THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
QUALITY CONTROL: MARCELO, RETIRADO
ANNOTATIONS: CHATTO
SECTION 1
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.
BILL OF RIGHTS: PROTECTION AGAINST ABUSE OF POWER
Government becomes the delicate art of balancing the power of
government and the freedom of the governed.
o The existence of social institutions and all political
organizations and relationships are justified insofar as they
have for their primary aim the defense and protection of
freedom.
o This only becomes possible with power.
Philippines under the Spain
o Political and social system where power outweighed
freedom
o Philippine revolutions aimed to achieve a just restraint of
governmental power and a corresponding expansion of
individual freedom.
Philippines under America
o System promised the achievement of balance between
power and freedom.
The balancing of power and freedom is the story of governmental
power and the constitutional limits on it found in the Bill of Rights.
THREE GREAT POWERS: POLICE POWER, POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN, POWER OF TAXATION
Belong to the very essence of government and without them the
government cannot exist.
Inherent powers the Constitution cannot grant such powers but
only define and delimit them and allocate their exercise among
various government agencies.
POLICE POWER
o the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending to all the great public needs.
o Negative definition: inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society.
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o Chief Justice Shaw: the power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same.
o Rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the
state and of the public to self-protection.
o Scope expands and contracts with changing needs.
o Police power has been used to justify the following
measures:
Public health: requirements to make house repairs
(US v. Abendan), compulsory connection to a city
sewerage system (Case v. Board of Health),
licensing of the practice of medicine (US v. Gomez
Jesus), regulation of cattle imports (Cruz v.
Youngberg) and sale of meat (People v. Sabarre).
Public safety: building regulations (Fable v. City of
Manila), regulations of the carrying of deadly
weapons (US v. Villareal), the requirement of
rotational participation in patrol duty (US v.
Pompeya), regulation of gasoline stations (Javier v.
Earnshaw) and movie theaters (People v. Chan),
and the use of city roads (Calalang v. Williams).
Public morals: basis for judicial approval of
legislation punishing vagrancy and classifying a
pimp as a vagrant (US v. Giner Cruz), regulating the
operation of public dance halls (US v. Rodriguez),
prohibiting gambling (US. Pacis), regulating the days
when panguingui may be played (US v. Salaveria),
licensing cockpits (Pedro v. Provincial Board of
Rizal), prohibiting the operation of pinball machines
(Uy Ha v. City Mayor), regulating the operation of
motels and hotels (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association v. City Mayor), and regulating
establishment of massage parlors (Velasco v. Mayor
Villegas).
Limitations:
Dela Cruz v. Judge Paras where a
municipality refused to give any permit for
night clubs and any license for professional
dances, the Court declared the ordinance as
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unconstitutional as going beyond mere
regulation into prohibition of a profession
or calling which, properly regulated, can be
legitimate.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties the morality
of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. There is
nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling. It is left
to the discretion of Congress.
o While the scope of police power is vast, it must be
exercised within the limits set by the Constitution.
Determination of what is a proper exercise of its
police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject
to the supervision of the courts.
o Restrictions found in the Bill of Rights are directed against
the state. They do not govern relations between private
persons.
However, almost all the protections against the state
found in the Bill of Rights have been made
applicable as civil law to relations between private
persons through Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
MMDA vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE
(ANGSIY)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: MMDA, not being a political subdivision but merely an
executive authority, has NO police power thereby not having the mandate to
open Neptune Street to public traffic. Police power in Metro Manila is
exercised only by cities and municipalities.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. 13596 March 27, 2000
PONENTE: PUNO, J.
PETITIONER: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), a
government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila
RESPONDENT: Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA), a non-stock, non-
profit corporation composed of home owners in Bel-air Village, Makati
FACTS:
Petition:
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Motion for Reconsideration of the decision which issued a permanent
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street
and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.
Factual Antecedents:
Petitioner MMDA sent respondent BAVA a notice requesting the
latter to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996.
Respondent was also informed that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Previous actions were instituted by the respondent from which the
CA finally rendered a decision declaring that the petitioner has no
authority to order the opening of Neptune Street and cause the
demolition of its perimeter walls as such authority is lodged in the
City Council of Makati by ordinance.
Hence, the instant case.
Statute Involved:
Article III Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution: No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of the law.
Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
o One of the powers limited by the Bill of Rights is police
power which is exercised by the national government,
through the legislative department. It is also delegated,
within limits, to local governments.
RA 7924: Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority. The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and
supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services
within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local
government units concerning purely local matters."
Position of Petitioner:
Petitioner claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to
public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police
power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila, including
traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of
thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the
general public.
o Police power is the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the
same.Such power is plenary and its scope is vast and
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pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public
health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
Position of Respondents:
espondents allege that police power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty and is vested by the Constitution in the legislature and
may only be delegated to the President and administrative boards
as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units, any of which the MMDA does not fall under.
ISSUE:
W/N the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuant to its regulatory and police power.
HELD/RATIO:
No.
Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature and
cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power
o However, the National Legislature may delegate this
power to the President and administrative boards as well
as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units
NOTE: Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in
the Local Government Code of 1991. Such delegation is
found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the
general welfare clause.
RA 7924, which instituted the MMDA, limited its function to the
delivery of the seven (7) basic services which includes transport and
traffic management
o R. A. No. 7924 does NOT grant the MMDA police power,
let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council,
its governing board, has NOT been delegated any legislative
power.
MMDA is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations
and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature as stated in the charter itself (RA 7924
Section 2).
While the general welfare should be promoted, it should be stressed
that such should not be achieved at the expense of the rule of law.
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Final Ruling:
The petition is denied.
LIFE, LIBERTY, PROPERTY
The guarantees of the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights
are universal in their application to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race,
color or nationality.
LIBERTY
o Civil liberty measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in
a civilized community.
o Includes the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary personal restraint or servitude.
o Deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties to
which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to
such restraints as are necessary for the common
welfare.
o US Supreme Court: Liberty includes the right of the citizen to
be free to use his faculties in lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling.
o Chief elements of the guaranty:
Right to contract
Right to choose ones employment
Right to labor
Right of locomotion
o Writ of Amparo
remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
Covers
extralegal killings
enforced disappearances
threats thereof
Not included:
Threatened demolition of a dwelling does
not constitute right to life liberty and security
(Canlas v. Napico Homeowners)
No deprivation of liberty where the only
limitation imposed upon police officers is
that their movements within the premises of
the camp shall be monitored, that they have
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to be escorted whenever the circumstances
warrant that they leave the camp, and that
their estimated time of departure and arrival
shall be entered in a logbook. (Manalo v.
PNP Chief)
Blanket restriction on contact visits of
military detainees as a practice reasonably
related to maintaining security. (In re:
Petition for Habeas Corpus)
PROPERTY
o Protected property includes the following vested rights:
Perfected mining claim
Perfected homestead
Final judgment
Right to work
Right to earn a living
o Not considered protected property
License to operate a cockpitmerely considered a
privilege withdrawable when public interest required
such.
Certificate of public convenience granted to a
transportation company confers no property right
However, a privilege may evolve into some form of
property right when a holder of an export quota, has
been enjoying it for so long and has put in
substantial investment making the business the
source of employment of thousands.
Public office is not property but a public trust or
agency.
However, it is still a protected right in the
sense that public officials may rely on due
process to protect the security of tenure.
Pronouncements which say that licenses are
mere privileges cannot be taken as a
sweeping declaration that revocation of
licenses never requires opportunity for a
hearing.
o Classification of property into historical treasures or
landmarks, to the extent that it will involve the imposition of
limits on ownership, must also be done with both procedural
and substantive due process.
o Jurisprudence on extent of protection of property:
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A policy against employees having marital or
romantic relationship with employees of competitor
companies can be justified if based on the right to
guard a companys trade secrets. There must be a
reasonably necessity for the prohibition. (Duncan
Association of Employees v. Glaxo Wellcome)
A law allowing only skilled workers to be deployed
for overseas employment can be valid. (Executive
Secretary v. CA)
No right is absolute, and the proper
regulation of a profession, calling,
business or trade has always been
upheld as a legitimate object of a valid
exercise of the police power by the state
particularly when their conduct affects
either the execution of legitimate
governmental functions, the preservation
of the State or the public health and
welfare and public morals.
Private commercial banks are protected property.
(Beltran v. Secretary of Health)
The State may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations in order to secure the
general welfare.
An Executive Order requiring the closure of bus
terminals in the city was found to be an
unreasonable exercise of police power. (Lucena
Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner)
LIFE
o It is not just the right to be alive or to the security of ones
limb against physical harm. It is the right to a good life.
o Includes the policy against nuclear arms as well as the
abolition of the death penalty.
HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS
Justice Fernando: if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much
more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at
the most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measure is wider. (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators v. City
of Manila)
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Justice Makasiar: the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost through prescription
but human rights are imprescriptible.
Civil liberties: rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions.
Validation of a law restricting property rights: a mere reasonable
or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purpose would suffice
Validation of a law infringing human rights: existence of a grave
and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent.
Despite the hierarchy, the right to property is still a basic right.
o Protection of property was a primary object of the social
compact and the absence of such would lead to anarchy.
o Property is considered an important instrument for the
preservation and enhancement of personal dignity.
For the poor who are oppressed, property is as important as life and liberty.
To protect their property is to protect their life.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO, INC.
(BUENDIA)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;
and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PONENTE: Makasiar
PETITIONER: Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO)
a legitimate labor union of respondent company
RESPONDENT: Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc.
FACTS:
Petition:
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Petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969 which
dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioners for being
pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed
by the Rules
Factual Antecedents:
Petitioner PBMEO claims that they decided on March 1, 1969 to hold
a mass demonstration 3 days after on March 4, 1969 in
Malacanang against alleged abuses of the Pasig police
o The demonstration will be participated in by 3 shifts of
employees of respondent company. (6 AM 2 PM; 7AM 4
PM; 8AM 5 PM)
Respondent company asked PBMEO to not require the members of
the 6 AM-2PM shift to be in the demonstration unless they risk
being dismissed from work
PBMEO proceeded with the demonstration so respondent company
charged petitioners and employees of the 6 AM 2 PM shift with
"violation of Republic Act No. 875, and of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement providing for No Strike and No Lockout (CBA)
Petitioners answered that they did not violate the CBA and that the
demonstration was not against the respondent company
September 15, 1969 petitioners were terminated from their
employment because the Court of Industrial Relations Judge
Salvador found them guilty of bargaining in bad faith
Petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration but respondent
company averred that it was filed two days late
o October 9, 1969 - the respondent en banc dismissed the
motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro
forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period
prescribed by its Rules.
Statute Involved:
Art. 3 Sec. 1. No Person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, now shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
Position of Petitioner/s:
Their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due
to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the
president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their
counse
ISSUE:
W/N the resolution dated September 15, 1969 terminating the
petitioners from their employment is correct and if the October 9,
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1969 resolution dismissing the motion for reconsideration is just
based on filing beyond the reglementary period
HELD/RATIO:
NO. The resolutions dated September 15, 1969 and October 9,
1969 by the Court of Industrial Relations are null and void
The case restates basic concepts and principles posed by the case
o (2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of
liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision
of those who have no patience with general principles."
o (4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the
appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress
and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
o (5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the
primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and
the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity."
Superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by
the law and its object or purpose (that the law is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive)
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or
impairs property rights. On the other hand, a
constitutional or valid infringement of human
rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent.
The court finds that the demonstration on March 4, 1969 could not
be legally enjoined by the court of Industrial Relations on such
slender grounds such as the Collective Bargaining Agreement
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because it denies the workers the right to stage mass demonstration
during work hours.
The respondent firm is the one who committed unfair labor practices
for not allowing all its employees to join in the demonstration against
alleged police abuses and the separation of the 8 petitioners
constituted a violation of their freedom of expression, assembly and
for redress of grievances.
Final Ruling:
Judgement is hereby rendered: setting aside as null and void the
orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated
September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
directing the reinstatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with
full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until
re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might
have realized from other sources during their separation from the
service.
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION vs. GLAXO WELCOME
PHILIPPINES
(BULLO)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Companies cannot prohibit marriage of their employees
with employees of competitor companies but they can initiate policies that
eliminate conflicts of interest that arise from it. Equal protection clause
cannot be invoked against private persons, only the state or those acting
under the color of its authority.
DATE/G.R. NO./SCRA: September 17, 2004 GR No. 162994
PONENTE: TINGA, J.
PETITIONER: Duncan Association and Pedro A. Tecson
RESPONDENT: Glaxo Wellcome Philippines
FACTS:
Petition
Review on Certiorari assailing prior decisions in a lower court and
the CA in 2003 and 2004 respectively.
Factual Antecedents:
Pedro Tecson was hired by Glaxo Wellcome Philippines as a
medical representative in 1995. He signed a contract of
employment that stipulates that he agrees to the company rules
o The pertinent rule here is ...to disclose to management
any existing or future relationship you may have, either
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by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies. Should [such
relationship] pose a possible conflict of interest,
[Tecson] agree[s] to resign voluntarily from the Company
as a matter of Company policy
Tecson was originally assigned in Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
Sales area
He entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy from Astra, a
rival company
1998 - After several warnings of conflict of interest from his
district manager, Tecson still married Bettsy
January 1999 - Glaxo reminded him that either he or Bettsy should
resign to eliminate conflict of interest
o But Glaxo expressed that they wanted to keep him because
he was doing well in his job
Tecson requested for a transfer into the milk division of Glaxo
because Astra did not have a milk division
o Glaxo denied the request in view of their least-movement-
possible policy.
November 1999 - Tecson was transferred to Butuan City- Surigao
City-Agusan del Sur Sales area in Mindanao away from his previous
Visayas post
Tecson sought for reconsideration to its Grievance Committee about
his transfer but the company remained firm
Tecson defied the transfer and continued working in Camarines Sur
area.
While his Grievance was pending he was not issued samples of
products that competed with Astra nor was he included in the
seminars regarding said products.
Both parties sought for voluntary arbitration
o Glaxo offered severance of 50,000 ( month pay for every
year of service) and the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) declared Glaxos policy as valid.
Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the CA assailing the NCMB
decision
o The CA promulgated the NCMB decision that the assailed
policy was a valid exercise of management prerogatives
Hence the instant case which was elevated to the SC for a Motion for
Reconsideration of the CAs decision
o In the instant case, Tecson claims that Glaxos policy
violates the equal protection clause in creating invalid
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distinctions among employees on account of whom they
want to marry
Statute Involved:
Art. III Section 1. No person shall be deprived of Life, Liberty,
Property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of laws.
Position of Petitioner/s:
1. The CA erred in affirming the NCMBs finding that Glaxos
policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an employee of a
competing company is valid.
Position of Respondent/s:
1. Glaxo is validly exercising management prerogatives and does not
violate the equal protection clause. Reassignment is not dismissal
and Tecson was reassigned to his hometown Agusan del Sur and
his wifes roots tracing to Butuan City.
2. They cannot issue him samples and drugs nor allow Tecson to
attend seminars about drugs that compete with Astra. In general, it
wants to keep its trade secrets and marketing strategies private.
In this case, 67% of Astras products were in direct competition
with Glaxos.
Tecson read, understood, and signed his employment contract with
full knowledge of the stipulation.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in its ruling supporting Glaxos policy against
employees marrying employees from competitor companies.
HELD/RATIO:
NO.
Tecson agreed and signed his contract, Glaxo has expressly
informed him of its position against these kinds of marriages
The prohibition against personal or marital relationship with
employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is
reasonable under the circumstances
o Glaxo has a right to protect its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and
economic interests
o The Constitution protects the right of enterprises to create
policies that protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth
Glaxo did NOT violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
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o The equal protection clause is addressed only to the state
or those acting under its authority
o U.S. jurisprudence holds that the equal protection clause
does NOT shield against private conduct however
discriminatory or wrongful
Furthermore, Glaxo did NOT impose an absolute prohibition
against relationships between its employees and those of
competitor companies
o A Glaxo employee remains free to marry anyone of his/her
choosing
o Policy does not restrict a personal prerogative that belongs
to the individual
However, an employees personal decision does
NOT detract the employer from exercising
management prerogatives to ensure maximum
profit and business success
STAR PAPER CORPORATION vs. SIMBOL
(CUBACUB)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Prohibitive policies on employment practices are
management prerogative as long as there is a reasonable business
necessity for such. If there is none, it is illegal and may be in violation of the
law.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: April 12, 2006 G.R. No 164774
PONENTE: PUNO, J.
PETITIONER: Star Paper Corporation, Josephine Ongsitco & Sebastian
Chua
RESPONDENT: Ronaldo D. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia & Lorna E. Estrella
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for Review on Certiorari the decision of the CA, reversing the
previous decision of the NLRC that affirmed the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter
Factual Antecedents:
This case involves 2 separate instances wherein an employee of
Star Paper Corporation (SPC) had to resign because he/she married
a co-employee (Respondents Simbol & Comia). Their marriages to
their co-employees were found to be against company policy
8
Respondent Estrella, on the other hand, had to resign because she
got impregnated by a married man (Luisit Zuniga, also an
employee in SPC).
The 1995 SPC policy is as follows:
o New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case
he/she has a relative of up to 3rd degree of relationship,
already employed by the company.
o In case of two of our employees developed a friendly
relationship during the course of their employment and
then decided to get married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated above.
Respondents filed for an unfair labor practice against the
Petitioners with the Labor Arbiter on the ground that SPCs policy
was in violation of Art. 136 of the Labor Code
o The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case due to lack of merit,
stating that it was management prerogative to impose such
policy.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and awarded
backwages and reinstatement to the 3 respondents.
Statute Involved:
Art. 136 of the Labor Code It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment
that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of her marriage.
Position of Petitioner/s:
SPCs policy is not violative of relevant constitutional rights on
marriage and family and Art. 136 of the Labor Code.
The respondents resignation from the company was voluntary. As to
Respondent Estrella, petitioners contend that she was pressured to
resign due to her immoral conduct.
It is management prerogative to employ a policy that relatives within
the 3rd degree will not be hired.
Art. 136 of the Labor Code, if read together with the 1995 policy,
does not require the woman employee to resign. The couple is given
the option to choose who between them to resign and that
employees are given the freedom to choose who to marry.
There is no express provision in our laws that prohibit marital
discrimination.
Position of Respondent/s:
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Respondents argue that they were illegally dismissed from the
company and that their resignation from the company was far from
voluntary. Respondents Simbol and Comia were compelled to resign
because of the 1995 policy. Estrella was issued a memorandum that
she was dismissed because of immoral conduct. She refused to sign
the memorandum at first but due to financial need, she filed for
resignation so that she could receive her back wages.
ISSUE:
W/N the 1995 policy is violative of Art. 136 of the Labor Code and
other constitutional rights of the employees.
HELD/RATIO:
YES
There is NO valid reasonable business necessity for the 1995
SPC policy
o Such policy is premised on management fear that
employees married to each other would be less efficient.
Allowing SPC to continue on with this policy without just
cause violates the employees right to security of tenure.
The SC makes mention of the concept of bona fide occupational
qualification exception there must be a compelling BUSINESS
NECESSITY and the same should be REASONABLE
o 2 requisites:
employment qualification is reasonably related to the
essential operation of the job involved
a factual basis for believing that all or substantially
all persons meeting the qualification would be
unable to properly perform the duties of the job
The questioned policy does not violate Art. 136 of the Labor Code on
its face but it creates a disproportionate effect. The petitioners failed
to raise a legitimate business concern to base the 1995 policy. In
effect, the policy creates a form of arbitrary discrimination against
married couples who work in the same company.
The dismissal of Respondent Estrella is illegal. Petitioners argument
that she resigned voluntarily contradicts the fact that she filed for a
case of illegal dismissal. Voluntary resignation is an act of
abandonment on the part of the employee, which is lacking in this
case.
Final Ruling:
The decision of the CA is affirmed. The dismissal of the
Respondents is declared illegal. They are entitled to reinstatement,
full back wages and attorneys fees.
9
DUE PROCESS AS PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
Banco Espaol Filipino v. Palanca: essentials of procedural
fairness in judicial proceedings
o Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are
present:
1. There must be a court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant or over the property which
is the subject of the proceedings
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing
Due process is not always a judicial process.
o Frequently, legal controversies have to be decided by
administrative bodies and not by the courts.
o Administrative bodies are not always bound by the finer
points of judicial due process but they are bound by the due
process clause.
o Requirements on due process in courts of justice:
actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to
answer and a trial according to some settled course
of judicial proceedings.
o Requirements in administrative proceedings:
Right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present ones case and submit evidence in support
thereof
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
The decision must have something to support itself
Evidence must be substantial, meaning such
reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected
The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on
its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate
The Board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that
THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
o In both judicial and administrative proceedings, the heart of
procedural due process is the need for notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
What is required is not actual hearing but a real
opportunity to be heard.
One who refuses to appear at a hearing is not
denied due process if a decision is reached without
waiting for him.
o As a rule of fairness, procedural due process achieves
two purposes:
It contributes to the accuracy and thus minimizes
errors in deprivations.
To the person who is the subject of deprivation, it
gives him a sense of rational participation in a
decision that can affect his destiny and thus
enhances his dignity as a thinking person.
o While fairness is not violated in administrative proceedings
when the hearing officer is not the same person who decides
the case (American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents
1975), there is violation of due process when the officer who
reviews a case is the same person whose decision is on
appeal. (Zambales v. Chromite Mining v. Court of Appeals
1979).
o Notice and due hearing are required in judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings but they are not required in the
promulgation of general rules. (Taxicab Operators v. Board
of Transportation 1982).
o Fixing rates, being a quasi-judicial process, requires hearing.
(PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz 1989).
Due process guidelines in handling disciplinary cases in
schools.
o The contractual obligation of a school to afford its students a
fair opportunity to complete the course a student has
enrolled for is recognized. However, when a student
commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the
required academic standards of the school, the student
forfeits his rights and courts are not at liberty to reverse the
discretion of university authorities in this matter. (Licup v.
University of San Carlos 1989)
o Minimum standards of due process in schools
10
The student must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them
They shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired
They shall be informed of the evidence against them
They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf
The evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO vs. PALANCA
(DANTES)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: The requirement of due process is satisfied if the
following conditions are present: (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction
must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be
given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon
lawful hearing.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: March 26, 1918/ G.R. No. L-11390
PONENTE: STREET, J
PETITIONER: EL BANCO ESPAOL-FILIPINO (plaintiff-appellant)
RESPONDENT: VICENTE PALANCA (defendant-appellant)
FACTS:
Petition:
June 25, 1915: Vicente Palanca, respondent, as administrator of the
estate of the original defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y
Limquingco, requested the court to set aside the order of default of
July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to
subsequently vacate all the proceedings.
Factual Antecedents:
Petitioner bank instituted an action to foreclose a mortgage upon
various parcels of real property in Manila
o This mortgage was executed by the original defendant
Limquingco as security for a debt he owes to the bank.
After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, defendant
returned to China and died there without returning to the Philippines.
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
As the original defendant was a nonresident at the time of the
foreclosure, it was necessary for the petitioner in the foreclosure
proceeding to give notice to the defendant by publication
pursuant to Section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure
July 2, 1908: Defendant did NOT appear in the Court of First
Instance, so judgment was taken against him by default
July 3, 1908: Ordered defendant to deliver the indebted amount to
the clerk of the court, and failure to do so within the specified
period in the judgment would lead to the public sale of the
mortgage property located in Manila
o Accordingly, it was declared that publication had been
properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about
this notice being mailed to the original defendant
The payment was never made; and the court ordered the sale of
the property.
o July 30, 1908: the sale took place
o August 7, 1908: the court confirmed the sale.
Statute Involved:
Section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that a nonresident
or absent defendant must be given notice of the summons and
complaint
o In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident
or absent defendant is known, the judge must direct a copy
of the summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited
by the clerk in the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to
the person to be served, at his place of residence
Position of Petitioner/s:
The order and judgment of the CFI are void because the court had
never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject
of the action.
The irregularity in the proceedings, i.e., the mailing of the notice
of the foreclosure proceeding, amounted to a denial of "due
process of law"
ISSUE:
W/N the supposed irregularity in the proceedings was of such gravity
as to amount to a denial of due process of law
HELD/RATIO:
NO
The requirement of due process in judicial proceedings is satisfied
if the following conditions are present:
11
1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it
2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding
3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard
4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
In relation to requisite no. 3 (that the defendant be given an
opportunity to be heard)
o In a foreclosure case, notification of the proceedings to
the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which
appearance must be made, is recognized as essential
As such, statutes generally provide for publication,
and usually, in addition, for the mailing of notice to
the defendant, if his residence is known
Actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind
is NOT considered absolutely necessary under the
law
Property is always assumed to be in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent;
and it may be assumed that he has knowledge of
any proceedings that are instituted for its
condemnation or sale
o The failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact did
happen, is NOT such an irregularity that amounts to a
denial of due process of law
Notice was given by publication in a newspaper,
and this is the only form of notice which the law
unconditionally requires
Final Ruling:
The judgment and action of the CFI are without error, and the same
are accordingly affirmed.
FABELLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(DE GUIA)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Due process of law requires notice and hearing.
Hearing presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal. The right to be
heard and, ultimately, the right to due process of law lose meaning in the
absence of an independent, competent and impartial tribunal.
NOTE: See what due process in administrative proceedings includes under
the Held/Ratio portion of the digest.
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: November 28, 1997 / G.R. No. 110379
PONENTE: Panganiban
PETITIONER: Hon. Armand Fabella in his capacity as Sec. of Department of
Education, Culture, and Sports; John Doe (not his real name) in his capacity
as Regional Director of NCR; Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano in his capacity as the
Superintendent of Quezon City Schools Divion; Alma bella O. Bautista;
Aurora C. Valenzuela; Teresita V. Dimagmaliw
RESPONDENT: The Court of Appeals; Rosarito A. Septimo, Erlinda B. De
Leon, Clarissa T. Dimaano, Wilfredo N. Bacani, Marina R. Vivar, Victoria S.
Ubaldo, Jennie L. Dogwe, Norma L. Rongcales, Edita C. Septimo, Teresita
E. Evangelista, Catalina R. Fragante, Rebecca D. Bagdog, Marilynna C. Ku,
Marrisa M. Samson, Henedina B. Carillo, Nicasio C. Bravo, Ruth F.
Lacanilao, Mirasol C. Baligod, Felisa S. Villacruel, Ma. Violeta Elizabeth Y.
Hernandez, Antonio C. Ocampo, Adriano S. Valencia And Eleuterio S.
Vargas,
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the May 21, 1993 Decision
of the CA which ordered the Hon. Armand Fabella substituted as
respondent-appellant in place of former Secretary Isidro Carino.
Factual Antecedents:
Sept 17, 1990: DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work
order for all public school teachers who participated in walk-outs and
strikes from Sept. 26, 1990 Oct 18, 1990.
o Strikes from Sept. 26, 1990 Oct. 18, 1990: mass action to
demand for their 13th month pay, clothing allowance, and
passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress
Carino filed an administrative case against the respondents, who
are teachers of a Mandaluyong High School, in this case for
participating in the strike and placed them under preventive
suspension
April 10, 1991: The teachers filed an injunctive suit with the RTC
charging Carino with fraud and deceit
o RTC denied the restraining order
Teachers amended the complaint and made it for certiorari and
mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion because its guidelines
for investigation place the burden of proof on them by requiring them
to prove their innocence instead of requiring Carino and his staff to
adduce evidence to prove the charges against the teachers
o RTC dismissed filed motion for certiorari with SC SC
reinstated the action
12
Carino was ordered to appear personally before the RTC but failed
to do so which led to respondents counsel to file for a Motion for
Reconsideration
o Motion denied
Court found that the dismissal of the teachers was unjust and
granted the demands of the teachers.
Statute Involved: RA 4670
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers
o Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure. Every
teacher shall enjoy equitable safeguards at each stage of
any disciplinary procedure and shall have:
a: the right to be informed, in writing, of the charges;
b. the right to full access to the evidence in the case;
c. the right to defend himself and to be defended by a
representative of his choice and/or by his organization, adequate
time being given to the teacher for the preparation of his defense;
and
d. the right to appeal to clearly designated authorities. No publicity
shall be given to any disciplinary action being taken against a
teacher during the pendency of his case.
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against
teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly
authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a division
supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative
of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national
teacher's organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to
be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall
submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public
Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings:
Provided, however, That where the school superintended is the
complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.
ISSUE:
W/N private respondents were denied due process of law
HELD/RATIO:
YES
The contention that government employees are prohibited from
undergoing strikes is not the question in the present case, but rather
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
were the respondents robbed of due process of law in the
proceedings after their strike
In administrative proceedings, due process includes the
following:
1. The right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's
legal rights
2. A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence
in one's favor, and to defend one's rights
3. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality
4. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the
hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected.
RA 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers covers the
administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers stating
that a specific committee must be created to hear such cases
The committees formed by DECS did not include a representative
of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national
teachers organization
o Inclusion of a representative of a teachers organization was
indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal which would
give meaning to the right to be heard
o Essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard
Final Ruling:
Petition is DENIED for its utter failure to show any reversible error on
the part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision is thus
AFFIRMED.
NON vs. JUDGE DAMES
(EXCONDE)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: School authorities are not powerless to discipline
students; however, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires
observance of procedural due process.
DATE/GR NO. SCRA: G.R. No. 89317 May 20 1990
PONENTE: Cortes, J
13
PETITIONERS: Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano,
Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba,
Sonny Moreno, Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel
Torres
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Sancho Danes II, in his capacity as presiding Judge
of 5 Regional Trial Court 38, Daet Camarines Norte nd Mabini Colleges Inc,.
th
representd by its president Romula Adeva and the by the chairman of the
Board of Trustees, Justo Lukban
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
Petition to reverse the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz.
Factual Antecedents:
Petitioners are students of Private Respondent and were not
allowed to re-enroll by the latter for the academic year 1988-1989
for leading or participating in student mass actions against
private respondent
They were given 5 different days by the private respondents to air
their grievances, but when classes resumed they still continued to
hold their rally picketing, without renewing their permits.
Thus, they were not allowed to re-enroll for the next semester
because the petitioners have failing grades
Alcuaz doctrine: Student once admitted by the school is considered
enrolled for one semester and hence, may be refused readmission
after the semester is over, as the contract between student and
school is deemed terminated
Statutes Involved:
Art. III Sec. 1No person shall be deprived if life, liberty and property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
o Students were refused readmission by the school without
according them procedural due process.
Position of Petitioners:
Their rally picketing was during the exercise of the cognate rights
of free speech and peaceful assembly and there was no due
investigation that could serve as basis for disciplinary action.
Position of Respondents:
Denies the readmission of the petitioners by relying on Par. 137 of
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides that
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
when a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is
enrolling for the entire semester for collegiate courses
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners were afforded procedural due process
HELD/RATIO:
NO.
Private respondents cannot discriminate against petitioners who
exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly.
This does not mean that school authorities are powerless to
discipline students.
o The students can be subjected to disciplinary proceedings
but only AFTER the requirements of procedural due
process have been completed
Requisites of procedural due process for students
1. Students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with assistance of a counsel if desired
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by school authorities to hear
and decide the case
Final Ruling
Petition is granted. Respondent is to readmit petitioners.
LAO GI ALIAS CHIA, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(FILASOL)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Private prosecutors cannot intervene in deportation
proceedings in order to avoid harassment and oppression. Hence, there are
special prosecutors tasked to prosecute deportation.
DATE/ GR NO/ SCRA: December 29, 1989, G.R. # 81798, 180 SCRA 756
PONENTE: GANCAYCO, J.
PETITIONERS: Lao Gi alias FILOMENO CHIA SR., his wife, ONG UE, and
children FILOMENO, JR., MANUEL, ROSITA VICENTA, and DOMINGA
14
RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA which
dismissed the appeal from the decision of the trial court to dismiss
the petition for lack of legal basis and for want of supervisory
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court involved.
Factual Antecedents:
March 9, 1981, a charge for deportation was filed with the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) against
petitioner and his family
A private prosecutor is assisting in the prosecution of the case by
the special prosecutor of the CID
Statute Involved
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Sec. 16, Rule 110: an offended
party may intervene in a criminal prosecution when there is a
civil liability arising from the criminal action claimed by said
party. In such case he may intervene by counsel.
Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
o No alien shall be deported without being informed of the
specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a
hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
Position of Petitioner:
Deportation proceedings must be conducted in accordance with the
principles of due process.
Position of Respondent:
CID alleged that petitioners refused to register as aliens having been
required to do so and continued to refuse to register as such. Thus,
citizenship may be threshed out as the occasion may demand and
that due process was accorded to respondents.
ISSUE:
W/N a private prosecutor should be allowed to participate in a
deportation case.
HELD/ RATIO:
NO.
The power to deport an alien is an act of the state by or under the
authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is injurious to the
public.
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature
of a criminal action, since it is harsh and affects the freedom of a
person, the constitutional right of such person to due process
should NOT be denied
o Thus, the rules of court on criminal procedure are applicable
to deportation proceedings
o Hence, in accordance with Section 37(c) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, the charge against an alien must
specify the acts or omissions complained of to be stated
in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of
common understanding to know on what ground he is
intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a
proper judgment.
Before any charge should be filed in the CID, a preliminary
investigation must be conducted to determine if there is sufficient
cause to charge the respondent for deportation.
Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an offended party may
intervene in a criminal prosecution when there is civil liability arising
from the criminal action. He may intervene by counsel.
o In deportation cases, the intervention of a private
prosecutor should NOT be allowed. Even if such party can
establish any damages due him arising from the deportation
charge against the alien, such relief cannot be afforded him
in the deportation proceedings. His recourse is in the
ordinary courts.
The deportation of an alien is the sole concern of
the state. This is the reason why there are special
prosecutors and fiscals tasked to prosecute such
case.
Final Ruling
Petition is GRANTED. The Court cannot conceive of any justification
for a private party to have any right to intervene in deportation cases.
PEOPLE vs. JUDGE NAZARIO
(FONACIER)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: A statute is not rendered uncertain and void just
because of the general terms used therein, but it must be utterly VAGUE
and unable to be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction
(Void for vagueness doctrine)
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: 165 SCRA 186 August 31, 1988 / GR. No. L-44143
15
PONENTE: Sarmiento, J.
PLAINTIFF: The People of the Philippines
APPELLANT: Eusebio Nazario
FACTS:
Petition:
Nazario was charged with the violation of certain municipal
ordinances of the municipality Pagbilao, Quezon.
Nazario admitted to committing the acts he was charged with but
claims that the ordinances do not apply to him, and if they did then
the ordinances are unconstitutional due to their uncertainty and
ambiguity.
Factual Antecedents:
Pertinent sections of the ordinance in question: Section 1. Any
owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits
of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of
P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. (In this
case, the total amount was 362.62)
Nazario is leasing the land. Owners are the National Government.
Statute Involved:
Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance No. 15,
series of 1965 and as further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series
of 1966 of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao.
Position of Plaintiff:
That the ordinance is not sufficiently vague to be considered
unconstitutional.
Position of Appellant (Nazario):
He is neither the owner nor is he the manager therefore he
contends that the ordinance does not apply to him.
o He is a mere lessee of the fishpond, and is thus not
covered since the said ordinances speak of owner or
manager.
Also, there were differences with regard to when the payments must
be made. For example Ordinance 4 stated that payments would be
made after the lapse of 3 years starting from the date said fishpond
is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries. while Ordinance No. 12
states beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond
started operating before the year 1964.
ISSUE:
W/N the Ordinances are unconstitutional due to ambiguity and
uncertainty.
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
HELD/RATIO:
NO
As a general rule, statutes may be considered vague if they lack
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
Void for vagueness doctrine It is repugnant to the Constitution if
it
1) violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid
2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions.
But the act must be UTTERLY vague on its face meaning that it
CANNOT be clarified by either a saving clause or by
construction
o What may be saved by proper construction legislation in
imprecise language but which nonetheless specifies a
standard though defectively phrased
Nazario comes within the term of manager since he did not deny
the fact that he financed the construction and had employed laborers
to maintain the fishpond.
Furthermore, even if the Government owns the land, they are
immune from taxes, but not only that, the Government is not the one
that has been making money from the venture nor have they shared
in the profits, therefore it is only fair that Nazario shoulders the
burden of tax under these Ordinances
o As Nario is the actual operator of the fishponds and the
recipient of the profits brought about by the business
With regard to the difference in payment dates the Court explained
that Ordinance No. 12 only grants amnesty to old delinquent
fisheries, it does not repeal the other Ordinances, therefore
Ordinance No. 15 shall prevail (3 years starting from date of approval
by Bureau of Fisheries)
The Ordinances set forth enough standards that clarify imagined
ambiguities
o While such standards are not apparent from the face
thereof, they are visible from the intent of the Ordinances
Final Ruling
Appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against appellant
CORONA vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS
(GARCIA)
16
KEY TAKE-AWAY: License of harbor pilots cannot be cancelled without
due process.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997
PONENTE: ROMERO J.
PETITIONERS: Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato Corona, Acting
Secretary of the DOTC Jesus Garcia, General Manager of the Philippine
Ports Authority Rogelio Dayan
RESPONDENTS: United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines and
Manila Pilots Association
FACTS:
Petition:
Certiorari seeking to reverse the decision of the RTC of Manila
declaring the Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order 04-92
(PPA-AO) null and void
Factual Antecedents:
Prior to the issuance of the PPA-AO 04-92, the governing
Administrative Order is PPA-AO 03-85 or the Rules and Regulations
Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage
Fees in Philippine Ports which states that:
o Aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses and must
train as probationary pilots in outports for 3 months and in
the Port of Manila for 4 months
o When they have achieved satisfactory performance, they are
given permanent appointments by the PPA to exercise
harbor pilotage until they reach 70 years old.
July 15, 1992 - PPA General Manager Dayan issued PPA-AO 04-92
which limits the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year
subject to yearly renewal or cancellation
Respondents questioned the said AO before the DOTC and
requested for its suspension. However, DOTC Secretary Garcia
stated that the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPAs
issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its
governing body.
Respondents appealed before the Office of the President where said
office issued a TRO to the said PPA-AO. Eventually, however, the
Office of the President through Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs
Corona lifted the TRO and concluded that the PPA was merely
implementing Section 6 of PD 857 mandating the same to control,
regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port
district
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
Respondents then filed a case before the RTC of Manila. The RTC
of Manila ruled in favor of the respondents and stated that:
o The PPA acted in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of
discretion
o PPA AO 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders
are null and void
o The PPA and the pertinent government agencies are
permanently enjoined from implementing PPA AO 04-92
Petitioners seek to reverse the decision of the RTC in this present
case.
Statutes Involved:
PPA AO 04-92 which limits the term of appointment of harbor pilots
to one year
o All existing regular appointment which have been previously
issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain
valid up to December 31, 1992 only
o All appointment to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage
districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one year from
the date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance
If said AO deprives respondents rights in Section 1, Article 3
o No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law
Position of Petitioners:
PD 857 authorizes the PPA to control regulate and supervise
pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district
Section 26 of said PD merely requires PPA to consult with relevant
government agencies before the issuance of any AO and they have
complied with such. PPA AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely
regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPAs
jurisdictional area
Position of Respondent/s:
PPA AO 04-92 deprives their right to exercise their profession and
the issuance of such denied them due process
No hearing was conducted whereby relevant government agencies
and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views (procedural
aspect of the enactment)
ISSUE:
W/N PPA AO 04-92 violates respondents right to exercise their
profession and their right to due process of law
17
HELD/RATIO:
YES
When one speaks of due process, there should be a distinction
between matters of procedure and matters of substance.
Procedurally, respondents rights were NOT denied as the facts
show that MARINA (Maritime Industry Authority), which took over the
licensing function, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of
the PPA
o Moreover, as the PPA is a mere administrative agency (it
does not have a quasi-judicial function), it need NOT
comply with the requirements of notice and hearing
However, pilotage, as a profession, has the nature of a property
right
o Pilotage may be practiced only by duly licensed
individuals; this license is granted in the form of an
appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage
until they retire at the age of 70 years.
o Under the PPA 04-92, pilots have to contend with an annual
cancellation of their license which can be temporary or
permanent depending on the outcome of their performance
evaluation
Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly
confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto
expire at the end of that period
Renewal of their license is now dependent on a
rigid evaluation of performance which is conducted
only after the license has already been cancelled
It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which
primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable
and constitutionally infirm.
Since PPA 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to
enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement, it
deprives the respondents right to property without due process
of law.
Final Ruling
Petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED
ARMY AND NAVY CLUB vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(GUERRERO)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Recognition of a Historical Landmark can be a subject of
police power; and police power necessarily includes state regulation
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
therefore due process must be observed. the prescribed procedure must be
followed first before being classified/recognized.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. 110223, April 8, 1997
PETITIONER: Army and Navy Club of Manila
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Petition:
This case seeks to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the RTC decision that the City of Manila is the
owner of the parcel of land where the Army and Navy Club is
located, therefore the former can evict the latter for failure its failure
to comply with its obligations.
Factual Antecedents:
This is an ejectment case where the City of Manila ordered the Army
and Navy club to vacate the premises on the grounds that the said
club is only a lessee of the land which is really owned by the City of
Manila
Petitioner insists that the Army and Navy Club already has been
declared as a national historical landmark by the by the National
Historical Commission
o Thus its existence shouldnt be undermined by a simple
ejectment suit against it
o To support its claim, the Army and Navy Club has presented
the Certificate of Transfer and Acceptance of the Historical
Marker granted to it pursuant to RA 4846 as amended by PD
374
Statute Involved:
RA 4846 as amended by PD 374, which provides that it shall be "the
policy of the State to preserve and protect the important cultural
properties and National Cultural Treasures of the nation and to
safeguard their intrinsic value."
Position of Petitioner:
Petitioners insist that since the disputed property of land where the
Army and Navy Club is located has been declared as a historical
marker (as supported by the Certificate of Transfer and Acceptance),
the defendants attempt of ejectment was a clear transgression of its
formal declaration of it as a historical landmark
Position of Respondents:
Private respondents contend that there is no dispute that the City of
Manila is the real owner of a prime parcel of land where the Army
and Navy Club is located
18
And the said club entered into a lease contract with the City of
Manila sometime in January, 1983
Petitioner failed to pay the rents for 7 consecutive years, and the
private respondents had no other choice but to file a simple
ejectment case
ISSUE:
Whether or not a simple/formal declaration of a piece of land as a historical
landmark will transform the property into a legally recognized historical
landmark?
HELD/RATIO:
NO
While the declaration that it is a historical landmark isnt
objectionable, the recognition is however, baseless
As stated by Fr Bernas in the Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS: the
countrys artistic and historical wealth can be a subject for the
exercise of police power which the state ay regulate
o State regulation is a function of the legislature; and once
regulation comes in, due process is necessary
o When the classification of property into historical treasures
or landmarks will involve the imposition of limits on
ownership, the Bill of Rights demands that it be done with
due process, both substantive and procedural
For the Army and Navy Club to be considered as a historical
property, it must go through the procedure described in the
governing law, which is RA 4846 as amended by PD 374
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the procedure has
been complied with and nonetheless, such certification doesnt give
any possessory right over the property to the petitioners
o Also the National Historical Commission does not have the
authority as well to vest such right of ownership as they are
only tasked of supervisory powers over historical landmarks
Thus it is clear that the City of Manila is still the owner of the
disputed land and the lease contract made between the parties
should be considered as valid
o Petitioner cannot just hide behind some formal recognition in
order to escape the obligations of the lease contract
Final Ruling:
The instant petition is denied, and the Decision of the CA is affirmed,
petitioners are enjoined to vacate the premises and pay the
outstanding obligations from the lease contract
SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD vs. TORCITA
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
(KHO)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Absence of specification of the offense for which he
was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. 130442 April 6, 2000
PONENTE: GONZAGA-REYES, J.
PETITIONER: The Summary Dismissal Board and The Regional Appellate
Board, PNP, Recion VI, Iloilo City
RESPONDENT: C/INSP. Lazaro Torcita
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for review of the CAs decision setting aside the Dismissal
Boards decision of suspending respondent from service for 20 days
Factual Antecedents:
On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro
Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, was overtaken by a Mazda pick-up
owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo
Consejo with four (4) passengers
After the Mazda pick-up had overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and
after a vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and
proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the
congressman.
The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the
hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted to confront Puey and
company
Respondent was charged with 12 administrative complaints which
were consolidated into one major complaint, which is, conduct
unbecoming of a police officer
All the charges were dismissed because of lack of evidence but
the Summary Dismissal Board suspended respondent from
service for 20 days, for Simple Irregularity in the Performance of
Duty under Section 41 of RA 6975 because he was taking alcoholic
drinks in the performance of his official duty which is a breach of
internal discipline
The CA reversed the decision of the Board because the respondent
was found guilty for an offense which he was not properly charged
Statute Involved:
Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 defines acts constituting "simple
irregularity in the performance of duty"
o It is a light offense, incurred, among others, by a member of
the PNP who shall, among others, be found to "have the
odor or smell of alcohol on his breath while on duty, or
19
possess alcoholic beverages on his person, police
vehicle, post or office." (Sec. 2. A, Rule VI)
Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 (Rules and Regulations in the
conduct of summary dismissal proceedings against erring PNP
members) Section 3 (c), Rule II defines conduct unbecoming of a
police officer
o "Conduct unbecoming of a police officer" refers to any
behavior or action of a PNP member, irrespective of rank,
done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or
otherwise disgracing himself as a PNP member, seriously
compromise his character and standing as a gentleman in
such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of
moral character; it may also refer to acts or behavior of any
PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity which, in
dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a gentleman,
seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and
exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member
of the organization.
Position of Petitioner/s:
The offense of conduct unbecoming of a police officer is broad
enough to include any act of an officer which tends to dishonor
and disgrace the PNP
Position of Respondent/s:
The respondent insists that his right to due process of law was
impaired because he was convicted for an offense for which he was
not charged and pleads in the affirmation of the CAs decision
ISSUE:
W/N Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of
internal discipline even though the original charges did not contain
such offense
HELD/RATIO:
NO
The absence of specification of the offense for which he was
eventually found guilty is NOT a proper observance of due
process
While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost
all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how
light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be
countenanced without violating the requirements of due
process
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
None of the 12 administrative charges against the respondent
mentioned the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of
duty
It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed how
the litigation was decided with an explanation that led to the
conclusions of the court
Final Ruling
Affirm CAs decision that the Board was in excess of jurisdiction
when they found respondent guilty for an offense which he was not
properly charged
ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(LAUENGCO)
KEY TAKE-AWAY(S): The overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines
have special application only to free speech cases and are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes. With respect to criminal statutes, the
established rule is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional
will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might
also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. 148560
PONENTE: BELLOSILLO, J.
PETITIONER: Joseph Ejercito Estrada
RESPONDENT: SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition assailing the constitutionality of RA 7080 An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder
Factual Antecedents:
April 4, 2011 - Ombudsman filed several informations before the
Sandiganbayan concerning multiple laws including RA 7080
April 11 - Estra filed for an Omnibus Motion for Remand for
reconsideration and reinvestigation of the offenses charged against
him. This was denied on June 21
June 14 - Estrada moves to quash the information on his criminal
case on the grounds that the facts do not constitute any offense and
that the law it was based on is unconstitutional due to vagueness.
This was also denied by the Sandiganbayan on July 9
Estrada files present case assailing RA 7080
Statute Involved:
20
RA 7080
o Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset,
property, business, enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof,
acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates
by any combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:.
..( An enumeration of acts such as misuse of public funds
and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the
National Government)....
o Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. -
Any public officer who, ... amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1
(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death.
o Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing
the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove
each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy
Position of Petitioner
RA 7080 suffers from vagueness
RA 7080 does not take into account the reasonable doubt standard
in criminal prosecutions
RA 7080 abolishes the element of mens rea (criminal intent)
Estrada questions the meaning of series and combination in Sec.
1 & 2 as well as pattern in Sec. 4 in his argument of vagueness
Position of Respondents:
Estrada unjustly enriched himself an amount of 4 billion pesos to the
damage of the Filipino people through receiving illegal commissions,
gifts, shares or any form of benefit from illegal activities such as
illegal gambling, personal shares from the GISIS and SSS,
connivance with John Does & jane Does among others
There is nothing presented in the facts that would appear to create a
scenario where the application of the statute would make it vague or
ambiguous
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
ISSUE:
W/N Plunder law is unconstitutional for being vague
W/N Plunder Law requires violates the rights of accused to due
process
HELD/RATIO:
NO.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general
terms are used. There is no statutory command that requires
legislators to be specific and define every single word
o It is a principle in Statutory Construction that the words of a
statute will be implemented in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification
o The intended meanings of combination and series are to
be understood in their popular meaning
Ex. Combination = at least 2 acts falling under
different categories of enumeration
A statute or act may be void when it lacks a comprehensible
standard for men of common intelligence and leads to a
situation where everyone has different understandings and
different interpretations of the same words
o The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-
defined parameters which would enable the accsued to the
determine the nature of his violation
o As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or
rule that would inform those who are subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity
will be sustained
In the case at bar, it can be understood with little
difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is
the act of a public officer in amassing or
accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least Php
50,000,000 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d) of the Plunder Law
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice
o Flexibility is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of
the statute are clearly delineated
NO.
21
Under Sec. 4 of Rules of Evidence, it states that For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall NOT be necessary to
prove that each and every single act is done
o What is needed is only sufficient proof to establish a
pattern of overt criminal acts that indicate that there is an
unlawful scheme/conspiracy in the works
By proving that the accused committed the acts in Sec. 1 (d) of RA
7080
The prosecution needs to only prove beyond a reasonable doubt a
number of acts that would be enough to show that there is a
combination or series. In this case, they have already gathered
enough evidence to show the commission of acts that led to
acquisition of at least P50,000,00
Final Ruling:
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit
GONZALES vs. NLRC and ATENEO DE DAVAO
(MASIGLAT)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: In every case, an accused has the right to demand
compliance with the basic requirements of due process. This means
compliance with procedural and substantial due process which is ample
opportunity must be afforded the employee to defend herself either
personally and/or with assistance of a representative; to know the nature of
her offense; and, to cross examine and confront face to face the witnesses
against her. Likewise, due process requires that the decision must be based
on established facts and on a sound legal foundation.
DATE/GR NO.SCRA: G.R. No. 125735 | August 26, 1999
PONENTE: BELLOSILLO
PETITIONERS: LORLENE A. GONZALES
RESPONDENTS: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH
DIVISION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, and ATENEO DE DAVAO
UNIVERSITY
FACTS:
Petition
Certiorari seeking to nullify the Decision of the NLRC which reversed
and set aside the decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Conchita J.
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
Martinez (finding the dismissal of Lorlene Gonzales ILLEGAL for lack
of of factual basis)
Factual Antecedents:
Lorlene Gonzales (Petitioner) has been a schoolteacher in the
Elementary Department of Ateneo De Davao University since 1974.
In 1991, Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., Ateneo Grade School Headmaster
sent a letter to petitioner Lorlene informing her of the complaints
from 2 parents for her alleged use of corporal punishment on her
students
o Petitioner claimed that she was NOT informed of the
identity of the parents who complained she purportedly
inflicted in school-year 1990-1991.
o She also claimed that she was NOT confronted about it by
the school and that it was only two (2) years after the
complaints were made that she discovered, through her
students and their parents, that ATENEO was soliciting
complainants to lodge written complaints against her.
On 31 March 1993 she wrote a letter to Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J.,
demanding that she be formally informed of the complaint and be
duly investigated.
She was then informed of the composition of an investigative
committee organized by Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., to look into the alleged
use of corporal punishment in disciplining her students.
o Petitioner refused to take part in the investigation
unless the rules of procedure laid down by the
Committee be revised, contending that the same were
violative of her right to due process
o Petitioner specifically objected to the provision which stated:
Counsel for Ms. Lorlene Gonzales shall not directly
participate in the investigation but will merely advise Ms.
Gonzales . . . (par. 3)
On November 10, 1993, Lorlene was served a Notice of
Termination pursuant to the findings and recommendation of the
Committee. Thereafter, petitioner received a letter from the president
of ATENEO demanding her voluntary resignation a week from
receipt of the letter, otherwise, she would be considered resigned
from the service.
Lorlene then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal
o Arbiter Conchita J. Martinez found her dismissal illegal
for lack of factual basis and ordered ATENEO to award
petitioner separation pay, back wages and 13th month pay.
22
Both parties appealed to the NLRC and it reversed the decision of
the Executive Labor Arbiter by declaring petitioners dismissal
valid and legal.
o Petitioner now seeks the reversal of the decision; hence, this
petition.
Statutes Involved:
No statute mentioned in the case except for the investigative
procedure of the Ateneo De Davao mentioned above
Position of Petitioner:
Her termination was illegal as she was not fully informed of the
complaints against her.
She was not given ample opportunity to defend herself because
of the procedure of the Committee mentioned above.
Position of Respondents:
That Ateneo has complied with due process in terminating the
petitioner
ISSUE:
W/N the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in saying that
the dismissal of Lorlene was valid and legal. YES
Was there due process? (not in the actual case but in terms of the
discussion) NO
HELD/RATIO:
YES
Lorlene should have been given ample opportunity must be afforded
the employee to defend herself either personally and/or with
assistance of a representative; to know the nature of her offense;
and, to cross examine and confront face to face the witnesses
against her. Likewise, due process requires that the decision must
be based on established facts and on a sound legal foundation.
The Committees adamant refusal to change the investigating
procedure resulted in her failure to confront and cross-examine
her accusers.
o This is not "harping at technicalities" as wrongfully pointed
out by the NLRC but a serious violation of petitioner's
statutory and constitutional right to due process that
ultimately vitiated the investigation
Final Ruling: Decision of NLRC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Conchita J. Martinez "declaring the
dismissal of complainant Lorlene A. Gonzales illegal for lack of factual basis
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
and ordering respondent Ateneo de Davao University to pay complainant
separation pay, back wages and 13th month pay.. is REINSTATED,
AFFIRMED and ADOPTED.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
It is the guarantee against the exercise of arbitrary power even when
the power is exercised according to proper forms and procedure.
Lawton v. Steel (US 1894):
o The State may interfere wherever the public interest
demands it.
o Large discretion is left in the legislature to determine, not
only what the interests of the public require, but what
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
o Requirements:
The interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference
The means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
Uses of substantive due process:
o Churchill v. Rafferty (1877): upheld the validity of a portion of
a statute authorizing the Collector of Internal Revenue to
remove any sign, signboard or billboard found by him to be
offensive to the sight or otherwise a nuisance.
o Berman v. Parker (1954): It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well
balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
o Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (1919): a law creating
reservations for the Mangyan tribes and prescribing
penalties for Mangyan non-conformists was challenged as a
deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The
conclusion reached was that the law was justified by the
demands of general welfare and public interest.
o Binay v. Domingo (1991): Applying principles of social
justice, the municipality of Makati was allowed to use public
money for burial assistance to indigents.
o People v. Pomar (1924): The case dealt with a statute
prescribing a thirty day vacation with pay both before and
after confinement arising form pregnancy. Court struck down
the statute saying that: the contracting parties may establish
any agreements, terms and conditions they may deem
23
advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or
public policy.
Citing Adkins v. Childrens Hospital: the right to
contract about ones own affairs is a part of the
liberty of the individual guaranteed by the due
process clause.
Citing Adair v. U.S. : the employer and employee
have equality of right and any legislation that
disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with
the liberty of contract, which no government can
legally justify in a free land.
o People v. Fajardo (1958): Aesthetics may be used as reason
for taking down structures, but then there must be due
process and just compensation.
o Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators, Inc. v. City Mayor
of Manila (1967): Factual foundation must be presented to
rebut the presumption of constitutionality.
o Homeowners Association of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Municipal Board of Manila (1968): one of the rare cases
where police power measure was declared unconstitutional,
solely on the ground that the ordinance did not fix the period
of its effectivity.
Individual rights may be adversely affected by the
exercise of police power to the extent only that may
be fairly required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare.
When there is a temporary need, such as in a state
of emergency, the duration must also be temporary.
It must be coextensive, coeval and coterminous with
the existence of the situation.
UNITED STATES vs. TORIBIO
(OAMINAL)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: For an exercise of police power to be in compliance with
substantive due process it must be shown that:
The state interferes in the interests of the public generally and not
just a particular class.
The means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: 15 Phil. 85 (1910)
PONENTE: CARSON, J.
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
PETITIONER: United States
RESPONDENT: Luis Toribio
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition against respondent for violation of Act. No. 1147, an Act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large
cattle. The Acts constitutionality however is challenged by
respondent as being unconstitutional for being in violation of
Section 5 of the Philippine Bill (The Bills equivalent to Section 1 Art
3 of the 1987 Constitution).
Factual Antecedents:
Respondent had a carabao slaughtered without a permit from the
municipal treasurer in violation of Sec. 30 and Sec. 33 of Act. No.
1147
The respondent did so despite his application for permit having been
denied as the animal was deemed not unfit for agricultural work or
draft purposes or simply put, it could still be of good service to the
owner for agricultural purposes and therefore also to the community.
Statutes Involved:
Act No. 1147 SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or
killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon
permit secured from the municipal treasury. Before issuing the
permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the
municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of
the original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer
showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for unbranded
cattle such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the
ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been
requested.
Act No. 1147 SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption or killing for food at the
municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of
not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine
currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more
than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court.
Philippine Bill of 1902 SEC 5. No law shall be enacted which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.
Position of Petitioner:
24
Respondent should be punished for violating Act No. 1147 (and,
impliedly since petitioner did not raise any arguments for it, that Act
No. 1147 is constitutional)
Position of Respondent:
Act 1147 is unconstitutional for being violative of Sec 5 of the
Philippine Bill.
ISSUE:
W/N Act No. 1147 violates the due process clause of the Philippine
Bill
HELD/RATIO:
NO.
The court states how it is not clear from the respondents argument
whether his contention is that the statute amounts to the taking of
property for public use without just compensation or it is and undue
exercise of the states police power. However, the court is of the
opinion that the law in question as Chief Justice Shaw put it is not a
taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the
Constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the
legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of
property with or injurious to the rights of the public.
Although the enjoyment and beneficial use of property of carabao
owners may be affected by the Act and if it was made for private
purposes it would be violative of Sec 5 of the Philippine Bill, the court
is satisfied that the act is a just restraint on an injurious private
right, namely the indiscriminate killing of carabaos for human
consumption as to not take into consideration that it could still be of
use to the community
o The act is not a taking that that would interfere with the right
and title of the owners as is involved in the exercise by the
state of eminent domain so as to entitle the owners to
compensation.
To further the point that the act is a valid exercise of police power by
the state, the implied liability of property owners is distinguished
from the governments right of eminent domain by discussing the
case of Com. v. Alger
o Property owners have the implied liability that his use of
it may be regulated that it shall NOT be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of their property by others having such
an equal right nor the community.
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
o Eminent domain on the other hand is the right of the
government to take and appropriate private property to
public use whenever public exigency requires it.
For an exercise of police power to be in compliance with substantive
due process it must be shown that:
o The state interferes in the interests of the public generally
and not just a particular class.
o The means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
Final Ruling:
It is clear that the provisions of the Act meets the requirement for
substantive due process.
YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(RAPAL)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Outright confiscation (in this case, of carabaos under EO
626-A) when not reasonably related to the purpose of the statute is unjustly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property is
refused to be heard and is immediately condemned and punished.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
PONENTE: CRUZ, J.
PETITIONER: Restituto Ynot
RESPONDENT: Intermediate Appellate Court, The Station Commander,
Integrated Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo and the Regional director, Bureau of Animal
Iloilo City
FACTS:
Petition:
Review on Certiorari on the Constitutionality of EO No. 626-A which
amended EO 626 (prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except when
they are are at least 7 years old if male and 11 years old if female
upon the issuance of the necessary permit)
Factual Antecedents:
January 13,1984 Petitioner had transported six carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo which were then confiscated by the
police commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for violation of EO 626-A.
Petitioner sued for recovery and the RTC of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond (appeal bond) of
P12,000.
25
The court then sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and
ordered the confiscation of the bond.
The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the EO for
lack of authority and presumed validity.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC), which upheld the trial court.
Statute Involved:
EO 626-A SECTION 1. EO No. 626 is hereby amended such that
henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director
of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
Purpose - to conserve such animals for the benefit of small farmers
who rely on them for energy needs.
Position of Petitioner/s:
EO 626-A is unconstitutional because it amounts to an outright
confiscation of carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries
The penalty is invalid for depriving owner the right to be heard before
a competent authority and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process.
Improper exercise of legislative power by the President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
Position of Respondent/s:
EO 626-A has a presumption of constitutionality and is a valid
exercise of police power in amending the basic rule EO 626.
o Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas (subordination of individual interests to the
benefit of the greater number)
o
ISSUE:
W/N EO 626-A is constitutional
HELD/RATIO:
NO
There is an invalid exercise of police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is (1) not reasonably
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, (2) unduly
oppressive.
Not reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law
Being an amendment, the statute should support the object provided
for in EO 626 where the prohibition is on slaughter. EO 626-A on the
other hand imposes an absolute ban on movement, and not on
slaughter.
No connection as to how can the prohibition on interprovincial
transport of carabaos prevent the slaughter considering that they can
be killed anywhere.
Due process is violated
o The owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to
be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished.
Conferment of the power to adjudge guilt is (1) an
encroachment of judicial functions and (2) militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers
o EO 626-A is penal in nature, being so, the outright
confiscation should not be done by the police only but by a
court of justice which alone has authority to impose the
prescribed penalty and only after trial and conviction of the
accused.
o The properties involved were not inimical per se as to
require instant destruction. There was no reason why the
offense should not have been proven first in court.
Invalid delegation of legislative power to officers in the manner
of disposition of confiscated property.
o The term may see fit is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition.
o The options of the officers are boundless and there are no
guidelines they observe in making their decision.
Final Ruling
EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional. Supersedeas bond is
canceled and amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner.
No costs.
CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY
(RONQUILLO)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Police Power rests upon public necessity and upon the
right of the State and of the public to self-protection. For this reason, its
scope expands and contracts with changing needs.
26
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: Dec. 21, 1915 / G.R. No. L-10572
PONENTE: TRENT, J.
PETITIONER: Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait
RESPONDENT: James J. Rafferty, Collector of Internal Revenue
FACTS:
Petition:
Appeal of the decision to restrain and prohibit the Respondent from
destroying or removing any sign, signboard or billboard in the
property of the Petitioners.
Factual Antecedents:
Complaints were made by the British and German consuls about the
billboards in the Petitioners property.
Statute Involved:
Act No 2339, Section 100 Subsection (b)
o Confers the power to remove any sign, signboard or
billboard upon the Collector of Internal Revenue on the
grounds that it is offensive to the sight or otherwise a
nuisance.
Position of Petitioner/s:
The billboards in question are not a nuisance and are not harmful to
the health, moral or general welfare of the community or any
persons.
Act No 2339 Section 100 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Position of Respondent/s:
Alleges that the billboards are offensive to the sight.
The suppression of advertising signs displayed or exposed to public
view which are offensive to the sight is conducive to public interest.
ISSUE:
W/N Act No 2339 Section 100 is constitutional and a valid exercise
of police power
HELD/RATIO:
YES, Act No 2339 Section 100 is constitutional and a valid
exercise of police power
The exercise of police power belongs to the Legislature, it can only
be limited by Acts of Congress
o If an act of the Legislature is obviously and undoubtedly not
related to any of the purposes of police power and interferes
with the ordinary enjoyment of property then it will be invalid
o But if the act is in consideration and care of public health,
safety or comfort. It should NOT be disturbed by the courts.
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
The state may interfere wherever public interest demands it and
large discretion is vested to the Legislature but its determination is
NOT final or conclusive, it is still subject to the supervision of the
courts.
NOTE: The court did not accept the American rule that aesthetic
considerations are a matter of luxury and do not justify the exercise of police
power. Under Philippine Jurisprudence, aesthetic considerations justify the
exercise of police power if they interfere with public safety, welfare and
comfort.
Final Ruling:
The appealed decision is REVERSED; the constitutionality of Act No
2339 Section 100 is upheld.
PEOPLE vs. FAJARDO
(SEA)
KEY TAKE-AWAYS: The State may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the right to use their property and confiscate
them without just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. Also, the
powers granted to public officials must be limited by a policy or set of
standards to prevent the exercise of arbitrary power of such officials.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. L-12172, August 29, 1958
PONENTE: REYES, J.B.L, J.
PETITIONER (DEFENDANT): Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia
RESPONDENT (PLAINTIFF): The People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Petition:
Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Camarines Sur convicting
defendants-appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a
violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of
Baao for having constructed without a permit from the municipal
mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.
Factual Antecedents:
1950 - The municipal council of Baao passed an ordinance which:
o required a written permit from the Mayor for the construction
or repair of a building in Baao
o penalties for its violation were provided
o buildings constructed or repaired without the written permit
which destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any
public property shall be removed at the expense of the
owner of such building.
27
1954 - Fajardo and Babilonia twice requested the incumbent mayor
of Baao to grant them a written permit to construct a building on a
parcel of land owned by Fajardo. Both requests were denied on the
reason that the building to be constructed would destroy the view
and beauty of the plaza.
o Fajardo and Babilonia proceeded to construct the building
because they needed a place of residence badly.
o Fajardo and Babilonia were convicted by the justice of the
peace court of Baao for violating the Ordinance No. 7.
o CFI affirmed the conviction, ordering them to pay a fine and
to demolish the building, pursuant to the ordinance. The
case was subsequently brought to the Supreme Court.
Statute Involved:
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950
Position of Petitioners (Defendants):
Ordinance No. 7 is invalid for violating the Constitution, particularly
substantive due process
Under the ordinance, the mayor has absolute discretion to issue or
deny a permit without following any standard which should guide or
limit the mayors action.
Position of Respondent (Plaintiff):
Ordinance No. 7 is valid Section 3 provides that the mayor can
refuse a permit on the basis that the building would destroy the view
of the public plaza.
ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950 is unconstitutional for violating
substantive due process
HELD/RATIO:
YES, Ordinance No. 7 is unconstitutional.
The ordinance is unreasonable, oppressive, and oversteps the
bounds of police power; it permanently deprives Fajardo and
Babilonia of the right to use their own property,
Although the State may regulate property in the interest of the
general welfare, it may not permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and confiscate them without just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard just to preserve the
aesthetic appearance of the community, as provided in Section 3 of
the ordinance.
Under Ordinance No. 7, the mayor exercises arbitrary power
because the ordinance does not provide a policy or set of standards
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which should serve as a limitation to the power of the mayor to grant
permits.
Final Ruling
Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, is therefore null and void.
Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said
accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
ACEBEDO OPTICAL CO. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(ZERRUDO)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Although imposing conditions for the grant of business
permits is a valid exercise of police power of the local government, the
conditions as well as the power to grant/revoke such licenses or permits
must be reasonable and must not deny persons/corporations of the right to
due process and equal protection of the law. Also, take note that business
permits are different from professional licenses (over which the LGUs have
no authority to regulate).
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. 100152. March 31, 2000
PONENTE: J. Purisima (EN BANC)
PETITIONER: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals, Hon. Mangotara (RTC Judge of Iligan),
Samahang Optometrist sa Pilipinas Iligan Charter (SOPI), Leo Cahanap (City
Legal Officer), Hon. Cabili (City Mayor of Iligan)
FACTS:
Petition:
For review of the CA decision and petition to nullify the dismissal of
petitioners original petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Factual Antecedents:
Acebedo applied for a business permit and was granted by the City
Mayor despite opposition from SOPI because Acebedo is a
corporation, not a clinic.
The business permit (No. 5342) was granted on the following
conditions: (1) it can only be a commercial store; (2) cannot sell
prescription glasses without prescription from independent
optometrists; (3) cannot examine or prescribe optical glasses for
patients; (4) cannot grind glasses to put grade on lenses; (5) cannot
advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses.
SOPI filed a complaint to the Office of the City Mayor saying that
Acebedos business permit should be revoked because it hired its
own optometrists.
The City Legal Officer then conducted an investigation and reported
Acebedo to be guilty.
28
City Mayor gave Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business
Permit giving petitioner three (3) months to settle their affairs.
1989 - Acebedo filed a case in RTC of Iligan. RTC Judge granted the
writ of preliminary injunction despite a Motion to Dismiss filed by
SOPI. In 1990, RTC dissolved the preliminary injunction and denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration
Oct. 3, 1990 - Petitioner filed for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus to CA. In 1991, CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit
and denied motion for reconsideration.
o CA findings include:
Conditions in business permit are ultra vires (beyond
the scope of authority of the City Mayor).
However, contract between petitioner and Iligan City
was entered in performance of its proprietary
functions. And so, Acebedo is estopped from
questioning the conditions of the contract because it
became binding on the petitioner once it was
accepted as a private agreement.
Position of Petitioner/s:
The conditions imposed by the City Mayor are ultra vires (beyond
their authority) and not grounded on law and thus, non-compliance
cannot be a ground for revoking their business permit.
Due process was denied
o They allege that they were not given an opportunity to
present evidence during the investigation
Denied equal protection of the laws - conditions imposed on their
business permit was not imposed on similar businesses in Iligan
City Legal Officer had no authority to conduct the investigation. It
should have been the PRC and Board of Optometry.
Position of Respondent/s:
Imposing those conditions was a valid form of police power.
The petitioners entered into a contract with the City of Iligan by
accepting the business permit given the conditions imposed.
ISSUES:
1. W/N CA erred in holding that special conditions became binding on
Acebedo upon its acceptance of the private agreement/contract
2. W/N CA erred in holding that the contract between Acebedo and City
of Iligan was entered into by the City of Iligan in the performance of
its proprietary functions
HELD/RATIO:
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
1. YES. The CA erred in saying that Acebedo was bound to follow
the conditions set because the conditions are null and void to
begin with.
o Granting licenses and permits by the local government is
well within the police power of the State pursuant to Sec. 16
(General Welfare clause) of the Local Government Code and
Sec. 171 of BP No. 337 (Local Govt Code of 1983) but these
must be exercised in accordance with law.
i. It was ruled that the employment of a qualified optometrist by a
corporation is not against public policy.
ii. Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas vs. Acebedo International
Corporation (March 1997) - SC held that based on the Optometry Law, RA
8050, corporations can hire optometrists. The issue of whether or not
optometrists can indirectly practice in corporations was left by the bicameral
conference committee for the courts to decide on during the deliberations for
RA 8050.
YES. The CA erred in saying that a license or permit has the
nature of a contract.
License is a privilege, not a contract. It is not a property in the
constitutional sense. It is not in any way vested, permanent or absolute.
Estoppel cannot apply.
Final Ruling:
Petition is GRANTED. CA decision is reversed and business permit
is reissued to Acebedo.
Concurring Opinion: J. Kapunan
It was not within the scope of the City Mayors powers to determine
the application of the Optometry Law through the conditions that he
set for the business permit.
No law exists for such restriction to employ optometrists in
corporations.
What the City Mayor did was in excess of his authority and deprives
optometrists of their right to seek legitimate employment of their
choice (may it be under a corporation or not).
The objective of the Optometry Law which is to make sure that
services would be done by licensed persons can still be attained if
they were employed by corporations or practiced independently.
Dissenting Opinion: J.Vitug, Davide Jr., Melo, Panganiban, Pardo, J.J.
Petitioner did not deny violating the conditions but instead attacked
the authority of the mayor to impose such conditions.
The Mayor merely restated the contents of the Optometry Law and it
is within his power to impose such regulations. Police power is the
29
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
LAWRENCE, ET AL. vs. TEXAS
(ANGSIY)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: The right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives
individuals the full right to engage in private conduct without government
intervention.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: No. 02102. Argued March 26, 2003Decided June
26, 2003
PONENTE: KENNEDY, J.
PETITIONER: John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner
RESPONDENT: Texas
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for certiorari
Factual Antecedents:
Due to a reported weapons disturbance, Houston police entered
petitioner Lawrences apartment thereby seeing him and another
man, petitioner Garner, engaging in sexual intercourse.
Petitioners were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse
in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same
sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.
The State CA held that the Texas statute was constitutional under
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Hence, the instant
case.
Statute Involved:
14th Amendment, Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Position of Petitioner:
The Texas statute violates their right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause.
Position of Respondents:
The prohibition of sodomy heavily relies on the values shared by a
wider civilization.
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
The proscriptions against sodomy have ancient roots.
ISSUE:
W/N the Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process
Clause of the 14th Amendment.
HELD/RATIO:
YES
Petitioners' right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives
them the full right to engage in private conduct without
government intervention as the heart of substantive due process is
the requirement of reasonableness and the absence of arbitrary
power (Section 1 of the 14th Amendment).
The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the individual's personal and private
life.
The Court deemed it necessary to reconsider its holding in Bowers v.
Hardwick (jurisprudence) wherein it declared the Georgia statute,
criminalizing sodomy which is committed by two adult males
engaging in sexual intercourse, to be constitutional.
o The case decision reflects the Court's failure to appreciate
the extent of the liberty at stake.
o They seek to control a personal relationship that is within the
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
criminals, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the
law.
The case does not involve minors, persons who might be injured or
coerced, but involves two adults who, with full and mutual consent,
engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.
The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons
the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as
free persons.
Final Ruling:
The decision in 41 S. W. 3d 349 is reversed and remanded.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL
OPERATORS vs. CITY OF MANILA
(BUENDIA)
30
KEY TAKE-AWAY: There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which the governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
PONENTE: Fernando
PETITIONER: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.,
Hotel Del Mar Inc., and Go-Chiu
RESPONDENT: City of Manila
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 and the city
mayor of Manila
Factual Antecedents:
Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760 on June 13,
1963 and was approved the day after by Vice Mayor Herminio
Astorga then acting Mayor of Manila
Lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance
No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963 for being null and void.
An answer was filed on August 3, 1963, with a denial of the alleged
nullity of the Ordinance, whether on statutory or constitutional
grounds.
o The petition failed to state a cause of action and that the
challenged ordinance bears a proper purpose, which is to
curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police
power.
o Only the guests or customers not before the court could
complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and
the guaranty against self incrimination
The lower court concluded that Ordinance 4760 would be
unconstitutional therefore null and void.
Statute Involved:
Ordinance 4760
o Imposed a fee of 6,000 pesos and 4,500 pesos on 1 and 2st nd
class motel
Claimed unconstitutional for being unreasonable
o All guests and companions must fill up a form in the lobby
before being checked in
Violates right to privacy and self-incrimination
o Rooms may not be rented out more than twice in 24 hours
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
Counter to due process guarantee for being
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive.
o All premises may be inspected by the city mayor at any time
violating right to privacy
Violates right to privacy and self-incrimination
Position of Petitioner/s:
That Ordinance 4760 is null, void and unconstitutional making it
unenforceable
Position of Respondents:
Ordinance 4760 is a valid exercise of police power
ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance 4760 was unconstitutional therefore null and void
And if not, is it a valid exercise of police power
HELD/RATIO:
NO. It is not unconstitutional.
The judgment must be reversed. Its decision cannot be allowed to
stand, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Because no evidence was submitted, the presumption of validity
must stand
o The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in
effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the
well being of the people
o No such factual foundation being laid in the present case,
the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the
stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail
and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Petitioners may not assert the ordinance is fatally defective and
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution as the
mantle of protection associated with the due process guarantee does
not cover petitioners.
The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural
and a substantive requisite is its responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason and obedience to the dictates of justice.
Final Ruling
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the writ of injunction
is lifted. With costs.
CITY OF MANILA vs. JUDGE LAGUIO
(BULLO)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Police Power must be for the interest of the general
public not for a specific class and must employ means that are reasonably
31
necessary for the accomplishment of its purpose and not oppressive
against individuals. There must be no other alternative that is less
intrusive to rights for police power to be executed. Business under
question cannot be prohibited because they are legal in their very basic
essence. (Bars, motels, clubs etc.)
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: GR No. 118127
PONENTE: Tinga
PETITIONER: City of Manila, Gon. Alfredo S. Lim, Hon. Joselito Atienza, and
the members of the CIty Council of Manila
RESPONDENT: Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. and Malate Tourism
Development Corporation
FACTS:
Petition
Petition to seek the reversal of the Decision in the RTC which
invalidates Ordinance No. 7783
Factual Antecedents:
Malate Tourist Development Corporation is engaged in the business
of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses.
It filed a petition for Declaratory Relief with a Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/ or a Temporary Restraining Order against
Ordinance No. 7783.
o AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT
OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN
FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES,
AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES AND VIOLATION THEREOF,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
o Sec 1. prohibits no person no corporation to operate in the
Ermita-Malate Area, businesses...which annoy inhabitants
and adversely affect social and moral values of the
community.
o These include but are not limited to: 1. Sauna Parlors 2.
Massage Parlors 3. Karaoke Bars 4. Beerhouses 5.Night
Clubs 6. Day Clubs 6. Super Clubs 7. Cabarets 8.
Discotheques 9. Dance Halls 10. Motels. 12. Inns.
o Sec 2. prohibits the city mayor or treasurer or anyone acting
in behalf of said officials to issue licenses for such
establishments temporary or otherwise.
June 1993 - Judge Perfecto Laguio issued an ex-parte TRO against
the ordinance then granted a preliminary injunction requested by the
MTDC making ordinance NULL AND VOID.
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
Petitioners appealed elevating it to the SC under then rule 42 on
pure questions of law.
Statute Involved:
Art. 3 Sec. 1
Position of Petitioner/s:
RTC erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires
(beyond the legal power of the authority), or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power.
RTC erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes
P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial
establishments, except those specified therein.
RTC erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
Position of Respondent/s:
Ordinance is an arbitrary use of police power, it violates due process,
and property rights.
ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance is valid.
HELD/RATIO:
NO, the ordinance is not valid.
SC affirms the decision of the lower court. Ordinance is declared
unconstitutional
The ordinance is constitutionally repugnant.
Ordinance must conform to the following SUBSTANTIVE
REQUIREMENTS:
1. Must not contravene with the constitution
Ordinance violates Due Process. It is an arbitrary use of government power
because it inhibits the use of property by way of legislation. Gov. cannot
seize, forfeit, and destroy property without trial and conviction by the ordinary
mode of judicial procedure.
2. Must not be unfair or oppressive
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory
4. Must not prohibit but only regulate trade
(2, 3, 4) The goal of the City of Manila can be achieved by less restrictive
means and regulations rather than absolute prohibition. These
establishments by themselves/per se do not contribute to the social ills the
City of Manila wishes to cure. Absolute prohibition of legitimate businesses
will not stop prostitution, fornication, adultery, and the spread of STDs.
5. Must be general and consistent with public policy
32
In this case, requisites for lawful use of Police Power were not met. PP can
only be valid if it requires an interference of public rights for the interests of
the public generally and not just a specific class or group of people.
6. must not be unreasonable.
THERE MUST BE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE THAT IS LESS INTRUSIVE.
A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment.
Final Ruling:
Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION
vs. CITY OF MANILA
(CUBACUB)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: The concept of substantive due process highlights the
need for a sufficient justification before the government can effectively
deprive a person from his rights to life, liberty and property. In this case, the
ordinance issued by the City of Manila was found to violate the right to
property of the establishments and the right to privacy of their corresponding
clients.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: January 20, 2009 G.R. No 122846
PONENTE: TINGA, J.
PETITIONER: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation, Sta. Mesa
Tourist & Development Corporation
RESPONDENT: City of Manila, represented by De Castro and Mayor Alfredo
Lim
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for review on Certiorari of CA decision on the validity of
Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-
Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses,
and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila
Factual Antecedents:
December 3, 1992 - Mayor Alfredo Lim signed the ordinance
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses,
pension houses, and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
December 15, 1992 The Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTDC), the proprietor of Victoria Court in Malate, Manila filed for a
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
TRO against the City of Manila to declare the said ordinance as
invalid and unconstitutional.
December 21, 1992 - Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC),
Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC) filed for a motion to intervene, as the ordinance
would affect their business interests.
December 28, 1992 MTDC withdrew from the petition and this was
approved by the RTC. The RTC issued a TRO against the City of
Manila, which sought to stop the city government from implementing
the Ordinance.
October 20, 1993 - The RTC declared the ordinance as
unconstitutional and made the previously issued writ of preliminary
injunction as permanent. The RTC noted that such ordinance strikes
at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously
guarded by the Constitution."
On appeal to the CA, the City of Manila argued that the ordinance
was a valid exercise of police power pursuant to the LGC and the
Revised Manila Charter.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC by stating that the
ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or freedom of
movement. Police power is bounded by a lawful objective and a
lawful method. The ordinance aims to curb immoral activities (lawful
objective) and the establishments are still allowed to operate (lawful
method). The adverse affect on the business operators is justified by
the uplifted well-being of the people.
Statute Involved:
Art. III Sec 1 of the Constitution No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Position of Petitioner/s:
The ordinance is unconstitutional and void as it violates the
constitutional right to privacy and freedom of movement.
The ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power and serves to
interfere with private business operations.
Position of Respondent/s:
As per the Section 458, par. 4 of the LGC, the City of Manila asserts
that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports
Art. III, Sec. 18 of the Revised Manila Charter states that it is also
within the power of the City of Manila to enact all ordinances it may
33
deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants
ISSUES:
1. W/N the petitioners have standing as owners of their establishments
and to represent the equal protection rights of their clients.
2. W/N the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD/RATIO:
1. YES
o As a general rule, locus standi is conferred on those who
have a direct and personal interest in the case. However,
it is subject to the exceptions such as the overbreadth
doctrine, third party standing, taxpayer suits, doctrine of
transcendental importance. In this case, third party
standing and overbreadth doctrine is apparent.
o Third party standing - The petitioners in this case stand to
lose a portion of their businesses as the ordinance threatens
to reduce the patronage of their clients.
o Overbreadth doctrine Even under the assumption that
the petitioners have no relationship with their clients, they
are permitted to raise the rights of their clients as a result of
this doctrine.
2. YES, the ordinance is unconsititutional.
o Test of a valid ordinance:
Within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and
pass the same
Substantial requirements
Must not contravene the constitution
Must not be unfair or oppressive
Must not be partial or discriminatory
Must not prohibit but may regulate trade
Must be general and consistent with public
policy
Must not be unreasonable
o The ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
Police power based upon the necessity of the
state to protect itself and its people
3 requisites of a valid exercise of police power:
In the interest of the general public and not
just a particular class
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
No other alternative for accomplishment
Reasonable relationship between the
purposes of the measure taken and the
means employed
In the case, the goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate
the use of the establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use, among
many others. However, the end does not necessarily justify the means.
There is a probability that legitimate
activities such as sexual behavior between
spouses and consenting adults, which are
actually protected by the constitution, will be
curtailed in the process.
The ordinance makes no distinction as
between places frequented by patrons
engaged in illicit activities and patrons
engaged in legitimate actions.
Due Process Clause invoked to prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals
Procedural vs. Substantive due process
the former is confined only to procedural
aspects (like form of notices, etc) while the
latter requires that the government should
have SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION for
depriving a person of life, liberty and
property.
Due process thus stands against the
broadness of police power as a mechanism
to check if it should be upheld
o The ordinance violates the right to property of the
establishments as well as the right to privacy of their
clients.
The rights involved in this case fall within the ambit
of the rights to liberty. The concept of liberty
compels respect for the individual whose claim to
privacy and interference demands respect.
The right to privacy is a constitutional right and the
invasion of which should be justified by a compelling
state interest.
The ordinance is an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion
into the rights of the establishments and their
patrons as restrains the operation of the businesses
of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of
their patrons without sufficient justification.
34
Final Ruling
The decision of the CA is reversed and the Manila City Ordinance
No. 7774 is declared unconstitutional.
BALACUIT vs. CFI
(DANTES)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: A police measure for the regulation of the conduct,
control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate
and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. The right of the
owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent
attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due
process clause.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: June 30, 1988/ G.R. No L-38429
PONENTE: GANCAYCO, J.
PETITIONER: Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan and Sergio Yu Carcel
RESPONDENT: Court of First Instance of Agusan Del norte and Butuan City,
Branch 11, and the City of Butuan
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for review on the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan
Factual Antecedents:
Petitioners, managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown
Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively, assailed the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board
of the City of Butuan, and filed a complaint in the CFI of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City.
o The law reduced the admission ticket prices of minors, from
7-12 years old, by , and imposed a fine of PhP200-
PhP600 or 2-6 months imprisonment to all violators.
Upon motion of the petitioners, a TRO was issued
The court decided in favor of the respondents, declaring the law
valid, provided, however, that the fine for a single offense shall not
exceed PhP200, as prescribed in Section 15 (nn) of Rep. Act No.
523.
Statutes Involved:
Municipal Ordinance No. 640 - reduced the admission ticket prices of
minors from 7-12 years old by , and imposed a fine of PhP200-
PhP600 or 2-6 months imprisonment to all violators
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
Section 15 of RA 523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, expressly
grants the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for
theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions
and other places of amusement.
Position of Petitioner/s:
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.
640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of
police power.
Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of
the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of
Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Municipal board can
only fix license fees for theaters and not admission fees.
Position of Respondents:
Respondent City of Butuan attempts to justify the enactment of the
ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in
Section 15 (n) of the city charter.
ISSUE:
W/N the City of Butuans power to regulate includes the authority to
interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of
exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power
or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City.
HELD/RATIO:
NO
The Ordinance violates the due process clause of the Constitution
for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue
restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into
contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a
contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general
admission, balcony and lodge.
The operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public
exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the
exercise of delegated police power by the local government.
o The power of legislation under police power, which the
respondent invoked, however, must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must
exist between purposes and means.
35
o Here, there is NO discernible relation between the ordinance
and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the
general welfare.
A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding
savings for the parents of the minors who will be seeing a movie in
the theater; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the
cost of these savings.
Final Ruling:
o The Ordinance was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES
(DE GUIA)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: A local ordinance cannot undo the acts in a national
statute
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: July 20, 1994 / G.R. No. 111097
PONENTE: Cruz
PETITIONER: Mayor Pablo P. Magtajas & the City of Cagayan de Oro
(CDO)
RESPONDENT: Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. & Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
Factual Antecedents:
PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in CDO which caused
civic organizations to angrily denounce the project
The issue began in 1992 when PAGCOR wished to extend their
operations to CDO and leased a portion of a building belonging to
Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. and prepared to inaugurate its
casino
CDO enacted Ordinance No. 3353 which prohibited the issuance of
a business permit and cancelling existing business permits for any
establishment permitting the operations of a casino in their premises
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
They also enacted ordinance No. 3375-93 which prohibited the
operation of casinos
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA and the CA declared
the ordinances invalid and ordered for the prohibition of their
enforcement
ISSUE:
W/N the Court of Appeals erred in their decision that the ordinances
are invalid
HELD/RATIO:
NO
PAGCOR is a corporation created by PD 1869 to help centralize and
regulate all games of chance including casinos
CDO is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in
the Local Government Code
o It is vested with police power under Sec. 16 or the General
Welfare Clause
o They are also authorized to regulate properties and business
within their territorial limits in the interest of the general
welfare.
The question at hand is the validity of the ordinance promulgated by
the City of Cagayan de Oro
Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code excludes games permitted
by other laws
o The language of the law is clear in excluding such forms of
gambling
The evident flaw in the Ordinances is that they contravene PD 1869
and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent
PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a
casino in CdO
o The Local Government Code does not explicitly repeal PD
1869, neither does it provide a sufficient indication of an
implied repeal
o Furthermore, ordinances of LGUs cannot undo acts of
Congress
Final Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.
BENNIS vs. MICHIGAN
36
(EXCONDE)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Even if the consent of the owner of the property is
absent and such property was used contrary to law, the due process clause
is not violated.
DATE/GR NO. SCRA: No. 94-8729 March 4, 1996
PONENTE: Rehnquist, C.J
PETITIONERS: L. Bennis
RESPONDENTS: Michigan
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Michigan
Factual Antecedents:
Petitioner, was a joint owner, with her husband of a car in which her
husband engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute
Petitioners husband was convicted of gross indecency and the car
was abated under 600.3801 and 600.3825 of Michigans Compiled
Laws.
A Michigan court, Wayne County Circuit Court (probably like RTC in
Ph) ordered the car forfeited as a public nuisance, notwithstanding
her lack of knowledge of her husbands activity.
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the decision of WCCC and
held that the car can not be abated in absent of proof that she knew
to what end the car would be used.
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Michigan
Court of Appeals and reinstated the abatement, ordered by WCCC,
completely.
Statutes Involved:
Michigan Compiled Laws 600.3801
o Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the
purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling,
or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other
disorderly persons, is declared a nuissance, and all
...nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as provided in this
act and as provided in the court rules. Any person or his or
her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases,
conducts, or maintains any building, vehicle, or place used
for any of the purposes or acts set forth in this section is
guilty of a nuisance.
Position of Petitioners:
Petitioners defense was that she did not know that her husband
would use the car to violate Michigans indecency law.
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
Position of Respondents:
According to jurisprudence, Michigan does not need to prove that the
owner knew or agreed that her vehicle would be used in a manner
prescribed by 600.3801 when she entrusted it to another user.
ISSUE:
W/N Michigans abatement scheme has deprived petitioner of her
interest in the forfeited car without due process, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
HELD/RATIO:
NO.
Wayne County Circuit Court took into consideration the fact that the
petitioners had another car to use in case the car in question is
declared a public nuisance.
According to jurisprudence, owners interest in a property may be
forfeited even though the owner did not know that it was used as
such and this is not a violation of the due process clause.
Final Ruling:
Both the trial court and Michigan Supreme Court followed our
longstanding practice, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Michigan is therefor Affirmed.
CRUZAN vs. DIRECTOR, MISSOURI
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.
(FILASOL)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person, free from all restraints or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law (Doctrine of Informed Consent).
Patients generally possess the right not to consent, that is, to refuse
treatment. If the person is incompetent, a surrogate can exercise this right.
Surrogates action must be proven with clear and convincing evidence that
they conform to the patients wishes while she was still competent.
DATE/ GR NO/ SCRA: June 25, 1990, No. 88-1503, 497 U.S. 261
PONENTE: REHNQUIST CJ.
PETITIONERS: Nancy Cruzan represented by her parents and guardian,
Lester and Joyce Cruzan
RESPONDENT: Director of Missouri Department of Health, et al.
FACTS:
Petition:
PETITION for Certiorari to review the decision of the Missouri SC.
Factual Antecedents:
37
Petitioner Nancy Beth Cruzan sustained severe injuries in a car
accident. She now lies in a Missouri state hospital in a persistent
vegetative state (a condition in which a person exhibits motor
reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function).
After some time, it was clear she would not recover and her parents
(co-petitioners) decided to remove the feeding tube that was keeping
her alive.
The state trial court authorized the termination of death-prolonging
procedures at the instance of the co-petitioners, stating that she had
the fundamental right under the state and Federal Constitutions to
refuse or direct the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures.
o The Court also referred to the doctrine of informed consent,
citing the statement Petitioner made to her housemate that
if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life
unless she could live at least halfway normally. This
suggested that she would not continue on with her nutrition
and hydration.
However, the SC of Missouri reversed the state trial courts decision,
stating that the latter did not observe the procedure that there has to
be clear and convincing evidence that the patient indeed wanted to
stop life support and that the state policy strongly favors the
preservation of life.
Statute Involved:
Due Process Clause (Fourteenth Amendment): no State shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.
Position of Petitioner:
The Court should grant the petition based on the common-law
doctrine of informed consent.
Position of Respondent:
Missouri SC recognized that while the right to refuse treatment is
embodied in the doctrine of informed consent, its applicability in this
case is questionable.
Missouri has a general interest in the protection and preservation of
human life, as well as other more particular interests. Thus, it may
legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of an individuals
choice between life and death.
ISSUE:
W/N the State of Missouri had the right to require "clear and
convincing evidence" in order for the Cruzans to remove their child
from life support.
HELD/ RATIO:
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
YES.
It is assumed that a competent person would have a
constitutionally-protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition. HOWEVER, this does not mean that an incompetent
person should possess the same right as the latter is not able to
make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical
right to refuse treatment or any other right.
o Such a right must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort
of surrogate safeguard to assure that surrogates actions
conforms as best it may to the wishes expressed by the
patient while competent to prove by clear and convincing
evidence of the wishes of the patient.
Thus, clear and convincing evidence standard is appropriate when
the individual interests at stake are both particularly important and
more substantial than mere loss of money.
o HOWEVER, The alleged consent given by Nancy Cruzan
was based merely on a statement she made to a
housemate, which falls short of the standard of clear and
convincing evidence.
With this level of proof requirement, courts have established a
procedural safeguard to assure that the surrogates action conforms
to the wishes expressed by the patient while competent and guard
against potential abuses of the surrogate when the patient is
incompetent.
o If the court grants the termination of life and it turns out to be
erroneous, then it is not susceptible to correction since it
would result in death.
o if the court does not grant the petition, and it turns out to be
erroneous, other events could still happen to correct said
error (e.g. eventual natural death of patient, development in
medicine, etc.).
Final Ruling: Missouri SCs decision AFFIRMED. The requirement of clear
and convincing evidence is CONSTITUTIONAL.
BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
(FONACIER)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: The exercise of police power in the interest of protecting
public health and well being is considered as a valid exercise of police
power.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: GR No. 133640 November 25, 2005
PONENTE: Azcuna, J.
38
PETITIONER: Rodolfo S. Beltran (commercial blood banks)
RESPONDENT: Secretary of Health
FACTS:
Petition:
Petitions assailing constitutionality of Section 7 (and 23) of RA 7719
(National Blood Services Act of 1994) on the grounds that it is not a
valid exercise of police power AND that commercial blood banks are
denied the equal protection of the laws.
Factual Antecedents:
RA 7719s purpose is to supply safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donations and regulating blood banks in the country and in
doing so Section 7 of RA 7719 calls for the phasing out of
commercial blood banks. (Section 23 is the process of the phasing
out of commercial blood banks)
o With the rise of diseases like malaria, AIDS, hepatitis, and
syphilis which can all be transmitted via blood transfusion, it
becomes necessary to properly regulate the supply of blood.
o 64.4% of blood is supplied by commercial blood banks.
14.5% by PNRC, 13.7% by government based hospitals,
7.4% by private hospital blood banks.
o It was found that since donors who are paid are typically
poor they tend to lie / omit certain details about their medical
history which makes blood from commercial blood banks 3x
more likely to contain the aforementioned diseases.
Additionally Filipino doctors who involved in the blood
transfusion/donations are not fully trained, do not feel the
need to adjust their practices, and do not care where the
blood comes from.
Statute Involved:
Section 7 of RA 7719
Position of Petitioner/s:
Phasing out of commercial blood banks will adversely affect their
business and existing contracts with hospitals
RA 7719 infringes on individual freedom to do what they will with
their blood
Undue delegation of police power
Violates the equal protection clause for discriminating against
commercial blood banks
Position of Respondent/s:
Promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State
and RA 7719 was enacted to promote and preserve public health
and safety.
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
ISSUES:
1. W/N RA 7719 is an undue delegation of police power.
2. W/N RA 7719 violates the equal protection clause by discriminating
against commercial blood banks
HELD/RATIO:
1. NO
o Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the
public generally requires the interference of the state and (b)
means employed are reasonably necessary.
o In this case, in order to adequately supply the country with
safe blood through voluntary donations it would require the
interference of the state to change the blood banking system
of the Philippines. And in serving public interest the
Legislature deemed it NECESSARY to phase out
commercial blood banks.
2. NO
o Discriminating against some and favoring others is
prohibited, but classification on a reasonable basis and not
made arbitrarily is permitted. Criteria to be reasonable: (a)
based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences, (b) germane to the purpose of law, (c ) not
limited to existing conditions, (d) apply equally to each
member of the class.
i. Voluntary blood donations = purely humanitarian and medical
service. Commercial blood banks = profit oriented, sale of blood as a
commodity.
ii. Phasing out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of
law which is to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood, and
in removing paid blood donors, you essentially have less risk of obtaining
infected blood.
iii. Legislature intended for the general application of the law
iv. Applies to ALL commercial blood banks without exception
*Note: Freedom of choice with regard to what one wishes to do with their
blood does not fall into the same classification of organs since blood can be
replenished by the body, which means it is not outside the States domain of
intervention.
Final Ruling:
Petitions are DISMISSED. RA 7719 upheld as constitutional.
MANALO vs. PNP CHIEF
(GARCIA)
39
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Restrictive Custody of police officers under investigation
is NOT a form of illegal detention therefore it does NOT deprive them of
substantial rights.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. NO. 178920 October 15, 2007
PONENTE: REYES J.
PETITIONER: SPO2 GERONIMO MANALO, SPO2 LEO MORCILLA, PO3
RICO M. LANDICHO, PO2 ROMEO MEDALLA, JR., SPO2 WILLIAM
RELOS, JR., P/INSP. ROBERTO N. MARINDA
RESPONDENT: HON. PNP CHIEF OSCAR CALDERON, HON. P/DIR.
GEARY BARIAS, Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management,
Camp Crame, HON. REGIONAL DIRECTOR, POLICE CHIEF SUPT.
NICASIO J. RADOVAN, HON. POLICE SR. SUPT. AARON DEOCARES
FIDEL, HON. POLICE SR. SUPT. LUISITO DE LEON
FACTS:
Petition:
Issuance of a writ of habeas corpus assailing the restrictive custody
and monitored movements of petitioners
Factual Antecedents:
During the May 2007 elections, five unidentified malefactors bearing
high-powered firearms suddenly appeared at the Pinagbayanan
Elementary School in Taysan, Batangas. The school grounds is
polling area for the 2007 national and local elections. The five armed
men forcibly entered a polling precinct and poured gasoline over a
ballot box. Then they fired several rounds of ammunitions at the
premises, setting it ablaze
The investigation of the incident yielded that all six petitioners, who
are all members of the PNP Regional Special Operations Group
(PNP-RSOG), failed to timely respond.
Because the petitioners are implicated of the crime, a memorandum
stating their restrictive custody and monitored movements was
issued.
However, before the resolution of this present case, the assailed
memorandum has already been recalled.
Although they are not detained or imprisoned, their physical
movements are limited only within Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba.
They cannot go home to their respective families and if they would
leave Camp Vicente Li, they need to be escorted.
Position of Petitioners:
The restrictive custody is illegal and not sanctioned by any existing
provision in the Constitution or any law. Moreover, it is degrading
and arbitrarily imposed on the basis of mere suspicion. It makes PNP
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
members enjoy lesser rights that what are actually enjoyed by
ordinary citizens.
ISSUE:
W/N there is illegal restraint in the Restrictive Custody and Monitored
Movements of Police Officers Under Investigation
HELD/RATIO:
NO
Although the case is moot, the SC decided to resolve it given the
paramount public interest, the susceptibility of recurring yet evading
review and the imperative need to educate the police community on
the matter.
In the present case, petitioners are not illegally and involuntarily
deprived of their freedom of action.
o FIRST: In the assailed memoranda, it is evident that
petitioners are not actually detained or restrained of their
liberties. What was ordered by the PNP is that their
movements, inside and outside camp be monitored. Even
the petitioner themselves admit that they are not actually
detained.
o SECOND: The "restrictive custody" complained of by
petitioners is nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of
habeas corpus. It is a permissible precautionary measure to
assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned
are always accounted for.
o THIRD: Petitioners are merely held to account for their
movements inside and outside the camp's premises. They
are not required to secure prior approval before they can
move out of the camp, only that each of them be
accompanied by an escort and their time of departure and
arrival noted.
o FOURTH, RA. 6975 (DILG Act of 1990), as amended by RA.
8551 (PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly
provides that members of the police force are subject to the
administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section
41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions,
including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly
designated officers.
o FIFTH: Although the PNP is civilian in character, its
members are subject to the disciplinary authority of the PNP
under the National Police Commission. Courts cannot, by
injunction, review, overrule or otherwise interfere with valid
40
acts of police officials. The police organization must observe
self-discipline and obey a chain of command under civilian
officials.
Final Ruling
The petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. vs.
JAC LINER
(GUERRERO)
KEY TAKE-AWAY: In enacting an ordinance by local governments, there
should be two concurring requisites and these are the lawful subject and a
lawful method. Equal Protection is the balance between the authority of the
state and the liberty of its individuals, therefore not only the effectiveness of a
law is being looked at but also its reasonableness
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. 148339/ February 23,2005
PONENTE: Carpio Morales. J.
PETITIONER: LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC.
RESPONDENT: JAC LINER, INC.
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for review to assail the decision and resolution of the CA
which declared that that the City Ordinance No. 1778 of Lucena in
which it denies all the other temporary terminals in the City of
Lucena the right to operate as an invalid exercise of police power
Factual Antecedents:
With an objective of decongesting traffic in the city of Lucena, these
ordinances were enacted:
o Ordinance 1631: grants a franchise to the Lucena Grand
Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance, establish,
operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facilities
in Lucena
o Ordinance 1778: makes the Lucena Grand Central Terminal,
Inc. as the only common terminal for all busses and jeepnies
Respondent was negatively affected by both ordinances, assailed
the same through a prohibition and injunction proceeding before the
RTC
The RTC statedg that ordinance 1631 is a valid exercise of police
power while invalidating 1778 is invalid as it is oppressive and an
unreasonable exercise of police power
The CA affirmed the RTC decision
 THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II DIGESTS: ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS)
Position of Petitioner:
Invoked the grounds of public interest warranting the interference of
the state.
Position of Respondents:
The city ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power since it is an
undue taking of private property, and a violation of the prohibition
against monopolies.
ISSUE:
W/Nt the enacted ordinances of the Sanggunian is a valid exercise of
police power.
HELD/RATIO:
NO
There are two requisites for an ordinance to be considered as a valid
exercise of police power:
o Public interest, which requires state interference
o Means employed are reasonably necessary, for the
attainment of the objection
In simple terms, there must be a lawful subject and also a lawful
method
The first requisite is obviously present since it involves the public
interest in relieving the terrible traffic congestion inside the City of
Lucena
While the first requisite is present, the second is considered absent
as the disputed ordinances, specifically ordinance number 1778,
went beyond what is reasonable to solve Lucenas traffic problems
o By the enactment of ordinance number 1778, common
carriers such as respondent will be compelled to take down
their own terminals and use the existing facilities in the
Lucena Grand Terminal
o With the use of the facilities of Lucena Grand Terminal, extra
fees and charges are most likely to be added to the
expenses of common-carrier operators, therefore making the
ordinance as oppressive and unreasonable
Final Ruling:
The petition is denied, and the decision of the CA is once again
affirmed
PUBLICATION AND CLARITY OF LAWS AS A REQUIREMENT OF DUE
PROCESS
41
Taada v. Tuvera (1986):
o the phrase unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the
Civil Code refers not to the need of publication but to the
requirement of 15 days.
o The 15 days can be lengthened or shortened but not to the
extent of having no publication at all. There can be no such
law that is effective immediately.
o The underlying reason for this rule is that due process
requires that those who must obey a command must
first know the command.
Requirement of publication does not apply to interpretative
regulations and to those merely internal in nature.
Rule on publication also applies to: presidential decrees, executive
orders and administrative rules and regulations which have for their
purpose the implementation of an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.
Rule on vagueness: a law that is utterly vague is defective because
it fails to give notice of what it commands.
o Lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.
o Repugnant to the Constitution in two ways:
Violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid;
Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle.
o The act must be vague on its face. It cannot be clarified by
either a saving clause or by construction.
- END -