 2009