RULE 14- SUMMONS

Sec. 1. Clerk to issue summons

Optima Realty v. Hertz Phils., G.R. No. 183035, January 9,

2013

OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE

CARS, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

Before us is a Rule 45 Petition assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 99890, which reversed the
Decision3 and Resolution4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13 7,
Makati City in Civil Case No. 06-672. The RTC had affirmed in toto the 22 May
2006 Decision5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 64, Makati City
in Civil Case No. 90842 evicting respondent Hertz Phil.

Exclusive Cars, Inc. (Hertz) and ordering it to pay back rentals and other
arrearages to petitioner Optima Realty Corporation (Optima).

Optima is engaged in the business of leasing and renting out commercial

spaces and buildings to its tenants. On 12 December 2002, it entered into a
Contract of Lease with respondent over a 131-square-meter office unit and a
parking slot in the Optima Building for a period of three years commencing
on 1 March 2003 and ending on 28 February 2006.6 On 9 March 2004, the
parties amended their lease agreement by shortening the lease period to
two years and five months, commencing on 1 October 2003 and ending on
28 February 2006.7?r?l1

Renovations in the Optima Building commenced in January and ended in

November 2005.8 As a result, Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in
monthly sales and a significant decrease in its personnels productivity. It
then requested a 50% discount on its rent for the months of May, June, July
and August 2005.9?r?l1

On 8 December 2005, Optima granted the request of Hertz.10 However, the

latter still failed to pay its rentals for the months of August to December of
2005 and January to February 2006,11 or a total of seven months. In addition,
Hertz likewise failed to pay its utility bills for the months of November and
December of 2005 and January and February of 2006,12 or a total of four
months.
On 8 December 2005, Optima wrote another letter to Hertz,13 reminding the
latter that the Contract of Lease could be renewed only by a new negotiation
between the parties and upon written notice by the lessee to the lessor at
least 90 days prior to the termination of the lease period.14 As no letter was
received from Hertz regarding its intention to seek negotiation and extension
of the lease contract within the 90-day period, Optima informed it that the
lease would expire on 28 February 2006 and would not be renewed.15?r?l1

On 21 December 2005, Hertz wrote a letter belatedly advising Optima of the

formers desire to negotiate and extend the lease.16 However, as the Contract
of Lease provided that the notice to negotiate its renewal must be given by
the lessee at least 90 days prior to the expiration of the contract, petitioner
no longer entertained respondents notice.

On 30 January 2006, Hertz filed a Complaint for Specific Performance,

Injunction and Damages and/or Sum of Money with prayer for the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
(Complaint for Specific Performance) against Optima. In that Complaint,
Hertz prayed for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin petitioner from committing
acts that would tend to disrupt respondents peaceful use and possession of
the leased premises; for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction ordering petitioner to
reconnect its utilities; for petitioner to be ordered to renegotiate a renewal of
the Contract of Lease; and for actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorneys fees and costs.

On 1 March 2006, Optima, through counsel, wrote Hertz a letter requiring the
latter to surrender and vacate the leased premises in view of the expiration
of the Contract of Lease on 28 February 2006.17 It likewise demanded
payment of the sum of ?420,967.28 in rental arrearages, unpaid utility bills
and other charges.18 Hertz, however, refused to vacate the leased
premises.19 As a result, Optima was constrained to file before the MeTC a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of
a TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (Unlawful Detainer
Complaint) against Hertz.20?r?l1

On 14 March 2006, Summons for the Unlawful Detainer Complaint was

served on Henry Bobiles, quality control supervisor of Hertz, who complied
with the telephone instruction of manager Rudy Tirador to receive the
Summons.21?r?l1

On 28 March 2006, or 14 days after service of the Summons, Hertz filed a

Motion for Leave of Court to file Answer with Counterclaim and to Admit
Answer with Counterclaim (Motion for Leave to File Answer).22 In that Motion,
Hertz stated that, "in spite of the defective service of summons, it opted to
file the instant Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court."23 In the same
Motion, it likewise prayed that, in the interest of substantial justice, the
Answer with Counterclaim attached to the Motion for Leave to File Answer
should be admitted regardless of its belated filing, since the service of
summons was defective.24?r?l1

On 22 May 2006, the MeTC rendered a Decision,25 ruling that petitioner

Optima had established its right to evict Hertz from the subject premises due
to nonpayment of rentals and the expiration of the period of lease.26 The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment for

the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering:cralawlibrary

1. the defendant corporation and all persons claiming rights from it to

immediately vacate the leased premises and to surrender possession thereof
to the plaintiff;

2. the defendant corporation to pay the plaintiff the amount of Four Hundred
Twenty Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Seven Pesos and 28/100 (P420,967.28)
representing its rentals arrearages and utility charges for the period of
August 2005 to February 2006, deducting therefrom defendants security
deposit;

3. the defendant corporation to pay the amount of Fifty Four Thousand Two
Hundred Pesos (P54,200.00) as a reasonable monthly compensation for the
use and occupancy of the premises starting from March 2006 until
possession thereof is restored to the plaintiff; and

4. the defendant corporation to pay the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos

(P30,000.00) as and for attorneys fees; and

5. the cost of suit. ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r

SO ORDERED.27?r?l1

Hertz appealed the MeTCs Decision to the RTC.28?r?l1

Finding no compelling reason to warrant the reversal of the MeTCs Decision,

the RTC affirmed it by dismissing the appeal in a Decision29 dated 16 March
2007.

On 18 June 2007, the RTC denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration of

its assailed Decision.30?r?l1

Hertz thereafter filed a verified Rule 42 Petition for Review on Certiorari with
the CA.31?r?l1
On appeal, the CA ruled that, due to the improper service of summons, the
MeTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz. The
appellate court thereafter reversed the RTC and remanded the case to the
MeTC to ensure the proper service of summons. Accordingly, the CA issued
its 17 March 2008 Decision, the fallo of which reads:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 22, 2006 Decision of the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 90842,
and both the March 16, 2007 Decision, as well as the June 18, 2007
Resolution, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 137, in Civil
Case No. 06-672, are hereby REVERSED, ANNULLED and SET ASIDE due to
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant corporation HERTZ. This
case is hereby REMANDED to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 90842, which is DIRECTED to ensure that its
Sheriff properly serve summons to only those persons listed in Sec. 11, Rule
14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the MTC could acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant corporation HERTZ.

SO ORDERED.32?r?l1

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs Decision was denied in a

Resolution dated 20 May 2008.33?r?l1

Aggrieved by the ruling of the appellate court, petitioner then filed the
instant Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court.34?r?l1

THE ISSUES

As culled from the records, the following issues are submitted for resolution
by this Court:cralawlibrary

1. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of

respondent Hertz;

2. Whether the unlawful detainer case is barred by litis pendentia; and

3. Whether the ejectment of Hertz and the award of damages, attorneys fees
and costs are proper. ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r

THE COURTS RULING

We grant the Petition and reverse the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
appellate court.

I
The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz.

In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired
either by service of summons or by the defendants voluntary appearance in
court and submission to its authority.35?r?l1

In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent
Hertz by reason of the latters voluntary appearance in court.

In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy,36 we had occasion

to state:cralawlibrary

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either

by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his
voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing
of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered
to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:cralawlibrary

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on

voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal
manner; and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the

court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative
relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution. (Emphases
supplied) ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r

In this case, the records show that the following statement appeared in
respondents Motion for Leave to File Answer:cralawlibrary

In spite of the defective service of summons, the defendant opted to file the
instant Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court, upon inquiring from
the office of the clerk of court of this Honorable Court and due to its notice of
hearing on March 29, 2005 application for TRO/Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction was received on March 26, 2006. (Emphasis supplied)37?r?l1

Furthermore, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised the
defense of improper service of summons. The defenses that it pleaded were
limited to litis pendentia, pari delicto, performance of its obligations and lack
of cause of action.38 Finally, it even asserted its own counterclaim against
Optima.39?r?l1

Measured against the standards in Philippine Commercial International Bank,

these actions lead to no other conclusion than that Hertz voluntarily
appeared before the court a quo. We therefore rule that, by virtue of the
voluntary appearance of respondent Hertz before the MeTC, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over respondents.

II

The instant ejectment case is not barred by litis pendentia. Hertz contends
that the instant case is barred by litis pendentia because of the pendency of
its Complaint for Specific Performance against Optima before the RTC.

We disagree.

Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following

elements:cralawlibrary

(1) Identity of parties, or at least their representation of the same interests in

both actions;

(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and

(3) Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases,
such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case.40?r?l1 ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r

Here, while there is identity of parties in both cases, we find that the rights
asserted and the reliefs prayed for under the Complaint for Specific
Performance and those under the present Unlawful Detainer Complaint are
different. As aptly found by the trial court:cralawlibrary

The Complaint for Specific Performance] seeks to compel plaintiff-appellee

Optima to: (1) renegotiate the contract of lease; (2) reconnect the utilities at
the leased premises; and (3) pay damages. On the other hand, the unlawful
detainer case sought the ejectment of defendant-appellant Hertz from the
leased premises and to collect arrears in rentals and utility bills.41?r?l1

As the rights asserted and the reliefs sought in the two cases are different,
we find that the pendency of the Complaint for Specific Performance is not a
bar to the institution of the present case for ejectment.

III

The eviction of respondent and the award of damages,

attorneys fees and costs were proper.

We find that the RTCs ruling upholding the ejectment of Hertz from the
building premises was proper. First, respondent failed to pay rental
arrearages and utility bills to Optima; and, second, the Contract of Lease
expired without any request from Hertz for a renegotiation thereof at least 90
days prior to its expiration.

On the first ground, the records show that Hertz failed to pay rental
arrearages and utility bills to Optima. Failure to pay timely rentals and utility
charges is an event of default under the Contract of Lease,42 entitling the
lessor to terminate the lease.

Moreover, the failure of Hertz to pay timely rentals and utility charges
entitles the lessor to judicially eject it under the provisions of the Civil
Code.43?r?l1

On the second ground, the records likewise show that the lease had already
expired on 28 February 2006 because of Hertzs failure to request a
renegotiation at least 90 days prior to the termination of the lease period.

The pertinent provision of the Contract of Lease reads:cralawlibrary

x x x. The lease can be renewed only by a new negotiation between the

parties upon written notice by the LESSEE to be given to the LESSOR at least
90 days prior to termination of the above lease period.44?r?l1

As the lease was set to expire on 28 February 2006, Hertz had until 30
November 2005 within which to express its interest in negotiating an
extension of the lease with Optima. However, Hertz failed to communicate its
intention to negotiate for an extension of the lease within the time agreed
upon by the parties. Thus, by its own provisions, the Contract of Lease
expired on 28 February 2006.
Under the Civil Code, the expiry of the period agreed upon by the parties is
likewise a ground for judicial ejectment.45?r?l1

As to the award of monthly compensation, we find that Hertz should pay

adequate compensation to Optima, since the former continued to occupy the
leased premises even after the expiration of the lease contract. As the lease
price during the effectivity of the lease contract was P54,200 per month, we
find it to be a reasonable award.

Finally, we uphold the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000 and
judicial costs in the light of Hertz's unjustifiable and unlawful retention of the
leased premises, thus forcing Optima to file the instant case in order to
protect its rights and interest.

From the foregoing, we find that the MeTC committed no reversible error in
its 22 May 2006 Decision, and that the RTC committed no reversible error
either in affirming the MeTC's Decision.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Rule 45 Petition for Review
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 99890 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 7, Makati City in Civil Case No. 06-672
affirming in toto the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64,
Makati City in Civil Case No. 90842 is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Sec. 2. Contents

Sec. 3. By whom served

Sec. 4. Return

Sec. 5. Issuance of alias summons

Sec. 6. Service on person of defendant

Planters Development Bank v. Chandumal, G.R. No. 195619,

September 5, 2012

FACTS:

BF Homes, Inc. and Chandumal entered into a contract to sell

a parcel of land. BF Homes then sold to PDB all its rights and
interests over the contract. On June 18, 1999, an action for
judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of
possession was filed by PDP against Chandumal.

Consequently, summons was issued. According to the Sheriff's

return, Sheriff Galing attempted to personally serve the
summons upon Chandumal on three dates but it was
unavailing as she was always out of the house on said dates.
Hence, the sheriff caused substituted service of summons by
serving the same through Chandumal's mother who
acknowledged receipt thereof.

For her failure to file within the prescribed period, PDB filed an
ex parte motion to declare Chandumal in default which was
granted by the RTC. On February 23, 2001, Chandumal filed
an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default maintaining
that she did not receive the summons and/or was not notified
of the same. RTC denied Chandumal's motion which was
reversed by the Court of Appeals due to invalid and ineffective
substituted service of summons.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether there was valid substituted service of summons
(2) Whether Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court
(3) Whether there was proper rescission by notarial act of the
contract to sell

HELD:
(1) There was no valid substitute service of summons.

The Return of Summons does not specifically show or indicate

in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any positive step
taken by the officer or process server in attempting to serve
the summons personally to the defendant. The return merely
states the alleged whereabouts of the defendant without
indicating that such information was verified from a person
who had knowledge thereof.

(2) Respondent voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the

trial court.

Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states "The

defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons"

(3) There is no valid rescission of the contract to sell by

 notarial act.

The allegation that Chandumal made herself unavailable for

payment is not an excuse as the twin requirements for a valid
and effective cancellation under the law, i.e. notice of
cancellation or demand for rescission by a notarial act and the
full payment of the cash surrender value, is mandatory.

Oaminal v. Castillo, G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection against respondents with the
RTC. The summons together with the complaint was served upon the
secretary of respondent. Respondents filed their Urgent Motion to Declare
Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective alleging that the
Sheriffs Return has failed to comply on substituted service of summons but
said motion was not heard due to the Judges absence. Petitioner then filed
an Omnibus Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default and to Render
Judgment because no answer [was] filed by [the latter]. The respondents
filed Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer
with. The judge denied [respondents] Motion to Dismiss, and admitted
[their] Answer. However six months after admitting their answer, the judge
ruled that [respondents] Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to
Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim was filed outside the period to file
answer, hence he (1) denied the Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and
Answer; (2) declared [respondents] in default; and (3) ordered [petitioner] to
present evidence ex-parte within ten days from receipt of [the] order,
[failing] which, the case will be dismissed.

ISSUE: WON respondents were properly declared in default?

HELD: NO. Respondents herein were declared in default by the trial court on
May 22, 2001, purportedly because of their delay in filing an answer. Its
unexpected volte face came six months after it had ruled to admit their
Answer on November 16, 2000. Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission
on Higher Education held that no practical purpose was served in declaring
the defendants in default when their Answer had already been filed albeit
after the 15-day period, but before they were declared as such. Applying
that ruling to the present case, we find that respondents were, therefore,
imprudently declared in defaul

Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013

BERSAMIN, J.:
To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the
complaint, the serving officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the
defendant in person. Only after the attempt at personal service has become
futile or impossible within a reasonable time may the officer resort to
substituted service.

The Case

Petitioners defendants in a suit for libel brought by respondent appeal the

decision promulgated on March 8, 20021 and the resolution promulgated on
January 13, 2003,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively dismissed
their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and denied their
motion for reconsideration. Thereby, the CA upheld the order the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 51, in Manila had issued on March 12, 2001 denying
their motion to dismiss because the substituted service of the summons and
copies of the complaint on each of them had been valid and effective.3

Antecedents

On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western

Police District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general
circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director Nicolas V.
Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R.
Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners),
claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners
published in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite. The suit, docketed as
Civil Case No. 00-97907, was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which in due
course issued summons to be served on each defendant, including Abante
Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305
3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street,
Intramuros, Manila.4

In the morning of September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to
the stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on the
defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address
were futile because the defendants were then out of the office and
unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second
attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were
still out of the office. He decided to resort to substituted service of the
summons, and explained why in his sheriffs return dated September 22,
2005,5 to wit:

SHERIFFS RETURN
This is to certify that on September 18, 2000, I caused the service of
summons together with copies of complaint and its annexes attached
thereto, upon the following:

1. Defendant Allen A. Macasaet, President/Publisher of defendant

AbanteTonite, at Monica Publishing Corporation, Rooms 301-305 3rd
Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana corner A. Soriano Streets,
Intramuros, Manila, thru his secretary Lu-Ann Quijano, a person of
sufficient age and discretion working therein, who signed to
acknowledge receipt thereof. That effort (sic) to serve the said
summons personally upon said defendant were made, but the same
were ineffectual and unavailing on the ground that per information of
Ms. Quijano said defendant is always out and not available, thus,
substituted service was applied;

2. Defendant Nicolas V. Quijano, at the same address, thru his wife Lu-
Ann Quijano, who signed to acknowledge receipt thereof. That effort
(sic) to serve the said summons personally upon said defendant were
made, but the same were ineffectual and unavailing on the ground that
per information of (sic) his wife said defendant is always out and not
available, thus, substituted service was applied;

3. Defendants Isaias Albano, Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang, Randy Hagos

and Lily Reyes, at the same address, thru Rene Esleta, Editorial
Assistant of defendant AbanteTonite, a person of sufficient age and
discretion working therein who signed to acknowledge receipt thereof.
That effort (sic) to serve the said summons personally upon said
defendants were made, but the same were ineffectual and unavailing
on the ground that per information of (sic) Mr. Esleta said defendants is
(sic) always roving outside and gathering news, thus, substituted
service was applied.

Original copy of summons is therefore, respectfully returned duly served.

Manila, September 22, 2000.

On October 3, 2000, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint

through counsels special appearance in their behalf, alleging lack of
jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual
substituted service of summons. They contended that the sheriff had made
no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on each of them in
accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. They
further moved to drop Abante Tonite as a defendant by virtue of its being
neither a natural nor a juridical person that could be impleaded as a party in
a civil action.
At the hearing of petitioners motion to dismiss, Medina testified that he had
gone to the office address of petitioners in the morning of September 18,
2000 to personally serve the summons on each defendant; that petitioners
were out of the office at the time; that he had returned in the afternoon of
the same day to again attempt to serve on each defendant personally but his
attempt had still proved futile because all of petitioners were still out of the
office; that some competent persons working in petitioners office had
informed him that Macasaet and Quijano were always out and unavailable,
and that Albano, Bay, Galang, Hagos and Reyes were always out roving to
gather news; and that he had then resorted to substituted service upon
realizing the impossibility of his finding petitioners in person within a
reasonable time.

On March 12, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss, and directed
petitioners to file their answers to the complaint within the remaining period
allowed by the Rules of Court,6 relevantly stating:

Records show that the summonses were served upon Allen A. Macasaet,
President/Publisher of defendant AbanteTonite, through LuAnn Quijano; upon
defendants Isaias Albano, Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang, Randy Hagos and Lily
Reyes, through Rene Esleta, Editorial Assistant of defendant Abante Tonite (p.
12, records). It is apparent in the Sheriffs Return that on several occasions,
efforts to served (sic) the summons personally upon all the defendants were
ineffectual as they were always out and unavailable, so the Sheriff served
the summons by substituted service.

Considering that summonses cannot be served within a reasonable time to

the persons of all the defendants, hence substituted service of summonses
was validly applied. Secretary of the President who is duly authorized to
receive such document, the wife of the defendant and the Editorial Assistant
of the defendant, were considered competent persons with sufficient
discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served upon them
and to relay the same to the defendants named therein (Sec. 7, Rule 14,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby

DENIED for lack of merit..

Accordingly, defendants are directed to file their Answers to the complaint

within the period still open to them, pursuant to the rules.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that the sheriff had
immediately resorted to substituted service of the summons upon being
informed that they were not around to personally receive the summons, and
that Abante Tonite, being neither a natural nor a juridical person, could not
be made a party in the action.

On June 29, 2001, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.7 It
stated in respect of the service of summons, as follows:

The allegations of the defendants that the Sheriff immediately resorted to

substituted service of summons upon them when he was informed that they
were not around to personally receive the same is untenable. During the
hearing of the herein motion, Sheriff Raul Medina of this Branch of the Court
testified that on September 18, 2000 in the morning, he went to the office
address of the defendants to personally serve summons upon them but they
were out. So he went back to serve said summons upon the defendants in
the afternoon of the same day, but then again he was informed that the
defendants were out and unavailable, and that they were always out
because they were roving around to gather news. Because of that
information and because of the nature of the work of the defendants that
they are always on field, so the sheriff resorted to substituted service of
summons. There was substantial compliance with the rules, considering the
difficulty to serve the summons personally to them because of the nature of
their job which compels them to be always out and unavailable. Additional
matters regarding the service of summons upon defendants were sufficiently
discussed in the Order of this Court dated March 12, 2001.

Regarding the impleading of Abante Tonite as defendant, the RTC held, viz:

"Abante Tonite" is a daily tabloid of general circulation. People all over the
country could buy a copy of "Abante Tonite" and read it, hence, it is for public
consumption. The persons who organized said publication obviously derived
profit from it. The information written on the said newspaper will affect the
person, natural as well as juridical, who was stated or implicated in the news.
All of these facts imply that "Abante Tonite" falls within the provision of Art.
44 (2 or 3), New Civil Code. Assuming arguendo that "Abante Tonite" is not
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is deemed a
corporation by estoppels considering that it possesses attributes of a juridical
person, otherwise it cannot be held liable for damages and injuries it may
inflict to other persons.

Undaunted, petitioners brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition,

mandamusin the CA to nullify the orders of the RTC dated March 12, 2001
and June 29, 2001.

Ruling of the CA

On March 8, 2002, the CA promulgated its questioned decision,8 dismissing

the petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, to wit:
We find petitioners argument without merit. The rule is that certiorari will
prosper only if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act
without or in excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge. A
judicious reading of the questioned orders of respondent Judge would show
that the same were not issued in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment. There are factual bases and legal justification for the assailed
orders. From the Return, the sheriff certified that "effort to serve the
summons personally xxx were made, but the same were ineffectual and
unavailing xxx.

and upholding the trial courts finding that there was a substantial
compliance with the rules that allowed the substituted service.

Furthermore, the CA ruled:

Anent the issue raised by petitioners that "Abante Tonite is neither a natural
or juridical person who may be a party in a civil case," and therefore the case
against it must be dismissed and/or dropped, is untenable.

The respondent Judge, in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration,

held that:

xxxx

Abante Tonites newspapers are circulated nationwide, showing ostensibly its

being a corporate entity, thus the doctrine of corporation by estoppel may
appropriately apply.

An unincorporated association, which represents itself to be a corporation,

will be estopped from denying its corporate capacity in a suit against it by a
third person who relies in good faith on such representation.

There being no grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Judge

in the exercise of his jurisdiction, the relief of prohibition is also unavailable.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Orders of

respondent Judge are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.9

On January 13, 2003, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.10

Issues

Petitioners hereby submit that:

 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER HEREIN
PETITIONERS.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY

SUSTAINING THE INCLUSION OF ABANTE TONITE AS PARTY IN THE
INSTANT CASE.11

Ruling

The petition for review lacks merit.

Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam the power of the

court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular
action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action is an
element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as
criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the
defendantin an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court
acquires jurisdiction over an actionas long as it acquires jurisdiction over the
resthat is thesubject matter of the action. The purpose of summons in such
action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to
satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.12

The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in personam,

on the one hand, and an action inrem or quasi in rem, on the other hand, are
aptly delineated in Domagas v. Jensen,13 thusly:

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its
character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem
for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A
proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and
obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of,
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in
personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility
or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are
suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to
fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one
which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from
a judgment against the property to determine its state. It has been held that
an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or
obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for
injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in
personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to
enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are
rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is
in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons
seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the
claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests
therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem
deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which
are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular
parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or
interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only
upon the parties who joined in the action.

As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily
appears in court; but when the case is an action in rem or quasi in rem
enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they have jurisdiction
over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant
is not essential. In the latter instance, extraterritorial service of summons
can be made upon the defendant, and such extraterritorial service of
summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for
the purpose of complying with the requirements of fair play or due process,
so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against
him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in
which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so
minded. On the other hand, when the defendant in an action in personam
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, our courts cannot try the
case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over
his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.14

As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself
to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to
the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the
proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action.15

Upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees,
the clerk of court forthwith issues the corresponding summons to the
defendant.16 The summons is directed to the defendant and signed by the
clerk of court under seal. It contains the name of the court and the names of
the parties to the action; a direction that the defendant answers within the
time fixed by the Rules of Court; and a notice that unless the defendant so
answers, the plaintiff will take judgment by default and may be granted the
relief applied for.17 To be attached to the original copy of the summons and
all copies thereof is a copy of the complaint (and its attachments, if any) and
the order, if any, for the appointment of a guardian ad litem.18

The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in

an action in personam cannot be overemphasized. The service of the
summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the
defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him.19 As
to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action
through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such
proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void.20 If the defendant
knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of
personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.21 As to the
latter, the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of his
defense. With the proper service of the summons being intended to afford to
him the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him, he may also waive
the process.21 In other words, compliance with the rules regarding the service
of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction. 23

Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be
effected on the defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal
service consists either in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in
person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it
to him.24 The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order to
ensure the realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned.
If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a
reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a)
by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy
at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.25 The latter mode of service is known as substituted service
because the service of the summons on the defendant is made through his
substitute.

It is no longer debatable that the statutory requirements of substituted

service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted
service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective.26 This
is because substituted service, being in derogation of the usual method of
service, is extraordinary in character and may be used only as prescribed
and in the circumstances authorized by statute.27 Only when the defendant
cannot be served personally within a reasonable time may substituted
service be resorted to. Hence, the impossibility of prompt personal service
should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant himself
and the fact that such efforts failed, which statement should be found in the
proof of service or sheriffs return.28Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the
impossibility of prompt personal service as basis for resorting to substituted
service may be waived by the defendant either expressly or impliedly. 29

There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the

summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first
in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the
same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were "always
out and not available" and the other petitioners were "always roving outside
and gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in the office
address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of
petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other
day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a
reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his
conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect
personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was
expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to
effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was
a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we
are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to
such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service
instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.30

In reality, petitioners insistence on personal service by the serving officer

was demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses
served through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several
pleadings in the RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad
cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam. They had also availed themselves
of the modes of discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts
evinced their voluntary appearance in the action.

Nor can we sustain petitioners contention that Abante Tonite could not be
sued as a defendant due to its not being either a natural or a juridical
person. In rejecting their contention, the CA categorized Abante Tonite as a
corporation by estoppel as the result of its having represented itself to the
reading public as a corporation despite its not being incorporated. Thereby,
the CA concluded that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding
that the non-incorporation of Abante Tonite with the Securities and Exchange
Commission was of no consequence, for, otherwise, whoever of the public
who would suffer any damage from the publication of articles in the pages of
its tabloids would be left without recourse. We cannot disagree with the CA,
considering that the editorial box of the daily tabloid disclosed that basis,
nothing in the box indicated that Monica Publishing Corporation had owned
Abante Tonite.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 8, 2002;
and ORDERS petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sec. 7. Substituted service

Planters Development Bank v. Chandumal, G.R. No. 195619,

September 5, 2012 (Supra.)
Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013 (Supra.)
Gentle Supreme v. Consulta, G.R. No. 183182, September 1,
2010

Gentle Supreme Philippines, Inc. vs Consulta

Facts:
Gentle Supreme Philippines, Inc. (GSP) filed a collection case with
application for a writ of preliminary attachment against Consar Trading
Corporation (CTC), its president, Consulta, and its vice-president, Sarayba.
The sheriff failed to serve the summons and copies of the complaint
on any of CTCs authorized officers as well as on Consulta and
Sarayba, so he left copies of such documents with Canave who, according to
the sheriffs return, was Saraybas secretary and an authorized
representative of both Sarayba and Consulta. The defendants failed to file an
answer and they were declared in default. A property owned by Consulta was
also attached. The RTC eventually ruled in favor of GSP. Consulta now claims
that he was not properly served with summons because, although his
address stated in the complaint was his regular place of business, Canave,
who received the summons, was not in charge of the matter.

Issue:
W/N there was a valid service of summons YES.

Doctrine:
It is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendants regular place
of business be specifically authorized to receive the summons. It is enough
that he appears to be incharge. In this case, Canave, a secretary whose job
description necessarily includes receiving documents and other
correspondence, would have the semblance of authority to accept the court
documents.

Sec. 7 (b) (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Leah Palma v. Hon. Galvez, G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
the Orders dated May 7, 2004[1] and July 21, 2004[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 24, granting the motion to dismiss filed by
private respondent Psyche Elena Agudo and denying reconsideration thereof,
respectively.

On July 28, 2003, petitioner Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for
damages against the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Dr. Danilo Giron and Dr.
Bernadette O. Cruz, alleging that the defendants committed professional
fault, negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against
her will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted from her during the
surgery; and that although the specimens were subsequently found,
petitioner was doubtful and uncertain that the same washers as the label
therein pertained that of somebody else. Defendants filed their respective
Answers. Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Complaint, praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were all
nurses at the PHC, namely, Karla Reyes, Myra Mangaser and herein private
respondent Agudo. Thus, summons were subsequently issued to them.
On February 17, 2004, the RTC's process server submitted his return of
summons stating that the alias summons, together with a copy of the
amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon private respondent
thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the same as
private respondent was out of the country.[3]
On March 1, 2004, counsel of private respondent filed a Notice of
Appearance and a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer [4] stating that
he was just engaged by private respondent's husband as she was out of the
country and the Answer was already due.

On March 15, 2004, private respondent's counsel filed a Motion for Another
Extension of Time to File Answer, [5] and stating that while the draft answer
was already finished, the same would be sent to private respondent for her
clarification/verification before the Philippine Consulate in Ireland; thus, the
counsel prayed for another 20 days to file the Answer.
On March 30, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss [6] on the
ground that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not
properly served with summons, since she was temporarily out of the country;
that service of summons on her should conform to Section 16, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioner filed her Opposition [7] to the motion to dismiss,
arguing that a substituted service of summons on private respondent's
husband was valid and binding on her; that service of summons under
Section 16, Rule 14 was not exclusive and may be effected by other modes
of service, i.e., by personal or substituted service. Private respondent filed a
Comment[8] on petitioner's Opposition, and petitioner filed a Reply[9] thereto.
On May 7, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order granting private
respondent's motion to dismiss. It found that while the summons was served
at private respondent's house and received by respondent's husband, such
service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as she was out
of the country at the time the summons was served, thus, she was not
personally served a summons; and even granting that she knew that a
complaint was filed against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person as she was not validly served with summons;
that substituted service could not be resorted to since it was established that
private respondent was out of the country, thus, Section 16, Rule 14 provides
for the service of summons on her by publication.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its
Order dated July 21, 2004.
Petitioner is now before us alleging that the public respondent committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
ruled that:

I. Substituted service of summons upon private

respondent, a defendant residing in the Philippines but
temporarily outside the country is invalid;
II. Section 16, Rule 14, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
limits the mode of service of summons upon a defendant residing
in the Philippines, but temporarily outside the country,
exclusively to extraterritorial service of summons under section
15 of the same rule;

III. In not ruling that by filing two (2) motions for extension
of time to file Answer, private respondent had voluntarily
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court,
 pursuant to Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, hence, equivalent to having been served with
summons;

IV. The cases cited in his challenged Order of May 7, 2004

constitute stare decisis despite his own admission that the
factual landscape in those decided cases are entirely different
from those in this case.[10]

Petitioner claims that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that Section 16, Rule 14, limits the service of summons upon the defendant-
resident who is temporarily out of the country exclusively by means of
extraterritorial service, i.e., by personal service or by publication, pursuant to
Section 15 of the same Rule. Petitioner further argues that in filing two
motions for extension of time to file answer, private respondent voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
In her Comment, private respondent claims that petitioner's certiorari under
Rule 65 is not the proper remedy but a petition for review under Rule 45,
since the RTC ruling cannot be considered as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion; that the petition was not properly verified because while
the verification was dated September 15, 2004, the petition was dated
September 30, 2004. She insists that since she was out of the country at the
time the service of summons was made, such service should be governed by
Section 16, in relation to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; that there
was no voluntary appearance on her part when her counsel filed two motions
for extension of time to file answer, since she filed her motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction within the period provided under Section 1,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
In her Reply, petitioner claims that the draft of the petition and the
verification and certification against forum shopping were sent to her for her
signature earlier than the date of the finalized petition, since the petition
could not be filed without her signed verification. Petitioner avers that when
private respondent filed her two motions for extension of time to file answer,
no special appearance was made to challenge the validity of the service of
summons on her.
The parties subsequently filed their respective memoranda as required.
We shall first resolve the procedural issues raised by private respondent.
Private respondent's claim that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a
wrong remedy thus the petition should be dismissed, is not persuasive. A
petition for certiorari is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy at law.[11] There is grave abuse of discretion when public respondent
acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to
be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal
may be taken only from a final order that completely disposes of the
case; that no appeal may be taken from (a) an order denying a motion for
new trial or reconsideration; (b) an order denying a petition for relief or any
similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) an interlocutory order; (d) an
order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order denying a motion to
set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of
fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) an order
of execution; (g) a judgment or final order for or against one or more
of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims
and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless
the court allows an appeal therefrom; or (h) an order dismissing an
action without prejudice. In all the above instances where the judgment or
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
In this case, the RTC Order granting the motion to dismiss filed by
private respondent is a final order because it terminates the proceedings
against her, but it falls within exception (g) of the Rule since the case
involves several defendants, and the complaint for damages against these
defendants is still pending.[12] Since there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in law, the remedy of a special civil action
for certiorari is proper as there is a need to promptly relieve the aggrieved
party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal. [13]
Anent private respondent's allegation that the petition was not
properly verified, we find the same to be devoid of merit. The purpose of
requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the
petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely
speculative.[14] In this instance, petitioner attached a verification to her
petition although dated earlier than the filing of her petition. Petitioner
explains that since a draft of the petition and the verification were earlier
sent to her in New York for her signature, the verification was earlier dated
than the petition for certiorari filed with us. We accept such
explanation. While Section 1, Rule 65 requires that the petition
for certiorari be verified, this is not an absolute necessity where the material
facts alleged are a matter of record and the questions raised are mainly of
law.[15] In this case, the issue raised is purely of law.

Now on the merits, the issue for resolution is whether there was a valid
service of summons on private respondent.
In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant either by the service of summons or by the latters voluntary
appearance and submission to the authority of the former. [16] Private
respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of
the Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus, service of
summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When an

action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides
within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it,
service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of
the Philippines, as under the preceding section. (Emphasis
supplied)

The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15,

which speaks of extraterritorial service, thus:

SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does

not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the
subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or
 in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property
of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service
may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by
personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time
as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court
may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify
a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days
after notice, within which the defendant must answer.

The RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time of
the service of summons, she was a resident who was temporarily out of the
country; thus, service of summons may be made only by publication.

We do not agree.
In Montefalcon v. Vasquez,[17] we said that because Section 16 of Rule
14 uses the words may and also, it is not mandatory. Other methods of
service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the
serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of
the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the
country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1)
substituted service set forth in section 7 ( formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2)
personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by
publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court
may deem sufficient.[18]

In Montalban v. Maximo,[19] we held that substituted service of

summons under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a
suit in personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily absent
therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer
jurisdiction on the court over such defendant. In the same case, we
expounded on the rationale in providing for substituted service as the normal
mode of service for residents temporarily out of the Philippines.
 x x x A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a
definite place of residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local
base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be
directed and where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily
absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who
may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do
all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate
with him from time to time any incident of importance that may
affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man
to leave at his home or with his business associates information
as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that
affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him,
and a case comes up in court against him, he cannot just raise his
voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of our
courts. He cannot stop a suit from being filed against him upon a
claim that he cannot be summoned at his dwelling house or
residence or his office or regular place of business.

Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to

enable him to contest a suit against him. There are now
advanced facilities of communication. Long distance telephone
calls and cablegrams make it easy for one he left behind to
communicate with him.[20]

Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the

country, the summons and complaint may be validly served on her through
substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which
reads:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the

defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where
the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is
made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.
[21]
It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that
must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the
house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of
summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.
[22]

Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may
be left. The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists
between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and,
therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or
in some way give him notice thereof.[23]
In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of
the country; thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with
her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was
presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place
and, therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private
respondent's behalf.
Notably, private respondent makes no issue as to the fact that the place
where the summons was served was her residence, though she was
temporarily out of the country at that time, and that Alfredo is her husband.
In fact, in the notice of appearance and motion for extension of time to file
answer submitted by private respondent's counsel, he confirmed the Sheriff's
Return by stating that private respondent was out of the country and that his
service was engaged by respondent's husband. In his motion for another
extension of time to file answer, private respondent's counsel stated that a
draft of the answer had already been prepared, which would be submitted to
private respondent, who was in Ireland for her clarification and/or verification
before the Philippine Consulate there. These statements establish the fact
that private respondent had knowledge of the case filed against her, and
that her husband had told her about the case as Alfredo even engaged the
services of her counsel.
In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed acquired
jurisdiction over the person of private respondent when the latter's counsel
entered his appearance on private respondent's behalf, without qualification
and without questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even
filed two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer. In effect, private
respondent, through counsel, had already invoked the RTCs jurisdiction over
her person by praying that the motions for extension of time to file answer
be granted. We have held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief,
such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the court.[24] When private respondent earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the
RTC to secure affirmative relief in her motions for additional time to file
answer, she voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC and is
thereby estopped from asserting otherwise.[25]
Considering the foregoing, we find that the RTC committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Orders.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated May 7,

2004 and July 21, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24,
are hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is DIRECTED to file her Answer
within the reglementary period from receipt of this decision.

Sagana v. Francisco, G.R. No. 161952, October 2, 2009

On Dec.13, 1994, Arnel Sagana filed a complaint for damages

before the RTC of Quezon City. He alleged that on November
20, 1992, Richard Francisco, with intent to kill, shot him with a
gun hitting him on the right thigh.

On January 31, 1995, process server Manuel Panlasigui

attempted to personally serve the summons to respondent,
Francisco, at his address: No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa,
Quezon City but was unsuccessful because the occupant, who
refused to give his identity, said that the respondent is
unknown at the said address. Subsequently, the trial court
attempted to serve summons to respondents office through
registered mail on February 9, 1995. However, despite three
notices, the respondent failed to pick up the summons.

The Trial Court then dismissed the case on account of

petitioners lack of interest to prosecute, noting that the
petitioner did not take any action since the filing of the
Servers Return on 8 February 1995. In response, the
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that he
exerted efforts to locate the respondent and that respondent
indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City.
The trial court granted petitioners motion for reconsideration
on August 4, 1995, conditioned upon the service of summons
on the respondent within 10 days from receipt of the Order.

Thus, on August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar tried to

serve summons at the respondents address but was told by
Michael Francisco, the respondents 19-year old brother, that
the respondent no longer lived at the said address. As such,
Iconar left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco.

On November 10, 1995, the petitioner filed a Motion to

Declare Defendant in Default, since the respondent still failed
to file an Answer despite the service of summons. The trial
court granted the Motion, finding that the summons was
validly served through his brother, Michael, and allowed the
petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Nonetheless,
copies of all pleadings and court documents were furnished to
respondent at his address.

On March 1, 1996, petitioner and movant Michael Francisco,

through his counsel, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, filed a
Manifestation and Motion denying that he received the
summons or that he was authorized to receive the summons
on behalf of his brother. He alleged that the substituted
service did not comply with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, since summons was not served at the defendants
residence or left with any person who was authorized to
receive it on behalf of the defendant. Michael Francisco also
asserted in an Affidavit of Merit that his brother had left their
residence in March 1993, and that respondent would only call
by phone, or write his family without informing them of his
address.

Thereafter, Michael Francisco submitted his respective

Opposition, Reply, and Rejoinder. In his Rejoinder, he attached
a copy of an Affidavit prepared by the respondent, dated
December 23, 1992, where he declared himself a resident of
No. 36 Sampaguita St. The affidavit was notarized by Atty.
Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, the same lawyer who represented
respondents brother before the trial court.
The trial court denied Michael Franciscos Manifestation and
Motion for lack of merit, holding that: plaintiff had already
sent numerous pleadings to defendant at his last known
address. As also pointed out by [petitioner] in his Opposition,
movant has not adduced evidence, except his affidavit of
merit, to impugn the service of summons thru him. Movant
herein also admits that defendant communicates with him
through telephone. Movant, therefore, being a person of
sufficient age and discretion, would be able, more likely than
not, to inform defendant of the fact that summons was sent to
him by the court.

On 20 September 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision in

favor of the plaintiff.

On November 23, 1999, respondent Richard A. Francisco filed

a Notice of Appeal, claiming that he received a copy of the
trial courts Decision on November 9, 1999, and that the same
was contrary to the law, facts, and evidence, and prayed that
his appeal be given due course.

On 5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to

file their respective briefs, a copy of which was sent to
respondent by registered mail at No. 36 Sampaguita St.,
Baesa, Quezon City.

The respondent attended the preliminary conference on

September 3, 2002, but the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement. Thus, on August 13, 2003, the appellate
court rendered the Decision granting the appeal and setting
aside the Decision of the trial court on the grounds that the
service of summons was irregular and such irregularity
nullified the proceedings before the trial court. The trial
courts decision was void since it did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he

alleged that respondent did, in fact, reside at No. 36
Sampaguita St. To prove this assertion, petitioner submitted
the original copy of the envelope containing respondents
Notice of Appeal, which indicated respondents return address
to be No. 36 Sampaguita St. Nonetheless, on January 29,
2004, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, the petitioner filed this Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether there was valid service of summons upon the
respondent.

HELD: YES. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we

find there was proper substituted service of summons upon
the respondent.

Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court

provided:

Section 8. Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be

served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section [personal service on defendant], service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.

The personal service of summons was twice attempted by the

trial court, although unsuccessfully. The trial court also thrice
attempted to contact the respondent through his place of
work, but to no avail. These diligent efforts to locate the
respondent were noted in the first sheriff's return, the process
server's notation, as well as the records of the case. Moreover,
respondents claim that he moved out of their residence on
March 1993 without informing his family of his whereabouts
despite the regular calls and letters is incredulous. It is even
more implausible when the respondent admitted to receiving
the trial courts decision on September 20, 19999 which was
sent to No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City, and that
his Notice of Appeal indicated the same address. He also
admitted to receiving a copy of the appellate courts order for
a preliminary conference which was also sent to the same
address. Finally, it is unbelievable that, since respondent and
his brother was assisted by the same lawyer, none of them
was able to inform respondent of the receipt of summons.

Indeed, there was no proof presented as to when respondent

left and then returned to his original home, if he actually did
leave his home.

The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction

over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant
that an action has been commenced so that he may be given
an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.
 Under the circumstances of this case, the respondent was
duly apprised of the action against him and had every
opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner.
However, since he refused to disclose his true address
because of his own pretenses, it was impossible to personally
serve summons upon him.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is

GRANTED. The 13 August 2003 Decision of the Court of
Appeals and its 29 January 2004 Resolution are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006

FACTS:

Respondent Celita Miralles filed a complaint for collection of sum of money

against petitioner Remelita Robinson, alleging that $20,054 was borrowed by
Robinson, as shown in the MOA they both executed.

Summons was served on Robinson at her given address. However, per

return of service of the Sheriif, petitioner no longer resides there. Thus, the
trial court issued an alias summons to be served at Muntinlupa City,
petitioners new address.

Again, the Sheriff reported twice thereafter that the summons could
not be served on petitioner. Sheriff Pontente, who was to serve the summons
interposed that he was stopped by the Security Guard of Alabang Hills Village
because they were allegedly told by Robinson not to let anyone
proceed to her house if she is not around. Despite the explanations of
the Sheriff, the guards didnt let him in. Thereafter, the Sheriff just left a copy
of the complaint to a guard, who refused to affix his signature on the original
copy, so he will be the one to give the summons to petitioner Robinson.
 Eventually, petitioner Robinson was declared in default for her failure
to file an answer seasonably despite service of summons. The trial court
rendered its decision in favor of Miralles ordering Robinson to pay her
obligations plus cost of damages. A copy of the court Order was sent to
petitioner by registered mail at her new address and a writ of execution was
also issued.

Robinson filed a petition for relief from the judgment by default. She
claimed that summons was improperly served upon her, thus, the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over her and that all its proceedings are void.
Petitioner Robinson contends that the service of the summons upon
the subdivision guard is not in compliance with Section 7, Rule 14
since he is not related to her or staying at her residence, as
required by the rule.

ISSUE: Whether the substituted service of summons effected is valid.

RULING:

YES. Although the SC have ruled that the statutory requirements of

substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any
substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered
ineffective, the Court frowns upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It
is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs.

Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or

substituted service of summons upon petitioner. We note that she failed to
controvert the sheriffs declaration. Nor did she deny having received the
summons through the security guard. Considering her strict instruction to
the security guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the
trial court that summons has been properly served upon petitioner and that
it has acquired jurisdiction over her.

Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the

Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or
substituted service in the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended.

Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over

substituted service, the latter mode of service being a method extraordinary
in character. For substituted service to be justified, the following
circumstances must be clearly established:

(a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;

(b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and

(c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing at the partys residence or upon a competent person in charge of
the partys office or place of business.

Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional

grounds.

Chu v. Mach Asia, G.R. No. 184333, April 1, 2013

SIXTO N. CHU, Petitioner, v. MACH ASIA TRADING

CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated July 25,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70666, and the
Resolution2 dated August 28, 2008 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as

follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation is a corporation engaged in

importing dump trucks and heavy equipments. On December 8, 1998,
petitioner Sixto N. Chu purchased on installment one (1) Hitachi Excavator
worth P900,000.00 from the respondent. Petitioner initially paid P180,000.00
with the balance of P720,000.00 to be paid in 12 monthly installments
through Prime Bank postdated checks. On March 29, 1999, petitioner again
purchased two (2) heavy equipments from the respondent on installment
basis in the sum of P1,000,000.00, namely: one (1) motorgrader and one (1)
payloader. Petitioner made a down payment of P200,000.00 with the balance
of P800,000.00 payable in 12 monthly installments through Land Bank
postdated checks.3chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

However, upon presentment of the checks for encashment, they were

dishonored by the bank either by reason of "closed account," "drawn against
insufficient funds," or "payment stopped." Respondent informed petitioner
that the checks were dishonored and invited him to its office to replace the
checks. On September 16, 1999, respondent sent petitioner a formal demand
letter urging the latter to settle his accounts within five days from receipt of
the letter. In response, petitioner sent respondent a letter explaining that his
business was badly hit by the Asian economic crisis and that he shall
endeavor to pay his obligation by giving partial payments. He said that he
shall also voluntarily surrender the subject units should he fail to do
so.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On November 11, 1999, respondent filed a complaint before the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for sum of money, replevin, attorney's fees and
damages against the petitioner. Respondent prayed for the payment of the
unpaid balance of P1,661,947.27 at 21% per annum until full payment, 25%
of the total amount to be recovered as attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On November 29, 1999, the RTC issued an Order6 allowing the issuance of a
writ of replevin on the subject heavy equipments.

On December 9, 1999, Sheriff Doroteo P. Cortes proceeded at petitioner's

given address for the purpose of serving the summons, together with the
complaint, writ of replevin and bond. However, the Sheriff failed to serve the
summons personally upon the petitioner, since the latter was not there. The
Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by having the summons and the
complaint received by a certain Rolando Bonayon, a security guard of the
petitioner.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading, which prompted respondent

to move for the declaration of defendant in default. On January 12, 2000, the
RTC issued an Order declaring defendant in default and, thereafter, allowed
respondent to present its evidence ex parte.

On December 15, 2000, after respondent presented its evidence, the RTC
rendered a Decision against the petitioner, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. By adjudicating and adjudging plaintiff's right of ownership and possession
over the subject units mentioned and described in the complaint, and which
were already seized and turned over to the plaintiff by virtue of the writ of
replevin.

2. Ordering defendants to pay to plaintiff the sum of (sic) equivalent to 25%

of the total amount recovered or value of the heavy equipments possessed
as attorney's fees, and to reimburse no less than P15,000.00 as expenses for
litigation, plus the cost of the premium of replevin bond in the amount
of P11,333.50.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV

No. 70666. Petitioner argued that the RTC erred in concluding that the
substituted service of summons was valid, and that, consequently, there was
error on the part of the RTC when it declared him in default, in proceeding
with the trial of the case, and rendering an unfavorable judgment against
him.

On July 25, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision9 affirming the Decision of the
RTC, the decretal portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Cebu, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. CEB-24551, rendered on
December 15, 2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with the sole modification as to
award of attorney's fees, which is hereby reduced to 10% of the value of the
heavy equipments recovered.

SO ORDERED.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ruling in favor of the respondent, the CA opined, among others, that the
requirement of due process was complied with, considering that petitioner
actually received the summons through his security guard. It held that where
the summons was in fact received by the defendant, his argument that the
Sheriff should have first tried to serve summons on him personally before
resorting to substituted service of summons deserves scant consideration.
Thus, in the interest of fairness, the CA said that the process server's neglect
or inadvertence in the service of summons should not unduly prejudice the
respondent's right to speedy justice.

The CA also noted that petitioner failed to set up a meritorious defense aside
from his contention that summons was not properly served. It went further
and decided the case on the merits and ruled that petitioner has an unpaid
obligation due to respondent for the heavy machineries he purchased from
the latter. It, however, reduced the amount of attorney's fees awarded to
10% of the value of the heavy equipments recovered.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the
Resolution11 dated August 28, 2008.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN

DEFIANCE OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT EVEN
WHEN THE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS
IMPROPER.12chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN

DEFIANCE OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN HOLDING THAT HEREIN
PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE SET UP A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE EVEN WHEN
THE SUMMONS WAS IMPROPERLY SERVED.13chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Petitioner argues that there was no valid substituted service of summons in

the present case. He maintains that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is acquired only through a valid service of summons or the
voluntary appearance of the defendant in court. Hence, when there is no
valid service of summons and no voluntary appearance by the defendant,
any judgment of a court, which acquired no jurisdiction over the defendant,
is null and void.

On its part, respondent posits that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner and the judgment by default of the RTC was based
on facts, law, and jurisprudence and, therefore, should be enforced against
the petitioner.

The petition is meritorious.

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired
either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its
authority.14chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only

when summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of
time that substituted service may be resorted to.15Section 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service
may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.

It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report

indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendant's
behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence,
ensuring that the latter would actually receive the
summons.16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that

efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such
efforts have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in
character, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances
authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service
must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service
other than that authorized by statute is considered
ineffective.17chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In the case at bar, the Sheriff's Return provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Respectfully returned to the Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu
City, the Summons and writ issued in the above-entitled case with the
following information, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. That the Summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond
was received on December 7, 1999, by Rolando Bonayon, a security guard
on defendant Sixto Chu at his given address who received and signed receipt
thereof.

2. That the writ of replevin was duly executed on the same date, December
7, 1999, Tacloban City and San Jorge, Samar of the following properties
subject of the writ.

a) Excavator Hitachi with Serial No. WHO44-116-0743

b) Motorgrader with Serial No. N525PS-1014

c) Payloader with Serial No. KLD70-54224

After the issuance of the Sheriff's inventory receipt, the units were turned
over to Al Caballero and companion, representatives of plaintiff, who shipped
the same to Cebu to be deposited with MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION,
Block 26 MacArthur Highway, Reclamation Area, Cebu City, for safekeeping,
subject to the provision of Sec. 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court.18chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons
in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of
confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not
the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard
could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of
substituted service.

Moreover, the reasoning advanced by the CA in ruling against the petitioner

was based merely on conjectures and surmises. The CA even went as far as
to conclude that the process server's neglect should not have unduly
prejudiced the respondent, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Hence, if Chu had actually received the summons through his security guard,
the requirement of due process would have nevertheless been complied
with. x x x. Based on the presumption that a person takes ordinary care of
his concerns, the security guard would not have allowed the sheriff to take
possession of the equipments without the prior permission of Chu; otherwise
he would be accountable to Chu for the said units. Chu, for his part, would
not have given his permission without being informed of the fact of the
summons and the writ of replevin issued by the lower court, which
permission includes the authority to receive the summons and the writ of
replevin.

Thus, where summons was in fact received by defendant, his argument that
the sheriff should have tried first to serve summons on him personally before
resorting to substituted service of summons is not meritorious.

x x x.

Evidently, plaintiff-appellee cannot be penalized, through no fault of its own,

for an irregular or defective return on service of summons. x x x.

x x x.

In the interest of fairness, the process server's neglect or inadvertence in the

service of summons should not, thus, unduly prejudice plaintiff-appellee's
right to speedy justice. x x x 19chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due

process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against
them is null and void.20 Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner, the judgment rendered by the court could not be
considered binding upon him for being null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals, dated July 25, 2007, as well as its Resolution dated
August 28, 2008, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70666 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated December 15, 2000 is
declared NULL and VOID. The Regional Trial Court is hereby ORDERED to
validly serve summons upon Sixto N. Chu and, thereafter, proceed with the
trial of the main action with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Sec. 8. Service upon entity without juridical personality

Sec. 9. Service upon prisoners

Sec. 10. Service upon minors and incompetents

Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity

B.D. Long-Span Builders v. R.S. Ampeloquio, G.R. No. 169919,

September 11, 2009

It is well-settled that a defendant who has been declared in

default has the following remedies, to wit: he may, at any
time after discovery of the default but before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the
ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious
defense; if judgment has already been rendered when he
discovered the default, but before the same has become final
and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under
Section 1(a) of Rule 37; if he discovered the default after the
judgment has become final and xecutor, he may file a petition
for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and he may also appeal
from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the
order of default has been presented by him. Thus,
respondent, which had been declared in default, may file a
notice of appeal and question the validity of the trial courts
judgment without being considered to have submitted to the
trial courts authority
 Tung Ho Steel v. Ting Guan, G.R. No. 182153, April 7, 2014

26. TUNG HO STEEL ENTERPRISES CORPORATION vs. TING GUAN

TRADING CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 182153 April 7, 2014

FACTS:
- Ting Guan Trading Corp. (Ting Guan), a domestic corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines) obligated itself under a contract of
sale to deliver heavy metal scrap iron and steel to Tung Ho, a foreign
corporation organized under the laws of Taiwan, Republic of China.
- Tung Ho filed a request for arbitration before the ICC International
Court of Arbitration (ICC) in Singapore after Ting Guan failed to deliver
the full quantity of the promised heavy metal scrap iron and steel.
- The ICC ruled in favor of Tung Ho and ordered Ting Guan to pay Tung
Ho.
- Tung Ho filed an action against Ting Guan for the recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati.
- Ting Guan moved to dismiss the case based on Tung Hos lack of
capacity to sue and for prematurity.
- Ting Guan subsequently filed a supplemental motion to dismiss based
on improper venue.
- Ting Guan argued that the complaint should have been filed in Cebu
where its principal place of business was located.
- The RTC denied Ting Guans motion to dismiss.
- Ting Guan moved to reconsider the order and raised the RTCs alleged
lack of jurisdiction over its person as additional ground for the
dismissal of the complaint.
- Ting Guan insisted that Ms. Fe Tejero, on whom personal service was
served, was not its corporate secretary and was not a person allowed
under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to receive a summons.
o It also asserted that Tung Ho cannot enforce the award in the
Philippines without violating public policy as Taiwan is not a
signatory to the New York Convention.
- The RTC denied the motion and ruled that Ting Guan had voluntarily
submitted to the courts jurisdiction when it raised other arguments
apart from lack of jurisdiction in its motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
- Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over Ting Guan?
HELD:
 - Yes. Tejero was not the proper person to receive the summons.
Nonetheless there is no reason to disturb the lower courts finding that
Tejero was not a corporate secretary and, therefore, was not the proper
person to receive the summons under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts; cannot re-examine, review or
re-evaluate the evidence and the factual review made by the lower
courts. In the absence of compelling reasons, it will not deviate from
the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding
on this Court.
Moreover, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court.
However, the Court cannot agree with the legal conclusion that the
appellate court reached, given the established facts. To the Court mind,
Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court in view of the
procedural recourse that it took before that court. Its voluntary
appearance is equivalent to service of summons.

Cathay Metal v. Laguna West, G.R. No. 172204, July 2, 2014

Respondent was not validly served with summons

Republic Act No. 6938 of 1990 or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines
provides that cooperatives are mandated to have an official postal address to
which notices shall be sent, thus:

Art. 52. Address. Every cooperative shall have an official postal address to
which all notices and communications shall be sent. Such address and every
change thereof shall be registered with the Cooperative Development
Authority.

This provision was retained in Article 51 of RepublicAct No. 9520 or the

Philippine Cooperative Codeof 2008. Article 51 provides:

Art. 51. Address. Every cooperativeshall have an official postal address to

which all notices and communications shall be sent. Such address and every
change thereof shall be registered with the Authority.

Relying on the above provision, petitioner argued that respondent was

sufficiently served with summons and a copy of its petition for cancellation of
annotations because it allegedly sent these documents to respondents
official address as registered with the Cooperative Development Authority.
Petitioner further argued that the Rules of Procedure cannot trump the
Cooperative Code with respect to notices. This is because the Cooperative
Code is substantive law, as opposed to the Rules of Procedure, which
pertains only to matters of procedure.

Petitioner is mistaken.

The promulgation of the Rules of Procedure is among the powers vested only
in this court. Article VIII, Section 5(5) provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law,the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged.Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modifysubstantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

This means that on matters relating toprocedures in court, it shall be the

Rules of Procedure that will govern. Proper court procedures shall be
determined by the Rules as promulgated by this court.

Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or

special proceeding is court procedure. Hence, it shall be governed by the
Rules of Procedure.

The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to

cooperatives activities as administered by the Cooperative Development
Authority. However, they are not procedural rules that will govern court
processes. A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to have an
official address to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot
take the place of the rules on summonsunder the Rules of Court concerning a
court proceeding.

This is not to say that the noticescannot be sent to cooperatives in

accordance with the Cooperative Code. Notices may be sent to a
cooperatives official address. However, service of notices sent to the official
address in accordance with the Cooperative Code may not be used as a
defense for violations of procedures, specially when such violation affects
another partys rights.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules ofCourt provides the rule on service of
summons upon a juridical entity. It provides that summons may be served
upon a juridical entity only through its officers. Thus:

Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. When the defendant
is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.

We have already established that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is

exclusive.102 Service of summons upon persons other than those officers
enumerated in Section 11 is invalid.103 Even substantial compliance is not
sufficient service of summons.104

This provision of the rule does not limit service to the officers places of
residence or offices. If summons may not be served upon these persons
personally at their residences or offices, summons may be served upon any
of the officers wherever they may be found.

Hence, petitioner cannot use respondent's failure to amend its Articles of

Incorporation to reflect its new address as an excuse from sending or
attempting to send to respondent copies of the petition and the summons.
The Rules of Court provides that noticesshould be sent to the enumerated
officers. Petitioner failed to do this. Nonotice was ever sent to any of the
enumerated officers.

Petitioner insists that it should not be made to inquire further as to the

whereabouts of respondent after the attempt to serve the summons by
registered mail to respondents address as allegedly indicated in its Articles
of Incorporation. The Rules does not provide that it needs to do so. However,
it provides for service by publication. Service by publication is available when
the whereabouts of the defendant is unknown. Section 14, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are

unknown. In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown
owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such
places and for such time as the court may order. (Emphasis supplied)

This is not a matter of acquiringjurisdiction over the person of respondent

since this is an action in rem. In an action in rem, jurisdiction over the person
is not required as long asthere is jurisdiction over the res. This case involves
the issue of fair play and ensuring that parties are accorded due process.
In this case, petitioner served summons upon respondent by registered mail
and, allegedly, by personal service at the office address indicated in
respondents Certificate of Registration. Summons was not served upon
respondents officers. It was also not published in accordance with the Rules
of Court. As a result, respondent was not given an opportunity to present
evidence, and petitioner was able to obtain from the Regional Trial Court an
order cancelling respondents annotations of adverse claims.

Respondent was, therefore, not validly served with summons.

Sec. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entities

See: A.M. No. 11-3-6, March 15, 2011

Atiko Trans v. Prudential Guarantee, G.R. No. 167545, August

17, 2011
NM Rothschild v. Lepanto, G.R. No. 175799, November 28,
2011

Sec. 13. Service upon public corporations

Sec. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts

are unknown

Pua v. Deyto, G.R. No. 173336, November 26, 2012

Cathay Metal v. Laguna West, G.R. No. 172204, July 2, 2014
(Supra.)

Sec. 15. Extraterritorial service

NM Rothschild v. Lepanto, G.R. No. 175799, November 28,

2011 (Supra.)
Acance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159699, March 16, 2005
Spouses Jose v. Spouses Boyon, G.R. No. 147369, October 23,
2003

Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines

Leah Palma v. Hon. Galvez, G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010
(Supra.)
Montefalcon v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008
Belen v. Belen, G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008

Sec. 17. Leave of court

Sec. 18. Proof of service

Sec. 19. Proof of service by publication

Acance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159699, March 16, 2005

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance

Note: The following cases were already assigned on page 5 of

the syllabus.

Herrera-Felix v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143736, August 11,

2004
JAPRIL Dev. Corp. v. Security Bank, G.R. No. 190107, June 6,
2011
Rapid City Realty v. Villa, G.R. No. 184197, February 11, 2010
Allan Co v. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010
Lhuillier v. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010
Rodriguez vs. Alikpala, G.R. No. L-38314, June 25, 1974