.R. No.

L-5371 March 26, 1953

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AQUINO MINGOA, defendant-appellant.

Marcelino Lontok for appellant.

Office of the First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for
appellee.

REYES, J.:

Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of Despujols,
Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the
provincial auditor, the defendant Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of
public funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon, and having been found guilty as charged and
sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified
the case here on the ground that it involved a constitutional question.

The evidence shows that it is not disputed that upon examination of his books and accounts on
September 1, 1949, defendants, as accountable officer, was found short in the sum above-named
and that, required to produce the missing fund, he was not able to do so. He explained to the
examining officer that some days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope
which he took with him to show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when
he returned. But he did not testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor.

We agree with the trial judge that defendant's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot
overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his inability to produce the fund which was found
missing. As His Honor observes, if the money was really lost without defendant's fault, the most
natural thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability. But
this he did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he
preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further
as the prosecution points out in its brief, that defendant had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor
who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged loss many teachers
and other employees of the town had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe
that defendant had really malversed the fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure
invention.

It is now contended, however, that lacking direct evidence of actual misappropriation the trial court
convicted defendant on mere presumptions, that is, presumptions of criminal intent in losing the
money under the circumstances alleged and presumptions of guilt from the mere fact that he failed,
upon demand to produce the sum lacking. The criticism as to the first presumption is irrelevant, for
the fact is that trial court did not believe defendant's explanation that the money was lost,
considering it mere cloak to cover actual misappropriation. That is why the court said that "whether
or not he (defendant) is guilty of malversation for negligence is of no moment . . . " And as to the
other presumption, the same is authorized by article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
 The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.

The contention that this legal provision violates the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained. The question of the
constitutionality of the statute not having been raised in the court below, it may not be considered for
the first time on appeal. (Robb vs. People, 68 Phil., 320.)

In many event, the validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now settled
matter, Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations, 8th ed., Vo. I, pp. 639-641says that "there is
no constitutional objection to the passage of law providing that the presumption of innocence may be
overcome by contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting
what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence." In line with this view,
it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that when certain facts have
been proven they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift
the burden of proof provided there be rational connection between that facts proved and the ultimate
fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and
arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. (See annotation on
constitutionality of statutes or ordinances making one fact presumptive or prima facie evidence of
another, 162 A.L.R. 495-535; also, State vs. Brown, 182 S.E., 838, with reference to embezzlement.)
The same view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of this court in the
U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303; U.S. vs. Luling, 34 Phil., 725; and People vs. Merilo, G.R. No. L-3489,
promulgated June 28, 1951.

The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It
makes the failure of public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demaand, any public funds
or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. The ultimate fact presumed is that officer has malversed the funds or
property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has
received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact
presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no
rational connection between the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima
facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The
presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations.

There being no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with
costs.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and
Labrador, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-60884 November 5, 1987

PEDRO BACASNOT Y CALIAO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN & THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This petition for certiorari assails the decision dated June 7, 1982, of respondent Sandiganbayan
finding accused-petitioner Pedro Bacasnot y Caliao, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds/Property. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Pedro Bacasnot y

Caliao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217, Paragraph 4, of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstance on record, hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS AND
ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY as maximum, both of reclusion temporal, to suffer perpetual special
disqualification, to pay a fine of P3,900,961.39, to indemnify the National Food
Authority in the same amount of P3,900,961.39 malversed by him and to pay the
costs of this action. (Rollo, p. 111)

Petitioner was the Operation Officer and the Grains Stock Control Officer of the National Food
Authority (NFA, for short) at Malaybalay, Bukidnon from May, 1975 until his suspension in October,
1980. As such he was issued Special Orders Nos. 19-B and 38 (Exhs. A-3 and A-4) authorizing him
to assist in the procurement operations in Bukidnon. He was an accountable officer and he was
required to post a bond. (Exhs. A-5 and A-6)

Petitioner's area of responsibility covered the entire province of Bukidnon. He was responsible for
numeruos warehouses where thousands or millions of kilos of corn grains, palay, rice and corn grit
were stored.

On or about November 21, 1979, a team of auditors from the Commission on Audit (COA) assigned
at the NFA head office examined the stocks and empty sacks accountabilities of petitioner. He was
found to have incurred shortages in his accounabilities, not only for stocks of corn, grains, rice and
palay, but also for empty sacks. Initial examination (Exh. M) revealed that he had incurred shortages
as follows:

Variety Quantity Replacement Cost Amount

Corn grains 1,399,966.05 P2.86 P4,003,902.90

Palay 20, 702.90 1.80 38,507.39

Rice 8,210.00 3.83 29,805.60

Corn grits 1,800.16 2.73 4,914.44

Empty Sacks 361,020.72

Total Shortages P4,438,151.05

Petitioner was informed of such shortages in a letter/formal demand Exh. N) dated August 26, 1980.
He replied thereto on September 12, 1980 (Exh. O) and on September 18, 1980 (Exh. 5) claiming
that the shortages were due to (a) poor storage facilities; (b) bumper harvests in 1978 which led to
the utilization of additional temporary werehouses; (c) vulnerability of the stocks to the natural
elements; and (d) uncontrolled infestation.

Thereafter and following well-established guidelines, the COA made the corresponding studies and
after reevaluation/recomputation of toerable alloance due to insect infestation using "uncontrollable
formulaiton" the Auditor-in- Charge, NGA, reduced petitioner's shortages on stocks from
P4,438,151.72 to P3, 539,940.67, excluding petitioner's shortage on empty sacks valued at
P361,020.72, thereby pegging his total shortages at P3,900,961.39, broken down as follows:

Stock N R R A
e e e m
t d p o
K u l u
il c a n
o e c t
s d e
m
b e
y n
t

T C
o o
 l s
e t
r s
a
b
l
e

A
l
l
o
w
a
n
c
e

Cor 1 P P P
n , l 2 3
grai 4 , . ,
ns 5 2 8 4
1 1 6 7
, 4 4
6 , ,
8 7 2
8 6 3
. 6 3
7 . .
9 9 4
5 8

Pala 3 1 1 3
y 1 8 . 4
, , 8 ,
7 5 6 4
5 2 6
8 8 2
. . -
1 1 3
5 5 6

Rice 8 7 2
, , 7
 2 6 ,
0 6 8
9 4 2
. . 0
0 1 .
5 5 9
7

Cor 1 1 3
n , , ,
grits 8 2 4
0 5 2
0 4 3
. . .
1 1 8
6 6 6

Total Money Value of Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

P3,539.940.67

Add: Sacks of various types and

capacities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 361,020.72

TOTAL
SHORTAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.P3,900,961.39

Exhs. T to T-20

Petitioner was thus prosecuted for malversation of public funds/property before respondent
Sandiganbayan, which as earlier stated, found him guilty thereof.

In assailing his conviction petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether or not the evidence submitted by the prosecution has satisfactorily

established that the shortage was due to misappropriation or embezzlement or
conversion of the accused as alleged in the information for his own benefit or use,
and

2. Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it shall be prima facie evidence for malversation
when a public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property for which he is
chargeable on demand by any duly authorized officer. That presumption of guilt is founded on
human experience and is valid. (Albores vs. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 604)
 In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his
possession public funds, that he could not account for them and did not have them in
his possession and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for the
disappearance of the same. An accountable public officer may be convicted of
malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only
evidence is that there is shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to
explain satisfactorily. (De Guzman vs. People 119 SCRA 337)

In the case at bar, petitioner admits there was a shortage. But he claims that the same was mainly
due to infestation by weevils and respodents, usual shrinkage, spillage and poor conditions of the
various warehouses where the stocks were piled. The evidence on record however shows that to
verify the alleged infestation, the NFA management directed a study of tolerable allowance for
uncontrolled infestation. The result of the study still left petitioner with an accountability of
P3,539,940.67 plus an additional accountability for empty sacks valued at P361,020.72. Therefore,
even on the assumption that the warehouses under his control and supervision were inadequate for
storage, or were exposed to the elements, or the stocks were subject to uncontrolled infestation, at
the very least, the petitioner should not have incurred such an extraordinary shortage of empty
sacks, since such materials cannot be totally eaten up by insects, and even if damaged by the
elements, parts thereof would still exist or be salvageable. For such quantity of empty sacks to be
totally inexistent, the answer would be they were either stolen or misappropriated. It simply boggles
the mind to accept the proposition advanced by the petitioner that stocks of corn grains, palay and
rice totalling P1,428,879.86 kilos and P361,020.72 worth of empty sacks would disappear without
human intervention, gross inexcusable negligence or willful misappropriation. Even granting that the
stocks and empty sacks under the custody and responsibility of petitioner were exposed to the
elements, or stored in inadequate warehousing facilities or subjected to uncontrollable infestation
such quantities of accountable properties affected thereby would, at the very least, leave some
remnants in their storage places.

Citing the case of Albores vs. Court of Appeals (132 SCRA 604) wherein it was held that "even
granting that the shortage is too great to be attributable to shrinkage, that consideration is neither
sufficient to convict." Petitioner now claims that like Albores (who was found short of 4,658 cavans
and 38 kilos of corn valued at P75,656.94, he is also entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.

The aforesaid case of Albores is not applicable in the case at bar. In the said case, the Court found
that:

The accused was the one who requested that his accountability be liquidated
because he wanted to transfer to another office. Mr. Arsenio Guerra, then the RCA
Agency Manager and his immediate supervisor, testified that there was no report of
any anomaly having been committed by the accused. The accused himself
voluntarily submitted the records with which the auditors established the shortage.
When informed of the shortage by the auditors, the accused consulted the Branch
Manager, Vicente Caballero, the Chief of the Agency Manager, who informed him
that he was found short because he was not given any shrinkage allowance. This
conduct of the accused we find consistent with good faith. (p. 610, supra)

Petitioner in the case at bar cannot be said to have acted in good faith. On the contrary, he has not
contradicted or rebutted the evidence of the prosecution showing numerous irregularities in his
records, operations and transactions as Grains Stock Control Officer of Bukidnon.

Notable among such irregularities found by the audit team are the following: (1) duplicate copies of
warehouse stock receipts (WSR) were cancelled to make it appear that the stocks covered were not
received by him; (2) WSRs were not reflected in his accountabilities in the stock report; (3) duplicate
copies of WSRs were altered to increase their moisture contents; (4) 1,433 bags of palay
categorized as damaged stocks were rebagged and intentionally mixed with soil, sand and gravel
and other foreign matters (Exh. "M-1"); (5) poor warehouse keeping and negligence, compound by
non-perfomance by the classifier of his assigned tasks; (6) excessive losses due to abnormal drying
operations; (7) rampant alteratations in warehouse documentation on empty sacks transactions in
warehouse documentation on empty sacks transactions; and (8) non-issuance of official receipts for
sales of stocks. (Exhs. "M", "M-1" to "M-2")

These documents submitted as evidence were received from petitioner himself (Exh. "D"). What is
apparent inthese altered and cancelled documents is a scheme to conceal irregularities and justify
losses incurred. Not only that, actual stock inventory revealed some bags of palay to have been re-
bagged and filled with gravel, sand and foreign matters, an obnoxious attempt to cover-up losses by
showing that appellant had 1,443 bags purportedly filled with palay.

If there had been no timely audit and inventory, petitioners could have gone scot-free in his attempt
to cover-up his losses. Under the circumstances, his contention that has led a non-luxurious life and
is not wealthy is an obvious non-sequitur.

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.