Ravi Singh Achrol, Torger Reve, & Louis W.
Stern
The political economy framework for the compar-
ative analysis of marketing channel dyads pro-
posed by Stern and Reve (1980) focused nnainly
on relationships between channel nnennbers. This
article extends the political economy framework
by indicating bow environmental factors (i.e., fac-
tors external to a dyad) might influence and affect
the structure and processes of the dyad. When
combined with the original article by Stern and
Reve, the resulting overall perspective should pro-
vide a comprehensive basis for theory develop-
ment and research in the marketing channel area.
A CCORDING to the political economy framework
for the comparative analysis of marketing chan-
nels (Stem and Reve 1980), a marketing channel dyad
can be analyzed in terms of (1) its intemal economy,
i.e., the intemal economic structure and processes, and
(2) its intemal polity, i.e., the intemal sociopolitical
structure and processes.
The intemal economic structure is described by
the type of transactional form linking two chan-
nel members, i.e., the vertical economic ar-
rangements within any given dyad, ranging fix)m
market mediated to hierarchical transactions.
The intemal economic processes refer to the na-
ture of the decision mechanisms employed to
determine terms of trade among the members
of the dyad, covering impersonal and routine
decision making, bargaining, and centralized
planning processes.
Ravi Singh Achrol is Visiting Assistant Professor of Marketing, Univer-
sity of Notre Dame, and doctoral candidate, Northwestern University.
Torger Reve is Research Professor of Organization Theory, Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration, and visiting scholar,
Stanford University. Louis W. Stern is A. Montgomery Ward Professor
of Marketing, Norihv^restern University. The authors gratefully acknowl-
edge the contributions of two anonymous reviewers to the develop-
ment of this article.
Journal of Marketing
Vol. 47
The
Environment of
Marketing
Channel Dyads:
A Framework
for CoiTiparative
Analysis
The intemal sociopolitical structure is defined
by the pattem of power-dependence relations
which exist between any two channel members,
ranging from minimal power, through balanced
power, to imbalanced and centralized power.
The intema! sociopolitical processes are de-
scribed in terms of the dominant sentiments (e.g.,
cooperation and/or conflict) within the dyad.
As indicated in the original article outlining the
political economy framework, the tasks remaining to
complete the framework were (1) to identify the in-
teractions and variables outside of the intemal dynam-
ics of dyadic exchange, which have the greatest in-
fluence on the stmcture and processes of a dyad, and
(2) to suggest how these extemal factors might be or-
ganized in theoretically illuminating ways.
The significance of a channel's environment is not
well-reflected in the literature on channel theory and
research. References have been made to extemal con-
ditions as possible determinants of channel structure
(e.g., Bucklin and Carman 1974, Sturdivant 1966),
but explicit investigations into the nature of extemal
variables and their impacts are lacking. Even among
those rare inquiries (e.g., Etgar 1977), the findings
only seem to sharpen consciousness of how fragmen-
tary current knowledge of environmental impacts re-
mains.
The Political Economy Paradigm / 55
 This article suggests an environmental framework
which can be coupled with the earlier framework deal-
ing with intemal interactions. Before proceeding,
however, a few caveats and previews may assist the
reader in making sense and appreciating the limita-
tions of our attempt to capture all of the critical en-
vironmental variables within the confines of a single
article of limited length.
1. This article proposes a framework, not a the-
ory. A framework can be viewed as a first step
in the direction of identifying and dimension-
alizing the major variables influencing and or-
dering the structure and processes of social en-
tities. It is primarily an attempt to lay out the
variables and to chart a field of interaction. As
such, a framework makes no pretension of being
a theory. Rather, its purpose is to help position
individual researches so that they can proceed
in a systematic and methodical fashion toward
the emergence of a dominant theoretical para-
digm (see Zaltman, LeMasters, and Heffring
1982).
2. The framework presented here rests on six basic
tenets: (a) two-party or "dyadic" exchange rep-
resents the fundamental unit of analysis; (b) the
environment of a focal dyad can be sectioned
into primary and secondary task environments
and a macro environment; (c) the primary and
secondary task environments of a focal dyad
can be partitioned into input, output, compet-
itive, and regulatory sectors; (d) the original
political economy framework can be directly
applied to studying interactions between focal
dyads and their primary task environments; (e)
the secondary task environment can best be de-
scribed in terms of certain "qualitative" di-
mensions which impact dyadic exchange; and
(f) macro environmental influences manifest
themselves through developments in a focal
dyad's secondary task environment.
3. A series of illustrative propositions are in-
cluded to provide some clues about how this
framework might be used for possible predic-
tions, and to indicate potential sources of the-
ory.
4. In keeping with the objective of an encom-
passing framework, the range of the article is
extremely broad. The objective has been ac-
complished at the expense of detail, and some
topics have only been hinted at or referenced.
Later in this article, we lay out the general sche-
matic dimensions of the proposed framework and the
definitions on which its structure rests. Then we dis-
cuss the variable dimensions we propose as most use-
56 / Journal of Marketing, Fall 1983
ful in describing environmental influences from dif-
ferent sectors of the structure. However, before turning
to the basic substance of the framework, we shall pro-
vide a short justification for the unit of analysis cho-
sen herethe channel dyadsince it forms such an
essential construct around which the framework itself
revolves.
The Dyad as the Unit of Analysis
In this article, as in the previous article (Stem and
Reve 1980), we adopt the perspective that the fun-
damental activity in marketing channels is the trans-
action, i.e., the act of exchange between two eco-
nomic agents. Transactions are consummated in order
to carry out the various marketing functions that com-
prise the channel's work. In fact, any interorganiza-
tional system can be defined in terms of the transac-
tions which take place between social actors.
Focusing on transactions as the basic activity com-
pels a dyadic perspective in which the relationship be-
tween the two transacting parties is highlighted. The
dyadic approach is not entirely new (see Evans 1963),
but applications to marketing have been relatively few
(e.g., Bonoma, Bagozzi, and Zaltman 1978; Reve and
Stem 1982; Sheth 1976). In contrast to the majority
of extant approaches, which focus either on the in-
dividual firm or on the channel as a whole, the focus
in transactional level analysis is on how and why dif-
ferent transactions are created, carried out, or avoided
between channel members. In addition, analysis of
channel transactions concentrates on the relative ef-
ficiencies associated with altemative modes for com-
pleting transactions, such as vertical integration, con-
tractual arrangements, and market exchange (cf.
Williamson 1975).
Eventually, the study of interorganizational rela-
tions in marketing channels should probably take the
form of analyzing networks instead of dyads. Net-
work analysis would more completely capture the
complexity of interorganizational relations (Aldrich and
Whetten 1981). In order to study networks of orga-
nizational interactions, however, first one needs to
understand the basic transaction or acts of exchange
between pairs of social actors by applying a dyadic
interaction model. Indeed, as Aldrich and Whetten ac-
knowledge, "The starting point for all studies of ag-
gregates of organizations is a relation or transaction
between two organizations" (p. 385).
It is extremely important to understand that in de-
fining a dyad as the unit of analysis, there are no con-
straints whatsoever against there being meaningful
linkages among three or more parties within a channel
system. In fact, the very need for specifying an ex-
temal or environmental framework is to allow for the
methodical treatment of such extradyadic influences,
 e.g., understanding what happens to bilateral trans-
actions when a third party inuence interacts. In this
sense, the dyad provides a convenient boundary from
which to examine the nature of a wide variety of "ex-
temal" forces.
Another compelling reason for choosing the dyad
as the unit of analysis is that a framework should be
useful for theory development and testing. While the
state of theories pertaining to dyadic interorganiza-
tional interactions is improving (cf. Pfeffer and Sal-
ancik 1978, Williamson 1975), the state of network
or systems theory is relatively weak and chaotic. As
Bonoma, Bagozzi, and Zaltman (1978) point out, "At
this state of its development, systems 'theory' is pri-
marily a descriptive tool (e.g., the now chart) which
does not admit rigorous hypothesis formulation, test-
ing, or theory formulation" (p. 58). Focusing on the
transaction (and thus, on dyadic exchange) is likely
to permit research in marketing channels to advance
farther and faster than reliance on the rather nebulous
generalities found in systems theory. But, in order to
justify such a focus, it is imperative that the research
account for all meaningful interactions extemal to the
dyad that may impinge upon it. The framework pro-
posed here is an effort to assure that all such relevant
variables will be accounted for.
The Environment of Marketing
Channel Dyads
There is no single environment facing the members of
a channel dyad. Each separate exogenous force which
impinges on a dyadic relationship can be said to rep-
resent a separate environmental context. However, both
from the perspective of analytical expediency and the-
oretical generalization, it is reasonable to assume that
there are important clusters of forces which seem to
affect channel dyads differentially. Theoretically, the
environmental pluralism of channel dyads can be han-
dled by distinguishing the forces creating direct and
indirect extemal dependencies for a dyad. Thus, there
is for every dyad a primary task environment, a sec-
ondary task environment, and a macro task environ-
ment.
The Primary Task Environment is comprised of
immediate suppliers and customers of the dyad.
(In some situations, regulating agencies and
competitors to the channel dyad may be drawn
into direct exchange relationships and thus into
the primary task environment.)
The Secondary Task Environment is comprised
of suppliers to the immediate suppliers, cus-
tomers to the immediate customers, regulatory
agents and interest aggregators who influence
nt of Marketing Channel Dyads: A Framework for Comparative Analysis / 57
them, and direct and potential competitors to
the channel dyad.
The Macro Environment is comprised of gen-
eral social, economic, political, and technolog-
ical forces which impinge on the activities in
the primary and secondary task environments.'
In the theoretical analysis of environments, insight
into the nature of extemal dependencies and influ-
ences is vitally important. First, the strategic options
available to channel actors in adapting to or acting
upon environmental forces are heavily constrained by
the nature and proximity of these forces. For example,
developments in a dyad's primary task environment
can be traced to specific actors. In reacting to them,
dyad members can consider various forms of integra-
tion, ranging through merger, spontaneous coopera-
tion, negotiated cooperation, etc. (cf. Pfeffer and Sal-
ancik 1978), as well as strategies for enhancing their
own power through such actions as diversification. On
the other hand, developments in the secondary task
environment are less amenable to absorption or indi-
vidual influence. Joint efforts through coalition for-
mation and horizontal cooperation are more effective.
Further, changes in the macro environment cannot
usually be acted upon proactively with much success,
and adaptive strategies (e.g., withdrawal) provide the
only effective response.
The second important leverage in theoretical gen-
eralization comes from the types of variables that are
likely to be useful explanators. Because the elements
of the primary task environment are identifiable actors
that are being dealt with on a one-to-one basis, the
variables and interactions specified in the intemal po-
litical economy framework (Stem and Reve 1980) come
into direct relevance. But elements in the secondary
and macro environmentssuch as the technological
state of the industry, the demographic mix of the pop-
ulation, the orientation to social welfare in the soci-
ety, and the system of laws and regulationsrelate
to the focal dyad through such a variety of complex
mediating, filtering, and buffering processes and in-
teractions that only some higher order constructs (as
opposed to specific operating variables) are likely to
'For the secondary and macro environments, the classification scheme
departs from the language of the pohtical economy framework (eco-
nomic and political structures and processes), because we feel it is
less useful to segregate economic and political forces in characterizing
the extemal environment. In dealing with the environment, the polit-
ical economy gestalt within which channel members function is often
nwre important to an understanding of the structures and processes
which typify their interactions than is an understanding of the specific
components of that gestalt classified along political or economic lines.
This corresponds to an institutional economics approach in which eco-
nomic and political forces interact in shaping collective behavior and
results.
capture enough explanation for the purposes of the-
oretical generalization. FIGURE 1
In addition to separating the environment into pri- Environment of Marketing Channel Dyads
mary, secondary, and macro phenomena, it is also
useful to segment it in terms of the main sectors to
which any channel dyad must relate. Consequently, MACRO ENVIRONMENT
for the purposes of a comprehensive framework, the \
\ SECONDARY TASK
primary and secondary task environments may be di- ^
\
ENVIRONMENT

vided into an input sector, an output sector, a com- \

petitive sector, and a regulatory sector (Dill 1958, \
\
Thompson 1967):
The input sector of the task environment of a
channel dyad consists of all direct and indirect
suppliers to the dyad.
The output sector consists of all direct and in-
direct customers of the channel dyad, both dis-
tributors and end users. (The input and output
sectors refer to vertical relationships in a mar-
keting channel sense.)
The competitive sector primarily captures hor-
izontal relationships faced by the channel dyad,
i.e.., actual and potential competitors of the
channel dyad.
The regulatory sector consists of regulatory
groups, including governmental agencies, trade
associations, interest organizations, and ad hoc
groups.
We now tum to explicating the major conceptual
components of the framework depicted in Figure 1. tailers. But these same manufacturers may also main-
tain direct relations with their retailers by assisting in
The Concept of the Focal Dyad in-store display and promotions, inventory planning,
A dyadic interaction model takes two-party exchange local advertising, and the like. Wherever direct, goal-
relationships as its fundamental subject matter or phe- oriented social interaction occurs between actors in
nomenon to be explained. In such a model, marketing a channel, a channel dyad exists.
behavior is regarded as an inherently social activity Second, if all goal-directed social interactions cre-
where the outcomes of exchange depend on structural ate dyadic links, then "transactions" refer to more than
arrangements, bargaining, negotiation, power, con- just the exchange of physical or monetary resources,
flict, and the shared affect or cognitive images exist- and include exchanges involving information, good-
ing between buyer and seller (Bagozzi 1978, Carman will/identification, social legitimacy, influence, etc.
1980, Stem and Reve 1980). Four fundamental con- In this sense, organizational exchange is any activity
cepts need to be understood in isolating dyads for between two or more organizations that has conse-
analysis. quences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of
First, the focal dyad is any two-party exchange re- their respective goals or objectives.'^
lationship under investigation. Thus, while it might be A key phrase of the definition is the realization of
most usual, it is not necessary that the focal dyad in goals. We suggest that interactions that are not goal-
question correspond to hierarchically adjacent actors oriented are too tenuous to be cast in the mold of ex-
in the formal channel of distribution. The formal change. Thus, goodwill and identity may be ex-
channel is generally acknowledged as the sequential changed, provided actual or anticipated consequences
route taken by the physical and/or title flows of goods
and services. The channel as a social action system is
much more widely defined and encompasses all sorts ^Basically, this is Levine and White's definition (1961, p. 588).
of linkages and relations. For example, many manu- However, their definition focused on voluntary activity. We believe
facturers' formal channels involve moving all orders that not all exchange need be voluntary on both sides. For example,
dyad members may be forced into exchange and relationships with
through independent wholesalers to independent re- regulatory agencies.

58 / Journal of Marketing, Fall 1983

 for goal realization are involved. Such a characteriza-
tion preserves the fundamental give-and-take and ne-
gotiable nature of exchange.
Third, the "focal" dyad should not be confused
with the idea of a central or key set of actors/linkages
that are focal to the operation of a specific channel
system. The focal dyad is so called to distinguish the
level in the chain of distribution that is to be the focus
of any given study. Thus, manufacturer-wholesaler,
wholesaler-retailer, manufacturer-retailer, and even
supplier-manu facturer represent archtype focal dyads
that could be the separate focus of study in any given
research. The need for distinguishing the level of dis-
tribution as focal is important to the application of this
framework, because such specification will permit
consistent definitions of the primary and secondary
environments relevant to the sampling pool for any
given study.
Finally, empirical field testing of hypotheses can
only be conducted across a sample of specific or unique
dyads. While a uniquely identified dyad might be sub-
ject to a variety of singular traits and individual
differences (e.g., personalities, multiple branding pol-
icies, or emphasis on service work), these should not
impede the application of a framework that leads to
theory development or theory testing. If a theory is
strong, the singular traits in dyads comprised of in-
dividual channel units or actors will end up in a small
residual term. If it is weak, the amount of variance
accounted for is smaller, the residual larger, and the
validity, robustness, and/or generalizability of the
theory would be in danger of rejection.
Analyzing Interactions with the Primary Task
Environment
Every actor operating outside a specific channel dyad
is a member of the environment of the dyad. The
question at issue here is how the relationship between
"outsiders" and "insiders" can be described so that,
eventually, predictions can be made regarding effects
on the intemal exchange relationship and vice versa.
Clearly, in the transactionai approach to studying so-
cial behavior the nature of the relationship or linkage
is likely to be central. For a large number of extemal
actors (specifically those positioned in a dyad's pri-
mary task environment), it is possible to define their
relationship to the focal dyad as a transactionai one.
Then, because every transaction engaged in with par-
ties outside the dyad by dyad members also involves,
by definition, a dyadic exchange, the intemal political
economy variables apply to all such transactions
wherever they occur. In other words, it might be said
that such interactions can be handled by an "extended
political economy model" of exchange. For example,
in the case of a manufacturer-wholesaler dyad, sup-
pliers and institutional customers such as retailers are
Marketing Channel Dyads: A Framework for Comparative Analysis / 59
among the more important actors in the input and out-
put sectors of the channel dyad's primary environ-
ment. The relationships between commercial channel
members operating outside the dyad and those within
the dyad can often be stmctured and, in some cases,
administered. As such, the relationships can be de-
scribed in terms of ( 1 ) whether market or hierarchical
transactions take place between the parties (economic
structure); (2) what decision-making mechanisms are
used to establish the terms of trade between them
(economic processes); (3) whether power is minimal,
balanced, imbalanced, or centralized (political stmc-
ture); and (4) what type of sentiments and behaviors
(cooperative/conflictive) typify their interactions (po-
htical processes).
Identical observations can be made for actors in
the competitive and regulatory sectors of the primary
task environment // an exchange relationship exists
between them and members of the focal dyad. (Thus
in Figure 1, competitors and regulatory actors are po-
sitioned on the boundary of the primary and secondary
environments, indicating that the relationships can be
director indirect.) For example, if a cartel exists, then
competitors are involved in transactions with at least
one member of the focal dyad. Also, if a member of
the dyad is in a relatively close exchange relationship
with a regulatory agentsuch as exists between a
trucking company and the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, or between a farm cooperative and the U.S.
Department of Agriculturethe political economy
variables could be readily employed to position the
relationship (e.g., a market transaction subject to bar-
gaining and/or centralized planning, where power is
usually imbalanced, and resource allocation processes
are frequently highly cooperative and generally min-
imally conflictive). Clearly, exchanges with extemal
actors in the competitive and regulatory sectors may
not involve goods or services for money, but the ex-
changes are just as important for the focal dyad as
those that do.
In summary then, as a general mie, the variables
and perspective outlined in the intemal political econ-
omy framework apply directly to any extemal rela-
tionship which involves a direct exchange between an
"outside" party and either member of the focal dyad.
This direct exchange network should be considered
the key strategic arena in channel analysis. For theory
building and testing in this context, the "micro" the-
ories and propositions indicated in the intemal polit-
ical economy framework (Stem and Reve 1980) should
provide strong explanatory power for handling influ-
ences from sectors in the primary task environment.
When elements in the environment serve to influ-
ence the character of the exchange between an "out-
sider" and a dyad member, but do not participate di-
rectly in the actual transaction, they fall beyond the
 analytical scope of the political economy framework.
Thus, the task still remaining here requires isolating
variables that should be applied to the nonexchange
relationships between a channel dyad and its environ-
ment. These elements are generally found in the sec-
ondary task environment and in the macro environ-
ment of channel dyads. Since these forces cannot be
specified in terms ofthe political economy model, the
illustrative propositions advanced later in this article
focus on developing insights (and indicating sources
of theory) into the effects of such forces on the po-
litical/economic relationships between exchanging
actors in a focal dyad.
Analyzing the Impact of Secondary and Macro
Environments on Channel Dyads
In accounting for all of the nonexchange environmen-
tal influences present in both the secondary and macro
environments of channel dyads, we believe there are
two basic altemative approaches. One is to conceive
of focal dyads or the individual organizations com-
prising them as reacting to specific environmental re-
sources/actors in contemplation of them (but without
being involved in any form of direct exchange). Al-
tematively, one can conceptualize the environment as
a dynamic but amorphous reality (without well-de-
fined shape, size, or elements), but one that can be
characterized in terms of its abstract qualities or di-
mensions.
Under the former tradition, actors in the secondary
task environment may be studied specifically in terms
of the resources they control and the power they might
potentially and indirectly wield vis--vis contemplated
moves by the focal dyad. Similarly, the state of and
changes in specific resources in the macro environ-
mentsuch as the level of technological develop-
ment, the communications infrastructure, economic
growth/cycles, or demographic changesmay be ob-
served as variables affecting the focal dyad and its
socioeconomic relations. Under this tradition, some
organization researchers have attempted to isolate ob-
jective characteristics of the environment that have
meaningful consequences for organizational structure,
control mechanisms, information systems, and adap-
tive and proactive strategies. For example. Black and
Kase (1963) studied the environment of mental health
rehabilitation agencies in the context of changing pop-
ulations and needs, disease categories, medical tech-
nology, and concepts of professional practice. Aiken
and Alford (1970) studied innovation in public hous-
ing in terms of political culture, concentration of com-
munity power, level of poverty, and community dif-
ferentiation, continuity, and integration.
For the following practical, methodological, and
theoretical-conceptual reasons, we believe that adopt-
60 / Journal of Marketing, Fall 1983
ing the above tradition for channel analysis would be
less than fruitful.
First, the problem with using a subset of actual,
objective variables (elements in the environment) is
that such an approach implies itemizing the environ-
ment. The inventory of environmental items (ele-
ments) is, to understate the case, immense. For ex-
ample, one could choose variables such as level of
income, interest rates, technology, population trends,
business cycles, and severity of competition, and still
have only scratched the surface. Indeed, most of these
variables can be broken down into subvariables (e.g.,
severity of competition is a function of the size and
number of competitors, institutional character of com-
petitors, price competition, nonprice competition, and
so on), making the problem of specifying relevant
variables a lifetime work, if not more.
Second, every event confronting an organization
does not necessarily affect it, because the organization
is either isolated or buffered from certain environ-
mental elements, or the events are too unimportant to
require a response. That is what organization theorists
mean when they speak of organizations being "loosely
coupled" with the environment. As Pfeffer and Sal-
ancik (1978) note: "If organizational actions were
completely determined by every changing event, or-
ganizations would constantly confront potential dis-
aster and need to monitor every change while contin-
ually modifying themselves. The fact that environmental
impacts are felt only imperfectly provides the orga-
nization with some discretion, as well as the capabil-
ity to act across time horizons longer than the time it
takes for an environment to change" (p. 13).
Third, generalizability of such "item effects" is
extremely tenuous across time and situations. For ex-
ample, high correlations may be found at any given
time between a technological development and the level
of conflict in the system under investigation. But the
specific technology is unlikely to recur in the future.
Moreover, it may not be the technology itself but the
use of power in assimilating it, a tight capital market,
or some other interacting variable that is causing the
conflict.
Fourth, it follows that if item effects are poorly
generalizable and confounded by a multiplicity of in-
teractions, then there will be very few good sources
of theory upon which to evolve a strong tradition of
scientific empiricism. When direct exchange relations
exist between extemal actors and dyad members, we
have seen that a formal framework defining the re-
lationships can be identified on the basis of which the-
oretical propositions can then be generated (see Stem
and Reve 1980). However, when direct exchange does
not exist and influences are being mediated, filtered,
and buffered by a variety of intervening variables and
processes, then the power to predict "item" specific
responses is correspondingly attenuated, and large re-
sidual terms will result.
Given these problems, the altemative tradition
which involves dimensionalizing the environment is
likely to be more productive, especially in the analysis
of secondary task environments. Adoption of this tra-
dition generally requires that measurement instru-
ments be constructed from as comprehensive a list of
specific, objective, environmental variables as possi-
ble. The list may be narrowed and/or focused by con-
ducting preliminary research via archival, survey, or
observational methods. What will eventually be ex-
tracted from the data once collected is a set of qual-
itative variables that parsimoniously describe the ma-
jor factors in the environment and are amenable to the
development of theoretical propositions. Some of the
qualitative dimensions of the environment concep-
tualized by organizational theorists adopting this
tradition for environmental analysis, are shown in Fig-
ure 2.
While we believe this approach is likely to be ex-
tremely insightful for analyzing influences in the sec-
ondary task environment, its utility is initially ques-
FIGURE 2"
Illustrative Qualitative Dimensions
of the Environment
Environmental Capacity (rich/lean): the relative abun-
dance or scarcity of input and output resources avail-
able to an organization within its "domain" of oper-
ation.
Environmental Homogeneity-Heterogeneity: the degree
of similarity or diversity between elements of the
population dealt with, including organizations, indi-
viduals, and sociopolitical forces affecting resources.
A related, and possibly more inclusive, dimension is
Environmental Simplicity-Complexity; this relates di-
rectly to the complexity of decision making. The fewer
and more homogeneous the informational inputs
necessary for decision making, the simpler the envi-
ronment. The more numerous and heterogeneous the
informational inputs, the more complex the environ-
ment (see Duncan 1972).
Environmental Stability-Instability: the rate of variability
or turnover in elements of the environment.
Environmental Concentration-Dispersion: the extent to
which available input and output resources are con-
trolled by or concentrated in a few or many organi-
zations, individuals, or locations.
Environmental Turbulence: the extent to which envi-
ronments are being disturbed by environmental in-
terconnectedness, and an increasing rate of intercon-
nection.
'Developed from Aldrich 1979, pp. 63-74. For various treat-
ments of environmental dimensions, see: Child (1972), Duncan
(1972), Emery and Trist (1965), Jurkovich (1974), Lawrence and
Lorsch (1967), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Starbuck (1976), Ter-
reberry (1968), Thompson (1967).
Jhft Marketing Channel Dyads: A Framework for Comparative Analysis / 61
tionable for analysis of the macro environment. Clearly,
an economy's level of technological development, af-
fluence, consumption and savings, growth, demo-
graphic changes, communications and transport in-
frastructure, and the like dictate to a very large extent
the type of distribution systems and vertical program-
ming that evolve. But when channel analysis is fo-
cused on individual dyads, the state of the economy
can be treated as a given for most foreseeable time
horizons. The more continuous processes of change
have less radical impacts, and these effects are pri-
marily visible in the secondary task environment.
Moreover, for comparative analysis (either static or
dynamic), the significant impact of the level of, or
changes in, the macro environmental variables is usu-
ally in terms of the "institutional" character of chan-
nel organizations.
Unfortunately, no empirically testable basis in the-
ory presently exists to forecast the character and di-
rection of institutional change vis--vis any specifi-
able level or direction of change in any of the macro
environmental variables. Therefore, in evoking a
framework for the comparative analysis of marketing
channel dyads, we propose that it is best to ground
the framework in the considerable theoretical ration-
ale that views the effects of macro environmental forces
as manifesting themselves through elements in the
secondary task environment. According to the theory
organizations do not perceive their environment as such,
rather, they "enact" one. As Weick (1969) cogently
states:
. . . the environment is a phenomenon tied to pro-
cesses of attention, and . . . unless something is at-
tended to, it doesn't exist.
Rather than talking about adapting to an external en-
vironment, it may be more correct to argue that or-
ganizing consists of adapting to an enacted environ-
ment which is constituted by the actions of inter-
dependent human actors (pp. 27, 28).
It is our basic stance here that, for channel members
in a focal dyad, tbe enacted perception of the macro
environment is represented by and can be measured
through the set of interacting organizations and pro-
cesses which comprise the primary and secondary task
environments of the dyad.
In sum, it is suggested that a manageable and the-
oretically interesting approach to conceptualizing a
channel dyad's environment should be based on;
1. the primary task environment essentially char-
acterized in terms of interacting political econ-
omies, affected by
2. amorphous forces in the secondary task envi-
ronment best characterized in terms of abstract
qualitative dimensions, while
3. taking account of the state of the changes in
 the macro environment, only to the extent and
in terms of their impact on the qualitative di-
mensions of the secondary task environment.
In the remainder of this paper, we illustrate the
significance of thinking of extemal forces (generated
via nonexchange factors) in terms of abstract dimen-
sions, and develop, via the application of the frame-
work suggested here, some illustrative propositions
regarding political/economic changes in the focal dyad
as the result of these forces.
Environmental Dimensions and
Channel Dyad Behavior
Using the environmental framework outlined above,
we can make some predictions about actions and be-
havioral states in channel dyad relationships under
specific environmental conditions. To do this we fo-
cus mainly on the constmct of environmental uncer-
tainty. There is ample support in the organization and
institutional economics literatures that uncertainty is
a key environmental dimension affecting organiza-
tions (their structure and intemal processes), interor-
ganizational relations, and the mode and costs of
transacting (cf. Aldrich 1975, 1979; Lawrence and
Lorsch 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Thompson
1967; Williamson 1975). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)
observe that, "Uncertainty . . . can be viewed as one
outcome of other environmental dimensions" (p. 68)
(see also Lawrence 1981, p. 316).
A principal source of uncertainty is the variability
or instability of resources and/or infiuences in the en-
vironment (Child 1972). In addition, the perception
and the magnitude of environmental uncertainty ex-
perienced by dyad members are functions of the com-
plexity or heterogeneity of the environment (Duncan
1972, Emery and Trist 1965, Lawrence and Lorsch
1967, Thompson 1967, Williamson 1975). In other
words, the more numerous the units of information
necessary for decision making and the more randomly
these are distributed in a heterogeneous environment,
the more uncertain the environment becomes. Dyadic
decision making and coordination are also made un-
certain if resource availability is scarce (i.e., if en-
vironmental capacity is lean; see Figure 2), and if the
output and/or input environment is concentrated. Thus,
the more task environments move away from being
rich, homogeneous, stable, dispersed, and placid (as
opposed to turbulent), the more uncertainty can be ex-
pected to increase.
Environmental uncertainty influences the structur-
ing and functioning of marketing channel dyads. In
terms of its intemal economic structure, a dyad may
move from market mediation to some level of vertical
integration (in terms of ownership or contractual
62 / Journal of Marketing, Fall 1983
changes). Such developments are not likely to be
manifested in the very short run. The more immediate
effect may be to alter the perceived power balances
between actors (political stmcture), the functional
processes such as negotiation of new terms of trade
(economic processes), or the dominant sentiments of
conflict and cooperation (political processes).
Altematively, or in addition, one or both of the
actors may move (a) to operate upon the extemal source
of uncertainty, to achieve some measure of control
over it, or (b) to seek to buffer itself (themselves) from
its effects. For example, in the former case, the man-
ufacturer in a manufacturer-retailer dyad might, de-
pending upon the source of uncertainty, set up an
elaborate information system to monitor and predict
developments, or resort to increased product differ-
entiation and promotion strategies, to strengthen brand
loyalty in the output market. In the latter case, the
retailer might seek to diversify its product assortment,
thus buffering itself by reducing its extemal depen-
dencies. In both instances, if the actions are success-
ful, the actor in question accumulates increased power
vis--vis the other member of the dyad, and may use
it to bring about further intemal changes in the dyad
in the future. On the other hand, if the source of un-
certainty is from lateral (regulatory or competitive)
rather than vertical (input or output) sectors of the en-
vironment, both actors may seek cooperative agree-
ments of some sort with the sources of uncertainty
(thus establishing direct links where none existed be-
fore, and drawing the source into a negotiated polit-
ical economy). All of these strategies will have effects
visible only over the long run."'
The subsections below will seek to develop these
phenomena into testable propositions. In following
them, we ask the reader to keep two important issues
in mind. First, our purpose is simply to indicate the
utility of the framework for transactional analysis in
marketing channels. No attempt is made here to ad-
vance or apply some grand theory that encompasses
the environment in all its dimensions or pretends to
explain all aspects of dyadic behavior. Even in or-
ganization theory, where many of the conceptual di-
mensions are borrowed from, no dominant paradigm
can be said to exist today (see, for instance. Van de
Ven and Joyce 1981, for state of the art discussions
on the major paradigms). This means that research in
channels contexts should concentrate mainly on the-
ory development (cf. Zaltman, LeMasters, and Heff-
ring 1982). At the same time, it means that research-
in terms of the dependent effects and organizational strategies im-
plicit in them, the entire set of possibilities here is covered in Pfeffer
and Salancik's (1978) excellent treatment of mergers, diversification,
coordination, cooperation, joint ventures, co-optation, and associa-
tion, coalition, and cartel formation.
 ers will be drawing on a number of streams of theory,
some leading to conflicting predictions, and often re-
sulting in that very distasteful situation where one is
faced with a prediction that if X does not occur, then
Y. The development of sufficient theory and the spec-
ification of conditions which preclude one outcome
over the other is a necessary precondition before any
set of hypotheses can be developed that are compre-
hensive and entirely consistent. We do not pretend to
be in a position to do that below.
Second, the construct of environmental uncer-
tainty must be approached with caution. It is probably
an epistemological misnomer to say that environments
are uncertain (although that has been common in some
organizational and economics literatures). Strictly
speaking, it is the organization that is uncertain about
its environment, so that the amount of manifest un-
certainty is really a function of "fit" between the or-
ganization (its structure, information systems, deci-
sion processes, and capacities) and the environmental
qualities listed in Figure 2, rather than the latter by
themselves. One can then expect to find organizations
(in our context, channel dyads) that have developed
the appropriate structures and processes to cope ef-
fectively with and survive in "uncertain environ-
ments," so to speak. In this sense, the propositions
that follow must be read in the context of an under-
lying dynamic. There is the implicit assumption that
the beginning state is one of stability and relative en-
vironmental certainty. This is not a "heroic" assump-
tion. Channel transactional relations, no matter under
what circumstances they be forged, are structured un-
der explicit and implicit assumptions about the envi-
ronment. It is when these assumptions no longer hold
(when environments change in important ways), that
channel members experience uncertainty. Therefore,
a dynamic may be expected to be set in progress be-
fore a new equilibrium state is reached. The propo-
sitions that follow are essentially concemed with such
a dynamic.
For the reasons in the first point above, the prop-
ositions and discussion in the following subsections
serve simply as an illustrative, and not an exhaustive,
application of the framework.
illustrative Propositions: Input and Output
Sectors
Dyadic Sentiments. In marketing channels, the un-
certainty surrounding a dyad's ability to obtain its in-
puts and place its outputs will have far-reaching con-
sequences for channel members' behaviors and
relations. One of the more immediate effects would
be to increase the level of friction and perceived con-
flict between dyad members. Uncertainty in the input
sector, e.g., shortages or variabilities in the supply of
raw materials, manufactured products, or parts, is often
Environment of Marketing Channel Dyads: A Framework for Comparative Analysis / 63
attributed to the channel actor that is prior in the dis-
tributive chain. Similarly, uncertainty in the output
sector, e.g., fluctuating demand or lagging sales, may
often be attributed to lacking marketing capabilities of
channel actors down the line. As Assael (1969) ob-
served in his study of automobile channels:
During f>eriods of short demand, manufacturers typ-
ically accuse dealers of poor performance and failure
to comply with their directives about retail manage-
ment, promotion, and price policies; and dealers ac-
cuse manufacturers' representatives of unwarranted
pressures in ensuring compliance, particularly in the
maintenance of inventories (p. 573).
. . . policies of manufacturers that are acceptable
during prosperity may cause conflict in periods of
lagging sales (p. 576).
An illustrative proposition of how environmental
uncertainty tends to influence the transaction climate
or sentiments within marketing channel dyads is;
Pj: The higher the uncertainty in the input or
output sectors of the task environment of
marketing channel dyads, the higher is the
level of conflict within the dyad.
Coordination. While dyad sentiments may register
the first effects, the next most likely effect would be
to alter the way in which dyad relationships are or-
ganized. Marketing channel dyads, like organizations
(cf. Thompson 1967), tend to protect themselves from
extemal uncertainty. One way of being better able to
handle extemal uncertainty is by being better orga-
nized. The situation of high extemal uncertainty is met
by better planning, more coordinated actions, and
higher competitive strength. In terms of a dynamic, it
would be predicted that as uncertainty increased, ef-
forts towards increasing the level of vertical coordi-
nation would be made by one or both parties. Such
efforts might be reflected in terms of the frequency
and intensity of interaction, and the degree of for-
malization/standardization of dyadic procedures, etc.
P2: The higher the uncertainty in the input or
output sectors of the task environment of
marketing channel dyads, the greater the
efforts towards increasing the level of
vertical coordination within the dyad.
Power Balances. Increased vertical coordination
is initiated by the channel actor that is able to cope
more effectively with or absorb the extemal uncer-
tainty (Hickson et al. 1971). Thus it seems that changes
in the power balances (political structure) of the dyad
mediate (and, therefore, should precede) changes in
economic processes. The unit facing a high degree of
uncertainty will become increasingly dependent on the
unit that can more effectively cope with the extemal
uncertainty under focus. Also, as Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978) observe, the more critical a resource is to the
 effective functioning of the entire system, and the more
uncertain the supply of that resource, the more likely
that efforts will be made to control the availability of
that resource. When direct control of the input or out-
put environment is impossible to attain, approxima-
tion to control can be achieved through the develop-
ment of an elaborate information system to monitor
the relevant sectors of the task environment. The suc-
cessful development of such an information system
about uncertain input or output environments can alter
the power structure in channel dyads in favor of the
party administering the system.
P3: Under environmental uncertainty, the di-
rection of the change in the power bal-
ance of channel dyads is determined by
which member is able to cope with the
sources of uncertainty (thus absorbing it
on behalf of the other). Further, the di-
rection of change in power also deter-
mines the direction of centralization of
planning, coordination, and decision pro-
cesses (economic processes).
Extradyadic Coordination. Propositions P, through
P3 explore the effects of uncertainty in input-output
sectors on intradyadic behaviors. Similar coordinative
actions may take place at the channel dyad bounda-
ries, i.e., forward or backward vertical coordination.
The direction of the coordinative actions depends, it
is suggested, on the sector in which the critical un-
certainty arises.
P4: The higher the uncertainty in the input or
output sectors of the task environment of
marketing channel dyads, the closer are
the vertical linkages established between
the dyad and other channel actors. If un-
certainty arises in the input sector, back-
ward vertical coordination is attempted. If
uncertainty arises in the output sector,
forward vertical coordination is at-
tempted.
The rationale behind proposition P4 is given by ex-
tending Thompson's (1967) arguments that organi-
zations seek power over those elements in their task
environment on which they are most dependent. Ex-
temal uncertainty may be reduced through the use of
contracting, co-opting, or coalescing, all resulting in
increased coordination between organizations.
Vertical Decentralization. If the level of conflict
(or opportunistic behavior; see Williamson 1975)
thwarts effective formation of intra- and extradyadic
coordinating mechanisms, and if uncertainty contin-
ues, then the dyad is likely to decentralize or move
to "looser" relationships. This typically means that
distributors (wholesalers, retailers) will begin to widen
64 / Journal of Marketing, Fall 1983
and differentiate themselves (through the addition or
deletion of products, services, and geographic terri-
tories), thereby reducing their dependence on the orig-
inal dyadic partner, and that producers will begin to
employ multiple channels, comprised of a variety of
distributors, so as to reduce their dependency as well.
P5: If uncertainty in input-output sectors of
the environment cannot be absorbed by
vertical integration/coordination or "cop-
ing" strategies, the level of dysfunctional
conflict will escalate, and the dyad is likely
to move to a "looser" relationship.
Illustrative Propositions: Competitive and
Regulatory Sectors
Uncertainties emanating from the competitive and
regulatory sectors may be thought of as lateral forces
impacting the channel dyad. The level of competitive
uncertainty can be defined in terms of some of the
dimensions listed in Figure 2. For example, the more
heterogeneous the competitors and the greater their
capacity (size and resources), and the more interme-
diate the level of competitive concentration (see Pfef-
fer and Salancik 1978, p. 124), the higher the uncer-
tainty generated by the competitive sector of a dyad's
environment, all other things being equal. Theory per-
taining to these dimensions permits fine tuning the basic
propositions that arise out of analysis of input-output
uncertainties. For example, proposition Pj suggests
that vertical uncertainties increase conflictive senti-
ments in channel dyads. On the other hand, lateral
competitive uncertainties may in fact lead to less
conflictive and more cooperative sentiments within the
channel dyad. Competitive threats are likely to make
the channel dyad more cooperative because such threats
are usually perceived as moves from a common en-
emy. It is a well-known finding from behavioral sci-
ence research that the more stressful the intergroup
conflict, the more cohesive and integrated the in-groups
become.
Pfii The higher the uncertainty in the com-
petitive sector of the task environment of
marketing channel dyads, the higher is the
level of cooperation within the dyad.
Dealing with increased uncertainty in competitive
sectors of the task environment can be met by two
types of channel strategies, as seen from the view-
point of channel dyads. One strategy is to meet com-
petitive challenges through increased vertical integra-
tion or, at least, better vertical cohesion. Existing firms
in an industry can substantially decrease competitive
uncertainty by (1) coordinating or integrating back-
wards to control sources of raw materials, such as
minerals and oil; (2) coordinating or integrating for-
 ward to tie up retail outlets, such as buying up of choice
gasoline sites; and (3) linking fmal customers more
tightly to the marketing channel, such as in health care
delivery systems (Aldrich 1979, Scherer 1980).
The other strategy available is to forge cooperative
arrangements with competitors. Even though public
policy may sometimes be implemented to restrain co-
operative efforts among competitors, intelligent actors
will always find ways to partly overcome the restric-
tions imposed. The latter strategy is, however, seen
as more costly, given the drive toward channel dyad
autonomy and the prevailing norms and regulations
against restrictions of competition, at least in the U.S.
P7: If the uncertainty in the competitive sec-
tor of the task environment of marketing
channel dyads cannot be absorbed by ver-
tical coordination, closer linkages are es-
tablished with competitors at each chan-
nel level.
Uncertainties in the input, output, and competitive
sectors may lead a channel actor to devise strategies
to enhance its power in dyadic exchanges. But the
subsequent use of this power and dyadic subordina-
tion to it are often circumscribed by regulation in the
form of specific laws and/or normative constraints.
In general, in dealing with the regulatory sector, cop-
ing with uncertainty and handling extemal dependen-
cies are, once again, likely to be critical dimensions
confronting channel dyads. The uncertainty emanat-
ing from the regulatory sector can be dened in terms
of some of the variables listed in Figure 2. Thus, the
more variable, concentrated, and heterogeneous the
regulatory organizations in a dyad's environment, the
more uncertain the regulatory environment is likely to
be.
If regulatory certainty-uncertainty is defined in terms
of certainty and clarity ofthe regulator's ability to im-
pose the regulation and police it, the effects of un-
certainty on dyadic behavior are likely to be different
from those proposed for the input, output, and com-
petitive sectors. This is because the environmental
pressure for vertically coordinated and integrated re-
sponse to regulatory threat is likely to be a direct func-
tion of the certainty of discovery and sanction in the
event of noncompliance. If the regulatory environ-
ment is uncertain because of heterogeneous and vari-
able regulators, channel members can better risk non-
compliance as well as defend themselves by trading
off between regulators and their conflicting demands.
Pg: The more certain the regulatory environ-
ment, the more cooperative, coordinated,
and integrated dyad behavior becomes in
response to regulatory demands.
However, marketing channel dyads are not pas-
The Enuirnnmnt of Marketing Channel Dyads; A Framework for Comparative Analysis / 6 5
sive recipients of forces in the regulatory sector of their
task environment. Regulatory pressure and actions
which restrict channel activity (cf. Mitnick 1980) are
usually countered by political actions and coalition
behavior by channel dyads. The more uncertain the
regulatory environment, the more opportunity there is
for effective horizontal coordination and political ac-
tion.
P9: Under regulatory uncertainty, marketing
channel dyads tend to enter into interest
coalitions with actors in the input, output,
and competitive sectors of their task en-
vironment, to counter uncertainty in the
regulatory sector.
Organization in one sector of the task environment
(e.g., actions in the regulatory sector) breeds orga-
nization in other sectors ofthe task environment (e.g.,
formation of trade associations and lobbying groups),
to counter the extemal uncertainty faced. The phe-
nomenon can be interpreted in terms of countervailing
power, but can also be seen as a normal phenomenon
in a pluralist society, with markets for social, politi-
cal, and economic interests corresponding to a poly-
archie structural context of social control (Zald 1978).
When the regulatory context is predominantly poly-
archie in nature, it follows that actors who are targets
of regulation may also try to influence regulatory agents
directly by entering into exchange relationships with
the regulators. Such exchange relationships seem to
be more and more common (see Amdt 1979) in most
countries.
Pio: If the uncertainty in the regulatory sector
of the task environment of marketing
channel dyads cannot be absorbed by co-
alition behavior, marketing channel dyads
tend to establish closer linkages with the
regulatory agents.
Conclusion
The political economy framework for the comparative
analysis of marketing channels proposed by Stem and
Reve (1980) focused on interactions intemal to chan-
nel dyads. In this article, the original framework is
extended to account for the impact of environmental
forces on dyadic structure and processes. To date, the
latter topic has largely been ignored, especially in em-
pirical studies, because of the conceptual and meth-
odological difficulties associated with it. Hopefully,
the framework advanced in this paper will make the
topic more tractable.
It has been suggested here that the environment be
disaggregated into primary, secondary, and macro en-
vironments, and further into input, output, competi-
tive, and regulatory sectors. Actors in the primary en-
vironment are those with which the dyad maintains
direct exchange. For such interactions, the Stem-Reve
(1980) political economy framework is applicable. For
extemal forces generated by nonexchange factors, a
higher level of dimensionalizing and theory induction
is called for. In this article, it has been suggested that
the application of constructs and theories representing
the major paradigms in the field of macro organization
behavior is likely to be useful for studying the effects
of these other external forces on dyadic behavior. In
this context, the construct of uncertainty was em-
ployed as an example, and illustrative propositions were
advanced.
To a significant extent, the topics addressed in this
article are not radically new. It is to be expected that
the reader familiar with organization theory will also
be familiar with many of the concepts raised here, and
some of the propositions appear noncontroversial. The
purpose of the framework is not to astound, but rather
to bring some relatively developed organizational in-
sights into a more tightly knit and comprehensible whole
in the specific contexts of marketing channels. In this
light, its primary contribution should be found in its
intersection with the intemal political economy frame-
work. As the illustrative propositions indicate, atten-
tion should focus on the effect of environmental forces
on the structure and processes of channel dyads, be-
cause obviously, the eventual goal of research in this
tradition must be to suggest more effective ways to
manage marketing channel relationships. It is through
the management of these relationships that enhanced
dyadic performance will be forthcoming. The com-
prehensive framework now provided by combining the
one proposed here with the one proposed earlier (Stem
and Reve 1980) can be used to raise a multitude of
yet unaddressed questions relative to channel perfor-
mance."* For example, if high levels of environmental
uncertainty lead, eventually, to increased vertical co-
ordination, what form should the coordination take,
and how should the coordination be accomplished in
order to generate optimum performance? Is it better
to have quasi-market transactions mediated by nego-
tiation and bargaining, where power is imbalanced and
where confiictive processes are frequent, or would it
be better to tum to hierarchical transactions where
power is fiilly centralized but where conflictive pro-
cesses may somehow be dampened? (See Thompson
and Tuden 1959, and Van de Ven and Ferry 1980, p.
"For a number of propositions relating the intemal political economy
of channel dyads to performance, the reader is encouraged to review
Stem and Reve (1980). The focus in this article has been on the re-
lationship between the environment and the structure and processes
likely to be found in channel dyads. We have consciously avoided
repeating our views on the links between structure, behavior, and per-
formance advanced in the earlier article.
66 / Journal of Marketing, Fall 1983
93, for some insights into the relationship between un-
certainty, goal consensus, and decision strategies.)
Likewise, important questions arise regarding inter-
action between environmental states and the mana-
gerial mechanisms (e.g., power bases) available to exert
control or to manage conflict within a dyad. (See, for
example, Perrow 1967, p. 200, for some insights into
how different influence strategies may be more effec-
tive under different environmental states.)
Indeed, a comprehensive framework with all of its
complexities is, in reality, only a road map. It merely
points out the wide variety of routes one might follow
to get to a desired destination, but it does not point
out all of the obstacles along the way or the availa-
bility of special benefits that might be gained by trav-
eling one way or another. That is the role of theory
testing. Hopefully, the framework serves the purpose
of a reference and coordination structure for efficient
theory testing. The contribution of the combined
frameworks must, therefore, be accounted as a rela-
tively small but necessary first step in light of the ef-
fort that remains to be expended in applying the
frameworks to the task of linking structure and pro-
cess to performance. Certainly, this challenge is the
dominant one, which the field must address to move
forward and enhance its managerial relevance.
REFERENCES
Aiken, M. and R. Alford (1970), "Community Structure and
Innovation: The Case of Public Housing," The American
Political Science Review, 64 (September), 843-864.
Aldrich, H. E. (1975), "An Organization-Environment Per-
spective on Cooperation and Conflict between Organiza-
tions in the Manpower Training System," in Interorgani-
lation Theory, Anant R. Negandhi, ed., Kent, OH: Kent
State University Press.
(1979), Organizations and Environments, Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
and D. Whetten (1981), "Organization-sets, Ac-
tion-sets, and Networks: Making the Most of Simplicity,"
\r\ Handbook of Organizational Design, Vol. 1, P. Nystrom
and W. Starbuck, eds.. New York: Oxford University Press,
385-408.
Amdt, J. (1979), "Toward a Concept of Domesticated Mar-
kets," Journal of Marketing, 43 (Fall). 69-75.
Assael, H. (1969), "Constructive Role of Interorganizational
Conflict," Administrative Science Quarterly, 14 (Decem-
ber), 573-582.
Bagozzi, R. (1978), "Marketing as Exchange: A Theory of
Transactions in the Marketplace," American Behavioral
Scientist, 21 (March-April), 535-556.
Black, B. and H. Kase (1963), "Interagency Cooperation in
Rehabilitation and Mental Health," Social Service Review,
37 (March), 26-32.
Bonoma, T., R. Bagozzi, and G. Zaltman (1978), "The Dyadic
Paradigm in Marketing Thought," in Organizational Buy-
ing Behavior, T. Bonoma and G. Zaltman, eds., Chicago,
 IL: American Marketing Associatioti, 49-66.
Bucklin, L. P. and J. M. Cannan (1974), "Vertical Market
Structure Theory and the Health Care Delivery System,"
in Marketing Analysis for Societal Problems, J. N. Sheth
and P. L. Wright, eds.. Urbana, IL: University of Illitiois,
Bureau of Economie and Business Research, 7-39.
Cannan, J. (1980), "Paradigms for Marketing Theory," in Re-
search in Marketing. Vol. 3, J. Sheth, ed., Greenwich, CT:
Jai Press, 1-36.
Child, J. (1972), "Organizational Structure, Environment and
Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice," Sociology, 6
(January), 2-22.
Dill. W. R. (1958), "Environment as an Influence on Mana-
gerial Autonomy, " Administrative Science Quarterly, 2
(March), 407-443.
Duncan, R. B. (1972), "Characteristics of Organizational En-
vironments and Perceived Environmental Uncertainty, "
Administrative Science Quarterly, 17 (September), 313-327.
Emery, F. E. and E. L. Trist (1965), "The Causal Texture of
Organizational Environments," Human Relations, 18 (Feb-
ruary), 21-32.
Etgar, M. (1977), "Channel Environment and Channel Lead-
ership," Journal of Marketing Research, 15 (February), 6 9 -
76.
Evans, F. B. (1963), "Selling as a Dyadic RelationshipA
New Approach," The American Behavioral Scientist, 6
(May), 76-79.
Hickson, D. J., C. A. Lee, R. E. Schneck. and J. M. Pennings
(1971), "A Strategic Contingencies Theory of Intraorgan-
izational Power," Administrative Science Quarterly, 16
(June), 216-229.
Jurkovich, R. (1974), "A Core Typology of Organizational
Environments," Administrative Science Quarterly, 19
(September), 380-394.
Lawrence, P. and J. Lorsch (1967), Organization and Envi-
ronment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School.
Lawrence, R. P. (1981), "The Hain/ard Organization and En-
vironment Research Program," in Perspectives on Orga-
nization Design and Behavior, A. H. Van de Ven and W.
F. Joyce, eds.. New York: John Wiley, 311-337.
Levine, S. and P. E. White (1961), "Exchange as a Concep-
tual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Rela-
tionships," Administrative Science Quarterly, 5 (March),
538-601.
Mitnick, B. M. (1980), The Political Economy of Regulation:
Creating. Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms, New
York: Columbia University Press.
n* of Marketing Channel Dyads: A Framework for Comparative Analysis / 6 7
Perrow, C. (1967), "A Framework for the Comparative Anal-
ysis of Organizations," American Sociological Review, 32
(April), 194-208.
Pfeffer, J. and G. R. Salancik (1978), The External Control
of Organizations, New York: Harper & Row.
Reve, T. and L. W. Stem (1982), "The Relationship between
Interorganizational Form, Transactional Climate, and Eco-
nomic Performance in Vertical Interfirm Dyads," working
paper, Northwestern University.
Scherer, F. M. (1980), Industrial Market Structure and Eco-
nomic Performance, 2nd ed., Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
Sheth, J. N. (1976), "Buyer-Seller Interaction: A Conceptual
Framework," in Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 3,
B. B. Anderson, ed., Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Con-
sumer Research, 382-386.
Starbuck, W. H. (1976), "Organizations and their Environ-
ments." in Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psy-
chology, M. D. Dunnette, ed., Chicago, IL: Rand Mc-
Nally, 1069-1123.
Stem, L. W. and T. Reve (1980), "Distribution Channels as
Political Economies: A Framework for Comparative Anal-
ysis," Journal of Marketing, 44 (Summer), 5264.
Sturdivant, F. D. (1966), "Determinants of Vertical Integra-
tion in Channel Systems," in Science, Technology, and
Marketing. R. M. Haas, ed., Chicago: American Market-
ing Association, 472-479.
Terreberry, S. (1968), "The Evolution of Organizational En-
vironments," Administrative Science Quarterly, 12 (March),
591-613.
Thompson. J. D. (1967), Organizations in Action, New York:
McGraw-Hill.
and A. Tuden (1959), "Strategies, Structures, and
Processes of Organizational Decision," in Comparative
Studies in Administration, J. D. Thompson et al., eds.,
Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press.
Van de Ven, A. and D. L. Ferry (1980), Measuring and As-
sessing Organizations, New York: John Wiley.
and W. F. Joyce, eds. (1981), Perspectives on Or-
ganization Design and Behavior, New York: John Wiley.
Weick, K. E. (1969), The Social Psychology of Organizing,
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Williamson, O. E. ( 1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis
and Antitrust Implications, New York: Free Press.
Zaid, M. N. (1978), "On the Social Control of Industries,"
Social Forces, 51 (September), 79-102.
Zaltman, G., K. LeMasters, and M. Heffring (1982), Theory
Construction in Marketing, New York: John Wiley.