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h. No excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment Sec. 19, Par.
(1), Article III, Constitution
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
Perpetua.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the
Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the
military law of the United States over United States personnel in the
Philippines.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of
the United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not
under the laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an
offense relating to security means:
(1) treason;
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction
over all offenses committed by United States personnel, except in cases
provided for in paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the military law of the
United States in relation to:
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or
offenses solely against the property or person of United States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official
duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other
government to waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular
case.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense
charged by authorities of the Philippines against United States personnel arises
out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the
commander will issue a certificate setting forth such determination. This
certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines
and will constitute sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the
purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this article. In those cases where the
Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a
review of the duty certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine
authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels
may also present any information bearing on its validity. United States military
authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position. Where appropriate,
United States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action against
offenders in official duty cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of
the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it
shall notify the authorities of the other government as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each
other of the disposition of all cases in which both the authorities of the
Philippines and the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines
and the United States shall assist each other in the arrest of United States
personnel in the Philippines and in handing them over to authorities who are to
exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to
exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military
authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until
completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall,
upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make
such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or
judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been
charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its
position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the United
States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial
proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall be
relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not
include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not include
any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United
States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange
for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine
authorities shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary
investigations into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance
of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including seizure
and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the
provisions of this article and have been acquitted or have been convicted and
are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted
or suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the
same offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall
prevent United States military authorities from trying United States personnel
for any violation of rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which
constituted an offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such
witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the
same basis as nationals of the Philippines;
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of
ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine
military or religious courts.
2. Prescribe Punishment
It provides the punishment or penalties for the crime committed
Contention of the state: judgment of conviction against the petitioner had long
attained finality and could no longer be modified.
Held
SC administrative circular 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence Article 22 of
RPC is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as to
the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
a. Retribution
- Exact justice for the victims family, intended to punish bad conduct in the
past. Penalty should communicate with the act.
b. Prevention
i. Deterrence
Specific- exist to affect behavior of individual
General- relies on cost benefit analysis to stop people from committing
crimes. Most effective in deterring well planned crimes. It includes
evaluation of social stigma and it requires the public to be educated
ii. Incapacitation - cannot stop individual in committing crimes
iii. Rehabilitation - it modifies the undesirable behavior of an individual
Contention of the state: the city atty. Of Zamboanga filed his answer to the
motion to dismiss contending that the law which was violated by the accused
that carries with it both civil and criminal liability the latter being covered by
section 5 which provide for the penalty for all willful violations of any of the
provisions of the minimum wage law.
Contention of the accused: the accused pleaded guilty. His counsel filed a
written motion to dismiss based on two grounds; that the violation charged
does not constitute a crime offense but carries only civil liability and even if it
does this section because of the alleged to have been violated does not carry
any penalty penalizing it.
Held:
According to the court of first instance of Zamboanga , sustained the view
that section 5 is not applicable to violations of section 3 of the minimum wage
law. We have the well settled principle in the interpretation of penal laws that in
case of doubt, he interpretation available to the accused is adopted.
The victim was abducted by the appellant, who brought her to his house. When they
arrived at
the appellants house the victim was divested of her jewelry and other valuables,
after which she
was raped several times. The appellant was convicted of the special complex crime
of robbery
with homicide. Whether multiple rape can be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
HELD:
No. In several cases the Court realized that there was no law providing for the
additional rape/s
or homicide/s for that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It
further observed
that the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised
Penal Code is
exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the mitigating
circumstances
where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies with the
legislature.
Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s
or homicide/s
may be considered aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law in favor of
the offender
as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the
statute. Under
this view, the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered an
aggravating
circumstance. Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "(i)n all
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof x x x x 2. (w)hen there are neither
mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty
shall be
applied," the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accused-
appellant.
Facts: On 7 June 1977, Eleno Maquiling was shot while at the yard
of their house. Esmenia, the victims mother, and Dionisio, the
victims brother, saw Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio running
down the hill away from the bamboo groves. The lower court decided
that the accused are guilty of murder, imposing upon each them the
capital penalty of death, damages and costs.
Issue: WON there was a conspiracy between the accused in killing
Maquiling.
Held: Yes. Judgment AFFIRMED. But under the 1987 Constitution, in
view of the abolition of capital punishment, the applicable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. The evidence of the prosecution is more than
adequate to sustain the finding of conspiracy between the two
accused. It does not matter that the prosecution has failed to show
who was between the two who actually pulled the trigger that
consequently killed the child. They are liable as co-conspirators since
any act of a co-conspirator become the act of the other regardless of
the precise degree of participation in the act.
Also, there was presence of treachery, because of the
circumstances that the crime was done at night time and that the
accused hid themselves among the bamboo. Evident premeditation is
also an aggravating circumstance (the accused had planned to kill the victims
some days before).
Go vs. Dimagiba, 460 SCRA 451
Facts: The pertinent facts are not disputed. Respondent Fernando Dimagiba
issued to petitioner Susan Go 13 checks which, when presented to the drawee
bank for encashment or payment on the due dates were dishonoured for the
reason account closed. Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts
of violation of BP 22 under separate complaints filed with the Municipal Trial
Courts in the cities in Baguio City.
Ruling: Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an
order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and
requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. However, the
civil aspect of the decision of the MTC was not touched upon. A subsequent
order, explaining in greater detail the basis of the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus was issued on October 11, 2001.
3. Equipoise Doctrine
People vs. Dindo, 349 SCRA 492
Facts: On July 26, 1996, the accused, with 3 unknown persons, shot Crestita
Lao which caused the death of the latter.
Ruling: In the absence of any evidence that accused-appellant conspired with
the assailants, conspiracy cannot be attributed against him for, in criminal
cases, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case with the
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind, with
evidence which stands or falss on its merits, and which cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Unless it
discharges the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt , the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf. Thus, when the
guilt of the accused has not been proven with the moral certainty, such as the
case at bar, it is the policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence
of the accused must be favored and his exoneration be granted as a matter of
right.
Held
Plunder is a malum in se because it is a heinous offense. For
when the acts are inherently immoral or wrong, they are mala in se and
it does not matter that such acts are punished under special laws
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mala in
se.
3. Republic Act 75
AN ACT TO PENALIZE ACTS WHICH WOULD IMPAIR THE PROPER
OBSERVANCE BY THE REPUBLIC AND INHABITANTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
OF THE IMMUNITIES, RIGHT, AND PRIVILEGES OF DULY ACCREDITED
FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Section 1. Any person who shall falsely assume and take upon himself to act as a
diplomatic, consular, or any other official of a foreign government duly accredited
as such to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines with intent to defraud
such foreign government or the Government of the Philippines, or any person, or in
such pretended character shall demand or obtain, or attempt to obtain from person
or from said foreign government or the Government of the Philippines, or from any
officer thereof, any money, paper, document, or other thing, of value, shall be fined
not more than five thousand pesos, or shall be imprisoned for not more than five
years, or both, in addition to the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised
Penal Code.
Section 2. Any person, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attach, who
shall act in the Republic of the Philippines as an agent of a foreign government
without prior notification to, and registration with, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
shall be fined not more than five thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both, aside from other penalties that may be imposed by law.
Section 3. Any person, who with intent to deceive or mislead, within the jurisdiction
of the Republic, wear any naval, military, police, or other official uniform,
decoration, or regalia of any foreign State, nation or government with which the
Republic of the Philippines is at peace, or any uniform, decoration or regalia so
nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive, unless such wearing
thereof be authorized by such State, nation, or government, shall upon conviction,
be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.1awphil-itc-alf
Section 4. Any writ or process sued out or prosecuted by any person in any court of
the Republic of the Philippines, or by any judge or justice, whereby the person of
any ambassador or public minister of any foreign State, authorized and received as
such by the President, or any domestic or domestic servant of any such
ambassador or minister is arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are
distrained, seized, or attached, shall be deemed void, and every person by whom
the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every
officer concerned in executing it, shall upon conviction, be punished by
imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine of not exceeding two
hundred pesos in the discretion of the court.
Section 5. The provisions of section four hereof shall not apply to any case where
the person against whom the process is issued is a citizen or inhabitant of the
Republic of the Philippines, in the service of an ambassador or a public minister,
and the process is founded upon a debt contracted before he entered upon such
service; nor shall the said section apply to any case where the person against
whom the process is issued is a domestic servant of an ambassador or a public
minister, unless the name of the servant has, before the issuing thereof, been
registered in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and transmitted by the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs to the Chief of Police of the City of Manila, who shall upon receipt
thereof post the same in some public place in his office. All persons shall have
resort to the list of names so posted in the office of the Chief of Police, and take
copies without fee.
Section 6. Any person who assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons or in any other
manner offers violence to the person of an ambassador or a public minister, in
violation of the law of nations, shall be imprisoned not more than three years, and
fined not exceeding two hundred pesos, in the discretion of the court, in addition to
the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code.
Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall be applicable only in case where the
country of the diplomatic or consular representative adversely affected has
provided for similar protection to duly accredited diplomatic or consular
representatives of the Republic of the Philippines by prescribing like or similar
penalties for like or similar offenses herein contained.
Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
4. Article V, VFA
Criminal Jurisdiction
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with
respect to offenses committed within the Philippines and punishable under the law
of the Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the
Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the
military law of the United States over United States personnel in the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the
Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of
the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the
United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under the
laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense
relating to security means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules
shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all
offenses committed by United States personnel, except in cases provided for in
paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the military law of the United
States in relation to:
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses
solely against the property or person of United States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other
government to waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to
maintain good order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will,
upon request by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction
except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the Government of
the Philippines determines that the case is of particular importance, it shall
communicate such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20)
days after the Philippine authorities receive the United States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense
charged by authorities of the Philippines against United States personnel arises out
of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the commander will
issue a certificate setting forth such determination. This certificate will be
transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute
sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2)
of this article. In those cases where the Government of the Philippines believes the
circumstances of the case require a review of the duty certificate, United States
military authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine
authorities at the highest levels may also present any information bearing on its
validity. United States military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine
position. Where appropriate, United States military authorities will take disciplinary
or other action against offenders in official duty cases, and notify the Government
of the Philippines of the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall
notify the authorities of the other government as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other
of the disposition of all cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and
the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and
the United States shall assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in
the Philippines and in handing them over to authorities who are to exercise
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to
exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military authorities,
if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the
Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those
authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the
offense with which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the
Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government
regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account.
In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the
United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one
year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period
will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed
because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities
to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities
shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into
offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in
the collection and production of evidence, including seizure and, in proper cases,
the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the
provisions of this article and have been acquitted or have been convicted and are
serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or
suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same
offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United
States military authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of
rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which constituted an offense for
which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted
by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards
established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States personnel
shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such
witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same
basis as nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of
ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military
or religious courts.
Issues:
1.WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI.
2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of
war is not an offence under the penal code?
3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal code, WON the military character
sustained by the person charged with the offence at the time of its commission
exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals?
Held
Judgment thereby affirmed An offense charged against a military officer in
consequence of an act done in obedience to an order is clearly shown on the face,
where such offense is against the military law, is not within the jurisdiction of the
courts of the Civil Government. Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission,
the CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty more
than 6 months imprisonment or a fine greater than $100may be imposed.
Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the
Penal Code within their territorial limits, regardless of the military character of the
accused. The defendant and his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI because
he failed to prove that he was indeed acting in the line of duty. Yes. Though assault
by military officer against a POW isnt in the RPC, physical assault charges may be
pressed under the RPC. No. The application of the general principle that the
jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character brought before them for trial (R.A. No. 7055).Appellant claims that the act
was service connected. If this were true, it may be used as a defense but this
cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction of the case.
Issues:
1.WONthe US SC has Original Jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
consuls, et. Al and such jurisdiction excludes courts of the Philippines.
2.WON original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al. is
conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines
Held
Has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and the petition for a writ of prohibition must be
denied. First of all, a consul is not entitled to the privilege of diplomatic immunity. A
consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the
country where here sides. The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on
November 15, 1935 caused the Philippine Constitution to go into full force and
effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. It also provides that the
original jurisdiction of this court shall include all cases affecting ambassadors,
consuls et.al. The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdictions
may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution. According to Section 17 of Act Number
136 and by virtue of it, jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus was also conferred on the CFIs. As a
result, the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of
the Philippines at the time the Constitution was adopted was not exclusive of, but
concurrent with, that of the CFIs. The original jurisdiction conferred to SC by the
Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction.
7. Liang vs. People (232 SCRA 652)
Facts
Petitioner is an economist for ADB who was charged by the Metropolitan TC of
Mandaluyong City for allegedly uttering defamatory words against her fellow
worker w/ 2 counts of grave oral defamation. MTC judge then received an office of
protocol from the Department of Foreign Affairs, stating that petitioner is covered
by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the agreement between ADB
and the government. MTC judge, without notice, dismissed the two criminal cases.
Prosecution filed writ of mandamus & certiorari and ordered the MTC to enforce
the warrant of arrest.
Issues: WON the petitioner is covered by immunity under the agreement and that
no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
Held
He is not covered by immunity because the commission of a crime is part of the
performance of official duty. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from the DFA that a certain person is covered by immunity. That a
person is covered by immunity is preliminary. Due process is right of the accused
as much as the prosecution. Slandering a person is not covered by the agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime such as defamation in
the name of official duty. Under Vienna convention on Diplomatic Relations,
commission of a crime is not part of official duty. On the contention that there was
no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary
investigation isnt a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MTC such as the one
at bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only
when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear than no
preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within in the jurisdiction of the
MTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation doesnt affect the courts
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.
2. Article 4, New Civil Code - Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.
Facts
Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion
perpetual for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson
and kidnapping (along with Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the
first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955.
The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan.12,
1954. Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by
virtue of their convictions. They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v.
Hernandez which negated such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed
down until after their convictions have become final. In People v. Hernandez, the
SC ruled that the information against the accused for rebellion complexed with
murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after their
conviction shave become final. Since Hernandez served more than the maximum
penalty that could have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and
thus, his continued detention is illegal.
Issue: WON Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment are proactive effect
is applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions favorable to the
accused/convicted for the same crime can be applied retroactively.
Held
Yes. Judicial decisions favorable to the accused must be applied retroactively.
Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who is not a habitual criminal.
CC also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution
forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to
equal protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same
offense as they have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the
only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable
decision.
Issues:
1.WON it violates three rights? No. Its set up to prevent prostitution of electoral
process and equal protection of laws.2.WON it is an ex post facto law? No. Ex post
facto law defined: a. makes criminal an act done before law was passed and
punishes act innocent when done. b. aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it
was c. inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when committed alters
legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different tests e.
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of right which when done was lawful f. deprives a person accused of a
crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction of acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty.
Held
Petition denied. Constitutional act, Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal
laws. Penalty in law imposed to acts committed after approval of law.
Issues
1. WON the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect in1997: crime occurred in
1994) is applicable. No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an
unlicensed firearm was still not an aggravating circumstance in murder to
homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase his penalty from reclusion perpetual
to death. Hence, RA 8294cannot retroact as it is unfavorable to the accused, lest it
becomes an ex post facto law.
2.WON RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple illegal possession of firearms
and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years. Yes. In
cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of
firearms under PD 1866. It is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance,
no longer as a separate offence. According to theA22 of RPC, retroactivity of the
law must be applied if it is favorable to the accused. Thus, insofar as it spares
accused-appellant a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms, RA 8294
has to be given retroactive application.
3.WON trial court erred in convicting accused of murder. No. For self-defense to
prosper, unlawful aggression, proportionality of methods to fend said aggression,
and lack of sufficient provocation from defender must be proven. In this case,
defendant failed to prove unlawful aggression. The statement that the victim
approached him with a bolo was inconsistent to the witness statement of the victim
being in a prone position in the table. This does not constitute the requisite
quantum of proof for unlawful aggression. With the first requirement missing, the
last two requisites have no basis.
4.WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for murder which wasnt
proven & that the alleged murder committed by the appellant, the appropriate
penalty for the offense is reclusion perpetual due to the absence of an aggravating
circumstance.Yes. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances to a
crime of murder as described by A248 RPC, a lesser penalty of reclusion Perpetua
has to be imposed in according to A63(2) RPC.
3. Article V, VFA
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with
respect to offenses committed within the Philippines and punishable under the law
of the Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the
Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the
military law of the United States over United States personnel in the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the
Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of
the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the
United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under the
laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense
relating to security means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules
shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all
offenses committed by United States personnel, except in cases provided for in
paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the military law of the United
States in relation to:
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses
solely against the property or person of United States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other
government to waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to
maintain good order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will,
upon request by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction
except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the Government of
the Philippines determines that the case is of particular importance, it shall
communicate such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20)
days after the Philippine authorities receive the United States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense
charged by authorities of the Philippines against United States personnel arises out
of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the commander will
issue a certificate setting forth such determination. This certificate will be
transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute
sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2)
of this article. In those cases where the Government of the Philippines believes the
circumstances of the case require a review of the duty certificate, United States
military authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine
authorities at the highest levels may also present any information bearing on its
validity. United States military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine
position. Where appropriate, United States military authorities will take disciplinary
or other action against offenders in official duty cases, and notify the Government
of the Philippines of the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall
notify the authorities of the other government as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other
of the disposition of all cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and
the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and
the United States shall assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in
the Philippines and in handing them over to authorities who are to exercise
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to
exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military authorities,
if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the
Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those
authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the
offense with which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the
Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government
regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account.
In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the
United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one
year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period
will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed
because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities
to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities
shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into
offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in
the collection and production of evidence, including seizure and, in proper cases,
the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the
provisions of this article and have been acquitted or have been convicted and are
serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or
suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same
offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United
States military authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of
rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which constituted an offense for
which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted
by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards
established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States personnel
shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such
witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same
basis as nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;
Issue: WON the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands has
been proven?
Held
Yes. It is the onus of the government to prove that the vessel from which the drug
discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on
board. In this case, it is to be noted that 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, Any person
who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands Import and bring should be construed as synonymous terms. The mere
act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of
importation. The importation is not the making entry of goods at the customhouse,
but merely the bringing them into the port, and the importation is complete before
the entry to the customhouse. Moreover, possession for personal use is unlikely,
judging from the size of the amount brought.
Issue: WON Philippines has jurisdiction over Merchant ships in its territory?
Held
Yes; smoking within territory allows substance to produce pernicious effects, which
is against public order. It is also an act of defiance of authority.
Issue: Was Look Chaw accountable, as he didnt bring down the opium from the
ship and did not intend to sell within Philippines
Held: Yes; investigation showed that he did sell to a secret service agent while in
the port.
Issues:
1. WON the offense has been committed within a US base thus giving the
US jurisdiction over the case. No. The Port of Manila Area where the
offense was committed is not w/in a US base for it is not names in Annex A
or B of AXXVI of the Military Base Agreement (MBA) & is merely part of
the temporary quarters located w/in presented limits of the city of Manila.
Moreover, extended installations & temporary quarters arent considered
to have the same jurisdictional capacity as permanent bases & are
governed by AXIII pars. 2 & 4. The offence at bar, therefore is in the
beyond the jurisdiction of military courts.
2. WON the offender is a member of the US armed forces. No. Under the
MBA, a civilian employee is not considered as a member of the US armed
forces. Even under the articles of war, the mere fact that a civilian
employee is in the service of the US Army does not make him a member
of the armed forces.
8. Extraterritorial Application
a. Article 2, RPC
Extraterritorial application of the Revised Penal Code on crime committed on
board Philippine ship or airship refers only to a situation where the Philippine
ship or airship is not within the territorial waters or atmosphere of a foreign
country. Otherwise, it is the foreign countrys criminal law that will apply.
However, there are two situations where the foreign country may not apply its
criminal law even if a crime was committed on board a vessel within its
territorial waters and these are:
(2) When the foreign country in whose territorial waters the crime was
committed adopts the French Rule, which applies only to merchant vessels,
except when the crime committed affects the national security or public order of
such foreign country.
1. Prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not to exceed
P10,000 pesos, if the counterfeited coin be silver coin of the Philippines or coin
of the Central Bank of the Philippines of ten centavo denomination or above.
2. Prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not to
exceed P2,000 pesos, if the counterfeited coins be any of the minor coinage of
the Philippines or of the Central Bank of the Philippines below ten-centavo
denomination.
3. Prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P1,000
pesos, if the counterfeited coin be currency of a foreign country.
Art. 166.Forging treasury or bank notes on other documents payable to bearer;
importing, and uttering such false or forged notes and documents. The
forging or falsification of treasury or bank notes or certificates or other
obligations and securities payable to bearer and the importation and uttering in
connivance with forgers or importers of such false or forged obligations or
notes, shall be punished as follows:
1. By reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed
P10,000 pesos, if the document which has been falsified, counterfeited, or
altered, is an obligations or security of the United States or of the Philippines
Islands.
2. The word "obligation or security of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands" shall be held to mean all bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national
bank notes, fractional notes, certificates of deposit, bills, checks, or drafts for
money, drawn by or upon authorized officers of the United States or of the
Philippine Islands, and other representatives of value, of whatever
denomination, which have been or may be issued under any act of the
Congress of the United States or of the Philippine Legislature.
3. By prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine not to exceed P5,000
pesos, if the falsified or altered document is a circulating note issued by any
banking association duly authorized by law to issue the same.
4. By prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not to exceed P5,000
pesos, if the falsified or counterfeited document was issued by a foreign
government.
5. By prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P2,000
pesos, when the forged or altered document is a circulating note or bill issued
by a foreign bank duly authorized therefore.
Art. 169. How forgery is committed. The forgery referred to in this section
may be committed by any of the following means:
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument, payable to bearer or
order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true genuine document.
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures,
letters, words or signs contained therein.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall
commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this
article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its
falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
Art. 210. Direct bribery. Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act
constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of this official duties, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer,
personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine [of not less than
the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of the gift in
addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same
shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall
suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act
shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of
prision correccional, in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the
value of such gift.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public
officer refrain from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall
suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine [of
not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of
such gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit
shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable
to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any
other persons performing public duties. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg.
872, June 10, 1985).
Art. 211. Indirect bribery. The penalties of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, and public censure shall be imposed upon any public
officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).
Art. 212. Corruption of public officials. The same penalties imposed upon the
officer corrupted, except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be
imposed upon any person who shall have made the offers or promises or given
the gifts or presents as described in the preceding articles.
Art. 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses. The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any public officer who:
1. In his official capacity, in dealing with any person with regard to furnishing
supplies, the making of contracts, or the adjustment or settlement of accounts
relating to public property or funds, shall enter into an agreement with any
interested party or speculator or make use of any other scheme, to defraud the
Government;
2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts
shall be guilty or any of the following acts or omissions:
Art. 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts. Any public officer,
whether in the service or separated therefrom by resignation or any other
cause, who is required by law or regulation to render account to the Insular
Auditor, or to a provincial auditor and who fails to do so for a period of two
months after such accounts should be rendered, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period, or by a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000
pesos, or both.
Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. Any public officer who shall
apply any public fund or property under his administration to any public use
other than for which such fund or property were appropriated by law or
ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason
of such misapplication, any damages or embarrassment shall have resulted to
the public service. In either case, the offender shall also suffer the penalty of
temporary special disqualification.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty
shall be a fine from 5 to 50 per cent of the sum misapplied.
Art. 221. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property. Any public
officer under obligation to make payment from Government funds in his
possession, who shall fail to make such payment, shall be punished by arresto
mayor and a fine from 5 to 25 per cent of the sum which he failed to pay.
This provision shall apply to any public officer who, being ordered by competent
authority to deliver any property in his custody or under his administration, shall
refuse to make such delivery. The fine shall be graduated in such case by the
value of the thing, provided that it shall not less than 50 pesos.
e. RA 9372
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when
the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Felony
A crime under the Revised Penal Code is referred to as a felony. Do not use this term
in reference to a violation of special law.
Offense
Misdemeanor
Crime
Whether the wrongdoing is punished under the Revised Penal Code or under a special
law, the generic word crime can be used.
The term felony is limited only to violations of the Revised Penal Code. When the
crime is punishable under a special law you do not refer to this as a felony. So
whenever you encounter the term felony, it is to be understood as referring to crimes
under the Revised Penal Code
.
This is important because there are certain provisions in the Revised Penal Code
where the term felony is used, which means that the provision is not extended to
crimes under special laws. A specific instance is found in Article 160 Quasi-
Recidivism, which reads:
A person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment,
before beginning to serve sentence or while serving the same, shall be punished under
the maximum period of the penalty.
Dolo or culpa
However, It does not mean that if an act or omission is punished under the Revised
Penal Code, a felony is already committed. To be considered a felony, it must also be
done with dolo or culpa.
Under Article 3, there is dolo when there is deceit. This is no longer true. At the time
the Revised Penal Code was codified, the term nearest to dolo was deceit. However,
deceit means fraud, and this is not the meaning of dolo.
Dolo is deliberate intent otherwise referred to as criminal intent, and must be coupled
with freedom of action and intelligence on the part of the offender as to the act done by
him.
The term, therefore, has three requisites on the part of the offender:
(3) Intelligence.
Powell vs. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed. 2d. 1254
Facts
Powell was arrested and charged with being found in a state on
intoxication in a public place, in violation of Texas Penal Code, Article 477
which says, Whoever shall get drunk or found in a state of intoxication in any
public place, or at any private house expect his own shall be fined not
exceeding 100USD.
Held
Ruled as a matter of law that chronic alcoholism was not a defense to the
charge. The court found that Powell was guilty and fined him.
b. Omission
In action, the failure to perform a positive duty which one is bound to do.
There must be a law requiring the doing or performance of an act.
Must be punishable by law.
a. Articles 4, 116, 137, 208, 223, 234 and 275 (2), RPC
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Art. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. Any public officer who
shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be
punished:
1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
temporary special disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual
special disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final
judgment to any penalty.ch
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special
disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but
only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or
municipal ordinance.
Art. 232. Disobedience to order of superior officers, when said order was
suspended by inferior officer. Any public officer who, having for any
reason suspended the execution of the orders of his superiors, shall
disobey such superiors after the latter have disapproved the suspension,
shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and perpetual special disqualification.
Held
Mere passive presence at the scene of another crime, mere
silence and failure to give alarm without evidence of agreement or
conspiracy is not punishable. Only omissions in the revised penal code
are punishable.
Contention of the state: the worn statement of a 13 year old Corazon was
true. She knew the accused because they live nearby their place. Besides
the accused-appellants testimonies are indefensible and futile. Moreover
her claimed that she had no suspect in mind during the investigation in their
house although she was in conspiracy with the other.
Held
In these premise, the crime committed by the appellant, that is
murder, qualified by treachery and attended by aggravating circumstances,
the court has no alternative under the law but to impose upon them the
capital penalty. Teresa was found guilty as an accessory to the same
murder by concealing the escape of the principal in the scene, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of 5 years prision
correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum with
accessory penalty of the law.
Mens rea of the crime depends upon the elements of the crime. You can only
detect the mens rea of a crime by knowing the particular crime committed. Without
reference to a particular crime, this term is meaningless. For example, in theft, the
mens rea is the taking of the property of another with intent to gain. In falsification,
the mens rea is the effecting of the forgery with intent to pervert the truth. It is not
merely writing something that is not true; the intent to pervert the truth must follow
the performance of the act.
In criminal law, we sometimes have to consider the crime on the basis of intent.
For example, attempted or frustrated homicide is distinguished from physical
injuries only by the intent to kill. Attempted rape is distinguished from acts of
lasciviousness by the intent to have sexual intercourse. In robbery, the mens rea is
the taking of the property of another coupled with the employment of intimidation or
violence upon persons or things; remove the employment of force or intimidation
and it is not robbery anymore.
i. Elements
Freedom- voluntariness on the part of a person it commit an act or
omission.
Intelligence-the capacity to know and understand the consequence of the
act.
Intent- the purpose to use a particular means to achieve an objective.
ii. General and Specific Intent
i. In criminal law, intent is categorized into two:
General intent is presumed from the mere doing of a wrong act. This does
not require proof. The burden is upon the wrong doer to prove that he
acted without such criminal intent.
On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to tell right from
wrong. It relates to the moral significance that a person ascribes to his act
and relates to the intelligence as an element of dolo, distinct from intent.
Punos wife, his sister in law and his 2nd cousin all testified in
court describing his appearance [bloodshot eyes] and his behavior
immediately before and after them murder, [boxing the dog, having an
imaginary bumble bee flying around him, singing, etc..]
The defense presented 3 doctors to prove insanity but the doctors
instead proved that Puno had acted with discernment when he killed
Aling Kikay.
Dr. Araceli Maravilla of Dr. Jose Reyes Memorial hospital said
Puno was an outpatient who could very well live with society even if he
was afflicted with schizophrenic reaction.
Dr. Reynaldo Robles stated that Puno had schizophrenic reaction
but that this condition was not socially incapacitating. Dr. Carlso
Vicente of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno acted w/
discernment & could distinguish right from wrong.
21 October 1970 Puno was indicted for the murder in the Circuit
Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the information as aggravating
circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and
disregard for sex. Puno was sentenced to death and ordered to pay
P22K to the heirs of the victim
Held
No. Record from Punos stay at the National Mental Hospital
stated that he had been an outpatient for schizophrenia in 1962,
recovered, had a relapse in 1964, improved and in 1966 his sickness
remained UNIMPROVED. Treatment continued in San Lazaro
Compound up to 1970 where he was relieved of symptoms and did not
come back for medication. It cited that he was quiet and as usual
manageable. The report stated that he is presently free from any social
incapacitating psychotic symptoms, but persons suffering from
schizophrenia may retain some of the residual symptoms but it wouldnt
affect their discernment of right and wrong.
The court says: in the light of the strict rule just stated and the
circumstance surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that
Puno was not legally insane when he killed, the victim The court cited
that had he been a homicidal maniac he would have killed Lina and
Hilaria too. The evidence should prove clearly that he was insane at the
time of the commission of the crime.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of
the power to discern, or total deprivation of freedom of wilt. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
Two aggravating circumstances, dwelling and disregard of the
respect due to the age of the victim are offset by the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and the offenders mental illness
(mild schizophrenic reaction) which diminished him of his will power but
did not deprive him of consciousness of his acts.
Held
Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would
have been justified in killing the intruder under A11, par. 1, of the RPC,
which requires, to justify the act, that there be:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed, reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, & lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself If the
intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong,
there would have been unlawful aggression on the part of the intruder.
There would have been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to defend
himself and/or his home. The knife would have been a reasonable
means to prevent or repel such aggression. And Ah Chong gave no
provocation at all. Under A11 of the RPC, there is nothing unlawful in
the intention as well as in the act of the person making the defense.
Thus, he must be acquitted.
Held
Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal, the
accused would not be justified in killing him while the latter was
sleeping. In apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the law
does not permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive from
justice is determined to fight the officers of law who are trying to capture
him that killing him would be justified. Thus, both accused are guilty of
murder
Violations of the Revised Penal Code are referred to as malum in se, which
literally means, that the act is inherently evil or bad or per se wrongful. On
the other hand, violations of special laws are generally referred to as malum
prohibitum.
Note, however, that not all violations of special laws are mala prohibita.
While intentional felonies are always mala in se, it does not follow that
prohibited acts done in violation of special laws are always mala prohibita.
Even if the crime is punished under a special law, if the act punished is one
which is inherently wrong, the same is malum in se, and, therefore, good
faith and the lack of criminal intent is a valid defense; unless it is the
product of criminal negligence or culpa.
Likewise when the special laws requires that the punished act be
committed knowingly and willfully, criminal intent is required to be proved
before criminal liability may arise.
When the act penalized is not inherently wrong, it is wrong only because a
law punishes the same.
Distinction between crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code and
crimes punished under special laws
In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the moral trait of the
offender is considered. This is why liability would only arise when there is
dolo or culpa in the commission of the punishable act.
In crimes punished under special laws, the moral trait of the offender is not
considered; it is enough that the prohibited act was voluntarily done.
In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, good faith or lack of
criminal intent is a valid defense; unless the crime is the result of culpa
In crimes punished under special laws, the act gives rise to a crime only
when it is consummated; there are no attempted or frustrated stages,
unless the special law expressly penalize the mere attempt or frustration of
the crime.
5. As to degree of participation
In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, when there is more
than one offender, the degree of participation of each in the commission of
the crime is taken into account in imposing the penalty; thus, offenders are
classified as principal, accomplice and accessory.
If the wording of the law punishing the crime uses the word willfully, then
malice must be proven. Where malice is a factor, good faith is a defense.
In violation of special law, the act constituting the crime is a prohibited act.
Therefore culpa is not a basis of liability, unless the special law punishes an
omission.
When given a problem, take note if the crime is a violation of the Revised
Penal Code or a special law.
Held
Proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in
offenses punished by special laws which are mala prohibita. In requiring
proof of malice, the judge has by his gross ignorance allowed the
accused to go free. Added to this, he directed in his decision to release
to the accused of at least the amount of USD 3000 allowed according to
him under CBC 965.
The SC found Judge Dizon guilty of gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his
integrity and efficiency. He was ordered to be dismissed from the
service.
Held
Even if mere issuance of a bouncing check does not constitutes
violation of BP 22, Magno is not liable for in the first place, he informed
the spouse that the check were not funded.
Held
While we agree with the private respondent that the violation of
BP22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon
presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically.
We must find if the applicable of the law is consistent with the purpose
and reason for the law ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. It is not the
letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is so in this
case where a debtor criminalization would not serve the ends for justice
but subvert it.
Held
Plunder is a malum in se because it is a heinous offense. For
when the acts are inherently immoral or wrong, they are mala in se and
it does not matter that such acts are punished under special laws
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mala in
se.
In a case where mother and son were living in the same house, and
the son got angry and strangled his mother, the son, when prosecuted for
parricide, raised the defense that he had no intent to kill his mother. It was
held that criminal intent applies on the strangulation of the vital part of the
body. Criminal intent is on the basis of the act, not on the basis if what the
offender says.
Look into motive to determine the proper crime which can be
imputed to the accused. If a judge was killed, determine if the killing has
any relation to the official functions of the judge in which case the crime
would be direct assault complexed with murder/homicide, not the other way
around. If it has no relation, the crime is simply homicide or murder.
Contention of the accused: In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the
court a quo erred: (1) in finding that he was positively identified by the
prosecution witness as the killer, and (2) in rejecting his defense of alibi.
Held
The accused is guilty of murder. Judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED in all respects and civil indemnity increased to P30K. It was
proven that he had motive in killing Cagampang: he had knowledge that
Cagampang possessed a firearm; this was motive enough to kill him, as
part of NPAs agaw armas campaign or killings perpetrated by NPA for the
purpose of acquiring more firearms. Moreover, proof of motive is not
essential when the culprit has been positively identified. Also, his flight
implies guilt.
The prosecution witness, Victorina Cagampang, may have minor
inconsistencies in her testimony but this does not diminish her credibility
that is part of being human? What is important is that she had positively
identified the accused as the assailant and that her testimony is
corroborated by other witnesses.
Furthermore, the accuseds alibi was unacceptable because it was self-
serving and uncorroborated. It cannot overrule positive identification, it was
merely 15-20 minutes away from crime scene and Perol was at work.
i. Elements
Freedom
Intelligence
Negligence- deficiency of perception to avoid a foreseeable damage
Imprudence- lack of foresight, failure to take necessary precaution.
Contention of the accused: no motive and intent. The instant civil action
may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered.
Contention of the state: Carmen Maceja, wife of the deceased alleged that
her husband died because of group negligence of Dr. Japso. She filed a
separate civil action for damages.
Held
The petition is granted. It is apparent that the civil action against Dr.
Japson may proceed independently to the criminal suit against her. Death
due to negligent act may be delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action
based on Article 100 of RPC, criminal liability of a person guilty of felony-
every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, also as stated
in Article 2176 of the civil code.
Held
A criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act had done be different from what was intended.
Pugay can only be convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence
because of his failure to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act that maybe committed by his
companion at the time they were making fun at Miranda.
iv. Distinguished from Dolo - the requisites of criminal intent, which is required
in dolo replaced the requisites of imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight
or lack of skill committed by means of culpa.
c. Transferred Intent Art. 4, Par. 1 (El que de la cause del mal causado)
By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
Criminal liability
Since in Article 3, a felony is an act or omission punishable by law, particularly
the Revised Penal Code, it follows that whoever commits a felony incurs
criminal liability. In paragraph 1 of Article 4, the law uses the word felony, that
whoever commits a felony incurs criminal liability. A felony may arise not only
when it is intended, but also when it is the product of criminal negligence.
What makes paragraph 1 of Article 4 confusing is the addition of the qualifier
although the wrongful act be different from what he intended.
Proximate cause
Article 4, paragraph 1 presupposes that the act done is the proximate cause of
the resulting felony. It must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the felonious act.
Proximate cause is that cause which sets into motion other causes and
which unbroken by any efficient supervening cause produces a felony without
which such felony could not have resulted. He who is the cause of the cause is
the evil of the cause. As a general rule, the offender is criminally liable for all
the consequences of his felonious act, although not intended, if the felonious
act is the proximate cause of the felony or resulting felony. A proximate cause
is not necessarily the immediate cause. This may be a cause which is far and
remote from the consequence which sets into motion other causes which
resulted in the felony.
i. Aberratio ictus
In aberratio ictus, a person directed the blow at an intended victim,
but because of poor aim, that blow landed on somebody else. In aberratio
ictus, the intended victim as well as the actual victim is both at the scene of
the crime.
Distinguish this from error in personae, where the victim actually
received the blow, but he was mistaken for another who was not at the
scene of the crime. The distinction is important because the legal effects
are not the same.
In aberratio ictus, the offender delivers the blow upon the intended
victim, but because of poor aim the blow landed on somebody else. You
have a complex crime, unless the resulting consequence is not a grave or
less grave felony. You have a single act as against the intended victim and
also giving rise to another felony as against the actual victim. To be more
specific, let us take for example A and B. A and B are enemies. As soon as
A saw B at a distance, A shot at B. However, because of poor aim, it was
not B who was hit but C. You can readily see that there is only one single
act the act of firing at B. In so far as B is concerned, the crime at least is
attempted homicide or attempted murder, as the case may be, if there is
any qualifying circumstance. As far as the third party C is concerned, if C
were killed, crime is homicide. If C was only wounded, the crime is only
physical injuries. You cannot have attempted or frustrated homicide or
murder as far as C is concerned, because as far as C is concern, there is
no intent to kill. As far as that other victim is concerned, only physical
injuries serious or less serious or slight.
If the resulting physical injuries were only slight, then you cannot
complex; you will have one prosecution for the attempted homicide or
murder, and another prosecution for slight physical injuries for the innocent
party. But if the innocent party was seriously injured or less seriously
injured, then you have another grave or less grave felony resulting from the
same act which gave rise to attempted homicide or murder against B;
hence, a complex crime.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in finding Guillen guilty of the said
crime.
Ruling
The court ruled that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the
crime of multiple frustrated murderer because the act of Guillen was not
fully realized when the bomb was kicked out of the stage, preventing him
from fulfilling his act of assassinating the President. Therefore, Guillen is
not guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated murder but of the crime of
multiple attempted murder.
In Article 49, when the crime intended is more serious than the
crime actually committed or vice-versa, whichever crime carries the lesser
penalty, that penalty will be the one imposed. But it will be imposed in the
maximum period. For instance, the offender intended to commit homicide,
but what was actually committed with parricide because the person he
killed by mistake was somebody related to him within the degree of
relationship in parricide. In such a case, the offender will be charged with
parricide, but the penalty that would be imposed will be that of homicide.
This is because under Article 49, the penalty for the lesser crime will be the
one imposed, whatever crime the offender is prosecuted under. In any
event, the offender is prosecuted for the crime committed not for the crime
intended.
Paragraph 2 refers to a situation where the wrongful act done did not
constitute any felony, but because the act would have given rise to a crime against
persons or against property, the same is penalized to repress criminal tendencies
to curtail their frequency. Because criminal liability for impossible crime
presupposes that no felony resulted from the wrongful act done, the penalty is
fixed at arresto mayor or a fine from P200.00 to P500.00, depending on the social
danger and degree of criminality shown by the offender (Article 59), regardless of
whether the wrongful act was an impossible crime against persons or against
property.
Under Article 4, paragraph 2, impossible crime is true only when the crime
committed would have been against person or against property. It is, therefore,
important to know what are the crimes under Title VIII, against persons and those
against property under Title X. An impossible crime is true only to any of those
crimes.
******In the Intod case, the wrongful acts of the culprits caused destruction to
the house of the intended victim; this felonious act negates the idea of an
impossible crime. But whether we agree or not, the Supreme Court has
spoken, we have to respect its ruling.
Contention of the state: Saladino committed the crime of rape that is now
against a person under RA8353.
Contention of the accused: he claimed that on the alleged rape, he was drunk.
Held
The court found Saladino guilty of 3 counts of simple rape and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetual for each count.
2. Uncompleted Crimes
a. Attempted Felonies - when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident, other
than his own spontaneous acts.
i. Article 6, RPC
Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
iv. People vs. Lizada (G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003)
Facts
Freedie Lizada was accused of raping his step daughter Analia Orilloso in
four instances in their house in Tondo, Manila, sometime in August 1998, on
or about Nov. 5, 1998, on or about Oct. 22, 1998 and on or about
September 15, 1998. Physical examination showed no extragenital physical
injuries. Hymen intact.
Held
Attempted rape only:
1. No proof of introduction of penis into pudendum of childs vagina
2. Not act of lasciviousness,
3. RPC Art. 6 attempted is based on 4 elements (reyes)
4. Not preparatory (devise means or measure to accomplish desired end).
Attempt should be equivocal. No need to complete all acts, just needs to
start act w/ causal relation to intended crime.
5. Acts must be directly related to consummation of act and ascertainable
from facts.
6. Accused had intended to have carnal knowledge of complainant. Acts
not preparatory, he commenced execution but failed to finish due to
presence of 3rd party, not spontaneous desistance.
Elements
i) Offender performs all the acts of execution
ii) All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence
iii) The felony is not produced by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator.
Held
Lileth was in fact released in the hospital after 5 days. Even so, the
assaults upon her constituted frustrated murder, her relative quick recovery
being the result of prompt medical attention which prevented the infection in the
wound from reaching fatal proportions which would otherwise has ensued.
Held
Frustrated only
1. Possible for mans organ to enter labia of a 3 years and 8 months old
child.
2. No conclusive evidence of penetration so give accused benefit of the
doubt. Frustrated only.
Facts
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, Cristina arrived at her boarding
house from a party. She knocked at a door, then all of a sudden, somebody held
her, and poked a knife at her neck. She then recognized Orita who was a frequent
visitor of another boarder.
She pleaded to release her but he ordered her to go upstairs with him.
With his left arm wrapped around her neck, he dragged her upstairs. He
commanded her to look for a room, still the knife poked around her neck. Then
they entered Cristinas room. With one hand holding the knife, Orita undressed
himself and ordered her to undress too. Scared, she did undress. He ordered her
to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and
inserted in her vagina. In his position, Orita cannot fully penetrate her as she keeps
on moving. Then he again ordered her to lie down as he mounted on her back, with
this, only a small part of his penis was inserted in her vagina. However, Cristine
escaped and dashed out to the next room. Orita pursued her so she ran again to
the nest room and jumped out through a window. Still naked, she went to the
municipal building and a policeman rescued her.
Contention of the state: Perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the
female organ is sufficient to charge the accused of consummated rape.
Held
The rape was consummated from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of the victim, since by it, he attained his objectives. All elements of the
offense to do so, having performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime and
accomplish it.
The entry of the penis to the labia of the vagina, even without rupture of the
hymen or laceration of the vagina was sufficient to warrant conviction of
consummated rape.
Contention of the accused: He capitalizes on the fact that the medico legal report
by Dr. Cenido showed no laceration of the hymen of Gladys. He contends that the
three incidents of penetration, if true, could not have failed to produce lacerations
of the hymen.
Contention of the state: Sanchez committed three counts of rape. The victim even
saw Sanchez penis and thought that it was big and it was inserted into her private
part and felt pain. The pain could be nothing but the penetration to sufficient to
contribute the crime.
Held
Even if there was no laceration of the hymen, this fact doesnt necessarily
mean that there was no rape because lacerations heal within ten days. A broken
hymen is not an essential element of rape. The mere introduction of the penis into
the labia of the vagina is sufficient for the crime to be consummated. And the
credibility of Gladys was proven. She described in detail how she had been
sexually abused and is accorded with high respect.
Contention of the state: the crime was consummated when they acquired robberies
of the properties, the moment they possession of the things, unlawful taking is
complete. While it is claimed that they intended to surrender, they did not, despite
several opportunities to speak out. The accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of robbery with serious physical injuries and serious illegal detention.
And sentencing them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Contention of the accused: The crime should be consummated because having the
same was only attempted. They claim that the voluntary surrender is a mitigating
circumstance. The crime of robbery has 3 stages: 1. Giving, 2. Taking, 3. Carrying
away or asportation. And without asportation, thje crime committed is only
attempted
Held
The elements of the offense of serious illegal detention were present in the case.
The victims were illegally deprived of their liberty. It follows that as the detention in
this case was not merely incidental to the robbery but necessary means employed
to facilitate it. the penalty imposed by the TC is proper.
Contention of the accused: Dalisay claimed that the TC erred: 1. In giving full
weight and credibility oto the compliants testimony. 2. In failing to appreciate the
expert testimony of the medico legal in favour of the appellant finding out that the
victims hymen is intact
Held
Among other contentions, such findings as to Lanies age is erroneous since it is
based solely on Lanies testimony that she was 11y/o when her father raped her on
9/26/96. Nonetheless, Dalisay, should be convicted of simple rape under Article
335 (1) of the RPC, pay the victim with P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as
moral damages and P25,000 for exemplary damages.
Contention of the accused: the accused contends that the TC gravely erred in
convicting the accused of the crime of consummated rape despite of certainty of
commission. Accused also contends that the insertion of his 4th finger to the
private complainants vagina does not constitute rape under the anti-rape law. He
agrees that the insertion of the human finger into the victims vagina is excluded in
Senate Bill No 950 and House Bill No. 6265. He also contends that there was no
evidence proving that he threatened the victim with physical harm.
Contention of the state: the state contends that mere insertion of an object to the
vagina against her will consummates the crime of rape. The state also contends
that the threats of physical harm on the part of the victim is not indispensible
element in the crime of rape. For rape to be consummated, it is enough that the
victim is intimidated or forced into submitting into the beastial lust of the accused
Held
The accused is guilty of consummated rape because all the elements were
present: a. to force, threat of intimidation; b. when the offended party is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious; c. by means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority.
In the light of all the foregoing, the decision of the RTC is affirmed with
modifications and that the accused is ordered to pay Mary Ghel the amount of
P75,000 for moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
8. Light Felonies Punishable Only When Consummated Art. 7 and Art. 9, par.
3
Article 7. When light felonies are punishable Light felonies are punishable only
when they have been consummated, with the exemption of those committed
against persons or property.
Article 9 (3). Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of
which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200 or both, is
provided.
When conspiracy itself is a crime, no overt act is necessary to bring about the
criminal liability. The mere conspiracy is the crime itself. This is only true when the
law expressly punishes the mere conspiracy; otherwise, the conspiracy does not
bring about the commission of the crime because conspiracy is not an overt act but
a mere preparatory act. Treason, rebellion, sedition, and coup detat are the only
crimes where the conspiracy and proposal to commit to them are punishable.
Held
Supreme court ruled that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement
to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner
by which the offense was perpetrated from the acts of the accused themselves
without such point to a joint purpose and designed concerted actions and
community interest. Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during or after.
ISSUE: W/N the Court had enough evidence to convict the accused.
HELD: The SC upholds the conviction. The elements of illegal recruitment in large
scale are: (1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of
workers; (2) the accused has no license or an authority to recruit and deploy
workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts
against three or more persons, individually or as a group. All the conditions are
present. The evidence shows that she could do something to get their applications
approved. Accused contends that all she did was to refer the complaints but the
Labor Code, recruitment includes referral which is defined as the act of passing
along or forwarding an applicant for employment after initial interview of a selected
application for employment or a selected employer, placement after initial interview
of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer,
or bureau. Also she did more than just make referrals, she actively and directly
enlisted complainants for employment aboard, when promising jobs as seamen,
and collected money.
Held
Guilty. Rule 110, Sec. 11 provides that it is not necessary for the information
to allege the exact date and the time of the commission of the crime is such is not
an essential ingredient of the offense. In the crime of rape, the date of the
commission is not an essential element. The delay in reporting the crime
committed can also be attributed to the tender age of the victim and the moral
ascendancy of the accused over the victim. Oftentimes, a rape victims actions are
moved by fear rather than by reason, and because of this, failure of the victim to
report the crime immediately is not indicative of fabrication. Also, victims are not
expected to recall the exact and accurate account of their traumatic experiences.
However, accused cannot be sentenced to death because the information against
him failed to allege victims minority and her relationship to the accused. RA 7659
enumerates the circumstances that justify the imposition of the death penalty.
Consistent with the accuseds right to be informed of the nature and the cause of
the accusation against him, these circumstances must be specifically pleaded or
alleged with certainty in the information and proven during the trial. Accused is
guilty only of simple rape and sentenced only to reclusion perpetua on each count
of rape.
Held
No. Punzalan acquitted. Elijorde guilty. In People v. Lug-aw, conspiracy
should be proven through clear and convincing evidence. In People v. De Roxas, it
is established that it must be proven that he performed overt act to pursue
completely. Visbal testified that only Elijorde chased Hierro. Punzalans only
participation was kicking which does not prove that he might have known Elijordes
evil design or intent to kill. In People v. Agapinay, there was no proof that the
accused knew about the deadly weapon and that it was to be used to stab victim.
In the case at bar, Punzalan desisted from acts of aggression and did nothing to
assist Elijorde in committing murder.
Held
Appellants were charged with and convicted of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention (Art. 267, RPC). The court agreed with the TC
that they were guilty of kidnapping for ransom.
However, they cannot be held liable for illegal possession of firearms since
there was another crimekidnapping for ransomwhich they were committing at
the same time.
Interpreting Sec. 1, P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, the SC has
consistenly ruled that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any
other crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of
firearms.
Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. Since the plain
meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant, no
other interpretation is justified. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of 2
separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with
attempted homicide.
Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide
or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating
circumstance. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person
arrested. The law does not distinguish or refer only to homicide and murder.
Hence, the Court set aside judgment convicting them of illegal possession
of firearms.
Held
Treachery was not alleged in the information; hence, it should not be
considered as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime. There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. In order that treachery may be appreciated
as a qualifying circumstance, it must be shown that: a.) the malefactor employed
means, method or manner of execution affording the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and b.) the means, method or manner
of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. The second
is the subjective element of treachery. Treachery must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. In the absence of any
convincing proof that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the means
by which they committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Court must
resolve the doubt in favor of the accused.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the mode or manner of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the appellants when they
stabbed the victim. Appellant Winchester first boxed the victim. The appellants and
Ritchie then mauled and kicked the victim. There is no evidence that at the outset,
they had decided to stab and kill the victim. It was only at the late stage of the
assault that the appellants and Ritchie stabbed the victim. The Court believes that
after ganging up on and mauling the victim, the appellants, at the spur-of-the
moment, decided to stab the victim. Thus, the subjective element of treachery was
not present.
Held
The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that Michael, in
conspiracy with 3 others, kidnapped George and son for the purpose of extorting
ransom. Conspiracy maybe inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during
and after the commission of the crime showing that they have acted the common
purpose and design. He is found guilty of kidnapping under article 267(4) of RPC.
Held
There was no conspiracy. Conspiracy needs not be proven by direct
evidence, but may be inferred from the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime. The accused were guilty of murder, however it was
reserved and only guilty of slight physical injuries.
Defense:
Rodlofo Hillarion contends that they have no intention to kill Carlos.
Moreover, it was only Rodrigo and their cumpadre who stabbed Carlos, and he
only acted as a look out/ back up man, thus, he is not liable for the crime charged.
State:
The evidence sufficiently demonstrates the existence of conspiracy in the
execution of the crime. Thus, all their acts tend to manifest a common purpose and
devise. The familiar rule in conspiracy is that when two or more persons agree or
conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible, when the conspiracy is proven,
for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the conspiracy. In a conspiracy,
every act of the conspirators in furtherance of a common design or purpose, is in
contemplation of the law, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, all the three
accused are liable as principals for the death of the victim Carlos Reyes.
Ruling:
The accused is found GUILTY of MURDER qualified by treachery. Accordingly, he
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Facts
April 8, 1980, evening; San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija: Armed men entered
the house of spouses Luisito and Priscilla Cruz and robbed them of P3,000 &
jewelry. Subsequently, they also took the spouses car and forcibly boarded
Priscilla along with them. They headed towards Manila, and along the way Priscilla
recognized the one of the kidnappers, who then was driving the car. They told her
that they were holding her for ransom of P50,000, but later on left her at Paxton
Hotel in Valenzuela, the kidnappers having convinced themselves that the
kidnapping did not materialize.
On same date, Luisito Cruz reported the incident, which led the police
authorities to the detention and investigation of accused Vergel Bustamante at the
WPD in Manila. He was later identified by Priscilla as the driver of the car when
they kidnapped her.
HELD
1) Questioned order of the trial court to amend the info. and include the correct
name of Dan Saksak as Vergel Bustamante is not without basis. Records of the
criminal case forwarded by the MTC of NE to the RTC of NE led the judge of the
latter to believe that Bustamante & Dan Saksak was one & the same person (di
sinabi sa case kung bakit kasali yung MTC dito. Apparently, it conducted a
preliminary examination):
a) A subpoena issued by the MTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija in Crim Case Nos.
186-80 & 192-80 was directed to one Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak.
b) In a return of service of one subpoena, the warden of the City Jail of Manila
informed the Clerk of Court of the MTC of Gapan, NE that Vergel Bustmante @
Dan Saksak said to be one of the accused is not included in the list of present
Inmates of said Jail
c) The order issued by the MTC of Gapan, NE finding a prima facie case against
the accused therein also stated that one of the accused is Vergel Bustamante alias
Dan Saksak
d) The letter of transmittal of the records of the cases to the RTC of NE stated
that one of the accused therein, Vergel Bustamante @ Dan Saksak is detained at
the Mla. City Jail
2) In any event, THE ISSUE CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL . THE ISSUE IS ONE AFFECTING JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED BEFORE THE RTC IN A MOTION
TO QUAH THE INFORMATION. SINCE THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FAILED
TO DO SO, HE IS DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED HIS OBJECTION TO THE
INFORMATION.
Facts
Givera was sentenced to death for stabbing Eusebio Gordon.
Contention of the accused: givera claimed that he was merely trying to pacify
the victim and Maximo and ran away because the victims son, armed with
bolo, and charged at him.
Held
In conspiracy, it is necessary that all participants performed specific acts
designed to bring about the death of the victim. Givera is guilty of the crime
murder as he himself dealt the death blow that sent Eusebio to his grave.
Held
There was no aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Indeed,
there is no evidence showing the time when accused appellants determined to
commit the crime, acts manifestly indicating that they had clung to their
determination, and a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the
execution to allow them opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of their
acts and to allow their conscience to overcome the resolution of their will.
Contention of the state: There should be 4 penalties of R.P. as there were 4 victims
killed.
Contention of the accused: It is a complex, crime, hence, there should be only one
penalty. Only one criminal impulse by pressing the trigger once.
Ruling: The SC ruled in favor of the state.
The court declared that it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should
produce the several felonies, but the no. of bullets which actually produced them.
Hence, where the accused pressed the trigger of a submachine gun and the gun
fired continually and several persons were killed or injured, there are as many
crimes as persons killed or injured.
Contention of the State: He was guilty of rebellion because he was a member f the
communist party that through his speeches he aroused the labor class to rebel
against the gout and providing the needed supply and clothes.
Contention of the accused: He was a mere communist by ideology and was not
part of the conspiracy to overthrow Zuirino government. He did not actually
participated in the rebellion or any act of conspiracy to commit or faster the cause
of the rebellion.
He merely plays the role of propagation by lecture, meetings and organizations of
committees of education by communists.
Ruling: Murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion,
as a means necessary for the perpetration of the offense. Such offenses are
absorbed or inherent in the crime of rebellion. In as much as the act specified in
art. 135 constitute one single crime, it follows that said acts offer no occasion for
the application of act. 48, which requires therefore the commission of at least two
crimes.
Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the
RPC, hence the rules in said code for graduating by degrees of determining the
proper period should be applied.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty
imposable when the crime was committed in 1972 is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death which has a duration of 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to death. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance that
attended the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the medium
period of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death which is reclusion
perpetua. Hence, the trial court imposed the correct penalty upon appellant.
On the civil aspect of the case, we affirm the trial courts award of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim. By way of exemplary damages
based on the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, an amount
of P25,000.00 should be awarded to the said heirs.
As to actual damages, Serafin Hubines, Sr. presented the receipts showing that
he spent P106,288.85 as hospital and medical expenses; P13,000.00 as
funeral expenses, or a total of P119,288.85.
In self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the accused. His duty is to
establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise conviction
would follow from his admission that he killed the victim. Here, appellant
miserably failed to discharge such burden.
The trial court also held that the crime committed by appellant is qualified by
treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Treachery is present in this case. The fact that the attack is frontal does not
negate the finding of treachery. Even a frontal attack can be treacherous if
sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed. Here, the victim was
suddenly stabbed when he was extending his hand to the appellant. With his
mindset, the victim could not have any inkling that there was danger to his life
when he approached appellant.
The trial court awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000, but failed to
award P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim. Moral damages
cannot be granted in the absence of proof therefor. Unlike in rape cases, this
type of award is not automatically given in murder or homicide. The
prosecution was, however, able to prove actual damages in the sum of
P28,650. The award of exemplary damages should be omitted considering that
no aggravating circumstance was duly proven.
At 7:00 p.m. on May 15, 1990, Loreto Hernandez, a resident of Brgy. Sto.
Rosario, Paombong, then employed with the Manila Hotel as a security guard
and his companion Roy de Borja, were walking along a narrow footpath on
their way home from a visit to a mutual friend, Fely Jumaquio. Upon reaching
that portion of the footpath in front of the house of Rufino Panganiban (a
maternal uncle of petitioner Oscar P. Santos), the petitioner and his brother
Pedro Santos, Jr. suddenly emerged into view and effectively blocked their
way. Hernandez greeted the petitioner by his name Ka Oscar but, without
much ado, Pedro, Jr. aimed a .45 calibre automatic pistol at the face of
Hernandez, and squeezed the trigger of the gun which, fortunately, did not fire.
Forthwith, the petitioner hacked Hernandez twice with a jungle bolo. Hernandez
was struck; first, at the right forearm which he defensively raised to parry the
blow and, second, at the right side of the head. Hernandez fell to the ground
semi-unconscious, blood oozing from his wounds. The petitioner then turned to
De Borja who attempted to flee. The petitioner stabbed De Borja at the back,
near the waistline. De Borja fell to the ground, and saw the petitioner hack
another person whom he could not identify. The petitioner even told his brother,
Utol, Jr. alis na tayo; patay na ang mga iyan.
As soon as Santos and his brother left the premises, De Borja, although
himself already injured, endeavored to help Hernandez to his feet. The two
crossed a river and proceeded to the barangay road where, at the foot of a
bridge, Hernandez was left behind, as De Borja went to look for any available
vehicle that would take them to the hospital. While Hernandez was waiting for
De Borja, a tricycle appeared. Hernandez boarded the same and proceeded to
the De Leon Clinic in Paombong, where he was refused admission for
undisclosed reasons. Thereafter, Hernandez boarded another tricycle which
brought him to the provincial hospital at Malolos where he was administered
blood transfusion and extended first-aid treatment.
Santos testified that when Hernandez aimed his gun at his head, the petitioner
raised his right hand, and holding his bolo, swung it downwards. Hernandez
then raised his right hand to parry the thrust of the petitioner. In the process,
the petitioners bolo hit Hernandez right forearm and the right side of his head
above the right ear. Santos interposed self-defense. He claimed that he hacked
Hernandez and De Borja only as an act of self-defense.
RULING:
The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution for even if the evidence of the prosecution
were weak, the same can no longer be disbelieved after the accused has
admitted killing or injuring the victim.
Held: Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense which can be easily
fabricated. When the accused interposes self-defense, he hereby admits
having caused the injuries of the victim. The burden of proof then shifts on him
to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the essential
requisites for such a defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed and to prevent or
repel it; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on
the prosecutions, for even if the latter is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after
the accused has admitted the killing. In People v. Alfaro, and People v.
Camacho, we held that the failure of the accused to account for the
presentation of the bladed weapon allegedly used by the victim is fatal to his
plea of self-defense. In this case, the appellant failed to account for the knife
supposedly held by the victim and the bolo which the victim allegedly handed
over to Rones. He also failed to account for the knife he used in stabbing the
victim and to surrender himself and the said knife to the police authorities and
to admit having stabbed the victim in self-defense. Such failure rejects
appellants claim of self-defense. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81, is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. Petitioner Alexander P. Rugas is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide defined and penalized under Article
247 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime, is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
The petitioner is hereby directed to pay to the victim Herberto D. Rafol
P25,000.00, as moral damages, and P25,000.00, as exemplary damages.
Costs against the petitioner.
b. Burden of Proof
- Unidad vs. CA, 399 SCRA 27
Held: To start with, petitioner claimed self-defense, thereby shifting upon him
the burden of the evidence to prove that: (1) the victim unlawfully attacked him;
(2) he took the necessary means to repel the attack; and (3) he did not provoke
said attack. Petitioner had to prove these by clear and convincing evidence. As
to the award of damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the
victim in homicide is correct.[46] The grant of P192,000.00 for unearned
income of the victim is also supported by the evidence, according to the
formula set forth in People v. Silvestre, The record shows that the victim was 32
years old and was earning at least P1,120.00 a month. Finally, the actual
damages for funeral expenses should be reduced from P131,000.00 to
P54,500.00, as only the latter amount is supported by receipts.
The crime of homicide is punished by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
with reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). With the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender the penalty should be imposed in its
minimum, which is, 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months.
Infuriated, appellant without warning, picked up his M-14 armalite rifle and
strafed the former on the back. Obngayan sprawled bloodied on the ground.
Shortly after, appellant took the garand rifle of Artemio Tallong, and unleashed
another barrage of gunshots. Obngayan died instantaneously with his brain
splattered and an eye fallen on the ground.
The prosecutor adopted the testimony of defense witness Artemio Tallong for
purposes of the prosecution. Other prosecution witnesses were Dr. Dan Redel
Edroso, the Municipal Health Officer of Pudtol, Apayao, who conducted a post-
mortem examination on the victims body; Lt. Walfrido Felix Querubin of the
Philippine Army; Cpl. Robert Salarzon, from the Philippine Army assigned at
Nararragan, Ballesteros, Cagayan; Capt. Efren Paulino, from the Philippine
Army assigned at the Headquarters Service Battalion, Camp Upi, Gamu,
Isabela; and Mrs. Agnes Obngayan, the victims widow.
Held: In his Brief, appellant offers no substantial reason, however, why we
should overturn the trial courts appreciation of the evidence presented against
him. Instead, he merely reiterates in this appeal his claim of self-defense. In
cases where the accused admits committing the crime but invokes self-
defense, the basic rule that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies
on the prosecution is reversed, and the burden of proof is shifted to the
accused to prove the elements of his defense.[16] In our view, the defense has
not discharged its burden successfully.
The elements of self-defense are (1) that the victim has committed unlawful
aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the
person claiming self-defense; (2) that there is reasonable necessity in the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there
is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense
or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense
be not the proximate and immediate cause of the victims aggression.
Facts: On the morning of January 30, 1965, Geminiano met Pio and asked him
if he could have his share of the palay that Pio harvested from tilling
Geminianos land. Pio told him to drop by his house anytime to get it so
Geminiano said he will drop by in the afternoon with his son Marianito. That
afternoon, Geminiano sat outside Pios house to wait for the promised palay.
Pio was standing by the door of his house with Severo also standing by.
Marianito was standing a few feet behind his father with a gun slung in his
shoulder. Hostile, Pio told Geminiano that he was not going to give him palay
thus Geminiano remonstrated. Pio then unsheathed his bolo and approached
Geminiano from the left. Severo took an axe and approached from the right. At
this, Geminiano held up his hands and told Severo not to fight. Pio then
stabbed Geminianos neck with the bolo. With Geminiano faced down on the
ground, Severo hacked his back with the axe. While this was going on, Juan
suddenly embraced Marianito from behind. They grappled and rolled downhill
where Marianito passed out. When he came to, he saw his mortally wounded
father and carried him a short distance. Geminiano died at approximately 2pm.
Pio is a fugitive from justice in this case. Severo and Juan were
convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The two were also
convicted of lesions leves (for Marianito). Other three were acquitted. Severo
and Juan appealed for the murder conviction. They contend that Geminiano
unsheathed his bolo first so Pio met him and struck. As Geminiano turned to
flee, Pio struck again on the left side and thus Geminiano fell to the ground and
died due to the bleeding. Marianito was embraced by Juan because he
allegedly reached for his gun and tried to shoot Pio. With this argument, they
shift the responsibility of the killing to Pio (who was not there and not trieda
fugitive) and that Pio was only acting in self-defense. Juan contends he was
just protecting Pio and Severo when he prevented Mariano from firing his gun.
A few days after filing this appeal however, Severo withdrew and in effect
accepted prosecutions version. So, this appeal concerns Juan only.
Issue: WON Juan conspired with Pio and Severe in the killing of Geminiano
and is he deserving of reclusion perpetua?
Held: Yes, judgment affirmed. Considering the trios orchestrated behavior and
Juans close relationship to Pio and Severo, conclusion is that he acted in
conspiracy with them, planning the whole thing, from the time after Pio met
Geminiano in the morning to the event in the afternoon. He cannot invoke
Article 11, par 4 (justifying circumstances) in explaining his act of preventing
Marianito from shooting Pio and Severo as evidence shows he did this to
ensure that the killing of Geminiano happened without any risk to Pio and
Severo. His malicious intention was not to avoid any evil from Marianito but to
forestall any interference in the assault done by Pio and Severo. Even though
he did not take direct part in the killing, his conspiracy with the others made him
a principal too. Moreover, treachery was involved. Juan weakened the victims
defense by disabling Marianito and ensured the killing without any risk to
themselves. Thus, the act of one is the act of all, and Juan is also guilty of
murder.
RATIO:
It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. The
record does not show that Tipace was bent on committing any act of
aggression or that he attempted to escape.
According to Lagata himself, Tipace was running towards and around
him. How could anyone intending to escape run towards and around the very
guard one was supposed to escape from?
Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the performance of
his duties, the circumstances show that there was no necessity for him to fire
directly against the prisoners as to wound them seriously and even kill one of
them.
While custodians should take care for prisoners not to escape, only
ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would authorize them to fire against them.
Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two degrees
lower than the prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the
preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than arresto mayor.
(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;
(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision
mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the
presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of
penalty prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not
less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three
hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological
counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.
2. MINORITY
a. RA 9344 (Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice System)
1) 15 yrs old or below at the time of commission of offense: absolutely exempt
from criminal liability but subject to intervention program
2) Over 15 yrs old but below 18:
exempt from criminal liability & subject to intervention program
If acted w/ discernment: subject to diversion program
3) Below 18 yrs are exempt from:
a) Status offense
b) Vagrancy and Prostitution
c) Mendicancy (PD1563)
d) Snuffing of Rugby (PD 1619)
b. People vs. Estepano, 307 SCRA 707 (1999)
Facts: Enrique Balinas was stabbed & hacked to death for w/c Dominador,
Rodrigo, Ruben, Rodney, Dante & Rene, all surnamed Estepano were charged
w/ murder. Rodrigo died during the trial & before judgment could be rendered.
Dante was never apprehended hence, as against him, the case was never
archived. After trial, Dominador was acquitted on reasonable doubt. Only
Ruben, Rodney & Rene were found guilty. Accordingly, the 3 were sentenced to
reclusion perpetua & ordered to indemnify the heirs of Enrique Balinas in the
amount of P100K for moral damages & P9.5K for actual damages w/o
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
As to the crime: The case was woven mainly on the testimony of Florencio
Tayco, that on April 16, 1991 at around 10 pm, he was on his way home in
Barangay IV Himamaylan with Lopito Gaudia and Enrique Balinas. En route,
they met Dominador at the BM Trucking compound. Lopito than talked to
Dominador while he and Estepano stood nearby. Suddenly, Rodrigo appeared
without any provocation stabbed Enrique in the stomach with a guinunting
(fighting bolo). Ruben armed with a cane cutter and Rodney, Dante and Rene,
each armed with a bolo followed suit in hacking Enrique. While this was
happening, Dominador told his companions You better kill him! Lopito
confirmed the testimony of Florencio.
Dominadors version: That on April 16 1991 at 10pm, he was at home w/ his
wife & son Roberto. They were about to eat supper when he heard Enrique
Balinas call out for his son Rodrigo to come down. He peeped through the
window & saw Rodrigo hacking Enrique. When Enrique fell to the ground,
Rodrigo fled. Robert Hautea & Luz Cuepas, both residents of Barangay IV
corroborated the testimony of Dominador.
Accused Ruben, Rene & Rodney invoked alibi. Ruben claimed that he was at
the provincial hospital attending to his wife who earlier underwent a caesarian
operation. Rene & Rodney, sons of Rodrigo, claimed that they were at home
sleeping when the killing occurred. Rene, who was only 13 then, testified that
he came to know about the incident that same night when his mother
awakened him. Rodney on the other hand, was awakened by shouts that his
father killed Enrique Balinas.
Issues
1. WON the lower court erred in giving credence to the testimony of
prosecution witness Florencio Tayco
Findings of the TC is binding & conclusive on the appellate court unless some
facts or circumstances of weight & substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted, w/c isnt true in the present case.
Florencios testimony is clear & convincing, as he was only 2 arms length away
from the victim as well as from the assailants. Alibi of appellants were not
supported by any pieces of evidence & thus were not sufficient to outweigh
their positive identification by 1 of the prosecution witnesses.
2. WON conspiracy had taken place
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in w/c the offense was
committed and concerted acts of the accused to obtain a common criminal
objective signifies conspiracy.
3. WON the appellants are guilty of murder (particularly Rene, who was
13)
With respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the records show that he
was only 13 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Under
A12. par. 3 of the RPC, a person over 9 years of age & under 15 is exempt
from criminal liability unless it is shown that he acted with DISCERNMENT.
Scrutiny of records show that prosecution failed to prove that Rene acted w/
discernment, what was only established was his presence & his supposed
participation in the killing.
* Damages of P100K were also modified and reduced to P50,000, considering
that the purpose of such award is not to enrich the heirs but to compensate
them for the injuries to their feelings. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
modified and accused-appellants Ruben and Rodney are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, Rene Estepano is ACQUITTED.
3. ACCIDENT
Elements:
1. A person performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
ACCIDENT
something that happen outside the sway of our will and although it comes about
through some act of our will,
lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.
Under Article 12, paragraph 4, the offender is exempt not only from criminal but
also from civil liability
ISSUE:
WON del Rosario's arrest was unlawful since there was no
warrant therefore.
HELD:
Yes, Sec. 5 par, Rule 113, requires that the accused be
caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the
consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is outside of the
aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the
commission of the robbery with homicide.
2. EFFECT OF PARDON
Article 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. - A pardon of the offended party
does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code;
but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his
express waiver.
ARTICLE 266-C. EFFECT OF PARDON.
-Subsequent valid marriage between the offenderand the offended party
extinguishes the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
- A Husband may be guilty of raping his wife.
- When the legal husband is the offender, subsequent forgiveness of the wife
extinguishes the criminal action or penalty. This does not follow if the marriage is
void ab initio.
3. ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
a. RPC, Arts. 6(3), 7, 20, 16, 247, 280, 332, 344 - are those where the act
committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy the accused is exempt
from criminal liability.
A. RPC, Arts 6(3), 7, 20, 16, 247, 280, 332, 344
Art 6(3) - There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.
Art 7 - When light felonies are punishable. - Light felonies are punishable
only when they have been consummated, with the exception of those
committed against person or property.
Article 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. - The
penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are
such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the
same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The following are criminally liable
for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
1. Principals
2. Accomplices.
Article 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. - Any private person who shall enter
the dwelling of another against the latter's will shall be punished by arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty
shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who shall
enter another's dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to
himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be
applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of
rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall enter
cafes, taverns, inn and other public houses, while the same are open.
Article 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. - No criminal, but only civil
liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. INCOMPLETE JUSTIFICATION/EXEMPTION
those circumstances has reference be (1) justifying circumstance. Not all the
requisites necessary to justify the act or except from from criminal liability in the
respective are attendant.
6. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
Elements:
1. The accused acted upon an impulse.
2. The impulse must be so powerful that it naturally produce passion or
obfuscation in him.
Passion or obfuscation not applicable when:
The act committed in a spirit of LAWLESSNESS.
The act is committed in a spirit of REVENGE.
The mitigating circumstance of obfuscation arising from jealousy cannot be
invoked in favor of the accused whose relationship with the woman was
illegitimate.
Passion and obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the
honest belief of the offender.
Held: Before this circumstance may be taken into consideration it produce such
a condition of mind The act producing the obfuscation must not be for removed
from the commission of the crime by considerable length of time during w/c the
accused might have recover his equanimity. The crime almost after Victoria
abandoned the conjugal dwelling.
Issues:
1. WON the trial court was correct in finding that the killing of the victim
amounts to murder.
2. WON the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm
be taken against the appellant.
3. WON the lower court correctly imposed the sanction of death penalty.
Held:
On the issue WON the trial court was correct in finding that the killing of the
victim amounts to murder.
NO. The trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime of murder. The
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged in the information.
Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect only on
December 1, 2000 or long after the fatal shooting of Nemesio Lopate, as a
procedural rule favorable to the accused, it should be given retrospective
application. Hence, absent specific allegations of the attendant circumstances
of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity in the amended information,
it was error for the trial court to consider the same in adjudging appellant guilty
of murder. As worded, we find that the amended information under which
appellant was charged and arraigned, at best indicts him only for the crime of
homicide. Any conviction should, thus, fall under the scope and coverage of
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. As for the separate case for illegal
possession of firearm, we agree with the trial courts order to dismiss the
information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case
No. 97-CR-2753. Under R.A. No. 8294, which took effect on July 8, 1997,
where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
the separate penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall no longer be
imposed since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. This
Court has held in a number of cases that there can be no separate conviction
of the crime of illegal possession of firearm where another crime, as indicated
by R.A. No. 8294, is committed. Although R.A. No. 8294 took effect over a year
after the alleged offense was committed, it is advantageous to the appellant
insofar as it spares him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of
firearms and thus should be given retroactive application.
On the issue WON the lower court correctly imposed the sanction of death
penalty.
No. As appellant can only be convicted of homicide, it follows that he cannot,
under the provisions of RA No. 7659, be sentenced to suffer the death penalty.
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion temporal. Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the
offense of homicide the penalty imposable under Art. 64 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty which could actually be imposed on appellant is an
indeterminate prison term consisting of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
7. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Elements:
1. That the offender had not been actually arrested.
2. That the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latters
agent.
3. That the surrender was voluntary.
8. PLEA OF GUILT
Elements:
1. That the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt;
Plea of guilty on appeal is not mitigating.
2. That the confession of guilty was made in open court, that is, before the
competent court that is to try the case;
The extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not voluntary confession
because it was made outside the court.
3. That the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for
the prosecution.
The change of plea should be made at the first opportunity when his arraignment
was first set.
A conditional plea of guilty is not mitigating
This paragraph does not distinguish between educated and uneducated deaf-
mute or blind persons.
Physical defect referred to in this paragraph is such as being armless, cripple,
or a stutterer, whereby his means to act, defend himself or communicate with his
fellow beings are limited.
The physical defect that a person may have must have a relation to the
commission of the crime.
Elements of Illness:
1. That the illness of the offender must diminish the exercise of his will-power.
2.That such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts.
- When the offender completely lost the exercise of will-power, it may be an
exempting circumstance.
It is said that this paragraph refers only to diseases of pathological state that
trouble the conscience or will.
E. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Those circumstances which raise the penalty for a crime in its maximum period
provided by law applicable to that crime or change the nature of the crime.
The aggravating circumstances must be established with moral certainty, with the
same degree of proof required to establish the crime itself.
According to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, BOTH generic and
qualifying aggravating circumstances must be alleged in order to be appreciated.
The list in this Article is exclusive there are no analogous circumstances.
Basis:
the motivating power behind the act
the place where the act was committed
the means and ways used
the time
the personal circumstance of the offender and/or of the victim
Kinds:
1) GENERIC Those that can generally apply to all crimes. Nos. 1, 2, 3 (dwelling), 4,
5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19, and 20 except by means of motor vehicles.
2) SPECIFIC Those that apply only to particular crimes. Nos. 3 (except dwelling),
15, 16, 17 and 21.
3) QUALIFYING Those that change the nature of the crime. Art. 248 enumerates the
qualifying AC which qualify the killing of person to murder.
4) INHERENT Those that must accompany the commission of the crime and is
therefore not considered in increasing the penalty to be imposed such as evident
premeditation in theft, robbery, estafa, adultery and concubinage.
5) SPECIAL Those which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty of
the offense and cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances such as:
quasi-recidivism (Art. 160)
complex crimes (Art. 48)
error in personae (Art. 49)
taking advantage of public position and membership in an organized/syndicated
crime group (Art. 62)
When there are several applicable qualifying aggravating circumstances, only one
will be deemed as such and the others will be deemed as generic.
1. PLACE OF COMMISSION
a. Palace of the Chief Executive, etc., or in a Place of Religious Worship
b. Uninhabited Place
People vs. Damaso, 86 SCRA 370
Facts: Donata Rebolledo and her son-in-law, Victoriano de la Cruz were
residents of Barrio Bangar, municipality of Victoria, province of Tarlac. At about
9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1959, Donata and Victoriano heard
the barkings of dogs outside their house. Shortly, two men armed with guns,
entered, pointed their weapons at them, tied up the hands of Victoriano,
covered him with a blanket and asked Donata for the wereabouts of her
daughter Catalina Sabado. Stricken by fear, Donata kept silent and blocked the
door leading to her daughter's room but was promptly pushed aside. Donata
was then ordered to open an "aparador" from which the two men took
valuables like jewelry, clothing, documents, and cutting instruments. All the
while, Donata and Victoriano could hear the movements and voices of some
three to four other persons beneath the house. The two men brought Catalina
Sabado down from the house and then asked where they could find Susana
Sabado, Donata's other daughter who was then in her store located about five
meters away in the same house. Thereafter, Donata heard the men opening
the door to Susana's store. After several minutes, feeling that the intruders had
left, Donata untied the hands of Victoriano and asked him to go to the store to
see if her daughters were there. When the two women could not be found,
Donata sent Victoriano to the barrio lieutenant to report the incident.
Accordingly, Victoriano went to the barrio lieutenant and the two later went to
town to inform the police of the occurrence. On the same night, Chief of Police
Pedro Valdez with the aid of several policemen and a handful of civilians went
out in search for the Sabado sisters. It was only the following morning when the
two women were found already dead with wounds in several parts of their
bodies. They were found in a sugar plantation belonging to one Ignacio Fabros,
located about one hundred meters from Donata Rebolledo's house.
Crime: robbery w/ Double Homicide
Held: The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the
nearest house to the scene of the crime, but whether or not in the place of
commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help.
Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and the sugarcane in the
field was tall enough to obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby, there
was no reasonable possibility for the victims to receive any assistance. That the
accused deliberately sought the solitude of the place is clearly shown by the
fact that they brought the victims to the sugarcane field although they could
have disposed of them right in the house of Donata Rebolledo where they were
found. Thus, in People v. Saguing, the Court considered the crime as having
been committed in an uninhabited place because the killing was done in a
secluded place at the foot of a hill, forested, and uninhabited. The penalty is to
be imposed in its maximum period by reason of the presence of three
aggravating circumstances found by the trial court, to wit: that the robbery was
committed by a band, with treachery, and in an uninhabited place. There is
likewise the additional aggravating circumstance that the robbery was
committed in the dwelling of the victim. Donata Rebolledo which although not
alleged in the Information is however established by the evidence.
c. Dwelling
Building or structure, exclusively used for rest and comfort.
This is considered an AC because in certain cases, there is an abuse of
confidence which the offended party reposed in the offender by opening the
door to him.
Dwelling need not be owned by the offended party.
It is enough that he used the place for his peace of mind, rest, comfort and
privacy.
Dwelling should not be understood in the concept of a domicile.
A person has more than one dwelling.
So, if a man has so many wives and he gave them places of their own, each
one is his own dwelling.
If he is killed there, dwelling will be aggravating, provided that he also stays
there once in a while.
The crime of adultery was committed.
Dwelling was considered aggravating on the part of the paramour.
However, if the paramour was also residing in the same dwelling, it will not be
aggravating.
The offended party must not give provocation.
It is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the
dwelling of the victim to commit the offense;
it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house,
although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the assault.
Dwelling includes dependencies,
the foot of the staircase
and the enclosure under the house.
When the masked men returned to Jimmy's house, one of them informed
Erlinda that her husband and father-in-law had been killed for trying to escape.
Upon hearing this, Erlinda, as if the heavens had fallen on her, slowly lost
consciousness.
Crime: Robbery w/ homicide w/ AC of Dwelling
Held: Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only
be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and
robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors
thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the
victim's domicile. In the case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent
disregard of the inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in,
looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into submission,
disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of
the house to be killed.
People vs. Daniela, 401 SCRA 519
FACTS: Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis came tothe house of Ronito and his
common-law wife, Maria Fe toborrow money. Manuel, Jose, and Ronito then
had adrinking spree. Later, Manuel armed with a .38 caliber gun,entered the
bedroom of Ronito and Maria Fe and poked thesaid gun on Maria Fe. Jose,
armed with a knife followedManuel to the bedroom. Upon Manuels order Jose
tied thehands of Maria Fe behind her back and put a tape on hermouth. Jose
also tied the hands of Marifes cousin, Leo.Jose and Manuel then divested
Maria Fe of her necklace,rings and earrings. Manuel demanded that she give
themher money but Maria Fe told them that she had used hermoney to pay her
partners in the fish vending business.Manuel and Jose did not believe Maria Fe
and ransackedthe room but failed to find money. Manuel then threatenedto
explode the grenade tucked under his shirt and kill MariaFe, her family and
their househelps if she refused tosurrender her money. Petrified, Maria Fe took
the moneyfrom her waist pouch and gave the same to Manuel andJose.
Manuel took a blanket and ordered Jose to kill Ronitowith it. Jose went to the
kitchen, got a knife, coveredRonito with the blanket and sat on top of him then
stabbedthe latter several times. Manuel also stabbed Ronito ondifferent parts of
his body. Manuel hit Ronito with the buttof his gun. Jose slit the throat of Ronito
and took thelatter's wristwatch and ring. Manuel then raped Julifer, ahousehelp
of Marife.
HELD: The law does not require that the solemotive of the malefactor is
robbery and commits homicideby reason or on the occasion thereof. In People
vs. Tidula,et al., this Court ruled that even if the malefactor intendsto kill and
rob another, it does not preclude his convictionfor the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. In People v. Damaso, the Court held that the fact that
theintent of the felons was tempered with a desire also toavenge grievances
against the victim killed, does notnegate the conviction of the accused and
punishment forrobbery with homicide.A conviction for robbery with homicide is
propereven if the homicide is committed before, during or afterthe commission
of the robbery. The homicide may becommitted by the actor at the spur of the
moment or bymere accident. Even if two or more persons are killed and
awoman is raped and physical injuries are inflicted onanother, on the occasion
or by reason of robbery, there isonly one special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.What is primordial is the result obtained without referenceor
distinction as to the circumstances, cause, modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime. Robbery with homicide is committed even if the victim
of the robbery is different from the victim of homicide, as long as the homicide
is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. It is not even
necessary that the victim of the robbery is the very person the male factor
intended to rob. For the conviction of the special complex crime, the robbery
itself must be proved as conclusively as any other element of the crime. It
maybe true that the original intent of appellant Manuel was to borrow again
money from Ronito and Maria Fe but later on conspired with Jose and robbed
the couple of their money and pieces of jewelry, and on the occasion thereof,
killed Ronito. Nonetheless, the appellants are guilty of robbery with homicide.
2. TIME OF COMMISSION
These 3 circumstances may be considered separately
when their elements are distinctly perceived and
can subsist independently,
revealing a greater degree of perversity.
Aggravating:
When it facilitated the commission of the crime; or
When especially sought for by the offender to insure the commission of the crime
or for the purpose of impunity; or
When the offender took advantage thereof for the purpose of impunity.
a. Nighttime
1) NIGHTTIME
The commission of the crime must begin and be accomplished in the
nighttime.
The offense must be actually committed in the darkness of the night.
When the place is illuminated by light, nighttime is not aggravating.
It must be shown that the
offender deliberately sought the cover of darkness and t
he offender purposely took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the offense.
People vs. Desalisa, 229 SCRA 35
FACTS: Emmanuel Desalisa, a 22-yr old farmer, lived w/ his 18-yr old legal
wife, Norma, who was then 5 mos pregnant and their 2-yr old daughter in a
small nipa hse on a hill at Pinaductan, Sorsogon. The whole neighborhood
consists of 3 houses. The other 2 houses are about 150 meters away: the
house of his parents-in-law and the house of Carlito Dichoso. The view of the
houses is obstructed by the many fruit trees and shrubs prevalent in the area.
On Oct 9, 1983, Vicente Dioneda, the father-in-law of the accused, testified that
the latter went to their house and left his 2 yr-old. The next day, at about 6 or
7AM, Vicente went to the house of the accused only to find plates scattered on
the floor, the kettle w/ cooked rice untouched, and the other rope holding the
hammock missing. He went out of the house and noticed the couples pig to be
hungry. He thought of feeding it w/ coconut meat from the tree w/c was nearby.
He saw the back of the body of his daughter. He called her and touched her
back. However, her body swayed. It was only then that he realized that she
was hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree. Her neck was suspended
about 4 inches above the ground. Her neck was tied w/ the missing rope of the
hammock. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident.
Accused-appellant often manhandled his daughter because he suspected her
of having a paramour and that the baby in her womb was not his. He believed
that one Ariate was courting his wife.
Desalisa invokes the defense of denial. He speculates that it was his wife who
was jealous. She suspected him of having an affair w/ the daughter of Manoy
Charito.
HELD: The accused has the opportunity to commit the crime. The house
where they lived is up a hill and isolated. The whole neighborhood consists
only of 3 houses. No one can go up the hill to visit w/o being known to the
neighbor. Moreover, the motive of jealousy is evident for what can be more
humiliating to a man aside from a wife being unfaithful to be refused entry to
ones very home? Although the accused did not flee after the crime, there is no
case law holding that non-flight is conclusive of proof of innocence.
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation can not be appreciated
against accused-appellant absent any proof as to how and when the plan to kill
was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out. Neither may the
aggr circumstance of nighttime be appreciated against him because there is no
proof that it was purposely sought or taken advantage of or that it facilitated the
commission of the crime.
However, the aggr circumstance of uninhabited place is present. The
uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest
house to the scene of the crime but WON there was reasonable possibility of
the victim receiving some help in the place of commission. Considering that
the killing was done during nighttime and many fruit trees and shrubs
obstructed the view of the neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable
possibility for the victim to receive any assistance.
Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of parricide w/ unintentional abortion and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay civil indemnity of PhP50K. Being a single
indivisible penalty, reclusion perpetua is imposed regardless of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances.
That night, according to Jeffre, they slept in the same room. He was suddenly
awakened when he heard a commotion (kalambugan). However, by the time
he woke up, the room was very dark because the lamp was already turned off.
He heard his mother shout, Dikong, tulungan mo kami. When he heard the
kalambugan he immediately eased his way to where they kept their pillows and
tried to hide. Then, there was silence. Then he heard somebody going
downstairs. His brother Melvin lit the lamp, while Jeffre stayed where he was.
He then heard the person downstairs going up again. He saw through his
blanket that the person had come up: Naaninag ko po sa kumot yung tao.
That was when he distinctly heard his Kuya Melvin say, Kuya Willie, tama na,
tama na! That was just before Melvin was killed.
On July 5, 1997, Dionisio asked Allan to come to his farm the following day to
help him till the land. Allan agreed. At about 5:00 a.m. on July 6, 1997, Allan
left their place in Liway, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and proceeded to Dionisios
farm. Allan had a lente placed on his forehead to illumine his path as it was
still dark. When Allan was about a hundred meters away from Dionisios hut,
he noticed Rafael at a distance of ten meters coming from the direction of the
hut of Dionisio. Rafael was no stranger to Allan because the latter used to help
Dionisio till the field. Allan readily recognized Rafael from the illumination
coming from the lente on his forehead. Allan noticed bloodstains on the
clothes of Rafael. Allan was perplexed when Rafael tried to evade him as they
met. Allan then entered Dionisios hut which at that time was lighted by a
kerosene lamp called kingke. Allan called but nobody answered. He peeped
through the window and was horrified to see his brothers feet as well as blood
under the bed. Allan immediately rushed home and reported the incident to his
parents. Allan and his parents proceeded posthaste to Dionisios hut. They
saw several persons near the hut of Dionisio including some policemen who
prevented Allan and his parents from entering the hut. It turned out that
Dionisio, his wife Edna and their young son Mark Joseph Anthony were already
dead.
Held: There is AC of nighttime. Rafael took advantage of the night darkness to
successfully consummate his dastardly acts. Not proven that nighttime is
sought.
At around midnight, appellant went to Riveras house to check whether his wife
Evelyn was there. Rivera did not reply but instead asked if the two had a
quarrel. The appellant answered in the negative. Rivera, his wife and appellant
conversed in the formers garage for about 30 minutes, with the Rivera couple
suggesting places where appellant should look for his wife. Then appellants
sister-in-law went to appellants house and peeped inside the unlighted room of
the couple but did not find her sister, the deceased. After this, the Rivera couple
returned to their house and went to sleep.
b. Reiteration or Habituality
1. That the accused is on trial for an offense;
2. That he previously served sentence for another offense to which the law
attaches:
a. an equal or
b. greater penalty, or
c. for 2 or more crimes to which it attaches lighter penalty than that for the new
offense;
and
3. That he is convicted of the new offense.
Reiteracion or Habituality
it is essential that the offender be previously punished;
that is, he has served sentence.
Par. 10 speaks of
penalty attached to the offense,
not the penalty actually imposed
Held: The trial court also erred in finding the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of official position in the commission of the offense. This
circumstance requires that the accused, as a public officer, used the influence
or reputation of his position for the purpose of committing the crime. If the
accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then
there is no abuse of public position. In the case before us, no evidence was
adduced to show that the killing of Zandro vargas was in any way facilitated by
the accused-appellants public position. It was not even shown whether the
accused-appellant wore his uniform or used his service firearm when he
committed the crime. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
MODIFIED, finding accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy guilty of homicide, and
SENTENCING him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Zandro Vargas in the increased sum of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Held: The AC of insult to public authority does not seem to be borne by the
records . For this circumstance to be considered, it must not only be shown
that the time crime was not committed in the presence of the public authority
but also that crime was not committed against the public authority himself.
When the masked men returned to Jimmy's house, one of them informed
Erlinda that her husband and father-in-law had been killed for trying to escape.
Upon hearing this, Erlinda, as if the heavens had fallen on her, slowly lost
consciousness.
Crime: Robbery w/ homicide w/ AC of Dwelling
Held: Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only
be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and
robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors
thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the
victim's domicile. In the case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent
disregard of the inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in,
looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into submission,
disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of
the house to be killed.
d. Abuse of Confidence
Elements:
a. That the offended party had trusted the offender.
b. That the offender abused such trust by committing a crime against the
offended party.
c. That the abuse of confidence facilitated the commission of the crime.
The confidence between the offender and the offended party must be
immediate and personal.
It is inherent in malversation, qualified theft, estafa by conversion or
misappropriation and qualified seduction.
g. Evident Premeditation
Elements:
1. The time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination;
and
3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow is conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will.
While she was proceeding to the pile of sand, Corazon saw Haide standing in
the middle of the road near the steel gate of the house of Mario Chan talking
with Meriam Manzano. Seeing that Haide wanted to talk with her, Corazon went
to the store of Romeo and waited there for Haide. At the store, Haide asked
Corazon if the latter was willing to lend her P200.00 to which the latter agreed.
Before Haide left to go back to the house of Mario Chan, she looked at
appellant who was still at the store.Thereafter, Corazon followed Haide to
borrow the shovel which she would use for the pile of sand. She then
proceeded towards the pile of sand and began to shovel sand to a pail and
dumped it on the drainage.After 3 trips, Corazon felt thirsty. As the house of
Mario Chan was the closest house, she went there to ask Haide for cold
drinking water.
Calling out to Haide, Corazon decided to enter the compound as there was no
answer from inside the house. Since the gate and the door to the house were
not locked, Corazon entered the house to look for Haide. Again, she called for
Haide but still she did not get any response.Looking inside the room of Haide,
Corazon saw that there was nobody there. So, she proceeded towards the
kitchen of the house of Mario Chan.At the kitchen, she saw Haide sprawled on
the kitchen floor lying face down and bloodied. Surprised, Corazon ran outside
and asked for help from Romeo.On the other side of the house of Mario Chan,
Nemesio Capiz, the house boy of Gerardo Musa Jr., while bringing out a gas
tank to the car of latter, saw a man inside the compound of the residence of
Mario Chan.
At a distance of about 25 meters, Nemesio saw the man looking from side to
side and then jumped over the fence. Then, this man casually walked away
from the house of Mario Chan tucking in his shirt inside his pants. Nemesio
noticed that the mans shirt was bloodied and very red and the edge of his
pants [was] red. Nemesio recognized this man to be appellant.However,
Nemesio did not mind appellant. Instead, he went back to the house of
Gerardo Musa and informed the latter that he saw a man jumping from the
fence of the house of Mario Chan and that the mans shirt and pants were very
red. Thereafter, he went to the pigsty and continued to work.Outside the house
of Mario Chan, Remegio Almonte, Jr. saw the commotion and entered the
house of Mario Chan. There, he saw the bloodied cadaver of Haide. He
suggested that the cadaver be brought to the hospital and one man lifted the
cadaver and brought it outside. Outside, people commented that there were
many stab wounds on the neck of Haide. Remegio tried to look for clues about
the murder but he found nothing. Then he decided to go home.
Held: A perusal of the Information filed against appellant clearly shows that
dwelling was not alleged as an aggravating circumstance. Even assuming that
this circumstance was subsequently proven during trial, the lower court was
precluded from appreciating it because of the new requirement under the rules.
Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion
temporal in its medium period in accordance with Article 249 of the RPC, which
defines and penalizes the crime of homicide. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the absence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the proper penalty is prision mayor in its medium
period, as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Although the trial court correctly awarded P50,000 to the heirs of the victim as
civil indemnity, it failed to grant actual and moral damages, which were prayed
for and proven during the trial. An examination of the records of the case will
show that the defense agreed to the stipulation of P39,000 as actual damages,
which the heirs had spent for the funeral of the victim. Moreover, the
prosecution presented one of her children to prove the pain and the moral
anguish they had suffered by reason of her untimely demise. WHEREFORE,
the automatically appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found
GUILTY of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum; to 14 years
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, he shall pay the heirs of the victim
the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and
P39,000 as actual damages.
Since Ernesto was already some distance away, Joel decided to turn back.
Standing approximately ten meters from Remegio, Joel saw Lorenzo and Rudy
overtake Remegio. Thereafter, Joel witnessed Lorenzo hack Remegio with a
bolo on the back of his head, causing Remegio to fall to the ground. Shocked
by what he saw, Joel could not move to help Remegio. From where he stood,
Joel witnessed Lorenzo deliver another blow at Remegio's neck. Afterwards,
Rudy hacked Remegio at the mouth and forehand. Lorenzo and Rudy
forthwith fled. When the brothers had gone, Joel approached Remegio, who lay
prostrate on the ground, and then he shouted for help. Bobby Antimano, Joey
Villamar, Ben Gapisan, and Eniong Marcelo arrived and helped Joel carry
Remegio's lifeless body to the street pavement. Eventually, SPO3 Dominador
Urbiztondo Jr. and other policemen arrived at the crime scene and conducted
an investigation.
Held: The records are bereft of any information with respect to the physical
condition of both Ernesto and Remegio. For the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength to be appreciated, the age, size, and strength of the
parties must be considered. There must be a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, giving the latter a superiority of strength
which is taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.[42] And
even assuming arguendo that it existed, abuse of superior strength should not
be appreciated separately, for it is absorbed in treachery.
Between nine oclock and nine-thirty on the evening of 8 March 1996, Joelyn
was washing clothes in front of the door of their house, lighted by a fluorescent
lamp, when she saw Lorna coming home from work in her type B uniform and
carrying a brown bag. From a distance of barely four to five meters, Joelyn
could see Lorna running away from appellant. Appellant, apparently drunk, had
no clothes from waist up, was wearing shorts and carrying a gun. When Joelyn
asked the pale and trembling Lorna why she was running, the latter replied,
Lyn, Lyn, enter, close the door, a man (is) following me! (Lyn, Lyn, pasok,
sarado ang pinto, may sumusunod sa akin lalaki). Joelyn promptly closed the
door but appellant was able to kick it open. Joelyn, her forehead hit by the
door, was pushed aside. Appellant grabbed Lornas bag, opened it and,
apparently not finding what he could have been looking for, hurled the bag to
the floor (binalibag po niya ang bag sa sahig). Appellant asked Lorna, Why
did you run? Why did you not mind me? (Bakit ka tumakbo? Bakit di mo ko
pinansin?). Lorna answered, I did not hear you. Joelyn tried to hold the hand
of appellant but he pushed her hand away. Appellant then shot Lorna with a
caliber .45 gun with its muzzle just two feet away from Lornas face. Lorna fell
on the floor with half of her body outside the door and the other half inside the
house. Joelyn held her sister. Lorna was still alive. A neighbor responded to
Joelyns cries for help. Lorna was brought to the hospital. At six oclock the
following morning of 9 March 1996, Joelyn went to Camp Karingal to report the
incident. Later, Joelyn, accompanied by Randy who took down her statement
at the camp, went to the East Avenue Hospital where Lorna had been taken.
Held: Even beyond that, as so expressed above, is the overriding principle that
an accused has the unfettered right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. The Court has no reason to doubt the fact that the
prosecutor and trial judge must have relied in utmost good faith on the old
rule (that a generic aggravating circumstance may be appreciated against the
accused even if it is not alleged in the information), but it is not enough for this
Court to now take that belief into account against appellant and to abandon a
standing tenet that the law, as well as rules of procedure favorable to the
accused, must be given retroactive effect. The Court realizes that neither the
Solicitor General and the prosecutor nor the trial judge, are out of line; indeed,
in People v. Mitra the Court has virtually agreed to consider aggravating
circumstances not alleged in the information but proved during the trial and
appreciated in imposing the sentence, without necessarily impinging the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Nevertheless, in subsequent cases, starting with
People v. Salalima, the Court, taking a hard look on the issue has concluded
that the new rules must be given retroactive effect in the light of the well
settled rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage.
People vs. Roxas, 410 SCRA 451
On or about January 23, 1998, in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with guns, with
intent to kill, and with abuse of superior strength and by means of treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot
Juanito Regacho y Gamboa, thereby inflicting upon said Juanito Regacho y
Gamboa fatal shot wounds, which directly caused his death.
Held: The crime committed by appellants is homicide. Under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, homicide is punished by reclusion temporal. There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period. Appellants are entitled to the benefits under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and may thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum term of which shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
namely, prision mayor. Thus, appellants may be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
Finally, the trial court awarded to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. In
accordance with prevailing judicial policy, the civil indemnity must be reduced to
P50,000.00. The award of moral damages has no factual basis. However, the
heirs of the victim should be awarded temperate damages of P25,000.00, it
appearing that they are entitled to actual damages but the amount thereof
cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265 in Criminal Case No. 113892-H, is
MODIFIED. As modified, appellants Mateo Gregorio y Carpio a.k.a. Jhun
Tayo and Juancho Osorio y Dela Paz are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals of the crime of Homicide and are each sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They are further ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
People vs. Gregorio, 412 SCRA 90
On or about January 23, 1998, in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with guns, with
intent to kill, and with abuse of superior strength and by means of treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot
Juanito Regacho y Gamboa, thereby inflicting upon said Juanito Regacho y
Gamboa fatal shot wounds, which directly caused his death.
Held: The crime committed by appellants is homicide. Under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, homicide is punished by reclusion temporal. There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period. Appellants are entitled to the benefits under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and may thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum term of which shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
namely, prision mayor. Thus, appellants may be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
Finally, the trial court awarded to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. In
accordance with prevailing judicial policy, the civil indemnity must be reduced to
P50,000.00. The award of moral damages has no factual basis. However, the
heirs of the victim should be awarded temperate damages of P25,000.00, it
appearing that they are entitled to actual damages but the amount thereof
cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265 in Criminal Case No. 113892-H, is
MODIFIED. As modified, appellants Mateo Gregorio y Carpio a.k.a. Jhun
Tayo and Juancho Osorio y Dela Paz are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals of the crime of Homicide and are each sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They are further ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
j. Band
In the circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what is taken into account is
not the number of aggressors nor the fact that they are armed
but their relative physical might vis--vis the offended party
Means Employed to Weaken Defense
This circumstance is applicable only
to crimes against persons and
sometimes against person and property, such as robbery with physical
injuries or homicide.
The means used must not totally eliminate possible defense of the victim,
otherwise it will fall under treachery
In the information, the People erroneously charged the accused with robbery
in band with homicide. There is no such crime in the Revised Penal Code. The
felony is properly called robbery with homicide. If robbery with homicide is
committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as
robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, but
the circumstance that it was committed by a band would be appreciated as an
ordinary aggravating circumstance.
k. Treachery
When the masked men returned to Jimmy's house, one of them informed
Erlinda that her husband and father-in-law had been killed for trying to escape.
Upon hearing this, Erlinda, as if the heavens had fallen on her, slowly lost
consciousness.
Crime: Robbery w/ homicide w/ AC of Dwelling
Held: Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only
be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and
robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors
thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the
victim's domicile. In the case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent
disregard of the inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in,
looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into submission,
disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of
the house to be killed.
The trial court held that there was no voluntary surrender, reasoning that the
surrender was worked out only because Senior Police Inspector Mazo
accidentally found appellant when he accompanied the latters relatives back to
their house. It did not occur to the trial court, though, that appellant could have
escaped right after that meeting but he did not. Instead, he submitted himself
unconditionally later that morning when Senior Police Insp. Mazo came for him.
By doing so, appellant manifested his intention to save the authorities the
trouble of conducting a manhunt for him. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Romblon is MODIFIED insofar as it convicts appellant Dennis Mazo of
Murder and imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Judgment is
hereby rendered finding appellant GUILTY of Homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal in its minimum
period as maximum.
Certainly, the victim knew that his scuffle with appellant could eventually turn
into a violent physical clash. The existence of a struggle before the fatal blows
were inflicted on the victim clearly shows that he was forewarned of the
impending attack, and that he was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense.
Indeed, a killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. Moreover,
any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the
accused.
- People vs. Dela Cruz, 416 SCRA 24
l. Ignominy
It is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order,
which adds disgrace to the material injury caused by the crime.
The means employed or the circumstances brought about must tend to
make the effects of the crime
MORE HUMILIATING or
TO PUT THE OFFENDED PARTY TO SHAME.
Applicable to crimes against chastity, rape, less serious physical injuries,
light or grave coercion and murder.
Raping a woman from behind is ignominous because that is not the normal
form of intercourse, it is something which offends the morals of the offended
woman. This is how animals do it.
m. Unlawful Entry
There is unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way not intended
for the purpose.
Unlawful entry must be a means to effect entrance and not for escape.
There is no unlawful entry when
the door is broken
hereafter the accused made an entry thru the broken door.
The breaking of the door is covered by paragraph 19.
Unlawful entry is
inherent in the crime of trespass to dwelling and robbery with force upon
things
but aggravating in the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons.
p. Cruelty
Elements:
1. That the injury caused be deliberately increased by causing other wrong;
2. That the other wrong be unnecessary for the execution of the purpose of the
offender.
Cruelty
For it to exist, it must be shown that the accused enjoyed and delighted in
making his victim suffer.
If the victim was already dead when the acts of mutilation were being
performed,
this would also qualify the killing to murder due to
outraging of his corpse.
Paragraph 21, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
cruelty in the commission of a felony when the wrong done in the commission
of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary
for its commission. There is no cruelty when the other wrong is done after the
victim is already dead. The test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating
circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented
the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or
inhumanly increased the victims suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person
or corpse. The Court agrees with the trial court that the accused and appellants
are guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The hands of the victim were tied
behind his back when he was stabbed. The attack was sudden. The
appellants, with their co-accused, stabbed the victim with their knives/bolos.
The commission of the crime was thus aggravated by abuse of superior
strength. However, abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery.
Dwelling aggravated the crime. However, it cannot be appreciated against the
appellants because it is not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section
8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crime
was committed before the said rule took effect, the new rule had been applied
retroactively since it is more favorable to the accused. No other modifying
circumstances attended the commission of the crime. At the time the crime
was committed, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. Notwithstanding the suspension of the imposition of the death
penalty at the time, the medium of the prescribed penalty remained reclusion
perpetua. Hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court
is correct.
1. RELATIONSHIP
WHERE RELATIONSHIP IS EXEMPTING:
In the case of an accessory who is related to the principal within the relationship
prescribed in Article 20;
Also in Article 247, a spouse does not incur criminal liability for a crime of less
serious physical injuries or serious physical injuries if this was inflicted after having
surprised the offended spouse or paramour or mistress committing actual sexual
intercourse.
Those commonly given in Article 332 when the crime of theft, malicious mischief
and swindling or estafa.
WHERE RELATIONSHIP IS AGGRAVATING:
in CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS in cases where
o the offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the offender (grandson
kills grandfather), or
o when the offender and the offended party are relatives of the same level, as
killing a brother, a brother-in-law, a half-brother or adopted brother.
When CRIME AGAINST PERSONS is any of the SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES (Art. 263), even if the offended party is a descendant of the offender,
relationship is AGGRAVATING.
o But the serious physical injuries must not be inflicted by a parent upon his child
by excessive chastisement.
When the crime is LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES OR SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES
o if the offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the offender
When crime against persons is HOMICIDE OR MURDER,
o relationship is aggravating even if the victim of the crime is a relative of lower
degree.
In CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY,
o relationship is always aggravating
In the CRIME OF QUALIFIED SEDUCTION,
o the offended woman must be a virgin and less than 18 years old.
o But if the offender is a brother of the offended woman or an ascendant of the
offended woman,
regardless of whether the woman is of bad reputation,
even if the woman is 60 years old or more,
o crime is qualified seduction. In such a case, relationship is qualifying.
WHERE RELATIONSHIP IS MITIGATING:
When the CRIME IS LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES OR SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES
o if the offended party is a relative of lower degree
Relationship is neither mitigating nor aggravating, when relationship is an
element of the offense
2. INTOXICATION
It is only the circumstance of intoxication which
if not mitigating,
is automatically aggravating.
WHEN MITIGATING:
1. There must be an indication that
a. because of the alcoholic intake of the offender,
b. he is suffering from diminished self-control.
c. It is not the quantity of alcoholic drink.
d. Rather it is the effect of the alcohol upon the offender which shall be the basis
of the mitigating circumstance.
2. That offender is
a. not a habitual drinker and
b. did not take alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit
crime
WHEN AGGRAVATING:
1. If intoxication is habitual
2. If it is intentional to embolden offender to commit crime
1. By Direct Participation
- People vs. Nunag, 173 SCRA 274
FACTS: Complainant, Lorenza Lopez, then about 15.5 y.o., declared that in the
2nd wk of May 1978, at 730PM, while she was watch a TV program in the
house of her neighbor, Laxamana, she saw the accused Mario Nunag, 1 of her
neighbors, coming towards her. Nunag, staggering & drunk, came to her &
asked her to go w/ him. Because she refused, Nunag held her by the hand &
poked a knife at her stomach & threatened to kill her. Nunag placed something
in her mouth & led her to a nearby ricefield, about 15m. away from Laxamanas
house. Very soon thereafter, the accused was joined by 4 others, whom she
knew also. After conspiring in whispers, Mandap & Salangsang held her hands
while Carpio & Manalili held her feet & forced her to lie on the ground. Nunag
undressed her & had sexual intercourse w/ her. After him, Mandap followed.
She lost consciousness & only regained it while Manalili was abusing her. The
5 accused left w/ a threat that they would kill her & her family.
After the incident, the complainant missed her menstruation period whenit
became due and noticed that her stomach was getting bigger. Yet she didnt
tell anybody until her family noticed. In Oct 1978, she gave birth prematurely to
female twins who died after baptism.
Accused Nunag admitted having sexual intercourse w/ Lopez but denied the
charge of rape. He asserted that it was while he was sleeping when she came
on to him and they went to the ricefield to relieve their lasciviousness. She
asked money after the act and he gave her PhP4.00 and went home.
Accused Salangsang offers the same testimony but asserts that he gave Lopez
P2 instead. Accused Manalili also contends that it was Lopez who came on to
her but he refused to give her money. It was only Carpio & Mandap who
denied having sexual intercourse w/ her.
RTC found them guilty of the charge & sentenced Nunag, Mandap &
Salangsang to suffer reclusion perpetua while Carpio & Manalili, who were
both above 16 & below 18 at the time of the commission of the offense, to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 yrs of prision mayor as min to 17 yrs & 4
mos of reclusion temporal as max.
HELD: Finding that Lopez, a poor barrio girl who looked timid and
inexperienced in the ways of the world, had no motive whatsoever to testify
falsely against the appellants, each of the 5 accused must be found guilty of 3
distinct and separate crimes of rape, the first 3 men by direct act & participation
& the other 2 by indispensable cooperation. Nunag, Mandap & Salangsang
sentenced to suffer 3 penalties of reclusion perpetua while Manalili & Carpio
both being above 16 but below 18 yrs at that time, sentenced to suffer 3
indeterminate penalties of 10 yrs of prision mayor as min & 17 yrs 4 mos of
reclusion temporal as max. Judgment affirmed w/ modification.
2. By Induction
- People vs. Yamson-Dumancas, 320 SCRA 584
On February 20, 1992, Jeanette Yanson Dumancas was swindled in a fake
gold bar transaction losing P352,000 to Danilo Lumangyao and Rufino Gargar,
Jr. On Aug. 5, 1992 10:30 AM Mario Lamis, Dominador Geroche, Rolando
Fernandez, Jaime Gargallano, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Moises
Grandeza were planning to abduct Lumangyao & Gargar Jr. because they
swindled the Dumancas family. Col Nicolas Torres was also informed of the
plan of the group. On August 6, 1992, Jeannette investigated the two abducted
and told the group of Geroche to take care of the two.On Aug 7, 1992,
Gargallano shot Gargar while Geroche shot Lumangyao. Then the 2 bodies
were buried by Pecha & Hilado.
The RTC found the following guilty of:
o Principals by Induction: Jeanette Yanson Dumancas
o Principals by Induction and by Direct Participation and/or Indispensable
Cooperation: Police Col. Nicolas M. Torres
o Principals by Participation:
Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto
Police Officer Mario Lamis Y Fernandez, Dominador Geroche Y Mahusay,
Jaime Gargallano, Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado
o Principals by Participation: Cesar Pecha & Edgar Hilado
Issues:
1. WON Charles Dumancas and Jeannette Yanson Dumancas can be
considered principals by induction?
NO. Jeanette Yanson Dumancas is not guilty as principals by induction
because there are not other evidence that can prove the shes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Article 17. Principals The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the acts.
2. Those who directly force or induce other to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime, namely: (1) by
using irresistible force or (2) by causing uncontrollable fear. Likewise there are
two ways of inducing another to commit a crime, namely: (1) by giving a price
or offering reward or promise and (2) by using works of command. All of the
factors arent admissible to Jeanette. The only evidence that may be
considered is the word to take care of the two w/c may constitute words of
command. Evidenced should the Jeanette meant the to take care of the two
is to allow the law to its course upon cross examination of Moises Grandeza.
This also raises some doubt of what the interpretation of the phrase. Thus it
cannot be concluded since it cannot be concluded that there is command to kill
the victims beyond reasonable by the vague phase itself.
2. WON Police Inspector Adonis Abeto can be considered principals by
participation?
NO. Police Inspector Adonis Abeto participation was to serve a search warrant
on Helen Tortocios residence (person which Gargar and Lumangyao told the
police officers where the money might have gone) and that subsequently
interrogated Gargar and Lumangyao.
3. WON Police Col Nicolas M. Torres can be considered principals by
induction?
NO. Police Col Nicolas M. Torres should have been criminally liable but since
his death the criminal liability is extinguished but the civil liability still subsists.
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death
of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. CC A1157 enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) Law, (b)
Contracts, (c) Quasi-contracts, and (d) Quasi-delicts
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to 1, 1985 RCP 111, as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator of the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon w/c the same is based as
explained above.Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file a separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action & prior to its extinction, the private-offended
party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably w/ provisions of CC A1155, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on possible privation of right by prescription.
3. By Indispensable Cooperation
- People vs. Maluenda, 288 SCRA 225
On August 19, 1992 at around 9:45 in the evening, Engr. Miguel E. Resus
("Engr. Resus") and his wife, Dr. Bernardita B. Resus ("Dr. Resus"), arrived at
their residence/clinic at Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur, from a novena they
attended. Waiting for the Resus spouses at the clinic which adjoins the Resus
spouses' residence were three men who identified themselves as Commander
Bobong Gonzaga (who is actually Raul Mondaga), Commander Bongkoy (who
is actually Maluenda) and alias "Alex". Upon the arrival of the Resus spouses,
Mondaga declared that they came upon orders of a certain Father Simon, an
alleged NPA Commander, with his directive to solicit money and medicines
needed for the victims of the recent military-NPA encounter at Melale, Agusan
del Sur. The trio demanded from the couple medicines and money in the
amount of P20,000.00, but when the couple told them that they did not have
such an amount, they lowered their demand to P10,000.00, and reduced it still
to P5,000.00 when the couple still could not produce the said amount. Finally,
the demand was lowered to any amount the Resus couple could provide. The
latter gave the amount of P500.00 plus assorted medicines worth P800.00.
After they were given the money and medicines, the trio demanded that they
be driven by Engr. Resus in his Volkswagen car to San Roque, Barobo,
Surigao del Sur, but the couple begged off reasoning that their car [did] have
any sufficient gasoline and that the car was not in good running condition to
travel that night. Mondaga then demanded that very early in the morning, the
couple should prepare the vehicle so Engr. Resus [could] drive them to San
Roque, Barobo, Surigao del Sur. They left the clinic with [a] threat not to tell
anybody about their coming, otherwise they [would] kill all the members of their
family and blow-up the clinic.
Held: The appeal is partially granted. The assailed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED as regards Maluenda, but MODIFIED as regards Legarto. Legarto
is hereby found GUILTY as an ACCESSORY only and is ORDERED to serve
the indeterminate sentence of two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prision
mayor, as maximum. He is further ordered to RETURN to Engineer and Dr.
Miguel E. Resus the amount of thirty-six thousand pesos (P36,000)
corresponding to the amount he used to pay his loan arrears. The amount
which the trial court ordered to be restituted by Mondaga and Maluenda is
accordingly reduced by said amount.
B. ACCOMPLICES
a. RPC, Art. 18
Art. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in
Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
HELD:
The Court sustained the authority of the COMELEC to exempt from prosecution
persons charged with vote-buying, vote-selling, and conspiracy to bribe voters who
volunteer to give information and testify on any information under Section 28 of
R.A. No. 6648.The immunity statute seeks a rational accommodation between the
imperatives of the privilege against self-incrimination and the legitimate demands
of government to encourage citizens, including law violators themselves, to testify
against law violators. The statute operates as a complete pardon for the offenses
to which the information was given. Comelec won not only principal but also
accomplices & accessories are criminally liable for election offense. But under sec
68 or sec 265 of bp 381 those violators who testified against violators (vote buying/
selling) are exempt from prosecution. Therefore all the 13 are excempt from
prosecution & their criminal cases are dismissed.
C. ACCESSORIES
a. RCP, Arts. 19, 20
Art. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the
crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments
thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the
crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever
the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take
the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other
crime.
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with
the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of
the next preceding article.
c. PD 1829
PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine
ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing
any of the following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from
reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means
of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or
object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or
admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal
cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal
cases;
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or
has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under
existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction;
(d) publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading
prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other
personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes;
(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process
or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in
the courts;
(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with
knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of
abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender;
(h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his
person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or members of his
family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the investigation of, or
official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or
unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of or in
official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law
enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or
property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in
confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background information and
not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the
investigator or to the court.
If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher
penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.
Section 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or employee,
he shall in addition to the penalties provided thereunder, suffer perpetual
disqualification from holding public office.
Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of January, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty-one.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused may be held criminally liable for the death of the
victim which is not attributable to the stab wounds but due to drowning?
Decision:
A person who commits a felony is criminally liable for the direct naturaland logical
consequences of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime ismore serious
than that intended. The essential requisites for this criminal liabilityto attach are as
follows :
PENALTIES
Section 19.
Issues:
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of
SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other
organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus
is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that
membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the
organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a members
direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid
and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to
its unlawful acts.
Parnala and her husband arrived home from the Kingdom of Jehovahs
Witnesses and were confounded when their housemaid refused to heed their
call from the outside. Parnala was surprised to see three men emerge from
inside the house. The three men then dashed off.
Found inside the house were the bodies of 6-year old Jay Vee and the
Paranalas housemaid, Rosalina. Some items, amounting to P1,100, were
also found to have been missing. Thus, the charges.
Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in 1989 while Sapon and
Bracamonte were at large until the latters arrest in October of the same year.
Appellant Bracamonte denied the charges and interposed the defense of
alibi. Appellant also contended that there was no circumstantial evidence that
will link him in the crime and that Parnala couldnt possible know him to merit
identification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bracamontes defense of alibi and Parnalas lack of personal
affiliation with Bracamonte are worth discharging the appellant of the crime.
RULING:
It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very
easy to concoct. In order that this defense may prosper, it must be
established clearly and convincingly not only that the accused is elsewhere at
the time of the commission of the crime, but that likewise it would have been
physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof. In the instant case,
appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof,
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the victims house at the time
the crime was committed.
Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to
have any reason or motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple denials
and the unacceptable alibi of the accused. Appellant himself admitted that he
was not aware of any reason or motive why Parnala should testify against
him. There is also nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires that in
order for there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a
felon, he must know the latter personally. If this were the case, the
prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in most instances, the
perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim. The witness degree of
closeness or familiarity with the accused, although may be helpful, is by no
means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive identification.
The Court noted that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused,
were charged and convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge
and the corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with homicide
only although two persons were killed. In this complex crime, the penalty
prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the
number of killings accompanying the robbery. The multiplicity of the victims
slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
Appellant further avers that the civilian asset should have been presented in
court to shed light on how he managed to get his information. This argument
is not tenable. The settled rule is that the presentation of an informant in
illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a
successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative
and cumulative.
Based on the foregoing, this Court is convinced that the guilt of appellant has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.
With the enactment and effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty imposable
upon violators of Section 4 of Dangerous Drugs Act is reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to
ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) if the marijuana involved weighs 750
grams or more. In this case, the quantity of marijuana involved weighs more
or less two kilograms, hence, the applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the imposable penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties,
the rules for the application of indivisible penalties under Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code should be applied. This is pursuant to our
pronouncement in People vs. Simon[24] where we recognized the suppletory
application of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code as well as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to the Dangerous Drugs Act after the
amendment of the latter by R.A. No. 7659.[25] Thus, as there is neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
trial court correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. Finally,
considering that the penalty imposed is the indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua, the Indeterminate Sentence Law could not be applied.
1. Exceptions
Issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively
applied to herein accused, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any
future law restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them?
Held: Although at the time of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution the
present case was still its trial stage, it is clear that the framers intended the
provision to have a retroactive effect on pending cases without any penalty of
death having been imposed yet. The retroactive effect may be given during
three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: a) when the crime has been
committed and the prosecution began; b) when sentence has been passed
but service has not begun; and c) when the sentence is being carried out.
The abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused by virtue of Art 22
of the RPC which provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony who is not a habitual
criminal. Hence, they are subject to a reduction of penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua. A subsequent statute cannot be applied retroactively as to
impair a right that accrued under the old law.
In the information, the People erroneously charged the accused with robbery
in band with homicide. There is no such crime in the Revised Penal Code.
The felony is properly called robbery with homicide. If robbery with homicide
is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as
robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, but
the circumstance that it was committed by a band would be appreciated as
an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
Issue: Can the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band in the commission
of the crime be appreciated when it is not properly alleged in the information?
a. With re-enactment
b. Without re-enactment
c. People vs. Pimentel, supra
Facts:
In 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with Subversion
under R.A.1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law) as amended before the RTC of
Manila, and a warrant ofarrest was issued on July 29, 1983, but was not
carried out due to his disappearance. After seven years, on June 5, 1990,
Antonio Tujan was arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrestin the
subversion case, and was likewise found to possess an unlicensed .38
caliber specialrevolver and six rounds of live ammunition. Because of this,
Tujan was charged with IllegalPossession of Firearm and Ammunition in
Furtherance of Subversion under PD No. 1866 beforethe RTC in Makati.
Contention of the People:
Antonio Tujan filed the motion to quash the charge under PD No.1866 on
the ground that he has been previously in jeopardy of being convicted for
Subversion, based on Sections 3(H) and 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.Furthermore, Tujan contends that common crimes
such as illegal possession of firearms andammunition should be
absorbed in subversion. The present case is the twin prosecution ofthe
earlier subversion case, and therefore he is entitled to invoke the
constitutionalprotection against double jeopardy.
Contention of the State:
Tujan does not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a second
timebecause: (a) he has not even been arraigned in the subversion case,
and (b) the previousoffense charged against him is for Subversion,
punishable under RA 1700, while the presentcase is for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of
Subversion,punishable under PD 1866, a different law.
Issue/s to be Solved:
WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in
view of the previous charge under RA 1700.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
While the SC holds that both the subversion charge under RA1700, as
amended, and the one for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
infurtherance of subversion under PD 1866, as amended, can co-exist,
the subsequentenactment of of RA 7636 on Sept. 22, 1992, totally
repealing RA 1700, as amended, hassubstantially changed the
complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the said repealinglaw being
favorable to the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual
delinquent,should be given retroactive effect. With the enactment of RA
7636, the charge of subversionagainst the accused-private respondent
has no more legal basis, and should be dismissed. Itwould be illogical for
the trial courts to try and sentence the accused-private respondent for an
offense that no longer exists.Subversion charge against Tujan was
dismissed, illegal possession of firearm and ammunitionin furtherance of
subversion against the same accused is deemed amended. Accused
wasordered to be released immediately from detention, since he was
already detained for 7years, whereas the amended charge has a penalty
of 4 years, 2 mos. and 1 day to six years.
2. RA 8353
Republic Act No. 8353
AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE,
RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines
in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Anti-Rape Law of
1997."
Section 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of rape shall
hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act
No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a
new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
"Chapter Three
"Rape
"Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
"1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
"a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
"b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
"c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
"d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
"2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
"Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall become reclusion perpetua to death.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim;
"2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or
any law enforcement or penal institution;
"3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity;
"4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or
calling and is personally known to be such by the offender before or at the
time of the commission of the crime;
"5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
"6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human Immuno-
Deficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any
other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to
the victim;
"7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or para-military units thereof or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency or penal institution, when the offender took advantage of
his position to facilitate the commission of the crime;
"8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation or disability;
"9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the
time of the commission of the crime; and
"10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder
and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission
of the crime.
"Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
prision mayor.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
"Reclusion temporal shall be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the
ten aggravating/ qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.
"Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between
the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent
forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or
the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
"Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance
against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the
offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid
consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts
punished under Article 266-A."
Section 3. Separability Clause. - If any part, Sec., or provision of this Act is
declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not affected
thereby shall remain valid.
Section 4. Repealing Clause. - Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, and
all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders,
rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Act
are deemed amended, modified or repealed accordingly.
Section 5. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
completion of its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Issue: WON the pardon made by the mother in behalf of a minor can be
considered.
Held: The SC said that granting a pardon in the name or in behalf of a minor
is not sufficient to extinguished penal action. The injured party must be done
to grant pardon or in case of minority, the guardians should take part only. As
the offense essentially and directly affects the injured party, she alone is
entitled to remit the offense and to authorize the extinction of the penal
action.
In the case at bar, it has been made to appear that the offended party has
expressly pardoned the injury alleged to have been by luna. The pardon of
her mother is not sufficient to authorize the dismissed of the case.
Scale
Principal Penalties
Capital punishment:
Death.
B. Afflictive penalties:
Reclusion perpetua,
Reclusion temporal,
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Prision mayor.
C. Correctional penalties:
Prision correccional,
Arresto mayor,
Suspension,
Destierro.
D. Light penalties:
Arrestomenor,
Public censure.
E. Penalties common to the three preceding classes:
Fine, and
Bond to keep the peace.
F. Accessory Penalties
1. Death/Capital Punishment
a. Sec. 19, Art. 3, Constitution
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment
against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate
penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
b. Related laws
i. RA 7659, imposition of the death penalty
AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN
HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE
REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL
PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1.Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of
the State to foster and ensure not only obedience to its authority,
but also to adopt such measures as would effectively promote the
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare which are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy in a just and humane society;
Section 2. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 114. Treason. - Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the
Philippines or adheres to her enemies giving them aid or comfort
within the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000
pesos."
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony
of two witnesses at least to the same overt act or on confession of
the accused in open court.
Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who commits acts of
treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished
by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed
100,000 pesos."
Section 3. Section Three, Chapter One, Title One of Book Two of
the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Section Three. - Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in the
Philippine waters
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine
waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment or passengers.
The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high
seas or in Philippine waters."
Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes
referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following
circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon
the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without
means of saving themselves or;
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide,
physical injuries or rape."
Section 4. There shall be incorporated after Article 211 of the
same Code a new article to read as follows:
"Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted
with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting
an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift
or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was
not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present,
he shall suffer the penalty of death."
Section 5. The penalty of death for parricide under Article 246 of
the same Code is hereby restored, so that it shall read as follows:
"Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate of illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death."
Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the
aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or
of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of
an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any
other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse."
Section 7. Article 255 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article
246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any
person who shall kill any child less than three days of age.
If any crime penalized in this Article be committed by the mother of
the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods, and if said crime be committed for the same purpose by
the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal."
Section 8. Article 267 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three
days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall
have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except
when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed."
Section 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
- Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence
against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or
on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua, when or if by reason or on occasion of such
robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision I of
Article 263 shall have been inflicted.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in
subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, shall have been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, if the violence or intimidation
employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been
carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the
crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender shall
have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission
any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of
said Article 263.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period in other cases."
Section 10. Article 320 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single
act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed
on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the
public in general or where people usually gather or congregate for
a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental
function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade,
workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a
definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient
dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said
building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of
whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane,
devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use,
entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any
appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of public
utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of
concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of law, or
for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors
or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed
by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of
whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or
the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or
another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or
fireworks factory, ordnance, storehouse, archives or general
museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable
or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty
of death shall be imposed."
Section 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent,
any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years
old.
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered permanent physical mutilation."
Section 12. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Sec. 2.Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount
or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall
be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In
the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties
and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State."
Section 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act 1972,
are hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 3.Importation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusionperpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring into
the Philippines any prohibited drug.
"Sec. 4.Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
"Sec. 5.Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort for Prohibited Drug
Users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall
maintain a den, dive or resort where any prohibited drug is used in
any form or where such prohibited drugs in quantities specified in
Section 20, Paragraph 1 of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed in every
case where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to
a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate cause of the death of a
person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary.
"Sec. 7.Manufacture of Prohibited Drug. - The penalty of
reclusionperpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the
manufacture of any prohibited drug.
"Sec. 8.Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any
prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
"Sec. 9.Cultivation of Plants which are Sources of Prohibited
Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall plant, cultivate or
culture any medium Indian hemp, opium poppy
(papaversomniferum), or any other plant which is or may hereafter
be classified as dangerous drug or from which any dangerous
drug may be manufactured or derived.
The land or portions hereof, and/or greenhouses on which any of
said plants is cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and
escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove that
he did not know such cultivation or culture despite the exercise of
due diligence on his part.
If the land involved in is part of the public domain, the maximum of
the penalties herein provided shall be imposed upon the offender."
Section 14. Sections 14, 14-A, and 15 of Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 14.Importation of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusionperpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring any
regulated drug in the Philippines.
"Sec. 14-A. Manufacture of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusionperpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the
manufacture of any regulated drug.
"Sec. 15.Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed."
Section 15. There shall be incorporated after Section 15 of Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drug Act of 1972, a new section to read as follows:
"Sec. 15-a. Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for regulated drug
users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall
maintain a den, dive or resort where any regulated drugs is used
in any form, or where such regulated drugs in quantities specified
in Section 20, paragraph 1 of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed
in every case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or
sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed.
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must
be imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases:
1. When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age.
2. When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme
court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as
to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty. For the
imposition of said penalty or for the confirmation of a judgment of
the inferior court imposing the death sentence, the Supreme Court
shall render its decision per curiam, which shall be signed by all
justices of said court, unless some member or members thereof
shall have been disqualified from taking part in the consideration
of the case, in which even the unanimous vote and signature of
only the remaining justices shall be required.
Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed.
The death sentence shall be executed with reference to any other
and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by
electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed under the
authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible
to mitigate the sufferings of the person under sentence during
electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution.
If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be
anaesthetized at the moment of the electrocution.
Art. 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance
to the culprit. The court shall designate a working day for the
execution but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not
be communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and
the execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at
least eight hours following the notification, but before sunset.
During the interval between the notification and the execution, the
culprit shall, in so far as possible, be furnished such assistance as
he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by
priests or ministers of the religion he professes and to consult
lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with
members of his family or persons in charge of the management of
his business, of the administration of his property, or of the care of
his descendants.
Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence.
The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the
three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is
pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this
last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article
40.
Art. 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness
thesame.chanrobles virtual law library The execution shall take
place in the penitentiary of Bilibid in a space closed to the public
view and shall be witnessed only by the priests assisting the
offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives, not exceeding
six, if he so request, by the physician and the necessary
personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as the
Director of Prisons may authorize.
Art. 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed
and its burial. Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of the
culprit shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings
subsequent to the execution, be turned over to the institute of
learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose
of study and investigation, provided that such institute shall take
charge of the decent burial of the remains. Otherwise, the Director
of Prisons shall order the burial of the body of the culprit at
government expense, granting permission to be present thereat to
the members of the family of the culprit and the friends of the
latter. In no case shall the burial of the body of a person
sentenced to death be held with pomp.
c. Cases
i. Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil 741
Facts: Fred Harden transferred over P1000 in drafts of cash to
Hong Kong, P20,196.80 to California and P50000 to an unknown
person, the said amounts are conjugal property. His wife
petitioned the court to order Harden to return all these amounts as
well as the P386,553 shares of Balatoc Mining Corporation
alleged to be in his possession. Because of civil disobedience or
civil contempt, the court ordered his arrest as well as his
confinement of the New Bilibid Prisons, this means an indefinite
time of imprisonment until he complies with the court orders.
Ruling: The punishment for contempt is neither cruel nor
excessive. The SC said that punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is
not cruel, within the meaning as used in the Constitution. It implies
there something inhuman or barbarous, something more than
extinguishment of life. In this case, if the term of imprisonment is
indefinite and might last through the life of the petitioner, yet by the
terms of the sentence, the door is left open for him to avoid
serving any part of it by complying with the orders of hte court,
and in this manner put an end to his incarceration.
Facts: Pedro raped his own daughter, Elvie who was then under 18 yrs
old. The first sexual abused happened on Nov 24, 1992 when she was
only 12 yrs old. The second abuse was on December 24, 1996, when the
family moved to another place. The third was on Jan 1997. In all those
abuses Pedro always threatened to kill Elvie if she would reveal the same
to anyone.
Contention of the accused: There should only be one death penalty since
it was committed against one person. Intoxication should mitigate.
Accessory
-Does not have any accessory penalties -Has accessory
penalty (example:
Perpetual special disqualification)
Nature
-A penalty under special laws -A penalty
under the RCP
(example: firearms, carnapping)
Duration
-Does not appear to have extent or duration -has specified
duration (example: 20 yrs. 1 day- 40 yrs)
-intails on 30 years imprisonment after which the convict becomes
eligible for pardon.
Held: The SC ruled that the RTC 50 Palawan and Puerto Princesa
erred in imposing life imprisonment on Gerry Ballabare for
violation of PD 1866. Illegal possession of firearms in its
aggravated form is punishable by the death penalty was since the
crime was committed on September 16. 1990, when the
imposition of the death penalty was prohibited, the next lower in
degree, reclusion perpetua, should be instead be imposed. This is
not the equivalent of life imprisonment, as the SC explained.
Wherefore the penalty is modified. He is guilty of PD 1866,
violation subjected to reclusion perpetua.
Held: At the time of the commission of the crime, the penalty for
murder was reclusion temporal to death but death penalty was
suspended and we should follow art. 64 (mitigating- minimum
period, aggravating- maximum period,no more aggravating
medium period).
In the case at the bar, there being mitigating or
aggravating, the medium period which is reclusion perpetua is
imposed.
He is not entitled to the benefit of indeterminate sentence
law because Sec. 2 provides that it is not applicable to offences
punishable by death or life imprisonment.
The term Life Imprisonment has been construed to
include reclusion perpetua.
a. Reclusion Perpetua
Article 27. Reclusion perpetua- The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
from twenty years and one day to forty years.
Reclusion temporal- The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be
from twelve years and one day to twenty years.
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification- The duration of the
penalties prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be six years
and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification
is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be
that of the principal penalty.
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro- The duration of
the penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be
from six months and one day to six years, except when suspension is
imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that
of the principal penalty.
Arresto mayor- The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall
be from one month and one day to six months.
Arresto menor-bThe duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall
be from one day to thirty days.
Bond to keep the peace- The bond to keep the peace shall be
required to cover such period of time as the court may determine. (as
amended by RA no. 7659)
i. RA 7659
-Under RA 7659, the legal duration of reclusion perpetua is 20 and
1 day to 40 yrs. However, the SC ruled that it is still an indivisible.
Penalty and has no legal duration.
-This act restored the death penalty. It took effect on December
31, 1993. It will be applicable for some serious crimes.
Held: He can only be charged for attempted rape for the second
case because the compliant for this incident charges the accused
only with the crime of attempted rape. he cannot led convicted of
consummated rape. He can only be sentenced to prision mayor.
For the first case, rape is consummated sentencing him to 34 yrs,
4 mos and 1 day of reclusion perpetua because:
-Pursuant to section 21 of RA 7659, reclusion perpetua
has now a duration of 20 yrs and 1 day to 40 yrs.
-Art. 76 still provides that it is divisible into medium,
minimum and maximum.
-But RA 7659 does not make explicit intention to convert it
divisible penalty.
-So Art. 65 should be applied (penalty cases not composed
of 3 periods can be divided into 3 equal time)
-Because ther is aggravating, the maximum period (34 yrs,
4 mos and 1 day to 40 yrs) should be applied: (minimum- 20 yrs, 1
day to 28 yrs and 8 mos) (medium- 26 yrs, 8 mos and 1 day to 33
yrs and 4 mos).
Art. 87 Rule in the case the maximum penalty: the accused shall
be released from preventive imprisonment after 30 days.
Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted to enter
the place or places designated in the sentence, nor within the various
therein specified, which shall not be more than 250 not less than 25 km
from place designated.
If the detention does not agree to abide by the name disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the
service of his sentence with 4/5 of the time during which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment.
b. Public censure
Public Censure- Censure being a penalty; not proper acquainted
reprimanded by the judge.
Art.88- Served in a municipal jail or in the house of the defendant himself
under the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides
in its decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and
other reason which may seem satisfactory to it.
Art. 35 Effects of bond to keep the peace- It shall be the duty of any
person sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to present two
sufficient surities who shall undertake that such person will not commit
the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such offense be
committed they will pay the amount in the office of the clerk of the court to
guarantee said undertaking.
The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of
duration of the bond.
Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he
shall be detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, if
if he shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and
shall not exceed thirty days, if for a light felony.
G. ACCESSORY PENALTIES
1. Perpetual or Temporary Absolute Disqualification
Art. 32 Effects of penalties of perpetual /temporary special disqualification for
the exercise of the right of suffrage.
The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of
the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty of the right to vote in
any public office or to be such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be
elected to such office during the period of his disqualification.
3. Suspension from Public Office, the Right to Vote and Be Voted for, the
Profession or Calling
The suspension from public office, profession or calling or right of suffrage
during the term of the sentence.
The persons suspended from holding public office shall not hold another
having similar functions during the period of his suspension.
4. Civil Interdiction
Art. 34 civil Interdiction-civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the
time of his sentence of the parental authority, or property of any ward, of
marital authority, of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.
*Civil Interdiction is imposable when penalty is:
1. Death when not executed
2. reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
A person civilly interdicted cant appoint an agent to manage his property
because the act of the agent is also the act of the principal.
He can prepare a last will and testament because what the law prohibits
is the disposition of property (at the time of its making) by an act inter vivos.
5. Indemnification
6. Bond Art. 35
Art. 35 Effects of bond to keep the peace- It shall be the duty of any person
sentenced to give bond to keep peace, to present two sufficient surities who
shall undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to be
prevented and that in case, such offense be committed.
H. SUBSIDIARY PENALTY
Art. 39. If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary
personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the
following rules:
RA 5465: Eliminated the pecuniary liability of the accused, other than fine, in art
39 of the revised penal code.
-Since RA 5465 is favorable to the accused, it has retroactive application.
A. GRAVE FELONIES
B. LESS GRAVE FELONIES
C. LIGHT FELONIES
Art. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases- In cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another than another given
penalty, without specification designating the name of the former, if such
higher penalty should be that of death, the same penalty and the accessory
penalty/ies of art.40, shall be considered as the higher penalty.
Art. 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees -
Whenever it would be necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by
one or more degrees, it shall be increase or reduced, respectively for each
degree, by of the maximum amount prescribed by law without, however,
changing the minimum.
The same rules shall be observed with regard to fines that do not consist
of a fixed amount, but are made proportional.
Art. 76. Legal period of duration of divisible penalties- The legal period of
divisible penalties shall be considered as divided into 3 parts, forming 3
periods, the minimum, the medium, and the maximum in the manner shown
in the following table.
Art 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of 3 distinct penalties-
In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of 3 distinct
penalties, each one shall form a period; the lightest of them shall be the
minimum, the next the medium, and the most severe the maximum period.
Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms
specially provided for in this code, the periods shall be distributed, applying
by analogy the prescribed rules.
a. EO 214, 1987
Art.29. Period of Preventive Imprisonment Deducted from term of
imprisonment Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting
of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees
voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice
or more times of anyc rime;
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence
they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoner, he shall be credited in the service
of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone
preventive imprisonment.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a
period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the
offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is
under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be
sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty days of preventive
imprisonment. (As amended by R.A. No. 6127, and further amended by
E.O. No. 214, July 10, 1987).
Held: Art. 63 (3) of the RPC will be applied when the commission of the
act is attended by some MC and there is no AC, the lesser penalty shall
be applied: that the accused is suffering from illness which would
deminish the exercise of his will power.
The court finds the appellant guilty of parricide and hereby affirm
the judgment of the lower court with the modification that the appellant will
be credited with 1/2 of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone.
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties- for the purpose of graduating the
penalties which according to the provisions of article 50 to 57, inclusive of
this code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principal of any
frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately that indivisible
penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Art. 71 of this
code.
2. When the penalty prescribe for the crime is composed of two indivisible
penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full
extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective
graduated scale.
3. When the penalty precribed for the crime is composed of one or two
indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible penalty,
the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and
minimum period of that immediately following in said respective
graduated scale.
4. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several
periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next
lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately following
the minimum prescribed and of the two next following which shall be
taken from the penalty prescribed kif posible, otherwise from the penalty
immediately following in the above-mentioned respective graduated
scale.
Contention of the Accused: primo assails that rape was not consummated
as proven by the absence of any sign of physical injuries or of penetration
of Crysthel's private parts.
Habitual Delinguent- within a period of 10 yrs from the date of his release
or conviction of the crimes:
1. S-erious/ less serious physical injuries
2. T-heft
3. R-obbery
4. E-stafa
5. F-falsification
is found guilty of any of the said crime for a 3rd time or oftener.
Ruling: The rape is on its attempted stage because the alleged touching
is merely a stroke on the external surface of the female organ and there
must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the
labia or slid into the female organ for rape to be consummated.
The penalty for attempted rape is 2 degrees lower than the
imposable penalty of death for the offense charged, which is statutory
rape of a minor below 7 yrs. 2 degree lower is reclusion temporal,
applying the indeterminate sentence law and in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum of penalty to be
imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the medium period to
reclusion temporal, while the minimum shall be taken from the medium
period of the penalty next lower in degree which is prison mayor in any of
its period.
Campuhan is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 8 yrs 4
mos and 10 days of prision mayor medium as minimum to 14 yrs, 10mos
and 20 days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods-
in case in which the penalties prescribed by law contain 3 periods,
whether it will be a single devisition penalty or composed of 3 different
penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the
provisions of article 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application
of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they
shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of
the act, they shall impoe the penalty in its minimum periods.
3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission
of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum periods.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the
court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other
according to thier relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigation circumstancesand no
aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall imposethe penalty
next lower period tha it may deem applicable, according to the number.
Art. 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of
the fourth circumstanceof art.12 are present- When all the conditions
required in circumstance number 4 of art.12 of the code to exempt from
criminal liability are not present, the penalty of the arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, if of a less grave felony.
Art. 69 Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly
excusable- A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the
lack of some of the conditions required to justify liability in the several
cases mentioned in art.II and 12, provided that the majority of such
conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period
which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the
conditions of exemption present or lacking.
Ruling: The present case would have fallen under no.5 of art. II if the two
conclusions therefore:
1. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office concurred.
2. That the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or lawful exercise of
such right or office.
Art. 69 is applicable for the requirement that the majority of such condition
be present is IMMATERIAL since there are only 2 conditions in in no. 5 of
Art.II. Basic is the rule that penal laws in favor of the accused shows be
given liberal construction without going beyond the obvious intention of
the legislature. (Only the first is fulfillment and the other is wanting) Art. 69
is obviously in favor of the accused as it provides a penalty lower than
that prescribed by law when the crime committed is not wholly justifiable,
the intention of the legislature being to mitigate the penalty by reason of
the diminution of either or the lesser perversity of the offender.
Petition is granted. The petitioner is hereby sentenced to
interminate penalty of from 2 yrs. 4 mos. A day of prision correcional to 8
yrs. 1 day of prision mayor.
B. SPECIFIC RULES
1. Complex Crimes Art. 48
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes- When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied In its
maximum period.
a. Kinds
1. Compound Crime- when a single act constitutes 2/more grave or
less grave felonies (delito Compuesto)
Requisites:
a. That only one single act is performed by the offender.
b. That such single act produces two or more grave or less grave
felonies.
Examples:
Double homicide/ murder (2 deaths)
Multiple homicide (3 or more deaths)
Homicide with frustrated homicide
Homicide with attempted homicide
-a grave or less grave felony cannot be complexed with a light felony
(should be and not complexed).
Examples:
Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
Slight physical injuries
2. Complex crime proper (Delito Complejo)- when the offense is
necessary in committing the other.
Requisites:
a. That at least 2 offenses are committed.
b. That one of the offenses is necessary means for committing the
other.
c. That both of the offenses must be punished under the same
statute.
Examples:
Estafa through falsification of commercial documents
Malversation through falsification of public document
Seduction through usurpation of public functions
c. Principles of Pro Reo in Criminal Law- Art. 48 is intended to favor
the accused. When 2 or more crimes are the result of a single act, the
offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes
through separate and distinct acts.
d. Rebellion
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection- How committed- The crime rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or
any part thereof , of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or
depriving the chief executive or the legislature, wholly or partially, of any
of their power or prerogatives (as amended by RA no. 6968, October 24,
1990).
Contention of the state: Enriles case does not fall within the
Hernandez riding because the information in Hernandez charged
murder & other common crimes committed as a necessary means
for the commission of rebellion (delito complejo) whereas the the
information against Sen. Enrile et. al charged murder and
frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance of rebellion (delito compuesto, arising from a single
act constituting 2/ more grave/less grave offenses).
iv. RA 6968
-common crimes involving hillings, violence, robberies, etc even
though committed by rebels in furtherance.
d. Related Cases
i. Napolis vs. CA, 43 SCRA 301
Facts: Mrs. Peatla, after answering a call of
nature,heard the barking of dogs indicating the
presence of strangers. She wake up her husband,
Ignacio who took his flashlight and revolver to check
out on the commotion. As he approached the door of
the store I suddenly gave way having been pushed
by 4 armed men. Ignacio fired his gun but missed. He
tell to the ground after being hit in the head. The 4
men went upstairs and took money from Mrs. Pea
Flor and her two children. They were sentenced to
suffer imprisonment from 10 yrs and 1 day prision
mayor as min. to 17 yrs. 4 mos. And 1 day at R.T. as
max.
Issue: WON the crime was a result of one distinct act making it a
complex crime.
Continuing Crime
-one where any of the elements of the offense is
committed in different localities skuch that the accused maybe
charged in any place where an essential element of the crime was
committed.
-not a complex crime because the offender does not
perform a single act but a series of acts and not offense is not a
necessary means of committing the other.
f. Reckless Imprudence
Ruling: Applying Art. 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there
is no complex crime. The resulting offense maybe treated as
separate of the light felony maybe absorbed by the grave felony.
Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical
injuries, both resulting from reckless imprudence, do not constitute
a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information.
The penalty of arresto menor in its max/ should be
imposed.
Two-tiered Penalties
-occurs when the law provides that a penalty to a particular
crime is in addition to the penalty imposable for another crime
which results from the commission of such particular crime.
Examples:
1. Maltreatment of Prisoners (Art. 235)
-the penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to prision
mayorin its min. period, in addition to his liability for the physical
injuries shall be imposed upon any public officer or e.e. who shall
overdo himself in the correction of handling of a prisoner or
detention officer under his charge.
2. Direct Bribery (Art. 210)
-Any public officer, who shall agree to perform an act
constituting a crime in correction with the performance of his
official duty in consideration of any offer promise, gift or present
received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of
another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its min. and
medium periods and a fine not less than 3 times the value of the
gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed
upon, if the same shall have been committed.
3. Occupation of property or usurpation of real rights in property
(Art.312)
-Any person who, by means of violence against
intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property
or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in
addition to the penalty incurred for the acts violence executed by
him, shall be punished by a fine from 50 to 100 per centum of the
gain which he shall have obtained, but not less than 75 pesos.
*Crimes committed by public servants.
Issue: WON the crime is correct as robbery with homicide and rape.
Held: In the case of Pp vs. Lascuna, It was held that when rape co-exist
with homicide in the commission of robbery, rape should be considered as
an aggravated circumstance.
When the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is
accompanied by another offense like rape or intentional mutilation, such
additional offense is treated as an aggra. Circumstance which would
result in the imposition of the max. penalty of death.
The penalty for robbery with homicide is RP to death which is
composed of 2 indivisible penalties. The imposable penalty is death due
to the presence of the aggra. Circumstance of dwelling and absence of
any mit. circumstance.
In special crimes, only one crime is committed.
Contention of the accused: There should only be one death penalty since
it was committed against one person. Intoxication should mitigate.
7. Degrees Art. 61. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of
three periods
-In cases in which the penalty prescribed by the law is not composed of
three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contain in foregoing articles,
dividing into 3 equal portions the time included in the penalty prescribed, and
forming one period of each of the 3 portions.
8. Periods Art. 64
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.
In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods,
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions
of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the penalty
the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or
aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they
shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the commission of the
act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.
3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act,
they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the
court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to
their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to
the number and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating
circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that
prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the
penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by the
crime.
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to
be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case
exceed 30 years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual
delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo,
hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third
time or oftener.
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases in which
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is
no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances
and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the act, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one
another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of
applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the
result of such compensation.
Art. 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods.
In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods,
the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into
three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one
period of each of the three portions.
Art. 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of the
fourth circumstance of Article 12 are present. When all the conditions required
in circumstances Number 4 of Article 12 of this Code to exempt from criminal
liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he
shall have been guilty of a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if of a less grave felony.
a. PD 603
*youthful offender- over 9 but under 18 at the time of commission of the
offense a youth offender held for examination or trial who cannot furnish
tail will be committed to the DSWD/ local rehabilitation center or detention
home.
Judgment of the court shall not be pronounced but suspended
except for the following cases:
1. Those who previously enjoyed a suspension of sentence.
2. Those convicted of death or L.I.
3. Those convicted of an offense by the military tribunals
b. RA 9344
Below 1h5 yrs exempt
15-18 yrs - exempt unless acted with discernment (one degree lower,
sentence suspended)
18-70yrs full criminal responsibility
Not with standing the provisions of the next preceding, the max duration
of the convicts sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of
time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon
him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the
sum total of those imposed equals the same max period.
Such max period shall in no case exceed 40 yrs.
Contention of the state: The 3-fold rule does not concern the imposition of
penalties but to the successive service of sentence only.
Ruling: Under art. 70 of the RPC when an offender has to serve two or
more penalties, he should serve them simultaneously it the nature of the
penalties will so permit. Otherwise said penalties shall be executed
successively, following the offender of their respective severity in such
case, the 2nd sentence will not commence to run until the expiration of
the first.
The nature of the two sentences does not allow its simultaneously
service, hence he must serve it successively. Not only that he must serve
it successively, he must also serve it up to its max term.
He must serve the penalty in the sale of shabu up to its max,
before service of the penalty in the possessions of shabu also up to its
max.
Scale no.2
1. PAD
2. TAD
3. Suspension from public office, suffrage, profession or calling
4. Public censure
5. Fine
C. CASES
Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed.
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be
imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases:
Section 5 - Effectivity This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation, whichever comes earlier. Publication shall not be later
than ten (10) days after the approval thereof.
3. In the matter of the petition for Habeas Corpus of Pete C. Lagran, 363 SCRA
275
Facts: The accused was convicted of 3 counts of violation of BP22 and was
sentenced to imprisonment of 1 year for each count. He was detained on
Feb. 24, 1999. On March 19, 2001, he filed a petition for habeas corpus
claiming he completed the service of his sentence. Citing Art. 70, RPC, he
claimed that he shall serve the penalties simultaneously. Thus, there is no
more legal basis for his detention.
Held: Art. 70 allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the
nature of the penalties so permit. In the case at bar, the petitioner was
sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the offense
committed. The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all
the terms simultaneously. The rule of successive service must be applied.
2. Minors
a. Supreme Court A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, Sections 31-35
Supreme court am no. 02-1-18-SC, sections 31-35
Section 31.Diversion Committee - In each court, there shall be
organized a Diversion Committee composed of its Branch Clerk of Court
as chairperson; the prosecutor, a lawyer of the Public Attorney's Office
assigned to the court, and the social worker assigned by the court to the
child, as members.
Section 32.Proceedings Before Arraignment - The Diversion
Committee shall determine if the child can be diverted and referred to
alternative measures or services. Subject to pertinent provisions of this
Rule and pending determination of diversion by the Committee, the court
shall release the child on recognizance to the parents, guardian or
custodian, or nearest relative; or if this is not advisable, commit the child
to an appropriate youth detention home or youth rehabilitation center
which shall be responsible for the presence of the child during the
diversion proceedings.
If the Diversion Committee determines that diversion is not proper, or
when the child or the private complainant object to the diversion, or when
there is failure if the diversion program if undertaken by the child, it shall
submit a report to the court recommending that the case be subjected to
formal criminal proceedings. The court in turn shall direct the transmittal
of the records of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court for the
assignment of a regular criminal docket number to the case as follows:
CICL Crim. Case No.___-___( year). The Office of the Clerk of Court shall
thereafter return the case to the court for arraignment and formal
proceedings.
Section 33.Proceeding Before the Diversion Committee. - Upon
receipt by the Committee of a case for diversion from the Office of the
Clerk of Court, the chairperson shall call for a conference with notice to
the child, the mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in
their absence, the nearest relative, the child's counsel, and the private
complainant and counsel to determine if the child can be diverted to the
community continuum instead of formal court proceedings.
In determining whether diversion is appropriate for the child, the
Committee shall consider the following factors:
(a) The past records, if any, involving the child in conflict with the law;
(b) The likelihood that the child will be an obvious threat to himself/herself
and the community;
(c) Whether the child has feeling of remorse for the offense committed;
(d) If the child or the parent are indifferent or hostile; and whether this will
increase the possibility of delinquent behavior; and
(f) If community-based programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration of
the child are available.
If the Committee finds that diversion is appropriate, it shall design a
diversion program in accordance with Section 34 of this Rule for the
consideration and approval of the court.
Should the Committee determine that diversion is not appropriate, it shall
make the corresponding report and recommendation in accordance with
Section 31 of this Rule.
The Committee cannot recommend diversion in case the child or the
private complainant objects.
Section 34.Diversion programs. -The Committee shall design a
diversion program talking into consideration the individual characteristics
and peculiar circumstances of the child in conflict with the law. The
program shall be for a specific and definite period and may include any or
a combination of the following:
(a) Written or oral reprimand or citation;
(b) Written or oral apology;
(c) Payment of the damage caused;
(e) Payment of the cost of the proceedings;
(f) Return of the property;
(g) Guidance and supervision orders;
(h) Counseling for the child and his family;
(i) Training, seminar and lectures on (i) anger management skills; (ii)
problem-solving and/or conflict resolution skills; (iii) values formation; and
(iv) other skills that will aid the child to properly deal with situations that
can lead to a repetition of the offense;
(j) Participation in available community-based programs;
(k) Work-detail program in the community; or
(l) Institutional care and custody.
The Committee shall also include in the program a plan that will secure
satisfaction of the civil liability of the child in accordance with Sec. 2180 of
the Civil Code. Inability to satisfy the civil the liability shall not by itself be
a ground to discontinue the diversion program of a child. On the other
hand, consent to diversion by the child or payment of civil indemnity shall
not in any way be construed as admission of guilt and used as evidence
against the child in the event that the case is later on returned to the court
for arraignment and conduct of formal proceedings.
The court shall act on the recommendation within five (5) days from the
termination of the hearing.
When the youthful offender has reached the age of twenty-one while in
commitment, the court shall determine whether to dismiss the case in
accordance with the next preceding article or to pronounce the judgment
of conviction.
In any case covered by this article, the youthful offender shall be credited
in the service of his sentence with the full time spent in actual
commitment and detention effected under the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 198.Effect of Release of Child Based on Good Conduct. -
The final release of a child pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter shall
not obliterate his civil liability for damages. Such release shall be without
prejudice to the right for a writ of execution for the recovery of civil
damages.
Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court acquits him, or
dismisses the case or commits him to an institution and subsequently
releases him pursuant to this Chapter, all the records of his case shall be
destroyed immediately after such acquittal, dismissal or release, unless
civil liability has also been imposed in the criminal action, in which case
such records shall be destroyed after satisfaction of such civil liability. The
youthful offender concerned shall not be held under any provision of law,
to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of
his failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in
response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose.
"Records" within the meaning of this article shall include those which may
be in the files of the National Bureau of Investigation and with any police
department, or any other government agency which may have been
involved in the case.
Article 201.Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. - The civil liability
for acts committed by a youthful offender shall devolve upon the
offender's father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother,
or in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian. Civil liability may
also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender.
Article 202.Rehabilitation Centers. - The Department of Social
Welfare shall establish regional rehabilitation centers for youthful
offenders. The local government and other non-governmental entities
shall collaborate and contribute their support for the establishment and
maintenance of these facilities.
I. TOTAL EXTINCTION
A. Extinction in General
1. RPC, Articles 89-93, 36
Art. 89.How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this
Code.
********explanation
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
a. Criminal liability whether before or after final judgment is extinguished
upon death because it is a personal penalty. (The penalty requires personal
service of sentence. If death occurs, there will be nobody to serve the penalty for
the crime.)
b. Extinguishment of criminal liability is a ground of motion to quash
c. If the offender dies before final judgment, pecuniary penalties are
extinguished.
d. If the offender dies after final judgment, the pecuniary penalties are NOT
extinguished.
e. Civil liability exists only when the accused is convicted by final judgment.
g. Extinction of criminal liability does not necessarily mean that the civil
liability is also extinguished.
Effect of the death of the accused pending appeal on his criminal and civil
liability.
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore, may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1 Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator of the estate of the
accused, depending on the source obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
Example: The claim of civil liability based on law may also be made in the
offense of physical injuries, since Art. 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil
action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action (Belamala vs. Palomar).
Contention of the accused: The full pardon has wiped out the crime and thus:She
is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension and,she must be
reinstated to her former post as assistant city treasurer.
Contention of the state: Acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer
is the only ground for reinstatement to a former position and entitlement to
payment of salaries, benefits and emoluments due to during the period of her
suspension.
Held
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past.
1. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has
been suffered. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be
entitled to receive backpayfor lost earnings and benefits.
2. The absolute disqualification from public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and
punishment were wiped out by her pardon, this absolute disqualification from
public office was likewise removed.
Hence, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited
by reason of her conviction. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer,
she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
Ruling
Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself;
it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the
penalty and all its effects.
Hence, Patriarca is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder of Arevalo.
Issue :Whether or not the death of the appellant extinguished his criminal and
civil liabilities arising from the delict or crime.
Held
Yes.
Art. 89.(RPC) provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished:
In the present case, it is clear that the death of appellant extinguished his
criminal liability.
Moreover, becauseAbungan died during the pendency of the appeal and before
the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or
delict was also extinguished.
It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of
obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil
action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
The lower court's Decision -- finding him guilty and sentencing him to suffer
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased -- becomes
ineffectual.
b. The death of the offended party does not extinguish the criminal liability of
the offender, because the offense is committed against the state. (People vs.
Misola)
c. Where there are several accused, the death of one does not result to the
dismissal of the action because the liabilities, whether civil or criminal of said
accused are distinct and separate. (Problem 3)
d. By service of sentence;
e. Crime is a debt, hence extinguished upon payment
f. Service of sentence does not extinguish the civil liability
g. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
Contention of the accused: The ten-year prescriptive period started at the time of
the commission of falsification (1979), thus it has prescribed in 1991.
Held
The petitioners contention is inaccurate. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.
It was only in 1990 that Doral knew the falsification and the ten-year
prescriptive period has not yet prescribed when the information was filed in 1991.
Cojuangco has also allegedly conspired with the members of the UCPB Board of
Directors, in open breach of the fiduciary duty as administrator-trustee of the
Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF), to manipulate the said fund
resulting in the transfer of (P840,789,855.53) of CIDF to his own corporation - the
Agricultural Investors, Inc.
In February 12, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) initiated the
complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
The case was referred to Ombudsman AnianoDesierto.
Desierto dismissed it because the offense charged has already
prescribed when the complaint was filed.
Contention of the accused: The prescription period for violation of the Anti-Graft
Practices Act was ten (10) years. The complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019
was filed before the PCGG on February 12, 1990 or more than fifteen (15) years
after the birth of the allegedly illegal contract (1974). Thus, it has prescribed.
Contention of the accused: The prescription period in R.A. No. 3019 does not
apply to respondents. It should be imprescriptible. The prosecution is actually a
suit intended to recover ill-gotten wealth from public officials, and therefore Sec.
15, Art. XI of the 1987 should be followed:
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or their nominees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel.
Held
For a violation of a special law, Act No. 3326 shall be used. Since R.A. No. 3019
is a special law, the commencement of the period for the prescription for any act
violating it is governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
As a rule:
If the commission of the crime is known- the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day it was committed.
If the time of commission is unknown - prescription shall only run from its
discovery and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
In the case at bar, it was impossible for the State to have known the violations at
the time the questioned transaction was made. Thus, the prescription shall be
computed from the discovery of the commission and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment (1990), and NOT from the day
of such commission.
Note: The institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment
starts in 1990, the crime will prescribe in 2000 (10 years after).
Thus, the prior decision of Desierto was reversed and set aside.
Ombudsman Desierto was directed to proceed with the preliminary investigation
Contention of the state: The right of the Republic of the Philippines to recover
behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible pursuant to the mandate of
Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution, which provides:
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials
or employees, from them or from their nominees as transferees, shall not be
barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
Contention of the accused: The prescriptive period commenced to run from the
time of the commission of the crime, not from the discovery thereof. As a matter
of fact it prescribed in ten years pursuant to the original provision of Section 11 of
R.A. No. 3019, which fixed the prescriptive period at ten years. Hence, the
offenses which might have arisen from the grant of the assailed loans in 1969,
1975 and 1978 prescribed in 1979, 1985 and 1988, respectively.
Held
Behest loans are part of the ill-gotten wealth which former President Marcos and
his cronies accumulated and which the Government through the PCGG seeks to
recover.
For a violation of a special law, Act No. 3326 shall be used.SinceR.A. No.
3019 is a special law, the commencement of the period for the prescription for
any act violating it is governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
In the present case, it was impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions
were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or
conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans."
Thus, the Court agree with the Ad Hoc COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period
for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged
should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from
the day of such commission.
It was discovered in 1996, the prescriptive period shall commence from there.
The crime has not prescribed. The OMBUDSMAN is hereby directed to proceed
with the preliminary investigation of the case OMB-0-96-0968.
Note: The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year of imprisonment
as minimum to three (3) years of imprisonment as maximum. It is a correctional
penalty . Being a correctional penalty it prescribed in ten (10) years.
Held
The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the 1978
Election Code.
This law does not provide for the prescription of penalties.
The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such
judgment would have been executed on October 14, 1986 but the accused did
not appear for such proceeding. And he has never been apprehended.
The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as follows:
In the case at bar, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not prescribed
because the second element is not present.
As a matter of fact, the petitioner never served a single minute of his sentence.
Moreover, before the prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence
will commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even
before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding.
Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to
live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the
execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive.
The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioners
guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the
wrong he committed. Petition dismissed.
If a convict can avail of mitigating circumstances and the penalty is
lowered, it is still the original penalty that is used as the basis for prescription.
However, if the convict already serves a portion of his sentence and
escapes after, the penalty that was imposed (not the original) shall be the basis
for prescription.
B. Particular Rules
1. Article 89
a. Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34
Facts
Santos was guilty is guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced
him to 6 months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On August 22, 1938,
Commonwealth Act No. 357 which disqualifies the respondent from voting
and have been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against
property.
Held
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case,
the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no
basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only
punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command.
There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power
likewise extends to such disabilities.
Held
It is admitted that the respondent mayor elect committed the
offense more than 25 years ago, he had already merited conditional
pardon from the Governor General. In 1915, that he exercise the right of
suffrage, was elected councilor and elected mayor, under the
circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute
pardon was enable him to assume the position in difference to the popular
will, and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned.
Held
Novation theory cannot apply in the case at bar, since what the
petitioner promise, turned out to be only an empty promise which
effectively delayed private complaints filling of case. Under Article 89 of
the RPC, are list of instances where criminal liability totally extinguish
since novation is not under the list it cannot be granted the same with the
one listed.
Held
Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under
Article 172 and the RPC which carries an impossible penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine not more than P5,000. This crime prescribe in ten years
where San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the
alleged forgery after the document was registered in the register
of deeds on August 26, 1948.
Held
Prescription offenses resulting from the violation of this
article in new election code shall prescribe 1 year after the
commission; but if the discovery of such offenses in incidental to
judicial proceeding in any election contest the term of prescription
shall commence only when such proceeding it holds that the
discovery in question was not incidental to judicial proceeding in
the said election contest, but; even before the filling of the motion
of protest, the contestants and their election watchers with
knowledge of the falsification committed by the inspectors in
connection with the count of the votes and the preparation of
election return hence the general rule of one year for the
prescription of the crime charged in the information.
Held
The SC ruled in negative. Under Article 93 of the RPC, for
prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final judgment
to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of
such imprisonment, prescription of penalty, then does not run in
her favor.
Article 95. Obligation incurred by a person granted conditional pardon.- Any person who
has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with
the conditions imposed therein otherwise his non-compliance with any of the conditions
specified shall result in the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of art.159 shall
be applied to him.
Article 96. Effect of commutation of sentence.- The commutation of the original sentence
for another of a different length and nature shall have the legal effect of substituting the
latter in the place of the former.
Article 97. Allowance for good conduct.- The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal
institution shall entitle him to the following deduction from the period of his sentence.
1.During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days
for each month of good behavior;
2. During the 3rd to the 5th year, inclusive of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of eight days for each month of good behavior.
3. During the following yearuntil the 10th year,inclusive of his imprisonment he shall be
allowed of deduction for 10 days for each month of good behavior.
4. During the 11th and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of 15 days for each month of good behavior.
Article 98. Special time allowance for loyalty.- A deduction of 1/5 of the period of his
sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his
sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this code, gives himself
up to the authorities within 48 hrs following the issuance of a proclamation announcing
the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article.
Article 99. who grants time allowances.- when never lawfully justified, the Director of
prisons shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not
be revoked.
Contention of the accused: the president has no power to revoke the conditional
pardon, since there was not yet conviction.
RULING: In case the convict violates any of the conditions of the conditional
pardon, the president has the power to order his recommitment and the courts
will not inquire into the validity of such recommitment.
The acceptance thereof by the prisoner carries with it the power of the
executive to determine a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been
violated.
RULING: The rule is that in requiring the convict to undergo such punishment
imposed by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his
release, the court should not consider the time during which the conduct was at
large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence.
The terms of the parole states that should any of the conditions stated
be violated,the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect.
The petitioner here should serve the unexpired portion of the penalty
originally imposed upon him.
The commission of an offense is a mere violation of the
condition,conviction is not necessary.
Held:
I. GENERAL RULE
A. RPC, ART. 100
Art. 100. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Dual character of a crime
1. As an offense against the state
2. As an offense against the person injured by the crime
General Rule: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil aspect arising from
the crime is deemed instituted. exception: waier, proper reservation
Effects of dismissal of case:
The dismissal of the information does not preclude the complainant to institute a
civil action arising from the crime. Dismissal of the criminal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil action
Effect of death of the accused: accused dies before the criminal action or vefore
the judgment becomes final, civil liability is extinguished..
Effecto of acquittal: acquittal of the accused does not mean extinction of his civil
liability unless there is a declaration in the decision that the fact from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist.
As a rule, if the offender is acquitted, his civil liability is also extinguished:
Exceptions:
1. When the civil action is based on obligations not arising from the act
complained of as a felony.
2. When acquitted is based on reasonable doubt
3. Acquittal is due to an exempting circumstance
4. Where the court states that the case merely involves a civil obligation
5. Where there was a proper reservation for the filing of a separate civil
obligation
On March 27, 1991, Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a Special Appearance and
Motion for Reconsideration to set aside the judgment rendered last February 4,
1991. He said that it affected him and subjected him to subsidiary liability for the civil
aspect of the criminal case. This motion was denied for lack of merit.
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a motion for execution of the
subsidiary liability of petitioner Basilio.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that the petitioner is neither an accused nor
a party in criminal case and he is not entitled to file a motion for reconsideration of
the judgment of Subsidiary Civil Liability against him?
RULING:
This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is
made. However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a
determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-
employee relationship2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry 3)
that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits
while in the discharge of such duties) and4) that said employee is insolvent. There
are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an
accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the
criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard,
which is the essence of due process. Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was
filed against the accused because it was his truck that was involved in the incident.
Further, it was the insurance company, with which his truck was insured, that
provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract.
ISSUE;
W/N an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee,
may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
Ruling: When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted
out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the
judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a
review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-
employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single
decision that has become final and executory. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code
states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers:In default of the persons criminally
liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall
have been committed by them or their employees.
Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction
meted out to the employee.
B. Civil Code, Articles 20, 22, 29, 31,32, 1161, 2176, 2177
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond
to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from
the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to
make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same
is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted),
and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal
laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter
2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating
damages. (1092a)
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. (n)
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof
in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefore shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the
filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in
the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay
in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If
the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by
the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions.
Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action. chan robles virtual law library
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever state it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits rendered in the civil action, the same may,
upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court
trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the
civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witness presented by the
offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running period of prescription of the
civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist.
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action.
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment
and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising
from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this
Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of
obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused
after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the
accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the
deceased. chan robles virtual law library
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice
to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased.
Sec. 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. A final judgment rendered in a civil action
absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the
defendant for the same act or omission subject of the civil action.
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may
be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution
rests.
B. State of Necessity
In case of state of necessity, the ones benefited shall proportionately shoulder the civil
liability.
PARAGRAPH 2-ELEMENTS:
1.that the guest notified in advance the innkeeper or his representative of the deposit of
their goods within the inn or house
2. the guests followed the directions with respect to the care of and vigilance over such
goods
3. such goods were taken by robbery with force upon things or theft committed within the
inn or house
DEFENSES:
1. failure of notification on the part of the guest
2. violation of innkeepers direction over care and vigilance of goods
3. robbery with violence or intimidation
Held : Private individuals not engaged in business or industry are not subsidiary
liable. The DOGF in the selection and supervision will not exempt the party who is
subsidiary for dameges.
Art. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability established in
Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Art. 105. Restitution How made. The restitution of the thing itself must
be made whenever possible, with allowance for any deterioration, or diminution
of value as determined by the court.
The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the
possession of a third person who acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter
his action against the proper person who may be liable to him.
This provision is not applicable in a case in which the thing has been
acquired by the third person in the manner and under the requirements which, by
law, bar an action for its recovery.
Art. 106. Reparation How made. The court shall determine the
amount of damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing, whenever
possible, and its special sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation
shall be made accordingly.
Art. 107. Indemnification What is included Indemnification of
consequential damages shall include not only those caused to the injured party,
but also those suffered by his family or by third person by reason of the crime.
Art. 108. Obligation to make restorartion, reparation for damages, or
indemnification for consequential damages and action to demand the same
Upon whom it devolves. The obligation to make restoration for consequential
damages devolves upon the heirs of the person liable.
The action to demand restoration, reparation and indemnification likewise
descends to the heirs of the person injured.
Facts: Antonio Regoles was driving the truck of Frederico Serfino when he
collided with another truck causing the death of Artemio Jamelo. The mother of
the deceased filed a civil action for damages against Regoles wherein Regoles
was ordered to pay P6000 and additional P2000 for moral damages. A writ of
execution was issued but was returned unsatisfied because of Regoless
insolvency. Hence, another civil action the owner of the truck, Serfino was filed
for recovery of subsidiary liability.
Contention of Jamelo: Serfino is subsidiary liable being the employer of Regoles
pursuant to Art. 103 of the RPC.
Contention of Serfino: He cannot be held subsidiarily liable because there wasnt
any criminal action instituted against Regoles. He was nto made a party in the
civil action. Subsidiary liability arises only after conviction of a criminal offense.
Ruling: Held the contention of the defendant Serfino.
Subsidiary liability presupposes that there was a criminal action. If there
was no criminal action, the employers subsidiary liaibility would not be
predicated on Art. 103 of the RPC.
There can be no automatic subsidiary liability of the employer where his
employee had not been criminally convicted.
The judgment in the civil case against the driver is enforceable only
against the only defendant. Jamelo cannot enforce such judgment in the present
case for subsidiary liability against Serfino. Prior criminal conviction of the driver-
employee is a conviction sine qua non for the subsidiary liability of the employer.
There having been no criminal conviction of the employee wherein his
civil liability was determined and fixed, no subsidiary liability under Art. 103 can
be claimed against the employer.
Ruling: As to civil indemnity ex-delicto, the court ruled in People vs. Robles that in
rape with homicide, in which the penalty imposed is death, the amount should be
increased to look.
With respect to damages, the G.R. is that the alleged pecuniaryloss and the
moral and mental suffering must be established by factual evidence before actual or
moral damages may be awarded to victims of rape notwithstanding the absence of
specific proof of the basis for its awrd.
In the instant case, however, while the prosecution offered to present the victims
mother to testify and prove the damages sustained by the family, the defense opted
to simply admit the combined claim of actual and moral damages in the amount of
P150000.
Contention of Accused: P500000 lost earning should not be awarded for lack of
documentary evidence to prove the same.
Contention of State: P15000 indemnification for the money stolen and P50000 moral
damages and exemplary damages should be included.
Ruling: Held contention of the accused and the state in their respective claimes.
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim
for damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence, provided that there is testimony either that the victim was
employed earning less than the minimum wage and judicial notice may be taken of
the fact that in the victims time of work, no documentary evidence is available; or
that the victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum
wage.
In the case at bar, the testimony of Lea Espina, was the sole basis for the award.
As other documentary evidence does not support it, her bare testimony cannot be
made the basis for such award. Nor do the exceptions apply to justify the award
despite the absence of documentary evidence. The victim was not employed as a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage at the time of his death. As
claimed by the widow, he was in fact earning substantially more than minimum wage.
For this reason, damages for loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded in the
absence of evidence sufficiently showing his income.
The trial should have ordered the accused to indemnify the heirs the amount of
P15000 representing the money stolen. Also, the trial court should have awarded
P50000 moral damages and exemplary damages since there was abuse of superior
strength.
10. People vs. Bantilan, 369 SCRA 47
Facts: Rolando Damaso, younger brother of the victim (Severino Damaso) and
Milmal Domingo were walking home when they heard a sudden explosion. He lighted
his flashlight to where the sound came from. He was Bantilan shoot Damaso with a
pugakhang (shotgun). Bantilan ran towards their house, shouting Cantoy, (it is
finished). Rolando was sure that it was Bantilans voice since they oftentimes meet.
Bantiling was convicted with murder (treachery was attendant) and was ordered to
pay P50000 as death indemnity; P21,960 as actual damages; P20000 moral
damages and P50000 lost earning.
Contention of State: The P50000 award for loss of earning capacity is not enough
and moral damages should be P50000.
Contention of the Accused: He should not be liable for any loss of earning capacity
since he acted in self-defense and that no documentary evidence was presented to
prove the award.
Ruling: Treachery was erroneously appreciated. Bantilan is liable for homicide.
There is a need to modify the civil liability. The award for moral damages should
be increased from P20000 to modify the civil liability. The award for moral damages
should be increased from P20000 to P50000 in accordance with existing
jurisprudence.
The P50000 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity should be augmented. The
following factors should be considered in determining the compensable amount of
lost earning: 1) the number of years for which the victim would have lived; 2) the rate
of loss sustained by the heirs.
Evidence reveals that the victim was 50 years old. From the testimony of hsi wife,
the victim was making P40000 in one crop year. Thus, applying the formula, the
accused should pay P800000 for loss of earning capacity.
Art. 291. The ff. are obliged to support to support to each other to the whole extent set
forth in the preceeding article:
1. spouses
2. legitimate ascendants and descendants
3. parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate and illegitimate
descendants of the latter.
4. Parents and natural children by legal fiction and the legitimate and illegitimate
descendants of the latter
5. Parents and illegitimate children who are not natural
Brothers and sisters owe their legitimate and natural brothers and sisters,
although they are only of the half-blood, the necessaries for life, when by physical or
mental defect, or any other cause not imputable to the recipients, the latter cannot
secure their subsistence. This assistance includes, in a proper case, expenses for
elementary education and for professional or vocational training.
A Formal Demand was made by Flores counsel but PNB persisted in its
refusal to honor the check.Left with no other choice, Flores filed a case with
the RCT of Quezon City against PNB. In itsanswer PNB insisted that only
P900,000.00 and P40.00 bank charges were actually paid byFlores when he
purchased the two checks. That it was dues to Flores demanding attitude
andtemper that Montes, a money counter, made an error in good faith in
issuing a receipt for P1,000,040.00.After trial, the court rendered its decision
in favor of Flores, ordering PNB to pay the sum of P100,000.00 representing
the amount of the check dishonored with interest thereon at the legalrate
per annum from November 16, 1989 until fully paid; as well as ordering PNB
to pay FloresP1,000,000.00 moral damages, P1,000,000.00 exemplary
damages as well as attorneys fees andcosts of the suit.PNB appealed to the
CA, to which the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. Their
subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.
THE ISSUE:
Is the award of P1,000,000.00 moral and exemplary damages in addition to
actual claim of inordinately disproportionate and unconscionable?
THE RULING:
YES. We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
however, we giveconsideration to PNBs allegation that the award of
P1,000,000.00 moral damages and P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages in
addition to Flores' actual claim of P100,000.00 is"inordinately
disproportionate and unconscionable."Under the circumstances obtaining in
the case at bench, we rule that the award of moral andexemplary damages
is patently excessive and should be reduced to a reasonable amount. We
takeinto consideration the following factors:First, Flores' contention that he
lost the opportunity to purchase a house and lot in BaguioCity due to
petitioner's gross negligence is based solely on his own testimony and a
meregeneral statement at that. The broker he named during his cross-
examination, Mr. Nick Buendia was not even presented to confirm the
aforementioned allegation.Second, the award of moral damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 is obviously not proportionate to the actual losses
of P100,000.00 sustained by Flores. In RCPI v. Rodriguez, SC ruled that: it
is undisputed that the trial courts are given discretion todetermine the
amount of moral damages and that the Court of Appeals can only modifyof
change the amount awarded when they are palpably and scandalously
excessive so asto indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of theTrial Court. But in more recent cases where the
amount of moral and exemplarydamages are far too excessice compared to
the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court ruled that they
should be reduces to more reasonable amounts.In other words, the moral
damages awarded must be commensurate with the loss or injurysuffered.
Moral damages though incapable of pecuniary estimations, are in the
category of anaward designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penaltyon the wrongdoer. It is not intended to
enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded
only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements
thatwill serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of
the defendant's culpableaction. Its award is aimed at the restoration, within
the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and it must be
proportional to the suffering inflicted.PNBs act of issuing the manager's
checks and corresponding receipt before payment thereof wascompletely
counted reckless and grossly negligent. It is an appalling breach of bank
proceduresand must never be repeated However, the award of
P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages is also far too excessive and should
likewise be reduced to an equitable level. Exemplary damages areimposed
not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent
against or as anegative incentive to curb socially deleterious
actions.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:1. The award of moral damages is reduced from
P1,000,000.00 to P100,000.00; and2. The award of exemplary damages is
reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00.
Under present case law, the award of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity is
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of murder. Moral damages, vis-a-vis
compensatory damages or civil indemnity, are different from each other and
should thus be awarded separately. Thus, as explained in People v. Victor,
[52] the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for
the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy
and aside from other established actual damages, is itself equivalent to
actual or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as
moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on different jural
foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.
In People v. Victor the Court increased the civil indemnity for rape committed
or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00. The Court held that "This is not only a reaction to the apathetic
societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctations over time,
but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of
heinous crimes against chastity." It is submitted that the heirs of victims of
murder, which is also a heinous crime, should not receive less than what
victims of rape receive as civil indemnity. If the civil indemnity is
automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than
the fact of the commission of the offense, all the more reason should the
same minimum amount be imposed on those convicted of murder, as more
often than not the victims who are killed leave behind grieving families who
are depended upon them for support. Thus, indemnity of P75,000.00 should
therefore be reckoned for each count of murder committed by accused-
appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado.
Since the crime was committed on 27 June 1993, the penalty for murder
prescribed by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by
RA 7659, which took effect only on 31 December 1993, should be applied in
imposing the penalty for frustrated murder, i.e., reclusion temporal maximum
to death.
The penalty for frustrated murder is one (1) degree lower than that
prescribed by the Penal Code for the consummated offense, hence, the
imposable penalty for frustrated murder should be prision mayor maximum to
reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and
there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance present in the
commission of the offense, the penalty to be imposed for the frustrated
murder shall be taken from the range of prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor medium or four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day to
ten (10) years as minimum, to the medium period of prision mayor maximum
to reclusion temporal or twelve (12) years five (5) months and eleven (11)
days to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days as
maximum. Hence, an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years two (2)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen
(14) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal medium
as maximum may be considered reasonable for the frustrated murder under
the facts of this case.
As to the victims earning capacity, the trial court found that his annual gross
income at the time of his death was P76,800.00 computed at the rate of
P1,600.00 a week for forty-eight (48) weeks. From this amount is deducted
the necessary and incidental expenses, estimated at 50%, leaving a balance
of P38,400.00. His net annual income would then be multiplied by his life
expectancy, using the following formula: 2/3 x 80-34 (age of the victim at
time of death). Considering that he was 34 years old when he died, his life
expectancy would be 31. Multiplying the net balance of his annual income
by his life expectancy, the loss of his earning capacity is P1,190,400.00,
thus:
Life expectancy -
2/3 x [80 - the age of the victim at the time of death or 34] = 30.66 or 31
A modification of the trial courts finding that the victims loss of earning
capacity amounts to P560,000.00 on the basis of a life expectancy of 28
years is, therefore, in order.
In line with the recent jurisprudence, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the
victim of rape with homicide is in the amount of P100,000.00 which is fully
justified and properly commensurate with the seriousness of the said special
complex crime.
11. People vs. Quisay, GR. No. 106833, December 10, 1999
Held: The trial court awarded the heirs of the victim civil indemnity of
P50,000.00. This should be increased to P100,000.00 in accordance with
the ruling in People v. Payot[45]and People v. Robles,[46] in which it was
stated:
With regard to the civil indemnity, the court hereby rules that the victim of
rape with homicide should be awarded the amount of P100,000.00.
Prevailing judicial policy has authorized the mandatory award of P50,000.00
in case of death, and P50,000.00 upon the finding of the fact of rape. Also,
under recent case law the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased
amount of P75,000.00 if the crime of rape committed is effectively qualified
by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by
the applicable amendatory laws [R.R. No. 4111 and R.A. No. 7659]; Thus, if
homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the rape, indemnity in the
amount of P100,000.00 is fully justified and properly commensurate with the
seriousness of the said special complex crime.
The testimonial evidence shows that Placido Agustin, Roberto Raagas, and
Melencio Castro Jr. were not self-employed or employed as daily-wage
workers earning less than the minimum wage under the labor laws existing
at the time of their death. Placido Agustin was a Social Security System
employee who received a monthly salary of P5,000. Roberto Raagas was
the President of Sinclair Security and Allied Services, a family owned
corporation, with a monthly compensation of P30,000. Melencio Castro Jr.
was a taxi driver of New Rocalex with an average daily earning of P500 or a
monthly earning of P7,500. Clearly, these cases do not fall under the
exceptions where indemnity for loss of earning capacity can be given despite
lack of documentary evidence. Therefore, for lack of documentary proof, no
indemnity for loss of earning capacity can be given in these cases.
Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, appellants shall be liable for the loss of
the earning capacity of the deceased. Indemnification for loss of earning
capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly
proven.[30] As shown by the victims service record,[31] he was holding the
position of Supervising Civil Engineering Draftsman at the Department of
Public Works and Highway (Region V, Legazpi City) when he died at the age
of 30 on July 18, 1988.[32] His salary then was P58.21 per day, hence, his
gross annual income would be P20,955.60. Using the American Expectancy
Table of Mortality, the award of damages representing loss of earning
capacity should be P349,225.07, computed as follows:
= 33.33 x P10,477.80
= P349,225.07
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 2540,
convicting appellants Felipe Musa Jr., Allan Reolo, Randy Lleno and Angelo
Mabini of the crime of Murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Appellants Felipe Musa Jr., Allan Reolo, Randy Lleno are sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, while appellant Angelo Mabini is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. All the appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the
heirs of the deceased, Zaldy Marifosque, the sums of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P349,225.07 as actual damages for loss of earning capacity.
The widow, Esperanza, also testified that she lost a source of income for her
family due to the death of her husband, who she claimed had an annual
income of P124,290.00 from farming and from the business of buying and
selling of cows, carabaos, and pigs. Of the P124,290.00, P81,600 or
P6,800.00 per month comes from the business of buying and selling of
animals, while P42,690.00 comes from farming. In People v. Panabang,[29]
we laid down the rule that for lost income to be recovered, there must be an
unbiased proof of the deceaseds average, not just gross, income. Although
in general, testimonial evidence is insufficient to substantiate a claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity, testimonies of the relatives on the
income of the deceased have been allowed to prosper when documentary
evidence is unavailable, such as when the deceased is self-employed and
the amount claimed is reasonable.[30] Esperanza stated that her late
husband used to sell 3 cows, 2 carabaos and 10 pigs per month. However, it
is of judicial notice that the buy and sell of animals is a seasonal business.
There are certain months of the year when business is good, such as during
the fiesta and Christmas seasons. In the same manner, there are times when
business is bad. In the exercise of our discretion, we reduce the claim of
Esperanza to a reasonable amount. We compute the award for the loss of
income of Fernando, as follows:
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that Rep. Act No. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional, and that the
death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
Art. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. Except in case of extinction of his civil
liability as provided in the next preceding article the offender shall continue to be obliged
to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the
fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or
has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of
sentence or any other reason.
2. Civil Code, Art. 1231
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.