Equal protection clause
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Respondents.
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. --- Justice Jose P. Laurel
Facts:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the
historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III
declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan,
"Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of
his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted
the good senator to the presidency.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition
instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen
and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of
the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to
create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr.,
Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as
incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010,
signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause
Held:
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this
constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all
members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the
"previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in
partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the
commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all
administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and extend
to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be
struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate
of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration"only. The intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three
portions of the questioned executive order.
Decision
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not
the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power
of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and
the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest
Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself
guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of
powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it
seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain
the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a
hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Central Bank Employees Association vs BSP GR 148208 15
December 2004
Facts: The New Central Bank Act abolished the old Central Bank and
created the new BSP on 1993 through RA No 7653. Central Bank
Employees Association assailed the provision of RA No 7653, Art II Sec
15(c). They contend that it makes an unconstitutional cut between two
classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers as exempt class of
Salary Standardization Law (RA 6758) and (2) the rank-and-file non-exempt
class. BSP contends that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from
the SSL was intended to address the BSPs lack of competitiveness in
terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended
to discriminate against the rank-and-file.
Issue: Whether or not Section 15(c) violates equal protection right of the
BSP r&f employees?
Decision: Sec 15(c) unconstitutional. Judicial notice that other Govt
Financial Institution undertook amendment of their charters from 1995 to
2004 a blanket provision for all employees to be covered by SSL. The said
subsequent enactments constitute significant changes in circumstance
that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c). Legal history shows that GFIs have long been
recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other
governmental entities. There is no substantial distinctions so as to
differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the
seven GFIs. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding
on the rest. It is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters
has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso
anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be
declared as an outlaw.
Commissioner Jose T. Almonte, petitioner v Honorable Conrado
Vasquez, respondent
Facts:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to
Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of
EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with
the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in
the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the
anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to
quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the
Government.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while
Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management
Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that
funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been
illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an
employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the
Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of
subpoena duces tecum to provide documents relating tWhether or not an
Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum
to provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of
EIIB employers.o personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will
be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the
EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence
reports and information. "illegal activities affecting the national economy,
such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion,
dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it
may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that
there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be
made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the
inspection of subpoenaed documents be made personally in camera by the
Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.
Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968)
Facts: In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance 4,
imposing on any and all productions of centrifuga sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City a municpal tax equivalent to 1% per
export sale to the United States and other foreign countries. The company
paid the said tax under protest. It subsequently filed a case seeking to
invalidate the ordinance for being unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause.

Held: The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported
by the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinances enacted, the company was the only sugar central in Ormoc
City. The classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the
same class as the present company, from the coverage of the tax. As it is
now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the
tax because the ordinance expressly points only to the company as the
entity to be levied upon.
Searches and Seizures
PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA [205 SCRA 791; G.R. No. 95902; 4 Feb
1992]
Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining
information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in
Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money treated with
ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a
certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and a
certain object wrapped in a plastic later identified as marijuana was given
in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made a
report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid was
conducted in the house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the
NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a
plastic syringe among others. There was no authorization by any search
warrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower
court, considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the
prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.
Held: The NARCOM agents procedure in the entrapment of the accused
failed to meet the qualification that the suspected drug dealer must be
caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person posing as a
buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said
raid also violated accused right against unreasonable search and seizure,
as the situation did not fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be
validly made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is
incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain
view. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the
urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the
raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a
search warrant during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and
ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and
other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against
appellant:
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold
him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag.
Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor,
what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized
as evidence against the appellant were the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A"Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops
contained inside a transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B" Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds
contained inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C" Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried
marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then further
wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D" Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing
suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seventeen
grams.
Exh. "E" One plastic syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during
the so-called follow-up raid in the house of Rodriguezas father. The
unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves
that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this
Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana
leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such,
the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness.
Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Conviction
is reversed and set aside and accused is acquitted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes,
went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders carrying
Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he
was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes
asked if she could examine and inspect the packages. She refused and
assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.
Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of Customs and
Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor
emitted from the box and that the gloves contain dried leaves. He
prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained
inside the cellophane wrappers.
The accused appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred
in admitting in evidence the illegality of search and seized objects
contained in the four (4) parcels.
ISSUE:Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?
HELD:Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution
Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule
Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by
virtue of a defective search warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling
earlier adopted in Mercado vs Peoples Court.
The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence
sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private
person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of state authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused /
appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the
government without the latter transgressing appellants rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty
the same should not be admitted.
FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI
agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited
merchandise, clearly that the NBI agents made no search and seizure
much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused / appellant.
CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof
BILL OF RIGHTS
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy, protection against whom, protection against the STATE.

Stonehill vs Diokno (20 SCRA 383)
Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against
petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers
directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal
properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for
violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations
and on the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized
documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were
subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the
legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those
seized as evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and
partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents
and papers.
Held:
Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules,
thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and
warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of
the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers.
Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in
court as a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned,
except if warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return
of those taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as
they are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.
Soliven vs. Makasiar (167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585)
This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
FACTS: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1)
whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for
libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a
prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional
rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and
the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events
have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and
upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City
Fiscals finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary
of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2,
1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners
contention that they have been denied the administrativeremedies
available under the law has lost factual support.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when
information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently by the President
2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable clause
3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution,
may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a
complaint-affidavit
DECISION:
Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to
DISMISS the petitions.
The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the
Court en banc is LIFTED.
RATIO:
Background of the first issue
MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration
APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice
MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary,
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary
Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.
This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, he filed a Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed, in effect,
waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is
deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
Second issue
This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
issuance of warrants of arrest:
Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.
However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall:
(1) Personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause (and on the basis,
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or
(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of
probable cause.
Third issue
Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the
Presidents filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to
be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial courts
jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity
from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing
herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue
of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by
any other person in the Presidents behalf.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the
Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege).
Additional Issue:
Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel
case to proceed would produce a chilling effect on press freedom.
Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at
this stage to rule on the chilling effect point.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J.
Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three
principal issues. With regard to whether or not the libel case would produce
a chilling effect on press freedom, Gutierrez believes that this particular
issue is the most important and should be resolved now rather than later.
Quotable quotes: Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. United States v. Bustos
No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such
exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated
breath. People v. Perfecto
NICOMEDES SILVA vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE
G.R. No. 81756 October 21, 1991
Facts:
M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, as chief of the PC NARCOM Detachment in
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental filed an application for the search warrant
with the RTC against petitioners. The application was accompanied by
deposition of witness executed by Arthur Alcoran and Pat. Leon Quindo.
Judge Hickarter Ontal, Presiding judge issued search warrant no. 1
directing the aforesaid police officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in
the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of the dangerous drugs law..
under the search warrant its state that :seize and take possession of the
following property marijuana, dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and bring said
property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
In the course of the search, the serving officer also seized money
belonging to Antoinette Silva in the amount of 1231.40. Antoinette filed a
motion the return of the said amount. Acting on said motion Judge Ontal
issued an order stating that the court holds in abeyance the disposition of
the said amount pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection
with the search warrant.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court provides for the requisite for the issuance oa a search warrant.
Section 3 a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
Judge after eamination under oath
ESTEBAN MORANO, CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN vs. HON.
MARTINIANO VIVO
G.R. No. L-22196 June 30, 1967
Facts:
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen, together with her minor son in her first
marriage, Fuyan Fun arrived in the Philippines to visit her cousin. they are
permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two
months and after they posted a cash bond of 4,000. afterwards, Chan
married Esteban Morano, native Filipino citizen. to prolong their stay in the
Philippines, chan and Fu obtained several extension. The last extension
expired on September 10, 1962.
In a letter, the commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan and Fu to leave
the country on or before September 10 with a warning that upon failure so
to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation
of their bond.
Instead of leaving the country they petitioned the court of first instance for
mandamus to compel the commissioner of immigration to cancel
petitioners' alien certificate of registration, prohibition to stop the issuance
of warrant of arrest and preliminary injunction to restrain the confiscation
of their cash bond.
Issue:
Whether or not the commissioner of immigration can issue warrant of
arrest
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Section 1 (3), Article III [Bill of Rights] of the
Constitution, to wit:
(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue
warrants of arrest and that the legislative delegation of such power to the
Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of Rights.
Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require
judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued
in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order
of arrest in the exercise of judicial power4 as a step preliminary or
incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or
administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid
decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation,
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid
legislation.
In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3),
Article III of the Constitution aforesaid, requiring that the issue of probable
cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF:
ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT
vs. HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988
Facts:
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles who
were apprehended after three months close surveillance by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) agents in Pagsanjan
Laguna. Two days after apprehension 17 opted for self deportation, one
released for lack of evidenced, one was charged by another offense,
working without a valid working visa. Thus, three was left to face the
deportation proceedings.
 Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo
negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitute shown in salacious
poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sexual act. There were also
posters and other literatures advertising the child prostitution.

Warrant of arrest was issued by respondent against petitioners for

violation of Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration act and sec. 69 of the
revised administrative Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippines immigration act clothed the

commissioner with any authority to arrest and detained petitioner pending
determination of the existence of a probable cause
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there can be no question that the
right against unreasonable search and seizure is available to all persons,
including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not.
One of the constitutional requirement of a valid search warrant or
warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause.
The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined
after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their
activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the
arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters
without warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest
and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not
valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation charges
have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens.
NARCISO ALVAREZ vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY BOARD
G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937
Facts:
the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David an
affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept
in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits
and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-
lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath
at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his
answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and
belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own
knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a
reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date,
issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the
search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure
of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery
thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law.

That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their
arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective
With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered
rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those
the petitioners store and residence at seven oclock on the night and
circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that
seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue
petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual
licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two
perversion involving children"
cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two
memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight
stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading,
one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra,
two packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis
Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many documents
and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits,
promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation.
As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who
issued the search warrant, the petitionerfiled a motion praying that the
agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to
deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said
agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the
court. Motion granted. Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-
Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order be set aside and that the
Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of
thirty (30) days for the necessary investigation.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the affidavit is valid for purposes in issuing a search
warrant
2. Whether or not affidavit of witnesses is needed
3. Whether or not the constitutional mandate that the thing to be seized is
particularly described is violated
4. Whether or not fishing evidence is valid
Ruling:
1. The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable
cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant
must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and
the witnesses he may produce. The oath required must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant
be held liable for damages caused
it appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the
search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the
manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that
the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books,
documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the
deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.
2. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce.
It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the
applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge
who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the
affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor
take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor
General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take
the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or
complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in
requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy
the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if
the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may
dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the
agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was
not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the
affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the
existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant.
3. These provisions of the constitution are mandatory and must be strictly
complied with but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather generally, it is not required that a technical
description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. The
only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge
was as follows: that there are being kept in said premises books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of
interest, in violation of the law. Taking into consideration the nature of the
article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed
description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give
a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made
substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the
law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling
him to identify the articles, which he did
4. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it
clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to
enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or
some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the
criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and
documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as
evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they
were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant
unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional
provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against
himself
SORIANO MATA vs. HON. JOSEPHINE BAYONA
G.R. No. 50720 March 26, 1984
Facts:
Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by
selling illegal tickets known as Masiao Tickets without any authority from
the Philippine Jai Alai and amusement Corporation or from the government
authorities concerned.
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered
that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search
warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same,
so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts and to which
inquiry respondent judge replied it is with the curt. The judge then
handed the records to the Fiscal who attached then to the records
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under the constitution no search
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge
personally or such other responsible officer as may be authorized b law
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
The examining judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant
and witnesses that he may produce and to attach then to the records. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the judge may be able to
properly determined the existence and nonexistence of the probable
cause, to hole liable for perjury the person giving It if it will be found later
that his declaration are false.
Deposition any written statement certified under oath. written
testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in
advance of the trail or haring upon oral examination
The search warrant is illegal, the return of the thing seized cannot
be ordered. Illegality of search warrant does not call for the return of the
thing seize, the possession of which is prohibited.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO Y
LOPEZ
G.R. No. 109633 July 20, 1994
Facts:
Del Rosario was charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammutions and illegal sale of regulated drugs
Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of PNP Cavite,
before RTC judge Arturo de Guia issued a search warrant authorizing the
search and seizure of an : undetermined quantity of methamphetamine
hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia in the
premises of appellants house. However, the search warrant was not
implemented immediately due to lack of police personnel to form the
raiding team.
In the course of the search they found a black canister containing
shabu, an aluminum foil, a plastic .22 caliber, three set of ammunitions and
three wallets containing the marked money.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the accused cannot be convicted of
the illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. The search warrant
implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and seizure of
the described quantity of shabu and paraphernalia.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding
party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The constitution itself and
the Rules of Court specifically mandate that the search warrant must
particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was
no authority for the police officers to seize the firearms which was not
mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the search warrant.
Neither may it maintain that the gun was seized in the course of an
arrest, for as earlier observed, accused arrest was far from regular and
legal. Aid firearm, having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible
in evidence.
Umil vs. Ramos
FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the
validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on the petitioners.
The arrests relied on the confidential information that the authorities
received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was charged, the
rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the New Peoples
Army.
RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the
arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a continuing crime
together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal
since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were
not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe
houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender
as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would be considered as impliedly waived
and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not
sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and
after a trial free from error.
to examine and inspect the packages. However, before the delivery of the
box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's husband inspected the package
and found marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A case was
filed against Marti. Marti invoked his right against illegal searches and
seizure. Held: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus,
it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may
only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the
exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a
private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed
as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an
absurd interpretation of the constitution

DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The confidential information was nothing but

hearsay. The searches and arrests made were bereft of probable cause and
that the petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act.
Utmost, the authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions.

2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state. People vs.
Marti -- Marti and his wife went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages.
Marti informed the owner that the packages simply contained books, cigars
and gloves as gifts to his friends in Zurich and refused to allow the owner