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GP 44-80
Applicability Group
Date 31 March 2006
GP 44-80
BP GROUP
ENGINEERING TECHNICAL PRACTICES
31 March 2006 GP 44-80
Guidance on Practice for Relief Disposal Systems
Foreword
This is the first issue of Engineering Technical Practice (ETP) BP GP 44-80. This Guidance on
Practice (GP) is based on parts of heritage documents from the merged BP companies as follows:
BP RPSE
RP 44-3 Design Guidelines for Relief Disposal Systems.
Amoco
A PC-PRD-00-E Process Control-Pressure-Relief Devices-Device Selection and Systems
Design Specification.
A PC-PRD-00-G Process Control-Pressure-Relief Devices Guide.
Copyright
Copyright 2002,
2006, BP Group.
BPAll rights reserved.
Group. The information
All rights reserved.contained
The in this
document is subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement or contract under which
information
the document wascontained inrecipients
supplied to the this document is subject
organization. toinformation
None of the the terms and
contained in this
conditions ofdocument shall be disclosed
the agreement outside the
or contract recipients
under which ownthe
organization
document was supplied to the recipients organization. None of
without the prior written permission of Director of Engineering, BP Group, unless the
terms of such agreement or contract expressly allow.
the information contained in this document shall be disclosed
outside the recipients own organization without the prior written
permission of Manager, Standards, BP Group, unless the terms of
such agreement or contract expressly allow. Page 2 of 62
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Guidance on Practice for Relief Disposal Systems
Table of Contents
Page
Foreword ........................................................................................................................................ 2
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 5
1. Scope .................................................................................................................................... 6
2. Normative references............................................................................................................. 6
3. Terms and definitions............................................................................................................. 7
3.1. General ....................................................................................................................... 7
3.2. Terms ......................................................................................................................... 7
3.3. Definitions ................................................................................................................... 8
4. Symbols and abbreviations .................................................................................................... 9
5. Choice of disposal systems.................................................................................................... 9
6. Atmospheric discharge ........................................................................................................ 10
6.1. Scope ....................................................................................................................... 10
6.2. General ..................................................................................................................... 11
6.3. Non-hazardous discharge ......................................................................................... 12
6.4. Flammable and toxic discharge in atmospheric vents ............................................... 12
6.5. Blowdown drums discharging to atmosphere ............................................................ 18
7. Closed systems ................................................................................................................... 18
7.1. General ..................................................................................................................... 18
7.2. Pipe & header sizing and layout ................................................................................ 19
7.3. Special relief arrangements ...................................................................................... 21
7.4. Winterisation ............................................................................................................. 22
8. Flare system design ............................................................................................................. 22
8.1. General ..................................................................................................................... 22
8.2. Component parts of the systems............................................................................... 22
8.3. Design considerations ............................................................................................... 23
8.4. Engineering diagrams ............................................................................................... 25
8.5. Flare types ................................................................................................................ 25
8.6. Smokeless flaring...................................................................................................... 26
8.7. Sizing of relief and flare systems............................................................................... 27
8.8. Siting......................................................................................................................... 28
8.9. Elevated flares .......................................................................................................... 33
8.10. Enclosed ground flares ............................................................................................. 33
8.11. Minimum heat content of flare gas ............................................................................ 33
8.12. Ignition systems ........................................................................................................ 33
8.13. Flashback prevention ................................................................................................ 34
8.14. Noise levels .............................................................................................................. 36
8.15. Flare sparing philosophy ........................................................................................... 36
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Introduction
This Guidance on Practice (GP) provides guidance on relief disposal systems that are within its stated
scope and is for use in determining the need for, and design of, specific relief disposal systems.
This GP refers to national and international standards that are widely accepted. Codes and standards of
the country in which the equipment is manufactured and/or operated should be considered and may be
accepted if they can be used to achieve an equivalent safe technical result. In any case, statutory and
local regulations must be complied with.
The value of this GP to its users is significantly enhanced by their regular participation in its
improvement and updating. For this reason, users are urged to inform BP of their experiences in all
aspects of its application.
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1. Scope
This GP specifies general requirements for designing relief disposal systems based on the engineering
principles set out in ISO 23251 or API RP 521 (Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring
Systems) and ISO 4126 or API RP 520 (Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving
Devices in Refineries). This GP should also be used in conjunction with sound engineering judgement
and with full consideration of country, state, and local rules and regulations. In addition, relief disposal
system shall be designed in compliance with the requirements of the insurance covering the plant or
installation.
In principle a relief disposal system includes individual pressure relief devices, a piping system with
associated control valves or manual valves and a discharge system. This system terminates in one or
more disposal systems such as a flare, in which the fluids are combusted, a scrubber or absorber in
which a component(s) of the relief stream is removed before venting, no treatment (i.e., vented directly
to the atmosphere), or blowdown systems in which non-volatile liquids are removed. Blowdown
drums are prohibited in services which handle heavier-than-air hydrocarbon vapour or light
hydrocarbon liquids (gasoline and lighter). The mechanical design of flare tips and stacks is covered in
GP 22-20.
This GP provides a level of safety acceptable to BP in the design and operation of the following
installations:
a. Refineries
b. Chemical plants
c. Terminals
d. Offshore installations
e. Crude oil and gas gathering centres
f. Pipelines: buried, above ground, or sub-sea
g. Storage installations
h. Floating production systems
i. Well Pads and Production Facilities
j. Steam generating plant and ancillary equipment
It shall be used in conjunction with GP 44-70, which specifies relief device requirements and the
calculation of relief loads.
2. Normative references
The following normative documents contain requirements that, through reference in this text,
constitute requirements of this technical practice. For dated references, subsequent amendments to, or
revisions of, any of these publications do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on this
technical practice are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of
the normative documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the normative
document referred to applies.
BP
gHSSEr BP Getting Health, Safety, Security and Environment Right.
GP 14-01 Guidance on Practice for Noise Control.
GP 22-20 Guidance on Practices for Design of Flares (API 537).
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GIS 22-201 Guidance on Industry Standard for Procurement of Flares to API 537.
GP 24-03 Guidance on Practice for Inherently Safer Design Concept Selection.
GP 30-76 Guidance on Practice for Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS)
Development of the Process Requirements Specification.
GP 30-80 Guidance on Practice for SIS Implementation of Process Requirements.
GP 30-81 Guidance on Practice for SIS Operations and Maintenance.
GP 31-01 Guidance on Practice for Analyser Systems.
GP 44-10 Guidance on Practice for Plant Layout.
GP 44-30 Guidance on Practice for Event Modelling and Risk Based Evaluation.
GP 44-60 Guidance on Practice for API RP 500 Area Classification.
GP 44-65 Guidance on Practice for IP 15 Area Classification.
GP 44-70 Guidance on Practice for Overpressure Protection Systems.
GP 48-02 Guidance on Practice for HAZOP - Hazard & Operability Studies-
Training.
GP 76-01 Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention.
3.1. General
a. In this GP the term approve, as applied to BP, is used if BP does not wish a design to
proceed unless certain features have been agreed in writing with a contractor or supplier.
This does not imply that all details of a document have been considered by BP and does
not affect the design responsibilities of the contractor or supplier.
b. Throughout this document, the words will, may, should, shall and must, when used
in the context of actions by BP or others, have specific meanings. For the purposes of this
GP, the following terms and definitions apply:
3.2. Terms
Will - used normally in connection with an action by BP, rather than by a contractor or supplier.
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3.3. Definitions
The technical terms used in this GP have the meanings as defined in ISO 23251 or API RP 521. The
following additional technical definitions also apply:
Coanda flare
A flare burner designed to employ the aerodynamic effect in which moving fluids follow a curved or
inclined surface over which they flow. Flares of this type generally use steam or pressure to achieve
smokeless operation.
Combustion support
The addition of fuel gas to the effluent to be flared for any of the following reasons:
Elevated flare
An elevated stack, (self-supported, guyed, or structure-supported), containing a flare tip, pilot burners,
igniters, smoke-suppressing devices, service pipes, and miscellaneous auxiliaries.
Flare
A general term used to designate a device or system used to safely dispose of relief gas in an
environmentally compliant manner through the use of combustion.
Flare system
The whole closed disposal system for fluids discharged from pressure relief valves, other pressure
relief devices, control valves, or manually operated valves, terminating in one or more flares.
Flare tip
The part of flare in which fuel and air are mixed at velocities, turbulence, and concentration required
to establish and maintain proper ignition and stable combustion. It is also referred as flare burner.
Flare vendor
A company that undertakes the design, supply, and sometimes the erection of a flare.
Ground flare
Any non-elevated flare. It is normally an enclosed flare, but may also refer to a ground multi-burner
flare or a burn pit.
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Molecular seals
A gravity seal using the difference in molecular weight between air and the purge gas being used.
Flare tips using molecular seals are susceptible to burn back inside the flare tip.
Purge rate
The rate of flow of an inert or combustible gas required to prevent the oxygen concentration exceeding
a specified level at a specified location in the flare stack or supply ducting, when oxygen ingress is
undesirable.
Safe location
A safe location is one that would not cause significant deleterious impact or harm to personnel,
environment or property. Dispersion analyses and/or consequence analyses may be required to validate
the suitability of the discharge location.
Self-erecting flare
Flare that is dismountable and can be erected without the use of cranes (may need cranes, but only for
initial installation).
Smokeless
Without emitting dark smoke as defined in the UK Clean Air Act 1956 Section 34(2) or as defined in
EPA CFR 60.18 (c)(1) which basically does not allow the emission of visible smoke during flaring.
For the purpose of this GP, the following symbols and abbreviations apply:
The selection of a disposal method is subject to many factors that may be specific to
a particular location or an individual unit. ISO 23251 or API RP 521 outline the
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general principles and design approach for determining the most suitable type of
disposal system.
a. The system design approach shall include provisions for the disposal of warm or cold
fluids to a closed collection system with associated vapours or directly vented gases
passing to a vapour disposal system (such as a flare) or being directly vented to
atmosphere, depending on the fluid properties, molecular weight, and temperature, without
compromising personnel safety or equipment/ plant integrity.
b. If permitted by local statutory regulations, for relief of other than non-hazardous fluids, the
choice of pressure relief discharge location shall generally be in the following order of
preference, subject to the detailed limitations of this GP:
1. Other parts of the process plant or system.
2. Closed system, subject to the requirements of clause 7.
3. Atmosphere, subject to the requirements of clauses.
In general, the magnitude and frequency of relief discharge should be reduced by
using pressure-limiting instrumentation, in accordance with clause 7.3 of GP 44-70.
Constraints on atmospheric relief may be imposed by compact installations, e.g.
offshore.
c. Normal venting of flammable and toxic materials arising from controlled process
variations and sustained discharges for plant operability shall usually be taken to a closed
system.
In remote or offshore locations where there can be fewer potential sources of
ignition, such flammable and toxic discharges may be to atmosphere provided
dispersion analysis and consequence analyses do not indicate significant impact to
personnel safety or equipment / plant integrity and subject to BP approval.
d. Environmental considerations of releases need to be discussed thoroughly with the
appropriate Regulatory Authorities, at the earliest stage of process design in order to
implement the most cost effective solutions and to minimise effects on the environment.
6. Atmospheric discharge
6.1. Scope
Atmospheric discharge is the release of vapours and gases from pressure-relieving
and depressuring devices to the atmosphere. Atmospheric discharge, if feasible,
offers advantages over alternative methods of disposal because of its inherent
simplicity, dependability and generally lower capital cost.
a. Direct atmospheric releases shall be made within the limitations of environmental
regulations and corporate gHSSEr guidelines. See GP 76-01. Atmospheric venting for
flammable and/or toxic gases in BP shall be eliminated or severely curtailed when
practicable. Any deviation from the atmospheric venting requirements of this GP or any
new atmospheric blowdown stack installation requires approval from the BP Group
Director of Engineering.
b. The safe disposal approach requires an analysis for possible consequences including
thermal radiation levels from atmospheric vents which could ignite, an analysis of vapour
cloud dispersion, including any toxic products either present or formed from ignition of the
vent discharge, and an analysis of other possible consequences that may occur, depending
upon the release, including but not limited to vapour cloud explosions and flash fires.
These analyses determine the suitability for atmospheric relief and, if permitted, the
location and elevation at the point of discharge to assure that allowable thresholds for
thermal radiation, blast overpressure, and toxicity/flammability are not exceeded. When
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6.2. General
a. Under normal operation there shall be no continuous venting of raw (unburned)
hydrocarbons or toxic vapours to the atmosphere. This restriction does not apply to
analyser sample streams (GP 31-01) with very small venting rates and purge gas systems
required to prevent air ingress and designed to keep atmospheric vent systems safe.
Proposed venting of anything other than steam, air, or nitrogen shall be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis with due consideration of regulatory and BP corporate guidelines.
b. Dispersion analyses and consequence analyses shall be performed for all flammable, toxic,
corrosive and/or otherwise hazardous relief streams venting directly to atmosphere.
c. Atmospheric relief shall present no unacceptable secondary hazard such as increased risk
of fire, toxic exposure, or an explosive hazard. The definitions and calculation methods
used to justify this general criterion, where not covered by this GP, shall be specified or
approved by BP for each project.
d. If required by a regulating authority, an integrity assessment analysis study shall be made
or approved by BP to assess the estimated frequency and duration of atmospheric
emergency relief streams covered by clause 7.6 of GP 44-70. Credit for the use of
automatic pressure-limiting instrumentation should be taken, as justified by the study.
e. General discussion of atmospheric discharge from pressure relief devices in processing
installations is given in GP 44-10. However, flammable and toxic discharges shall comply
with the requirements of clause 6.4, which may dictate modified distances.
f. Noise limits shall be maintained in normally manned areas to meet the Special Limits
given in GP 14-01.
g. If atmospheric relief discharge is permitted within this GP, allowed per applicable national
codes or standards, meets BP corporate guidelines, and is acceptable to the local
authorities, no additional closed system need be provided for such discharges.
h. If pressure relief devices discharge to atmosphere, each individual discharge line should
have at least the same bore as the outlet from the pressure relief device. If acceptable
dispersion cannot be attained with this tail pipe bore, the outlet end of the tail pipe may be
reduced in diameter to improve dispersion, provided such a reduction does not increase the
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relief device back pressure to where the pressure relief device does not operate stably or
where the relief rate is reduced below that calculated or required by the process.
6.4.1. General
a. The decision to intermittently discharge flammable and toxic materials to the atmosphere
requires careful attention to ensure that disposal can be accomplished without creating a
potential hazard or causing other problems, such as the formation of flammable mixtures at
grade level or at elevated structures, buildings, process and breathing air intakes; exposure
of personnel to toxic materials; ignition of relief streams at the point of emission; excessive
noise levels; and air pollution. ISO 23251 or API RP 521 covers in greater detail these
associated potential hazards or problems.
b. The duration of atmospheric relief discharge should be limited by the use of pressure-
limiting instrumentation, reseating relief valves, or operator intervention. However, in
addition, the following criteria shall be met for flammable and/or toxic relief streams as
defined by BP:
1. The discharge velocity shall be sufficient to reduce the concentration of flammable
material at a suitable distance downstream of the point of discharge to below the
lower flammable limit, but not such a high outlet velocity that a build-up of static
electricity could occur.
a) The additional effect of wind-assisted dispersion between the jet and any source
of ignition may be taken into consideration subject to BP approval.
b) The use of pilot-assisted relief valves may be necessary (in services in which
these types of valves can be used) to achieve adequate jet velocities.
c) The distance downstream is set by plant layout and environmental
considerations.
See clause 6.4.1.d below.
2. To maximise dilution in atmospheric discharge, every pressure relief device should
have its own discharge line where practical. The discharge pipe shall be adequately
supported and sized for rated capacity of the relief device per clause 6.2.h above.
3. Dispersion analysis and consequence analyses shall be performed to confirm that the
discharge does not represent a significant impact to personnel safety, environment or
to equipment/ plant integrity per clause 6.4.5.
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The combination of (a) a process upset causing a flammable discharge, (b) the
possible ignition of this discharge, and (c) the possible presence of an operator at a
point close enough to be significantly affected, may well be considered to be remote,
but should also consider the potential size of the release and radius of impact.
g. If the discharge is flammable or toxic, the discharge line to atmosphere shall have a 10 mm
(3/8 in) drain at its lowest point. As required, the drain shall be piped to a safe location and
may contain a locked-open isolation valve in an easily accessible location.
If the relief system is capable of creating significant system backpressure, higher
discharge rates than normally expected may flow through this drain.
h. Selection of the pressure relief device shall consider the potential effects (if possible) for
vacuum formation in the protected equipment.
1. For some pressure relief devices, failure or opening can occur if the outlet pressure
exceeds the inlet pressure thereby allowing air to enter the equipment.
2. If air entry is possible, the potential for formation of a flammable atmosphere inside
the equipment shall be evaluated and, as required, effective prevention/mitigation
measures shall be provided.
Some pilot operated pressure relief valves may open if the outlet pressure exceeds
the inlet pressure. Backflow preventers can be installed to minimize the potential for
opening, but may be ineffective at high pressure differentials.
Some rupture disks require vacuum supports to prevent disk damage or failure when
the outlet pressure exceeds the inlet pressure.
i. When specified by BP, steam or inert gas connections may be provided for atmospheric
relief streams at ambient temperatures or above, only for use in extinguishing any residual
burning.
1. This shall be by hand control from grade level using double block-and-bleed valves,
connected to the vent after the relief device.
Double block and bleed valves are used to prevent undetected steam or inert gas
leakage to atmosphere.
2. A drain hole, left permanently open, shall be provided in the vent line. The vent line
drain hole shall be fitted with a short line to a safe location, or be located to discharge
away from any operating platform.
3. Such locations shall be subject to approval by BP.
j. Extra attention is required when relief gas may contain vapours that are dangerous at
extremely low concentrations; for example, hydrogen sulphide vapours can cause
unconsciousness and fatality within seconds following exposure to a concentration above
1 000 ppm. This is approximately one-tenth the lowest flammable limit concentration for
many hydrocarbons.
k. When installed for discharge temperatures below 0C (32F), extinguishing connections
shall be inert gas instead of steam. The use of Halons (bromo- or chlorofluorocarbons) and
other vaporising liquids shall be avoided if possible, and shall be considered only if there is
no practical alternative and if approved by BP. In this eventuality, reasonable steps shall be
taken to minimise the release of the vaporising liquid to atmosphere.
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and Halons are now generally accepted as being
significant man-made contributors to the depletion of the ozone layer.
The implications of this philosophy for the BP Group are contained in Safety
Guidance Note No. 90/2. This document outlines the approach that should be taken
when selecting an extinguishant for various applications, and should be consulted if
a new use for a Halon is being considered.
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g
Re 1.54 10 4 (from ISO 23251 or API RP 521)
a
Where Re = Reynolds number calculated at the vent outlet
g = Density of the gas at vent outlet
a = Density of the air
b. If the vent gas exit velocity is too low, air entrainment is limited and the released vapours
will be wind dominated, potentially forming flammable or explosive mixtures some
distance from the emission source. See ISO 23251 or API RP 521 for additional guidance.
c. Relief valves do not always relieve at full capacity and reduced flow rates with lower
dispersion factors shall be considered in the required dispersion studies.
6.4.4. Liquid overfill potential for vessels with pressure relief devices discharging directly to
atmosphere
a. Many process vessels have a liquid level present during normal, start-up, or shutdown
operations.
1. If these vessels are provided with pressure relief devices that discharge directly to
atmosphere, then overfilling of the vessel with liquid shall be considered to be a
credible event.
2. Unlike vapour or mist discharges, a discharge of liquid can settle out to grade creating
a hazardous environment. Appropriate design interventions shall be implemented to
ensure liquid is not released from the vessel.
3. The following minimum safeguards listed in this clause against overfilling the vessel
and potentially relieving liquid to the atmosphere are required and shall apply to
services in which a flammable, hazardous, and/or toxic liquid may be discharged.
Other criteria for atmospheric relief specified elsewhere in this GP must also be met.
b. Relief valves designed to relieve vessel vapours shall have the valve inlet connected to the
vessel vapour space. Note that in cases in which fire is the only credible scenario involving
vapour relief and if the equipment is normally liquid-full, the relief device should be
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installed at the high-point of the equipment or at a location that would promote vapour-
liquid disengagement.
c. If the time between when a critical high level alarm occurs and when the vessel becomes
liquid full is 30 minutes or more, based upon normal liquid inflow or production rates with
no liquid removal, the minimum level safeguards are:
1. At least two independent and diverse liquid level measurements shall be provided.
2. An additional independent critical high level alarm shall be provided.
3. Operations actions to prevent further accumulation of liquid level in response to the
critical high level alarm shall be clearly defined in operating manuals and training
materials and shall be reviewed with operating crews at regular intervals. The
operator actions shall be simple and effective in reducing levels.
4. A Hazard Evaluation shall be done using the techniques described in GP 30-76 to
determine if additional protective measures should be implemented.
d. If the time between when a critical high level alarm occurs and when the vessel becomes
liquid full is between 15 and 30 minutes, the minimum level safeguards are:
1. All safeguards listed in (c) above for over 30 minute reaction times.
2. Addition of a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) rated Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
that will activate on High-High level to prevent further accumulation of liquid or shut
down the equipment. The required integrity level shall be determined from a Hazard
Evaluation using the techniques described in GP 30-76.
e. If the time between when a critical high level alarm occurs and when the vessel becomes
liquid full is less than 15 minutes the minimum required safeguards are either:
1. The pressure relief valve shall not discharge to atmosphere, but shall discharge to a
safe closed system or back to a safe location within the process, or
2. All safeguards listed above (c) for over 30 minute reaction times and the addition of a
Safety Integrity Level rated Safety Instrumented System that activates on High-High
level to prevent further accumulation of liquid or shut down the equipment. The
required integrity level shall be determined from a Hazard Evaluation using the
techniques described in GP 30-76. No credit for Operator response to alarms shall be
taken in this evaluation. It should be noted that this system may have to be SIL 3.
f. Measured level ranges for systems with atmospheric relief shall be sufficient to indicate
actual level during all operations including start-up and shutdown. Equipment shall not
continue to be operated if the level indications and alarms are not functional or if the
indicated level measurements are above the high range of the measurements. (e.g.,
indicated level is 100% or higher).
g. In cases where a closed relief disposal system is not considered adequate for a liquid
overfill case, the instrumentation criteria above (clauses c-e) covering overfill protection
shall be applied.
h. The following criteria shall be met when installing the level measurements and alarms
mentioned above:
1. Level instruments used for safeguards against overfilling shall use separate process
taps.
2. Level instruments used for safeguards against overfilling shall use diverse
technologies (e.g. differential pressure and radar, displacer and differential pressure,
displacer and float, etc.) and shall be proven in use for the specific process
applications. Tower differential pressure devices may be acceptable, but criteria for
their use as surrogate level indicating devices need to be developed.
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3. Float type level switches may be used for high critical alarms, but an additional
transmitter is preferred.
4. The range of at least one of the two primary level measurements shall be such that it
indicates a valid level reading at the high critical alarm point and any shutdown or
interlock points. Also, the lowest density material expected to be in the vessel shall by
used for instrument calibration of overfill protective devices.
5. Operating characteristics of the level measurement during off-design, start-up, and
shutdown operations shall be considered in setting alarms and trip points. This
behaviour shall also be included in operator training and operating procedures. For
example a differential pressure or displacer level measurement reads low compared to
actual level if the fluid specific gravity is less than the design gravity. This can mean
that the indicated level cannot reach 100% even if the actual level is well above the
measured range.
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7. Closed systems
7.1. General
a. Closed relief systems are most frequently flare systems incorporating knockout drums if
necessary, but may in some cases be absorbers, scrubbers, quench towers, dump tanks, etc.
Closed systems shall be subject to design and installation approvals by BP.
b. Fluids returned to other parts of the process shall be compatible in composition and
temperature, to avoid any violent vaporisation or the possible formation of solids.
c. The following relief streams shall be taken to a closed system:
1. Relief streams that do not satisfy the requirements for atmospheric relief as given in
clause 6.4.
2. Relief streams that satisfy atmospheric relief requirements but where regulating
authorities prohibit atmospheric venting.
d. Normal venting of flammable and toxic materials arising from controlled process
variations and sustained discharges for plant operability shall be taken to a closed system;
however, in remote or offshore locations where there are fewer potential sources of
ignition, such flammable discharges might be to atmosphere, subject to BP approval.
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For Exploration and Production flares the depressuring load can be very large,
approaching or exceeding the other individual or group loads. Unless certain
measures are undertaken, it is possible that either as a transient or even longer,
relief and blowdown loads could be superimposed if necessary to prevent
overpressure.
b. In determining the above, good engineering judgement shall be used in accordance with
ISO 23251 or API RP 521 generally, and GP 44-70 in particular. In all cases, design of the
closed pressure relief system shall meet requirements for air quality and for the release of
combustion products to a safe location.
c. If practical, the discharge pipe size should be as large as, or larger than, the size of the
pressure relief device outlet flange.
d. The hydraulic profile of closed disposal systems shall be verified and calculations shall be
updated as required to reflect the current piping arrangements, knockout drums, seal drum,
and flare installation. Laterals from the relief device outlet flange to the main header shall
use the rated capacity flow from the pressure relief valve except for modulating pilot
operated relief valves where the required relief load can be used. Main headers, flare
headers, and flare stacks should be sized for the required relief load.
e. Relief system piping shall be sized using the following pipe roughness, which reflects BP
experience of increased roughness in relief system piping:
1. 0,46 mm (0,018 in or 0,001 5 ft) for heavily corroded piping.
2. 0,15 mm (0,006 in or 0,000 5 ft) for carbon steel piping in normal service.
3. 0,046 mm (0,001 8 in or 0,000 15 ft) for stainless steel and other alloy piping in
normal service.
f. The use of an equivalent roughness of 0,046 mm (0,000 15 ft (0,001 8 in)) is generally not
considered to be sufficiently conservative basis for the sizing of relief headers and relief
valve discharge lines. The effect of using a higher pipe roughness varies with the system
concerned, however it is possible for pressure losses to be increased by as much as 50-
80%.The evaluation of pressure drops in piping handling compressible fluids (gases,
vapours, multiphase fluids, and/or fluids above the thermodynamic critical point) shall
evaluate the potential to reach sonic velocity (i.e., choking conditions) in the piping. The
isothermal flow model should be used to determine the hydraulic profile for gas/vapour
flow (See ISO 23251 or API RP 521). For multiphase compressible flow, the
homogeneous equilibrium model or equivalent that considers potential for choking (i.e.,
reaching sonic velocity) should be used to determine the hydraulic profile (See ISO 23251
or API RP 521).
g. Outlet relief device piping shall be sized to limit the maximum velocity to 0,8 Mach
Number if practical. Higher Mach numbers are allowed if an analysis is performed to
ensure acoustically induced vibration fatigue failures will not occur and that the piping and
pressure relief devices are adequately supported/ braced for the reaction forces caused by
venting.
h. Discharge piping shall be self-draining from the pressure relief device to the relief header.
Relief headers shall be self-draining toward their respective knockout drums or receivers
and all relief sub-headers shall be self-draining toward the main headers. The header
upstream of the flare shall similarly drain back to the drum.
i. Locating a pressure relief device below a header in closed systems should be avoided.
Laterals from a device that absolutely must be located below the header shall rise
continuously to the top of the header entry point and means shall be provided to both
prevent and confirm no condensate or liquid accumulation in the device discharge piping.
j. Discharge piping from operational vents should be insulated for a certain length if external
ice formation is to be prevented in a specified plot area to avoid falling ice hazards for
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personnel. Similarly, discharge piping from operational vents in hot service (above 65C or
150F) shall be insulated or barricaded if personnel could be exposed.
k. A closed system receiving multiple relief streams, in which vessels may be fitted with
pressure-limiting instrumentation, shall be sized on the general basis of ISO 23251 or API
RP 521 which states the maximum load as the sum of the loads of the individual devices
connected to it which are assumed to be relieving under the governing emergency
condition. The number assumed to be relieving simultaneously may be reduced if credit
for the operation of pressure-limiting instrumentation is taken.
l. Credit taken in this way for the operation of pressure-limiting instrumentation is subject to
approval by BP for each project, in accordance with the general principles of this GP and
the GP 30 series covering SIS systems as listed in clause 2.
m. If credit is taken for the operation of pressure-limiting instrumentation in the sizing of
closed relief systems, this instrumentation shall be evaluated and designed in accordance
with GP 30-76 and GP 30-80, appropriately SIS rated, and regarded as an integral part of
the pressure-relieving system.
n. In general, estimates shall be made of the possible incidence of pressure relief devices
lifting simultaneously due to the failure of pressure-limiting instrumentation or devices in
response to estimated demand rates. The criteria for sizing a closed relief system can be
refined using Quantified Risk Assessment principles as detailed in GP 50-01 and GP 50-02
such that the design flow rate is not likely to be exceeded within a period to be determined
for each case.
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a. Low-temperature relief of fluids shall be segregated from other streams that are wet, to
avoid freezing of lines. For other than atmospheric discharge, a separate knockout drum
and closed vent system shall be provided using materials of construction specifically
selected for low-temperature service.
b. If appropriate, consideration shall be given to the provision of methanol injection facilities
to prevent hydrate formation.
7.4. Winterisation
a. If the danger of freezing of vent lines or pressure relief devices exists, heat tracing or other
positive precautions shall be taken.
b. If any overpressure protection is by pressure-limiting instrumentation that relies on heat
tracing, the heat tracing shall be included in reliability considerations if necessary.
c. If liquid seals are being considered, winterization or freeze protection of these seals shall
be carefully considered during the closed system design phase.
8.1. General
Flare systems are used to convert flammable, toxic, or corrosive vapours to less
objectionable compounds by combustion. The type of flare as well as any design
features required will be based on many factors such as the characteristic of the
flare gas, namely, composition, quantity, pressure level; economics, including both
initial investment and operating costs; availability of space; and public relations.
a. Flare systems and all associated components (headers, knockout drums, etc.) that are
described in ISO 23251 or API RP 521 shall be designed to meet the minimum
requirements of this document and shall comply with this GP as well as other referenced
documents.
b. Refer to GP 22-20 for further details on flare: mechanical design, operation, maintenance
issues and use of the flare as a disposal device.
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h. Isolation system.
i. Smoke suppression control system.
j. Gas sampling system.
k. Oxygen analyzer.
l. Flow, temperature and level measurements and alarms.
m. Pump out facilities for drums.
n. Fire protection.
o. Insulation.
p. Heating and heat tracing.
q. Cold liquid/vapour vaporization and heating system.
r. Flare gas recovery system.
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2. Blockages/flow restrictions
a) Freezing of liquid seals, condensate in flare lines or molecular seals, steam
condensing, freezing in the flare tip during low steam flow under winter
conditions, low ambient temperatures, low temperature discharges or auto-
refrigeration are all potential sources of vapour line blockage or restriction. See
clause 9.3.
b) Polymerisation products, hydrates, waxes, corrosion products.
c) Solids carried forward from the plants, catalyst, polymers etc.
d) Liquids trapped through faulty drains, bad design, and level control failure.
e) Valves incorrectly closed or failing closed.
3. Toxic components: Streams containing more than 10% volume H2S or other highly
toxic material should be run in a separate line to the flare, and should preferably be
coupled to the main flare gas stream near the flare tip to minimise exposure of the
main flare pipe work to the corrosive effects of H2S. Careful consideration should be
given to the disposal of foul liquid effluents from flare seals, drains, etc.
4. Chemical reactions within the flare system, pyrophoric scale, acetylides, peroxides,
etc.
5. Mechanical damages, hydraulic surge of liquid slugs, propulsion of solid ice-slugs,
hydrates, impact, low temperature embrittlement through auto-refrigeration, external
fire damage, burn-back at the flare tip, flame lick, venting of high temperature gases
into the flare system.
6. Liquid accumulations in relief and flare systems: Liquid relief to the flare collection
system should be avoided. If this cannot be prevented, careful consideration shall be
given to potential problems associated with liquid disposal from pressure relief
devices and liquid de-inventorying into the flare systems. Appreciable quantities of
liquid discharged to the flare during an emergency vapour release could cause slug
flow in the horizontal lines and the entrance to the knockout receivers causing
possible mechanical damage. See clause 9 for additional design considerations.
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worthwhile checking the size of relief lines required and the cost of increasing vessel
design pressure to reduce the flare main size required.
c. Pressure drop limitations may dictate the flare stack diameter.
d. The flare vendor shall submit the calculated flare tip velocity to BP for approval. The
velocity shall be chosen to satisfy requirements for flame stability, noise, and dispersion.
The latest designs of pipe flare tips permit smokeless flaring at velocities above
0,2 Mach No., but if this velocity is exceeded then experience of satisfactory
operation of the design should be examined. For emergency flaring 0,5 Mach No. is
generally accepted as a maximum for pipe flares. Above that figure, the flame could
become unstable and lifts off, resulting in the risk of flame extinction of pipe flares.
High pressure flares are available where the flame is stable even at 1,0 Mach No.
e. The total allowable pressure loss through the flare system including stack, liquid seal (if
any), knockout drums, and piping is normally dictated by the back pressure limitation on
critical relief valves, and shall be subject to approval by BP. Evaluation of flare system
back pressure shall consider:
1. All potential relief, depressuring and process venting conditions.
2. A pipe roughness consistent with the pipe material and operating conditions.
3. The final piping configuration including fittings, entrance losses, etc.
f. Identification of equipment and systems tied into the flare system and their pressure
limitations. This includes, but is not limited to analyzer vents, pump seal vents, centrifuge
seal vents, agitator seal vent, other seal vents, dryers, vessels and tanks that float on the
header through an open pipe, etc. Very low pressure equipment such as atmospheric
storage tanks should not normally be connected to a flare system because of the back
pressure effects or potential for reverse flow.
g. It is prohibited to tie-in bleeds from double-block-and-bleed assemblies into flare systems.
h. The basis and methods to be used for determining system pressure losses shall be
submitted to BP for approval.
In general, piping losses may be calculated using data from any recognised source,
e.g. Flow of Fluids Though Valves, Fittings and Pipe; Crane Technical Paper
No. 410. However, in many cases the published data is thought to significantly
underestimate losses through tees. For these calculations, the data of Internal Flow
Systems edited by D.S. Miller - BHRA Fluid Engineering, published by Gulf
Publishing or VDI Waermeatlas can be used.
i. See clause 7.2 for relief and flare header sizing requirements.
j. Dynamic analysis of events occurring during a plant wide failure scenario may indicate
reduced overall loads based upon the sequence of the relief loadings considered. This type
of analysis is considered to be valid for a plant wide upset event providing it is reviewed
and approved by BP. In many cases, following ISO 23251 or API RP 521 guidance would
be sufficient which allows credit for some favourable instrumentation response during
plant wide failure scenarios depending upon their reliability.
8.8. Siting
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a. A flare should be as close as possible to the unit or units it serves. However, consideration
should be given to possible future expansion requirements into what will become the
sterile area.
b. The siting should take account of the likely route for the flare line (see clause 11.1).
c. Unless a shutdown of all flares is an operational requirement, the position of one flare in
relation to another should be selected so that either can be maintained during the others
operation.
d. Prevailing wind direction should be taken into account in siting the flare to minimise
environmental effects if possible. Consideration shall also be given to a potential flame
out event and the impact on plant/flare siting, combustion device locations, control
system response, etc.
e. Potential gas release from a plant and the possibility of the flare as an ignition source
should also be considered in flare siting.
f. The possibility of burning droplets being emitted from the flare tip should be taken into
account in the siting.
In very exceptional circumstances burning droplets of liquid could be discharged
from the tip of a flare. The area which could be affected by the burning droplets
would depend upon the size of the droplets and the wind conditions. If the least
favourable extremes of droplet size and wind speed are combined to calculate the
extent of the possible area which could be affected by the burning droplets, an
improbably large area would result. It is recommended, therefore, that the estimated
average droplet size and average wind speed should be used in such calculations
due to the improbability of the worst conditions occurring in combination.
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be interchangeable with that used in ISO and API. If possible, vendor thermal radiation
calculations, results, assumptions, and any other relevant documentation shall be provided
to verify compliance to the following flame radiation limits. The flare vendor/contractor
shall indicate the basis for the calculations including flame emissivity and shall supply
calculated results for flame length, flame shape and emission. BP will specify the locations
or positions where flare radiation calculations are required and the applicable
environmental and operating conditions.
ISO 23251 or API RP 521 methods can be used for initial rough calculations, but it
is significantly inaccurate at fewer than 2 flame lengths. The flare vendor thermal
radiation model is generally preferred.
Positions critical to Flare Radiation Calculations, particularly offshore, are:
Base of flare boom Nearest edge of platform Helideck
Crane cabs Monkey board (drilling derrick) Drillers pipe rack
Radio mast (includes fittings)
Environmental conditions that should be used in the thermal radiation calculations
are:
No wind
32 to 50 km/h (20 to 30 mph) wind
Water curtains or thermal radiation shield may be considered for reducing thermal
radiation from flaring. Higher wind speed can be evaluated as required but the user
should recognize that there is a better cooling at higher wind speed that would
mitigate the heat radiation.
b. Plant or process areas containing high thermal radiation levels (fired heaters, exothermic
reactors, etc.) shall be considered in relation to, and shall be additive to, the expected
thermal radiation rates from both operational and emergency flaring events.
c. The duration of and additive effect from radiation of any other elevated flare(s) located on
the site which would flare simultaneously with the flare under design shall also be
considered.
NOTES
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The following values should be used for the solar radiation allowance unless
specific measured values are available for the site. The average value should be
used in conjunction with the 1,6 kW/m2 (500 Btu/ft2h) (continuous full shift) value
and the peak value with all others. Linear interpolation between latitudes can be
used.
Solar Radiation Table
Latitude Peak radiation Average radiation
degrees kW/m2 (Btu/ft2h) kW/m2 (Btu/ft2h)
0 0,98 (311) 0,73 (231)
10 0,99 (314) 0,74 (235)
20 1,00 (317) 0,73 (231)
30 1,01 (320) 0,69 (219)
40 1,00 (317) 0,63 (200)
50 0,96 (304) 0,54 (171)
60 0,88 (279) 0,44 (139)
These figures are taken from data supplied by the Meteorological Office, Bracknell,
England, ref D/Met 01/21/1/2/L. The data refer to the global irradiance received on
a horizontal surface, for an air mass appropriate to a suburban environment.
The peak radiation is the maximum of the monthly peak irradiance received at 1200
(Local Apparent Time, LAT) solar time. The average radiation is the arithmetic
mean of the monthly average irradiance, for the period 0800-1600 LAT, except
when the day length is less than 8 hours (only Nov-Jan, latitude 60), the mean is for
the daylight period only.
Each monthly value used for the particular latitude refers to the 15th day in each
month. The data are derived from latitude averages of the correlation of sunshine
and irradiation (i.e. the Angstrom relation) and should be considered to be only
rough approximations to the actual values at specific sites.
The main problem with exceeding the full shift or blowdown exposure levels can be
both heat exhaustion and overt burns.
1. Metal surfaces irradiated at any of the time/level ratios given may produce burns on
contact with bare skin.
2. For offshore flares it may not be possible to satisfy some of the requirements. Access
to some areas may therefore have to be restricted, e.g. the flare structure, the bridge
for a linked flare and the drilling tower. It should be possible for any vital work in
these areas to be carried out under specified and controlled conditions.
3. If necessary, these design levels may be achieved by the use of displacement or
shielding. The requirements for any shielding system and the type of system to be
employed shall be agreed with BP at an early stage.
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4. On towers or other elevated structures where rapid escape is not possible, ladders
shall be provided on the side away from the flare, so that the tower or structure can
provide some degree of shielding if necessary.
5. In tower-supported multiple flare systems, all access requirements shall be
considered. Shielding shall be provided if specified by BP.
6. A maximum ground level radiation will be specified by BP, either where access
across a restricted access zone without shielding is required or where the ground
covering may be ignited, e.g. grass or peat.
7. The effect of flaring on equipment in the vicinity shall be considered, using the same
design level above, from the following aspects:
a) High temperature from radiation.
b) Large temperature gradients, between exposed and non-exposed surfaces.
c) Corrosive action of pollutants.
d) Possibility of burning of un-ignited droplets.
e) Effect of hot gases.
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8.12.1. General
a. The flare tip or burners shall be provided with pilot burners capable of igniting flare gas
under all relevant flow conditions and ambient conditions.
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b. The pilot burners shall be ignited by a reliable ignition system capable of operating under
all relevant ambient conditions.
c. As automatic ignition system is the primary means of ignition, an independent manual
back up is recommended. A flare gun is not an independent manual back up.
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If air (or oxygen) enters a flare system and forms a flammable mixture of gases
within the system, the mixture will be ignited by the pilot burners at the flare tip. If
the flash back velocity of the mixture exceeds the efflux velocity, the flame will burn
back into the flare stack and an explosion is likely to result. Flare stacks have been
ruptured by such explosions.
If the efflux velocity is very close to the flash back velocity, fairly steady combustion
may occur within the flare stack, which may lead to overheating and loss of
mechanical integrity. (To achieve such internal combustion for long enough to
overheat the flare stack in this way would require the in-leakage of sufficient air.
This can occur if insufficient purge gas is used to mitigate air in filtration due to
wind effect).
Some of the conditions conducive to the formation of flammable mixtures within the
flare system are if:
Vacuum systems are linked to the flare.
Lighter-than-air gases particularly hydrogen are being flared.
Condensation or rapid cooling can occur within the flare system. (It may be
possible to reduce or even prevent condensation by heating and insulating the
flare line; however, such measures may be expensive to install and difficult to
maintain in a reliable condition).
Relief valves are removed for servicing.
Two or more flares are open to a common header without liquid seals in
between.
Air or oxygen is used in processes connected to the flare system.
The flare flame does not travel back into the flare stack if the efflux velocity of
the flare gas exceeds the flash back velocity. (This still applies even if the flare
gases have been premixed with air upstream of the flare tip).
To achieve this essential condition, the efflux velocity may be increased by the
addition of purge gas, by use of a velocity accelerator or the flash back velocity
may be reduced by the addition of inert gases to the flammable mixture. The best
location for the addition of inert gas is as close to the flare tip as possible
compatible with good mixing of gases before burning at the tip.
Ensure the flare gas heat value is above the minimum allowed (clause 8.11) at
all phases of operation. Otherwise, the pilot and main flames can be
extinguished.
The practicability of using inert gas to reduce the flash back velocity would
further depend upon the availability of a very high integrity source of inert gas
at the site, in sufficient quantity at an economic price.
Velocity accelerators and inert gas addition may be used in combination.
The main advantages of using inert gas is that a properly designed system gives
protection against flash back through air ingress from any source. The major
disadvantage is that at low flare gas flow rates, the gas mixture may become
non-combustible due to the excess inert gas present. Unburned toxic and/or
strong smelling components may escape to atmosphere and possibly cause a
nuisance.
Method of Calculating the Flash Back Velocity:
A method of calculating the flash back velocities for some gases commonly
occurring in flare systems when mixed with nitrogen, carbon dioxide, or both,
has been developed by Van Krevelin and Chermin and reported in the
transactions of the Seventh International Symposium on Combustion, 1959,
pages 358-368.
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This method may be used to calculate the inert gas flow corresponding to the
peak flash back velocity of the gas mixture. An excess inert gas flow of twenty
five percent above the calculated value should provide an ample margin of
safety to compensate for measuring errors and minor flow disturbances.
9. Liquid removal
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2. The unit knockout drum shall comply with primary knockout drum requirements
detailed in clause 9.2.
b. If liquid carry-over from the unit knockout drum to the primary knockout drum is possible,
the flare header design should consider the potential for and mitigation of slug flow.
1. Piping that can be in liquid or multiphase service should be tied into the flare header
using 45 degree tees pointed towards the direction of flow as opposed to 90 degree
tees if practical.
2. Use of 90 degree elbows should be minimized or, if required, should use long radius
elbows that are braced and supported for slug impacts.
3. The weight of liquid that can be in the piping when relieving shall be considered
when specifying the pipe supports.
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temperatures falling below their minimum design temperature, long-term reliability of the
vaporisation facility shall be assured. Otherwise, materials suitable for the low temperature
service shall be used.
e. The design of the knockout drum or receiver shall also meet all of the following criteria:
1. Condensed liquids in the relief or flare header systems shall drain to and collect in the
knockout drum or receiver; therefore relief piping and headers shall always be free
draining towards their associated knockout drum.
2. The split entry configuration of inlet piping to the knockout drum should be avoided
unless uniform flow distribution can be assured. The knockout drum inlet should be
equipped with a diverter plate, internal elbow or baffle to direct liquid away from the
knockout drum outlet. See ISO 23251 or API RP 521 for additional details.
3. If closed drain liquids are sent to a knockout drum, the drum shall be sized to
accommodate both the maximum expected fluid levels from its sloped piping as well
as the maximum liquid possible from the closed drain vessel(s). Due to the potential
knockout drum size increase in this circumstance, routing liquids to a suitably
instrumented and protected alternative, low-pressure vessel should be considered.
4. Because of the potential for blockage from scale or waxy deposits, the use of a
demister pad to limit the size of the drum shall be avoided.
5. The knockout drum shall be provided with automatic hydrocarbon liquid removal
unless otherwise specified by BP. Knockout drum pump(s) designed and installed
shall be capable of emptying the drum from its highest level shutdown to the drum
normal operating level or low level shutdown in a maximum of 2 hours.
Since the liquid in the KO drum may be toxic or flammable, or have toxic or
flammable material dissolved in it, particular care should be taken in the design and
operation of any drain points.
If there is any risk of toxic materials being released, the drain should be routed
to a closed system.
If there is any risk of the materials freezing, a second valve in series is required
as a minimum.
6. If appropriate, separate facilities for water or heavy hydrocarbon removal shall also
be provided; these may be automatic or manual.
a) The disposal route and facilities for these liquids shall be approved by BP.
b) Particular attention should be paid to prevent creation of a hazard due to the
release to atmosphere of flammable or toxic materials from drain points.
7. Instrumentation and control systems for the drum shall be in accordance with
clause 12.6.
8. Adequate winterisation shall be provided for the drum as approved by BP if
necessary.
9. Personnel protection shall be provided if metal temperatures can exceed 65C (150F)
while relieving.
10. Facilities shall be provided for isolation, venting and purging, inspection,
maintenance, and cleaning of the drum. Specific attention shall be given to the
requirements of inspection, maintenance, and cleaning if the associated plants cannot
be shut down and proposed methods shall be submitted for BP approval.
11. Introduction of liquids with a temperature in excess of 93C (200F) into knockout
drums containing water or light liquids shall be avoided to prevent the potential for
steam or vapour explosions.
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b) Maximum oxygen of 4 volume percent for flare gases with a MW greater than 4
but not exceeding 6.
c) Maximum oxygen of 3 volume percent for flare gases with a MW 4.
f. The flare vendor shall specify the minimum purge required to prevent burn-back inside
non-refractory lined flare tips. This flow velocity shall be verified based on the selected
proprietary flare tip or molecular seal design. If the tip is refractory lined, then the purge
rate need be based only on that required to prevent air ingress due to wind effects.
g. When recommissioning an air-filled flare header network, knockout drum, and stack; a
supplemental, high initial purge flow may be required to air-free the entire flare system.
h. BP will specify if it is necessary to maintain the flare alight, even though in such cases the
minimum purge referred to in 10.1.b is very small.
i. For minimum purging, to check if the safe oxygen levels specified in 10.1.c are
maintained, the stack may be equipped with an oxygen monitoring system as described in
12.4; however the reliability of these systems should be considered before installation.
1. For flammable purge gases heavier than air, the minimum purge rate could
theoretically be achieved with very low flow rates. This may result in burning inside
the tip, resulting in higher tip temperatures and shorter tip life, or flame
extinguishment. The required purge rate using a gas mixture heavier than air shall be
calculated using nitrogen parameters in the Husa equation in Annex A.
2. Vendors shall specifically identify their minimum purge rate to avoid internal tip
combustion on the flare data sheet and confirm the Husa calculation using nitrogen
eliminates burning inside the tip or flame extinguishment. If not, alternatives such as
additional tip cooling or upgraded flare tip metallurgy should be considered.
The use of increased purge gas versus alternative tip cooling or metallurgy must be
evaluated against local and national regulations as well as total life cycle costs
considering the increased purge gas rates.
j. Emergency purge gas shall be provided to the flare system, if appropriate, to prevent the
formation of a vacuum in the flare header or stack due to vapour condensing or gas
contraction as the system cools following a release or due to cooling of uninsulated metal
pipework during a rainstorm.
1. This purge gas supply does not need to be continuous, but rather should be
automatically initiated and controlled by pressure, temperature, or a combination of
both. A calculation methodology is described in GN 44-002.
2. Alternatively, a liquid seal drum may be used (see clause 10.2).
With a liquid seal, the relief disposal piping system upstream of the seal is subject to
vacuum conditions when a hot relief flow stops and cools. This is not necessarily a
dangerous condition, provided that:
The equipment is designed for the maximum vacuum conditions that can occur.
No unintended flows are initiated because of increased pressure differential.
k. Purge gas connections shall be provided in every disposal system at the header extremities,
depending on final facility layout. These connections are required to ensure the system is
air-free before introduction of hydrocarbon.
l. The continuous purge gas used during normal operation can be tied into either near the
knockout drum and/or at the flare header extremities. Generally, continuous purge gas is
introduced near the knockout drum as it is the closest to the primary source of air ingress
(i.e., the flare tip).
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seen at the flare as flame pulses and can cause noise complaints of a rumbling type
noise. These make the flare more noticeable and defeat any attempt at maintaining a
controlled steam flow to keep the flare smokeless. A more effective system is based
on separate dip-legs of different sizes, sometimes with side slots (see ISO 23251 or
API RP 521), so that each release route allows a progressively larger flow without
any noticeable pulsation. To provide enough circumference for placement of
serrations and reduce the gas velocity the dip pipe diameter may have to be
increased. The diameter of the baffle sheath should be 1,8 to 2,0 times the diameter
of the dip leg, with 13 mm (0,5 in) diameter holes on 75 mm (3 in) diagonal centres.
The dip-leg should be surrounded by an anti-splashing perforated baffle sheath.
b. The maximum depth to which the inlet pipe may be submerged shall be based on the
maximum exit back pressure allowable in the relief or flare header.
c. To prevent surges of gas flow to the flare, the free area for the gas flow above the liquid
should equal at least 3 times the inlet pipe cross-section area.
d. Details of the dip leg design shall be submitted for BP approval. The design shall be
capable of flowing all quantities from maximum emergency flow down to 1/3 000th of that
flow without causing flow pulsations that cause nuisance.
The flow range of maximum to 1/3 000th may be too small a range. Recent designs
have shown a need to provide pulse free flaring from about 300 000 kg/hr
(660 000 lb/hr) (for the maximum emergency case) to about 100 kg/hr (220 lb/hr)
(for the normal leakage case).
e. A minimum pressure of 3,5 barg (50 psig) shall be used for the design of the seal drum.
f. Equipment shall be provided to maintain the design seal level. Make-up lines shall be sized
to replace the seal within 10 minutes. The design of the seal system shall provide for:
1. Prevention of hydrocarbon build up,
2. Prevention of displacement of seal liquid,
3. Maintaining the correct seal liquid level, over the operating pressure range.
4. Continuous purging of seal water shall be considered to prevent build up of H2S and
CO2.
g. The flare header shall slope from the top of the vacuum leg back to the off-site knockout
drum.
h. If water is used for the seal, the design of the disposal system for excess water shall take
into account the likely contamination with relieved materials, e.g. H2S. Alternatively, a
recirculation system may be provided with capacity to allow for make-up and for checking
the liquid inventory. This latter option should be provided for seal systems containing anti-
freeze.
i. If make-up requirements are not significant (i.e. static liquid seals), antifreeze systems may
be used. In this case, the requirements of 10.2.3.h may be under manual control.
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The labyrinth type, also referred to as an inverted gas seal is known under the trade
name of John Zink Molecular seal, or Flaregas 'Flarex', etc. The flow restriction
type, exemplified by National Airoil's Fluidic Seal, consists of a flow restriction in
the form of a series of stepped cone sections of changing diameter, the purpose of
which is to reflect back the atmospheric ingress turbulence. Though called seals,
neither stop the reverse flow completely, only reduce it. They are both installed
immediately below the flare tip. However, when the volumetric condensation or
cooling rate of vapour in the relief system exceeds the purge rate plus the incoming
gas volume, air entry can no longer be precluded and a risk of an explosion exists.
In the labyrinth type of seal when using purge gas lighter-than air, the buoyancy of
the purge gas creates a zone of greater-than- atmospheric pressure at the top of the
seal, which prevents air from entering the flare stack. Purge gas heavier-than-air
'floods' the seal, and the labyrinth prevents atmospheric ingress.
Due to the ingress of rain water and the possibility of condensation, labyrinth gas
seals require drains. These can block with ice or carbon, or with refractory, if any,
dislodged from the flare tip, and therefore such seals are not recommended.
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11.1. Routing
a. A flare line should be routed to avoid areas of high fire risk or otherwise hazardous areas,
e.g. other process plants. If this is not practicable, the routing and fire protection of the line
supports shall be proposed for BP approval.
b. The route should avoid areas of high fire risk, whether in the unit of origin or in another
unit.
An incident is known in which, during a process unit fire, a neighbouring unit had to
be shutdown for safety reasons. This involved dumping to the flare through a flare
line passing through the unit on fire. The line was damaged by the fire and fed it
with additional material.
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g. If several units are connected to one flare system, isolating block valves with flushing
connections, unless otherwise specified by BP, shall be provided in sub-headers at the unit
battery limits.
1. Rising stem gate valves are preferred.
2. Butterfly valves shall not be used because of uncertainty in failure position (i.e., may
stick closed or fail in a closed position).
3. Isolating block valves shall be provided with: position indicators, locking devices (car
seals or chain locks for example) which can be locked open and spectacle blinds
upstream.
Large spade or spacer blinds can be difficult to identify externally in a congested
process plant and may require additional operational controls.
4. Gate valves shall be installed in a horizontal position so that the gates cannot fall into
the closed position should they become detached from the stem.
h. A valved, blanked, drain branch shall be provided upstream of the block valve to facilitate
the draining and purging of the isolated branch.
i. Purge gas connections, including vents and drains, shall be provided to enable all parts of
the relief system to be purged and steamed out. These shall be connected to the fuel gas
system or nitrogen supply as specified by BP. See GP 44-70.
j. If headers of different materials of construction are connected together, in view of possible
backflow, the higher quality material shall be used for at least 10 m (33 ft) upstream of the
change in the process conditions.
k. Pipe stressing and anchor and support design shall allow for thermal expansion or
contraction, two-phase flow, slugs of liquid, acoustic fatigue due to high velocity flow, ice
formation or auto refrigeration cooling in cold service, and fire protection, if any. In order
to avoid expensive over design, the flare header mechanical design should be based on a
realistic evaluation of the maximum temperatures and durations of each relief situation,
and not simply the maximum specified relief temperatures.
l. Consideration shall be given to the need for hydrotesting after construction. If it is
required, all components, particularly foundations and supports, shall be designed for this
condition.
m. Relief devices and header material of construction selection shall consider potential
corrosive materials and other materials that can cause degradation (e.g., H2S) that may be
vented into the flare network and migrate back into interconnected piping.
Refer to GP 22-20 for details on flare controls, pilot flame detection and instrumentation design,
selection, operation, and maintenance issues.
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12.2. Burn-back
Burn-back detection is not normally required. Either refractory lining or burn-back prevention
methods (i.e. adequate purging) should be used. If burn-back in the tip can occur, burn-back
detection shall be provided by one or more thermocouples in thermopockets whose location
inside the flare tip shall be subject to approval by BP. The thermocouples shall be wired to
control room alarms through a temperature switch adjustable for a temperature range
appropriate for the tip.
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13. Testing
14. Spares
a. Spares lists shall be compiled by the flare vendor and submitted for BP approval. They
should consider the following as a minimum:
1. Replacement for all the gaskets for the joints that have to be broken during
construction or after testing.
2. One set of spares to cover the first overhaul.
3. One complete pilot burner.
4. One complete set of spare thermocouples.
5. One of each type of the equipment forming part of the ignition panel.
6. One set of spares for the smoke-suppressant apportioning instrumentation.
If purge is at the minimum rate and only sufficient to prevent air ingress at the tip,
burning in the tip and higher metal temperature may result. This shortens the tip
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life, but may produce significant energy saving, usually greater than the cost of
replacing a tip.
b. The above spare components should be evaluated on economic grounds, including an
allowance for change-out time.
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b) No credit shall be allowed for pump out systems in determining the residence
time.
2. Have a continuous level indication and high level alarm with an independent high
level trip. The reliability (SIL level) of the high level trip function shall be determined
per GP 30-76.
a) There shall be a procedure in place for operator response to prevent overfilling
under all foreseeable conditions, including start-up, shutdown and other non-
routine operations.
b) Design of level instrumentation should include functionality for ease of on-line
maintenance and may therefore require redundancy.
3. Be designed to knock out liquid droplets such that any remaining droplets act as
vapour (i.e., maximum of 20 micron (0,000 8 in) liquid particle size).
4. Not be used for temporary storage of liquids generated from maintenance or other
activities.
e. Inlet and outlet piping shall be designed to provide adequate vapour-liquid disengagement.
In most piping configurations this would require installation of internal diverter plates,
elbows, or other deflecting devices which shall be properly maintained.
f. An appropriate and reliable continuous inert purge gas shall be in place at a rate
determined by the Husa correlation to prevent air intrusion. Steam is not an effective purge
for prevention of air infiltration because it can condense.
g. Consideration shall be given to potential ignition of vapours from the vent stack.
1. Methods to extinguish the flame shall be determined.
2. Thermal radiation and possible impacts on nearby areas where personnel and
equipment can be located shall be evaluated.
h. Liquid in the blowdown system shall be cooled to less than its flash point, but in no case
greater than 65C (150F) before discharge to any open system such as an oily water
sewer.
1. If water is used as the quench medium, it should not directly contact liquid that is
> 93C (200F) to prevent steam explosion events that can lead to overpressure of
the vessel and/or entrainment/discharge of hydrocarbon liquid to the environment.
2. Quench designs should take into account the need for good contact between the
quench stream and the hot vapours being cooled/condensed (internals, such as baffles,
may accomplish this).
i. If quench systems are used, possible consequences from failure of the quench medium,
resulting in release of excessive vapours to atmosphere and/or hot liquids to the sewer,
shall be considered.
j. Flame arresters in vent stacks (not a clean service) are prohibited because of plugging
potential.
In general, process systems connected to a vent stack are susceptible to
overpressure of only a few pounds and may be very susceptible to vacuum
conditions. Normal design is to provide an adequate purge rate to prevent
flashback into the vent system. Whenever flame arresters are used, they must
comply with clause 10.4.
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provided it can be demonstrated that the closed sewer system can adequately handle the
materials (and the above restrictions on temperature and flash point are met). Systems should
have provisions to automatically start/stop the pumps via level control. Gooseneck seal depth
should take into account the maximum stack back-pressure at blowdown conditions.
Winterisation protection should be provided if the gooseneck contents can freeze at minimum
ambient temperatures.
16.1. General
a. Vents shall be provided to safely dispose of hydrocarbon vapours from equipment into one
of the following closed systems:
1. Process gas line (either fuel gas or wet gas).
2. Vapour recovery system.
3. Flare system. Tie-in of a vent to the flare system shall consider the impact of higher
flare header pressures under upset conditions on upstream vent process vessel
pressures.
4. Incinerator/thermo oxidizer.
5. Sump vent stack.
6. Combustion chambers.
b. Vents from process systems handling streams containing greater than 10 ppmw benzene on
an annual average may need to be controlled by a device such as carbon canister or an
incinerator.
c. Emergency vent to atmosphere may be used if it meets applicable country, state, and local
regulations.
d. If venting directly to atmosphere, all criteria in clause 6.4 shall be met.
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a. Flare gas recovery should be evaluated on a project specific basis. These systems collect
and recover low pressure gases from the flare header system, maximising product recovery
and minimising flaring environmental impact. Further process design aspects when using
flare gas recovery can be found in ISO 23251 or API RP 521.
Flare gas recovery issues are closely related to BPs HSSE policy that specifies No
accidents, no harm to people, and no damage to the environment. The eventual use
of flare gas recovery may have effects on all three principles of this policy.
b. Basic issues associated with decisions to use or not use a flare gas recovery system should
include:
1. Technical Feasibility: On a case by case basis, is the goal to recover part or all vent
gases technically feasible? If not, alternative technical solutions should be considered,
such as reduced leakage in pressure reducing valves, balancing fuel gas systems, and
use of inert gas blanketing instead of fuel gas.
2. Impact on Safety: Would implementation of flare gas recovery potentially have a
significant negative impact on safety? If yes, the recovery system shall not be used.
3. Good Engineering Practice: Some topics in a good engineering practice review should
include:
a) Can process design improvements, operational practices, and/or process controls
reduce the volumes of flare/vent gases?
b) Can users be found for recovered low pressure gas?
c) Can recovered low pressure gas be transferred to another facility for
consumption or recovery?
d) Can eductor compression technology be provided using high pressure gas to
compress low pressure gas (may be applicable in oil/gas production facilities)?
e) Can compressor(s) be used for compression regarding utilities, space, and
weight limitations?
f) Variability of flow and value of available volumes for recovery versus cost of
system?
g) Purity of gas and is a gas cleanup system required?
4. Environmental Cost Factors: What effects would eventual use of the flare gas
recovery system have on capital, operational, and maintenance costs? Justification for
use of the recovery system shall include costs for each category.
5. Reputation Issues: Even though reputation issues cannot readily be quantified, they
should be considered in the evaluation process. Reputation issues include: public and
government interest, along with any third party impact. The effects of flare visual
impacts, noise impacts at sensitive times (evenings, nights), odour nuisance of flare
plume, etc. are some issues that need to be considered in this group.
c. The following are some examples related to flaring reduction/elimination:
1. Eliminate routine flaring/venting (e.g., eliminate source as first option) or use flare
gas/vent gas recovery system and use recovered gas for internal use, export, or re-
injection.
2. Consider options to prevent the occurrence of non routine and emergency
flaring/venting (e.g., use of high integrity blowdown compressors). The safety
implications for any project utilizing this option shall be evaluated.
3. Recapture fugitive gases associated with loading/unloading facilities.
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Annex A
(Normative)
H.W. Husas correction formulae
The Husa correlation shall be used to calculate minimum purge gas flow rates for gases lighter than
air. If the purge gas mixture is heavier than air, a purge rate based on nitrogen shall be used. The Husa
correlation may be expressed either as:
1 20,9 n 0,65
Q 0,07068D 3, 46 ln Ci K i
y O2 i
where:
Q = purge gas rate, SCFH
D = flare stack diameter, in
y = column depth at which the oxygen concentration (O2) is to be predicted, ft
O2 = oxygen concentration, volume percent
Ci = Volume fraction of component i
Ki = Constant for component i. Typical values for Ki are:
Hydrogen: K = +5,783
Helium: K = +5,078
Methane: K = +2,328
Nitrogen: K = +1,067 (No wind)
Nitrogen: K = +1,707 (Wind 15 to 20 MPH or 6,7 to 8,9 m/s)
Ethane: K = 1,067
Propane: K = 2,651
CO2: K = 2,651
C4+: K = 6,586
Note that steam or other condensable is not a suitable purge gas.
In metric units:
1 20,9 n 0,65
Q 201,66 D 3.46
ln Ci K i
y O2 i
where:
Q = purge gas rate, m3/hr
D = flare stack diameter, m
y = column depth at which the oxygen concentration (O2) is to be predicted, m
O2 = oxygen concentration, volume percent
Ci = Volume fraction of component i
Ki = Constant for component i (see above)
These equations can be simplified using the standard criteria of limiting the oxygen concentration to 6
volume % 25 ft (7,62 m) down the flare stack (note that lower oxygen concentrations should be used
for certain compounds such as hydrogen see clause 10.1.c):
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Q = 0,0004044 D3,46 K
where: Q = purge gas rate, SCFH
D = flare stack diameter, in
K = constant (see above)
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Annex B
(Informative)
Flare system training information
BP has a website containing general process background, photos, training material and an assessment
tool on a variety of process areas including Flare Systems. Simply select Module 7 (Flare) in the
following website: http://amposs408/cmas/process_operations/. A pop-up screen will ask for login
information, but no login is required; merely click the topic of interest in the table of contents (left
hand side) to proceed. Note, though some screens will indicate End of Page, click on the Next
button as some material may still continue on that topic.
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Annex C-1
(Normative)
Atmospheric relief chart
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Annex C-2
(Normative)
Blowdown system assessment
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Annex C-3
(Normative)
Relief system studies and documentation
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Bibliography
[1] Van Krevelin and Chermin and reported in the transactions of the Seventh International Symposium
on Combustion, 1959
[3] Flow of Fluids Though Valves, Fittings and Pipe; Crane Technical Paper No. 410
[4] Internal Flow Systems edited by D.S. Miller - BHRA Fluid Engineering, published by Gulf Publishing
or VDI Waermeatlas
[6] Safety Guidance Note No. 90/2: The use of Halons in Firefighting (Feb 1990), published by Group
Safety Centre (now Corporate Safety Services)
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