Ethics Final

DEANS
CIRCLE 2016
LEGAL AND
JUDICIAL ETHICS
CASE SYLLABUS
School Year 2015-2016
SY 2015-2016 Case Syllabus
Table of Contents
LEGAL AND JUDICAL ETHICS
Practice of Law .....3
Canon 1. ....9
Canon 2.. 22
Canon 3.. 23
Canon 4...26
Canon 5...26
Canon 6...26
Canon 7...28
Canon 8...32
Canon 9...33
Canon 10....35
Canon 11.37
Canon 12.39
Canon 13.40
Canon 14.41
Canon 15.42
Canon 16.45
Canon 17.53
Canon 18.56
Canon 19.62
Canon 20.64
Canon 21.66
Canon 22.66
Page 1 of 117
Suspension, Disbarment and Discipline of Lawyers...68
Notarial Practice (A.M. NO. 02-8-13-SC, as amended). .74
Judicial Ethics..85
Page 2 of 117
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
PRACTICE OF LAW
RENATO CAYETANO v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON

APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991, Paras, J.
To practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Corazon Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the Commission on Elections. Petitioner opposed the nomination because the
respondent does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:
Whether Monsod had engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
RULING:
YES. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of the court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he, for a valuable consideration
engages in the business of advising persons, firms, associations, or corporations as to their rights in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversy.
IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELIQUENCY OF ATTY. MARCIAL A.

EDILION
A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978, Castro, C.J.
All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the bar
including payment of reasonable annual fees.
FACTS:
Marcial Ediliion is a duly-licensed practising attorney in the Philippines. The Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors recommended the removal of his name in the roll of
attorneys for refusal to pay his membership dues. Edilion questioned the mandatory membership
to the IBP, as well as the required payment of the membership dues. He claimed that it is a violation
Page 3 of 117
of his constitutional right to liberty and property since he is being compelled to be a member and to
pay membership dues.
ISSUE:
Whether Edilion can be compelled to pay his membership dues
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court, in order to further the states legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program. Such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of police power. The right to practice law should be, and is a matter of
regulation and inquiry.
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO USE THE FIRM NAME SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ AND CASTILLO
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION TO USE THE FIRM NAME OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON,
MABANTA AND REYES
July 30, 1979, Melencio-Herrera, J.
The use of assumed or trade name in law practice is improper
FACTS:
Two separate petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip who died
on May 5, 1975 and the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta who died on February 14,
1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using in the names of their firms the names of the
partners who are deceased. They contend that no fundamental policy is offended by the continued
use by firm professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least
where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a trade name.
ISSUE:
Whether the names of the deceased partners can be used in the firm name
RULING:
NO. The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel
might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is mere association for a
particular purpose. It is not a relationship formed for the purpose of carrying on a trade or business
or of holding property. The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration
of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade. The right to practice
law is a privilege that is highly personal and partaking the nature of public trust. Petitioners' desire
to preserve the identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical
impediment.
Page 4 of 117
ROBERTO SORIANO v. ATTY. MANUEL DIZON
A.C. No. 792, January 25, 2006, Per Curiam
Violation of Canon 1,01, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, and failure to pay
civil liabilities warrant disbarment
FACTS:
Atty. Manuel Dizon was driving under the influence of alcohol when he had an altercation
with Roberto Soriano, a cab driver. The confrontation resulted to Atty. Dizon shooting Soriano.
After the shooting, Atty. Dizon sped off his car and left Soriano, who was paralyzed. Atty. Dizon was
convicted of frustrated murder but was allowed probation. One of the conditions thereof is the
payment of civil liabilities to Soriano. Four years after the judgment, Atty. Dizon had not paid his
civil liabilities. A disbarment case was filed against him for violation of Canon 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for conviction for a crime involving Moral Turpitude.
ISSUE:
Whether the disbarment of Atty, Manuel Dizon is warranted.
RULING:
YES. He violated Canon 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by engaging in

unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct. He neglected his liability in paying civil
liability. Furthermore, he is convicted of frustrated murder, a crime involving moral turpitude.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF

TELESFORO A. DIAO v. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ
A.C. No. 244, March 29, 1963, Bengzon, C.J.
Passing the bar exams is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
FACTS:
Telesforo A. Diao finished his pre-law course at Arellano University in April 1949, 6 months
after he started his law studies. During his application for the bar exam, Telesforo represented in
his application that he finished his pre-law course at Quisumbing College in 1941. 2 years after
passing the bar, Severino charged Telesforo of false representation. The Solicitor General after
investigation, recommended that Telesforos name be stricken out of the Roll of Attorneys for
failure to complete the required pre-law course.
ISSUE:
Whether Telesforos name should be stricken out of the Roll of Attorneys for failure to
complete the required pre-law course
Page 5 of 117
RULING:
YES. Telesforo committed false representation when he claimed that he was a graduate of
Quisumbing College when in fact he was not. Admissions under false pretenses must be revoked.
Moreover, Telesforo caused the confusion so as not to reveal that he actually graduated from
Arellano University 6 months after starting his law studies; otherwise, his application to take the
bar exams would be denied outright because the Rules (then) require that he finish his Associate in
Arts degree (pre-law course) previous to the study of law.
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, ALIAS ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 BAR EXAMINEE

A.C. No. 1163, August 29, 1975, Makasiar, J.
The practice of the law is not an absolute right, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in
the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.
FACTS:
Ramon E. Galang was charged with slight physical injuries before the court against a fellow
Manuel L. Quezon University student. Years later, Ramon became a perennial bar candidate,
flunking the 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, and 1969 bar exams. For every application to take the
bar (including the 1971 bar exams), Ramon did not declare his criminal caseand from 1966
onwards, expressly declared under oath that he was not charged with any offense. Ramon
eventually passed the 1971 bar exams, but only with the help of the Bar Confidant, who cajoled
each bar examiner to re-check Ramons grades despite not being authorized by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Ramon should be disbarred
RULING:
YES. There are 2 reasons to disbar Ramon:
First, the Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion regarding the admission of
examinees to the Bar. Nor does he have the authority to determine whether examinee's answers
merit re-evaluation. The fact that the examinee benefited or was in connivance is immaterial. What
is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar
were in accordance with the rules.
Second, the Rules require that every applicant should be of good moral character and each
applicant is obliged to bare all charges filed against him. Not only did Ramon conceal the charge of
slight physical injuries against him in all his applications, he even committed perjury in 1966, 1967,
1969, and 1971 by declaring under oath that he was not charged with a crime and that a case is not
pending against him.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF UNSUCCESSFUL
Page 6 of 117
CANDIDATES OF 1946 TO 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL.

94 Phil 534, March 18, 1954, Diokno, J.
The admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers in the practice of law and
their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility.
FACTS:
RA 972 was passed, thereby fixing the passing marks for the Bar Exam from 1946 to 1955.
Thereafter, petitions for admission or revision of examination papers were filed before the
Supreme Court by the unsuccessful bar candidates who were covered by the provisions of RA 972.
ISSUE:
Whether RA 972 is constitutional
RULING:
NO. The object of the law (to relax the passing rate to accommodate bar candidates who are
inadequately prepared due to the aftermath of WWII) is contrary to public interest. Public interest
(and the practice of law) demands adequate legal preparation that should be developed constantly.
This is because the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil
liberties.
It is the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing
rules.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &

VICTORIANO TENAZAS v. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY,
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING
G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971, Reyes, J.B.L., J.
An attorney-client relationship must first exist before recovery of attorney's fees becomes
proper. This rule cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as
an "agent" and not as an attorney.
FACTS:
PAFLU, represented by Cipriano Cid & Associates (and in particular, Atty. Atanacio Pacis),
filed a case for Unfair Labor Practice before the Court of Industrial Relations. PAFLU was later
represented by Quintin Muning, a non-lawyer. The CIR ruled for PAFLU, and the decision became
final. Cipriano Cid & Associates and Atty. Pacis filed a notice of Attorneys Lien. Muning thereafter
filed a Petition for the Award of Services Rendered, but was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates
on the ground that Muning was not a lawyer. Muning argued that since RA 875 allows parties to be
represented by non-lawyers, then non-lawyers may be entitled to a share of the Attorneys fees. The
CIR ruled for Muning.
Page 7 of 117
ISSUE:
Whether Muning is entitled to a share in the attorneys fees
RULING:
NO. The permission for a non-member of the bar to appear in the CIR on behalf of a party-
litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. The
Rules of Court provides that an attorney shall be entitled to recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services. This implies that an attorney-client relationship must
first exist before recovery of attorney's fees. Since Muning is not a lawyer, he cannot establish an
attorney-client relationship. Public policy demands that legal work in representation of party
litigants should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to
observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary
control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. L-19450, May 27, 1965, Paredes, J.
Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
FACTS:
Simplicio Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Alaminos, Laguna. The complainant was represented by his relative, City Attorney Ariston
Fule, who was acting as a private prosecutor after securing the permission of the Secretary of
Justice. The appearance of Atty. Fule was questioned by the counsel for the accused on the ground
that the Rules and jurisprudence prevents City Fiscals from engaging into private practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether Fule was engaged in the private practice of law
RULING:
NO. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily
and demanding payment for such services. In this case, the appearance as counsel on one occasion
is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.
ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008, Carpio-Morales, J.
Page 8 of 117
By hurdling the bar exams, taking the Lawyers oath, and signing the Roll of Attorneys, a
lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as an officer of the court,
irrespective of where he obtained his law degree.
FACTS:
During the hearing of a case attended by Atty. Mane, counsel for plaintiff, Judge Belen
berated him after learning that he graduated from Manuel L. Quezon University instead of UP
College of Law: [Y]ou cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not
all law students are created equal x x x. The judge also made sarcastic and humiliating remarks.
Atty. Mane thereafter filed a letter-complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator. Judge
Belen claimed that Atty. Manes act of filing an Urgent Motion to Inhibit was a direct assault to the
integrity and dignity of the Court and of the Presiding Judge.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Belen is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
RULING:
YES. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should be courteous to lawyers,
especially the inexperienced. While they may correct the unprofessional conduct of attorneys,
judges may not do so in an insulting manner. Judges must not indulge in an unnecessary display of
learning or premature judgment. Judge Belen went out of bounds when he engaged in a very
personal discourse when he felt that his integrity and dignity was being assaulted.
An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. For a judge
to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is
clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.
CANON 1
LESLIE UI v. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO

A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000, de Leon Jr., J.
To warrant disciplinary action, immorality is not enough; the act must be "grossly immoral,"
that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.
FACTS:
Atty. Iris met Carlos Ui, married to Leslie Ui. Although Atty. Iris knew that Carlos had
children with a Chinese woman, she believed that Carlos was a bachelor. Atty. Iris fell in love with
Carlos. They got married in Hawaii. Despite the marriage, Carlos never lived with Atty. Iris and their
2 children.
Page 9 of 117
Leslie discovered the illicit affair and introduced herself as the legal wife to Atty. Iris in the
latters law office. Leslie filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline on the ground of immorality. Atty. Iris claimed that she entered into
the relationship with Carlos in good faith, falling in love with him on the belief that he was single,
and parting ways upon discovery of his true civil status.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Iris should be disbarred on the ground of immorality
RULING:
NO. The possession of good moral character is a condition sine qua non for admission to the
bar; a continuing requirement for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice. Its loss is a ground
for the revocation of the privilege to practice law.
This case shows the imprudence of Atty. Iris in managing her personal affairs. She would
not have found herself in such situation had she been more vigilant in finding out Carlos personal
background. However, her relationship with Carlos, clothed with an apparently valid marriage,
cannot be considered immoral. Immorality connotes a conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. The act of
Atty. Iris of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status
belies her alleged moral indifference.
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA v. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG

A.M. No. 1608, August 14, 1981, Aquino, J.
A lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons but he still is not subject to
disciplinary action because his misbehavior is not glaringly scandalous.
FACTS:
Segundino, then a law student, had a sexual relationship with Magdalena, a medical
technology student. Magdalena got pregnant. Segundino convinced Magdalenas father to delay the
marriage until Segundino passed the bar exams. He also reassured Magdalena that he will marry
her.
After passing the bar exams, Segundino stopped corresponding with Magdalena. The latter
soon discovered that Segundino was already married to another woman. A disbarment case was
filed against Segundino, who alleged that he breached that promise to marry because of
Magdalena's shady past.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Segundino should be disbarred for breach of promise to marry
RULING:
Page 10 of 117
NO. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding
circumstances. In this case, while the acts of Segundino of having sexual congress with Magdalena
and promising to marry her after getting her pregnant are indeed immoral, the same is not
sufficient so as to warrant disbarment.
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA v. ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA

A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007, Chico-Nazario, J.
Acts done without malice, although distasteful, are not grossly immoral.
FACTS:
Cynthia sought the legal advice of Atty. Macabata. The parties met at a restaurant to discuss
the matter. Atty. Macabata offered Cynthia a ride home. Before she stepped out of the car, Atty.
Macabata asked if he can kiss her goodnight. She agreed, but with the use of his hand, Atty.
Macabata was able to tilt Cynthias head and kiss her in the lips. A similar kissing incident
happened in one more occasion. Cynthia decided to hire the services of another lawyer. Atty.
Macabata apologized through a text message, but Cynthia responded by filing a disbarment case
against Atty. Macabata.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Macabata should be disbarred on the ground of gross immorality
RULING:
NO. Kissing (or beso-beso) are mere gestures of friendship and a form of greeting. The acts
of respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips
are undoubtedly distasteful. However, such acts cannot be considered grossly immoral. While
respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice.
It must be noted that right after Cynthia expressed her annoyance in the kissing incidents, Atty.
Macabata was quick to extend an apology through a text message.
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN v. GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR.

A.C. No. 1392, April 2, 1984, Aquino, J.
Conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless merits disbarment.
FACTS:
Atty. Generoso, believing that Natividad Estabillo was a widow, had carnal relations with
her, even if she was in fact still lawfully married. 4 days after giving birth to their love child, Atty.
Generoso married Preciosa and lived with her. After more than 1 year, Atty. Generoso abandoned
the conjugal abode, cohabited with Natividad and lived with the latter as husband and wife.
ISSUE:
Page 11 of 117
Whether Atty. Generoso should be disbarred on the ground of gross immorality
RULING:
YES. Atty. Generoso was not able to overcome the evidence of Preciosa that he was guilty of
grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former
paramour, a married woman, falls within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community." Such conduct merits no less than disbarment.
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA QUINGWA v. ARMANDO PUNO

A.C. No. 389, February 28, 1967, Regala, J.
It is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a
lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.
FACTS:
Atty. Armando and Flora, a public school teacher, are sweethearts. Atty. Armando brought
her to the Silver Moon Hotel, with Atty. Armando signing as Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno. Flora agreed to
have sexual intercourse with Atty. Armando on the promise of marriage. When Flora felt that she
was on the family way, Flora implored Atty. Armando to comply with his promise but the latter
refused.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Armando should be disbarred on the ground of gross immorality
RULING:
YES. The applicant must produce satisfactory evidence of good moral character, not only as
a condition precedent but also a continuing requirement to exercise the privilege of the practice of
law. Once a lawyers integrity is challenged by evidence, mere denial is not enough.
The special defense that the allegation is not one of the aforementioned grounds for
disbarment is unavailing since grossly immoral conduct is one of the stated grounds for
disbarment under the new Rules of Court. Even if grossly immoral conduct is not enumerated
under the Rules, the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not a
limitation on the inherent power of courts to disbar or suspend a lawyer.
JOSEFINA ROYONG v. ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA

A.C. No. 389, February 28, 1967, Regala, J.
The law demands good moral character, based on what he really is, and not just good
reputation, or what he or other people think of him.
FACTS:
Page 12 of 117
Ariston lived with his concubine, Briccia Angeles (who was separated with, but is legally
married to another man). Because Briccia could not bear him a child, Ariston seduced Josefina, then
around 17 years old, and engaged in illicit sexual encounters. When Ariston was applying to take
the bar exams, he filed a sworn petition alleging that he is a person of good moral character.
Ariston passed the bar. 5 years later, Josefina filed a disbarment complaint against him.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Ariston should be disbarred
RULING:
YES. Atty. Aristons conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on
his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Here, at the time of his application, Ariston openly cohabited with Briccia, a married woman, while
maintaining illicit relations with Josefina, a young woman who treated him like an uncle.
Atty. Aristons claims that he did not falsify his application since he was a person of good
moral character according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time. But moral
character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. The law demands
good moral character, based on what he really is. It does not demand good reputation, or what he or
other people think of him (or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which
he is held by the public in the place where he is known).
JOHNSON LEE AND SONNY MORENO v. HON. RENATO E. ABASTILLAS,

JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 50 BACOLOD CITY
A.M. No. RTJ- 92-863, July 11, 1994, Per Curiam
A lawyer who allows himself to be used as a conduit for an illegal act is guilty of unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
FACTS:
Judge Abastillas solicited P50,000.00 from Atty. Enrique Chua, counsel for the accused in a
criminal case pending in the formers sala, in consideration for a favorable ruling. Upon relaying
the information to his clients, Atty. Chua was handed with a P20,000.00 check as initial payment for
the bribe. Atty. Chua allegedly delivered the amount to Judge Abastillas.
When it became clear that Judge Abastillas was giving the accused a runaround, the accused
and Atty. Chua went to the Judicial and Bar Council to oppose the transfer of Judge Abastillas to RTC
Manila on the ground of lack of good moral character. In turn, Judge Abastillas charged Atty. Chua
for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Chua should be administratively liable
RULING:
Page 13 of 117
YES. Atty. Chua declared that while he believed that his clients case was meritorious, his
clients prevailed upon him to offer bribe money as the practical way to obtain justice. Atty. Chua
express a genuine feeling of remorse for his conduct, and he also willingly came forward, at the risk
of being administratively penalized himself, to expose what the Court considered as illegal and
immoral acts perpetrated by Judge Abastillas. Under the circumstances, the Court mitigated the
liability of Atty. Chua.
PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC. v. FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC.

G.R. No. 137378, October 12, 2000, Vitug, J.
An attorney cannot, without a client's authorization, settle the action or subject matter of the
litigation even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his client's interest.
However, when a client, upon becoming aware of the compromise and the judgment thereon, fails to
promptly repudiate the action of his attorney, he will not afterwards be heard to complain about it.
FACTS:
FASGI, organized under California laws, entered into a distributorship contract with
Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. (PAWI), a Philippine Corporation, where FASGI agreed to import
aluminum wheels manufactured by PAWI. Claiming breach of contract, FASGI filed a case for
rescission and damages against PAWI at the US Central District Court of California. In the interim, 2
settlement agreements were entered into between the parties, with PAWI represented by its
counsel, Mr. Thomas Ready, in both instances. A year after the last settlement agreement, the
President of PAWI sent a letter to FASGI seeking forbearance for the impending delay in complying
with the terms of the agreement.
PAWI ultimately failed to comply with the settlement agreements; consequently, judgment
was rendered in favor of FASGI in the US. But to satisfy the judgment, FASGI filed a complaint for
enforcement of foreign judgment before RTC Makati. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that Mr. Thomas Ready entered into both settlements without the authorization of PAWI.
The decision was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the California judgment should not be enforced
RULING:
NO. If Mr. Ready was indeed not authorized by PAWI to enter into the supplemental
settlement agreement, PAWI could have signified to FASGI a disclaimer of the settlement. Instead,
more than a year after the execution of the settlement agreement, PAWI sent a letter to FASGI that
failed to mention Mr. Ready's supposed lack of authority.
ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA v. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA

A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014, Sereno, J.
Page 14 of 117
For an honest mistake or error, and without any showing that his act was attended with bad
faith or malice, an attorney cannot be held administratively liable.
FACTS:
Spouses Lim, clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract called Times Square Preamble,
establishing the internal rules of a 4-unit condominium with the other unit owners except for Mr.
Abreu who is represented by Atty. Paguia.
Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
against Atty. Molina for giving legal advice to the latters clients to the effect that the Times Square
Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who did not sign the contract. Atty. Molina maintained that the
Times Square Preamble was entered into for purposes of maintaining order in the residential
compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.
Atty. Paguia filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the decision of the IBP Board of
Governors in affirming the decision of the Investigating Commissioner in dismissing the case for
lack of merit on the following grounds: 1) the complaint consisted only of bare allegations and 2)
even assuming that Molina gave an erroneous legal advice, he could not be held accountable in the
absence of proof of malice or bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Molina is guilty of Dishonesty
RULING:
NO. The Complaint is without factual basis. Atty. Paguia charges Atty. Molina with providing
legal advice to the latters clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble is binding on
complainants client, Mr. Abreu, who was not a signatory to the agreement. However, this was not
substantiated either in the complaint or in the hearings. The records do not state that Atty. Paguia
saw respondent giving the legal advice to the clients of the latter. Bare allegations are not proof.
An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. Chief Justice Abbott said that, No
attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a
counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law.
Bad faith is never presumed. Its determination is a question of fact and is evidentiary. There
is no evidence to show that the legal advice, assuming it was indeed given, was coupled with bad
faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith stands because the complainant failed to
prove his case by clear preponderance of evidence.
EUPROCINA CRISOSTOMO v. ATTY. PHILIP NAZARENO

A.C. No. 6677, June 10, 2014, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Lawyers should obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
They should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Page 15 of 117
FACTS:
Complainants sought the rescission of their contracts to sell before the HLURB because of
construction defects. In all the rescission cases, Rudex was represented by Atty. Nazareno. Rudex
filed three 3 petitions for review. In the certifications against forum shopping attached to the said
petitions, Rudex, through its President, and Atty. Nazareno stated that it has not commenced or has
knowledge of any similar action involving the same issues pending before any court,
notwithstanding the fact that it previously filed an ejectment case against one of the complainants.
The certification was notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself.
Complainants filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno, claiming that the
latter made false declarations in the certificates against forum shopping. Also, complainants
asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned 1
document number in all the certifications against forum shopping that were separately attached to
the complaints for rescission and ejectment.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable
RULING:
YES. Atty. Nazareno should have declared the existence of the pending related cases in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to the pleadings. Further, he is guilty of malpractice
as a notary public. For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time
of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the document notarized, and he
shall give to each document executed before him a number corresponding to the one in his register.
Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all the
complaints, fully aware that they asserted a falsehood. Due to the multiplicity of his infractions,
coupled with his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, it is proper to revoke his existing
commission and permanently disqualify him from being commissioned as a notary public.
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN

A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015, Villarama Jr., J.
A lawyers duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek loopholes.
FACTS:
Guarin was hired as CEO and as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the
Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned and transferred to St. Lukes Medical Center as the Vice
President for Finance. Atty. Limpin the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI) filed with the
SEC a General Information Sheet (GIS) which identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of
Directors (BOD) and President. Thereafter, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.
Guarin filed a complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing
Page 16 of 117
him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had
already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or
been President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant
disbarment. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her
certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting. She also asserted that
she sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of
Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative but failed to show up.
She also stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of any unethical conduct,
harassment and malpractice.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Limpin violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
YES. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the
law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
There is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is ineligible
to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company. Atty. Limpin filed and certified that
Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good
faith, her certification contained a stipulation that she made a verification of the statements
contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is
inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. Also, nothing supports the allegation that Guarin
was in fact a stockholder. In filing a GIS containing false information, Atty. Limpin committed an
infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of
the CPR. Considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpins action we see it fit to increase the penalty to
6 months of suspension from the practice of law.
MELVYN G. GARCIA v. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO

A.C. No. 10457, February 3, 2015, Per Curiam
Disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving
moral turpitude.
FACTS:
Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo before the IBP-CBD. He alleged
that Sesbreo is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide and despite the facts
that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo
violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law
despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
In his answer, Sesbreo alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with the
inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreo argued that even if the
Page 17 of 117
accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence.
Sesbreo further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreo claimed that
Garcias complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him
for representing Garcias daughters in court.
ISSUE:
Whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide
RULING:
YES. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
The victim (Amparado) and Yapchangco just passed by Sesbreos house when the latter
started firing at them. Amparado was hit. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and
Yapchangco did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing by Sesbreo that eventually
led to Amparados death.
We cannot accept Sesbreos argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil
and political rights. The Order of Commutation did not state that the executive clemency was
absolute and unconditional and restored Sesbreo to his full civil and political rights. The executive
clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years
imprisonment" the penalty imposed. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty and only partially
extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbreos crime was never wiped out. He served
the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More
importantly, the Final Release and Discharge stated that "it is understood that such accessory
penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist."
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those possessing good
moral character. A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.
VICTORIA C. HEENAN v. ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO

A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013, Velasco Jr., J.
An attorney may be suspended or disbarred where his misconduct outside of his professional
dealings is so gross in character as to show him unworthy of the privilege which the law confers.
FACTS:
Atty. Espejo borrowed money from Victoria and to secure the loan, Atty. Espejo
simultaneously issued to Victoria a check for P275,000. Victoria received a check in an amount
representing the interest. Victoria deposited the said check but it bounced. Atty. Espejo failed to pay
despite Victorias demands. Victoria decided to deposit in her account the first check in the amount
of PhP 275,000 however, the check was also dishonored. Victoria filed a criminal case against Atty.
Page 18 of 117
Espejo for violation of BP 22 and Estafa. Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas
Prosecutors Office and ignored Victorias demands.
Victoria filed the instant administrative case against Atty. Espejo before the CBD but at the
mandatory conference, only Victoria appeared. Atty. Espejo was declared in default. CBD
recommended the suspension of Atty. Espejo from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar
for 5 years.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Espejo is administratively liable
RULING:
YES. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession
but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. Atty. Espejos misconduct is
aggravated by her refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the
complaint and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. A lawyer must maintain respect
not only for the courts, but also for judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including
the IBP.
Atty. Espejos issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the directives of
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03;
and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Therefore, a penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for 2 years is commensurate under the circumstances.
ANASTACIO TEODORO III v. ATTY. ROMEO GONZALES

A.C. No. 6760, January 30, 2013, Brion, J.
Lawyers primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct that
tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation.
FACTS:
Anastacio N. Teodoro III filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Gonzales, he related that
Atty. Gonzales acted as counsel of Araceli Teodoro-Marcial in 2 civil cases that the latter filed
against him. The first case is a special proceeding which involved a settlement of estate but while it
was pending Atty. Gonzales filed a civil case for the Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and
Damages, without indicating the special proceeding earlier filed. The filing of the civil cases,
according to Anastacio, was a deliberate act of forum shopping that warrants the disbarment of
Atty. Gonzales.
Atty. Gonzales admitted filing the two cases. He asserted, however, that there was no forum
shopping as the cases were not identical in terms of parties, subject matter and remedies.
The IBP-CBD found Atty. Gonzales administratively liable for forum shopping on the ground
that both Special Proceeding and Civil Case hinged on the same substantial issue, i.e., on whether
Manuela held the Malate property in trust for Teodoro-Marcial. The commissioner found that a
Page 19 of 117
ruling in either case would result in res judicata over the other. However, the Board of Governors of
the IBP reversed the commissioners recommendation. The Board of Governors passed a Resolution
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the CBD with the modification lowering Atty. Espejos
suspension from 5 years to 2 years.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Gonzales committed forum-shopping
RULING:
YES. An identity of parties representing the same interest exists in both cases. There was
also identity of cause of action. In both cases, the issue of whether Manuela held the lot in Malate,
Manila in trust had to be decided by the trial court. The initiating parties claim in the two cases
depended on the existence of the trust Manuela allegedly held in their favor. The evidence
necessary to prove their claim was the same. While the reliefs prayed for in the initiatory pleadings
were different in form, a ruling in one case would have resolved the other, and vice versa.
In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law
and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice, and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. However,
the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh in light of all the circumstances of this case.
FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA

A.C. No. 4697, November 25, 2014, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
A lawyer is not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is
moreover expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto.
FACTS:
Atty. Astorga sold a parcel of land to Saladaga under a Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase. Respondent represented that he has "the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee
simple" the subject property which was "free from all liens and encumbrances." The deed provided
that respondent, as vendor, had 2 years within which to repurchase; otherwise, the parties shall
renew the agreement.
Atty. Astorga failed to repurchase. However, Saladaga received a letter stating that the
property was mortgaged to Rural Bank which had subsequently foreclosed on the property, and
that Saladaga should vacate the property. Saladaga filed a complaint for estafa and an
administrative case for disbarment. Respondent claimed that the agreement was an equitable
mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Astorga violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
Page 20 of 117
RULING:
YES. Regardless of whether the contract is a pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage,
respondents actuations in his transaction, as well as in the present administrative cases, show a
disregard to the standards of legal integrity and fair dealing required of lawyers, for which
respondent should be held administratively liable.
Respondent acted with bad faith when he made it appear that the property was covered by
a TCT under his name, when the said TCT had been cancelled 9 years earlier. He did not even
correct the wrong statement in the deed.
In order to be deceitful, the person must have knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless
and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was done with
the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false
statement or deed to his injury. The actions of clearly fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct. They violate Article 19 of the Civil Code. They show a disregard for Section
63 of the Land Registration Act. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit.
ERLINDA FOSTER v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014, Per Curiam
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.
FACTS:
Foster engaged Agtangs services. She agreed to pay P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and
P5,000.00 as incidental expenses. Agtang asked Erlinda for a loan of P100,000.00, evidenced by a
promissory note. Foster referred to Agtang a realty case. Agtang and requested filing fees of
P150,000.00. Foster learned that the actual filing fee in the civil case was only P22,410.00.
When Foster read the complaint, she found out that the important matters were not alleged,
the contracts were not attached, the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the
point of contention in the case, and the anomalies she complained of were not mentioned. Agtang
asked for another loan of P70,000.00, but Foster able to give only P22,000.00. Jaime demanded
P50,000.00 to be given allegedly to the judge for a favourable ruling, Foster gave P25,000.00. Later,
Jaime again demanded the balance of P25,000.00. Foster only learned that her case was dismissed
when she went to the court to verify her case. After several days, Jaimes driver came with a
message to give his driver P2,500.00 as reimbursement for the value of a bottle of wine he allegedly
gave the judge.
She later terminated his services and filed a case for disbarment. During the hearings at the
IBP, she gave copies of the MTC decision in Small Claims cases ordering Jaime to pay her the
P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 loans. Jaime claimed that P100,000.00 was no loan and Erlinda gave
it to him as consideration for his services; he admitted notarising the Deed of Sale subject of
Erlindas case but averred he was not paid for it; he denied having said that the hotel expenses of
the sheriff would be included in the filing fee; he also denied having received the P50,000.00 or the
P22,000.00.
Page 21 of 117
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Agtang violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING:
YES. Respondent engaged in deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private capacity.
He resorted to overpricing when misled complainant with regard to the filing fees. Assuming that
the complainant was willing to pay a high amount, respondent should not have accepted it.
Agtang received amounts from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse,
he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he
failed to return the excess money from the filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise
to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use. Complainants case was
dismissed. Respondent failed to inform his client of the status of the case. Respondent was not only
guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.
cha
CANON 2
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-
CADAVEDO v. ATTY. VICTORINO T. LACAYA
G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014, Brion, J.
Premium consideration is on the rights of the owner, not on the lawyer who only helped the
owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise, the lawyer acquires a
property right over the disputed property. If at all, due recognition of parity between a lawyer and a
client should be on the fruits of the disputed property.
FACTS:
During the 19 years of their attorney-client relationship, Atty. Lacaya represented the
spouses Cadavedo in 3 civil cases. The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into a
compromise agreement concerning the division of the subject lot where Atty. Lacaya agreed to
acquire a smaller portion. The MTC approved the compromise agreement.
Petitioners argue that Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latters contingent attorneys fee was
P2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This agreement was clearly stipulated in the
amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721. Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly
stipulated fee and cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms.
ISSUE:
Whether the attorneys fees consisting of one-half of the subject lot is valid and reasonable
RULING:
Page 22 of 117
NO. The parties impliedly set aside any express stipulation on the attorneys fees. We thus
have to fix the attorneys fees on a quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit meaning as much as he deserves is the basis for determining a

lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract, taking into account certain factors. Its
essential requisite is the acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the services
rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was
expecting to be paid compensation for it. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent
undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit
without paying for it.
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, factors such as the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the time
spent and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for similar services, the
amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service, to
name a few, are considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer is
entitled
In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and setting
Atty. Lacayas fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases did not
require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of time, skill or the performance of extensive
research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases
beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the instant case; (3) the first of these civil
cases lasted for 12 years; the second lasted for 7 years; and the third lasted for 6 years; and (4) the
property subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size.
All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTCs considerations in appreciating
the character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in the three cases, subject to modification
on valuation. We believe and so hold that the respondents are entitled to two 2 hectares, with the
fruits previously received from the disputed one-half portion, as attorneys fees. They shall return
to the petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half portion. The allotted portion of the subject
lot properly recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit of the client, not the lawyer,
particularly in a legal situation when the law itself holds clear and express protection to the rights
of the client to the disputed property (a homestead lot).
CANON 3
IN RE: USE BY ATTY. RENERIO G. PAAS AS AN OFFICE IN HIS PRIVATE PRACTICE OF HIS
PROFESSION THE OFFICE OF HIS WIFE, PASAY CITY METC JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS
A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC, April 4, 2003, Carpio-Morales, J.
A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety; and his behavior
not only in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
FACTS:
In a criminal case, it was revealed that Judge Paas husband, Atty. Paas, was using his wifes
office as his office address in his law practice. They claimed that Atty. Paas actually holds office at
Page 23 of 117
Escolta, Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio Martinez and that Atty. Paas would visit his wife at
her office only when he has a hearing before the courts or Prosecutors Office, or when he eats with
or fetches her, or when he is a guest during special occasions celebrated therein; and that Judge
Paas would never consent nor tolerate the use of the court for any personal activities.
However, Judge Paas admitted that Atty. Paas did use her office as his return address for
notices and orders but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of those notices, but after the cases
were terminated, all notices were sent to his office address in Escolta.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Paas violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
YES. Judge Paas allowed her husband to ride on her prestige for purposes of advancing his
private interest, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address
that had no purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or
his client, that he has close ties to a member of the judiciary, in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Canon 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Rule 3.01. - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.
The need for relying on the merits of a lawyers case, instead of banking on his relationship
with a member of the bench which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the
court, cannot be overemphasized. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by such
reprehensible and improper conduct.
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO" AND IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME OZAETA,
ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES
G.R. No. X92-1, July 30, 1979, Melencio-Herrera, J.
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might
be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
FACTS:
Page 24 of 117
Two firms ask that they be allowed to continue using the names of their firms despite the
fact that Attys. Sycip and Ozaeta died. One of their arguments is that he Canons of Professional
Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner because Canon
33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: The
continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not
unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
ISSUE:
Whether the names of deceased partners may be included in firm names
RULING:
NO. Although Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner when such a practice is permissible by local custom, but the Canon
warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced. In the Philippines, no
local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner's name. Firm
names, under our custom, identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the
law firm.
ADRIANO E. DACANAY v. BAKER & MCKENZIE

A.M. No. 2131, May 10, 1985, Aquino, J.
In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used.
FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman, represented by Atty. Adriano
Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some shares to Torres client. The letterhead contained the
name Baker & McKenzie. Dacanay denied Clurmans liability and asked why Torres using the
letterhead Baker & McKenzie, a foreign partnership established in Chicago, Illinois. No reply was
received so Dacanay filed an administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using Baker &
McKenzie.
Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres, a member of Baker &
McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members in 30 cities all over the world; that they
associated with them in order to make a representation that they can render legal services of the
highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment.
ISSUE:
Whether the use of a foreign law office name is allowed
RULING:
NO. An alien law firm cannot practice law in the Philippines. Baker & McKenzie is a
professional partnership organized in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates around the
Page 25 of 117
world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm
name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker &Mckenzie. Such use of foreign law
firm name is unethical therefore Torres and his law firm are enjoined from using Baker &
McKenzie in their practice of law.
CANON 4
CANON 5
CANON 6
GENERAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (GBTC) v. THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 125440, January 31, 2000, Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
To be criminally liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, these elements must be present: (1)
That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said
public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation
to their public positions; (3) that they cause undue injury to any party; (4) that such injury is caused
by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public
officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
FACTS:
The Monetary Board of the Central Bank passed a resolution to the effect that the General
Bank and Trust Company (GBTC) is insolvent and has to stop operation. It approved a Liquidation
Plan whereby Lucio Tan Group shall purchase the assets and assume the liabilities of GBTC. Three
minority stockholders of GBTC filed an intervention in the said case, praying for the annulment of
the closure and liquidation of GBTC by the Monetary Board as these were allegedly done in bad
faith. GBTC itself joined and adopted the intervention of its three minority stockholders.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo, to whose Team the said case was assigned, re-
assigned the said case from Solicitor Juan C. Nabong to the herein respondent.
Petitioners filed a complaint against ASG de Leon for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, for allegedly causing undue injury to the Government of the Philippines and the GBTC
Stockholders in giving Lucio Tan unwarranted benefit or advantage in the discharge of his official
functions by protecting the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central Bank.
ISSUE:
Whether the OSG is defending the interest of Lucio Tan.
RULING:
NO. In defending the Central Bank, respondent was performing his legal duty to defend the
interest of the Government and was merely pursuing the position taken by it. Whatever legal
services respondent ASG de Leon rendered in favor of the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No.
Page 26 of 117
107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 were made in his official capacity as a member of the legal staff of
the OSG.
In defending the validity of the closure of GBTC, respondent ASG de Leon was acting in the
interest of the Central Bank, which is the client of OSG. It may be true that a successful defense of
the interest of the Central Bank in said case would also inure to the benefit of the Lucio Tan group.
However, such benefit would just be an incidental result of the position that the government has
taken in justifying the closure of said bank because the approved Liquidation Plan for GBTC
provided that the Lucio Tan group shall purchase all the assets and assume all the liabilities of
GBTC and such Liquidation Plan would be in force upon a judgment upholding the legality of the
closure of GBTC. Whatever benefit the Lucio Tan group would reap upon a favorable judgment is
but a natural consequence of a successful defense of the actions of the Central Bank in closing GBTC.
LORENZO JOSE v. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-38581, March 31, 1976, Muoz-Palma, J.
A rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice
to render justice where justice is due to secure to the individual all possible legal means to prove his
innocence of a crime of which he is charged.
FACTS:
Lorenzo Jose was caught and was prosecuted for illegally possessing firearms and
explosives. During trial, he said that he is authorized to carry the explosives but he cannot present
at that time his permit, so he made a reservation to present his evidence at a later time. The trial
court acquitted him in the other cases but convicted him for illegal possession of hand grenade.
Jose filed a notice of appeal but at the same time asked for a new trial so that he may
present new evidence. The trial court denied the request for new trial because Jose was able to
perfect his appeal. The CA denied Joses request for a new trial, ruling that there is no reversible
error committed by the trial court. Jose filed a motion for reconsideration and for new trial. The
Solicitor General opposed the Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial as it stated that the evidence
sought to be presented by Jose does not fall under newly discovered evidence; that his permit to
possess a hand grenade was supposed to be known to Jose at the time of the trial and not
discovered thereafter.
Jose submitted a reply where he finally indicated he is an undercover agent for the
Philippine Constabulary; that being such, he was authorized to carry firearms and explosives; that
the reason why he did not disclose the same immediately was because of his fear for reprisals
considering that he resides in Huklandia; he enclosed a letter from Major General Fidel Ramos
confirming this fact. The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation where he recommended the
granting of the new trial, even if the same violates the Rules of Court
ISSUE:
Whether the Solicitor General is correct
RULING:
Page 27 of 117
YES. The Solicitor General embodies the principle that a prosecuting officer, as the
representative of a sovereignty whose obligation in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case but that justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the public that while guilt
shall not escape, innocence shall not suffer. The recommendation by the Solicitor General to
remand this case to the court of origin for a new trial will best serve the interests of justice.
CANON 7
ATTY. AILEEN R. MAGLANA v. ATTY. JOSE VICENTE R. OPINION

B.M. No. 2713, June 10, 2014, Brion, J.
The rotation by exclusion rule provides that "once a member of a chapter is elected as
Governor, his or her chapter would be excluded in the next turn until all have taken their turns in the
rotation cycle. Once a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the
region are once again entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion.
FACTS:
Outgoing Governor Manuel Enage, Jr. presided over the election and opened the
nominations for the position of Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
Atty. Maglana - the incumbent President of IBP Samar Chapter - was nominated for
Governor. Atty. Maglana moved that Governor Enage declare that only IBP Samar Chapter was
qualified to be voted upon for the position of Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas, to the exclusion of
the other 8 chapters. Atty. Maglana cited the rotation rule under Bar Matter No. 491 and argued
that since the implementation of the rotation rule, only IBP Samar Chapter had not served as
Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas.
Atty. Opinion, the candidate of the IBP Eastern Samar Chapter, sought the opinion of the IBP
if he was still qualified to run considering that he also ran for Governor and lost in the immediately
preceding term. Governor Enage ruled that Atty. Opinion was disqualified from running for the
position of Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas. He proclaimed Atty. Maglana as the duly elected
Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas in view of the disqualification of Atty. Opinion despite the fact that
the latter garnered more votes that Atty. Maglana.
Atty. Opinions election protest pointed out that the rotation rule had not been followed
since Cebu Province, Cebu City, Bohol and Northern Samar have had two elected governors each, as
opposed to other chapters which only had one governor elected. IBP Eastern Samar Chapter cannot
be disqualified to run in the same manner as that of the other chapters that had elected two
governors. Also, IBP Samar Chapter had waived its turn in the rotation when it did not field a
candidate for Governor in the 2007, 2009 and 2011 elections. He notes that IBP Samar Chapter
should not be allowed to assert its turn in the rotation at anytime; otherwise, it would disrupt the
sequence considering it "follows Cebu City sequence-wise." Thus, for the 2013 regional elections,
both Eastern Samar and Samar should have been declared eligible to run for Governor of IBP
Eastern Visayas.
Page 28 of 117
IBP Board of Governors granted the election protest and declared him the duly elected
Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Opinion should be declared Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas
RULING:
YES. In its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586 dated May 16, 1991, the Court decreed without
amending Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws that the rotation rule under Sections 37 and 39,
Article VI of the IBP By-Laws should be strictly implemented "so that all prior elections for
governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the
governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of
Governors.
As has been interpreted by the Court, the rotation rule under the IBP By-Laws actually
consists of two underlying directives:
First is the directive for the strict implementation of the rotation rule. It mandates that the
governorship of a region shall rotate once in as many terms as there may be chapters in the region.
This gives every chapter a chance to represent the region in the IBP BOG.
Second is the exception which allows a chapter to waive its turn in the rotation order,
subject to its right to reclaim the governorship at any time before the rotation is completed. The
rotation rule is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the order of rotation
opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the election regularly done
for that purpose.
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates the Courts power of supervision over
the IBP. Implicit in the Supreme Courts power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP is the power to
supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election of its officers. In administrative matters
concerning the IBP, the Court can supervise the IBP by ensuring the legality of the exercise of its
powers as to manner, and by interpreting for it the constitutional provisions, laws and regulations
affecting the exercise of its powers.
With the IBP Eastern Visayas region already in the second rotation cycle and with
governors from Leyte, Bohol and Southern Leyte Chapters having served the region as starting
points, Atty. Maglanas position that IBP Samar Chapter is the only remaining chapter qualified to
field a candidate for governor in the 2013 -2015 term clearly fails.
IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED

BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, December 04, 2012, Mendoza, J.
Through the rotation by exclusion scheme, the elections would be more genuine as the
opportunity to serve as Governor at any time is once again open to all chapters, unless, of course, a
Page 29 of 117
chapter has already served in the new cycle. While predictability is not avoided, the rotation rule
should be applied in harmony with, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through the ballot.
FACTS:
The SC resolved various controversies pestering various IBP chapter elections, upholding
once again u its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586 that the "rotation rule" under Sections 37 of the
IBP By-Laws should be strictly implemented, so that all prior elections for governor in the region
shall be considered in determining who should be the governor to be selected from the chapters to
represent the region in the Board of Governors. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was
denied by the SC.
Gov. Erwin M. Fortunato of IBP-Western Visayas Region sought clarification from IBP BOG
on whether "Capiz is the only Chapter in the IBP-Western Visayas Region eligible and qualified to
run for Governor in the forthcoming election for Governor. IBP-BOG was unable to reach a
unanimous resolution, it issued a resolution, urgently requesting the SC to issue a clarification. Atty.
Daquilanea, the immediate past president of the IBP-Iloilo Chapter, likewise sought clarification on
whether the IBP-Capiz Chapter would be the only chapter to be allowed to nominate candidates for
said election.
ISSUE:
Whether the rule to be used is rotation by exclusion
RULING:
YES. At the start of a new rotational cycle, "all chapters are deemed qualified to vie of the
governorship for the 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters entering into a consensus
to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle, provided each chapter will have its
turn in the rotation." The IBP-BOG recommends the adoption of the rotation by exclusion scheme.
The SC quotes with approval the reasons given by the IBP-BOG on this score:
a) Election through rotation by exclusion is the more established rule in the IBP. The rule
prescribes that once a member of the chapter is elected as Governor, his chapter would be excluded
in the next turn until all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation cycle ends
and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again entitled to vie but subject
again to the rule on rotation by exclusion.
b) Election through a rotation by exclusion allows for a more democratic election process. The rule
provides for freedom of choice while upholding the equitable principle of rotation which assures
the every member-chapter has its turn in every rotation cycle.
c) On the other hand, rotation by pre-ordained sequence, or election based on the same order as the
previous cycle, tends to defeat the purpose of an election. The element of choice which is crucial to
a democratic process is virtually removed. Only one chapter could vie for election at every turn as
the entire sequence, from first to last, is already predetermined by the order in the previous
rotation cycle. This concept of rotation by pre-ordained sequence negates freedom of choice, which
is the bedrock of any democratic election process.
d) The pronouncement of the Special Committee, which the Supreme Court may have adopted in
AM No. 09-5-2-SC, involving the application of the rotation rule in the previous election for GMR
may not be controlling, not being one of the principal issues raised in the GMR elections.
Page 30 of 117
Applying the principle of rotation by exclusion in Western Visayas which starts with a new
rotation cycle, all chapters (with the exception of Romblon) are qualified to vie for the
Governorship for 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters entering into a consensus to
adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn
in the rotation.
ATTY. OSCAR EMBIDO v. ATTY. SALVADOR PE, JR.

A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013, Bersamin, J.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions

can justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
FACTS:
Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written communication from
Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom, who requested a copy of the decision
rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death
of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo. Informed that the case records did not
exist, Hunt sent a letter attaching a machine copy of the purported decision presented by Shirley
Quioyo. Judge Penuela discovered that the document attached to the letter was falsified.
The NBI investigated the falsification. Dy Quioyo, brother of Shirley, executed an affidavit
stating that it was Atty. Salvador Pe, Jr. who made the falsified decision for a fee of P60,000.00. The
allegations were corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley. The NBI invited Atty. Pe to
explain his side, but he invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. After conducting its
investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the
investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of public
document and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019. The NBI likewise recommended to
the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and
violations of the Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the
purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear as a petition for declaration of
presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Pe should be disbarred
RULING:
YES. Atty. Pe violated Rule, 1.01, Canon 7, and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts of
malpractice in his professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with
his professional duties. No lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose
duty and obligation are to investigate and punish a lawyers misconduct committed in a
Page 31 of 117
professional or private capacity. The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the
lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.
CANON 8
SPOUSES WILLIE and AMELIA UMAGUING v. ATTY. WALLEN DE VERA

A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest,
imbued with integrity, and trustworthy.
FACTS:
The daughter of the spouses Umaguing ran for SK Chairman in 2007 but lost to her rival by
1 vote. The spouses lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. Wallen De Vera. The
spouses were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus other expenses in
the amount of P30,000.00. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had enough time file the
case but the former only took action when the deadline was looming. Atty. De Vera then rushed the
preparation of the election protest. Two of these attachments are the Affidavits of material
witnesses. At the time that the affidavits were to be signed, they were unavailable. Atty. DeVera
allegedly looked for the nearest kin of the witnesses and asked them to sign over the names. De
Vera had all the documents notarized before one Atty. Donato Manguiat.
One witness discovered the falsification and submitted his own Affidavit, declaring that he
did not authorize the signing of the document. The affidavit was presented to the MeTC. Presiding
Judge Edgardo Belosillo ruled that the affidavits were falsified.
The complainants asked the Atty. De Vera to withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse
them the P60,000.00. They also sought Atty. De Veras disbarment. In his Counter-Affidavit, Atty. De
Vera denied all the accusations. The IBP Commissioner found the administrative action meritorious,
and recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
months. The IBP Board of Governors affirmed the Investigating Commissioners resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. De Vera should be held liable
RULING:
YES. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the falsification of the witnesss affidavit is
rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De Veras comment on the same. In his Motion for
Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors Resolution, no specific denial was proffered. He
only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but another notary
public, whom he does not even know, and that he had no knowledge of the falsification of the
impugned documents. This a mere general denial which cannot overcome the witnesss positive
testimony that Atty. De Vera participated in the falsification. Atty. De Vera is guilty of violating the
Lawyers Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Page 32 of 117
CANON 9
ATTY. AURELIO ANGELES, JR. v. ATTY. RENATO BAGAY

A.C. No. 8103, December 03, 2015, Mendoza, J.
Lawyers should not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law
FACTS:
Atty. Aurelio Angeles, Jr. filed a case of disbarment against Atty. Renato Bagay for his alleged
notarization of 18 documents when he was abroad. Atty. Angeles had information that Atty. Bagay
was attending a Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The persons involved alleged that they did
not see Atty. Bagay sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary of the respondent
who signed them or the documents came out of the office already signed. It was found that the
secretary was the one who performed the act of notarization.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Bagay was negligent in allowing his secretary to notarize the documents
RULING:
YES. Atty. Bagay is responsible for the acts of his secretary. His secretary is not
commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public. He left his office open to the public
while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register within the reach of his
secretary. There is a likelihood that respondents flimsy excuse was an afterthought and such
carelessness exhibited by him could be a conscious act of what his secretary did. He allowed an
unauthorized person to practice law. He also violated Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every
lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came
into his office while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted
therein. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an unauthorized person,
their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS v. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR CO.

G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971, Reyes, J.
An agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, where a non-lawyer union president
is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no
less immoral in the absence of a contract.
FACTS:
PAFLU was a complainant in a case where the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ordered
the reinstatement with backwages of Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became
final. Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of
attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar
notice for a reasonable amount. Entila and Tenazas filed a manifestation indicating their non-
Page 33 of 117
objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin
Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
ISSUE:
Whether a non-lawyer may recover attorneys fees for legal services rendered
RULING:
NO. The ethics of the legal profession should not be violated. Acting as an attorney with
authority constitutes contempt of court which is punishable by fine, imprisonment ,or both. The law
will not assist a person to reap the fruits of an act done in violation of law. If this were be allowed to
non-lawyers, it would leave the public in confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity. This
would leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures. The rule on non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers cannot be
circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an agent and not as an
attorney.
RODRIGO TAPAY and ANTHONY RUSTIA v. ATTYS. CHARLIE BANCOLO and JANUS JARDER
A.C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013, Carpio, J.
The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is a privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct.
FACTS:
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated from the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of
authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by
Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1
was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally
chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the
Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to
meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that
the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia
convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact.
Using Atty. Bancolos affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a
counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty.
Bancolo. In a Resolution, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since
the falsification of the counsels signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaints validity.
Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public
Document2 and Dishonesty be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as
complainants. Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit denying that he falsified the
signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo and presented evidence thereto. The Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document for insufficiency of
Page 34 of 117
evidence. The administrative case for dishonesty was also dismissed for lack of substantial
evidence.
Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to
disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner. The complainants alleged that
they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the
forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in
the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. The IBP Investigating Commissioner found that
Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty.
Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Bancolo is administratively liable
RULING:
YES. The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of
law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The canons and
ethics of the profession enjoin a lawyer not to permit his professional services or his name to be
used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute practice of law which is reserved for
members of the bar. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal. Although he
may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Under the Rules of Court, counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the
pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it;
and (3) it is not interposed for delay.
CANON 10
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, et al. v. THE
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO, LTD., et al.
G.R. No. L025291, January 30, 1971, Castro, J.
FACTS:
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group
Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU
(hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW), entered into separate CBAs with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance
Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies). The Unions jointly submitted proposals to the
Companies; negotiations were conducted on the Unions proposals, but these were snagged by a
deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed a notice of strike for
deadlock on collective bargaining. The issue was dropped subsequently but, the parties negotiated
Page 35 of 117
on the labor demands with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary
increases.
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia.
The CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under
Republic Act 875. The Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of the
complaint, stating special defenses therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.
The CIR, through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered a decision dismissing the
Unions' complaint for lack of merit. The Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of
the said decision, and their supporting memorandum. This was denied by the CIR en banc in a
resolution.
15 of the petitioners ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge
Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents,
on the ground that the former wrote misquotations in his decision subject of the instant petition for
certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on the respondents' brief. It appears that the 60 un-
underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge do not appear in the
pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision. The first underscored sentence in the quoted
paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this
Court's decision. Finally, the second and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the
respondent Judge's decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the
other sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent judge and the respondents counsel should be held in contempt
RULING:
NO. The misquotation is not deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent judge to
mislead. It is fully realized how saddled with many cases are the courts, so clerical errors may
escape judges notice. The respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation
as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences
of the quotation in the respondent judge's decision is substantially the same as the particular ruling
in the SCs decision.
It is the duty of courts, judges and lawyers to copy SC decisions verbatim. Only from this
Tribunal's decisions do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is
because the decisions referred to in Article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," are only those enunciated by the SC of last resort. Only the decisions of this Honorable
Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction. Thus, ever present is the danger that
if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of the SC may lose their proper and
correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may be misled. But if
inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to recheck their citations
of authorities, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation.
Page 36 of 117
CANON 11
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, et al. v. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., et al.
G.R. No. L-27072, January 09,1970, Sanchez, J.
The dignity of the Court can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency instead of punishment.
FACTS:
The first contempt proceeding arose from the third Motion for Reconsideration (MR) signed
by Atty. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates,
and Jose Sotto. According to the Solicitor General, petitioners have made false, ridiculous and wild
statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. The
motion adds that to have such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and
arrogant attitude of the petitioners, and also, they have opportunistically changed their claims, not
only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Atty Santiago further alleged
that the SC has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the
petitioners counsel and Atty. Santiago also filed a motion to inhibit against Chief Justice Concepcion
and Justice Castro.
The second contempt proceeding arose when respondent MacArthur, through new counsel,
Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth MR
without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and included citing
the New Rules of Court (ROC) Section 1 Rule 51 and that alleged injustice may cut off all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government by invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment after making it
known to the World Court. Morton Meads, for his part, tried to reason out why such a distorted
quotation came about the portion left out was anyway marked by XS which is a common
practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize
his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that it is not candid nor fair for the
lawyer, knowingly, to misquote.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Santiago and the other lawyers of the counsel are guilty of contempt
RULING:
YES. On the third MR, the SC finds language that is not to be expected of an officer of the
courts. Atty. Santiago pictures petitioners as vulturous executives and speaks of the SC as a
civilized, democratic tribunal, but by innuendo would suggest that it is not. Atty. Jose Beltran
Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the ROC; and he has committed, under Section
3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. Atty.
Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. Atty. Uy was not
involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation.
On the fourth MR, Atty. Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case.
Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Atty. Caling
Page 37 of 117
lifted Section 1. Rule 51, ROC, out of context. He admits that he has read the fourth MR before he
signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was his duty to have taken
care that his name not be attached to contemptuous pleadings. As to Mr. Meads, having admitted
having prepared the fourth MR, he cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even
though he is not a lawyer.
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN v. ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES

A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013, del Castillo, J.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch the Government to which they
belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system.
FACTS:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the MTC. The Public Attorneys Office (PAO), thru
Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon, represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores appeared for the
defendant. During the Preliminary Conference, Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without
proof of MCLE compliance, hence, it was expunged from the records without prejudice to the filing
of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. Atty. Flores asked for 10 days
to submit proof. The preliminary conference was reset several times for failure of Atty. Flores to
appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating his MCLE compliance.
Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court with the following allegations: 4. When you took
your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth, justice and fair play. Do you think you
are being truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?; 5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for
which reason, even Erap was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. But even worse is a lawyer who
violates the law; and 6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine
Constitution commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative of
the foregoing divine and human laws. Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE
number which was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance.
During the preliminary conference, Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of compliance
of his MCLE on the following day, but failed.
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by
failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the MCLE
requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The Investigating Judge
recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. The OBC adopted
the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Flores should be held administratively liable
RULING:
YES. Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial courts order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance, He also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. He is expected to be
circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins
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all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his client's
genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is
entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech which must be exercised responsibly. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued
at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice.
CANON 12
NESTOR FIGUERAS and BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR. v. ATTY. DIOSDADO JIMENEZ

A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014, Villarama, Jr., J.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latters
interest with utmost diligence. He should exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
FACTS:
Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. is in charge of the affairs of the

homeowners of Congressional Village. The Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit
for damages against the Association before the RTC for building a concrete wall which denied them
their right of way. The Law Firm of Gonzalez, Sinense, Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel
for the Association, with Atty. Diosdado Jimenez as the counsel of record. After trial and hearing, the
RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association appealed to the CA which dismissed it
on the ground that the period to file the appellants brief had expired.
8 years later, Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association,
filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Jimenez before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
(CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12;
Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation
of his duties as an officer of the court. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found
respondent liable and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 3-6 months, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the recommendation but increased
Atty. Jimenezs suspension to 6 months.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Jimenez should be held administratively liable
RULING:
YES. Atty. Jimenez had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel for
Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. Records show that Atty. Jimenez filed the first
motion for extension of time to file appellants brief 95 days after the expiration of the
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reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of the homeowners
association. To justify his inexcusable negligence, he alleges that he was merely the supervising
lawyer and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by the
records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he
himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous motion had been filed but "due to
the health condition of the undersigned counsel, he was not able to finish said Appellants Brief
within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by him."Thus, it is clear that respondent was
personally in charge of the case.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states that: Canon 18A lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence. And Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In In Re: Atty.
Santiago Marcos, the SC considered a lawyers failure to file brief for his client as amounting to
inexcusable negligence: An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability
and with utmost diligence. A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable
negligence on his part. The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by
him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy
administration of justice.
CANON 13
JOSEFINA ROYONG v. ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA

G.R. No. 376, April 30, 1963, Barrera, J.
An attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also
for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
FACTS:
Josefina Royong charged Atty. Ariston Oblena with rape. The Solicitor General found that
there was consensual sex and no rape. However, he found that even if Atty. Oblena did not commit
rape, the latter was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint
charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the
bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the
same time maintaining illicit relations with 18-year old Josefina Royong. Considering him unfit to
practice law, the Solicitor General prayed for the permanent removal of Atty. Oblena as lawyer and
judge.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Oblena should be disbarred
RULING:
YES. The moral depravity of Atty. Oblena is most apparent. His pretension that before
Royong completed her 18th birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as
Page 40 of 117
not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing
and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his
knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose. His act becomes more despicable
considering that Royong was the niece of his common-law wife and that he had a moral ascendancy
over her who looked up to him as her uncle. From childhood, Royong treated him as an uncle and
called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering that 17 or 18 years old then, her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is
not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit
relations with Royong reveals Atty. Oblena to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction
for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability.
Atty. Oblena's conduct though unrelated to his office has nevertheless rendered him unfit of
the privileges of a lawyer. The SC cannot give sanction to his acts. For to do so would be as the
Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the
Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that Atty.
Oblena's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and
do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be
requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on
tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the
bar.
CANON 14
EDGARDO AREOLA v. ATTY. MARIA MENDOZA

A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014, Reyes, J.
Disbarment and suspension, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be
imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of
the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
FACTS:
Edgardo Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees. He
alleged that during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all
detainees with pending cases before the RTC of Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend her
ecture. Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech: "O kayong may
mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto
ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo
ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal
banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."
Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the complaint against her is a harassment tactic
by Areola. The Investigating Commissioner stated that Areola is knowledgeable in the field of law.
He however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from
Areolas co-detainees as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also uncorroborated.
Page 41 of 117
Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients and their relatives to approach the
judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would be granted and their cases against
them would be dismissed. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two months, to which the IBP-Board of
Governors adopted.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Mendoza should be held administratively liable
RULING:
NO. When Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at
palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While
it was inappropriate, her comment is not reproachful so as to cause disgrace to the Judiciary. The SC
takes note of Atty. Mendozas lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a PAO lawyer as
her main source of livelihood. Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly baseless and the
only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty. Mendozas own admission.
CANON 15
DARIA DAGING v. ATTY. RIZ DAVIS

The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even
if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. Lawyers
are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers.
FACTS:
Complainant was the owner of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased from Benjie
Pinlac a building space in Baguio City where she operated the bar. Complainant received a Retainer
Proposal from Davis & Sabling Law Office, signed by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib
Sabling. This eventually resulted in the signing of the said agreement. Because complainant was
delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the lease. Pinlac went to complainant's
music bar, inventoried all the equipment, and informed her that Balageo would take over the
operation of the bar. Complainant averred that subsequently respondent acted as business partner
of Balageo in operating the bar under her business name, which they renamed Amarillo Music Bar.
Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo before the
MTCC of Baguio City. At that time, Davis & Sabling Law Office was still her counsel. However,
respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case and filed, on behalf of the latter,
an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Respondent denied acting as a business partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar. He
insisted that it was Atty. Sabling who initiated the proposal. Respondent maintained that he never
obtained any knowledge regarding the business of complainant. Respondent denied that he took
advantage of the Retainer Agreement. The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of
Page 42 of 117
betrayal of his client's trust. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of 1 year. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the same.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Davis should be held administratively liable
RULING:
YES. A lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged the
services of his law firm brings the law profession into public suspicion and undermines the
integrity of justice. Undeniably aware of the fact that complainant is a client of his law firm,
respondent should have informed both the complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other
members of his law firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they would
be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent could have simply advised both complainant and Balageo to instead engage the
services of another lawyer.
ALMIRA FORONDA v. ATTY. JOSE ALVAREZ, JR.

A.C. No. 9976, June 25, 2014, Reyes, J.
Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.
FACTS:
The complainant is an overseas Filipino worker based in Dubai. During her vacation in the
Philippines in May 2008, she contracted the services of respondent to file a petition for the
annulment of her marriage for a fee of P195,000.00 which she paid in full by June 2008.
Respondent, however, filed the petition for the annulment of her marriage only in July 2009. In June
2008, respondent obtained P200,000.00 from complainant with the promise to pay the same with
interest at 4% per month starting July 2008 until June 2009. Respondent issued complainant 11
checks for P 8,000.00, each postdated checks monthly from 10 July 2008 until 10 May 2009, plus a
check for P 108,000.00, payable on 10 June 2009, and another check for P 100,000.00 which is
payable on 8 June 2009.
The first two checks were good but the rest of the checks were dishonored. When
complainant demanded payment, respondent issued to her 8 new checks dated 25th of every
month from June 2009 to January 2010. All of the replacement checks were dishonored.
Complainant filed a criminal complaint against him for violation of BP 22. The criminal complaint
was dismissed after complainant executed an affidavit of desistance after she was paid a certain
amount by respondent. The Investigating Commissioner found that there was basis to hold the
respondent liable.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Alvarez should be held administratively liable
Page 43 of 117
RULING:
YES. The respondent gave out different reasons for the delay filing the petition for
annulment in an attempt to exculpate himself. In the end, the respondent admitted the delay. The
complainant was diligent in following up the petition. The different excuses proffered by the
respondent also show his lack of candor in his dealings with the complainant.
The respondents issuance worthless checks is a violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." The issuance of checks which were dishonored indicates a lawyers
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and
good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action. It cannot be denied that the respondents unfulfilled promise to settle his
obligation and the issuance of worthless checks have seriously breached the complainants trust.
The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary.
JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN OROLA-

BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, and KARENOROLA v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR
RAMOS
A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties.
FACTS:
In the settlement of Trinidad Laserna-Orolas estate, the parties were represented by Atty.
Roy Villa as counsel for the heirs of Trinidad, Atty. Ely Azarraga as counsel for the heirs of Antonio
with respondent Atty. Ramos as collaborating counsel and Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel of the
initially appointed administrator, Emilio. The heirs of Trinidad and Antonio moved for the removal
of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the appointment of the latters son, Manuel
Orola. The court granted it in an order. Respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating
counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for reconsideration. Due to the respondents new
engagement, a disbarment complaint was as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the
subject case.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests
RULING:
YES. Under Canon 15, Rule 15.03, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether they are parties in the
same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public
policy. The test is, whether in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for a claim, but it is
Page 44 of 117
his duty to oppose it for the other client. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether
the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.
Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar but for
all the Heirs of Antonio. The Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing
Emilio as administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when
respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as
administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio.
Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos represented conflicting interests, he is suspended from the practice of law
for 3 months.
CANON 16
CESAR A. ESPIRITU v. ATTY. JUAN CABREDO IV

A.C. No. 5831, January 13, 2003, Mendoza, J.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of
fidelity and good faith. Hence, in dealing with trust property, a lawyer should be very scrupulous.
FACTS:
BPI Family Savings Bank Inc. filed 2 complaints for replevin and damages against Esphar
Medical Center Inc. and its president Cesar Espiritu and a certain John Doe. In the first complaint,
BPI alleged that Esphar, Espiritu and Doe executed a promissory note in favor of Gencars to pay
P511,956 secured by a chattel mortgage on an Isuzu Closed Van. Gencars executed a deed of
assignment in favor of BPI assigning to the latter all of its rights and interest in the promissory note.
The second complaint alleged similar facts involving Citimotors, Inc. as the payee of another
promissory note in which Esphar, Espiritu and John Doe, as makers, obligated themselves solidarily
to pay the former P674,640.00 in monthly installments.
Espiritu engaged the services of Atty. Juan Cabredo IV to represent him in the two civil
cases. While the cases were pending in court, Atty. Cabredo advised Esphar to remit money and
update payments to BPI through the trial court. Esphar's representative delivered a total of
P51,161.00 to Atty. Cabredo's office. When Atty. Cabredo failed to appear at a hearing of the civil
cases, Esphar found out that he did not deliver the sum of P51,161.00 to the court or BPI. Esphar
agreed to settle the cases amicably with BPI. Espiritu filed a complaint against Atty. Cabredo for
fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Cabredo should be held liable for failure to account for the money of his client
RULING:
YES. Respondent should be suspended for one year. Money or other trust property of the
client coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported by the latter and accounted for.
Page 45 of 117
Under any circumstance, the clients property cannot be commingled with his own or be used by
him. Respondent claims that he did not know about the receipt by his secretary on the amount of
P51,161.00 received from Esphar until he read the first demand letter of the company. However,
even after receiving this notice and 2 other demand letters, respondent never returned the money
of complainant nor paid it to the bank. It is improbable that respondent's secretary failed to inform
complainant about the receipt of such a substantial sum of money.
ESTRELLA R. SANCHEZ v. ATTY. NICOLAS C. TORRES, M.D.
A.C. No. 10240, [Formerly CBD No. 11-3241], November 25, 2014, Per Curiam
The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct.
FACTS:
Estrella Sanchez claimed that she lend money in the amount of P2,200,000.00 to Atty.
Nicolas Torres, who is her friend. She withdrew such amount from the bank in Atty. Torres'
presence. To bolster Sanchez's trust and confidence, Atty. Torres issued 2 Allied Bank checks.
However, after one month, Atty. Torres failed to pay his obligation as promised. When Sanchez
called Atty. Torres over the phone, she was told that she could again deposit the check and assured
her that the checks will be honored upon presentment for payment. When she deposited the
checks, the same were returned due to account closed. Despite repeated demands for the last 3
years, Atty. Torres had yet to pay his obligation.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Torres is guilty of willful dishonesty and unethical conduct
RULING:
YES. In the instant case, the existence of the loan obligation is undisputed. In Barrientos v.
Atty. Libiran-Meteoro, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and
vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Canon 1, Rule 1.01 provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As to the penalty, we note that in CF Sharp Crew management, Inc. v. Nicolas C. Torres, the
Court had already disbarred Torres from the practice of law for having been found guilty of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent Atty. Nicolas C. Torres is hereby suspended for a period of two years
from the practice of law. However, considering that respondent has already been previously
disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed.
Page 46 of 117
SPOUSES NICASIO DONELITA SAN PEDRO v. ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA
A.C. No. 5440, December 10, 2014, Leonen, J.
The lawyers failure to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption
that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed
in him by the client.
FACTS:
Complainants engaged the services of respondent Atty. Isagani Mendoza to facilitate the
transfer of title to property, in the name of Isabel Azcarraga Marcaida, to complainants. They gave
him a check for P68,250.00 for the payment of transfer taxes and another check for P13,800.00 as
professional fee. However, respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants repeated
follow-ups. Respondent promised to settle the transfer of the land title but he reneged on this
promise. Complainants were forced to obtain a loan from Philippine American Life and General
Insurance Company to secure the transfer of the title to the property in their names.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent failed to hold in trust the money of his clients
RULING:
YES. When a lawyer receives money from his client for a particular purpose, he should
promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its
intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an
accounting or to return the money constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property to
complainants name. He continuously assured complainants that he would still fulfill his duty.
However, after 3 years and several demands from complainants, respondent failed to accomplish
the task given to him and refused to return the money. Complainants alleged failure to provide the
necessary documents to effect the transfer does not justify his violation of his duty. Respondents
assertion of a valid lawyers lien is also untenable. He did not present evidence as to an unsatisfied
claim for attorneys fees. Even assuming that he has a valid retaining lien, he cannot appropriate for
himself his client's funds without the proper accounting and notice to the client. When there is a
disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer, the lawyer should not
arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees.
ERLINDA FOSTER v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014, Per Curiam
The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to
pay the same are indicative of a lawyers lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing.
Page 47 of 117
FACTS:
Complainant Foster engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Agtang for filing a case in
connection with her legal problem about a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty.
Respondent was paid P20,000 as acceptance fee and P5,000 as incidental expenses. He also asked
the complainant for a loan of P100,000 for the repair of his car. Respondent requested complainant
to extend to him the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 "in the moment of urgency or
emergency, to which the complainant agreed. Respondent demanded the sum of P50,000.00,
purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. The case filed against Tierra
Realty was dismissed. Complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel.
She requested him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual
cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied so complainant filed a case against him.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who willingly offered the amount to him for his
services. He denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from
complainant.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
YES. He violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR. In his private capacity, he requested from
his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. These acts were committed by
respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but
were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in him
as a lawyer. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his
client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair
dealing. Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED v. NICOLAS C. TORRES

A.C. No. 10438, September 23, 2014, Per Curiam
A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise
to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed
in him by his client.
FACTS
Complainant CF Sharp is a domestic corporation engaged in overseas maritime

employment. It hired respondent, a medical doctor and a lawyer, as its Legal and Claims Manager
who was tasked to serve as its legal counsel and to oversee the management of legal cases and
medical related claims instituted by seafarers against complainants principals. Respondent
handled the claims of seafarers Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and Chua. It was alleged that per
respondents request, complainant issued checks in the amounts of P524,000.00, P652,013.20,
Page 48 of 117
P145,650.00, P97,100.00, and P296,808.40 as settlement of the claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado,
and Chua. However, complainant later discovered that, save for the check in the amount of
145,650.00 issued to Delgado, respondent never gave the checks to the seafarers and instead, had
them deposited at International Exchange Bank. With respect to Sampani, complainant also
discovered that he only received the amounts of P216,936.00 and P8,303.00 or a total of
P225,239.00 out of the requested amount of P652,013.20, through checks not issued by
complainant. Respondent did not answer.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be held administratively liable
RULING:
YES. The complainant had duly proven its charges against respondent as it had exposed
respondents modus operandi of requesting checks purportedly for the settling the seafarers
claims against the complainants various principals, only to have such checks, except for the check
int he amount of 145,650.00 issued to Delgado, deposited to an unauthorized bank account. When a
lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. If he does not
use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client. Respondent's conduct of misappropriating complainant's money made him unfit to remain in
the legal profession.
FELIPE LAYOS v. ATTY. MARLITO I. VILLANUEVA

A.C. No. 8085, December 1, 2014, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a
client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and
competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the clients cause.
FACTS:
Atty. Villanueva is complainants counsel of record in a criminal case wherein the lawyers
constant failure to appear during court hearings resulted in the issuance of an order by the RTC
waiving the defenses right to cross-examine a prosecution witness. Despite the issuance of such
order, respondent remained absent. Thus, complainant was only able to move for reconsideration
after 4 years. Through respondent, a petition for certiorari was filed in the CA, but was dismissed.
The CA chastised respondent for his lack of candidness and fervor to champion the cause of his
client, and using this disquisition by the court, complainant filed an administrative complaint.
Respondent averred that during the hearing of the criminal case, his car broke down and he
was unable to attend the hearing. Respondent claimed that he no longer received any notices from
the RTC, and thus, he assumed that the case was amicabley settled. He also said that he asked for a
copy of the order of the court but was unable to due to lack of manpower in the RTC. Thus, it was
only after he received the copy that he was able to move for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Page 49 of 117
Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING:
YES. Since missing the hearing due to car trouble, respondent no longer kept track of
complainants criminal case and assumed that the same was amicably settled. When respondent
finally knew that the case was still on-going, he attended the hearing and discovered the RTCs
Order which is prejudicial to complainant. Respondent did not seek any remedy to further the
interests of his client. Instead, he relied on the representations of the court employees that they
would send him a copy of the aforesaid Order. When he finally secured a copy, it still took him over
a year just to move the RTC to reconsider. Naturally, it will be denied for being filed beyond the
reglementary period. He failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal
profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment. He is
suspended from the practice of law for 3 months.
CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS, SOLEDAD A.

FAJARDO AND ENCARNACION A. FERNANDEZ v. ATTY. JUAN B. BAEZ
A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013, Sereno, J.
While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling in
order to safeguard their clients rights, it is imperative that the advances be subject to reimbursement.
FACTS:
Complainants are the owners of 3 parcels of lands. They had a conflict with Fevidal, who
was authorized by the parties to enter into an agreement regarding the lands, for his failure to
account for the titles of the land and for selling without turning over the proceeds to them. Later,
they agreed to settle.
Complainants engaged the professional services of respondent for the purpose of assisting
them in the preparation of a settlement agreement. Instead of drafting a written settlement,
respondent encouraged them to institute actions against Fevidal in order to recover their
properties. Complainants then signed a contract of legal services, in which it was agreed that they
would not pay acceptance and appearance fees to respondent, but that the docket fees would
instead be shared by the parties and that complainants would pay respondent 50% of whatever
would be recovered of the properties. In preparation for the filing of an action against Fevidal,
respondent prepared and notarized an Affidavit of Adverse Claim. The costs for the annotation of
the adverse claim were paid by respondent. Respondents services were terminated because the
complainants cannot wait for the outcome of the action. Respondent filed a Manifestation and
Opposition alleging that the termination of his services and withdrawal of the complaint had been
done with the intent of defrauding counsel. He filed a Motion for Recording of Attorneys Charging
Lien in the Records of the case.
ISSUE:
Page 50 of 117
RULING:
NO. Respondent is entitled to reasonable compensation. That he had pursued payment in

the appropriate venue does not make him liable for disciplinary action.
However, respondent is not without fault. The contract for legal services he has executed
with complainants is in the nature of a champertous contract an agreement where an attorney
undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the clients rights in exchange for
some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public policy and
are void. They are also contrary to Canon 16.04. The purpose of this prohibition is to avoid a
situation in which a lawyer acquires a personal stake in the clients cause. Nowhere in the contract
is it stated that the expenses of litigation advanced by respondent shall be subject to
reimbursement. Also, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances, gasoline and
transportation allowance for the duration of their attorney-client relationship. In fact, he admits
that the cash advances were in the nature of personal loans that he extended to complainants.
AZUCENA SEGOVIA-RIBAYA v. ATTY. BARTOLOME C. LAWSIN

A.C. No. 7965, November 13, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Except for the retaining lien exception, a lawyer should not withhold the property of his client.
FACTS:
Atty. Lawsin undertook to process the registration and deliver the certificate of title over a
parcel of land in favor of the complainant acting as the representative of the Heirs of the late Isabel
Segovia. He received the amounts of P15,000.00 and P39,000.00 to cover for the litigation and land
registration expenses, respectively. Notwithstanding the expenditure for registration expenses,
respondent failed to fulfill his undertaking. Complainant decided to just withdraw the amount. She
confronted the Atty. Lawsin at his office and also sent him 2 demand letters, but all to no avail.
Complainant was prompted to file the administrative complaint.
ISSUE:
RULING:
YES. Respondents failure to account for and duly return his clients money despite due
demand is a violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code.
Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount but posited his failure to return the same
due to his client confronting him at his office wherein she shouted and called him names. However,
her act of "maligning" respondent does not justify the latters failure to properly account for and
return his clients money upon due demand. A lawyers duty to his client is one imbued with trust
so much so that it is incumbent upon the former to exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its
faithful compliance. A lawyer must deal with his client with professional maturity and commit
himself towards the objective fulfillment of his responsibilities. If the relationship is strained, the
Page 51 of 117
lawyer should account for his affairs and ensure the smooth turn-over of the case to another
lawyer.
MARILEN G. SOLIMAN v. ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY

A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise
to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed
in him by his client.
FACTS:
Soliman engaged the services of Atty. Amboy in connection with a partition case. In their
Retainer Agreement, Soliman agreed to pay P50,000.00 as acceptance fee and upon engagement,
half was given. Later, Atty. Amboy advised Soliman to no longer institute a partition case since the
other co-owners of the property were amenable to the partition. Atty. Amboy just facilitated the
issuance of title and treated the P25,000 as payment of professional services. Soliman gave Atty.
Amboy P16,700.00 as payment for the transfer tax. Atty. Amboy told Soliman that there was a delay
in the issuance of title because of failure to submit documents and that he knew someone in the
Register of Deeds who can help expedite the issuance thereof for a fee of P80,000.00. She later told
Soliman that her contact agreed to reduce it to P50,000.00. Soliman deposited the amount to Atty.
Amboys bank account. However, Atty. Amboy asked for additional P10,000.00 to facilitate the
release of the certificate of title. Soliman refused to pay and she asked for an update from the
lawyer but got no response. She went to the office of the Deputy RD of Manila who denied receiving
the P50,000 and claimed that the reason why the title could not be processed was due to the
lawyers failure to file certain documents. Soliman asked for the return of the documents or give
back the P50,000 but Atty. Amboy refused.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Amboy is liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING:
YES. Atty. Amboy, after receiving P25,000.00 as payment for her professional services,
failed to submit documents relative to the issuance of certificates of title to the owners of the
property. It was her negligence which caused the delay in the issuance of the certificates of title. She
abetted the commission of an illegal act when she asked for P50,000.00 to be paid to her "contact"
and notwithstanding such, she failed to obtain the certificate. Atty. Amboy also asked for an
additional P10,000.00 from Soliman. Atty. Amboys acts undermined the legal process.
In not returning the money to Soliman after demand, Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16,
particularly Rule 16.03, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to a client
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics. She is suspended from the practice of law for 2 years.
Page 52 of 117
CANON 17
PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC. v. FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC.

G.R. No. 137378, October 12, 2000, Vitug, J.
When a client, upon becoming aware of the compromise and the judgment thereon, fails to
promptly repudiate the action of his attorney, he will not afterwards be heard to complain about it.
FACTS:
FASGI, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of California, entered into a
distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated (PAWI), a Philippine
corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. (FPS), an Italian corporation. The agreement
provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the United States of aluminum
wheels manufactured by PAWI, which shipped to FASGI 8,594 wheels. FASGI paid PAWI. FASGI
later found the shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with stated requirements. FASGI
instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of contract and recovery of damages. The
parties resolved to enter into another arrangement entitled Supplemental Settlement Agreement.
The covenant provided that FASGI would deliver to PAWI a container of wheels for every LC
opened and paid by PAWI. The foregoing supplemental settlement agreement, as well as the motion
for the entry of judgment, was executed by FASGI president Elena Buholzer and PAWI counsel Mr.
Thomas Ready. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority.
ISSUE:
Whether the Supplemental Agreement signed by the parties and counsel is valid
RULING:
An attorney cannot, without a client's authorization, settle the action or subject matter of
the litigation even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his client's
interest. In the instant case, the supplemental settlement agreement was signed by the parties,
including Mr. Thomas Ready, on 06 October 1980. The agreement was lodged in the California case
2 days after the pre-trial conference. If Mr. Ready was not authorized by PAWI to enter into the
supplemental settlement agreement, PAWI could have forthwith signified to FASGI a disclaimer of
the settlement. Instead, more than a year after the execution of the supplemental settlement
agreement, PAWI President Romeo S. Rojas sent a communication to Elena Buholzer of FASGI that
failed to mention Mr. Ready's supposed lack of authority. On the contrary, the letter confirmed the
terms of the agreement when Mr. Rojas sought forbearance for the impending delay in the opening
of the first letter of credit under the schedule stipulated in the agreement.
PAWI cannot claim any prejudice by the settlement. PAWI was spared from paying FASGI
amounts of damages. PAWI should not, after its opportunity to enjoy the benefits of the agreement,
be allowed to later disown the arrangement when the terms thereof ultimately would prove to
operate against its hopeful expectations.
Page 53 of 117
LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION represented by Mr. SOLOMON U. LORENZANA, JR., as its

President and General Manager, and/or Mrs. ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, as its Vice-President v.
ATTY. FRANCISCO L. DARIA
A.C. No. 2736, May 27, 1991, Per Curiam
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but
also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated.
FACTS:
Francisco L. Daria was hired by Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) as its legal counsel and
was designated as its personnel manager 6 months later. While respondent was still connected with
complainant, its general manager, Sebastian Cortes, issued a memorandum to its employee, Roberto
San Juan, requiring him to submit a written explanation for his alleged double liquidation and
unliquidated cash advances. Complainant's internal auditor, Rosario L. Bernardo, issued another
memorandum summing up San Juan's unliquidated advances. Respondent was furnished a copy of
this memorandum. The executive committee, to which respondent belongs, investigated San Juan
on his unliquidated advances. Respondent placed San Juan under preventive suspension dated April
25, 1984. On September 20, 1984, when respondent had already resigned, complainant sent a
demand letter to San Juan requiring him to restitute such amount of P9,351.15. Since he failed to
pay the amount demanded, a complaint for estafa was lodged against him before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal. San Juan resigned and sought the assistance of respondent in the preparation of
his counteraffidavit. Respondent prepared San Juan's counteraffidavit and signed it. San Juan then
submitted his counteraffidavit to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent betrayed the complainant confidences in violation of the Code.
RULING:
YES. Respondent assisted Roberto San Juan in the preparation of the counter-affidavit,
submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of estafa filed against San Juan by LFC As a
matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the San Juan counter-affidavit he helped prepare.
It is also a fact that the respondent investigated this same charge of estafa while he was still the
lawyer of the complainant and San Juan still likewise an employee of LFC. Respondent tried to
extricate himself from his predicament by testifying that the counteraffidavit was prepared by a
lawyer-friend, Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez, who had his name typed on it; that after reading it, he
called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature thereon. It is submitted that,
apart from being a mere afterthought, respondent's explanation is incredible.
Respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his former client. An attorney
owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the
relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit him
afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that
the case is distinct from and independent of the former case. He is suspended from the practice for
6 months.
Page 54 of 117
FERDINAND A. SAMSON v. ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA

A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013, Bersamin, J.
An attorney who represents and serves conflicting interests may be suspended from the
practice of law, or even disbarred when circumstances so warrant.
FACTS:
Ferdinand Samson and his relatives were victims of a pyramiding scam perpetrated by ICS
Corporation, led by Emilia Sison. Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent them in the criminal
prosecution of Sison and her group. Atty. Era called Samson and his relatives to discuss the
possibility of an amicable settlement. They acceded because of the guarantee of the turnover of a
certain property located in Antipolo. A deed of assignment was issued and later, Samson and his
relatives demanded from Atty. Era that they be given instead a deed of absolute sale to enable them
to liquidate the property among themselves. Atty. Era, after giving the deeds, told them that
whether or not the title of the property had been encumbered or free from lien or defect would no
longer be his responsibility. When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the
property, they were dismayed to learn that they it was no longer registered under the name of ICS
Corporation. Samson wrote Atty. Era about the issue but they did not hear from Atty. Era at all.
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not appear for Samson and his group. However, they
learned that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her
other criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC in Quezon City involving the same pyramiding
scam.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Era is guilty of representing conflicting interest
RULING:
YES. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a
lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. The termination of the
attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the clients confidence once
given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the
severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former
client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer
disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this regard,
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity
to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." Atty.
Eras contention that the lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson and his group entered into
the compromise settlement with Sison on April 23, 2002 was unwarranted. The lawyer-client
relationship did not terminate as of then, for the fact remained that he still needed to oversee the
implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with the criminal cases until they were
dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court.
The protection given to the client is perpetual and even survives the death of the client. In
the absence of the express consent from Samson after full disclosure of the conflict of interest,
Page 55 of 117
therefore, Atty. Era should have declined or advice Sison to get another lawyer. Suspended for 2
years.
FE A. YLAYA v. ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT

Adm. Case No. 6475, January 30, 2013, Brion, J.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest
level of trust and confidence.
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that she and her husband are the registered owners of 2 parcels of
land. Prior to the acquisition of these properties, the land was already the subject of expropriation
proceedings. The RTC already fixed the price and issued an order for the City Government to
deposit P6,000,000.00 as just compensation. The respondent represented the complainants in the
expropriation case. The complainant alleged that the respondent convinced them to sign a
"preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the property, but he left blank the space for the name of
the buyer and for the amount. The respondent then fraudulently converted it into a Deed of
Absolute Sale selling the subject property to Sps. So for P200,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent violated of the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING:
YES. Respondent is liable under Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting interests
without the written consent of all concerned, particularly the complainant. It was shown that the
respondent retained clients who had close dealings with each other. The respondent admits to
acting as legal counsel for Cirilo Arellano, the spouses Ylaya and Reynold at one point during Civil
Case No. 2902. Subsequently, he represented only Reynold in the same proceedings, asserting
Reynolds ownership over the property against all other claims, including that of the spouses Ylaya.
There is no written consent from any of the parties involved. Respondent retained Reynold as his
client and actively opposed the interests of his former client, the complainant.
The respondent admits to losing certificates of land titles that were entrusted to his care by
Reynold. He is still liable under Canon 16 because he failed to exercise due diligence in caring for
his clients properties. He also violated Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted
to him. Despite the respondents admission that he represented the complainant and her late
husband in Civil Case No. 2902 and that he purportedly filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in
their behalf, the records show that he never filed such a motion for the spouses Ylaya. The
complainant herself states that she and her late husband were forced to file the Motion for Leave to
Intervene on their own behalf. Suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
CANON 18
BIOMIE SARENAS-OCHAGABIA v. ATTY. BALMES L. OCAMPOS
Page 56 of 117
A.C. No. 4401, January 29, 2004, Carpio-Morales, J.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the
latters interest with utmost diligence.
FACTS:
Biomie Sarenas-Ochagabia and her aunts engaged the legal services of Atty. Balmes L.
Ocampos in a civil case for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land. An adverse
decision was rendered. Atty. Ocampos filed a notice of appeal. The CA gave the plaintiffs-appellants
45 days from notice to file their brief but before the lapse of the period, their counsel Atty. Ocampos,
upon motion, was granted a 90-day extension. The extended period lapsed without appellants brief
being filed. The CA dismissed the appeal. The dismissal of the appeal was not challenged. This
spawned the present complaint against Atty. Ocampos.
In his defense, he claimed that he merely agreed to handle the case gratis et amore upon the
request of a friend. He appeared only when the defendants were already presenting their evidence.
When the decision was promulgated, the principal counsel, Atty. Placidtrank Osorio, was out of
town, hence, he was requested by the plaintiffs to appeal the decision. He asked for extension due to
pressure of work and gastrointestinal illness, and that he had in fact made arrangements with
herein complainant to ask Atty. Osorio to, in his stead, prepare the brief.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be held liable for his failure to file an appellants brief
RULING:
YES. By failing to file appellants brief, respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. That respondent accepted to represent complainant et al. gratis et
amore does not justify his failure to file appellants brief. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves full
attention, diligence, skill, and competence regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it
for a fee or for free. A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law and expects his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
Respondents claim that he conferred with complainant to request Atty. Osorio to draft and
file the appellants brief does not persuade, especially given his filing of a motion of extension of
time to file brief upon the grounds therein stated, without him mentioning that Atty. Osorio was
going to be the one to file it. Until his final release from the professional relationship with a client, a
counsel of record is under obligation to protect the clients interest. If a party has a counsel of
record, a court does not recognize any other representation on behalf thereof unless it is in
collaboration with such counsel of record or until a formal substitution of counsel is effected. Since
respondent had not then withdrawn as counsel as he filed a motion for extension of time to file
brief, he was under obligation to discharge his duty. Owing to respondents advanced age (73), he is
suspended for 3 months.
SPOUSES ARCING AND CRESING BAUTISTA v. ATTY. ARTURO CEFRA

A.C. No. 5530, 28 January 2013, Brion, J.
Page 57 of 117
Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free.
FACTS:
Spouses Bautista engaged the services of Atty. Cefra to represent them in a civil case. They
lost the case because of Atty. Cefras negligence. Atty. Cefra only presented testimonial evidence and
disregarded 2 orders of the RTC directing him to submit a formal offer of documentary exhibits.
Also, Atty. Cefra belatedly submitted the formal offer of documentary exhibits after the
complainants had been declared to have waived their right to make a submission. Atty. Cefra did
not file a motion or appeal and neither did he file any other remedial pleading to contest the RTCs
decision rendered against them. The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal
of the complaint because there is no evidence to warrant disciplinary action, since the complaint
was filed because the spouses thought they lost the case.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Cefra violated Canon 18
RULING:
YES. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence." It further states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In addition, a
lawyer has the corresponding duty to keep the client informed of the status of his case. Atty. Cefra
failed to live up to these standards. He did not deny the complainants allegations and impliedly
admitted his actions in the proceedings. He was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
FELIPE C. DAGALA v. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR. AND ATTY. AMADO T. ADQUILEN
A.C. No. 5044, 2 December 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
A retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and diligence and not leave
the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty. He is obliged to attend scheduled hearings or
conferences, prepare and file the required pleadings, prosecute the handled cases with reasonable
dispatch, and urge their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to
do so.
FACTS:
Atty. Quesada was engaged by the complainant to represent him in a labor case for recovery
of backwages. However, the case was dismissed due to the absence of Atty. Quesada after due
notice. The complainants through another counsel sent letters to Atty. Quesada informing him of
the possibility of the filing of an administrative case against him and that the complainants are open
to a settlement. During the meeting, Atty. Quesada undertook to compensate the damage sustained
by the complainants. Atty. Quesada reneged on his promise which prompted the filing of the
complaint against him.
Page 58 of 117
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Quesada violated Canon 18
RULING:
YES. Atty, Quesada failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainants case
by his failure to justify his absence on the 2 hearings in the NLRC despite due notice. This shows his
inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his clients cause in violation of Canon 17 and
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. He is suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
REX POLINAR DAGOHOY v. ATTY. ARTEMIO V. SAN JUAN

A.C. No. 7944, 3 June 2013, Brion, J.
A lawyer who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.
FACTS:
Atty. San Juan was administratively charged for gross negligence, in connection with the
dismissal of his clients appeal filed before the Court of Appeals. The case was dismissed due to the
failure of Atty. San Juan to file the appellants brief. Because of such dismissal, the client was
charged with and convicted of theft. The complainant also accused Atty. San Juan of being
untruthful in dealing with him because Atty. San Juan failed to inform him of the real status of the
appeal and did not disclose the real reason for its dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. San Juan was negligent
RULING:
YES. Atty. San Juans negligence in handling his clients appeal was duly established by the
records and by his own admission. We cannot accept as an excuse the alleged lapse committed by
his client in failing to provide him a copy of the case records. The securing of a copy of the case
records was within Atty. San Juans control and is a task that the lawyer undertakes. The
preparation and the filing of the appellants brief are matters of procedure that fully falls within his
control and responsibility. When the case was dismissed, he did not disclose the real reason for the
dismissal of the appeal. Neither did he file a motion for reconsideration. Suspended from the
practice of law for a period of 1 year.
MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER v. ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE

A.C. No. 9532, 8 October 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to
devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.
Page 59 of 117
FACTS:
Atty. Gagate was hired by Pitcher to settle the affairs of her deceased husband with regard
to his shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc. They met with Bantegui, the major stockholder of
Consulting Edge to discuss the settlement of the deceaseds interest in the company. Bantegui
refused to settle with them and asked them to leave the office, refusing to give them a duplicate key.
Atty. Gagate had the locks of the office changed, which resulted to Bantegui to file a case of grave
coercion. Warrants of arrest were issued against them and Atty. Gagate advised Pitcher to go into
hiding until he has filed all the necessary motions in court. Atty. Gagate abandoned the grave
coercion case and stopped communicating with Pitcher. Pitcher filed an administrative case against
Atty. Gagate.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Gagate should be held administratively liable
RULING:
YES. A lawyer is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives.
A lawyers duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to
his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any
court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required
pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination
even without prodding from the client or the court. Hence, considering respondents gross and
inexcusable neglect by leaving his client totally unrepresented in a criminal case, it cannot be
doubted that he violated Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code.
Atty. Gagate is suspended from the practice of law for a period of 3 years.
HENRY SAMONTE v. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA

A.C. No. 3452, 23 June 2014, Bersamin, J.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest,
trustworthy, and imbued with integrity.
FACTS:
Samonte engaged Atty. Abellana to represent him in a civil case. Samonte filed an
administrative case against Atty. Abellana for serious misconduct. Atty. Abellana superimposed the
0 on 4 to change the date of filing, but Atty. Abellana justified that by claiming that he had done
so only because the complainant had not given to him the correct amount of filing fees required.
Secondly, Atty. Abellana filed a spurious document by making it appear as one actually filed in court
by using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed because the rubber stamp imprint on his
document was different from that of the official rubber stamp of the trial court. He defended himself
by stating that court personnel accepted papers filed in the court without necessarily using the
official rubber stamp of the court.
ISSUE:
Page 60 of 117
Whether Atty. Abellana violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
YES. The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and
the Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client's case, were
unmitigated. But the Court must not close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually finished
presenting his client's case; and that the latter initiated the termination of Atty. Abellana's
engagement as his counsel only after their relationship had been tainted with mistrust.
JULIAN PENILLA v. ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR.

A.C. No. 9149, 4 September 2013, Villarama, Jr., J.
A lawyers actions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client.
FACTS:
Atty. Alcid was engaged by Penilla to file a case for breach of contract against Spouses Garin.
Atty. Alcid asked for a refund of Penillas payment. When the spouses failed, Atty. Alcid filed a
criminal case for estafa against the spouses. When the estafa case was dismissed, Atty. Alcid
proceeded to file a case for specific performance against the spouses for the refund of the money
plus damages before the RTC. Atty. Alcid no longer gave any updates regarding the case. Penilla
went to the Clerk of Court of Caloocan City and found out that the civil case for specific performance
was dismissed. According to Atty. Alcid, he missed Penilla, because the latter always goes to the
office when Atty. Alcid is out to attend his hearings. Penilla then filed an administrative case against
Atty. Alcid for gross misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Alcid is guilty of gross misconduct in handling the case of his client
RULING:
YES. Atty. Alcid violated Canon 18 when he filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of
the case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. After the complaint
for estafa was dismissed, respondent committed another blunder by filing a civil case for specific
performance and damages before the RTC. The complaint, having an alternative prayer for the
payment of damages, should have been filed with the MTC which has jurisdiction over Penillas
claim which amounts to only P36,000.
The errors committed by Atty. Alcid with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in the
criminal complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could have been
easily averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for complainant.
What aggravates the offense is the fact that his previous mistake in filing the estafa case did not
motivate him to be more conscientious, diligent and vigilant in handling the case of complainant.
The civil case he subsequently filed for complainant was dismissed due to what later turned out to
be a basic jurisdictional error. After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was
Page 61 of 117
plainly negligent and did not apprise Penilla of the status of both cases. His lack of professionalism
in dealing with complainant is inexcusable.
JOSEFINA CARANZA VDA. DE SALDIVAR v. ATTY. RAMON SG CABANES, JR.

A.C. No. 7749, 8 July 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
A lawyers duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases or giving
legal advice, but also representing the client before any tribunal, attending hearings, filing the
pleadings, prosecuting the cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without
waiting for the client or the court to prod him to do so.
FACTS:
Saldivar was the defendant in an unlawful detainer case and was represented by Atty.
Cabanes. Atty. CabaneS was unable to submit a pre-trial brief and attend the preliminary
conference. The MTC ruled against Saldivar. The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC, however on
appeal to the CA the MTC decision was reinstated. Atty. Cabanes received the adverse decision of
the CA, but he failed to inform Saldivar about it. Saldivar hired another counsel for the purpose of
seeking other remedies but due to Atty. Cabanes failure to turn-over the documents in the case, the
other remedies were barred.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Cabanes is guilty of gross negligence
RULING:
YES. Atty. Cabanes could have exercised ordinary diligence by inquiring from the court as to
whether the said hearing would push through, especially so since it was only tentatively set and
considering further that he was yet to confer with the opposing counsel. The fact that respondent
had an important commitment during that day hardly exculpates him from his omission since the
prudent course of action would have been for him to send a substitute counsel to appear on his
behalf.
CANON 19
SOLEDAD ARANGCO, et. al v. GLORIA BALOSO

G.R. No. L-28617, 31 January 1973, Fernando, J.
Lawyers should assure that all the learning at their command be brought to bear on the legal
questions that might be raised, or, in their opinion, could be raised, for the resolution of a higher court.
FACTS:
Vicente Abano mortgaged a parcel of land for P1,200 and his son mortgaged it again for
P1,800 to Gloria Baloso. The surviving children of Vicente brought an action to redeem the land and
deposited the amount of P1,800 with the Clerk of Court. According to Baloso, the amount to be paid
Page 62 of 117
was P2,600. The deficiency of P800 was due to the fact that at the time the amount was paid, the
children were still minors. The court cannot compel them to pay the amount in the proceedings for
redemption. The court suggested that Baloso file her claim in the guardianship proceedings. Baloso
instead appealed the decision of the court stating that the court made an error.
ISSUE:
Whether the appeal of the case was proper
RULING:
NO. There is a need for members of the Bar to temper their enthusiasm in seeking appellate
review. A lawyer should not hesitate in informing the disappointed litigant that most likely the
verdict would not be altered. Appellees had lost their father through a fatal accident, and the
mother was confined in a mental institution. Only a clear misapplication of the legal norms justifies
setting aside a decision that did not only apply settled doctrines but also did manifest full fidelity to
the laudable policy of protecting the minors. There is no such failure in the appealed judgment.
VERLEEN TRINIDAD v. ATTY. ANGELITO VILLARIN

AC No. 9310, 27 February 2013, Sereno, C.J.
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives.
FACTS:
Atty. Villarin was engaged by Prudence Realty when the decision of the HLURB became final
and executory. Atty. Villarin sent notices to the complainants to vacate the property they are
currently occupying. When his notice went unheeded, he proceeded to file an ejectment case
against them in the MTC. The complainants filed an administrative case against him since his
demand letters were issued with malice. According to Atty. Villarin, he only sent those demand
letters because upon inquiry in the HLURB, he found out that Prudence Realty never received any
summons, thus the decision of the HLURB is void.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be administratively sanctioned
RULING:
YES. As the lawyer of Prudence Realty, respondent is expected to champion the cause of his
client with fidelity. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense including the institution of an ejectment case that is recognized by our
property laws. Given that respondent knew that the aforementioned falsity totally disregarded the
HLURB Decision, he thus advances the interest of his client through means that are not in keeping
with honesty.
PATROCINIO V. AGBULOS v. ATTY. ROSELLER A. VIRAY
Page 63 of 117
AC No. 7350, 18 February 2013, Peralta, J.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the
same person who appeared before him to attest to the truth of what are stated therein.
FACTS:
Agbulos filed a complaint against Atty. Viray for allegedly notarizing a document executed
by her without her personally appearing before Atty. Viray. The document caused the transfer of a
property registered in her name to the name of Atty. Virays client. Atty. Viray admitted having
notarized the document. He was assured by said client that the document was signed by Agbulos.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Viray should be sanctioned
RULING:
YES. In notarizing the document, respondent contented himself with the presentation of a
CTC despite the Rules clear requirement of presentation of competent evidence of identity such as
an identification card with photograph and signature. With this indiscretion, respondent failed to
ascertain the genuineness of the affiants signature which turned out to be a forgery. A notary
public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same
person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of
what are stated therein.
CANON 20
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-
CADAVEDO v. VICTORINO T. LACAYA
G.R. No. 173188, 15 January 2014, Brion, J.
A lawyer should not have an additional stake in the outcome of the action which might lead
him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client.
FACTS:
Atty. Lacaya was hired by the Spouses Cadavedo to represent them in a collection suit and
annulment of a contract of sale. They agreed on a fee of P2,000. The case was resolved in favor of
the Spouses Cadavedo. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorneys fees.
Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente Cadavedo entered the portion assigned to Atty. Lacaya and
ejected them. Atty. Lacaya filed a suit for forcible entry before the MTC. Vicente and Atty. Lacaya
entered into an amicable settlement, readjusting the area. Spouses Cadavedo filed an action before
the RTC praying for the court to order the ejection of Atty. Lacaya from the one-half portion and
that the court fix the attorneys fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of the
expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.
ISSUE:
Page 64 of 117
Whether the attorneys fees consisting of one-half of the subject lot is valid
RULING:
NO. The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of P2,000.00 and
not, as asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended
complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a
contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer P2,000.00 as attorneys
fees should the case be decided in their favor.
The alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of one-half of the subject lot was not
reduced to writing prior to the start of Atty. Lacayas engagement as the spouses Cadavedos
counsel. The contingency fee of P2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the
alleged oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of the subject lot. The respondents are entitled
to 2 hectares, with the fruits previously received from the disputed one-half portion, as attorneys
fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half portion.
AUGUSTO M. AQUINO v. HON. ISMAEL P. CASABAR

G.R. No. 191470, 26 January 2015, Peralta, J.
The duty of the court is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is
also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees.
FACTS:
Atty. Angel Domingo contracted Atty. Aquino to represent him in an Agrarian Case on a
contingency basis. Atty. Aquino opposed in court the amount DAR initially valued Atty. Domingos
property. RTC increased the valuation of the property. The case was raised up to the SC but the
court still upheld the findings of the RTC. Since Atty. Domingo died while the case was pending,
Atty. Aquino informed Atty. Domingos wife of the finality of the decision but received no reply.
Atty. Aquino received a Notice of Appearance filed by Atty. Conde replacing him as counsel in the
Agrarian Case. Atty. Aquino then filed a motion for Approval of Charging Attorneys Lien and for the
Oder of Payment. The RTC denied the motion stating that it had already lost jurisdiction over the
case.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court committed a error in denying the motion to approve attorneys lien
RULING:
YES. Attorneys fees is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal
services rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful litigant
to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages. The attorneys fees being claimed by the
petitioner is the compensation for professional services rendered, and not an indemnity for
damages. Petitioner is claiming payment from private respondents for the successful outcome of
the agrarian case which he represented. Respondent cannot pass upon a proper petition to
Page 65 of 117
determine attorney's fees considering that it is already familiar with the nature and the extent of
petitioner's legal services. If we are to follow the rule against multiplicity of suits, then with more
reason that petitioner's motion should not be dismissed as the same is in effect incidental to the
main case.
A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or fraud on

the part of his client as the client against abuse on the part of his counsel. With his capital consisting
of his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he
is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to
escape payment of his just compensation.
CANON 21
CANON 22
PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION v. DE DIOS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.

G.R. No. 147010, 18 July 2003, Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
Coyukiat and Goldfinger Transport entered into a contract of sale with De Dios
Transportation Co. However, Coyukiat did not deliver the buses in good running condition. The RTC
issued a Temporary Restraining Order and granted a writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of
P11,000,000 issued by Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation. De Dios denied the allegations and
prayed for the dismissal of the case and interposed counterclaims for damages and attorneys fees.
The RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute and granted the counterclaim. The appellants
through Atty. Reyes filed their brief before the CA. Before the appellees could file their brief, Padilla
Reyes & De la Torre Law Office filed its withdrawal of appearance as counsel and on the same day
the Luis Q. U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates filed its appearance as counsel and filed a notice of
withdrawal of appeal. De Dios Transportation filed with the CA a Motion to Execute Against the
Injunction Bond. The appellants now contend that due to the withdrawal of the appeal before the
filing of the motion by appelles, the CA has already lost jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA had jurisdiction after filing of the Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal
RULING:
YES. The Withdrawal of Appeal was not filed by counsel of record for Coyukiat but a
different counsel purporting to be the newly substituted counsel for Coyukiat. This different
counsel from the counsel of record had entered her appearance as such only for the purpose of
withdrawing the appeal. Pioneer fails to disclose that neither the Entry of Appearance of new
counsel for Coyukiat nor the Withdrawal of the Appeal bore the conformity of the appellants.
Substitution of counsel is not effective without the conformity of client. Pleadings which
have the effect of withdrawing the appeal should bear the conformity of the appellant. The
Withdrawal of Appeal filed by a new counsel who substituted the counsel of record without bearing
Page 66 of 117
the conformity of Coyukiat was a mere scrap of paper. Since the Withdrawal of Appeal was
conformed to only after the filing of motion for execution of the bond, the CA still had jurisdiction
over the matter.
CZARINA T. MALVAR v. KRAFT FOOD PHILS., INC.

G.R. No. 183952, 9 September 2013, Bersamin, J.
An attorney should be compensated for the professional services rendered for the client.
FACTS:
Malvar was employed with Kraft Food Phils, Inc. and rose up the ranks to become its Vice-
President. She was sent a memo directing her to explain instances of willful violation of company
regulations. She was placed under preventive suspension then eventually was served a notice of
termination. Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal in the NLRC. The
case became final before the CA in favor of Malvar. The case was then remanded for the
computation of back wages, which were disputed by both parties. While the case was pending
before the SC, Malvar and Kraft Foods entered into a compromise agreement. Malvar then filed a
motion to dismiss the case due to the compromise agreement. The Law Firm of Dasal, Llasos and
Associates intervened in the case seeking for both Malvar and Kraft Foods to be held liable to pay
the contingent fees.
ISSUE:
Whether Malvars motion to dismiss was proper
RULING:
NO. A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the intervention of the
attorney, for the former is generally conceded to have exclusive control over the subject matter of
the litigation and may at any time, if acting in good faith, settle and adjust the cause of action out of
court before judgment, even without the attorneys intervention. It is important for the client to
show, however, that the compromise agreement does not adversely affect third persons who are
not parties to the agreement.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the
contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney
was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation
stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may intervene in the case to protect his rights. For
the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment
of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his
services had been retained by the client.
However, an attorney is entitled to just compensation for services performed at the instance
and request of his client. The attorney who has acted in good faith and honesty in representing and
serving the interests of the client should be reasonably compensated for his service.
SPOUSES GEORGE A. WARRINER AND AURORA R. WARRINER v. ATTY. RENI M. DUBLIN
Page 67 of 117
A.C. No. 5239, November 18, 2013, Del Castillo, J.
If the lawyer believes that the exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were
fabricated, then he may withdraw from the case.
FACTS:
Spouses Warriner engaged the services of Atty. Dublin in the filing of a complaint for
damages which was later dismissed for Atty. Dublins failure to submit Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence. They filed this disbarment case against the lawyer for gross negligence and
dereliction of duty. Atty. Dublin commented that the evidence presented to him were fabricated, so
he did not wish to submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, and after a heated argument
with Warriner, he did not withdraw from the case because complainants no longer visited him at
his law office and that if he withdraws, Warriner would only hire another lawyer to perpetrate his
fraudulent scheme.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Dublin violated Canon 22
RULING:
YES. Atty. Dublin deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of exhibits because he
believed that the exhibits were fabricated and was hoping that the same would be refused
admission by the RTC. This is improper. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for
good cause such as when the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct with the matter
he is handling or when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons
and rules.
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS v. QUINCIANO VAILOCES

Adm. Case No. 439, April 12, 1961, Bautista-Angelo, J.
Disbarment does not partake of a criminal proceeding. Thus, double jeopardy cannot be
availed of in disbarment proceedings against an attorney.
FACTS:
Vailoces notarized a document purporting to be a last will and testament which was later
found as a forgery by the probate court. He was charged with a criminal action for falsification of
public document and was convicted by a final judgment therefor. Later, a complaint for disbarment
was filed against him. In his comment, he invoked his right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether double jeopardy can be availed as a defense in disbarment proceedings
RULING:
Page 68 of 117
NO. Such defense can only be availed of when he is placed in the predicament of being
prosecuted for the same offense, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense necessarily included therein. Double jeopardy cannot be availed of in disbarment
proceedings against an attorney. A lawyer who was found guilty of falsification of public documents
cannot put up the defense of double jeopardy in the disbarment proceeding filed against him which
is based on the same facts as the criminal case.
MIGUEL CUENCO v. HON. MARCELO B. FERNAN

Adm. Case No. 3135, February 17, 1988, Per Curiam
Complaints for disbarment may not lie against impeachable officers of the government during
their tenure. They may only be removed from office by impeachment for and conviction of certain
offenses.
FACTS:
In his complaint for disbarment against Justice Fernan, Cuenco alleged that Justice Fernan
appeared as counsel in a civil case despite having already accepted his appointment as an Associate
Justice of the Court which enabled him to influence the outcome of the proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether a Justice of the SC may be disbarred during his incumbency
RULING:
NO. Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office only by impeachment. To
grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency,
would be to circumvent the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed
from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the
Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of impeachable officers of the
government who are required to be members of the Philippine Bar such as the the Ombudsman and
his deputies, a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections and the members of the
Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants.
SIAO ABA, MIKO LUMABAO, ALMASIS LAUBAN, AND BENJAMIN DANDA v. ATTYS. SALVADOR
DE GUZMAN, JR., WENCESLAO PEEWEE TRINIDAD, AND ANDRESITO FORNIER
A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011, Carpio, J.
In suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption
of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. The evidence required in the
suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties
are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the defendant.
FACTS:
Page 69 of 117
The complainants claim that they met former RTC Judge De Guzman who allegedly
persuaded them to file an illegal recruitment case against certain persons from whom to extort
money. They alleged that De Guzman represented to them that his group, composed of the other
respondents, were untouchable. In support of their allegations in the administrative complaint,
complainants submitted the allegedly fabricated complaint, 16 supporting documents, and other
relevant documents. De Guzman, on the other hand, pointed out that there are no details regarding
the allegations of grave and serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression, bribery, falsification of
documents, violation of lawyers oath and other administrative infractions in the administrative
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether Trinidad, et al. should be administratively disciplined
RULING:
NO. In suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. The evidence
required is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the
equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the defendant. The Joint Counter-Affidavit and
Affidavit of Complaint are spurious, not having been submitted to a prosecutor. Second, the
complainants failed to substantiate the allegations of misconduct. Third, the allegations of
complainants lack material details to prove their communication with De Guzman. Lastly, the
signatures on the alleged letter of De Guzman have material discrepancies.
BENJAMIN C. UY v. HON. RENATO S. MERCADO

AM No. R-368-MTJ, September 30, 1987, Per Curiam
Judges and lawyers may be dismissed from the service without the need of a formal
investigation if the records of the case provide a clear basis for the determination of administrative
liability and gross misconduct clearly appears thereon.
FACTS:
Former Mambabatas Pambansa Orlando C. Dulay filed a complaint for libel with the
Municipal Trial Court presided over by Judge Mercado against Benjamin Uy. The judge conducted
preliminary investigation and issued a warrant for the arrest of Uy on the same day, without
probable cause and without jurisdiction. So, Uy filed the instant disbarment case. The Court found
that considering that libel suits are often intended to harass an alleged offender, respondent judge
should have satisfied himself not only that probable cause exists, but likewise made certain that
venue is properly laid and jurisdiction legally acquired before taking cognizance of the case and
issuing the warrant of arrest. With this unjustified action, the Court is led to believe that he went
"out of his way" to accommodate and favor the then influential and powerful former Governor and
later Mambabatas Pambansa Orlando Dulay.
ISSUE:
Whether a lawyer or judge may be held liable without formal investigation
Page 70 of 117
RULING:
YES. Res Ipsa Loquitor applies to judges and lawyers. The unjustified acts of respondent
judge in the premises constitute serious misconduct or, at least, gross ignorance of the law.
HENRY SAMONTE v. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA

A.C. No. 3452, June 23, 2014, Bersamin, J.
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to

overcome the presumption of innocence.
FACTS:
Samonte filed a complaint against Atty. Abellana for several professional misconduct the
latter committed in a civil case in which he was the plaintiff. It was alleged that Atty. Abellana made
it appear that he had filed the civil case on June 10, 1988, although the complaint was actually filed
on June 14, 1988. He filed a spurious document by making it appear as one actually filed in court by
using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed because the rubber stamp imprint on his
document was different from that of the official rubber stamp of the trial court. He also admitted
being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil case. He filed the formal offer of evidence in behalf
of his client way beyond the period to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Abellanas negligence is established by the evidence presented
RULING:
YES. The lawyer resorted to outright falsification to mislead Samonte into believing that he
had already filed the complaint in court. He admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the
civil case. He filed the formal offer of evidence in behalf of his client way beyond the period to do so.
Atty. Abellana did not present any proof of his alleged filings, like certified copies of the papers
supposedly filed in court. The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana were unmitigated.
MARIANO R. CRISTOBAL v. ATTY. RONALDO E. RENTA

A.C. No. 9925, September 17, 2014, Villarama, Jr., J.
A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and is intended to cleanse the ranks of the
legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts.
FACTS:
Cristobal filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Renta for failing to file a petition for
recognition and to return the amount of P160,000 despite demand. Later, Atty. Renta submitted
Cristobals Affidavit of Desistance where the latter said that he has forgiven him.
Page 71 of 117
ISSUE:
Whether a complainants affidavit of desistance abates a disbarment proceeding
RULING:
NO. A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct
as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Atty. Renta breached
his duty to serve complainant with diligence and neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. He
violated Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
CONRADO N. QUE v. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR.

A.C. No. 7054, November 11, 2014, Per Curiam
The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is again
worthy of membership in the Bar.
FACTS:
Atty. Revilla was disbarred on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and
processes; filing of multiple actions and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort
to falsehood and deception before the courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and
fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court. He filed petitions for reinstatement on several
occasions, but all were denied by the Court. 4 years after his disbarment, he again filed a petition for
reinstatement. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll on his health;
and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five. He also pleads for clemency,
not because he intends to practice law again, but to be made whole, to recover from being
shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. He expressed his sincere repentance and deep remorse
by taking full responsibility for his misdemeanor.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Revilla should be reinstated on the ground of his failing health
RULING:
NO. The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the
lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. Whether the
applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion
of the Court. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her
conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment
and the application for reinstatement. While the Court sympathizes with the respondents
unfortunate physical condition, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established
moral reformation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy. The passage of more than 4 years is
sufficient to enable the respondent to realize his professional transgressions.
Page 72 of 117
JAIME JOVEN AND REYNALDO C. RASING v. ATTYS. PABLO R. CRUZ AND FRANKIE O.
MAGSALIN III
A.C. No. 7686, July 31, 2013, Villarama, Jr., J.
Claims anchored on speculation do not justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a

member of the Bar.
FACTS:
NLRC rendered a decision in favor of Joven and against a client of Atty. Cruz and Magsalin. A
copy of the decision was received by the lawyers on August 24. Stamped thereon was RECEIVED
AUG 24 and signed by tess. Later, the copy was found to be delivered on August 14. Joven filed a
complaint for disbarment against the lawyer, alleging that they altered the true date of receipt of
the NLRC decision with the intention of extending by 10 days the period within which to file a
motion for reconsideration. Respondents submit that complainants did not present any clear,
convincing or satisfactory proof that they induced their secretary to alter the true date of receipt.
They further argue that their reliance on their secretarys actual receipt of the subject NLRC
decision was justified.
ISSUE:
Whether the post office certification establishes the liability of Atty. Cruz and Magsalin
RULING:
NO. Complainants failed to prove respondents administrative liability. Granting that the
certification of the post office of the actual date of receipt of the subject NLRC decision has prima
facie credence, it is not sufficient to hold respondents administratively liable. Clearly, such claim is
merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and not backed by any clear preponderant evidence
necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN v. PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS, et. al.

G.R. No. 194578, February 13, 2013, Carpio, J.
A lawyer who prematurely discloses the pendency of a disbarment proceeding is guilty of

contempt.
FACTS:
This is a petition for contempt filed by Atty. Fortun, the lawyer of Ampatuan in the
Maguindanao Massacre case, against Atty. Quinsayas and others. Atty. Fortun alleged that Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint against him in
violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.
The filing of the disbarment complaint had been published and was televised by respondent media
groups. He alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint against him exposed this
Court and its investigators to outside influence and public interference.
Page 73 of 117
ISSUE:
Whether Atty Quinsayas violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings
RULING:
YES. Atty. Quinsayas is bound by the Rules of Court both as a complainant in the disbarment
case and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, he is familiar with the confidential
nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, he
disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint to members of the media which act constitutes
contempt of court. Premature disclosure by publication of the filing and pendency of disbarment
proceedings is a violation of the confidentiality rule.
NOTARIAL PRACTICE (A.M. NO. 02-8-13-SC, AS AMENDED)
CHARLES B. BAYLON v. ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO

A.C. No. 6962, June 25, 2008, Quisumbing, J.
A notary public shall exercise utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person
appearing before him.
Facts:
Charles Baylon filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Almo charging the
respondent with fraud and deceit for notarizing a forged Special Power of Attorney. He averred that
while he was abroad, his wife forged an SPA authorizing her to mortgage his real property to his
prejudice. In his answer, Atty. Almo admitted notarizing the SPA, but he argued that only notarized
the SPA when the wife came back to his office together with a person whom she introduced to him
as her husband who presented to him a Community Tax Certificate bearing the name Charles
Baylon.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Almo is justified in relying on the Community Tax Certificate presented to
him
Ruling:
NO. The notary public should exercise utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of
the person who represented himself and was represented to be the affiant on the document. He
should not have relied on the Community Tax Certificate presented by the said impostor in view of
the ease with which community tax certificates are obtained these days. Recognizing the
established unreliability of a community tax certificate in proving the identity of a person who
wishes to have his document notarized, we did not include it in the list of competent evidence of
identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons.
PASTOR EDWIN VILLARIN, PACIANO DE VEYRA, SR., AND BARTOLOME EVAROLO, SR. v. ATTY.
RESTITUTO SABATE, JR.
Page 74 of 117
A.C. No. 3324, February 09, 2000, Buena, J.
The function of a notary public would be defeated if the notary public were one of the
signatories to the instrument. For then, he would be interested in sustaining the validity thereof as it
directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position,
and the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted. Besides,
he cannot swear that he appeared before himself as Notary Public.
FACTS:
Atty. Sabate prepared and notarized a Motion to Dismiss filed by Paterno Diaz and 4 others
in the SEC Case instituted by Villarin and others. In the verification of the said motion, the signature
of Diaz was allegedly not his, and with regard to the signature of 2 others, Atty. Sabate signed for his
clients as manifested by the word "By." Villarin then filed this administrative complaint for not
having observed honesty in the performance of his duties as notary public for making it appear that
certain persons participated in the said act when in fact they did not do so.
ISSUE:
Whether a notary public can sign for his clients in a document he prepared and notarized
RULING:
NO. The acts of affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts
they have personal knowledge of and swore to the same personally and not through any
representative.
ARTURO L. SICAT v. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR.

A.C. NO. 5864, April 15, 2005, Per Curiam
The act of a lawyer notarizing a Special Power of Attorney knowing that the person who
allegedly executed it is dead is a serious breach of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1.
FACTS:
Sicat charged Atty. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, with violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud in notarizing a Special Power of Attorney. The
said SPA was purportedly executed by one Benitez of J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical
Management with which the Municipality of Cainta had a construction contract. The SPA was
notarized long after Benitez had died. Further, by virtue of the SPA, a check due to the company was
encashed by one Goco for outputs not delivered. In his defense, Atty. Ariola explained that Benitez
had already signed the SPA before he died.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Ariola shall be disbarred for notarizing the subject SPA
RULING:
Page 75 of 117
YES. As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Atty. Ariola should have been aware of his
responsibility as a notary public and also as a public officer. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring
parties in the construction project could not have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 to
the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the Administrator.
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA AND MAXIMO A. GLINDO v. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA

A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011, Carpio, J.
A notarized extrajudicial dissolution of marriage is void and has no legal effect for being
against public policy. A notary public is responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could
not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his
staff.
FACTS:
Espinosa and his wife sought Atty. Omaas legal advice on whether they could legally live
separately and dissolve their marriage. Omaa notarized a document entitled "Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay." Espinosa filed a complaint for disbarment against the lawyer. Omaa denied
notarizing the contract. She also claimed that it was her staff who notarized the contract but then
later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it.
ISSUE:
Whether Omaa violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility
RULING:
YES. A notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership.
Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed
Omaa's negligence in doing her notarial duties. In notarizing a void document, Omaa violated
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He knew fully well that the
"Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy.
FIDEL D. AQUINO v. ATTY. OSCAR MANESE

A.C. No. 4958. April 3, 2003, Carpio-Morales, J.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are
the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein.
FACTS:
Aquino charged Atty. Manese with falsification of public document for preparing and
notarizing a Deed of Absolute Sale of land which could not have been executed and sworn to by one
Lilia Cardona, she having died 4 years earlier. Atty. Manese asserted that he is not expected to
personally know every person who goes to him for notarization of documents.
Page 76 of 117
ISSUE:
Whether a notary public is expected to know the persons who appeared before him
RULING:
YES. The duties of a notary public include the ascertainment that the persons who signed
the document are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him. The
purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature
of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act and deed.
ELSA L. MONDEJAR v. ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA

A.C. Nos. 5907 and 5942, July 21, 2006, Carpio-Morales, J.
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, thus
rendering the document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.
FACTS:
Mondejar filed a case of violation of Anti-Dummy Law against Marilyn Corido and Yoshimi
Nakayama. As a counter-affidavit, Corido and Yoshimi submitted a document which was
acknowledged before Atty. Rubia on January 9, 2001 but appearing to have been entered into his
notarial register for 2002. Contending that the January 9, 2001 document did not exist before she
filed the criminal charge in 2002, Mondejar filed administrative complaint against Atty. Rubia as
well as criminal complaints for falsification of public document and use of falsified public document
also against Atty. Rubia, together with Marilyn, Nakayama, and the witnesses to the document Mona
Liza Galvez and John Doe. The case of falsification of document was due to the fact that Atty. Rubia
allegedly forged the signature of the vendor in the Deed of Sale of a parcel of land on which Marilyn
was the vendee. The complainant died and the case was pursued by her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Rubia violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
YES. Atty. Rubia stated in the acknowledgment portion thereof that the parties personally
appeared before her "on this 9th day of January, 2001." But respondents PTR Number is indicated
as being issued on January 3, 2002. The Counter Affidavit of Marilyn Carido, which Atty. Rubia
notarized was notarized on November 6, 2002. This counter affidavit also indicates respondent's
PTR Number as 4574844 issued on January 3, 2002. This is the same Number indicated in the
Memorandum of a Joint Venture Agreement notarized on January 9, 2001. But then a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 28 March 2001 between one Leandro Prosia and Jocelyn Canoy, also notarized
by respondent, indicates that her PTR for the year 2001 was PTR No. 4320009.
Page 77 of 117
All of the foregoing show that the respondent made an untruthful declaration in a public
document when she attested that the Memorandum of a Joint Venture Agreement was
acknowledged before her on 09 January 2001 when evidence clearly shows otherwise.
JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM v. ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA
A.C. No. 7036, June 29, 2009, Puno, J.
Notarizing documents with an expired commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Since the public is deceived into believing that he has been duly
commissioned, it also amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath
proscribes.
FACTS:
This administrative case stemmed from a letter addressed to this court filed by Judge Lily as
Executive Judge of RTC of Mudsayap, Cotabato alleging that Atty. Quintana is performing notarial
functions in Midsayap Cotabato which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court that issued his notarial commission as well as for allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his
absence.
Under Sec. 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Quintana could not
extend his notarial acts beyond Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao because Midsayap,
Cotabato is not part of Cotabato City or the Province of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of the
Province of Cotabato. The City within the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan City, and not Cotabato
City.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
RULING:
YES. Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he committed the following acts: (1) he notarized documents
outside the area of his commission as a notary public; (2) he performed notarial acts with an
expired commission; (3) he let his wife notarize documents in his absence; and (4) he notarized a
document where one of the signatories therein was already dead at that time.
Notarizing documents without the presence of the signatory to the document is a violation
of Sec. 2(b)(1), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the lawyers oath which unconditionally requires lawyers not to do or declare
any falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana is personally accountable for the documents that he admitted
were signed by his wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by passing the blame to his wife.
Page 78 of 117
ADELAIDA MENESES (deceased), substituted by her heir MARILYN M. CARBONEL-GARCIA,

ROSARIO G. VENTUROZO
G.R. No. 172196, October 19, 2011, Peralta, J.
The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is
beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A defective notarization will strip the document of
its public character and reduce it to a private instrument.
FACTS:
Rosario Venturozo filed a complaint against Adelaida Meneses alleging that she is the owner
of an untitled coconut land in Pangasinan as evidenced by a Deed of Absoulute Sale executed
between her and spouses de Guzman which in turn purchased the same from Meneses. Meneses
contended that she never signed any Deed of Sale and that the same was executed by spouses de
Guzman in forgery. She also alleged that she never appeared before any notary public and she did
not obtain a residence certificate. The trial court ruled in favor of Meneses but such decision was
reversed by the CA which ruled that the executed notarized Deed of Sale has in its favor the
presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the document should be upheld.
ISSUE:
Whether the notarized Deed of Absoulute Sale complied with the formalities required by
law
RULING:
NO. In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, the Notary Public signed his name as
one of the two witnesses to the execution of the said deed; hence, there was actually only one
witness thereto when the law requires two witnesses thereof. Moreover, the residence certificate
was issued to petitioner and then it was given to the Notary Public the day after the execution of the
deed of sale and notarization; hence, the number of petitioners residence certificate and the date of
issuance thereof was written on the Deed of Absolute Sale by the Notary Public on June 21, 1966,
after the execution and notarization of the said deed on June 20, 1966. Considering the defect in the
notarization, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 cannot be considered a public
document, but only a private document, and the evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based
on preponderance of evidence.
In regard to the genuineness of petitioners signature appearing on the Deed of Absolute

Sale dated June 20, 1966, the Court agrees with the trial court that her signature therein is very
much different from her specimen signatures and those appearing in the pleadings of other cases
filed against her, even considering the difference of 17 years when the specimen signatures were
made.
ZENAIDA B. GONZALES v. ATTY. NARCISO PADIERNOS
Page 79 of 117
A.C. No. 6713, December 8, 2008, Brion, J.
A notarial document is entitled to full faith and credit. Notaries public must comply with the
formalities intended to ensure the integrity of the notarized document and the acts it embodies.
FACTS:
Gonzales alleged that Atty. Padiernos notarized 3 documents on three separate occasions which documents were pu
to be the same person who executed the same an acknowledged to him that the same is her own
free act and deed. Gonzales claimed that she never appeared before Atty. Padiernos on the dates the
documents were notarized because she was then in the United States. When she amended her
complaint, Gonzales charged Atty. Padiernos with gross negligence and failure to exercise the care
required by law in the performance of his duties as notary publing resulting in the loss of her
property. She prayed for the revocation of Atty. Padiernoss notarial commission and suspension
from the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Padiernos violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission
RULING:
YES. The respondent violated rules when he notarized the 3 documents. The respondent did
not know the complainant personally, yet he did not require proof of identity from the person who
appeared before him and executed and authenticated the 3 documents. Had the respondent done so,
the fraudulent transfer of complainant's property could have been prevented. Through his
negligence, the respondent eroded the complainants and the publics confidence in
the notarial system; he brought disrepute to the system.
BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE v. ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR.
A.C. No. 9514, April 10, 2013, Villarama, J.
A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person
before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the
notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the
instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the
notary public as to such instrument or document.
FACTS:
Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn

Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla,
Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to perform the
notarial act per Section 3( c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which states that a
notary public is disqualified to perform notarial acts if he is a spouse, common-law partner,
ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil
degree. Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in the
complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification cards.
Page 80 of 117
ISSUE:
(1) Whether Atty. Revilla violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
(2) Whether or not he is liable for not requiring the affiants to present a valid identification
card.
RULING:
(1) YES. Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV which
disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the notarial act, since two
of the affiants or principals are his relatives within the 4th civil degree of affinity.
(2) NO. On the charge of not requiring the affiants to present a valid I.D., Atty. Revilla Jr.
cannot be held liable. If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to
show their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under
Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
MERCEDITA DE JESUS v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT

A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014, Sereno, J.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in

evidence without further proof of its authenticity.
FACTS:
De Jesus alleged that Atty. Sanchez-Malit drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a
public market stall falsely named her as the registered owner prompting the mortgagee to sue her
for perjury and for collection of sum of money. She claimed that respondent was aware that the
market stall was government-owned. Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts
that caused complainant legal problems.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution, unanimously adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Sanchex-Malit committed misconduct
RULING:
YES. Respondent knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall.
That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not make
respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latters liability for tolerating a wrongful
act. Respondents conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Page 81 of 117
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the
very same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. In acknowledging that the parties
personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.01 and her oath as a
lawyer. The blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties warrants the less severe
punishment of suspension from the practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be
commissioned as a notary public.
IMELDA CATO GADDI v. ATTY. LOPE M. VELASCO

A.C. No. 8637, September 15, 2014, Carpio, J.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the signatory to the document is in the
notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization, and personally known to the notary public
or otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity.
FACTS:
According to Imelda Gaddi, she was the Operations and Accounting Manager of the Bert
Lozada Swimming School (BLSS) when she broached the idea of opening a branch of BLSS in
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya to Angelo Lozada, the Chief Operations Officer of BLSS. Believing that Angelo
agreed, Gaddi opened a BLSS in Solano. However, in April 2010, Angelo informed the management
that he did not authorize a BLSS in Solano. Upon Angelos complaint, the police officers
apprehended the swimming instructors of BLSS in Solano and he subsequently filed a complaint
against Gaddi using her handwritten admission that BLSS in Solano was unauthorized and such
admission was notarized by Atty. Velasco.
Thus, Gaddi filed the present complaint against Velasco for violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, specifically Rule IV, Section 2 (b) and Rule VI, Section 3. Gaddi denied that she
personally appeared before Velasco to have her handwritten admission notarized. She alleged that
she did not consent to its notarization nor did she personally know him, give any competent
evidence of identity or sign the notarial register.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Velasco violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
RULING:
YES. If the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will, a notary public is mandated to
refuse to perform a notarial act. A notary public is also prohibited from affixing an official signature
or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete.
Contrary to Velascos claim that Gaddi appeared before him and presented two
identification cards as proof of her identity, the notarial certificate, in rubber stamp, itself indicates
unfilled spaces which establish that Velasco had been remiss in his duty of ascertaining the identity
of the signatory to the document. Velasco did not comply with the basic function of a notary public,
that is, to require the presence of Gaddi; otherwise, he could have ascertained that the handwritten
admission was executed involuntarily. Furthermore, Velasco affixed his signature in an incomplete
Page 82 of 117
notarial certificate. Velasco did not even present his notarial register to rebut Gaddis allegations. It
is presumed that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
EFIGENIA M. TENOSO v. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ
A.C. No. 8384, April 11, 2013, Leonen, J.
Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest.
FACTS:
Etigenia M. Tenoso filed a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez alleging that the latter
was engaged in practice as a notary public in Cordon, lsabela, without having been properly
commissioned by the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela. To support her allegations, Tenoso presented
evidence supporting her allegation that respondent had notarized various documents in Cordon,
Isabela from 2006 to 2008 and that respondent's name does not appear on the list of notaries
public commissioned by the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to
2008.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Echenez violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
Ruling:
YES. In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, Atty. Echenez exposed party-litigants,

courts, other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public
instruments. As noted by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed acts of deceit and
falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Evidently, respondent's conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers.
SEVERO SALES, ESPERANZA SALES BERMUDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

LEONILO GONZALES
G.R. No. L-40145 July 29, 1992 J. ROMERO
A notarial acknowledgment vests upon the document the presumption of regularity unless it is
impugned by strong, complete and conclusive proof.
FACTS:
Page 83 of 117
Sales owned an unregistered parcel of land in Pangasinan in which he mortgaged said

property to Faustina and Jose Agpoon to secure payment of a loan. Sales donated part of the same
property to his daughter Esperanza. Faustina Agpoon later filed a case against Sales thus the
mortgaged proeperty of Sales was set for foreclosure. Sales asked Ernesto Gonzales to pay his
indebtedness to the Agpoons. Gonzales agreed and asked Sales and his wife to sign a document
transferring the mortgage to him. The Sales claims they did not get the document. The Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan registered a Deed of Sale between Sales and Gonzales. Later on, a photostat
copy of said deed appearing to be signed by Sales and his wife before ex-officio Notary Public
Arturo Malazo was handed to him and it stated that he sold the land to Leonilo, the son of Ernesto.
In the Intestate Estate Proceedings of Ernesto, the land in question was claimed by Leonilo. Leonilo
filed an action for illegal detainer against Sales. Before trial, Sales and his daughter filed a case for
annulment of the dead of sale between Sales and Gonzales on the ground of fraud. thus the illegal
detainer case was suspended. The CFI later on found no fraud as it found the Deed of Sales was
valid and that the assertion of the wives that it was a fraud cannot defeat the fact that the Notary
Public ex-offico and the Justice of Peace testified to its execution and validity. The CA affirmed the
lower courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the Deed of Sale is valid
RULING:
YES. Although Sales did not go to school and knew only how to sign his name, he and his
wife had previously entered into contracts written in English: first, when Sales mortgaged his
property to Faustina P. Agpoon and second, when he donated a portion of the property involved to
his daughter, petitioner Esperanza Sales Bermudez. The court below also noted the fact that the
signatures of the Sales spouses in the deed of sale showed the "striking features of the signatures of
intelligent" individuals. Coupled with this is the fact that in court, the Sales spouses themselves
admitted that the signatures on the deed of sale "looked like" their signatures.
The deed of sale contains a statement that its executors were known to the notary public to
be the persons who executed the instrument; that they were "informed by me (notary public) of the
contents thereof" and that they acknowledged to the notary public that the instrument was freely
and voluntarily executed. When he testified at the hearing, notary public Arturo Malazo stated, "I
know Mr. Severo Sales and he appeared before me when I notarized that document." Later, he
added that "the document speaks for itself and the witnesses were there and those were the
persons present" (sic). The stark denial of the petitioners, specially Sales, that he executed the deed
of sale pales in the face of Malazo's testimony because the testimony of the notary public enjoys
greater credence than that of an ordinary witness.
The extrinsic validity of the deed of sale is not affected by the fact that while the property
subject thereof is located in Bugallon, Pangasinan where the vendors also resided, the document
was executed in San Miguel, Tarlac. What is important under the Notarial Law is that the notary
public concerned has authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial
jurisdiction. A notarial acknowledgment attaches full faith and credit to the document concerned.
It also vests upon the document the presumption of regularity unless it is impugned by strong,
complete and conclusive proof. Such kind of proof has not been presented by the petitioners.
Page 84 of 117
JUDICIAL ETHICS
PEDRO E. GAHOL v.HON. FRANCISCO MAT. RIODIQUE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch III, Court of First Instance of Batangas, and CORAZON A. CANIZA
G.R. No. L-40415 June 27, 1975, Barredo, J.
We have to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or

prejudice before we can brand him of violating his sworn duty.
FACTS:
Pedro E. Gahol and Corazon A. Caiza were rival candidates for the mayorship. Gahol was
declared elected but Caiza questioned the result. The respondent court upheld the protest and
declared Caiza duly elected.
The court refused to execute the judgment as it was deemed premature since an appeal was
made by Gahol. However, Caizas motion was reinstated because of failure to appear by Gahols
counsel. Gahol filed an administrative complaint against respondent judge charging him with
serious misconduct, inefficiency, gross and manifest partiality and knowingly rendering and issuing
an unjust decision followed by a similarly unjust interlocutory order. A "Motion for Disqualification
or Voluntary Inhibition" of respondent judge was filed by Gahol but was denied by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether the motion for disqualification of Judge Riodique should be dismissed
RULING:
YES. Most of the charges refer to errors supposedly committed by respondent judge in
making finding of fact and of law in his decision. The proper remedy in this respect is appeal, for
only after the appellate court holds in a final judgment that a trial judge's alleged errors were
committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be
levelled against a trial judge and thus warrant his being made to desist from further acting in the
case. And it is only when there are extrinsic circumstances or facts indicative of serious malfeasance
or misfeasance in the rendering of a questioned order or decision, may such disqualification be
perhaps justified. Any other rule would obviously lay the normal course of judicial proceedings in
the trial courts open to continuous and repeated derailments in order to give way to the
investigation of even the most groundless charge, which after all can be adequately taken up on
appeal.
LUCILA TAN v. Judge MAXWELL S. ROSETE
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8, 2004, Puno, J.
Page 85 of 117
The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the peoples confidence in the
judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the
members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are
expected to possess.
FACTS:
Before the cases were decided, Judge Rosete allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to
Tan. The staff member told complainant Tan that Judge Rosete was asking for P150,000.00 in
exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judges decision in
the criminal cases, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told
that Judge Rosete would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount
demanded. Complainant Tan however, did not accede to respondents demand because she
believed that she had a very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were
eventually dismissed by respondent judge.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Judges act constitutes misconduct
RULING:
YES. Respondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show
copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond
office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct. They constitute gross misconduct which is
punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court
ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008, Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS:
Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of demeaning, humilating, and berating
him during a hearing of a case where Atty. Mane was counsel for the plaintiff. During the
proceedings, Judge Belen asked Atty. Mane about the latters law school. When Atty. Mane
answered that he came from Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), Belen told him: Then youre
not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this,
not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are
created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form and
substance.
ISSUE:
Page 86 of 117
Whether the statements made by Judge Belen constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge
RULING:
YES. An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By
hurdling the Bar Examinations which the Court administers, taking of the Lawyers oath, and
signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions
and duties as an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to
determine the fitness of a lawyer primarily on his alma mater is an engagement in an argumentum
ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not the person of the counsel. If
Judge Belen felt that his integrity and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he
directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds,
however, when he engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse. The Court reminded
members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they
ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court.
CONSTANTE PIMENTEL v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINO C. SALANGA

G.R. No. L-27934 September 18, 1967, Sanchez, J.
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made
of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a
litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination.
FACTS:
Atty. Pimentel is counsel of record in 4 cases pending before Judge Salanga. Atty. Pimentel is
also a complainant in adminstrative case against Judge Salanga seeking for the judges suspension.
The case is still pending. Atty. Pimentel moved to disqualify Judge Salanga from the 4 pending cases
and have them transferred to another sala. Judge Salanga rejected the motion and stood his ground
that the administrative case against him is no cause for disqualification under the Rules of Court,
and that justice would be delayed if the cases were to be reassigned.
ISSUE:
Whether a judge is disqualified from acting in cases where he is administratively charged
RULING:
NO. The judge should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of
justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might
nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of
justice against him. He should exercise great care before making up his mind to act or withdraw
from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could inhibit himself where that case could
be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others
Page 87 of 117
involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the
all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to
voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned,
his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section
1, Rule 137.
VICTORIO ALERIA, JR. v. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, in his official capacity as Presiding
Judge, RTC-Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 127400, November 16, 1998, Quisumbing, J.
Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, as long as they are based on the
evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, even if found later on as erroneous, do not
prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.
FACTS:
Aleria Jr. is the accused in a criminal case for illegal possession of firearms and in a criminal
case for murder which are tried by Judge Velez. Aleria Jr. filed a petition for bail in both cases. The
Judge denied the petition as the evidence of guilt was strong. Aleria Jr. filed a Motion for
Reconsideration claiming that the Order denying bail failed to state the ground to deny the bail.
Judge Velez denied the motion for reconsideration thus Aleria Jr. filed a petition for certiorari with
inhibition and TRO. The prosecution filed a Comment averring that the trial court successfully
showed factual basis to deny the bail. The OSG filed a comment stating that the Order must
summarize the evidence submitted to give the denial of the bail. Aleria Jr. prayed for inhibition
claiming that Judge Velez already lost his impartiality or neutrality to administer justice.
ISSUE:
Whether the inhibition should be granted
RULING:
NO. The questioned Orders do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify
respondent Judge under Section 1, second paragraph of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. For such to
be a ground for disqualification, they must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source
and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.
JORDAN P. OKTUBRE v. JUDGE RAMON P. VELASCO, Municipal Trial Court, Maasin, Southern
Leyte
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1444, July 22, 2004, Per Curiam
As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the representation of the
law and of justice. From them, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law
FACTS:
Page 88 of 117
Judge Velasco stayed in the building of an Abraham Paler with the permsion of Palers wife,
DArcy. He sought to extend his stay but Darcy did not allow him to. He continued to stay in the
building by transferring to a different room. Due to Darcys refusal, Judge Velasco sent a letter to
the tenants that he is now the adminstrator of the estate of Abrahams father and co-heir of
Abraham and directed the tenants to deposit their rents to the MTC. The same judge sent a letter to
intimidate DArcy while using the MTCs letterhead. He moved out DArcys service jeep and put it
outside the building. He destroyed the padlock of Darcys room, the third and second floor entrance
to control the ingress and egress of the building. The complainant, attorney-in-fact of D Arcy, filed a
complaint against Judge Velasco with the Punong Barangay for his actions but they met no
settlement. In fact, after the hearing a police officer approached the complainant, who was served a
warrant of arrest for Robbery charge where Judge Velasco was the sole witness. When he got out,
subpoenas were served upon him for different crimes. Complainant was granted to annul the
warrant through another sala. He filed a complaint against Judge Velasco.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Velasco is guilty violating the Code of Judicial Conduct
RULING:
YES. For using his Office's letterhead and for acting on his own criminal complaints against
complainant and D'Arcy, respondent Judge violated Rules 2.03 and 3.12 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. He is liable for grave misconduct and grave abuse of authority.
Respondent Judge should know that a court's letterhead should be used only for official
correspondence. He aggravates his liability when, in his letters to the tenants, he further required
them to pay their rent at the MTC Maasin, although he was then staying at the Paler building. By
these calculated steps, respondent Judge in the words of Rule 2.03, clearly intended to "use the
prestige of his judicial office" to advance the interest of his maternal co-heirs.
Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints, respondent Judge did
not disqualify himself from the cases. He even issued a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485,
resulting in the arrest and detention of complainant. Respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12 and, by
implication Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary stages of criminal prosecution. The
situation does not fall under the instances enumerated in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, such
enumeration is not exclusive. More importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting in a
case where he is related to a party or to counsel within the sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, respectively. There is more reason to prohibit a judge from doing so in cases where he is
a party. The idea that a judge can preside over his own case is anathema to the notion of
impartiality that such was no longer included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by
Section 1 of Rule 137.
DATU INOCENCIO C. SIAWAN v. JUDGE AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056, May 21, 2001, Mendoza, J.
Page 89 of 117
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned and he should administer justice impartially and without delay.
FACTS:
Restituto C. Pedrano filed a criminal case for Usurpation of Authority against Julia Enriqua
Seco before the MCTC of Leyte presided by Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez. Pedranos counsel, Atty.
Otadoy was Inopiquezs relative, and among those who were participating in the trial was
Inopiquezs brother-in-law and father-in-law who were giving advice to Pedrano. Seco filed a
motion for inhibition of Inopiquez but the motion was denied. The case was dismissed by virtue of
Pedranos Affidavit of Desistance. But as soon as Seco filed an action for damages against Pedrano,
Inopiquez revived the criminal case by ordering the withdrawal of Pedranos Affidavit of Desistance
from the record and recalling his order of dismissal only to be dismissed again by inhibiting himself
on the ground of delicadeza. When a similar criminal complaint filed against Seco was assigned to
Inopique, the latter inhibited himself, reiterating that he is related to Atty. Otadoy.
Meanwhile, in an election case, Inopiquez did not inhibit himself as he admitted a petition
for inclusion of a voter in the voters list filed by his uncle, retired Judge Ponciano C. Inopiquez, Sr.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Inopiquez is guilty of mishandling the criminal and election cases
RULING:
YES. Inopiquez could have recused himself from the moment his disqualification was sought
by the accused Julia Enriqua Seco in Criminal Case No.594. Inopiquez hung on to the case as long as
he could until this case was filed against him. It is noteworthy that the order of respondent finally
inhibiting himself from trying Criminal Case No.584 was issued only after Datu Siawans letter-
complaint had already been drafted. It is too much of a coincidence that respondent judge's
decision to recuse himself in Criminal Case No.584 and Criminal Case No.1181 came only after the
filing of this case against him.
Although the disqualification of judges is limited only to cases where the judge is related to
counsel within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, the Rules nonetheless provide that a
judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for other just
and valid reasons. A judge should not handle a case where he might be perceived, rightly or
wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and impartiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and
promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary. In this case, the refusal of
Inopiquez to inhibit himself from the conduct of the case and his doing so only after being
threatened with an administrative case could not but create the impression that he had ulterior
motives in wanting to try the case.
In the election case, Inopiquez admits that the retired Judge Ponciano C. Inopiquez, Sr. is his
uncle. he justifies his failure to recuse himself on the ground that the petition of Ponciano C.
Inopiquez, Sr. was meritorious. Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides that no judge or judicial
officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which
Page 90 of 117
he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Similarly, Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should take no part
in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases
include, among others, proceedings where: (d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a
party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree; In every instance the
judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
Respondent judge was disqualified from hearing the petition of his uncle and it was
immaterial that the petition was meritorious. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only
a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of a judge.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 38, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan De Oro City
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660, August 25, 2005, J. Austria-Martinez
A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made
for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.
FACTS:
In the pre-trial presided by Judge Maximo Paderanga, Attorney Conchito J. Oclarit filed a
motion to approve the compromise agreement reached by parties before a barangay captain. A
tense atmosphere was created before the Court when Counsel for the defendant opposed the
motion because the defendant was placed in a disadvantageous position since the said agreement
was not accomplished before the court, while Atty. Oclarit vigorously argued that the compromise
agreement was signed by both parties. Judge Paderanga ruled in favor of the defendant. Atty. Oclarit
explained further to the court the propriety of obtaining a settlement before a barangay captain
when Judge Paderanga told him repeatedly to shut up. Atty. Oclarit requested the judge to stop
shouting at him, however Judge Paderanga issued a verbal order citing him for direct contempt and
sentencing him to serve one 1 day in prison and to pay a fine of P1,000.00. Judge Paderanga issued
a detention commitment order to the Jail Warden of City Jail in Cagayan De Oro City. The next day,
with Atty. Oclarit in Jail, the latter received a copy of the written order declaring him in direct
contempt. He was released after serving one 1 day in jail and paying the fine.
Atty. Oclarit filed a petition for certiorari before the Court which was granted and declared
void the order finding him guilty of direct contempt of court. The Court ordered the Office of Court
Administrator (OCA) to file an administrative charge against Judge Paderanga for gross misconduct
and grave abuse of authority. The OCA referred the case for investigation to Justice Magdangal M.
De Leon of the CA who ruled that the misconduct and the abuse of authority by Judge Paderanga
were not gross and grave as charged, and recommended that the latter be reprimanded for
drastically resorting to his contempt power.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Paderanga is guilty of grave abuse of authority and gross misconduct
Page 91 of 117
Ruling:
Judge Paderanga is guilty of grave abuse of authority and only of simple misconduct.
Judge Paderanga gravely abused his discretion. It was him who first shouted at Atty. Oclarit.
When the latter made an explanation, the court declared him in direct contempt. The lawyers
remarks do not justify the courts exercise of the power of contempt.
The the power to declare a person in contempt of court is an inherent power lodged in
courts of justice, used to preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings, and the
administration of justice from misbehavior and refusal to comply with court orders. Indeed, the
power of contempt is power assumed by a judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience
with the courts orderly process by exacting summary punishment. But the contempt power,
however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly. Judge Paderangas act of
citing Atty. Oclarit in contempt an unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law.
Judge Paderanga guilty of simple misconduct. Respondent may not be held guilty of gross
misconduct because the term gross connotes something out of all measure; beyond allowance;
not to be excused; flagrant; shameful. In the present case, respondents actuations, while
condemnable, are not totally inexcusable as he has also been provoked by the seemingly defiant
attitude of Oclarit.
MELENCIO P. MANANSALA III v. JUDGE FATIMA G. ASDALA, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 87,
Quezon City
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1916, May 10, 2005, Carpio-Morales, J.
The slightest breach of duty and the slightest irregularity in the conduct of court officers and
employees detract from the dignity of the courts and erode the faith of the people in the judiciary
FACTS:
Winfried Herbst is a German national and a family friend of Judge Fatima G. Asdala. The
former was arrested and detained at a police station in Kamuning, Quezon City for breaking a glass
wall in Menencio Manansalas office. Allegedly, Judge Asdala called up by telephone the Station
Commander Police Superintendent Atty. Joel Napoleon Coronel. Coronal averred that the former
introduced herself as a judge and asked for a possible amicable settlement and release of Herbst
under her custody. Atty. Coronel, however, did not accede to Asdalas request, he informing her
that Manansala was adamant in filing criminal charges against Herbst.
Herbst called Asdala asking for help to move his car left within the vicinity of Melencios
office which tires were reported being flattened by security guards of Manansalas office. Asdala
requested the sheriff assigned in her sala, Mark Cabigao to take custody of the car. Cabigao, with
two policemen proceeded to pull-out the car but Manansalas lawyer, Marcelino Bautista refused.
Manansala filed a complaint against Asdala before the Office of the Ombudsman charging
her with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which
was dismissed and referred it the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.
Thereafter, the Court referred the complaint to CA Justice Renato C. Dacudao for investigation,
Page 92 of 117
report and recommendation whose investigation revealed that Ibay is answerable for palpable
abuse of authority or plain misconduct for having called up Coronel to request for the release to her
custody of the German national Winfried Herbst; as well as in asking for the compounding or
amicable settlement of the malicious mischief case against the German national. For in making both
requests Asdala sought to bring to bear upon the precinct commander the influence of her office as
a judge.
The OCA, however, dismissed the complaint on the ground that Manansalas allegation was
never substantiated by evidence, documentary or testimonial. However, OCA finds that sending
Sheriff Cabigao to retrieve the car of Mr. Herbst was improper despite the non-involvement of the
car in the criminal case. Even if it was already after office hours, the fact that Sheriff Cabigao, being
a personnel of Judge Asdalas own court still in his office uniform and accompanied by two
policemen, would send the wrong signal, as it did.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Asdala was guilty of gross misconduct
RULING:
YES. The Court finds well-taken the investigating Justices evaluation of Manansalas
allegations. Instead however, of plain misconduct, Asdala is found liable for gross misconduct
constituting violation of Canon 2 Of The Code Of Judicial Conduct which states that a judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities; Rule 2.01. A judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary;
and Rule 2.04. which states that a judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
Venancio Inonog v. Judge Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
135, Makati City
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that
power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise.
FACTS:
Judge Francisco B. Ibay arrived at the basement of the Makati City Hall to find that his
reserved parking space was occupied by another car. The car was parked by Venancio Inonog who
works as a security-driver of the Chief of the Business Permit Division of Makati City. Ibay issued an
order directing Inonog to appear before his court and show cause why he should not be cited for
indirect contempt for parking the said car thereby causing delay in the administration of justice.
Inonog received a call from his brother, also an employee of the City Government of Makati,
informing him of the said order. Inonog immediately left for Makati City Hall even though he was
not feeling well. However, he arrived late and was already been adjudged guilty of contempt of
court.
Page 93 of 117
Inonog contended that he did not know that the parking space was reserved for Ibay and
pleaded for forgiveness. However, Ibay increased the amount of fine with stern warning. Inonog
filed an administrative complaint against the latter.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) held that when Ibay exercised his contempt
power, not only did he deny the complainant his right to be heard but also convicted him in
contempt of court based on a very flimsy reason.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Ibay abused his authority in exercising the power to contempt
RULING:
YES. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the rules and procedure for indirect contempt.
Sections 3 and 4 of the said rule states that After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt for xxx (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
Complainants act in parking his car in a slot reserved for respondent judge does not fall
under this category. There was no showing that he acted with malice or that he was improperly
motivated to delay the proceedings of the court. We cannot say that the said act of complainant
constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the court. The incident is too flimsy and inconsequential to
be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. Judges are enjoined to exercise their
contempt power with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction
and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. Ibays act of
unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt is an unjustified use of the authority.
J. KING & SONS COMPANY, INC. v. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR.
Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1802, September 21, 2004, Chico-Nazario, J.
A judge must not only be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. A judges private as
well as official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety and be beyond
reproach.
FACTS:
J. King & Sons company, represented by Richard L. King, filed an administrative complaint
against Judge Agapito Hontanosas. J. King & Sons was plaintiff in a case for Specific Performance
with Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Attachment, pending before the RTC presided
over by Judge Agapito. Judge Agapito issued a writ of preliminary attachment, the defendants filed
an urgent motion to lift the writ of preliminary attachment by posting a counter-bond in the
amount of P35,973,600.00. The company alleged that on the same day, Judge Agapito approved the
Page 94 of 117
defendants counter-bond although it exceeded the maximum net retention of only P13,432,136.31
based on the bonding companys Supreme Court clearance. Richard and his brother, Rafael
contended that Judge Agapito asked that they meet him at his residence where the latter demanded
the amount of P250,000 in exchange of granting their motion for reconsideration to reverse the
order lifting the attachment. The brothers refused. Richard filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied. It was also averred that on several occasions, Judge Agapito would spend leisure time
at the formers karaoke music lounge of Metropolis Hotel without paying for its services.
The Court issued a Resolution referring administrative matter to Associate Justice Jose
Reyes, Jr., CA, for investigation and recommendation. Justice Reyes ruled that the allegation as to
Judge Agapitos demand for P250,000 had not been sufficiently substantiated. However, the
investigating justice finds that it was inappropriate for respondent to have entertained a litigant in
his home particularly when the case is still pending before his sala. As to the use of complainants
karaoke bar at the Metropolis Hotel, the investigating justice finds that Judge Agapito should have
not frequented the place to prevent any appearance of impropriety which is a violation of Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. As to the alleged impropriety regarding the issuance of the order,
Judge Agapito failed to persuade the investigating justice of the urgency to grant the motion to lift
the writ of preliminary attachment as a justification for granting the motion without a full-blown
hearing. Judge Agapito was held guilty of gross ignorance of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the findings of the Investigating Justice is correct
RULING:
NO. The Investigating Justice overlooked the fact that to require the King brothers to
present evidence would be unrealistic. Human experience tells us that extortion would be done in
utmost secrecy, minimizing possible witnesses. Complainant is quite fortunate to even have two
witnesses to corroborate each other.
In administrative proceedings, substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence

which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conviction, is required. Evidence to
support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, as the standard of integrity demanded of
members of the Bench is not satisfied which merely allows one to escape the penalties of criminal
law.
The testimonies of the King brothers meet the required quantum of evidence which justifies
our conclusion that Judge Agapito indeed demanded P250,000.00 from them. Such conduct is a
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial conduct, which
provide that a judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary (Canon 1); A
judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence (Rule 1.01.); A judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities (Canon 2); A judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary (Rule 2.01.).
The Court agrees on with the Investigating Justices finding of gross ignorance of the law for
not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift attachment and for violating the three-day
notice rule. Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that every written
motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner
Page 95 of 117
as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least 3 days before the date of hearing, unless the court
for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, Judge Agapito utterly failed to exercise
due care in examining the supporting papers therefor. He should know the basic requirements
before approving a surety bond or a judicial bond such as counter-bond. Among the requisites for
the bond to be acceptable are a clearance from the Supreme Court and the current certificate of
authority showing the maximum underwriting capacity of the company.
The Clerk of Courts Indorsement dated July 5, 2002, clearly showed that the bonding
companys Supreme Court Clearance was valid only until June 28, 2002, and its Maximum Net
Retention is only P13,432,136.31. A simple perusal thereof would have alerted respondent that at
the time the counter-bond was submitted to him for approval on July 5, 2002, the bonding company
did not have enough properties to answer for the counter-bond it issued in the amount of
P35,973,600.00. Thus, the Court agrees with the Investigating Justice that respondent acted
negligently in approving the counter-bond.
Also, it is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meet with a litigant at his home and to
frequent the karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for free.
Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr. is guilty of two counts of Gross Misconduct, one count of
Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure, and, Simple Misconduct. He is dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits except as to accrued leave credits and disqualified from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
ATTY. GLORIA LASTIMOSA-DALAWAMPU v. JUDGE RAPHAEL B. YRASTORZA, SR., RTC OF

CEBU CITY, BRANCH 14.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1793, February 05, 2004, Ynares-Santiago, J.
The role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance,
patience and courtesy
FACTS:
Atty. Lastimosa-Dalawampu appeared as counsel for the accused before Judge Yrastorza, Sr.
After her client was arraigned, Atty. Lastimosa-Dalawampu moved for the re-setting of the pre-trial
conference in view of absence of the trial prosecutor. However, before she could finish her
statement, Judge Yrastorza, Sr. purportedly cut her off by saying, If you cannot handle this case,
Atty. Dalawampu, you better give this case to another lawyer. When Atty. Lastimosa-Dalawampu
answered that she can handle the case, the judge again cut her off saying, Do not give me so many
excuses, Atty. Dalawampu! I dont care who you are! When complainant was about to leave the
courtroom, she heard respondent say, I dont care who you are. You can file one thousand
administrative cases against me. I dont care.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts of the respondent judge are in clear derogation of his duty
RULING:
Page 96 of 117
YES. Upon his assumption to office, a judge becomes the visible representation of the law
and of justice. He must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. The tenor of
respondents statement can easily instill in the minds of those who heard them that as a judge he is
above the law. Also, respondents act of insulting the complainant in open court exhibited a
manifest disregard of his duty to be courteous to lawyers.
A judges duty to observe courtesy to those who appear before him is not limited to
lawyers. The said duty also includes being courteous to litigants and witnesses. Thus, Judges are
strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and existing administrative
policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of justice. Any act which
falls short of the exacting standard for public office, especially on the part of those expected to
preserve the image of the judiciary shall not be countenanced. Hence, he was reprimanded for
discourtesy against complainant.
ADARLINA G. MATAGA v. JUDGE MAXWELL S. ROSETE, MTCC OF SANTIAGO CITY AND

PROCESS SERVER GASAT M. PAYOYO, MTC, CORDON, ISABELA.
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1488, October 13, 2004, Ynares-Santiago, J.
When an administrative charge against a judge is determined to have no basis whatsoever, the
courts will protect him against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial process.
FACTS:
Mataga applied for disability retirement as she was suffering from Thrombosis. Her
application was approved and a disbursement voucher amounting to P165,530 was prepared in her
name. The check was released to Process Server Gasat Payoyo who turned it over to Judge Rosete.
Payoyo brought Mataga to Judge Rosetes house, where she was given P44,000 as her terminal pay.
It was only subsequently that Mataga came to know that the disability retirement benefit granted to
her was in the amount of P165,530. The judge stated that Mataga has not been to his house, nor has
he given her the sum of P44,000. The judge however, admitted that the check representing the
retirement benefits of Mataga was turned over to him by the SC security guard after it was
misplaced by his co-respondent, Payoyo. Upon his receipt of Matagas check, the judge immediately
handed the same to Payoyo. After conducting an investigation of the case, Mataga made it clear that
she had no more complaint against the judge provided that the latter will give her the money.
Rather, the complaint was directed at the dishonesty of respondent Payoyo in his dealings with the
complainant.
ISSUE:
Whether the case against the respondent judge should be dismissed
RULING:
YES. Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effect are by their nature highly penal, such that the
respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of judicial
misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced.
Page 97 of 117
From the conduct and actuations of Payoyo, together with his confusing testimony, it is
clear that he was not honest enough when he gave the proceeds of the terminal leave benefits of
Mataga. He was able to collect P165,530. He lost the check. It was found and given to the security
guard of the SC who in turn gave it to Judge Rosete who gave it back to Payoyo. By virtue of his
special power-of-attorney, Payoyo encashed the check but he did not give all of it to the
complainant. Hence, Payoyo was suspended for 6 months.
ATTY. MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR. v. JUDGE MICHAEL M. AMDENGAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, MTC,
ANGONO, RIZAL.
A. M. No. MTJ-12-1818, February 13, 2013, Sereno, J.
FACTS:
Atty. Jimenez is the counsel of Olivia Merced, the plaintiff in an ejectment case presided by
Judge Amdengan, which was filed in January 2009. During the preliminary conference, Judge
Amdengan referred the case for mediation. Due to the inability of the parties to arrive at a
settlement, the case was referred back to the MTC for trial on the merits. On 04 December 2009,
Judge Amdengan ordered the parties to file their respective position papers within 30 days, after
which the case was to be submitted for resolution. It was only on March 2010 when he promulgated
his ruling, in which he noted that the plaintiff had failed to refer her Complaint to the Lupon for the
mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings as required under the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. Thus, her ejectment Complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Complainant
filed the instant administrative case charging the judge guilty of gross inefficiency for failing to
resolve the ejectment case within a period of 30 days as mandated under the Rules of Summary
Procedure. Likewise, the latter was charged with gross ignorance of law for having dismissed the
case on the ground of failure to comply with the barangay conciliation procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Amdengan is guilty of undue delay and gross ignorance of the law
RULING:
YES for undue delay, NO for gross ignorance of the law. It was sufficiently established that
the judge committed undue delay in rendering a Decision in the subject ejectment Complaint. An
action for ejectment is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure, Section 10 of which provides
that the court shall render judgment within 30 days after receipt of the last affidavits and position
papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same. The ruling was already due on 04
February 2010, reckoned from the date the parties last filed their respective Position Papers. He
could not have extended the period by the mere issuance of an Order, when the rules clearly
provide for a mandatory period within which to decide a case. Hence, he was guilty of undue delay
in rendering a decision, with a fine in the amount of P10,000.
However, with regard to the gross ignorance of the law, administrative complaints against
judges cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved
by the erroneous orders or judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither
alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto, where such review is still available to
Page 98 of 117
the aggrieved parties and the case has not yet been resolved with finality. Complainant had the
available remedy of appeal when her ejectment Complaint was dismissed.
NARCISO G. DULALIA v. JUDGE AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, RTC, BRANCH 96, QC.

A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3492-RTJ, December 04, 2013, Perez, J.
A judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as
long as he acts in good faith.
FACTS:
Narciso Dulalia is one of the petitioners in the special proceeding cases pertaining to the
joint settlement of the testate and intestate estates of his parents wherein he and his sister, Gilda
Dulalia-Figueroa, vied for appointment as special and regular administrator. Gilda was
subsequently appointed as special administratrix. Narciso alleged that Judge Cajigal is liable for
gross inefficiency for his failure to resolve the pending incident within the required period. Also, he
alleged that Judge Cajigal ignored the basic rules and jurisprudence in the appointment of special
administrators.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Cajigal is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and undue delay
RULING:
NO, as to gross ignorance of the law. Judge Cajigals order was issued in the proper exercise
of his judicial functions, and as such, is not subject to administrative disciplinary action; especially
considering that the complainant failed to establish bad faith on the part of respondent judge. A
judge may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment in the absence of
showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to
do an injustice on his or her part.
YES, as to undue delay. Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary
period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against
the erring magistrate. The penalty to be imposed on the judge varies depending on the attending
circumstances of the case. It is proper to mitigate the penalty to be imposed on respondent judge
taking into consideration that this is his first infraction in his more than 15 years in the service; his
age; the caseload of his court; and his candid admission of his infraction. Hence, he is admonished to
be more circumspect in the exercise of his judicial functions.
ANONYMOUS v. JUDGE RIO C. ACHAS, MTCC, BRANCH 2, OZAMIZ CITY, MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL.
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013, Mendoza, J.
A judges personal behaviour outside the court, and not only while in the performance of his
official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice.
FACTS:
Page 99 of 117
An anonymous letter-complaint was sent which calls on the Court to look into the morality
of Judge Achas and alleges that: (1) it is of public knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is living
scandalously with a woman who is not his wife; (2) he lives beyond his means; (3) he is involved
with illegal activities through his connection with bad elements, the kuratongs; (4) he comes to
court very untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and monetary
consideration; and (6) he is involved with cockfighting/gambling.
The anonymous complainant never appeared to testify. Judge Achas denied all the charges
but admitted that he was married and only separated de facto from his legal wife for 26 years, and
that he reared game cocks for extra income, having inherited such from his forefathers.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Achas should be reprimanded as to the charges against him
RULING:
YES, but with modification. Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous
complaints may be filed against judges, but they must be supported by public records of indubitable
integrity. The burden of proof in administrative proceedings which rests with the complainant must
be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the
investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove
his defense. No evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared,
and no public records were brought forth during the investigation.
For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by
the Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary. Considering that his
immoral behaviour is not a secret, he has failed to ensure that his conduct is perceived to be above
reproach by the reasonable observer, and has failed to avoid the appearance of impropriety in his
activities, to the detriment of the judiciary as a whole. He should behave at all times so as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.
GERMAN WENCESLAO CRUZ, JR. v. JUDGE DANIEL C. JOVEN, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT, SIPOCOT, CAMARINES SUR
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1270, January 23, 2001, Vitug, J.
Mere filing of an administrative case against a judge is not a ground for disqualifying him
from hearing the case, for if on every occasion the party aggrieved would be allowed to either stop the
proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the
immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to
be kept pending or there would not be enough judges to handle all the cases pending in all the court.
FACTS:
Atty. German Cruz was the representative of the plaintiff estate for unlawful detainer.
Counsel for the defendant did not file any answer but instead filed a motion for extension of time to
Page 100 of 117

answer and for the inhibition of Judge Joven from further taking cognizance of the case on the
ground that said defendant had charged respondent Judge before the Ombudsman. Judge Joven
granted the petition for inhibition, but was later denied by the Executive Judge thus Judge Joven
proceeded with the case. He declared that no answer having been filed by the defendant in the
ejectment suit, judgment on the case would be rendered within thirty days yet no decision came
down. He afterwards inhibited himself again from the case.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Joven is guilty of gross negligence, abuse of authority, dereliction of duty and
failure to render decision within 30 days as so prescribed in the rules on summary procedure.
RULING:
YES. It was inexcusable for Judge Joven to allow the unlawful detainer case to drag on end. It
was not right for him to excuse himself from hearing the case simply because the defendant had
previously charged him before the Office of the Ombudsman. The inhibition order was aptly denied
by the Executive Judge who directed him to continue with the case. Instead of resolving the case as
he was so directed, Judge Joven awaited the appointment of a new executive Judge, upon whose
assumption to office, he again inhibited himself from the proceedings on the same ground he had
invoked in his first attempt to divorce himself from the case.
ANNA LIZA VALMORES-SALINAS v. JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, RTC, TACLOBAN CITY

A.M. No. RTJ-12-2335 , March 18, 2013, J. Peralta
Most essential in indirect contempt cases is that the alleged contemnor be granted an
opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses.
FACTS:
Anna Liza Salinas filed a case for Violence Against Women and their Children (VAWC) with a
Petition for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order against her husband Roy Salinas before
the RTC which was presided by Judge Bitas. He immediately issued an Order appointing an
administrator of the spouses community properties, to which Anna did not agree with. A Letter of
Administration was still issued. Roy Salinas counsel filed a motion to cite Anna for indirect
contempt for her defiance to the order of the court by disallowing the administrator to take over
their property. Judge Bitas summarily held Anna in contempt of court and was made to suffer 5-day
imprisonment.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Bitas is guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure
RULING:
YES. The following must be complied with before petitioner may be punished for indirect
contempt: First, there must be an order requiring the petitioner to show cause why she should not
be cited for contempt. Second, the petitioner must be given the opportunity to comment on the
Page 101 of 117

charge against her. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and
consider petitioners answer. Finally, only if found guilty will petitioner be punished accordingly.
Roy Salinas did not file a verified complaint, but instead initiated the indirect contempt
through his Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Cite Defendant
for Indirect Contempt. Judge BItas still issued an order holding petitioner in contempt of court.
Assuming that the contempt charge was initiated motu proprio by the Court, Judge Bitas still failed
to abide by the rules when he did not require petitioner to show cause why she should not be
punished for contempt. Judge Bitas disregard of established rules of procedure amounts to gross
ignorance of the law or procedure.
CARMEN P. EDAO v. JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA AND STENOGRAPHER MYRLA DEL

PILAR NICANDRO
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974, March 19, 2013, Sereno, J.
FACTS:
SC found Quezon City RTC Judge Asdala guilty of insubordination and gross misconduct. She
was dismissed from service with forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave credits to which she
may be entitled. Judge Asdala wrote a letter addressed to SC Chief Justice and SC Associate Justices
wherein she pleaded for mercy and prayed that she be given a last chance to redeem herself. She
then wrote another letter, while her first letter which was treated as a Motion for Reconsideration,
was still pending. SC denied the first MR with finality. Judge Asdala wrote another letter to the OCA
praying that the Resolution granting her the money equivalent of all her accrued sick and vacation
leaves be implemented as soon as possible. SC granted Judge Asdalas request that P80,000 of the
money equivalent of her accrued leave credits be retained by the OCA. However, another letter was
written by her with a prayer that at least the punishment be tempered by granting her the
retirement benefits due her for 24 years and 7 months of government service, where she attached a
Motion for Reconsideration praying that SC would reconsider its first decision. Judge Asdalas
second MR was denied. A year after her second MR was denied, Judge Asdala requested that she be
given half of the retirement benefits that were forfeited in the first Decision of SC.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Asdala is entitled to the benefits she is asking from the court
RULING:
NO. Judge Asdalas latest letter is in effect her third MR. It should be denied outright if not
expunged from the records. As regards her P100 personal monthly contributions to the GSIS from
July 1995 to December 1997, considering that these amounts have already been remitted to the
GSIS, she should have addressed her demand to the GSIS. With respect to the amounts deducted
from Judge Asdala from the period January 1998 to October 2001, it appears from the records of SC
that she has already filed a separate case with the OCA.
SONIA C. DECENA AND REY C. DECENA v. JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, RTC, BRANCH 32, IN
PILI, CAMARINES SUR
Page 102 of 117

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217, April 08, 2013, Bersamin, J.
A judges acceptance of an appointment to the Bench inhibits him from engaging in the private
practice of law, regardless of the beneficiary of the activity being a member of his immediate family.
FACTS:
Rey Decena had brought an administrative case against Judge Malanyaons wife, Dr. Amelita
Malanyaon then the Assistant Provincial Health Officer of the Province of Camarines Sur, and that
during the hearing of the administrative case Judge Malanyaon sat beside his daughter, Atty. Ma.
Kristina C. Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the case. Judge Malanyaon coached her
daughter in making manifestations/motions before the hearing officer, by scribbling on some piece
of paper and giving the same to the former. When inquired regarding the personality of Judge
Malanyaon, being seated at the lawyers bench beside Atty. Malanyaon, Judge Malanyaon then
proudly introduced himself and manifested that he was the counsel of the respondents counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Malanyaon is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge
RULING:
YES. Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his
wifes administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations to the hearing officer,
and preparing the questions that he prompted to his daughter in order to demand that the
collaborating counsel of the complainants principal counsel, should produce his privilege tax
receipt. Judge Malanyaon did so voluntarily, in light of his announcement during the hearing that he
was the counsel for Atty. Katrina Malanyaon, the counsel of the respondent, as his response to the
query by the opposing counsel why he was seated next to Atty. Malanyaon thereat. The situation of
Judge Malanyaon was different, for he was a judicial officer who came under the stricture that
uniformly applied to all judges of all levels of the judicial hierarchy, forbidding him from engaging
in the private practice of law during his incumbency, regardless of whether the beneficiary was his
wife or daughter or other members of his own family. A judge may not involve himself in any
activity that is an aspect of the private practice of law.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. LORENZA M. MARTINEZ, CLERK OF COURT, MTC,

CANDELARIA, QUEZON
A.M. No. P-06-2223, June 10, 2013, Per Curiam
A public servant is expected to exhibit, the highest degree of honesty and integrity, and should
be made accountable to all those whom he serves
FACTS:
The Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator conducted a financial audit
and discovered the accountabilities of Clerk of Court Lorenza Martinez. The audit showed that she
incurred shortages in the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) in the amount of P12,273.33 and in the
Fiduciary Fund (FF) in the amount of P882,250.00. There were collections without the date of
collection appearing on the duplicate or triplicate official receipt and were found undeposited.
There were collections with different dates appearing on the original and triplicate copies of OR.
Page 103 of 117

Ms. Martinez used a single OR for both JDF and FF collections, the original OR was used for FF and
its corresponding duplicate and triplicate copies were used for JDF. There were double withdrawal
of the bonds allowed by Martinez with no court orders that were issued to support the
withdrawals.
ISSUE:
Whether Martinez is guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty, Dishonesty, and Grave Misconduct
RULING:
YES. Martinez violated OCA Circular No. 26-97, which directs judges and clerks of court to
strictly comply with the provisions of the Auditing and Accounting Manual, particularly Article VI,
Sections 61 and 113 thereof, which require collecting officers to promptly issue official receipts for
all money received by them. She violated OCA Circular No. 50-95 which mandates all clerks of court
to deposit, within 24 hours from receipt, all collections from bailbonds, rental deposits and other
fiduciary collections. Clerks of Court, as custodians of the court funds and revenues, are obliged to
immediately deposit with the Land Bank of the Philippines or with any authorized government
depository, their collections on funds as they are not authorized to keep funds in their custody.
Martinez failed to present an explanation regarding her cash shortages, her improper use of official
receipts and the withdrawal of cash bonds. Her contention that it was the cash clerk who was
responsible for the JDF fund is untenable. As Clerk of Court, she was the courts accountable officer.
It was not the cash clerk. It was her duty to supervise and monitor her subordinate to ensure that
the proper procedures were followed in the collection of the courts funds. Being the custodian of
the courts funds, revenues, records, properties, and premises, she was liable for any loss, shortage,
destruction or impairment of such funds and property.
JILL M. TORMIS v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, February 04, 2015, Mendoza, J.
Courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
FACTS:
Jill Tormis was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review at Cebu City. She averred
that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge
Rosabella Tormis, then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, MTCC in Cebu City, as one of the judges
involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City with regard to a case which had not yet been
concluded. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position
as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law. She added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in
his discussions not only once but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have
included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis, son of Judge Tormis, Jills brother, stating
that he was a court-noted addict. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class
under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.
ISSUE:
Page 104 of 117

Whether Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge
RULING:
YES. The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the scams involving Judge Tormis,
the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the
case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013. In 2010, he still could not make
comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution. Commenting
on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of
the subjudice rule. Judge Paredes in using intemperate language tending to project Judge Tormis as
a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge.
BENITO B. NATE v. JUDGE LELU P. CONTRERAS, BRANCH 43, RTC, VIRAC, CATANDUANES
(THEN CLERK OF COURT, RTC-IRIGA CITY),
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2406, February 18, 2015, Sereno, J.
Public officials and employees are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution, law, or regulation; and under the condition that their
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions.
FACTS:
Nate alleged that Judge Contreras, while she was still a clerk of court and ex officio
provincial sheriff of RTC, allegedly notarized an administrative complaint by affixing her signature
to the jurat portion of such prepared by her father, certified a document (a labor complaint) as a
true copy of the original, and appeared as counsel for her father in a hearing before the IBP.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Contreras is guilty of grave misconduct
RULING:
NO. She is only found liable for the unauthorized notarization of documents unrelated to
her office while serving as Clerk of Court. As clerk of court and ex officio notary, Contreras may
notarize documents or administer oaths only in the exercise of her official functions. The same legal
reasoning is applied to the second act of Contreras being complained about; that is, her certification
of a copy of her sister-in-laws labor complaint. Contreras herself admits that the document was
filed before the NLRC in Naga City, not the RTCIriga City. In the regular course of her duties, she
would not have come across the document.
With regard to the third act, the primary employment of court personnel must be their
position in the judiciary, which is the chief concern requiring their attention. Nevertheless, it is
recognized that the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees does
Page 105 of 117

allow for exceptions. Contreras has proved that she was granted authority by this Court to
represent her father in an administrative case, provided that she files the leaves of absence on the
scheduled dates of hearing of the case and that she will not use official time in preparing for the
case.
EMILIE SISON-BARIAS v. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, RTC, BRANCH 24, BIAN, LAGUNA AND
EILEEN A. PECAA, DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BIAN,
LAGUNA
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388, June 10, 2014, Per Curiam
It is unethical for a judge to suggest to a litigant what to do to resolve his case for such would
generate the suspicion that the judge is in collusion with one party.
FACTS:
Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of Judge Rubia. Barias
had a dinner meeting with the respondents in a restaurant where they have discussed her pending
cases. Rubia allegedly asked her questions not related to her pending cases. She was asked whether
she was still connected with Philippine Airlines, which she still was at that time. Barias was then
informed that respondent Judge Rubia knew of this fact through Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel of
Romelias Almeda-Barias. This disclosure surprised Barias, as she was under the impression that
opposing counsel and Judge Rubia had no business discussing matters that were not relevant to
their pending cases. She was also asked about her supposed involvement with another man, and the
hospital where she brought her husband when he suffered cardiac arrest. These details, according
to Barias, were never discussed in the pleadings or in the course of the trial. She inferred that Judge
Rubia had been talking to the opposing counsel regarding these matters outside of the court
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Rubia is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance
of the law and incompetence
RULING:
YES. By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, Judge Rubia violated
several canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that
upholds the dignity mandated by his office. He had the authority to ensure that all court employees,
whether or not they were under his direct supervision, act in accordance with the esteem of their
office. Nothing in the record shows that Judge Rubia took action after being informed of Pecaas
interactions with a litigant, such as ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry to discipline her,
or at least reporting her actions to the Office of the Court Administrator.
A meeting with complainant, a litigant with cases pending before his sala, took place. Judge
Rubias presence in the dinner is a ground for administrative liability. His act of convincing
complainant to agree to his proposal is an act of impropriety. A litigant in a case is entitled to no
less than the neutrality of a judge. Judges are not only required to be impartial, but also to appear to
Page 106 of 117

be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Judge Rubias conduct in the instant
case inevitably invites doubts about respondent's probity and integrity.
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING
HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,
SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, September 23, 2014, Per Curiam
Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not
deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution.
FACTS:
The case against Justice Ong stemmed from disclosures by pork barrel scam whistleblower
Benhur Luy before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee in 2013, accusing Ong of being in personal
contact with Napoles. Ong was seen in one photograph partying with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy
Estrada, who has been charged with plunder in connection with the pork barrel scam. In their
testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Luy and Sula alleged that Ong, acting as a go-
between, fixed a case in the Sandiganbayan against Napoles involving the ghost purchase of 500
Kevlar helmets. They also claimed that Napoles handed Ong 11 checks totaling P3.1 million during
one of his visits to her office. Ong denied favoring Napoles and said the Kevlar case was dismissed
by members of the courts division that acted as a collegial body.
ISSUE:
Whether Justice Ong is guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty and impropriety
RULING:
YES. By his act of going to Napoles at her office on two occasions, Justice Ong exposed
himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. The context of the declarations under oath
by Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the Pork
Barrel controversy, made all the difference as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus, even in the
present administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the public revelations
of what they know of that government corruption controversy, and how it has tainted the image of
the Judiciary. Respondents association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into
the Pork Barrel controversy involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles
contact in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The SC cannot consider
respondents transgression as a simple misconduct. Justice Ong was thus dismissed from the
service.
CONRADO ABE LOPEZ, represented by ATTY. ROMUALDO JUBAY v. JUDGE ROGELIO S.

LUCMAYON, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Mandaue City, Cebu
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837, September 24, 2014, Brion, J.
[formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2463-MTJ]
Page 107 of 117

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
FACTS:
Complainant Conrando Abe Lopez alleged that he inherited from his adoptive father
Restituto Lopez of Lot No. 1718, evidenced by a document entitled "Katapusan Panugon". He
claimed that while the document mentioned Lot No. 1718, he ended up receiving a portion of Lot
No. 1696 with a land area of 49,817 square meters, that became the object of an extrajudicial
settlement involving him, his adoptive mother Honorata Lopez, and the relatives of Judge Rogelio
Lucmayon. Lopez also alleged that sometime in 2004 Lucmayon deceived him into signing a Special
Power of Attorney to process the sale of Lot No. 1696 to the prospective buyer, Aboitiz Group of
Company. Unknown to him, the said SPA contained at the bottom portion, a so-called "Waiver of
Rights" that Lucmayon had deceptively inserted in order to strip him of his ownership of Lot No.
1696. After signing the document which was notarized by a certain Atty. Arturo C. Mata without his
presence, Lucmayon told Lopez that he no longer had any right over the property. Lopez filed an
administrative complaint against Lucmayon charging the latter with Dishonesty, Corruption and
Malpractice.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Lucmayon is guilty of Impropriety
RULING:
YES. We agree with the OCA that the respondents acts of: (1) making the complainant sign
at least two (2) documents consisting of SPA and Waiver of Rights without the presence of a
counsel; and (2) allowing the notarization of the documents outside the presence of the executor,
amount to impropriety. While no evidence directly shows that the respondent had deceived the
complainant into signing these documents, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the documents the
respondent himself prepared prejudiced the complainant. The Waiver of Rights benefitted the
respondent and his family. As a judge who is more learned in the law than the complainant, the
respondent, at the very least should have taken the appropriate steps (e.g. advise the former to
engage the services of a lawyer who could lend him unbiased legal advice regarding the legal effects
of the waiver) to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in his dealings.
ANTONIO S. ASCAO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA D. TOLEDO,

JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L. NOGUERA, FIDEL S.
SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T. TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M. COLONIA, ERIC S.
PASTRANA, and MARIVEL B. ISON v. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., Branch 45,
Regional Trial Court, San Jose Occidental Mindoro
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015, Sereno, C.J.
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ]
Members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach in their conduct, and should be free from
any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their duties, as well as in their personal behavior.
FACTS:
Page 108 of 117

Petitioners were the section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in the public market of
Occidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Jose T. Villarosa
wanted to demolish the public market, so that the Municipality can use the space to erect the new
"San Jose Commercial Complex." Petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition With Urgent Application
for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the
Municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The case was raffled to respondent Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr.s, sala.
Mayor Villarosa, during the hearing dated July 3, 2012, stepped out of the courtroom to take
a call. He exited through the door used by the judge and the employees of the court. According to
petitioners, the Mayor did not speak to anyone, not even his lawyer, before leaving the courtroom.
Thus, it came as a surprise to everyone when respondent suddenly explained that the Mayor had to
excuse himself for an important appointment. Respondent eventually issued an Order lifting the
TRO.
Petitioners filed the present administrative complaint against respondent Judge charging
him with serious violations of the canons of the Codes of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics and for
Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Judge was guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct
RULING:
YES. Respondent violated Section 1 of Canon 2, Section 2 of Canon 3 and Section 1 of Canon
4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the courts permission to leave
while the trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the formers advocate. He did so by
declaring in open court that the abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the latter had an
important appointment to attend. It was the Mayors lawyer, and not respondent judge, who had
the duty of explaining why the mayor left the courtroom without asking for the courts permission.
The actions of respondent diminished public confidence in him. Petitioners cannot be

blamed for thinking that respondent must have communicated with Mayor Villarosa. Otherwise, he
would not have been able to explain that the Mayor could no longer return to attend the hearing
after leaving, when not even the latters own lawyers knew that.
DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO v. JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360, November 19, 2014, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-3010-RTJ)
The act of using the courts premises for residential purposes constitutes an irresponsible
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
FACTS:
Page 109 of 117

An Administrative Complainant filed by Dorothy Fe Mah-Arevalo, Court Stenographer of the

RTC of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17, against respondent Judge Celso Mantua charging the latter of
Disgraceful/Immoral Conduct as well as Gross Violation of the Judicial Code of Conduct. Mah-
Arevalo alleges that the respondent judge used the Hall of Justice, particularly his chamber, as his
residence and openly brought his mistress in court as observed by all of his staff. For his defense
respondent judge contended that he could not have used the Hall of Justice as his residence for he
was already renting a house near the same during his tenure as judge of the RTC.
ISSUE:
RULING:
YES. Respondent used his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his dwelling place.
Respondents defense that he rented a house did not negate the possibility that he used the Hall of
Justice as his residence, since it is possible that a person could be renting one place while physically
residing in another.
Immorality has been defined to include not only sexual matters but also conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or
is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.
The testimonies of complainant and Nuez demonstrated how respondent paraded his
mistress in full view of the general public by bringing her to public places, without regard to
consequences. Respondent had the audacity to use his chambers as a haven for their morally
depraved acts. Engaging in an extra marital affair is not only a violation of the moral standards but
is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage.
ATTY. JEROME NORMAN L. TACORDA for: ODELL. GEDRAGA v. JUDGE REYNALDO B. CLEMENS
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359, October 23, 2013, Sereno, C.J.
(Formerly O.C.A. IPI No. 12-3851-RTJ)
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, not only must the acts be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence, but they must also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty.
FACTS:
Atty. Jerome Norman Tacorda alleged that in the criminal case entitled People v. Belleza then
pending before the sala of respondent Judge, Atty. Tacorda presented as witness Odel Gedraga, then
15 years old, to testify for the prosecution. Atty. Tacorda alleged that Judge Clemens violated the
Child Witness Examination Rule when Judge Clemens failed to castigate the counsel for the defense,
Atty. Allan Mijares for standing beside the witness despite Judge Clemens earlier order to Atty.
Mijares to keep his distance. Atty. Tacorda further alleged that the trial where Gedraga was
presented lasted for three hours with only a two-minute break which consequently made Gedraga
feel humiliated and exhausted.
Page 110 of 117

ISSUE:
Whether Judge Clemens should be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the
law
RULING:
NO. The acts of Judge Clemens were far from being in bad faith as to justify any
administrative liability. He was vigilant in his conduct of the proceedings. He had been attentive to
the manifestations made by Atty. Tacorda and had acted accordingly and with dispatch.
It is doubtful that Judge Clemens failed to implement the directives he had issued during the
conduct of the trial. Based on the TSN, Atty. Tacorda did not have to make repeated manifestations
to respondent Judge after pointing out that the defense counsel tended to crowd the witness and/or
that the court interpreter should be the one to translate the testimony. Further, contrary to the
allegations of Atty. Tacorda, the TSN showed that respondent Judge was very much concerned with
following the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the One-Day Examination of Witness Rule
was followed; but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact that the witness was already
exhausted, having testified for almost 3 hours.
RE: UNAUTHORIZED TRAVEL ABROAD OF JUDGE CLETO R. VILLACORTA III REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT BRANCH 6, BAGUIO CITY
A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC, November 11, 2013, Sereno, C.J.
Unauthorized absences of those responsible for the administration of justice, especially on the
part of a magistrate, are inimical to public service.
FACTS:
Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III was granted authority to travel to Canada from 20 December
2010 to 3 February 2011. He was expected to report for work on 4 February 2011 but he reported
back for work only on 16 February 2011. According to Judge Villacorta he was unable to return to
the country at the expiration of his travel authority because he had to attend few family related
matters. The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that Judge Villacortas absence during his
extended travel from 4-15 February 2011 be considered unauthorized.
Judge Villacorta was granted another authority to travel to Canada for the period covering 1
May to 2 June 2011 to attend the wake and funeral of his sister. However, Judge Villacorta failed to
report for work on 3 June 2011. Judge Villacorta reported back for work only on 7 June 2011. When
asked to explain, Judge Villacorta replied that no other return flight was available other than on 5
June 2011. In a report to the Court dated 3 May 2012, the OCA recommended that Judge Villacorta
be given a stern warning for his failure to observe the rules relative to travel abroad.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Villacorta should be given stern warning for his unauthorized absences
RULING:
Page 111 of 117

YES. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and Extensions
for Travel/Stay Abroad) requires that a request must be made for an extension of the period to
travel/stay abroad, and that the request be received by the OCA 10 working days before the
expiration of the original travel authority. Failure to do so would make the absences beyond the
original period unauthorized.
Judge Villacorta was in a position to file an application for leave to cover his extended stay
abroad from 3-6 June 2011. In his letter dated 15 June 2011, he stated that he had to rush on 28
April 2011 to book a flight to Canada, as well as the return flight, for which the only available seat
was for 5 June 2011. On 1 May 2011, he was already aware that he would not be able to report for
work on 3 June 2011 because of the schedule of his return flight.
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA v. JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014, Brion, J.
When a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross and patent, error can
produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.
FACTS:
Antonio Lorenzana was involved in a case entitled In the Matter of the Petition to have
Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the
Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan" involving one Steel Corporation of the Philippines, a
corporation then under rehabilitation proceedings. The case was presided over by Judge Ma. Cecilia
Austria. In his administrative complaint against Austria, Lorenzana alleged that Austria committed
gross ignorance of the law when Austria ordered the creation of a management committee without
conducting an evidentiary hearing in violation of due process. Austria vehemently denied the
allegations against her. While she admitted that she crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan
best suited for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to render fairness and equity to all the
parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that if she erred in modifying the
rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative
disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were premature
because judicial remedies were still available.
ISSUE:
Whether Austria is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
RULING:
YES. With respect to ordering the creation of a management committee without conducting
an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, we find the error to be so egregious as to amount to bad
faith.
In rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must be given an opportunity to prove (or

disprove) the existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the
debtor-companys assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of minority
Page 112 of 117

stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public. The rehabilitation court should hear both sides,
allow them to present proof and conscientiously deliberate on whether the appointment of a
management receiver is justified. This is a basic requirement in every adversarial proceeding.
NARCISO G. DULALIA v. JUDGE AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon
City
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3492-RTJ, December 4, 2013, Perez, J.
Administrative complaints against judges cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial
remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or judgments of the former.
Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto, where
such review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the cases have not yet been resolved with
finality.
FACTS:
Narciso Dulalia, filed before RTC Branch 96 of Quezon City presided over by Judge Afable
Cajigal, a case for the settlement of the intestate estate of Sps. Emilio and Leonarda Dulalia. During
the pendency of the case to which Dulalia sought the issuance of letters administration in his
favour, Cajigal appointed Gilda Dulalia-Figueroa as special administratrix of the estate. Aggrieved,
Dulalia filed a Motion for Reconsideration and during the pendency of which, Dulalia filed an
administrative complaint for gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law for his failure to
resolve the motion on time. Cajigal denied the allegations in the complaint. He averred that the
complaint, which was filed by a disgruntled party who did not get a favourable action in his court, is
purely personal and meant only to harass him. Respondent judge insisted that when he issues an
order in a case, he sees to it that it is rendered within the bounds of the rules. He submitted that he
is also not liable for gross inefficiency considering that the matter submitted before him cannot be
resolved outright in view of the conflicting claims of the complainant and his siblings.
ISSUE:
Whether the Dulalia administrative complaint should be given due course
RULING:
NO. Dulalias complaint should be dismissed. Complainant assails the propriety of the
decision rendered by respondent judge. Unfavorable rulings are not necessarily erroneous. Should
he disagree with the courts ruling, there are judicial remedies available under the Rules of Court.
As a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no
matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. Complainant had in fact availed of the
remedy of a motion for reconsideration prior to his filing of the administrative complaint.
MAMASAW SULTAN ALI v. HON. BAGUINDA-ALI PACALNA, Presiding Judge HON. PUNDAYA A.
BERUA, Acting Presiding Judge HADJI IBRA DARIMBANG, Clerk of Court and MANDAG U.
Page 113 of 117

BATUA-AN, Court Stenographer, all of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Municipality of Balin
dong, Province of Lanao del Sur
In the Matter of: Petition for Absolute Judicial Clemency of Former Judge Baguinda-Ali A.
Pacalna, MTCC Marawi City
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505, November 27, 2013, Villarama, J.
This Court has laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to
wit: 1.) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited
to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation; 2.) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the
imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation; 3.) The age of the person asking for
clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by
giving him a chance to redeem himself; 4.) There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual
aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the
legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service; 5.)
There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
FACTS:
Judge Baguinda-Ali Pacalna sought judicial clemency and to re-join the judiciary as a trial
judge in Marawi City after resigning from the same post during investigation by the Office of the
Ombudsman in connection with various administrative complaints filed against him for dishonesty,
serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law and procedure. To these complaints, Pacalna
was subsequently meted out with a fine for having been found guilty of the allegations stated above.
ISSUE:
Whether Pacalna should be extended judicial clemency
RULING:
NO. Respondents petition is not supported by any single proof of his professed repentance.
His appeal for clemency is solely anchored on his avowed intention to go back to the judiciary on
his personal belief that "he can be x x x an effective instrument in the delivery of justice in the
Province of Lanao del Sur because of his seventeen (17) years of experience," and on his "promise
before the Almighty God and the High Court that he will never repeat the acts or omissions that he
had committed as a Judge." He claims having learned "enough lessons" during the three years he
became jobless and his family had "suffered so much because of his shortcoming." Apart from
respondents own declarations, there is no independent evidence or relevant circumstances to
justify clemency. Applying the standards set by this Court, respondents petition for judicial
clemency must be denied.
JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN v. JUDGE SIBANAH E. USMAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 28,
Catbalogan City, Samar
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2390, August 13, 2014, Peralta, J.
Page 114 of 117

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Such is the rule where the charge on which removal is sought is misconduct in office, wilful
neglect, corruption, or incompetence. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in
criminal trials apply.
FACTS:
Josephine Jazmines Tan is the plaintiff and accused in a civil and criminal case respectively,
both of which were heard before the trial court of Judge Sibanah Usman. Allegedly, Usman received
P250,000.00 from a certain Allan Tan so as to dismiss the civil case and hold Tan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Tan filed an administrative case for dismissal against Usman for corruption. Tan
offered as evidence his sworn statement and a receipt allegedly containing the fact the Usman
received the sum of money for a certain Allan Tan. Usman argued that the accusation of corruption
by Tan against him was merely a concoction and without the quantum of proof required by law.
ISSUE:
Whether the allegations of corruption against Usman was proven
RULING:
NO. The administrative complaint against Usman should be dismissed. No evidence was
presented showing that respondent in fact accepted money from Allan Tan in relation to the subject
cases. Neither was there any evidence to show that respondent judge unlawfully used his official
function for personal gain.
By merely presenting a "receipt" with a tenor that money in the amount of P250,000.00 was
received by Nilda Cinco in behalf of respondent to support an accusation of bribery will not stand
alone. While it may be considered as proof that indeed there was money received, it does not prove
that respondent received the same. While complainant presented the subject receipt, there was no
allegation as to how she acquired the receipt and from whom she obtained it. It did not help that the
due execution and authenticity of said receipt was not sufficiently established considering that the
parties thereto, Mr. Cui and Ms. Cinco, swore in their affidavits and in the hearing that no money
was received and that no receipt was issued. Complainant, despite notice, failed to attend the
hearing of the case, hence, she failed to substantiate her claim of bribery and corruption against
respondent.
GEORGE T. CHUA v. JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2394, September 1, 2014, Bersamin, J.
No judge can be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, or
incompetence in the adjudication of cases unless his acts constituted fraud, dishonesty or corruption;
or were imbued with malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice.
FACTS:
This complaint stems from an action for reformation filed in the sala of Judge Fortunito
Madrona of a lease contract involving a parcel of reclaimed land. The lessor Manila Bay
Page 115 of 117

Development Corporation (MBDC) with its President, George Chua was sued by Uniwide, the lessee,
for reformation of the lease contract on the ground that MBDC reneged on its obligations. MBDC
filed a motion of dismiss in lieu of an answer. Madrona denied the motion to dismiss. MBDC to file a
motion for reconsideration with respect to the motion to dismiss. Madrona ordered the parties to
file their Comment and Reply, respectively, after which the motion for reconsideration would be
deemed submitted for resolution. Before MBDC could file its Reply, Uniwide filed a motion to
declare MBDC in default. Judge Madrona issued another order resolving the motion to dismiss and
motion for reconsideration, declaring MBDC in default, and declaring its motion for reconsideration
moot. Chua, in behalf of MBDC, filed a complaint-affidavit charging Madrona with manifest
partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law. MBDC alleged that it cannot be
declared in default as it has a pending motion for reconsideration of the order denying its motion to
dismiss and that Madrona erred in resolving simultaneously MBDCs motion for reconsideration
and Uniwides motion to declare defendant in default. MBDC alleged that with the filing of its
motion for reconsideration, prescriptive period to file an Answer was interrupted and the counting
of the period shall run upon MBDCs receipt of the Order denying the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether Madrona is administratively liable
RULING:
NO. The admistrative complaint should be dismissed. No administrative recourse could

supplant or pre-empt the proper exercise by the CA of its certiorari jurisdiction. Furthermore, not
every error or mistake by a judge in the performance of his official duties as a judge renders him
administratively liable. MBDC did not adduce convincing evidence showing that Judge Madronas
acts were so gross or patent, deliberate and malicious; or imbued with evident bad faith; or tainted
with bias or partiality.
Page 116 of 117

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DEANS

LEGAL AND JUDICAL ETHICS

Practice of Law .....3

Suspension, Disbarment and Discipline of Lawyers...68

Notarial Practice (A.M. NO. 02-8-13-SC, as amended). .74

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

RENATO CAYETANO v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON

G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991, Paras, J.

IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELIQUENCY OF ATTY. MARCIAL A.

A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978, Castro, C.J.

Whether Edilion can be compelled to pay his membership dues

July 30, 1979, Melencio-Herrera, J.

The use of assumed or trade name in law practice is improper

ROBERTO SORIANO v. ATTY. MANUEL DIZON

A.C. No. 792, January 25, 2006, Per Curiam

Whether the disbarment of Atty, Manuel Dizon is warranted.

YES. He violated Canon 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by engaging in

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, ALIAS ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 BAR EXAMINEE

Whether Ramon should be disbarred

YES. There are 2 reasons to disbar Ramon:

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF UNSUCCESSFUL

CANDIDATES OF 1946 TO 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL.

Whether RA 972 is constitutional

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &

Whether Muning is entitled to a share in the attorneys fees

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA

Whether Fule was engaged in the private practice of law

ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN,

Whether Judge Belen is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.

LESLIE UI v. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO

Whether Atty. Iris should be disbarred on the ground of immorality

MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA v. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG

Whether Atty. Segundino should be disbarred for breach of promise to marry

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA v. ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA

Whether Atty. Macabata should be disbarred on the ground of gross immorality

PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN v. GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR.

Conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless merits disbarment.

Whether Atty. Generoso should be disbarred on the ground of gross immorality

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA QUINGWA v. ARMANDO PUNO

Whether Atty. Armando should be disbarred on the ground of gross immorality

JOSEFINA ROYONG v. ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA

Whether Atty. Ariston should be disbarred

JOHNSON LEE AND SONNY MORENO v. HON. RENATO E. ABASTILLAS,

Whether Atty. Chua should be administratively liable

PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC. v. FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC.

Whether the California judgment should not be enforced

ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA v. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA

Whether Atty. Molina is guilty of Dishonesty

EUPROCINA CRISOSTOMO v. ATTY. PHILIP NAZARENO

Whether Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN

Whether Atty. Limpin violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

MELVYN G. GARCIA v. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO

Whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide

VICTORIA C. HEENAN v. ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO

Whether Atty. Espejo is administratively liable

ANASTACIO TEODORO III v. ATTY. ROMEO GONZALES

Whether Atty. Gonzales committed forum-shopping

FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA

Whether Atty. Astorga violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

ERLINDA FOSTER v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG

Whether Atty. Agtang violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

"Quantum meruit meaning as much as he deserves is the basis for determining a