EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4585. November 12, 2004.]

MICHAEL P. BARRIOS , complainant, vs . ATTY. FRANCISCO P.

MARTINEZ , respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

This is a verified petition 1 for disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco Martinez for having
been convicted by final judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving moral
turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City. 2
The dispositive portion of the same states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Martinez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime for (sic) violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
charged in the Information. He is imposed a penalty of ONE (1) YEAR
imprisonment and fine double the amount of the check which is EIGHT
THOUSAND (8,000.00) PESOS, plus payment of the tax pursuant to Section 205
of the Internal Revenue Code and costs against the accused. 3

Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March 1996 and the Entry of
Judgment from this Court dated 20 March 1996.
On 03 July 1996, we required 4 respondent to comment on said petition within ten (10)
days from notice. On 17 February 1997, we issued a second resolution 5 requiring him to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure to comply
with our earlier Resolution, and to submit said Comment. On 07 July 1997, we imposed a
fine of P1,000 for respondent's failure to file said Comment and required him to comply
with our previous resolution within ten days. 6 On 27 April 1998, we fined respondent an
additional P2,000 and required him to comply with the resolution requiring his comment
within ten days under pain of imprisonment and arrest for a period of five (5) days or until
his compliance. 7 Finally, on 03 February 1999, or almost three years later, we declared
respondent Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid resolutions.
8

On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation reported 9 that respondent was
arrested in Tacloban City on 26 March 1999, but was subsequently released after having
shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17 February 1997 and 27 April 1998 by
remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting his long overdue Comment.
In the said Comment 1 0 dated 16 March 1999, respondent stated that:
1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 February 1997 as he was
at that time undergoing medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in
Palo, Leyte;
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June 1997; and
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 3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was
decided in respondent's favor (as plaintiff in the said case). Respondent
avers that as a result of his moving for the execution of judgment in his
favor and the eviction of the family of herein complainant Michael Barrios,
the latter filed the present administrative case.
cCaATD

In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal of the Provincial

Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter 1 1 to the First Division Clerk of
Court alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case before
the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a civil case involving the
victims of the Doa Paz tragedy in 1987, for which the Regional Trial Court of Basey,
Samar, Branch 30 rendered a decision against him, his appeal thereto having been
dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar, 1 2 it appears
that herein respondent Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to the victims of the Doa
Paz tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff in the said civil case was issued a check
for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing compensation for the deaths of his wife and
two daughters, Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check, which was then
deposited in the account of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinez's wife. When plaintiff asked for his
money, he was only able to recover a total of P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the
remaining P60,000 as his attorney's fees. Holding that it was "absurd and totally ridiculous
that for a simple legal service . . . he would collect 2/3 of the money claim," the trial court
ordered Atty. Martinez to pay the plaintiff therein the amount of P60,000 with interest,
P5,000 for moral and exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinez's dilatory tactics during the trial,
citing fourteen (14) specific instances thereof. Martinez's appeal from the above judgment
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure to file his brief, despite having been
granted three thirty (30)-day extensions to do so. 1 3
On 16 June 1999, we referred 1 4 the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The report 1 5 of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan stated in part that:
Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but none of the parties
appeared before the Commission, until finally it was considered submitted for
resolution last 27 June 2002. On the same date respondent filed a motion for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died sometime in June
1997 and that dismissal is warranted because "the case filed by him does not
survive due to his demise; as a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death."

We disagree with respondent's contention.

Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the Honorable
Supreme Court or the IBP may motu proprio initiate the proceedings when they
perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called
by any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a
lawyer which requires disciplinary sanctions.

As earlier cited, respondent lawyer's propensity to disregard or ignore orders of the

Honorable Supreme Court for which he was fined twice, arrested and imprisoned
reflects an utter lack of good moral character.

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 Respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or
violation of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration
of justice and therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him (see In
re: Abesamis, 102 Phil. 1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA
815; Medina vs. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30
Jan. 1990).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that

respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be disbarred and his name stricken out
from the Roll of Attorneys immediately. STcEaI

On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution 1 6 adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner.
On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for .Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation, 1 7 in the instant case alleging that:
1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law,
although admittedly the practice of law is a privilege;

2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in court and allowed
to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely different from
that arrived at by the Investigating Commissioner; and

3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the judiciary in various
capacities (from acting city judge to Municipal Judges League Leyte
Chapter President) for almost 17 years prior to resuming his law practice.

On 14 January 2004, we required 1 8 complainant to file a comment within ten days. On 16

February 2004, we received a Manifestation and Motion 1 9 from complainant's daughter,
Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they had not been furnished with a copy of
respondent's Motion, notwithstanding the fact that respondent ostensibly lives next door
to complainant's family. Required to Comment on 17 May 2004, respondent has until now
failed to do so.
The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a copy of said Motion to herein
complainant. The records also show that respondent was given several opportunities to
present evidence by this Court 2 0 as well as by the IBP. 2 1 Indeed, he only has himself to
blame, for he has failed to present his case despite several occasions to do so. It is now
too late in the day for respondent to ask this court to receive his evidence.
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience that it did when it waited
for his comment on the original petition. At any rate, after a careful consideration of the
records of the instant case, we find the evidence on record sufficient to support the IBP's
findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so.

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 In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and convicted by final judgment for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8,000. The issue
with which we are now concerned is whether or not the said crime is one involving moral
turpitude. 2 2
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals." 2 3 It involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals." 2 4

In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda, 2 5 where the erring lawyer was indefinitely
suspended for having been convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we held
that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude and
stated:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import
deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case,
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a
lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person convicted of such offense. . . 2 6 (emphasis supplied) THaDEA

Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber v. Commission on Elections
2 7 and disqualified a congressional candidate for having been sentenced by final judgment
for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Sec. 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which states:
SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he
has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (emphasis
supplied)

Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of a person in issuing a check
knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or
credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation
of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein petitioner's averment that he was not a lawyer,
we nevertheless applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the effect that
(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, "imports deceit" and "certainly
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person." [Indeed] the effects
of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano
v. Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest." Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an
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 unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men
or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals. 2 8 (emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, 2 9 we stated that:
(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino,
A.C. No. 4334, 07 July 2004] The issuance of a series of worthless checks also
shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious
effects of such act to the public interest and public order. [Lao v. Medel, 405
SCRA 227] It also manifests a lawyer's low regard for her commitment to the oath
she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the
image of the profession she should hold in high esteem. [Sanchez v. Somoso,
A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003]

Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover
the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the
public confidence in law and lawyers. And while "the general rule is that a lawyer may not
be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to
discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where, however,
the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to
show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and
the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the
office of attorney." 3 0
The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law is also untenable. As respondent himself admits, the
practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is "to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall
be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence." 3 1 "A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil
action where the complainant is plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of persons unfit to
practice them." 3 2 "Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society,
to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the values
and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or
private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court." 3 3
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondent's plea that if "given another chance
to have his day in court and to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely
different from that arrived at." We note with displeasure the inordinate length of time
respondent took in responding to our requirement to submit his Comment on the original
petition to disbar him. These acts constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful orders of
this Court, which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a cause sufficient
for suspension or disbarment. Thus, from the time we issued our first Resolution on 03
July 1996 requiring him to submit his Comment, until 16 March 1999, when he submitted
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 said Comment to secure his release from arrest, almost three years had elapsed. CIDcHA

It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took respondent to comply, his
Comment consists of all of two pages, a copy of which, it appears, he neglected to furnish
complainant. 3 4 And while he claims to have been confined while undergoing medical
treatment at the time our Resolution of 17 February 1997 was issued, he merely reserved
the submission of a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed, was he able to offer any
explanation for his failure to submit his Comment from the time we issued our first
Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16 March 1999. In fact, said Comment alleged, merely,
that the complainant, Michael Barrios, passed away sometime in June 1997, and imputed
upon the latter unsupported ill-motives for instituting the said Petition against him, which
argument has already been resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP report.
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear before the Commission
as the main reason for the long delay, until the same was finally submitted for Resolution
on 27 June 2002. Respondent, therefore, squandered away seven years to "have his day in
court and adduce evidence" in his behalf, which inaction also unduly delayed the court's
prompt disposition of this petition.
In Pajares v. Abad Santos, 3 5 we reminded attorneys that "there must be more faithful
adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which provides
that the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes that
for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action. 3 6 It is
noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined lawyers and judges for willful
disregard of its orders to file comments or appellant's briefs, as a penalty for
disobedience thereof. 3 7
For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondent's old age and the fact that he
served in the judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold respondent to a
higher standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence, 3 8 and his conduct should be above reproach. 3 9 The fact that respondent
has chosen to engage in private practice does not mean he is now free to conduct himself
in less honorable or indeed in a less than honorable manner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege, 4 0 demanding a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also
as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. 4 1 Sadly, herein respondent falls short
of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law. We agree.

We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v. Bernardino and
Lao v. Medel, we upheld the imposition of one year's suspension for non-payment of debt
and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of
the obligation. 4 2 However, in these cases, for various reasons, none of the issuances
resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for either estafa or B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, we held
therein that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
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 In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found guilty and stands convicted
by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda, which is similar
to this case in that both respondents were convicted for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 which we
have held to be such a crime, we affirmed the order of suspension from the practice of law
imposed by the Court of Appeals, until further orders.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided after Tuanda, we have held
disbarment to be the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Thus:
1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, 4 3 we
disbarred a lawyer convicted of estafa without discussing the
circumstances behind his conviction. We held that:
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The
review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment
not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument
is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on
him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the
respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of
justice. 4 4

2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles, 4 5 a lawyer was convicted of the crime

of attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals.
"And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S.,
p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the
plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained
by Section 25 of Rule 127." 4 6

3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces, 4 7 the erring lawyer

acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be a last will and
testament, which later turned out to be a forgery. He was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document,
which the Court held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, said act being
contrary to justice, honesty and good morals, and was subsequently
disbarred. aDHCAE

4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez, 4 8

Atty. Gutierrez was convicted for murder. After serving a portion of the
sentence, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. Holding
that the pardon was not absolute and thus did not reach the offense itself
but merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term, the court
nevertheless disbarred him.

5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon, 4 9 Atty. Vinzon was convicted of the crime
of estafa for misappropriating the amount of P7,000.00, and was
subsequently disbarred. We held thus:

Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there
can be no question that the term "moral turpitude" includes everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence and
in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude
because the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good
morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil. 27576). As respondent's guilt cannot now
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 be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable. (emphasis supplied) 5 0
6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avancea, 5 1 the conditional pardon extended to the
erring lawyer by the Chief Executive also failed to relieve him of the penalty
of disbarment imposed by this court.
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo, 5 2 a lawyer was charged and found
guilty of the crime of falsification of public document for having prepared
and notarized a deed of sale of a parcel of land knowing that the supposed
affiant was an impostor and that the vendor had been dead for almost
eight years. We ruled that disbarment follows as a consequence of a
lawyer's conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude,
and since the crime of falsification of public document involves moral
turpitude, we ordered respondent's name stricken off the roll of attorneys.

8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana, 5 3 we upheld the

recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had
been convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents,
because she was "totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession." 5 4
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson, 5 5 a lawyer was
disbarred for having been convicted of estafa by final judgment for
misappropriating the funds of his client.

In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. "Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample
them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position
and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of
the body politic." 5 6
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in
the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country. AacSTE

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ .,
concur.
Puno, J ., is on official leave.
Corona and Tinga, JJ ., are on leave.
Footnotes

1. 16 May 1996, filed by Michael P. Barrios, Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 13.

2. Entitled People of the Philippines v. Francisco Martinez for violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 09899 and by this Court in G.R. No.
118049.
3. Per Order, dated 10 May 1996, of Judge Mateo Leanda of the said trial court, Rollo, Vol. I,
p. 4.
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 4. Resolution, Id. at 23.
5. Resolution, Id. at 30.
6. Resolution, Id. at 33.

7. Resolution, Id. at 79.

8. Resolution, Id. at 97.
9. Letter from NBI Supervising Agent Arlis Vela to Second Division Clerk of Court Teresita
Magay-Dris, Id. at 100.
10. Id. at 112113.
11. Id. at 4950.
12. Id. at 5260.
13. Id. at 6162.
14. Resolution, Id. at 125.
15. Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 200205.
16. Id. at 199.
17. Id. at 215218.
18. Resolution, Id. at 219.
19. Id. at 253255.
20. Resolutions dated 3 July 1996, 17 February 1997, 7 July 1997, 27 April 1998, 3
February 1999; supra, Note Nos. 48.
21. IBP Order dated 08 February 2000, Records p. 156; Notice of Hearing dated 29
November 2001, Records, p. 163, Order dated 24 January 2002, Records, p. 169; Order
dated 27 June 2002, Records, p. 183.

22. In the Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, Adm. Case No. 229, 30
April 1957, 101 Phil 323; De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, 12 April 1961,
111 Phil 569.
23. In re Basa, 7 December 1920, 41 Phil. 275.
24. Villaber v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 148326, 15 November 2001, 369 SCRA
126, citing Dela Torre v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 121592, 05 July 1996, 258 SCRA 483.

25. Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692.
26. Id. at 697.
27. Supra, Note No. 24.
28. Id. at 134.
29. Adm. Case No. 6408, 31 August 2004.

30. Co v. Bernardino, Adm. Case No. 3919, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 102, citing In Re
Pelaez, 3 March 1923, 44 Phil 567 and In Re Sotto, No. 14576, 6 September 1918, 38 Phil
532.
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 31. In re MacDougall, No. 1167, 16 December 1903, 3 Phil 70, 78.
32. Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, Adm. Case No. 2884, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 93.
33. Ibid; Nakpil v. Valdes, Adm. Case No. 2040, 4 March 1998, 286 SCRA 758; Calub v.
Suller, Adm. Case No. 1474, 28 January 2000, 323 SCRA 556; Cruz v. Jacinto, Adm. Case
No. 5235, 22 March 2000, 328 SCRA 636.
34. Manifestation and Motion of Diane Frances Barrios Latoja dated 06 February 2004,
Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 253 to 255. Respondent has failed to comment within the period given
him to do so.

35. G.R. No. L-29543, 29 November 1969, 30 SCRA 748.

36. Id. at 753.
37. In The Matter Of Attorney Lope E. Adriano, Member of the Philippine Bar, People of the
Philippines v. Remigio Estebia, G.R. No. L-26868, 27 February 1969, 27 SCRA 106; People
v. Rosqueta, G.R. No. L-36138, 31 January 1974, 55 SCRA 486; People v. Manangan, G.R.
Nos. L-32918-19, 30 April 1974, 56 SCRA 817; People v. Dalusag, G.R. No. L-38988, 25
February 1975, 62 SCRA 540; Casals v. Cusi, G.R. No. L-35766, 12 July 1973, 52 SCRA
58.
38. Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct, 05 September 1989.
39. Canon 31, Canons of Judicial Ethics (Administrative Order No. 62, Department of
Justice, 01 August 1946).
40. Dumadag v. Lumaya, Adm. Case No. 2614, 29 June 2000, 334 SCRA 513; NBI v. Reyes,
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1120, 21 February 2000, 326 SCRA 109.
41. Supra, Note No. 28; supra, Note No. 26.
42. Supra, Note No. 25.
43. Adm. Case No. 229, 30 April 1957, 101 Phil 323.
44. Id. at 324.
45. Adm. Case No. 350, 07 August 1959, 106 Phil 1.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Adm. Case No. 439, 12 April 1961, 111 Phil 569.
48. Adm. Case No. 363, 31 July 1962, 115 Phil 647.

49. Adm. Case No. 561, 27 April 1967, 126 Phil 96.

50. Id. at 100.

51. Adm. Case No. 407, 15 August 1967, 127 Phil 426.
52. Adm. Case No. 2410, 23 October 1982, 203 Phil 79.

53. CBD Case No. 251, 11 July 1995, 245 SCRA 707.
54. Id. at 709.

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 55. Adm. Case No. 1037, 14 December 1998, 300 SCRA 129.
56. Supra, Note No. 44, p. 651, citing Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law Ed., 552, 556.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com