Process Counterplans - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors

NDI 2013 6WS Process
Counterplans
**Negative**
OAS CP
1NC Shells
1NC Mexico
Text: The United States federal government should propose to

the Organization of American States a multilateral effort
to __________________________.
Only the counterplan solves the Aff and only the counterplan
bolsters the OAS as a key regional institution
IAD 12 (Inter-American Dialogue, US center for policy analysis, exchange, and
communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, the Dialogue brings
together public and private leaders from across the Americas to address
hemispheric problems and opportunities, fourteen Dialogue members served as
presidents of their countries and more than two dozen have served at the cabinet
levelRemaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America, Inter-
American Dialogue Policy Report, p. 17-18, April 2012,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
it is important that the United

Even as Latin America expands its global reach and presence,
States and the region increase their attention to reshaping regional
institutions to better align them with current realities and challenges and
to make them more effective. The hemispheres institutional architecture is in great flux, and there
is growing need for decisions about priorities and objectives. The O rganization of A merican S tates, the worlds
oldest regional institution, has come under enormous stress as a result of the
rapidly shifting political and economic context of hemispheric relations. It
is still the regions main political organization, with legitimacy to work
across a spectrum of issues, but it is badly in need of institutional reform,
perhaps even a re-launching. For all its problems, the OAS has a singular capacity
to take on critical issues, including human rights, press freedom, and democracy, that other,
newer multilateral mechanisms seem years away from being able to handle
adequately. New groupingslike UNASUR and CELACmay have key roles to fulfill, but no institution
can yet match the normative frameworks developed over decades in the
OAS. Regional organizations focused on finance and development have emerged from the transformations
stronger than their political counterparts. This may be because there is greater consensus on economic
management than political questions. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has gone through a difficult
reform process, while the CAF Development Bank of Latin America, with only Latin American members, has
expanded considerably in recent years and extended its lending throughout the region. Although not strictly a
regional institution, Brazils National Development Bank has sharply increased its funding outside Brazil, chiefly to
support foreign investments by Brazilian companies on infrastructure and energy projects in neighboring countries.
It is encouraging how constructively Washington has responded to Latin
Americas growing independence and greater assertiveness in regional
and global affairs. It has readily accommodated the hemispheres emerging institutional landscape even
though that includes new regional groupings from which the United States is excluded. Less encouraging,
but indicative of its shrinking political and diplomatic profile in the region, is the reduced US
commitment to and active engagement in some regional arrangements to which it does
belong, among them the OAS and the Summit of the Americas. As the OAS goes through a troubled period, it
must have stronger engagement from member governments, including

effective involvement by the U nited S tates, in order to regain a central
role in inter-American affairs.
And Mexico is more likely to agree to the plan than the CP

OAS 12 (Organization of American States, OAS and Mexico Agree to Implement
Technical Cooperation Activities for the Benefit of other Countries, press release,
OAS, April 25, 2012, http://go-jamaica.com/pressrelease/item.php?id=509)
The Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), Jos Miguel Insulza, and
the Executive Director of the Mexican Agency for International
Development, Roger Granguillhome today signed a memorandum of understanding
for the implementation of technical cooperation activities such as assistance, expert
exchange and training seeking to foster the economic and social development of other
countries. The Secretary General Insulza stressed how the nature and definition of international cooperation has
changes in recent decades. "Before, cooperation in the hemisphere was almost entirely limited to the North-South
cooperation, and not conceived in a different way of that which came from more developed countries to the less
developed. Over the years, the countries of the region have gradually acquired a knowledge and technical capacity
OAS representative
that can be transferred to other countries in the developing world, "he said. The
also stressed the willingness of the more developed member countries to
cooperate with the most vulnerable, and welcomed the initiative of the
Mexican International Cooperation Agency to sign an agreement that will
"substantially strengthen our work in the area of cooperation, especially
in institutional strengthening and human resource training." At the signing
ceremony, the representative of the Mexican Agency welcomed the OAS'
willingness to create opportunities to strengthen the ties of cooperation

between the countries of the region and said that the government of his country
attaches "a role of fundamental importance to international organizations
in the new global architecture for development , given their representativeness and their
ability to mobilize and articulate collective joint efforts. " In this regard, Granguillhome said that the OAS
"plays an important role among the priorities of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Mexico," either as a partner in the deployment of cooperation or as a benchmark of best
practices in the hemisphere. The Mexican representative noted that the memorandum of understanding signed
today "will open new avenues of interaction in an area of ??growing importance such as triangular cooperation",
adding that the agreement will allow the sum of interagency strengths to maximize the human, technological and
budget resources allocated to cooperation, which will result in more effective support for the various subregions of
the continent. Prior to the signing, held at OAS headquarters in Washington, DC, OAS Secretary General and the
Agency's Executive Director held a private meeting during which they talked about the role of Mexico as current
president of the G20, cooperation in Haiti and the ways in which the OAS will provide a bridge for triangular
cooperation with Caribbean countries.
1NC Venezuela
Text: The United States federal government should propose to

the Organization of American States a multilateral effort
to __________________________.
Only the counterplan solves the Aff and only the counterplan
bolsters the OAS as a key regional institution
Even as Latin America expands its global reach and presence, it is important that the United
States and the region increase their attention to reshaping regional
institutions to better align them with current realities and challenges and
to make them more effective. The hemispheres institutional architecture is in great flux, and there
is growing need for decisions about priorities and objectives. The O rganization of A merican S tates, the worlds
oldest regional institution, has come under enormous stress as a result of the
rapidly shifting political and economic context of hemispheric relations. It
is still the regions main political organization, with legitimacy to work
across a spectrum of issues, but it is badly in need of institutional reform,
perhaps even a re-launching. For all its problems, the OAS has a singular capacity
to take on critical issues, including human rights, press freedom, and democracy, that other,
newer multilateral mechanisms seem years away from being able to handle
adequately. New groupingslike UNASUR and CELACmay have key roles to fulfill, but no institution
can yet match the normative frameworks developed over decades in the
OAS. Regional organizations focused on finance and development have emerged from the transformations
stronger than their political counterparts. This may be because there is greater consensus on economic
management than political questions. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has gone through a difficult
reform process, while the CAF Development Bank of Latin America, with only Latin American members, has
expanded considerably in recent years and extended its lending throughout the region. Although not strictly a
regional institution, Brazils National Development Bank has sharply increased its funding outside Brazil, chiefly to
support foreign investments by Brazilian companies on infrastructure and energy projects in neighboring countries.
It is encouraging how constructively Washington has responded to Latin
Americas growing independence and greater assertiveness in regional
and global affairs. It has readily accommodated the hemispheres emerging institutional landscape even
though that includes new regional groupings from which the United States is excluded. Less encouraging,
but indicative of its shrinking political and diplomatic profile in the region, is the reduced US
commitment to and active engagement in some regional arrangements to which it does
belong, among them the OAS and the Summit of the Americas. As the OAS goes through a troubled period, it
must have stronger engagement from member governments, including

effective involvement by the U nited S tates, in order to regain a central
role in inter-American affairs.
And Venezuela is much more likely to be receptive to the

counterplan than the plan
AVN 11 (Agencia Venezolana de Noticias, Venezuelan national news agency,
Venezuela reiterates to OAS commitment with inclusive democracy, November 21,
2011, http://www.avn.info.ve/contenido/venezuela-reiterates-oas-commitment-
inclusive-democracy)
Caracas, 21 Nov. AVN.- Ten years after having signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter, Venezuela's
delegation to the Organization of American States (OAS) reiterated its political
commitment against poverty and in favor of equality because "a democracy without social inclusion is not
democracy." Diplomat Maria Eugenia De los Rios said the statement in the OAS ordinary session held Monday in
Washington, United States, to hold a conversation among member states over the efficiency of implementing the
that in Venezuela exists a participatory
Inter-American Charter. De los Rios remarked
democracy which goes beyond the representative model because it
involves directly people's power. She also reminded to all member states
Venezuela's commitment to "respect the democratic path chosen by all
nations," ahead of threats constantly posed against "States which are not
subject to a single version of democracy or to a single model." "We have seen
that some States are determined to destabilize democracy and have attempted against people's will," De los Rios
stated after expressing her support to Nicaragua, whose representative to the OAS denounced US meddling in its
domestic affairs. After congratulating the Central American country for their democratic exercise on he elections
held last November 06, in which was reelected Daniel Ortega as president, De los Rios denounced that factors
seeking to destabilize Nicaragua's peace "are the same who were in charge of destabilizing Venezuela's
democracy."
Say yes
Neg Oas says yes
The OAS will say yes Latin American countries want the US to
prioritize their opinions consultation solves
Erickson 10 (Daniel P. Erikson, associate for US policy and director of Caribbean
programs at the Inter-American Dialogue, taught Latin American politics at Johns
Hopkins-SAIS, is frequently interviewed in US and international media, and has
testified before the US Congress, his past positions include research associate at
Harvard Business School and Fulbright scholar in US-Mexican business relations, he
is also a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, The Obama
Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership? Working Paper No.
46, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, April 2010, pg. 27,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Working_Paper%2046.pdf
Although the early hopes for momentous change have begun to dissipate,
the presidency of Barack Obama still has the potential to bring about an important
restructuring of inter- American relations. In retrospect, the initial warm glow of good
feelings was always destined to give way to a more pragmatic understanding on both sides of the relationship
regarding the possibilities and limits of what the US and Latin America can expect of each other. But
throughout the Americas, the desire remains that Barack Obama will be
attentive and respectful to the regions concerns. The 44th president of the
United States has already pledged to keep an open mind and demonstrate a
willingness to listen. The next step is to advance the strategy of
substantive, issue-oriented engagement that can sustain the goodwill that
so much of the hemisphere felt upon his election to the White House.
Majority
Say no args dont apply OAS only needs a majority to make
decisions
OAS Charter, no date (Charter of the Organization of American States,
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-
41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.htm#ch9)
Chapter IX THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY Article 54 The General Assembly is the supreme
organ of the Organization of American States. It has as its principal
powers, in addition to such others as are assigned to it by the Charter, the following: a) To decide the
general action and policy of the Organization, determine the structure and functions of its
organs, and consider any matter relating to friendly relations among the American States; b) To establish
measures for coordinating the activities of the organs, agencies, and entities of the
Organization among themselves, and such activities with those of the other institutions of the interAmerican
system; c) To strengthen and coordinate cooperation with the United Nations and its specialized agencies; d)
To promote collaboration, especially in the economic, social, and cultural fields, with other international
To approve
organizations whose purposes are similar to those of the Organization of American States; e)
the program-budget of the Organization and determine the quotas of the
Member States; f) To consider the reports of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
and the observations and recommendations presented by the Permanent Council with regard to the reports that
should be presented by the other organs and entities, in accordance with the provisions of Article 91.f, as well as
the reports of any organ which may be required by the General Assembly itself; g) To adopt general standards to
govern the operations of the General Secretariat; and h) To adopt its own rules of procedure and, by a twothirds
vote, its agenda. The General Assembly shall exercise its powers in accordance with the provisions of the Charter
and of other inter-American treaties. Article 55 The General Assembly shall establish the bases for fixing the quota
that each Government is to contribute to the maintenance of the Organization, taking into account the ability to pay
of the respective countries and their determination to contribute in an equitable manner. Decisions on budgetary
All Member States have
matters require the approval of two thirds of the Member States. Article 56
the right to be represented in the General Assembly. Each State has the
right to one vote. Article 57 The General Assembly shall convene annually during the period determined
by the rules of procedure and at a place selected in accordance with the principle of rotation. At each regular
session the date and place of the next regular session shall be determined, in accordance with the rules of
procedure. If for any reason the General Assembly cannot be held at the place chosen, it shall meet at the General
Secretariat, unless one of the Member States should make a timely offer of a site in its territory, in which case the
Permanent Council of the Organization may agree that the General Assembly will meet in that place. Article 58 In
special circumstances and with the approval of two thirds of the Member States, the Permanent Council shall
Decisions of the General
convoke a special session of the General Assembly. Article 59
Assembly shall be adopted by the affirmative vote of an absolute majority of
the Member States, except in those cases that require a twothirds vote as provided in the Charter or as
may be provided by the General Assembly in its rules of procedure. Article 60 There shall be a Preparatory
Committee of the General Assembly, composed of representatives of all the Member States, which shall: a)
Prepare the draft agenda of each session of the General Assembly; b) Review the proposed program-budget and
the draft resolution on quotas, and present to the General Assembly a report thereon containing the
recommendations it considers appropriate; and c) Carry out such other functions as the General Assembly may
assign to it. The draft agenda and the report shall, in due course, be transmitted to the Governments of the
Member States.
Say yes mexico
Mexico says yes for economic engagement empirically proven

OAS 12 (Organization of American States, OAS and Mexico Agree to Implement
Technical Cooperation Activities for the Benefit of other Countries, press release,
OAS, April 25, 2012, http://go-jamaica.com/pressrelease/item.php?id=509)
The Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), Jos Miguel Insulza, and
the Executive Director of the Mexican Agency for International
Development, Roger Granguillhome today signed a memorandum of understanding
for the implementation of technical cooperation activities such as assistance, expert
exchange and training seeking to foster the economic and social development of other
countries. The Secretary General Insulza stressed how the nature and definition of international cooperation has
changes in recent decades. "Before, cooperation in the hemisphere was almost entirely limited to the North-South
cooperation, and not conceived in a different way of that which came from more developed countries to the less
developed. Over the years, the countries of the region have gradually acquired a knowledge and technical capacity
that can be transferred to other countries in the developing world, "he said. The OAS representative
also stressed the willingness of the more developed member countries to
cooperate with the most vulnerable, and welcomed the initiative of the
Mexican International Cooperation Agency to sign an agreement that will
"substantially strengthen our work in the area of cooperation, especially
in institutional strengthening and human resource training." At the signing
ceremony, the representative of the Mexican Agency welcomed the OAS'
willingness to create opportunities to strengthen the ties of cooperation
between the countries of the region and said that the government of his country
attaches "a role of fundamental importance to international organizations
in the new global architecture for development, given their representativeness and their
ability to mobilize and articulate collective joint efforts. " In this regard, Granguillhome said that the OAS
"plays an important role among the priorities of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Mexico," either as a partner in the deployment of cooperation or as a benchmark of best
practices in the hemisphere. The Mexican representative noted that the memorandum of understanding signed
today "will open new avenues of interaction in an area of ??growing importance such as triangular cooperation",
adding that the agreement will allow the sum of interagency strengths to maximize the human, technological and
budget resources allocated to cooperation, which will result in more effective support for the various subregions of
the continent. Prior to the signing, held at OAS headquarters in Washington, DC, OAS Secretary General and the
Agency's Executive Director held a private meeting during which they talked about the role of Mexico as current
president of the G20, cooperation in Haiti and the ways in which the OAS will provide a bridge for triangular
cooperation with Caribbean countries.
Mexico and Latin America cooperate with the OAS

OAS 12 (Department of Sustainable Development, Organization of American
States, Mexico and the OAS announce ReefFix: An Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM) Ecosystem Services Valuation and Capacity Building Project for
the Caribbean, press release, OAS, October 18, 2012,
http://openchannels.org/sites/default/files/news/Pressrelease_Mexico%20and%20the
%20OAS.pdf)
" Recognizing the priority given by the Caribbean Countries to preserve marine areas, Mexico and the
OAS, within the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the OAS and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Mexico through the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID),
announced the Project "ReefFix: An Integrated Coastal Zone Management
(ICZM) Ecosystem Services Valuation and Capacity Building Project for the
Caribbean". Mexicos Permanent Representative to the OAS, Amb. Joel Hernndez,
highlighted that this project seeks to enhance the capacity of participating
countries to value and measure ecosystem services and strengthen
frameworks for coastal zone management. It will also complement initiatives for the
conservation and sustainable use of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System. The ReefFix project has been
designed to be replicated throughout the Caribbean by providing the building blocks for
stakeholder involvement, socio-economic and bio-physical analysis, and lessons learned. This project has the
objectives to complete (i) Ecosystem Services Valuation: Countries will generate data on the value of ecosystem
services of selected sites utilizing ecosystem valuation methodologies, (ii) Capacity Building: Civil society, coastal
communities stakeholders, and government officials will be trained in ecosystem valuation methodologies and
marine protected area management and (iii) Dissemination of Results and Lessons Learned: Conclusions and
lessons learned will be disseminated to a wide audience throughout the Americas. The
Executive
Secretary for Integral Development, Jorge Saggiante, noted the importance of
these efforts to promote triangular cooperation and underlined that the
recently signed Agreement between the OAS and Mexico is a model for
these types of mechanisms. Moreover, he recognized Mexicos extensive experience on coastal
management both the Caribbean and Pacific Coasts. The representatives of the Caribbean countries celebrated
Mexicos initiative and highlighted that protecting vital ecosystems in marine areas as well as coral reefs is a priority
for the Caribbean region. The project will build upon an earlier effort supported by the Government of Chile to
improve technical capacity for ecosystem valuation of Caribbean countries to collect and manage data on their
protected areas. This project also counts with the participation of the Princely Government of Monaco. Mexico's
Permanent Representative to the OAS, was joined by his counterparts from
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, St Kitts Nevis, Saint Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad Tobago and by Representatives from Colombia and the United States at
the OAS headquarters in Washington D.C.
Mexico wants the OAS to be involved organized crime summit

proves
OAS 12 (Organization of American States, Mexico and OAS to Hold Hemispheric
Meeting against Transnational Organized Crime, press release, OAS, February 27,
2012, http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-062/12)
The Organization of American States ( OAS ) will serve as the framework for the High-
Level Hemispheric Meeting against Transnational Organized Crime
convened by the Mexican government , to be held March 1st and 2nd, 2012, in Mexico City,
and to be inaugurated by the President of Mexico, Felipe Caldern. The regional meeting will also
feature the participation of OAS Secretary General Jos Miguel Insulza ,
Mexicos Foreign Affairs Minister, Ambassador Patricia Espinosa, and Minister Marisela Morales Ibez, the host
Insulza assessed the importance
countrys Attorney General, among other officials. Jos Miguel
of the thematic agenda of the Mexico gathering, noting that transnational organized
crime is the principal continental source of activities such as drug trafficking, the illicit trafficking of firearms and
immigrants, human trafficking, money laundering, corruption, kidnapping, and cybercrimes. He placed emphasis
on the danger of the organization capabilities of transnational crime, adding that when control of organized crime
over neighborhoods, communities or broader geographical areas impedes or substitutes for the work of public
The meeting in the Mexican
institutions, we are before a full threat to democratic governance.
capital will convene attorneys general and prosecutors from the countries
of the Technical Group against Transnational Organized Crime (GTDOT),
organized within the OAS with the purpose of elaborating concrete proposals to optimize the activities
of governments against the organized crime phenomenon. It will be an important complement to the Meeting of
Ministers of Justice or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA), also held in the framework of the hemispheric
organization. Among the issues to be discussed in Mexico City are the
importance of effectively combating organized crime through legal and
institutional modernization; progress in the region on penalizing criminal activities set in the
Palermo Convention; and the strengthening of institutions in the fight against transnational organized crime in the
Caribbean, among other things. The meeting will feature numerous brief presentations on various issues, followed
by open dialogue between the delegations.
Say yes Venezuela
Venezuela says yes - empirics

AVN 11 (Agencia Venezolana de Noticias, Venezuelan national news agency,
Venezuela reiterates to OAS commitment with inclusive democracy, November 21,
2011, http://www.avn.info.ve/contenido/venezuela-reiterates-oas-commitment-
inclusive-democracy)
Caracas, 21 Nov. AVN.- Ten years after having signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter, Venezuela's
delegation to the Organization of American States (OAS) reiterated its political
commitment against poverty and in favor of equality because "a democracy without social inclusion is not
democracy." Diplomat Maria Eugenia De los Rios said the statement in the OAS ordinary session held Monday in
Washington, United States, to hold a conversation among member states over the efficiency of implementing the
that in Venezuela exists a participatory
Inter-American Charter. De los Rios remarked
democracy which goes beyond the representative model because it
involves directly people's power. She also reminded to all member states
Venezuela's commitment to "respect the democratic path chosen by all
nations," ahead of threats constantly posed against "States which are not
subject to a single version of democracy or to a single model." "We have seen
that some States are determined to destabilize democracy and have attempted against people's will," De los Rios
stated after expressing her support to Nicaragua, whose representative to the OAS denounced US meddling in its
domestic affairs. After congratulating the Central American country for their democratic exercise on he elections
held last November 06, in which was reelected Daniel Ortega as president, De los Rios denounced that factors
seeking to destabilize Nicaragua's peace "are the same who were in charge of destabilizing Venezuela's
democracy."
They go to the OAS to try and promote energy interests

Universal 7 (El Universal, Venezuelan news source, Venezuela proposes energy
integration and cooperation at OAS, April 10, 2007,
http://www.eluniversal.com/2007/04/10/en_pol_art_venezuela-proposes-
e_10A853795.shtml)
Energy integration and cooperation based on solidarity and reciprocity to
fight poverty, attain peoples' economic and social development, and build
democratic societies upon social equality was proposed at the Organization of American
States (OAS) by Jorge Valero, the Venezuelan Foreign Vice-Minister for North American and
Multilateral Affairs and OAS permanent representative. Valero made such a request during his first
speech acting as chair of the OAS Permanent Council, during a regular meeting held in Washington D.C. As quoted by official Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias (ABN), Valero
told OAS representatives that there is need to consider whether energy

can be used to attain a sustainable development or, on the contrary, to
increase foreign debt and dependence. Valero explained that the most
vulnerable countries in the hemisphere, that lack hydrocarbons, should
have a fair, equitable and universal access to energy for the purposes of
comprehensive development to the benefit of their peoples.
Solvency
Democracy
OAS solves your democracy internal links
Meyer 4-8 (Peter J. Meyer, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Congressional
Research Service, Organization of American States: Background and Issues for
Congress, Congressional Research Service, p. 8-10, April 8, 2013,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42639.pdf)
Democracy Promotion The OAS has taken a much more active role in promoting and
defending democracy since the end of the Cold War and the return to civilian governance in most of the
hemisphere. Member states approved a series of instruments designed to
support democratic governance,25 culminating in the adoption of the
Inter-American Democratic Charter on September 11, 2001. The charter asserts
that the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their
governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.26 The OAS has
sought to uphold these commitments through a number of activities, which include support
for, and observation of, elections; technical assistance and other programs to
foster institutional development and good governance; and the coordination of collective action when democratic
institutions are threatened. While many analysts assert that the OAS has played an important role in normalizing
democratic governance in the region,27 some scholars maintain that the organization is selective in its defense of
One of the primary ways in which the OAS
democracy.28 Electoral Observation Missions
promotes democracy is through electoral observation missions. Since its first
observation mission in 1962, the OAS has observed more than 200 electoral
processes in 27 countries in the hemisphere.29 Over the years, the OAS has earned a reputation for
impartiality and technical competence, playing an important role in the legitimization of electoral processes as
many Latin American and Caribbean countries transitioned from authoritarian rule to representative democracy.30
Some analysts have been critical of OAS observation missions in certain instances, however, maintaining that the
organization has occasionally offered legitimacy to flawed elections.31 Today, the objectives of OAS electoral
observation missions include observing electoral processes; encouraging citizen participation; verifying compliance
with election laws; ensuring electoral processes are conducted in impartial, reliable, and transparent manners; and
making recommendations to improve electoral systems. The OAS observes several electoral processes every year,
but each mission must be invited by the country holding the election and must solicit separate funding from the
international donor community. In 2012, the OAS monitored electoral processes in six countries: the Bahamas,
The OAS
Belize, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico.32 Institutional Strengthening
also promotes democracy by providing technical assistance to member
states designed to strengthen institutions and improve good governance .
Among other activities, the organizations Secretariat for Political Affairs conducts research, provides training in
public management, analyzes risk factors for democratic instability, and promotes cooperation among government
officials. It also supports conflict resolution efforts. The OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, for
example, provides verification and advisory support to the Colombian government regarding the demobilization and
reintegration into society of illegal armed groups.33 In 1996, OAS member states adopted the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption.34 The convention is designed to improve government transparency by
strengthening anti-corruption laws and facilitating cooperation among member states. Under the follow-up
mechanism on the implementation of the convention, member states submit themselves to a reciprocal review
process that evaluates how well they are implementing the convention, formulates recommendations for improving
anti-corruption efforts, and facilitates the exchange of information to harmonize the regions anti-corruption legal
In addition to supporting elections and
frameworks.35 Collective Defense of Democracy
institutional strengthening activities, the OAS undertakes diplomatic
initiatives designed to protect and restore democracy. As noted above, by adopting
the Inter-American Democratic Charter, OAS member states accepted an obligation to promote and defend
democratic governance. However, disagreements among member states regarding when it is appropriate for the
OAS to apply the provisions of the Democratic Charter have limited the organizations actions. Article 20 of the
Democratic Charterwhich allows for collective action in the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the
constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member statehas been invoked by the OAS
on only three occasions,36 each of which followed the ouster of a president. In other instances, such as conflicts
between branches of government or the erosion of liberal democratic institutions by democratically elected leaders,
member states generally have been unwilling to support bold OAS actions, deferring instead to the principle of
nonintervention.37 (For more discussion of the charter and its application, see Application of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter below).
Drug trafficking
OAS solves drug trafficking in Latin America

Anti-drug Efforts Concerns that the production, trafficking, and consumption of
illegal narcotics posed a serious threat to the entire Western Hemisphere
led OAS member states to establish the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission (CICAD by its Spanish acronym) in 1986.54 The commissions primary purpose
is to develop and promote a comprehensive anti-drug policy for the
region. CICADs most recent hemispheric drug strategy was adopted in May 2010. It defines the world drug
problem as a complex, dynamic and multi-causal phenomenon that requires shared responsibility among all
The strategy includes over 50 guidelines for member states in the
states.55
areas of institutional strengthening, demand reduction, supply reduction,
control measures, and international cooperation. It also includes some policy shifts from
the previous strategy, such as calling on member states to treat drug addiction as a public health matter and
explore treatment and rehabilitation as alternatives to criminal prosecution. In addition to formulating strategy,
CICAD assists OAS member states in strengthening their antidrug policies .
It conducts research, develops and recommends legislation, and provides technical assistance and specialized
training. CICAD also conducts assessments of member states progress through its multilateral evaluation
mechanism. Each member state is required to submit reports documenting their efforts to combat drug trafficking
and related activities, which are then evaluated by a multidisciplinary group of experts who are appointed by each
The experts identify strengths
of the member states but do not evaluate their own countries.
and weaknesses and offer recommendations.56 For example, each of the five evaluations of
the United States conducted since the 1999-2000 review period has noted that the country has yet to ratify the
Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and
other Related Materials (CIFTA by its Spanish acronym), and has recommended that it do so.57 Although some
analysts contend that CICAD reinforces Washingtons hardline approach to illicit narcotics,58 others assert that
commission and its multilateral evaluation mechanism have been
the
instrumental in building trust and establishing common ground for
cooperation between the U nited S tates and other OAS member states .59
For example, several regional leaders expressed frustration with the results of U.S.-backed counternarcotics policies
in the lead up to the April 2012 Summit of the Americas. The heads of state attending the Summit called for the
OAS to analyze the results of current policies and explore new approaches that may be more effective. The policy
CICAD and is intended to ensure that the hemisphere moves
review is occurring within
forward with a unified approach.60
Economy general
Solves Latin American growth

Economic and Social Development Although the region has made considerable strides in terms of economic growth
OAS continues
and social inclusion, poverty and inequality levels remain high in many countries, and the
to support development efforts. The organizations Department of Economic
Development, Trade and Tourism, for example, supports efforts to enhance
the productivity and competitiveness of economic actors in the region, with
particular emphasis on micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). It provides assistance to
MSMEs designed to strengthen their capacities to take advantage of trade
and tourism opportunities, and encourages the use of science and
technology to foster sustainable growth .50 The Special Multilateral Fund of the Inter-
American Council for Integral Development (FEMCIDI) also supports development efforts. It
was established in 1997 to address the most urgent needs of member states, especially those with smaller and
more vulnerable economies. FEMCIDI projects are designed to strengthen
institutions, build human capacity, and act as a seed fund for more far-
reaching development programs. During the 2011-2012 funding cycle, projects receiving FEMCIDI
support were focused in the areas of education, culture, and science and technology. The fund also
supports development efforts related to trade, labor, tourism, the
environment, and economic diversification.51 The Inter-American Social Protection Network
is one of the more recent efforts by the OAS to foster economic and social development in the hemisphere. It was
launched in September 2009 as a forum for member states to share experiences and best practices with regards to
social protection systems. Over the past two decades, several countries in the region have implemented conditional
cash transfer programs52 or other innovative initiatives that have proven successful at reducing poverty and
inequality. Through the Inter-American Social Protection Network, the OAS intends to facilitate the introduction of
such programs to countries that have yet to establish effective social protection policies.53
Human Rights
OAS solves human rights promotion better than the aff

Human Rights Protection
Many analysts consider the inter-American human rights system to be the
most effective part of the OAS.38 Unlike most of the organizations bodies, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
are autonomous, allowing them to execute their mandates to promote and
protect human rights39 without needing to establish consensus among member
states on every action. Consequently, advocates maintain, the two bodies are able to take on
the pivotal role of condemnation and early warning in response to
situations that undermine the consolidation of democracy and rule of law
in the hemisphere.40 In the first decades after its 1959 inception, the IACHRs documentation of human
rights violations brought international attention to the abuses of repressive regimes. Although the human rights
situation in the hemisphere has improved significantly as countries have transitioned away from dictatorships to
IACHR
democratic governments, the IACHR continues to play a significant role. Among other actions, the
receives, analyzes, and investigates individual petitions alleging human
rights violations. In recent years, it has received roughly 1,500 such
petitions annually.41 It also issues requests to governments to adopt
precautionary measures in certain cases where individuals or groups are
at risk of suffering serious and irreparable harm to their human rights. The
IACHR receives several hundred petitions for precautionary measures annually, and in 2012, it issued requests to
IACHR observes the general human rights
governments in 26 cases.42 Additionally, the
situations in member states, conducting on-site visits to carry out in-depth
analyses; publishing special reports when warranted; and noting in its annual report which countries human
rights situations deserve special attention, follow-up, and monitoring. In its most recent annual report (issued in
April 2012 and covering 2011), the IACHR made special note of the human rights situations in Colombia, Cuba,
Honduras, and Venezuela.43 (For information on potential reforms of the IACHR, see Reform of the Inter-American
Human Rights System below). Since 1990, the IACHR has created rapporteurships to draw attention to emerging
human rights issues and certain groups that are particularly at risk of human rights violations due to vulnerability
and discrimination. There are currently ten rapporteurships, which focus on freedom of expression, human rights
defenders, economic, social and cultural rights, and the rights of women, children, indigenous peoples, afro-
descendants, prisoners, migrant workers, and lesbian, gay, trans, bisexual and intersex persons. These
rapporteurships have been rather effective at drawing attention to
potential abuses. In February 2012, for example, the Special Rapporteur for the Freedom of Expression
immediately expressed deep concern after Ecuadors National Court of Justice affirmed criminal and civil judgments
against three newspaper executives and a journalist that had been found guilty of criminal defamation of an
authority for publishing a column critical of President Rafael Correa. The Rapporteurs vocal criticism helped
initiate a wave of international outcry, which likely contributed to President Correas decision not to enforce the
sentences.44 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, created in 1978, is an autonomous judicial institution
charged with interpreting and applying the American Convention on Human Rights. Currently, 21 of the OAS
member states accept the courts jurisdiction; the United States does not.45 According to a number of analysts,
the Inter-American Court has played an important role in the development
of international human rights case law, securing justice for individual
victims while facilitating structural changes to prevent future violations .46
For example, the court has issued landmark rulings requiring states to investigate human rights violations and
punish those responsible, regardless of any amnesty laws that they may have adopted. In February 2011, the court
maintained this principle when ruling on the case of Mara Claudia Garca Iruretagoyena de Gelman. Ms. Gelman
was an Argentine citizen who was detained by the Argentine military, transferred to Uruguay during the countrys
dictatorship, had her daughter taken from her shortly after giving birth, and then disappeared while in the custody
of the Uruguayan security forces. In addition to awarding monetary damages to the daughter of Ms. Gelman, the
court ordered Uruguay to carry out a full investigation of the case, and comply with its obligations under inter-
American human rights treaties by ensuring that the countrys amnesty law is not an obstacle to investigating and
punishing human rights violations.47 In October 2011, the Uruguayan Congress passed legislation48 to amend
and effectively overturnthe countrys amnesty law, with proponents arguing that it was necessary in order to
comply with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruling.49
Terrorism
Empirical support OAS anti-terror efforts succeed
Anti-terrorism Efforts In the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the OAS took
action to strengthen hemispheric cooperation against terrorism.61 The OAS was
the first international organization to formally condemn the attacks of September 11, adopting a Permanent Council
resolution on September 19 that called the terrorist actions an attack against all States of the Americas.62 It also
adopted a resolution, at Brazils request, to invoke the Rio Treatythe collective security pact of the Western
Hemisphere.63 A Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs64 adopted another resolution on
September 21, which included provisions that called on OAS member states to pursue, capture, prosecute, and
punish...the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of the terrorist acts; deny terrorist groups the ability to operate
OAS member states
within their territories; and strengthen anti-terrorism cooperation.65 In June 2002,
adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, through which
they committed to take action against the financing of terrorism, ratify
U.N. anti-terrorism instruments, improve cooperation among law
enforcement, and deny asylum to suspected terrorists .66 Cooperation on
terrorism issues has continued through the reinvigorated Inter-American
Committee on Terrorism (CICTE by its Spanish acronym). CICTE was established in 1999 and serves as
the primary forum for cooperation on terrorism issues within the hemisphere. It provides a range of
programs to assist member states in preventing, combating, and
eliminating terrorism, and meeting their commitments under the Inter-American Convention Against
Terrorism. These programs support efforts in five areas: border controls, critical infrastructure protection, counter-
terrorism legislative assistance, crisis management exercises, and promotion of international cooperation and
partnerships.67 In 2011, CICTE conducted 117 training courses, technical assistance missions, and other activities
that benefited more than 5,800 participants.68
US key
OAS solves and promotes US interests

CFR 8 (Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Latin America Relations: A New Direction
for a New Reality, Independent Task Force Report No. 60, pg. 4, published 2008,
www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/LatinAmerica_TF.pdf)
In pursuing its objectives through the concrete policy recommendations laid out in this report , the United
States must focus its efforts and resources on helping Latin America
strengthen the public institutions necessary to address the challenges
identified in this report. In doing so, Washington should work in partnership with Latin
American nations through multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, Inter- American
Development Bank (IDB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Finance Corporation, and Organization of
American States (OAS). It should also continue to work closely with civil society organizations and domestic
and international businesses to create more inclusive economic, social, and political opportunities for Latin
Achieving the ambitious
American countries and their citizens, which will benefit U.S. policy goals.
goals of strengthening institutions and improving the lives of Latin
Americans will require long-term efforts on the part of many participants, most importantly
Latin American governments and societies themselves. Nevertheless, there is a significant
supporting role for the United States. Expanding its policy framework and
concentrating on strategic regional partnerships will best promote U.S.
interests , enhancing stability, security, and prosperity throughout the
hemisphere.
OAS is key most effective body in Latin America

Rettig 12 (Jessica Rettig, freelance journalist, World Politics Review, previously
worked in Washington, D.C., as a politics and policy reporter for U.S. News & World
Report, OAS Still Relevant Amid Rising Latin American Regionalism, article, World
Politics Review, April 12, 2012,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11838/oas-still-relevant-amid-rising-
latin-american-regionalism)
CARTAGENA, Colombia -- The O rganization of A merican S tates prides itself on being the
worlds oldest regional organization. Yet, as its members prepare for the Sixth Summit of the
Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, this weekend, its relevance in todays world, especially amid Latin Americas
The OAS remains the best-organized
recent wave of regionalism, will be called into question.
and most inclusive body in the Western Hemisphere, and apart from bilateral
relationships, it is considered the prominent link between the U nited S tates
and Latin America . Nevertheless, the regions increasingly diversified global engagement and a growing
sense of autonomy among Latin American nations has raised existential questions about the long-standing body,
and by the same token, about the influence of the United States in Latin America. Perhaps the most visible
challenge today comes in the form of alternative regional groupings, such as the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR), created by Brazil in 2008, or the smaller and more radical Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA), which began as an
agreement between Cuba and Venezuela in 2004. In addition, just this past December, in Caracas, Venezuela,
regional leaders established the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) as their newest
multilateral mechanism. Taking care to exclude the United States and Canada from its membership, certain regional
leaders, notably Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez, hailed CELAC as an outright rebuff of the OAS and its North
American members role in the affairs of Latin America. For Chvez and his fellow leftist counterparts in the region,
such as Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, CELACs creation marked a point of arrival and a point of departure"
for Latin America, as Chvez put it, a symbol of its success and a break from its dependence on the United States.
By contrast, other states in the region have adopted a more pragmatic, less political view of the newer regional
forums. According to Sandra Borda, international relations professor at the University of the Andes in Bogot, more-
centrist countries such as Colombia simply see these new entities as additional forums to address the regions
problems, particularly those in which the United States does not necessarily need to play a role. [Theres a
growing perception that] this region is powerful enough at this point in the story, Borda says. The U.S. is
not in a position to intervene or exercise a lot of power over Latin
American countries. So whats the purpose of having the U.S. in these organizations? Indeed, Borda
argues that rather than representing a rejection of the United States or a Cold War-like dynamic of picking sides, the
rise of these new organizations may simply reflect a practical recognition that the United States has been
increasingly less inclined -- and for domestic political and economic reasons, less able -- to intervene in Latin
American matters. Though the United States has in some ways worked to increase economic partnerships with
many Latin American nations -- most notably through the trade agreements with Colombia and Panama approved
last year -- it has been preoccupied elsewhere. Internally, debates over burgeoning federal deficits and a slow-going
economic recovery limit its capability to deliver foreign or military aid. Likewise, even as its wars draw down in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States will continue to keep a close eye on the Middle East. Moreover, the Obama
administrations much-hyped pivot toward Asia makes it even less likely that Washington will prioritize Latin
America among its list of geopolitical concerns. Still, what some have called a lack of attention to Latin America
may, in the end, be a blessing, as the region continues to seek solutions internally. The region has matured
significantly, and though its nations still look to the United States for assistance on certain issues -- such as the
lasting drug-trafficking problem in Colombia and Central America, for instance -- there are others where regional
powers are now more confident in their own autonomy. They have been used to having the U.S. around for such a
long time; its very difficult just to conceive the idea of solving a crisis without the U.S., Borda says. But I think
they are going to get used it. Partly as a result of the weakening impact of the United States, new regional
groupings, particularly UNASUR, have become especially attractive for Brazil, which has emerged as Latin Americas
standout global power. As it solidifies its economic potential as one of the so-called BRICS nations and seeks a
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, Brazils reach throughout the rest of South America could
be an important selling point. Such regional organizations could help to consolidate that influence, while also
embedding it in a multilateral context that reassures Brazils neighbors. That said, given the conflicting national
its unlikely that any of
interests, lack of trust and stark ideological differences among member states,
these new organizations will make significant progress toward economic
or political integration. Rather, in the foreseeable future, experts agree that these groups --
which fall significantly short of the OAS in structure -- will remain
additional avenues for monitoring issues, defusing conflicts and fostering discussion within
the region. Even with its own limitations, the OAS is still much better-
equipped financially and organizationally to encourage solutions on issues
such as poverty, human rights and democracy than the other regional
groups. And despite calls for its replacement, the OAS will continue to be a valuable
nexus for both its North and South American members.
OAS Good
Oas good general
Cooperative engagement is key and resolves your solvency

deficits about US action
Forman et al 2 (Shepard Forman, Director Emeritus and Senior Fellow of the
Center on International Cooperation at New York University, research professor, NYU
Department of Politics, Princeton Lyman, former US ambassador to Nigeria and
South Africa, Stewart Patrick, Senior Fellow and Director of the International
Institutions and Global Governance Program, The United States in a Global Age:
The Case for Multilateral Engagement, policy paper, Center on International
Cooperation at New York University, published 2002,
http://www.centroedelstein.org.br/PDF/US_Global_Age.pdf)
THE CASE FOR COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT The rise of global challenges to the top of the U.S.
foreign policy agenda makes multilateral cooperation an increasingly
indispensable vehicle for the pursuit of U.S. national interests and
objectives . The country has little choice but to collaborate with foreign
governments and international institutions in order to grapple with todays pressing transnational
challenges, whether these involve managing the global commons, keeping peace in troubled regions, ensuring
global financial stability, or curbing terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In each of these realms and so
many others multilateral
frameworks for international cooperation permit the
United States and its partners to consult, resolve differences, design
solutions, share burdens and risks, coordinate action, and monitor and
enforce commitments. A strategy of multilateralism recognizes that the vigorous pursuit of U.S.
national interests is often best accomplished through international
institutions and partnerships. It recognizes that there are limits to going it alone, particularly in dealing with
multilateralism
challenges that transcend national borders and elicit global concern. In most cases,
expands rather than restricts U.S. options, permitting the United States to
achieve otherwise unreachable goals, to share burdens in pursuing these objectives, and
not least to win legitimacy for its policies. One of the dilemmas that the
United States confronts in a unipolar world is how to exercise its
overwhelming power in ways that neither threaten other countries nor encourage their resistance.
Multilateralism provides a partial solution to this quandary. By exercising its leadership through
consensual institutions that give voice and satisfaction to the less powerful while placing only modest constraints
the United States can reassure
on its own policy autonomy and sovereign prerogatives,
weaker states that fear exploitation or abandonment, increase their
willingness to follow the U.S. lead, and consolidate a productive and
peaceful world that will advance long-term U.S. interests .
US cooperation through the OAS solves

Hoose 7 (Matthew S Hoose, Major, US Air Force, US OPPORTUNITY IN
VENEZUELA: A 21ST CENTURY GOOD NEIGHBOR STRATEGY, Research Report
Submitted to the Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements, Air
Command and Staff College, Air University, April 2007,
http://dtlweb.au.af.mil///exlibris/dtl/d3_1/apache_media/L2V4bGlicmlzL2R0bC9kM18
xL2FwYWNoZV9tZWRpYS8yNTUzMQ==.pdf)
The UN has repeatedly urged an end to the US embargo of Cuba and its repeal and acceptance of Cuba could be a
major turning point for US diplomacy and popularity throughout the region, much like its repeal of the Platt
Amendment in the early 20th Century71. Countries posing no real threat shouldnt be
contained, but accepted and cooperated with. Unlike Iran and N. Korea, which require
containment because of their support to terrorism and development of nuclear weapons, countries like Cuba
and Venezuela pose no immediate danger. Isolating and punishing these
countries only results in lost economic opportunities, world resentment
and an external enemy for their leaders to focus blame on. If the US
reverses its course and adopts a modern day Good Neighbor policy, anti-US leaders will
lose a significant platform from which they retain popularity and power.
The power of a sincere apology can affect people to the core , and regardless of
what anti-US media response follows, there will be Latin Americans that give the US another look following such an
apology. The State Department should make immediate and frequent trips to continue engagement in establishing
free trade agreements and economic ties with countries like Brazil as they work toward agreements to expand
research, share technology, stimulate new investment, and develop common international standards for biofuels72.
Thisengagement should be inclusive of all of Latin America, and overtures toward
Venezuela should be made regardless of whether they accept them. The US should also work
through the O rganization of A merican S tates and create a commission to determine how
best the US can help economically instead of only proposing its neoliberal
policy of free trade and market economy as the only economic solution .
2nc a2: US key (these arent in our compiled file for
whatever reason)
OAS solves and promotes US interests

In pursuing its objectives through the concrete policy recommendations laid out in this report, the United
States must focus its efforts and resources on helping Latin America
strengthen the public institutions necessary to address the challenges
identified in this report. In doing so, Washington should work in partnership with Latin
American nations through multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, Inter- American
Development Bank (IDB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Finance Corporation, and Organization of
American States (OAS). It should also continue to work closely with civil society organizations and domestic
and international businesses to create more inclusive economic, social, and political opportunities for Latin
Achieving the ambitious
American countries and their citizens, which will benefit U.S. policy goals.
goals of strengthening institutions and improving the lives of Latin
Americans will require long-term efforts on the part of many participants, most importantly
Latin American governments and societies themselves. Nevertheless, there is a significant
supporting role for the United States. Expanding its policy framework and
concentrating on strategic regional partnerships will best promote U.S.
interests , enhancing stability, security, and prosperity throughout the
hemisphere.
OAS is key most effective body in Latin America

Rettig 12 (Jessica Rettig, freelance journalist, World Politics Review, previously
worked in Washington, D.C., as a politics and policy reporter for U.S. News & World
Report, OAS Still Relevant Amid Rising Latin American Regionalism, article, World
Politics Review, April 12, 2012,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11838/oas-still-relevant-amid-rising-
latin-american-regionalism)
CARTAGENA, Colombia -- The O rganization of A merican S tates prides itself on being the
worlds oldest regional organization. Yet, as its members prepare for the Sixth Summit of the
Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, this weekend, its relevance in todays world, especially amid Latin Americas
recent wave of regionalism, will be called into question. The OAS remains the best-
organized and most inclusive body in the Western Hemisphere , and apart from
bilateral relationships, it is considered the prominent link between the U nited
S tates and Latin America . Nevertheless, the regions increasingly diversified global engagement
and a growing sense of autonomy among Latin American nations has raised existential questions about the long-
standing body, and by the same token, about the influence of the United States in Latin America. Perhaps the
most visible challenge today comes in the form of alternative regional groupings, such as the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR), created by Brazil in 2008, or the smaller and more radical Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA),
which began as an agreement between Cuba and Venezuela in 2004. In addition, just this past December, in
Caracas, Venezuela, regional leaders established the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)
as their newest multilateral mechanism. Taking care to exclude the United States and Canada from its membership,
certain regional leaders, notably Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez, hailed CELAC as an outright rebuff of the OAS
and its North American members role in the affairs of Latin America. For Chvez and his fellow leftist
counterparts in the region, such as Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, CELACs creation marked a point of arrival
and a point of departure" for Latin America, as Chvez put it, a symbol of its success and a break from its
dependence on the United States. By contrast, other states in the region have adopted a more pragmatic, less
political view of the newer regional forums. According to Sandra Borda, international relations professor at the
University of the Andes in Bogot, more-centrist countries such as Colombia simply see these new entities as
additional forums to address the regions problems, particularly those in which the United States does not
necessarily need to play a role. [Theres a growing perception that] this region is powerful enough at this point
in the story, Borda says. The
U.S. is not in a position to intervene or exercise a lot
of power over Latin American countries. So whats the purpose of having the U.S. in these
organizations? Indeed, Borda argues that rather than representing a rejection of the United States or a Cold War-
like dynamic of picking sides, the rise of these new organizations may simply reflect a practical recognition that the
United States has been increasingly less inclined -- and for domestic political and economic reasons, less able -- to
intervene in Latin American matters. Though the United States has in some ways worked to increase economic
partnerships with many Latin American nations -- most notably through the trade agreements with Colombia and
Panama approved last year -- it has been preoccupied elsewhere. Internally, debates over burgeoning federal
deficits and a slow-going economic recovery limit its capability to deliver foreign or military aid. Likewise, even as
its wars draw down in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States will continue to keep a close eye on the Middle East.
Moreover, the Obama administrations much-hyped pivot toward Asia makes it even less likely that Washington
will prioritize Latin America among its list of geopolitical concerns. Still, what some have called a lack of attention
to Latin America may, in the end, be a blessing, as the region continues to seek solutions internally. The region has
matured significantly, and though its nations still look to the United States for assistance on certain issues -- such as
the lasting drug-trafficking problem in Colombia and Central America, for instance -- there are others where regional
powers are now more confident in their own autonomy. They have been used to having the U.S. around for such
a long time; its very difficult just to conceive the idea of solving a crisis without the U.S., Borda says. But I think
they are going to get used it. Partly as a result of the weakening impact of the United States, new regional
groupings, particularly UNASUR, have become especially attractive for Brazil, which has emerged as Latin Americas
standout global power. As it solidifies its economic potential as one of the so-called BRICS nations and seeks a
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, Brazils reach throughout the rest of South America could
be an important selling point. Such regional organizations could help to consolidate that influence, while also
embedding it in a multilateral context that reassures Brazils neighbors. That said, given the conflicting national
its unlikely that any of
interests, lack of trust and stark ideological differences among member states,
these new organizations will make significant progress toward economic
or political integration. Rather, in the foreseeable future, experts agree that these groups --
which fall significantly short of the OAS in structure -- will remain
additional avenues for monitoring issues, defusing conflicts and fostering discussion within
the region. Even with its own limitations, the OAS is still much better-
equipped financially and organizationally to encourage solutions on issues
such as poverty, human rights and democracy than the other regional
groups. And despite calls for its replacement, the OAS will continue to be a valuable
nexus for both its North and South American members.
2nc a2: oas fails
Cooperative engagement is key and resolves your solvency deficits

about US action
THE CASE FOR COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT The rise of global challenges to the top of the U.S.
foreign policy agenda makes multilateral cooperation an increasingly
indispensable vehicle for the pursuit of U.S. national interests and
objectives . The country has little choice but to collaborate with foreign
governments and international institutions in order to grapple with todays pressing transnational
challenges, whether these involve managing the global commons, keeping peace in troubled regions, ensuring
global financial stability, or curbing terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In each of these realms and so
many others multilateral
frameworks for international cooperation permit the
United States and its partners to consult, resolve differences, design
solutions, share burdens and risks, coordinate action, and monitor and
enforce commitments. A strategy of multilateralism recognizes that the vigorous pursuit of U.S.
national interests is often best accomplished through international
institutions and partnerships. It recognizes that there are limits to going it alone, particularly in dealing with
multilateralism
challenges that transcend national borders and elicit global concern. In most cases,
expands rather than restricts U.S. options, permitting the United States to
achieve otherwise unreachable goals, to share burdens in pursuing these objectives, and
not least to win legitimacy for its policies. One of the dilemmas that the
United States confronts in a unipolar world is how to exercise its
overwhelming power in ways that neither threaten other countries nor encourage their resistance.
Multilateralism provides a partial solution to this quandary. By exercising its leadership through
consensual institutions that give voice and satisfaction to the less powerful while placing only modest constraints
the United States can reassure
on its own policy autonomy and sovereign prerogatives,
weaker states that fear exploitation or abandonment, increase their
willingness to follow the U.S. lead, and consolidate a productive and
peaceful world that will advance long-term U.S. interests .v
US cooperation through the OAS solves

Hoose 7 (Matthew S Hoose, Major, US Air Force, US OPPORTUNITY IN
VENEZUELA: A 21ST CENTURY GOOD NEIGHBOR STRATEGY, Research Report
Submitted to the Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements, Air
Command and Staff College, Air University, April 2007,
http://dtlweb.au.af.mil///exlibris/dtl/d3_1/apache_media/L2V4bGlicmlzL2R0bC9kM18
xL2FwYWNoZV9tZWRpYS8yNTUzMQ==.pdf)
The UN has repeatedly urged an end to the US embargo of Cuba and its repeal and acceptance of Cuba could be a
major turning point for US diplomacy and popularity throughout the region, much like its repeal of the Platt
Amendment in the early 20th Century71. Countries posing no real threat shouldnt be
contained, but accepted and cooperated with. Unlike Iran and N. Korea, which require
containment because of their support to terrorism and development of nuclear weapons, countries like Cuba
and Venezuela pose no immediate danger. Isolating and punishing these
countries only results in lost economic opportunities, world resentment
and an external enemy for their leaders to focus blame on. If the US
reverses its course and adopts a modern day Good Neighbor policy, anti-US leaders will
lose a significant platform from which they retain popularity and power.
The power of a sincere apology can affect people to the core , and regardless of
what anti-US media response follows, there will be Latin Americans that give the US another look following such an
apology. The State Department should make immediate and frequent trips to continue engagement in establishing
free trade agreements and economic ties with countries like Brazil as they work toward agreements to expand
research, share technology, stimulate new investment, and develop common international standards for biofuels72.
Thisengagement should be inclusive of all of Latin America, and overtures toward
Venezuela should be made regardless of whether they accept them. The US should also work
through the O rganization of A merican S tates and create a commission to determine how
best the US can help economically instead of only proposing its neoliberal
policy of free trade and market economy as the only economic solution .
Permutation/Competition
A2: Perm
Binding commitment to the OAS is key
level, Responding To The Hemispheres Political Challenges: Report of The Inter-
American Dialogue Task Force on the Organizatio n of American States, June 2006,
pg. 21, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/OAS_2006.pdf)
The task force was unanimous in urging support for a more active and robust OAS to engage the hemispheres
The OAS could and should be playing a far more
political and governance challenges.
influential role in hemispheric affairsbut, in order to do so, it will need
greater unity and cooperation among its member states. To be sure, there are
organizational changes that would strengthen the OAS and it certainly needs a larger budget and more reliable
financial support. But what most constrains the OAS are the divisions and antagonisms in inter-American relations
and the resulting disagreements among member states on the key issues and what needs to done about them.
The multiple challenges affecting the nations of the hemisphere provide the OAS an ample agenda of work. At the
strained relations among the hemispheres governments
same time, however, the
make it more difficult for the organization to act. The secretary general has
considerable room for initiative on his own, and he should certainly take that initiative when the member states
are unable to reach decision, and then do his best to get their support. Indeed, at all times, the effectiveness of
the OAS critically depends on the imaginative and energetic leadership of the secretary general, and his ability to
mobilize governments to take action. It is the secretary general who must drive the OAS. But, the OAS
cannot be a strong and effective regional organization if its member
states are unwilling to put aside their differences and use the
organization to advance their common interests and values.
Perm links to the net benefit unilateral action undermines the

OAS
Durrett 6-25 (Jessie McCamant Durrett, Research Associate at the Council on
Hemispheric Affairs, Open support for OAS is imperative for productive
partnership, Voxxi News, June 25, 2013, http://www.voxxi.com/open-support-for-
oas-imperative/)
U.S. politicians and diplomats routinely deride the effectiveness of the Organization of American States
(OAS), while appreciation of its efforts is rarely heard. These negative critiques, which regularly come from public officials as prominent as Secretary
of State John Kerry and Senator Marco Rubio (FL-R ), are misdirected and hinder the potential for
collaboration and progress within the most inclusive multilateral body

operating in the Americas. Secretary Kerrys comments reflect U.S.-centric
thinking and the lack of U.S. prioritization of Latin America in its
diplomacy. As senator, Kerry once described the OAS as a forum made up of third-
string diplomats. As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he authored a particularly scornful editorial about OAS failures and the need for
reform before proposing legislation that would impose significant budget restrictions on the organization. While testifying before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee as Secretary
of State, Kerry labeled Latin America as Washingtons backyard, an insulting categorization of the region. This time, however, the comments caused particularly significant
consequences for U.S.-Latin American relations. Specifically, Bolivian President Evo Morales disdainfully cited this remark while justifying his expulsion of the U.S. Agency for International
Development from his country. The backyard mindset has always been unpopular in Latin America and has recently sparked particular aggravation, exemplified by Ecuadorian
President Rafael Correas assertion that we are no longer anyones backyard, in his May inaugural address. However, Kerry attempted to quickly move past these verbal blunders and
towards a more polite and constructive engagement with the hemisphere by attending the OAS General Assembly in Antigua, Guatemala from June 5 to June 7. During his remarks, Kerry
Nevertheless, the Obama administration has yet to

affirmed the Obama administrations full commitment to partnership.
formulate a coherent Latin American policy and doubts about U.S.

devotion to the multilateral purpose of the OAS persist. While Washington appoints well-regarded and
politically influential diplomats to the United Nations (UN) and often discusses its work at the UN Security Council, it tends to not send top diplomats or high profile political figures as
[its] permanent representatives to the OAS, according to former Mexican Ambassador to the UN and the OAS, Claude Heller. Understandably, the United States prioritizes the UN over
disregard for the imperative role of the OAS and the region it
the OAS, but its
attempts to unite is all too apparent in its approach to the organization.

Public criticism of the OAS weakens Washingtons ability to engage in
meaningful diplomacy. As the role of regional organizations like the Union of South American States continues to grow, the United States has even more
reason to reiterate its public support for the only inter-American organization that includes representatives from North, Central, and South America, as well as Caribbean states.
condemnation of the OAS is misguided because the organizations

Additionally,
relevance and value depend on the political and financial contributions of

its member states. Ambassador Heller asserts, The financial crisis [within the OAS] will not be resolved without a renewal of member states commitment
to politically strengthening the organization. U.S. policymakers often complain about OAS working methods and dwindling U.S. influence at the organization, but Jorge Heine, retired
Chilean ambassador, argues that attempting to return to the days when Washington gave the OAS its marching orders poses the greatest risk of condemning it to irrelevance.
Similarly, many U.S. policymakers and scholars suggest utilizing the OAS further to advance government accountability and human rights. However, the United States is not currently in
the best position to press these agendas due to Washingtons own flawed human rights record in Latin America and its age-old, persistent tendencies to try to dominate OAS machinery.
Generating progress on issues ranging from corruption to drug-related violence at the OAS requires
consistently investing political capital , which calls for vocalizing greater
prioritization of the organization and demonstrating an eagerness to
work in equal partnership with rising hemispheric powers. In order to move beyond harmful
comments and set the stage for more meaningful and productive cooperation, Secretary Kerry must utilize his new leadership
position by directing U.S. diplomats to boldly support the OAS and work collaboratively with their Latin
American counterparts.
Unconditional Support for multilateral institutions is key

sends a signal that the US is committed the plan sends a
signal of ambivalence
Despite the growing linkages between the United States and the rest of the world and the rise of global challenges
the U nited S tates remains deeply ambivalent about
not amenable to unilateral action,
multilateral cooperation and international institutions . A more constructive
attitude is required, beginning with a renewed appreciation of the
indispensability of multilateral frameworks in achieving the countrys most important
national objectives. At this critical juncture in world history, the United States must again step forward to lead the
international community in shaping an effective institutional architecture to address global problems. More effective
multilateral engagement will require a practical reorientation of U.S.
foreign policy , with leadership coming from both the White House and Congress. It will require a
restructuring of the Executive Branch to match current global realities; greater involvement of the Legislative
Branch on transnational issues; innovative partnerships between the U.S. government and private actors; and
greater public awareness about Americas interest in multilateral cooperation. While precise recommendations
regarding institutional reform and policy orientations will await further study, we propose a number of initial steps
to improve the nations capacities for multilateral engagement. Specifically, we recommend that:
The Administration and Congress recognize that a foreign policy
fundamentally oriented toward strengthening multilateralism provides the most
promising means for advancing U.S. interests in an interdependent world; The Administration articulate to our
allies and to other nations a policy framework that assures them of our intention to build an international system of
cooperation and burden-sharing, one that preserves our ability to act alone where vital US interests or major
humanitarian concerns demand but also ensures that any such action will proceed with the maximum practical level
of consultation and coalition building;
Only the FTAA alone will solve --- the US will be perceived as
undermining the negotiation and taking the lead --- that fails
and links to the unilateralism net benefit.
Crandall 11 (Russell Crandall, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the
Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009, Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-
11, The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs 90.3, May-June, 2011, pg. ,
http://worldview.unc.edu/files/2012/02/Reading-1.pdf)
Across the region in recent years, the U nited S tates has seen its influence decline .
Latin American countries are increasingly looking for solutions among
themselves, forming their own regional organizations that exclude the United States and seeking friends and
opportunities outside of Washington's orbit. Some U .S. allies are even reconsidering their
belief in the primacy of relations with the U nited S tates. Much of this has to do with the
end of the Cold War, a conflict that turned Latin America into a battleground between U.S. and Soviet proxies.
Washington has also made a series of mistakes in the years since then, arrogantly issuing ultimatums that made it
Latin
even harder to get what it wanted in Latin America. At the same time as U.S. influence has diminished,
America's own capabilities have grown. The region has entered into an era of unprecedented
economic, political, and diplomatic success. Most visibly, Brazil has emerged as an economic powerhouse,
attracting foreign investment with an economy that grew 7.5 percent last year. (Regionwide, average GDP growth
last year was 5.6 percent.) Regular free elections and vibrant civil societies are now commonplace in Latin America,
and the region's diplomats are more visible and confident in global forums than ever before. After decades on the
receiving end of lectures from Washington and Brussels, Latin American leaders are eager to advertise their recent
gains. Santos has been known to tell visiting foreign counterparts that this will be "Latin America's century."
Although star performers such as Brazil and Chile have recently surged ahead, Latin America has yet to realize its
full collective diplomatic and political capacity. The problems that have plagued the region in the past--income
inequality, a lack of law and order, illicit trafficking networks--still exist, threatening to derail its hard-earned
successes. Guatemala, to take just one example, not only ranks among the world's poorest countries; it also has
one of the highest homicide rates in the world, with 6,000 people murdered each year in a population of only 13
million. Ironically, moreover, Latin America's entry into a "post-hegemonic" era, a
product of its own advancements, could undermine its past progress . As the balance of power in
the region is redistributed, unexpected alliances and enmities could arise. Many observers have assumed that less
U.S. involvement would be an inherently positive development, but that may be too optimistic. No one should
underestimate the capacity of the Venezuela-led bloc of quasi-authoritarian leftist governments to stop the regional
trend toward greater openness and democracy--values that the bloc sees as representing a capitulation to the U.S.-
controlled global system. Nonetheless, Latin America's emerging democratic consensus
seems inevitable, and as its strategic posture finally matures, the region will be more directly responsible
for its own successes and failures. Long Latin America's master, the U nited S tates must adapt to the
new realities of this post-hegemonic era, lest it see its influence diminish
even further . It must demonstrate an ability to quietly engage and lead
when appropriate--an approach that will allow Washington to remain
actively involved in the region's affairs without acting as though it is
trying to maintain its legacy of hegemony . Given how accustomed the United States is to
dominating the region, this project will be harder than it sounds. FROM HEGEMONY TO AUTONOMY The era of U.S.
hegemony in Latin America began over a century ago, when the United States started flexing its emerging
economic and military might in Central America and the Caribbean. In the jungles and mountains of Nicaragua,
Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, American soldiers and diplomats used persuasion, coercion, and force to
advance U.S. political and economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington sought to stem the threat of Soviet
and Cuban communism, acting directly, for example, when it invaded Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989, and
indirectly, as when it provided covert funding to undermine Chilean President Salvador Allende's leftist government
in the 1970s. Sometimes these efforts worked, as in Chile and Grenada, but often they did not; both the Bay of Pigs
operation in 1961 and U.S. efforts to overthrow by proxy the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in the 1980s were
there was a disconnect between
outright failures. For much of the twentieth century,
Washington's lofty rhetoric of democracy and regional harmony and its
demonstrated willingness to jettison these principles when its economic or
geopolitical interests were at stake. Even after the Cold War, the United States was accused of
peddling its "Washington consensus" of laissez-faire economic policies, such as the privatization of state-owned
assets and free-trade agreements, as a sort of neoimperialism. Instead of U.S. marines or CIA agents, blame for
doing the empire's bidding was now pinned on the "technocratic imperialists" from the World Bank, the International
U nited S tates'
Monetary Fund, and the U.S. Treasury Department. Yet over the past decade or so, the
willingness and ability to exert control in the region have diminished. This
has occurred in part because more important issues, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have forced Latin
America down the policymaking food chain. But there is also the indisputable reality that the region itself is now
more confident acting on its own. For the most part, this was inevitable, given the end of external and local
communist challenges and the shift to an increasingly multilateral world that had room for new powers. Latin
America's greater autonomy is both a cause and a result of decreased U.S. influence.
the perm fails --- modest support undercuts soft power --- only
a full engagement can solve
Forman et al 2 (Shepard Forman, Director Emeritus and Senior Fellow of the Center on International Cooperation at
New York University, research professor, NYU Department of Politics, Princeton Lyman, former US ambassador to Nigeria and South
Africa, Stewart Patrick, Senior Fellow and Director of the International Institutions and Global Governance Program, The United
States in a Global Age: The Case for Multilateral Engagement, policy paper, Center on International Cooperation at New York
University, published 2002, http://www.centroedelstein.org.br/PDF/US_Global_Age.pdf)
In the recent past, the U nited S tates has sometimes acted alone or opted out of
multilateral initiatives to pursue immediate gain or avoid short-term pain,
without due consideration of the long-term ramifications for its own
national interests, the broader global interest in which it shares, or the sustainability of international
institutions. Such uncritical ambivalence and shortsighted selectivity carries risks. Among other costs,
it can: Thwart the pursuit of coherent and effective policies toward
particular global problems. Internally divided about the merits of the International Criminal Court, for
example, the Clinton Administration failed to propose a compelling alternative or launch a timely initiative to build
support for its preferences. Now the United States faces the creation of a Court that could well come into conflict
with U.S. objectives and complicate our security arrangements overseas. Undermine collective responses to
pressing transnational challenges. The U.S. decision to repudiate the Kyoto Protocol without charting an alternative
course, for example, has hindered prospects for a solution to the problem of global warming. (It also threatens to
block American companies from participating in some economic opportunities available to firms from countries that
Weaken international institutions critical to U.S. national
have adopted the treaty).
interests: By resisting a rigorous verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, for example, the
United States may send an unfortunate signal to potential proliferators and increase its risk of eventual exposure to
biological weapons. Slow the spread of international norms and regimes : By failing to
ratify major human rights instruments, the United States may delay the formation of robust norms and undermine
its own human rights advocacy abroad. Likewise, by rejecting the CTBT, the United States may jeopardize a
longstanding bargain under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, whereby the non-nuclear states have foresworn
Undermine
such weapons in return for a commitment by nuclear states to eventual nuclear disarmament.
cooperative security: In the 1990s, the United States limited the UNs capacity to engage in
peacekeeping by holding back U.S. dues, insisting on zero nominal growth of the UN budget, and opposing UN
nation-building efforts. As a result, the UN has struggled to respond to U.S. requests for major peacekeeping and
peacebuilding operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, where the United States wants the UN and other
Hinder U.S. ability to mobilize the support of other
nations to share the burden.
countries: Perceived U.S. high-handedness and selectivity toward international
obligations can carry diplomatic costs, making it more difficult to forge
coalitions or build support within international institutions . The prolonged crisis
over U.S. arrears to the United Nations, for instance, undercut Washingtons leadership position within the UN. As a
result, the U.S. lost its seat on the influential budget oversight committee for several years in the late 1990s and, in
resentment contributed to U.S.
May 2001, its seat on the Human Rights Commission. Similar
difficulties in rallying needed support for the U.S. position at the Durban
Conference on racism, forcing the United States to withdraw from the
gathering.vi Jeopardize the values which the American public believes
should be a major part of U.S. foreign policy and which gives the United
States moral credibility with other nations. Both the U.S. public and peoples around the
world look to the United States to pursue policies consistent with its ideals. By providing only modest
levels of political and financial support to important international
institutions, the U.S. government jeopardizes domestic support for U.S.
engagement abroad and risks undercutting the soft power that helps
to sustain its global leadership in the eyes of foreign partners. Given the
drawbacks and limitations of acting alone, we believe that departures from multilateralism
should be the exception rather than the rule.
Only the cp resolves suspicions and causes the topic country to

say yes --- also perm do both destroys the CP
Malone and Khong, 2003 (David international security and development, as well as a career
diplomat former president of the International Peace Institute expert on international affairs, Yuen, Professor of IR
Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives
https://www.rienner.com/uploads/47d832b1257af.pdf)
unilateral behavior can undermine ones reputation relates to U.S.

A variant of how
approaches to Latin America and Africa. A priori, the hegemonic status of the United States
makes many observers in those two regions suspicious of U.S. intentions. U.S.
inconsistency, as well as coercive and nonconsultative behavior, makes it
even more difficult for many to trust the United States, even when the latters
intentions are benign. In areas such as nuclear policy, the use of force, the United Nations, climate change,
international crime, human rights, and the ICC, all the authors agree that the particular multilateral regime is
dealt a serious, though not necessarily fatal, blow when the United States opts out of the
agreement . The contributors agree that a more multilateral U.S. approach
to global and regional challenges will better serve the international
community as well as U.S. interests. Thus, Thakurs analysis of peacekeeping shows that a United States
more deeply engaged with the United Nations is able to get more done. Similarly, Gelson Fonseca advocates an Inter-American
future that moves away from the frequent U.S. unilateral military interventions of the past to a more multilateral approach that is
more likely to serve long-term U.S. interests
Random Card Aff or neg?
Threaten to cut funding CP? Or the cp doesnt solve

OAS budget constraints offer an opportunity for Members of Congress to
reflect on the utility of U.S. participation in the organization . Those who support
the organizations activities and would like the OAS to be as effective as possible might consider steps to shore up
the organizations finances and protect its human capital. In a November 2012 letter, for example, four U.S.
Senators called on the OAS to be more selective about the mandates it adopts, consider spinning off entities that
are currently part of the organizations institutional structure but outside its primary areas of focus, and adopt
transparent and fair human resources policies to strengthen the recruitment and retention of top quality
personnel.135 On the other hand, those who think the United States receives few benefits from its participation in
the OAS may question why the United States continues to provide the largest portion of the organizations budget.
They might suggest that the OAS look to other member states for funding increases, and consider directing U.S.
appropriations to institutions or programs that they believe are better able to advance U.S. interests. The
current constraints on the OAS budget also could provide significant
leverage to Congress. According to some analysts, the organizations reliance on
voluntary contributions has resulted in the OAS increasingly prioritizing its
efforts based on the preferences of donors.136 By directing contributions to programs that
advance U.S. objectives in the hemisphere, Congress could provide incentives for the OAS
to prioritize activities that Members support. However, the organization could lose some of
its legitimacy in the region if other member states believe it is no longer addressing their concerns and is simply
In addition to directing appropriations to certain OAS
advancing U.S. policy.
activities, Congress could utilize its leverage by threatening to withhold
funding for the organization. As noted above, Members of the 112th Congress introduced several
measures that would restrict funding for the OAS under various circumstances. While such actions could
put considerable pressure on the OAS to act, they also carry substantial risk to ongoing
OAS activities. As Brazil demonstrated in 2011, even temporarily withholding funding could force the organization to
take drastic actions or bring its operations to a halt. Moreover, unless the United States chooses to renounce its
membership in the OAS, it has an obligation under the OAS Charter, which it signed in 1948 and ratified in 1951, to
pay its assessed dues.
FTAA CP
Top Level
1NC Shell --- Democracy Clause
Text: The United States federal government should initiate
negotiations over the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
with the individual member countries of Latin America
(Including Cuba) and the Secretary General of the Organization
of American States. The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
should include a democracy clause that is clearly defined as
outlined by our Feinberg and Bates evidence. The negotiations
should include __plan__ as a part of the built in agenda to
encourage further engagement outside of the FTAAs core
elements.
Democracy clauses builds support for engagement, LA will say

yes, and the cp doesnt link to ptx
Feinberg and Bates, 2001 (Richard, Professor of International Political Economy at the Graduate
School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California special assistant to President Clinton and senior director
of the National Security Councils Office of Inter-American Affairs. Jenny, former international economist with the Progressive Policy
Institute, Why the FTAA Needs a Democracy Clause http://www.dlc.org/print472e.html?contentid=3056)
In sum, a democracy clause is not a universally applicable model for all trade agreements. In some cases it may be
irrelevant, while in bilateral deals it may smack of U.S. unilateralism. It should certainly not
become a blueprint for all future trade deals. However, in the case of the FTAA , where the United States'
primary long-term goal is the promotion of economic development and democracy in
the region, a strong commitment by all the parties to the protection of
democracy is both relevant and desirable. It would be supported by most
Latin American governments , who would welcome the implicit praise and signal of external
support for their own democratic systems. The inclusion of a democracy
clause will also help sustain and advance U.S. values in Latin America and
rebuild support for the policy of economic engagement among the American public. By
placing the FTAA in a broader political and security framework, a

democracy clause could be critical to building a congressional majority
behind freer trade with the Western Hemisphere.
Latin America would agree -- the democracy clause is crucial to

forge support for the FTAA --- MERCOSUR proves.
skeptics might argue that such

Yet, even when convinced of the need for a democracy clause as part of the FTAA,
a clause will be ineffective in practice. They might suggest that there are too many technical problems
in defining democracy and deciding when to take action, that it would never be invoked, and that
such a linkage between trade and democracy will be opposed by our Latin American trading partners. The
problems associated with designing a democracy clause, though real, are not insurmountable. Most other
examples (such as the European Union and MERCOSUR) simply refer to the protection of democracy and leave it to leaders to decide
themselves if and when democracy is under threat in practice. Since democracy is a difficult concept to define, some flexibility in
to guard against the trap of
interpreting when democracy is under threat is useful. However,
formalism -- where simply holding periodic elections becomes synonymous with democracy -- the FTAA
partners should adopt a more elaborate definition of democracy in this
context. It could include broad principles such as universal suffrage, regular
free and fair elections (with independent monitoring), a plurality of
political parties, and freedom of speech and association. In addition, those with
standing to bring a case under the FTAA clause might include individual member
countries, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), and, more
controversially, certain nongovernmental organizations. Cases might be reviewed by whatever
management structure is eventually established for the FTAA, or by the OAS Permanent Council
(composed of OAS member states), perhaps advised by an independent body such as the prestigious Inter-American Human Rights
It would also seem sensible to allow for a continuum of actions
Commission.
once a threat to democracy has been established, ranging from
consultations , to the suspension of voting rights and expulsion from
meetings , to the withdrawal of trade preferences in an extreme case. (The removal of trade
preferences granted under a regional trade deal, rather than the imposition of import bans or prohibitively high tariffs, is also legal
under WTO rules as long as all WTO members are fully informed in advance of any changes.5) On the question of invoking the
there is already some precedent in similar clauses in other economic agreements. For
clause,
following Paraguay's recent political instability, Paraguay's
example,
MERCOSUR trading partners, led by Brazil, threatened to invoke the

agreement's democracy clause . Brazilian President Cardoso warned the Paraguayan authorities that the
interruption of the constitutional order would result in Paraguay's expulsion from MERCOSUR. This pressure was a
key factor in the resignation of then-President Cubas and his replacement
with the leader of the Senate, as mandated by the Paraguayan
constitution. Finally, the objection that Latin American countries will oppose a
democracy clause seems unlikely in practice. Many of the countries in the region
have struggled with democracy and recognize the benefit of external
support during crises. For example, at a summit of the South American heads of state
held in Brasilia in September 2000, the presidents agreed that "maintenance of
the rule of law and strict respect for the democratic system in each of the
twelve countries of the region are at once a goal and a shared
commitment and are henceforth a condition for participation in South American meetings." They also agreed to
" conduct political consultations in the event of a threat of disruption of the democratic system in South
America." Indeed, existing regional economic deals -- such as MERCOSUR -- already contain
democracy clauses; the FTAA would simply be modeling itself on steps

already taken in Latin America independently of the United States.
The plan can be done through the FTAA --- itll be

incorporated into the built-in agenda.
Inter-American Development Bank, 2003 (Main source of development financing in Latin
America Creating The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Pragmatic Engagement for 2005
http://www.iadb.org/en/news/speeches/2003-11-19/creating-the-free-trade-area-of-the-americas-pragmatic-engagement-for-
2005,2216.html)
My message today is Engagement with a capital E. We need an FTAA agreement for all 34
countries . We need an agreement that is WTO consistent, comprehensive in scope
and with special attention to market access, including important agricultural liberalization. We
need an agreement with balanced concessions, but coupled with
instruments and modalities to level the playing field among countries that range from the
richest to some of the poorest in the world. This would include weighing the benefits and costs of adopted trade disciplines in light of
the level of development and the stage of structural reform of the participants. I think that many of those interested in freer
trade, especially those in the business community, would like to achieve the pristine ideal of the FTAA. However,
perfection can be the enemy of progress. Engagement in 2005 may require adjustments to immediate ambitions,
as the political and economic realities of today must ultimately shape any FTAA agreement -but engage we must.
After all, the FTAA is much more than business. Rather it is a grand regional public good that will contribute to
binding our hemisphere together in a venture that can make our neighborhood more stable and prosperous and
Rather than talk about an
contribute the same to the world economy. How to engage?
ambitious or light FTAA we should focus on a pragmatic FTAA, remembering
that such an agreement among so many heterogeneous countries will likely be a living process of intra-hemispheric
A pragmatic FTAA would involve a variable
relations rather than a one-off event.
geometry that incorporates core obligations for all with a scope that allows for
some critical tradeoffs: the possibility to engage bilaterally or plurilaterally
beyond the core elements of an FTAA. This could be accompanied by a post-
2005 built-in agenda to provide opportunities to expand the core obligations of the FTAA as advances
are made in the Doha Round and some of our economies and subregional agreements recover from several difficult
years. Another component of a pragmatic FTAA is to combine the proven technical prowess of our delegations with
the FTAA is much more
more direct political leadership in the process at the highest levels. As mentioned,
a grand political decision that will affect our countries
than business; it is ultimately
articulation with the hemisphere and world economy for decades to come.
1NC Shell --- Generic
Text: The United States federal government should initiate
negotiations over the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
with the individual member countries of Latin America
(Including Cuba). The negotiations should include __plan__ as a
part of the built in agenda to encourage further engagement
outside of the FTAAs core elements.
Latin American Countries will say yes and the plan can be
done through the FTAA --- itll be incorporated into the
built-in agenda.
2005,2216.html)
My message today is Engagement with a capital E. We need an FTAA agreement for all 34
countries . We need an agreement that is WTO consistent, comprehensive in scope
and with special attention to market access, including important agricultural liberalization. We
need an agreement with balanced concessions, but coupled with
instruments and modalities to level the playing field among countries that range from the
richest to some of the poorest in the world. This would include weighing the benefits and costs of adopted trade disciplines in light of
the level of development and the stage of structural reform of the participants. I think that many of those interested in freer
trade, especially those in the business community, would like to achieve the pristine ideal of the FTAA. However,
perfection can be the enemy of progress. Engagement in 2005 may require adjustments to immediate ambitions,
as the political and economic realities of today must ultimately shape any FTAA agreement -but engage we must.
After all, the FTAA is much more than business. Rather it is a grand regional public good that will contribute to
binding our hemisphere together in a venture that can make our neighborhood more stable and prosperous and
Rather than talk about an
contribute the same to the world economy. How to engage?
ambitious or light FTAA we should focus on a pragmatic FTAA, remembering
that such an agreement among so many heterogeneous countries will likely be a living process of intra-hemispheric
A pragmatic FTAA would involve a variable
relations rather than a one-off event.
geometry that incorporates core obligations for all with a scope that allows for
some critical tradeoffs: the possibility to engage bilaterally or plurilaterally
beyond the core elements of an FTAA. This could be accompanied by a post-
2005 built-in agenda to provide opportunities to expand the core obligations of the FTAA as advances
are made in the Doha Round and some of our economies and subregional agreements recover from several difficult
years. Another component of a pragmatic FTAA is to combine the proven technical prowess of our delegations with
the FTAA is much more
more direct political leadership in the process at the highest levels. As mentioned,
a grand political decision that will affect our countries
than business; it is ultimately
articulation with the hemisphere and world economy for decades to come.
Politics
1NC --- Generic
CP resolves political backlash
Godinich, 2011 (Andrew, Columbia Political Review Reviving Free Trade in the Americas
http://cpreview.org/2011/12/anyone-remember-the-ftaa/)
Anyone remember the FTAA? Probably not. The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) was supposed to be
revolutionary. Lowering or eliminating tariffs on thousands of goods in every country between Canada and Argentina, the treaty was
heralded as a breakthrough in Western relations when first announced at the 1994 Summit of the Americas. But today, the FTAA is
dead in the water. Instead, as a result of domestic and international hand-wringing, multiple bilateral agreements have been
negotiated and then subsequently postponed. Why? As any first-year student of economics could tell you, the logic of free trade
agreements is sound. Increased competition and access to resources, coupled with a decrease in job-killing tariffs and protectionist
policies lead to increased economic growth and employment. NAFTA the trilateral trade agreement between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico since its inception has resulted in a threefold increase in trade between the US and Canada and a quadrupling
of trade between the US and Mexico. While environmental and human rights concerns are important and need to be addressed, it is
undeniable that NAFTA and other free trade agreements are vital in an increasingly interconnected Western Hemisphere. So why am
free trade with our neighbors is the fastest and
I writing about this now? Quite simply,
surest way to ensure economic growth in the US. With the American Jobs Act and its financial stimulus
politically untenable and with the Federal Reserve unwilling to put its legitimacy further on the line, new avenues for economic
growth must be negotiated. Furthermore, free trade remains one the few issues where both
American political parties find common ground , reducing the risk of
political deadlock when passing legislation.
2NC --- Business Lobbies
The business community would push for the CP --- empirically
proven
Multi National Monitor, 2001 (NAFTA for the Americas Q&A on the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas) http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2001/01april/corp3.html)
The United States is the country pushing most aggressively for adoption of an FTAA. The
United States began the process at a 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami, following Congressional passage of
the NAFTA implementing legislation. The process gained momentum with the Santiago Summit in 1998. The
business community , in the United States and elsewhere throughout the Americas, is the social
force driving the agenda forward .
1NC --- Democracy Clause
Avoids the link to politics
In sum, a democracy clause is not a universally applicable model for all trade agreements. In some cases it may be
irrelevant, while in bilateral deals it may smack of U.S. unilateralism. It should certainly not
become a blueprint for all future trade deals. However, in the case of the FTAA , where the United States'
primary long-term goal is the promotion of economic development and democracy in
the region, a strong commitment by all the parties to the protection of
democracy is both relevant and desirable. It would be supported by most
Latin American governments , who would welcome the implicit praise and signal of external
support for their own democratic systems. The inclusion of a democracy
clause will also help sustain and advance U.S. values in Latin America and
rebuild support for the policy of economic engagement among the American public. By
placing the FTAA in a broader political and security framework, a

democracy clause could be critical to building a congressional majority
behind freer trade with the Western Hemisphere.
Say Yes
2NC --- Bargaining Chip
CP acts as a bargaining chip to forge an agreement.
Hornbeck, 2011 (J. F., Specialist in International Trade and Finance, U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and
Policy Issues, 2-8-11, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-840.pdf)
the Western Hemisphere has been the proliferation of reciprocal bilateral and
The result in
plurilateral agreements. The United States has implemented FTAs with Mexico, Central America, the Dominican
Republic, Chile, and Peru, but Congress has not acted on the proposed FTAs with Panama or Colombia, despite changes agreed to
even after the formal negotiations concluded. Currently, congressional reticence awaits further commitments in areas that fall
outside the negotiated text of the FTAs, such as tax law in Panama and human rights improvements in Colombia, raising questions
for some over the ability of the United States to consummate trade negotiations.8 The prospects are limited at best for exploring
reciprocal FTAs with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Brazil, as the major regional economy not in a unilateral
preferential arrangement with the United States, has abandoned the FTAA model and moved ahead separately by adding associate
members to Mercosur, supporting Venezuelas accession to Mercosur as a full member, and leading in the formation of broader
economic and political integration pacts in South America. Venezuelas President Hugo Chvez has taken a decidedly more
confrontational approach in establishing the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas (ALBA), enticing Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia,
trade
Dominica, and Honduras to join with subsidized oil trade.9 Although these are neither deep nor comprehensive
arrangements, they do signal a political will to consolidate regional

bargaining interests in juxtaposition to the U.S.-designed FTAA. Three clear challenges emerge from this picture.
First, Brazil and the United States have demonstrated a prolonged reluctance to move off their respective positions, which bodes
poorly for resurrecting the FTAA.10 The addition of Venezuela and possibly other countries with less than sympathetic attitudes
toward the United States as full Mercosur members could solidify this standoff. Nationalizations of key industries and other efforts to
increase the role of the state in managing the economies of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador also do not augur well for broadening
support for market-based trade solutions. Second, multiple FTAs, by definition, promote an inefficient and cumbersome trading
system with each FTA having its own rules of origin (to deter non-member transshipment of goods) and related customs
administration and enforcement requirements that can complicate trade and investment decisions. It is not without reason,
therefore, that many interest groups wish to find a way to rationalize such a convoluted system. Third, Latin America is expanding
its trade to other countries in the world. China, in particular, has increased its trade and investment relationship with the region.
From 2000 to 2009, total trade has grown by a factor of ten, and investment has poured into the region. In both cases, China is in
search of long-term, reliable sources of basic commodities. In 2009, over 70% of Latin American exports to China were in basic ores,
copper, grains, and mineral fuels. While this trade structure is currently lucrative, it does nothing to diversify Latin Americas
exports into more value added goods, and leaves the fortunes of these countries to the often volatile commodities markets.
Reconciling the disparate trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere will be difficult and perhaps impossible in the absence of
a complementary multilateral solution. For example, conventional wisdom argues that without advancement in agricultural issues
at the WTO, action on a comprehensive FTAA (or something like it) is unlikely. Further, a less comprehensive FTAA
has so far been rejected and offers a far less compelling alternative to a multilateral agreement on economic grounds. Therefore,
the FTAA may not emerge in the near future, despite the logical solution that
a hemispheric-wide agreement presents to improving the flow of trade (and
investment ) over existing arrangements.
2NC --- Democracy Clause
UNASUR proves a democracy clause will be agreed upon.
Ruttenberg and Fuchs, 2011 (Tara, International Peace Studies @ the University of Peace, Summit
Manager @ the Summit of Global Alliance for Ministries and departments of peace. Gustavo, United Arab Emirates Business
development, http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=801)
Responding to the September 2010 attempted coup against Rafael Correa, Ecuadoran President and
then-acting President Pro Tempore of UNASUR, an emergency conference was held in Buenos Aires, where
UNASUR released a statement strongly condemning the rebellion and emphasizing the importance of
institutional order and democracy in the region.[16] Argentinas Nestor Kirchner,
then-Secretary General of UNASUR, took the opportunity to express the regional blocs
commitment and most absolute solidarity with the democratically elected President of Ecuador.[17] Events in
Ecuador strengthened support for earlier calls to include a democracy clause in UNASURs
founding treaty, to demonstrate UNASUR's determination to place its full weight in ostracizing any South American regime if
ever it seizes power by non-constitutional means.[18] In late November 2010, UNASUR succeeded in
adopting a democratic charter calling for sanctions against non-democratic

regimes, particularly in response to attempted coups and coup regimes.[19] UNASURs response in Ecuador mirrored its
statements a year earlier condemning the illegal coup in Honduras in June 2009, expressing that it would not recognize any de facto
election or government in Honduras and calling for the restitution of constitutional order in the country.[20] Despite original
statements condemning the coup, however, UNASUR has since been unable to reach consensus over formal non-recognition of the
post-coup Honduran government, reflecting the realities of a regional bloc comprised of divergent political and ideological players.
[21]
The democracy clause builds support for the negotiations.

Ortiza and Tajesb, 2009 (Jaime, Division of International Programs and A.R. Sanchez, Jr. School of Business
at Texas A&M International University, Maria, Department of Languages and Cultures, College of Humanities and Social Sciences at
William Paterson University of New Jersey The SLEPT Aspects of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
http://www.craig.csufresno.edu/International_Programs/JC/IJB/Volumes/Volume%2014/V143-3.pdf)
a varied ideological spectrum poses problems for consolidating the

Lauredo (2004) warns that
the importance of
entire FTAA. Political ideologies strongly determine actions of each individual nation. Outlining
institutional governance requires invoking the democracy clause which

recognizes that values and practices of democracy are fundamental to the
advancement of all objectives. Hence, any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order becomes an
Nations need to make significant
insurmountable obstacle to the participation of a government in the FTAA.
progress democratizing their political institutions into the multi-party political systems they
are today. This is largely due to the general consensus that multi-party systems reduce both discretion and the need for oversight.
2NC --- Economic Incentives
Economic gains shifts political rationales for engagement.
As for the Latin American countries, economic gains provide the overriding
rationale for entering into an FTA with the United States. The United States is by far
their largest export market and the primary investor in the region, particularly in Mexico and
the Caribbean Basin region (Central America, Panama, and the Caribbean Islands). For these countries, moving to a
reciprocal FTA provides permanent rules of trade that do not require periodic
reauthorization by the U.S. Congress, as do the unilateral preferential arrangements. This feature of FTAs and
its rules-based framework provide a greater incentive for foreign investors and gives the
Latin American countries more control over their trade relationship with the
United States. Many see FTAs as anchors to broader economic reform and
providing greater opportunity for production-sharing technology transfer that can

improve economic competitiveness. Lower costs of imports from the United States is another tangible
benefit.
Latin American nations will agree -- trade liberalization

Hrinak, No Date Given (Donna, Ambassador for Latin American Nations, president of Boeing Brazil, Op-ed for
Folha de So Paulo FTAA Opportunity to Use https://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&ved=0CGUQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Firc.embaixadaamericana.org.br%2Fdownload
%2FOped.doc&ei=m4XyUcL7EPPCyAHa5AE&usg=AFQjCNHle5bwNDwgadXs_t1UezOMOUi-WA&sig2=tzqY7isgMaObGpgnYerEFw)
Despite widespread conjecture on the impact of our presidential elections in November, our trade policy remains fully engaged in
promoting trade liberalization. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick has led the way to re-energize the Doha Round so that
the United States concluded
substantive progress in the WTO can be made this year. In the last several months,
comprehensive, high-ambition free trade agreements with Australia, Morocco, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic. These add to already-completed accords with our NAFTA
partners, Chile and others outside the hemisphere. We are or will soon be conducting free trade negotiations with Bahrain, Panama,
Protectionist pressures exist in the United States as in
Colombia and, we expect, other Andean countries.
but support for trade liberalization has lasted long and will
other countries,
endure. It is worth noting that all our bilateral free trade agreement partners have
had significant agricultural issues among their priorities with the United States. They and we have
been able to expand mutual market access in agriculture while meeting each
others non-agricultural interests and sensitivities , as well as laying the basis for
greater economic integration. A similar pragmatic and balanced approach can
make the FTAA succeed , as well.
Trade
Blake, 2009 (Charles, Law review THE DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN VENEZUELA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE FTAA PROCESS http://studentorgs.law.smu.edu/getattachment/International-Law-Review-Association/Resources/LBRA-
Archive/15-1/SMB107.pdf.aspx)
What are the implications of the above public opinion and electoral trends for the FTAA
agenda? First and foremost, one can see the potential support for hemispheric free
trade. In concept, most Latin Americans embrace the idea that trade is
beneficial. This has buoyed the considerable and sustained liberalization of tariff rates in Latin
America.48 In 1985 the average tariff rate was 49 percent, but by 1995 it had fallen to 13 percent. In 2003 it was
10 percent.49 Venezuela mirrored these trends with the average tariff falling from 30 to 13 to 12
percent over the same period.50 In 2006, following several years in which the economic role of the state expanded
in Venezuela, the average tariff remained steady at 13 percent.51
2NC --- Obama
Obamas stance on globalization solves anti-FTAA sentiment ---
hell get it through
Godinich, 2011 (Andrew, Columbia Political Review Reviving Free Trade in the Americas
http://cpreview.org/2011/12/anyone-remember-the-ftaa/)
Aside from the Cuban embargo, the biggest fault lines at the upcoming summit are likely to emerge around economic policy and
trade. "The Free Trade Area of the Americas is the law of the jungl e, only the strongest
survive," Evo Morales told me back in 2003, before he became Bolivia's fist indigenous president, and was still a union organiser and
coca farmer. "From the point of view of the indigenous people here, the FTAA is an agreement to legalise the colonisation of the
Americas." Obama shares some of Morales' sentiments. The new US president has
been a critic of the free trade agreement with Colombia because of that country's
violations of labour rights and its repression of unionised workers. In a newspaper column in June 2005, Obama
explained his stance against the Central American free trade agreement ,
citing its lack of environmental and labour regulations, and said that "th e larger problem is what's missing
from our prevailing policy on trade and globalization - namely, meaningful
assistance for those who are not reaping its benefits ." Such views will be
warmly received by the region's presidents , many of whom see the alleviation of poverty as way
to curtail organized crime and narco-trafficking two topics sure to be discussed at the summit, and were part of the discussions
between Obama and Mexico's president Felipe Caldern during Obama's brief stop there yesterday. To make progess at the summit,
Obama should withdraw US support and financing for the disastrous Plan Colombia, stress non-military solutions in the drug
war, and develop economic relations with Latin America than benefit a majority of its population. Doing so would make a
clean break from the Bush years, and show that the US is interested in being a neighbour, not an empire.
Obamas built support

Luxner, 2009 ( Larry Luxner is news editor of The Washington Diplomat, What the World Wants From Barack
Obama,The Washington Diplomat February 2009, http://washdiplomat.com/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=6304:what-the-world-wants-from-barack-obama&catid=974:february-2009&Itemid=259
Jaime Daremblum, director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the Washington-based Hudson Institute, says
its important for Obama to capitalize on the unprecedented enthusiasm
hes generated throughout the region, where Bush has been deeply unpopular for years. The incoming
administration can do very positive things for Latin America, said Daremblum, Costa
Ricas former ambassador to the United States. The first is to support initiatives in countries that have been
successful in strengthening democracy, education, transparency in elections and the rule of law. The other area is
free trade which is key for many of our countries because thats the only way of offering real
opportunities to a more educated population. Daremblum disagrees with those who say Washingtons concept of a
financial turmoil in the world
hemisphere-wide FTAA is dead. Quite the contrary, he said. All this
has opened up the eyes of Latin America that they need export markets,
and they need to increase mechanisms to access those markets. The protective
little niches of Mercosur here and ALBA there are not going to work. Thats why we
need to look toward an FTAA.
2NC --- Brazil
Brazil will agree --- seen as US reciprocation.

Schott, 2005 (Jeffrey, Senior Fellow @ the Institute for International Economics, Does the FTAA Have a Future?
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/schott1105.pdf)
The basic problem is twofold: whether Brazil will open its market to foreign competition
in goods and services and whether the United States will reciprocate by increasing
market access, for Brazilian agriculture and competitive manufactures. In both cases, prospective liberalization is
contentious and subject to a fractious domestic debate. In both cases, electoral and legislative considerations probably will constrain
negotiations through much of 2006, if not longer. In Brazil, recent political scandals have weakened President Lula da Silva and cast
doubts about his reelection. Under these circumstances, the PT regime seems unlikely to risk further dissension within its own ranks
Brazilian negotiators may thus
by considering controversial policy reforms. Until the October 2006 election,
resist negotiating over reforms of important regulatory barriers (including those
tor the services industries), strengthening protection of IPRs, and opening of some public procurement tenders to bidding by foreign
suppliers. Such reforms are supported by some parts of the Brazilian business community but staunchly opposed by protectionist
interestsA FTAA deal could provide large inducements to undertake such
reforms, but only if the United States commits in turn to provide concrete
new trading opportunities in the US market tor Brazilian farmers and industrialistsespecially by slashing
subsidies and committing to liberalization in politically sensitive areas such as cotton, sugar, tobacco, and
citrus. In his speech to the United Nations in September 2005, President George W. Bush pledged that "the United States is ready to
eliminate all tariffs, subsidies and other barriers to free flow of goods and services as other nations do the same" [emphasis added].
Loosely translated, this means that he will ask Congress to authorize trade and subsidy reforms commensurate with liberalization
undertaken by the European Union and other major trading nations in the Doha Round. The success of this negotiating gambit will
turn, however, on what Congress legislates in the new US farm bill that will be dratted in 2006.
Brazil will agree --- trade importance

US Embassy, 2002 (IIP Digital Allgeier, Barbosa, Dooley examine FTAA-related obstacles and goals
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2002/10/20021008180031smiller@pd.state.gov0.9141504.html#axzz2aMmvjuBU)
Brazil is just as committed as the United States to creating the FTAA, the
Brazilian ambassador pointed out. Barbosa said that the FTAA is of great
importance to his nation , as over 50 percent of Brazil's trade is with its hemispheric neighbors. He
added that trade
will also be a "top priority" in Brazil's efforts to offset lower foreign direct
investment.
2NC --- Plan Inclusion Ensures Agreement
The plan ensures leverage for negotiations.
Inter-American Development Bank, 2002 (US Source for development financing for Latin
America Beyond Borders: The New Regionalism in Latin America http://issuu.com/idb_publications/docs/book_en_66478)
Alternatively,the hub-and-spoke approach could be geared primarily to achieving the countrys

narrow commercial interests through sheer leverage in the bilateral negotiations --or through
inclusion in some of them of issues that may not entail important concessions for the
bilateral counterpart - and then using them as precedents to forge similar FTAA agree-
ments. In this way, the agenda setter would obtain an agreement that is closer to meeting its own goals, with-out having to
make many concessions in return. Such an approach could stifle the formation of an FTAA-leaving a less efficient hub-and-spoke
system in place - or even create a welfare decreasing one, which would be politically conflictive and probably not sustainable.
Finally, while the formal 34 country negotiations and the hub-and-spoke roads are presented here as polar strategies, in reality they
are parts of the same process of negotiations , in which actions on one dimension
influence actions and the progress in the other.
FTAA Good/Solvency Advocates
2NC --- Agriculture Aff
The CP can increase agriculture investments
Multi National Monitor, 2001 (NAFTA for the Americas Q&A on the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas) http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2001/01april/corp3.html)
The FTAA is likely to contain a number of provisions that are not included in the WTO, and which
push a deregulatory agenda even beyond that embodied in the WTO. The FTAA is likely to contain important new
provisions in the area of investments , intellectual property, services and agriculture , to take a few
examples, that are more favorable to corporate interests than those in the WTO.
2NC --- Broader Cooperation
The CP spills over to broader economic cooperation.
Estevadeordal, 2012 (Antoni, manager of the Integration and Trade Sector of the Vice-Presidency of Sectors
and Knowledge at the InterAmerican Development Bank and the Brookings Institute Economic integration in the Americas: an
unfinished agenda http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/7/07%20summit%20of%20the
%20americas/07%20economic%20integration%20estevadeordal.pdf)
The recent global economic downturn has accentuated the importance of

trade and economic integration as engines of growth and development in
the Americas. As was true in past times of turmoil, exports have served as a countercyclical force in the
regions economies, propelling growth and economic stability. Further connecting countries via
trade would help to set the entire region on a more prosperous plane and
ignite cooperation in other areas.
2NC --- Border Cooperation
Counterplan solves
trade has been the anchor of the LAC regions

Through good times and bad,
economies throughout the postwar era. Since the 1990s, trade integration has also fueled
hemispheric cooperation. It has created trust , built crossborder networks of
stakeholders, and developed demands for further openness and interaction
regarding everything from cross-border infrastructure projects to
regional environmental protection and security cooperation . Trade integration
has also been integral for solidifying alliances and for the heady gains in
democracy in our hemisphere.
2NC --- Economic Growth
The CP drives economic growth and cooperation in the region.
Why then bother with a FTAA? The short answer is that an FTAA would yield both economic and
foreign policy benefits . First, the FTAA would have beneficial effects on the
overall economic policy in and economic relations among the
conduct of
participating countries. Second, the FTAA initiative covers the one big gap in the
free trade matrix of the Western Hemisphere, linking the major economies of North and South America,
whose bilateral trade-as projected by the gravity models-could expand two or threefold in response to FTA-type reforms. At the same
time, the hemisphere wide FTA would help harmonize over time the separate free
trade regimes that have been negotiated among regional trading partners. Third, and perhaps most important, t he
FTAA is the economic engine that drives hemispheric cooperation on more than
20 initiatives undertaken by leaders at the Summit of the Americas involving a number of
political, socio-economic, and cultural issues (e.g., promoting education,
strengthening the rule of law, and protecting the rights of indigenous
peoples). Progress on the FTAA is critical to sustain efforts in these other areas.
FTAA catalyzes exports and trade within Latin America

2005,2216.html)
the FTAA is conceptually very relevant for Latin

Within the context of North-South agreements
America. It would intersect with Latin Americas subregional agreements in ways described above and serve as
an instrument for deepening rules-based commerce and institutional modernization. It also
could absorb many simpler bilateral free trade agreements, eliminating less
efficient hub and spoke FTA arrangements in the hemisphere and ameliorate
the so-called Spaghetti Bowl of norms and regulations emerging from the myriad of regional agreements now in
place in the hemisphere and those being contemplated. Furthermore, the potential for an FTAA to create
an enabling environment help to our countries to compete in a globalizing
world economy should not be overlooked in light of increasing competition from Asia and elsewhere.
The FTAA would moreover facilitate trends already underway. Parallel to the forces of globalization
we are observing increasing regionalization of world trade, investment and even migration. The Western Hemisphere is no
exception. The percentage of exports of FTAA countries that stays within the hemisphere has grown from 48% at the beginning of
the 1990s to over 60% as we enter the 21st century. Since the early 1990s, the highest annual average rate of hemispheric export
An FTAA, in
growth for Latin America has been with the North American market and secondly in the respective subregions.
conjunction with the recovery of the US economy already under way and signs
of better growth performance in Latin America and the Caribbean, may be a powerful tool of export expansion and stimulus for
economic models of the FTAA suggest that it would be a very
investment. Indeed, most
important catalyst for exports , a significant part of which would be intra- Latin American and Caribbean
trade since there are still high commercial barriers between the subregions.
The CP builds resiliency within Latin Americas Market
Hrinak, No Date Given (Donna, Ambassador for Latin American Nations, president of Boeing Brazil, Op-ed for
Folha de So Paulo FTAA Opportunity to Use https://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&ved=0CGUQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Firc.embaixadaamericana.org.br%2Fdownload
%2FOped.doc&ei=m4XyUcL7EPPCyAHa5AE&usg=AFQjCNHle5bwNDwgadXs_t1UezOMOUi-WA&sig2=tzqY7isgMaObGpgnYerEFw)
Trade negotiations are never easy. Few have been so glorified and vilified as those to establish the Free Trade Area of the Americas.
the FTAA will open up new opportunities for
While no panacea for all problems the hemisphere faces,
commerce moving from south to north, north to south, east to west and back.
Those opportunities for Brazil, the United States and all the regions 800 million
people mean exports, jobs, investment, global competitiveness , and,
therefore, growth and prosperity . For the United States, the benefits of open markets are not just rhetoric. The
dynamism and resilience of the U.S. economy have been forged through
trade liberalization. New export markets have created high-paying jobs; millions
of American consumers and businesses benefit through lower-cost imports;
billions in foreign investment dollars has flowed into our country; and the U.S. economy has
grown to $11 trillion in size. Trade is no zero-sum game, and it offers the same
opportunities to Brazil and others.

2NC --- Include the Aff --- Generic
The plan should be brought to the negotiation table --- acts as
a crucial building block
Under the most favorable scenario, the agenda-setting nation would

approach bilateral negotiations with a balanced view of the longer-term
political and economic interests of the hemisphere, as well as the real capacities and
specific development needs of all its trading partners. In this case, its bilateral agreements
could become an effective building block for an FTAA that enhances the welfare of all.
2NC --- Mexico Reforms
Obama would be able to work with Nieto through FTAA ---
NAFTA proves
Carlsen, 2013 (Laura, Center for International Policy, B.A. in Social Thought and Institutions from Stanford University
and a Masters degree in Latin American Studies, also from Stanford. Obama Downplays Drug War, Recasts Mexico, Central America
as Economic Allies http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/9600)
It was easy for Obama and Mexican president Enrique Pea Nieto to come together on
trade and integration issues. Pea Nieto comes from the historically nationalist Institutional Revolutionary Party.
Within the party hes connected to the former president Carlos Salinas, the architect of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). Like his predecessor Felipe Calderon, PeaNieto has a strong commitment to the
neoliberal reforms that the U.S. government and multilateral banks have been imposing on Mexico for years. Unlike
his predecessor, however, he has a chance of pushing them through. During his visit to Mexico, Obama and Pena Nieto
committed to deepening NAFTA , although they avoided calling the controversial trade agreement by name.
Both are acutely aware that nearly twenty years since its ratification, NAFTA has a decidedly tarnished image among the publics of
all three countries involved. Instead, they announced a binational high-level commission to make
further integrate industry. Obama
both nations more competitive, increase efficiency and security at the border, and
also put in a plug for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a geographically rearranged version of the F ree T rade
A greement of the A mericas killed by South American nations in 2005. In some aspects, the TPP goes even further in binding
governments to corporate agendas than NAFTA. Obama threw his weight behind Pea Nietos reforms, referring obliquely to the
education reform that has provoked thousands of teachers to take to the streets in defense of their jobs and the public education
system. He also mentioned the crown jewel for U.S. oil companies and Pentagon plannersthe privatization of the national oil
company PEMEX.
2NC --- Venezuela
The CP initiates engagement with Venezuela --- that solves the
reasons why they opposed the FTAA in the past and ensures
the negotiations would be successful.
Griffin, 2013 (Harvard University, Engage with Venezuela https://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CDAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.thecrimson.com%2Farticle
%2F2013%2F4%2F3%2FHarvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death
%2F&ei=2oP1Uc2IMMiIqQGd5oGADw&usg=AFQjCNGOfRPNquExIUvy3fpNWevlBiL6qw&sig2=Wb8eggvNU39HYCtJOuFNUg)
It was mostly
Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America.
through Venezuelas efforts that the United States was unable to create a F ree
T rade A rea of the A mericas, an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby
leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the United States and Venezuela were
to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from

such agreements . For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the
best course of action for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the
countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic
cooperation nearly impossible. While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticizedauthoritarian
rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policiesnothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is
having any effect. The United States should stop playing tough guy with Venezuela, bite
the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We arent catching any flies with our vinegarits
high time we started trying to catch them with honey.
2NC --- CP Doesnt Link to Cred DA--- Id be careful
because its a reason why the perm shields the link
CP doesnt link to the international politics da --- ensures that
structural incentives exist to make reforms successful
the regional integration strategy of the countries of

One of the most important immediate objectives of
Latin America is to complete the F ree T rade A rea of the A mericas in a way that balances the interests of all
parties. This is important for several reasons. First, guaranteed reciprocal access to the markets in the Americas matters greatly to
all the countries in the region, which at present face barriers or insecure access to these markets. Particularly important is access to
the U.S. market, although there are also substantial opportunities for increased trade among existing sub-regional groups that still
trade little with each other. Second, the FTAA may contribute to locking in the structural
reforms carried out by the countries in the region, some of which are
being called into question in the current uncertain international and regional economic
environment. Indeed, experience has shown that sub-regional initiatives among
developing countries cannot always provide the same incentives for avoiding a
reversal of the reforms as are found in agreements in which an industrialized country

participates. Third, the FTAA may help consolidate political links at the hemispheric level,
reducing the likelihood of potential conflicts and, perhaps, serving to

strengthen and lock in U.S. cooperation with the countries of the region. In effect, increased trade and
investment in the hemisphere, and their contribution to the competitive-ness of U.S. firms in the global economy, increase that
countrys stakes in the prospects of Latin America.
2NC AT: Environment Turn
FTAA negotiations will include environmental protection
Colyer, 2002 (Dale, Department of Agricultural Resource Economics ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN THE FTAA
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/agswvucps/19107.htm)
Abstract: Paper presented at the 24th West Indies Agricultural Economics Conference, Granada, July 19-12, 2002.
Environmental issues have become important in trade agreement
negotiations. NAFTA explicitly includes environmental provisions and they are affecting ongoing WTO and FTAA
negotiations. The final role of the environment in the FTAA is uncertain, given opposition by most of the members. The draft
FTAA agreement does not contain a separate section on the environment, but a U.S. position paper
indicates that environmental provisions are important and that U.S.
negotiators will seek to incorporate environmental concerns into specific chapters
such those on investment and agriculture. The large number and varied economic and environmental conditions of the 34 countries
environmentalists
in the FTAA, make it difficult to include meaningful environmental provisions in the agreement, but
are seeking them and the inclusion of such provisions in the NAFTA and WTO agreements will tend to make it
difficult to get approval of future agreements that do not address environmental issues or at least that do not guard against creating
pollution havens or that encourage laxness in environmental protection. This paper examines environmental and trade issues in the
context of the FTAA negotiations including analyses of environmental conditions in the region and the pros and cons of their
inclusion in the FTAA and other trade agreements.
And itll allow for future protection


2NC AT: Democracy
1. Specifics of the CP solve --- incorporation of a democracy
clause ensures a check on abuse and authoritarian actions
through pressure and appeasement. - thats Feinberg and
Bates. It also results in further democracy spread

Theory/Perms
2NC Clear/Honest Intentions/Commitment Is Key
Clear commitment and binding contributions is crucial for
negotiations to be successful and ensure that nations dont
backlash.
Segger, 2003 (Marie-Claire, Fordham International Law Journal Director of the Centre for International Sustainable
Development Law ("CISDL"); Senior Manager of the CISDL / IISD / U.N. EP / OAS Americas Sustainable Development Capacity
Portfolio. Sustainable Development in the Negotiation of the FTAA http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2272&context=ilj)
The issue of financing deserves special emphasis. For negotiations to be successful, they must
start with a clear commitment of new and additional resources to finance the result. Serious
attention must be given to the establishment of mechanisms for new and additional resources to
properly finance the agenda in a realistic, cost-effective manner which the parties to
the accord control to themselves in ajust and equitable way. A new environmental
cooperation mechanism in the Americas should not burden already over-extended environmental ministries, particularly in smaller
economies. 246 The NACEC, with binding contributions from each member government of CAD$3 million per
year, has a budget of CAD$9 million annually to address environmental cooperation in North America. 2 " 7 A realistic estimate of
the costs involved in administering environmental cooperation for the Western Hemisphere, involving governments with very
diverse resources, must take into account the needs of each subregion. A comprehensive study of this issue, with budgets and
comparative analysis of other international environmental institutions, would be very valuable. At a minimum, it can be estimated
that a serious provision for hemispheric environmental cooperation, at U.S.$9 million annually per sub-region, would cost U.S.$45
million. This amount seems quite reasonable compared to the sums committed for the FTAA Hemispheric Cooperation Program, to
build trade technical assistance. In the interest of stability and consistency, such funds may need to be dedicated from government
budgets, with all governments making an assessed contribution on a scale and taking into account both the
common and the distinct responsibilities of the parties involved. Further project funds would also be necessary and could be raised
in innovative ways.2 48
Negotiations will only be successful if its transparent and

irreversible.
Lamy, 2001 (Pascal, European Trade Commissioner, Regionalism and Multilateralism in Latin America
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&ved=0CGMQFjAJ&url=http%3A%2F
%2Fwww.londoncanadianstudies.org%2FJournal%2F19%2F19-4.pdf&ei=tIj2UdnJF-
HOyAGO_IGwCg&usg=AFQjCNGuMDJ2iHTnccFyU95fvXwGcG5XvQ&sig2=kJbWY5WK9j9DOdvVggn9_w)
Unilateralism is the prerogative of a superpower, which none of our countries is. It belongs to
another era, that of bilateral agreements in which the strong imposed their will on the weak, that of extra-
territorial decisions, employing economic sanctions, that of arbitrary protectionism. Today unilateralism
would result in an unstable , inefficient and unjust international economic order.
Our increasingly interdependent world needs predictable and objective rules
and policies. Only international rule of law can guarantee these. What are, then, the two routes actually open
to us ? Regionalism and multilateralism. These are not mutually exclusive but complementary. They are not
equivalent: one is subordinate to the other. Regionalism is governed by the multilateral rules and disciplines of the
WTO. A country, like Brazil or any other one, can no longer pursue a national project without integrating it into a
regional project and multilateral dimension. Regionalism may be a European invention, but it is not protected by
copyright laws ! No need for compulsory licensing here. Regionalism is a global public good that the
EU has developed over half a century of integration, the benefit of which it is ready to share with its partners. The
principles are simple: a single market; harmonisation of standards and regulations affecting the free movement of
goods, services, people and capital; solidarity through financial mechanisms; and, where necessary, common
policies, among them trade and competition policies. Integration has even led to a single currency, the Euro,
which will gradually acquire the international status worthy of its 300 million consumers and savers. For twenty or
thirty years Europe has been pioneering ways of harnessing globalisation. The benefits
of regional integration are considerable: a single market attractive to foreign
investors; increased but fair competition; and far greater clout in international negotiations. Of
course, securing these benefits requires economic operators to place their
faith in integration, something they will only do if they judge the process
to be transparent and irreversible . And irreversibility entails both an institutional framework for
pooling sovereignty and sufficient convergence of economic policies, including currency stability.
The permutation results in an undermining of Latin American

Authority --- causes backlash against the FTAA
Nelson, 2008 (Marcel, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Studies Queens University, Kingston, Ontario THE FTAA
AND THE CONTESTATION OF NEOLIBERALISM IN LATIN AMERICA http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Nelson.pdf)
Negotiations for the FTAA occurred both while neoliberal policies were being
implemented in Latin America and the consequences of these policies were
being felt. For leaders like Hugo Chavez Frias of Venezuela, one of a wave of leaders in Latin America who had been elected
on a platform hostile to neoliberalism, the FTAA came to be associated with the
continuation of the neoliberal policies.22 This did not bode well for the
FTAA as neoliberalism was in many cases continually contested in a manner that prevented it from ever being truly hegemonic.
In fact, the states often had to rely on coercive mechanisms or outright deception
to implement neoliberal policies. Furthermore, in many cases, the legitimacy of neoliberal

policies was being contested, even among sectors of society that had originally supported it, as a
result of an increasing number of crises and disappointing economic growth. Soederbergh explains
that this has led to a crisis of authority of the structural power of the United States and financial capital in the South as ruling
classes there find it increasingly difficult to promote and pursue neoliberal policies.23
Clear commitment is key --- it was what caused the FTAA to fail
in the past
Nelson, 2008 (Marcel, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Studies Queens University, Kingston, Ontario THE FTAA
AND THE CONTESTATION OF NEOLIBERALISM IN LATIN AMERICA http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Nelson.pdf)
An example of the second approach to explaining the failure of the FTAA is I.M. Destlers chapter entitled The
United States and a Free Trade Area of the Americas, which emphasizes the importance of Congress
in passing trade agreements.10 Historically, Congress has tended to be more
protectionist than the executive branch because of electoral sensitivity to regional economic interests. Destler explains
that the economic sectors most important for Latin America , such as agriculture and
textiles, are those that are the most protected and consequently the most difficult sectors for which to
gather support for liberalization in Congress. Furthermore, he argues that the FTAA did not have the solid
political base that NAFTA had, which makes it difficult for free trade proponents in
Congress to gain momentum and counter protectionist interests. Destler concludes that support for
the FTAA has declined throughout the Americas as a result of the failure of liberal
economic policies to bring about welfare gains, but does not explore the concept further. Destlers approach is
interesting, particularly regarding the role of interest groups and Congress in the negotiation of trade agreements. He points to the
fact that there had been a renewed emphasis on protectionism in the House of Representatives, which suggests a delegitimization
of liberal economic policies in the United States, but, again does not elaborate the point. Though Destler touches upon discontent
with trade liberalization in both the United States and Latin America, he does not explore possible links between both phenomena.
Competition
Perm severs economic engagement --- the democracy clause is
a form of pressure and sanctions --- Thats Feinberg and Bates
Forcese, 2002 (Craig, associate professor at the University of Ottawa, Globalizing Decency: Responsible Engagement
in an Era of Economic Integration, 2002, http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LawJournals/Craig_Forcese_YHRDLJ.pdf)
While the conclusions noted above are strongly critical of the constructive engagement position, they cannot be
read as necessarily supporting the disengagement view. To conclude that constructive engagement and economic
growth are no guarantee of political liberalization and that trade and investment can prop up repressive regimes is
not to say that measures designed to reduce economic growth and investment lead dictatorships to tumble.
Evaluating the capacity of disengagement specifically, of economic
sanctions to induce political liberalization is a separate question. This
Article follows the Congressional Research Service in defining economic
sanctions as . . .the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or
threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations,76 via
measures such as trade embargoes; restrictions on particular exports or
imports; denial of foreign assistance, loans, and investments; or control of
foreign assets and economic transactions involving citizens in the
sanctioning country.77
And the counterplan is conditional --- the plan has to be

unconditional
Smith, No Date Given (Karen, http://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:8-
3RqE0TzFMJ:scholar.google.com/+engagement+positive+incentives+bilateral&hl=en&as_sdt=0,14)
First, a few definitions. Engagement is a foreign policy strategy of building close

ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community
of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices,
and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement
entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and
investment in particular. Some observers have variously labeled this strategy one of interdependence, or of
oxygen: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19 Conditionality, in contrast,
is the linking , by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another
state(such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions .
Positive conditionality entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the
conditions; negative conditionality involves reducing, suspending, or
terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words,
applying sanctions, or a strategy of asphyxiation).20 To put it simply, engagement implies
ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings . In

engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change
another way of looking at it,
in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy
Severs Should - means binding and immediate

Summer 94 (Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court, Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food
Warehouse of Durant, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?
CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)
4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May
18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this
query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old
practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the
omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an
expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue,
the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as
to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The
order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived
from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my
conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's
quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358]
signed by the judge.19 True minutes20 of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's
signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same
hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national
[Continues To Footnote] 14 In
jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State.
praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th
Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or
immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become
effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1
S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).
Permutation Do the Plan and Initiate FTAA.
Only the FTAA alone will solve --- the US will be perceived as
undermining the negotiation and taking the lead --- that fails
and links to the unilateralism net benefit.
Crandall 11 (Russell Crandall, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the
Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009, Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-
11, The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs 90.3, May-June, 2011, pg. ,
Across the region in recent years,the U nited S tates has seen its influence decline.
even harder to get what it wanted in Latin America. At the same time as U.S. influence has diminished, Latin
Latin America's entry into a "post-hegemonic" era, a
million. Ironically, moreover,
even further . It must demonstrate an ability to quietly engage and lead
outright failures. For much of the twentieth century, there was a disconnect between
U nited S tates'
the perm fails --- modest support undercuts soft power --- only
a full engagement can solve
Undermine
institutions, the U.S. government jeopardizes domestic support for U.S.


A variant of how
inconsistency , as well as coercive and nonconsultative behavior, makes it
The perm fails --- engagement solely through a robust trade

agreement can solve.
Wagner and Parker, 2013 (Daniel, CEO of Country Risk Solutions, a cross-border risk advisory firm, and
Nicholas, research analyst with CRS, Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership the Solution to Latin America's Fractured Trade Regime?
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/is-the-transpacific-partn_b_3284797.html)
The derailment of negotiations over the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and the Doha
Development Round had a significant impact on the perceived realism of regional trade agreements, while
negatively effecting Latin America's ability to uniformly and robustly

engage with its largest trading partners. The radically different trade policy paths that have emerged -
pitting the notion of collaboration against economic nationalism -- have given rise to a region divided over how, and whether, it
should approach trade liberalization going forward. Within Latin America, only Chile, Mexico and Peru are currently party to the TPP.
The three formed the Pacific Alliance (PA) in 2012, along with Colombia, which also hopes to join the Partnership. All four have made
significant commitments towards trade liberalization. The PA members have concluded FTAs with one another and with the U.S.,
have implemented numerous bilateral trade agreements, and share a number of overlapping trade agreements that include several
Asian countries. Membership in the TPP would facilitate increased integration with one another and offer a more coordinated
approach to expanding trade with Asia. In conjunction with the members of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), it
should one day be possible to create a supply chain running up the Pacific coast from Chile to Mexico. On the other side of the
spectrum are Latin America's "Atlantic" countries, whose approach to regional and global integration has taken a dramatically
different course. Mercosur, the once promising common market, now includes the protectionist wing of Latin America that has come
to include Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, along with socialist Bolivia and Venezuela. Between them, the ability to make genuine
as a
progress along regional trade lines has proven challenging. During the commodities boom these countries prospered, but
result of the global recession, growth waned and a propensity toward protectionism became
common. The customs union that in the 1990s united its members to reduce trade barriers, forge a common trade policy, and
actively participate in the FTAA negotiations has been transformed into one of the most protectionist blocs in Latin America, with its
members routinely employing tariffs, taxes, and trade restrictions against one another. This has limited Mercosur's general appeal in
and outside of Latin America. Mercosur has largely withdrawn from pursuing FTAs altogether, and its policies over the past decade
have failed to consolidate meaningful partnerships with any of its primary trading partners. I n
order to mitigate
the impact of a divided Latin America and prevent the schism from
intensifying , robust multilateral negotiations must be reconstituted . Much
of what happens next will be influenced by the actions of the U.S ., given its
leadership role in the TPP. A primary obstacle that must be overcome is the Brazil/US relationship, which was a major impediment
during the Doha round. Brazil is not currently party to any major multilateral trade initiative, and two of the principal agreements it
has signed in recent years -- CELAC and UNASUR -- specifically exclude the U.S. Additionally, Mercosur requires that its members
negotiate trade agreements in unison, meaning Brazil will need to find a way to compromise, as will its neighbors. The U.S. has
scored notable trade-related achievements in the past several years, mostly in the form of bilateral trade agreements, but these
took far too long to accomplish and were highly politicized. Given this, it seems unrealistic to hope for any near term breakthroughs
If the region continues to be a
in future multilateral negotiations that rely on the U.S. for leadership.
secondary priority of U.S. foreign and economic policy, large segments of
Latin America will continue to be left out of the broader trade integration
picture .
The CP alone is necessary to ensure continual growth ---

multiple different forms of engagement halt growth - the perm
would exasperate this problem.
The United States and Latin America have pursued trade liberalization through
multilateral, regional, and bilateral negotiations, with mixed results . In part this
reflects divergent priorities that have been difficult to fully reconcile. For many Latin American countries, reducing barriers to agricultural trade is top of
the list for a successful agreement. This goal includes reducing market access barriers (peak tariffs and tariff rate quotasTRQs), domestic U.S. subsidies,
and nontariff barriers (administrative rules, antidumping provisions). Although there are many other issues , agriculture policy has
played a big part in slowing progress in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Round and halting the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA).7 The United States has made clear its unwillingness to address most agricultural and antidumping issues in a regional agreement like the FTAA to
Latin American
preserve its bargaining leverage in the WTO against other subsidizing countries such as the European Union and Japan.
counties have their own sensitive issues and a particular concern in some countries for easing its subsistence
agricultural sectors slowly toward trade liberalization. In addition to market access, the United States has focused its trade
negotiating goals on areas where it is most competitive such as services trade (e.g., financial, tourism, technology, professional); intellectual property
rights (IPR); government procurement; and investment. Not surprisingly, these are areas where many Latin American countries are more reluctant to
negotiate. Hence, there is a near reversal of priorities that has slowed the progress of comprehensive agreements at the multilateral and regional levels,
The result in the Western Hemisphere has been
reflecting inherent differences between many developed and developing countries.
the proliferation of reciprocal bilateral and plurilateral agreements. The United

States has implemented FTAs with Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Peru, but Congress has not acted on the proposed FTAs
congressional
with Panama or Colombia, despite changes agreed to even after the formal negotiations concluded. Currently,
reticence awaits further commitments in areas that fall outside the negotiated text of the FTAs,
such as tax law in Panama and human rights improvements in Colombia, raising questions for some over the ability of the United
States to consummate trade negotiations.8 The prospects are limited at best for exploring reciprocal FTAs with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and
Venezuela. Brazil, as the major regional economy not in a unilateral preferential arrangement with the United States, has abandoned the FTAA
model and moved ahead separately by adding associate members to Mercosur, supporting Venezuelas accession to Mercosur as a full member, and
leading in the formation of broader economic and political integration pacts in South America. Venezuelas President Hugo Chvez has taken a decidedly
more confrontational approach in establishing the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas (ALBA), enticing Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Dominica, and
Honduras to join with subsidized oil trade.9 Although these are neither deep nor comprehensive trade arrangements, they do signal a
political will to consolidate regional bargaining interests in juxtaposition to the U.S.-designed
FTAA. Three clear challenges emerge from this picture. First, Brazil and the United States have demonstrated a prolonged reluctance to move off their
respective positions, which bodes poorly for resurrecting the FTAA.10 The addition of Venezuela and possibly other countries with less than sympathetic
attitudes toward the United States as full Mercosur members could solidify this standoff. Nationalizations of key industries and other efforts to increase the
role of the state in managing the economies of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador also do not augur well for broadening support for market-based trade
solutions. Second, multiple FTAs, by definition, promote an inefficient and cumbersome

trading system with each FTA having its own rules of origin (to deter non-member
transshipment of goods) and related customs administration and enforcement requirements that can
complicate trade and investment decisions. It is not without reason, therefore, that many
interest groups wish to find a way to rationalize such a convoluted
system. Third, Latin America is expanding its trade to other countries in the world. China, in particular, has increased its trade and investment
relationship with the region. From 2000 to 2009, total trade has grown by a factor of ten, and investment has poured into the region. In both cases, China
is in search of long-term, reliable sources of basic commodities. In 2009, over 70% of Latin American exports to China were in basic ores, copper, grains,
and mineral fuels. While this trade structure is currently lucrative, it does nothing to diversify Latin Americas exports into more value added goods, and
leaves the fortunes of these countries to the often volatile commodities markets. Reconciling the disparate trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere
will be difficult and perhaps impossible in the absence of a complementary multilateral solution. For example, conventional wisdom argues that without
advancement in agricultural issues at the WTO, action on a comprehensive FTAA (or something like it) is unlikely. Further, a less comprehensive FTAA has
the FTAA may not
so far been rejected and offers a far less compelling alternative to a multilateral agreement on economic grounds. Therefore,
the logical solution that a hemispheric-wide agreement

emerge in the near future, despite
presents to improving the flow of trade (and investment) over existing

arrangements.
The permutation imposes substantial costs on the ability of

Latin America to manage economic policies --- that prevents
the ability for effective growth.
Gallagher, 2012 (Kevin, Department of International Relations @ Boston University, Trading Away the Ladder?
Trade Politics and Economic Development in the Americas, New Political Economy, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2008,
http://www.relooney.info/0_New_5306.pdf)
there has been a six-fold increase in the number of

Over the past two decades
regional or bilateral trade agreements (RBTAs) in the world economy. Nowhere has this proliferation
been more prevalent than in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), where 33 of the 39 countries belong to at least one RBTA.1
Figure 1 depicts what has been termed the spaghetti bowl of RBTAs in the region a tangled web of trade agreements like none
other in the world. Since the early 1980s, the majority of the most important RBTAs in the region have been agreements with the
USA. The USA had completed agreements with Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. Discussions for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) commenced in
1993 and included all LAC nations except for Cuba. These discussions have been put on hold and perhaps
even put away forever. There is a puzzle regarding Latin Americas engagement in these numerous trade agreements with the USA.
Nations in the region tend to spend the majority of their international economic diplomacy on these agreements despite the fact
economic gains from such agreements are much smaller than they
that the
would be under world trade liberalisation. The costs of these agreements are seen as
significant , both in terms of trade diversion and the loss of policy space .
Policy space is defined as the extent to which trade rules provide nationstates
with an optimal degree of openness that allows them to be integrated
with the world economy as well as pursue domestic development policy. It has been argued that
developed nations are kicking away the ladder, whereby they are not permitting developing countries the ability to deploy many of
the same policies that developed countries used at earlier periods in their development history.2 This article acknowledges that
developed country power is a key variable, but, like others, it asks whether developing countries are also trading away the ladder.
It examines the gains from various RBTAs in the hemisphere and juxtaposes them with the costs. In addition, the article examines
the extent to which interests, power and ideas, as well as collective action issues, play a role in spurring Latin American
governments to favour economic integration with the USA over alternative trade and development paths.
Unilateralism Bad
A lot of the impacts and more work is already in other files, such as the Obama Cred
advantages and the Appeasement DA. Sorry if I didnt include it here.
Generic Unilat Bad
1NC --- Insert in either CP
Unilateralism is bad causes backlash to US policy and turns
the case --- also means the perm fails --- modest support
undercuts soft power
Undermine
institutions , the U.S. government jeopardizes domestic support for U.S.
2NC --- UQ
Were at a critical juncture hemispheric relations are fundamentally
changing its only a question of unilateralism or multilateralism
By most historical measures, changes over the last half dozen years in the Western
Hemispherein Latin America, the Caribbean, the United States, and Canadahave been far-
reaching. Some of the changes, including sustained economic growth and reduction in poverty and
inequality in many Latin American countries, have been favorable. Others, such as the spread of criminal violence
such as the
that poses a risk for democracy in some nations, have been deeply troubling. Still others,
emergence of several new regional organizations, are in early stages of
development. Their longterm significance is uncertain. All these changes
taken together are transforming the nations of the hemisphere and
their relations with one another . What is at stake is the future of inter-
American relations , which today are generally cordial but lack vigor and
purpose. Efforts at hemispheric integration have been disappointing. Effective cooperation in
the Americas even on widely shared problems like energy security, organized crime and the drug trade,
and international economic volatilityremains limited and sporadic. It is the good
news of Latin Americas progress that has most altered hemispheric
relations. In the past decade, the region has posted its best economic performance in a generation and
managed largely to sidestep the world financial crisis in 20082009. The ranks of the middle classes have swelled.
The regions political structures have also opened up, giving way to growing participation by women, indigenous
and Afro-descendant populations, and other once-excluded groups. All Latin Americans across a broadening
spectrum have greater access to education and health services, consumer goods, and foreign travel. They now
have real and rapidly expanding stakes in their societies. These advances have also led to new social stirrings
which, along with demands and expectations, are notably on the rise. There are more and more pressures for
further change and improvements. Impressive economic, political, and social progress at home has, in turn, given
Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and many other countries greater access to worldwide opportunities. Indeed,
the regions most salient transformation may be its increasingly global connections and widening international
relationships. Brazils dramatic rise on the world stage most visibly exemplifies the shift. But other countries, too,
are participating actively in global affairs and developing extensive networks of commercial and political ties.
China is an increasingly prominent economic actor, but India and other Asian countries are intensifying their ties
The United States has also changed markedly, in ways that many find
to the region as well.
worrisome. The 2008 financial crisis revealed serious misalignments in and
poor management of the US economywhich, four years later, is still struggling to recover.
Inequality has significantly widened in the United States, while much-needed improvements in education and
The most ominous change in the United States has taken
infrastructure are ignored.
place in the political realm. Politics have become less collaborative . It is
increasingly difficult to find common ground on which to build solutions to the critical problems on the policy
agenda. Compromise, the hallmark of democratic governance, has become an ebbing art, replaced by gridlock and
as a result of
inaction on challenges that would advance US national interests and well-being. In part
these shifts, US-Latin American relations have grown more distant. The
quality and intensity of ties have diminished. Most countries of the region
view the United States as less and less relevant to their needsand with
declining capacity to propose and carry out strategies to deal with the issues that most concern them. In the
main, hemispheric relations are amicable. Open conflict is rare and, happily, the sharp antagonisms that marred
US-Latin America relationship would profit
relations in the past have subsided. But the
from more vitality and direction. Shared interests are not pursued as
vigorously as they should be, and opportunities for more fruitful
engagement are being missed. Well developed ideas for reversing these
disappointing trends are scarce.
Hemispheric policy is fundamentally changing new Latin American

autonomy and post-hegemonic transition its a question of how the
US engages only multilateralism fits for the new hemispheric
landscape
For over 150 years, the Monroe Doctrine provided the guiding principles
for U.S. policy toward Latin America, asserting U.S. primacy in the foreign affairs of the
region. Over the past two decades, those principles have become increasingly obsolete.
Washingtons basic policy framework, however, has not changed
sufficiently to reflect the new reality. U.S. policy can no longer be based
on the assumption that the United States is the most important outside
actor in Latin America. If there was an era of U.S. hegemony in Latin
America, it is over. In most respects, this shift reflects positive developments
within Latin America itself. The region has undergone a historic transformation politically, with
military-authoritarian rule giving way to vibrant, if imperfect, democracy in almost every nation. Economically,
Latin America is now one of the more open market regions in the world and a crucial global provider of energy,
minerals, and food. None of this is to say that Latin America has entirely overcome its history of political tumult or
done enough to alleviate poverty, improve competitiveness and human capital, or correct extreme inequality. But
it does mean that U.S. policymakers must change the way they think about the
region. Latin America is not Washingtons to lose; nor is it Washingtons to save. Latin Americas fate is largely
in Latin Americas hands. A failure to acknowledge how Latin Americans define their
own challenges has created new political strains in recent years . It has
also caused U.S. policymakers to overlook the ways in which the United
States can meaningfully contribute to Latin Americas progress furthering the
United States own interests in the process. By truly beginning to engage Latin America
on its own terms, Washington can mark the start of a new era in U.S.-
Latin America relations. It is a cliche to bemoan Americans lack of interest in Latin America. Still,
this disinterest remains vexing given the regions proximity to the United
States and the remarkable interconnectedness of U.S. and Latin American
economies and societies. In recent years, as Washingtons attention has been focused on crises
elsewhere in the world, the connections have only deepened. From 1996 to 2006, total U.S. merchandise trade
with Latin America grew by 139 percent, compared to 96 percent for Asia and 95 percent for the European Union
(EU).1 In 2006, the United States exported $223 billion worth of goods to Latin American consumers (compared
with $55 billion to China).2 Latin America is the United States most important external source of oil, accounting
for nearly 30 percent of imports (compared with 20 percent from the Middle East), as well as its main source of
illegal narcotics. And as a result of both conditions in Latin America and demand for workers in the United States,
migration from the region has accelerated. Latinos now account for 15 percent of the U.S. population, nearly 50
percent of recent U.S. population growth, and a growing portion of the electorate allowing Latino voters
increasingly to shape the U.S. political agenda. Cross-border community and family ties, as well as the Spanish
language media, mean that Latin America remains part of many Latinos daily lives and concerns. For all of these
reasons, Latin Americas wellbeing directly affects the United States. But even with such integration, the opening
of Latin American economies and the globalization of Latin American societies means that U.S. policy is now but
one of several competing factors capable of influencing the region. Latin American states, especially the larger
ones, do not consider their interests to be primarily determined by diplomatic, trade, or security ties with the
United States. Brazil has made inroads into groupings such as the South-South Dialogue with South Africa and
India and the Group of 20 (G20), while countries such as Chile and Mexico have struck trade and investment
agreements with the EU and a number of Asian countries, China most prominently. The economic and political
diversification of Latin America is reflected in Latin American attitudes as well. Esteem for U.S. global and
hemispheric leadership is at its lowest level in the region in recent memory. In 2002, according to the Pew Global
Attitudes Project, 82 percent of Venezuelans, 34 percent of Argentineans, and 51 percent of Bolivians had a
favorable view of the United States; those numbers had fallen to 56, 16, and 43 percent by 2007. The percentage
of Latin Americans who approved of U.S. ideas on democracy decreased from 45 percent in 2002 to 29 percent in
2007.3 This general distrust of the United States has allowed Presidents Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Evo Morales
of Bolivia,Rafael Correa of Ecuador, and even FelipeCalderon of Mexico to bolster their domestic popular support
Most Latin Americans still prefer a mutually respectful
by criticizing Washington.
and productive relationship with the United States, but the factors driving
Latin Americas desire for greater independence are likely to shape the
regions posture toward the United States well into the future .
2NC --- Obama Influence
Obamas restoring international order now -- but unilateral
actions prevent his ability --- causes economic crisis, and
global conflicts.
Yu, 2012 (Shiyu, Watching America scholar, Obamas Neo-Unilateralism
http://watchingamerica.com/News/163526/obamas-neo-unilateralism/)
Unilateralism, which led to the decline of the United States reputation and moral authority, is the
most significant feature of the Bush administrations foreign policy. It not only worsened the U.S. debt crisis
through the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, but it also intensified antagonism between the United States
and Islamic countries, aggravating a global clash of civilizations. Ostensibly,
Obama is trying to bring order out of chaos, emphasizing international
cooperation , restoring alliances with Americas European allies and adopting friendly diplomacy
toward the Islamic world. Suddenly, Obama garnered many international accolades and even received his undeserved Nobel Peace
Obama administration recognizes the limitations of U.S.
Prize. Unlike the Bush administration, the
power and influence and always emphasizes cost-effectiveness, a way that helps America acquire the greatest
international interests at the least cost. This is the most significant feature of the so-called Obama doctrine, which affects the
White Houses policy-making and priorities and that revealed itself especially in the promotion of the strategic importance of the
Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, on the anti-terrorism front, even some American conservatives hold that there is no substantial
difference between policies adopted by Obama and Bush, except in how they are implemented.
2NC --- Working through multilateral institutions
key
US influence is declining now unilateral involvement triggers
backlash working through the cps key.
Crandall 11 (Russell Crandall, Associate Professor of International Politics at
Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S.
Department of Defense in 2009, Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security
Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an
Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs 90.3, May-June, 2011, pg. ,
Across the region in recent years, the U nited S tates has seen its influence decline .
Latin
even harder to get what it wanted in Latin America. At the same time as U.S. influence has diminished,
million. Ironically, moreover, Latin America's entry into a "post-hegemonic" era, a
even further. It must demonstrate an ability to quietly engage and lead
there was a disconnect between
outright failures. For much of the twentieth century,
U nited S tates'
Insert heg/Obama cred impact

2NC --- Link
Continued unilateralism kills Obamas credibility in Latin
America
Dangl, 2009 (Benjamin, Latin American philosopher, editor of Toward Freedom
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/apr/17/obama-summit-americas)
While George Bush was the most unpopular president ever in South America,
Barack Obama could end up being the most popular. To that end, much hinges on this weekend's fifth
Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, where all of the hemisphere's heads of state minus Ral Castro of Cuba will be in
attendance. In order to break with Bush's disastrous legacy in Latin American relations,
Obama would do well to follow the strategy set out by his vice president, Joe Biden,
during his recent visit to Chile: "The time of the United States dictating unilaterally , the time where
we only talk and don't listen, is over ," Biden said.

2NC --- Causes Topic Country to Agree to the Plan
and Answer to the Perm

A variant of how
inconsistency, as well as coercive and nonconsultative behavior, makes it
2NC AT: CP Isnt Multilateral Action
Yes it is.
Bouchard and Peterson, 2010 (Caroline and John, University of Edinburgh, Multilateralism: Dead or
Alive? http://www.sociology.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/39526/Conceptualising_Multilateralism_dead_alive.pdf)
Multilateralism is three or more actors engaging in voluntary and (more or less)

institutionalised international cooperation governed by norms and
principles, with rules that apply (more or less) equally to all. We have reflected carefully on the choices that
inevitably must be made in arriving at a truly modern, functional definition. All competing definitions
agree that multilateralism, at minimum, involves a minimum of three actors

(almost always states). Critics might say that this is to set the bar too low, especially given debates about mini- v. multilateralism
and k group v. n group multilateralism. But there are many imaginable cases of multilateralism that could have
major impacts on IR involving only a few actors, which need not all be states. We have seen that major
international agreements on emissions reductions, regulatory cooperation, and rights for workers might involve, even
necessarily, non-state actors. Consider, just as one example, what might be accomplished in terms of industry retrenchment and
the embrace of green technologies, between just 3 actors (only 1 of which is a state): the US, the EU, and the motor industry.
Impact Scenarios
2NC --- Obama Cred
Obamas strength is uniquely key to solve conflict
Ben Coes 11, a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration,
managed Mitt Romneys successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002 &
author, The disease of a weak president, The Daily Caller,
http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/
The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles heel all politicians are born with the desire to be popular. It
leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results
in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike.
In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to
protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States,
in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways.
Obamas weakness
Despite this, I wouldnt bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces. But
could in other places have implications far, far worse than anything
that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that
connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more
fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious
hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons. If you can only
worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this
one. Here are a few unsettling facts to think about: First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-
colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess
hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map
many times over. Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when
not if Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah
Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a
far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear
device. Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan.
China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China
covets Indias natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into
the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land
and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world . In my book, Coup
DEtat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving
problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical
Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear
weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani
leader through a coup dtat. I wish it was that simple. The more complicated and difficult
truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be
ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies .
And our allies are Israel and India. There are many threats out there
Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half
a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt
worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest
threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president . It doesnt have to be
this way. President Obama could if he chose develop a backbone and lead.
Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an
option.
Engagement is inevitable the only question is effectiveness
strong Obama foreign policy stops Syrian instability, Iran
nuclearization, South China Seas conflict, and Russian
resurgence
Ghitis 13 (Frida, world affairs columnist for The Miami Herald and World Politics
Review. A former CNN producer and correspondent, she is the author of The End of
Revolution: A Changing World in the Age of Live Television. World to Obama: You
can't ignore us, 1/22, http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/22/opinion/ghitis-obama-world)
President Obama made it very clear: The second term is all about the domestic
agenda. If only the world would cooperate. Obama outlined his goals for the next four years,
sketching above all a progressive vision of a country with less inequality and more justice. And, judging by his
inaugural speech, he plans to put his shoulder to the wheel. After all, much of the first term was consumed with
averting a national economic catastrophe. Now he can get on with building a legacy, reviving that hope and change
he promised back during the 2008 campaign. But the most subtly striking part of Obama's inauguration speech
was how it largely ignored the rest of the globe. In his 20-minute address, he dedicated perhaps
one minute to foreign policy. America, he said, will "try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully."
He vowed the country "will remain the anchor of strong alliances" and it will support democracy. He also declared
the United States "must be a source of hope for the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice..." and
he did not spare a single word for tens of
stand for "human dignity and justice." Beyond that,
Syria; nothing about the struggle for liberal democratic rights
thousands killed by dictators, as they have been in
in places like Egypt, which sets the tone for the Middle East. Nothing about repression and thwarting of
freedom of expression, the rollback of democratic rights, or the push to destroy existing democracies, statements
that could have come as welcome words of encouragement for people who share American values of freedom and
China, Iran, Russia or Mali. The president should keep in mind that
justice in places like Egypt,
millions around the world yearn to know they have the backing of the
most powerful country on Earth. As he surely knows, even his words make a big
difference. And while Obama plans to dedicate his efforts to the domestic agenda, a number of
brewing international crises are sure to steal his attention and demand
his time . Here are a few of the foreign policy issues that, like it or not, may force Obama
to divert his focus from domestic concerns in this new term. Syria unraveling: The United
Nations says more than 60,000 people have already died in a civil war that the West has, to its
shame, done little to keep from spinning out of control. Washingtonhas warned that the use of chemical or
The West has
biological weapons might force its hand. But the regime may have already used them.
failed to nurture a moderate force in the conflict. Now Islamist extremists are
growing more powerful within the opposition. The chances are growing
that worst-case scenarios will materialize. Washington will not be able to
endlessly ignore this dangerous war. Egypt and the challenge of democracy: What happens in
Egypt strongly influences the rest of the Middle East -- and hence world peace -- which makes it all the more
troubling to see liberal democratic forces lose battle after battle for political influence against Islamist parties, and
to hear blatantly anti-Semitic speech coming from the mouth of Mohammed Morsy barely two years before he
became president. Iran's nuclear program: Obama took office promising a new, more conciliatory
has succeeded in
effort to persuade Iran to drop its nuclear enrichment program. Four years later, he
implementing international sanctions, but Iran has continued enriching uranium ,
leading United Nations inspectors to find "credible evidence" that Tehran is working on nuclear weapons. Sooner or
If a deal is not reached, Obama will have to decide
later the moment of truth will arrive.
if he wants to be the president on whose watch a nuclear weapons race
was unleashed in the most dangerous and unstable part of the world. North
Africa terrorism: A much-neglected region of the world is becoming increasingly difficult to disregard. In recent days,
Islamist extremists took American and other hostages in Algeria and France sent its military to fight advancing
Islamist extremists in Mali, a country that once represented optimism for democratic rule in Africa, now overtaken
Russia
by militants who are potentially turning it into a staging ground for international terrorism.
repression: As Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeds in crushing opposition to his
he and his allies are making anti-American words and
increasingly authoritarianrule,
policies their favorite theme. A recent ban on adoption of Russian orphans by American parents is
only the most vile example. But Washington needs Russian cooperation to achieve its goals at the U.N. regarding
Iran, Syria and other matters. It is a complicated problem with which Obama will have
to wrestle. Then there are the long-standing challenges that could take a
turn for the worse, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Obama may not
want to wade into that morass again, but events may force his hand . And
there are the so-called "black swans," events of low probability and high impact. There is talk that
China and Japan could go to war over a cluster of disputed islands. A war
between two of the world's largest economies could prove devastating to the global economy, just as a sudden and
Japan's is only the hottest of
dramatic reversal in the fragile Eurozone economy could spell disaster.
many territorial disputes between China and its Asian neighbors. Then there's
North Korea with its nuclear weapons. We could see regions that have garnered little attention come back to the
forefront, such as Latin America, where conflict could arise in a post-Hugo Chavez Venezuela. The president -- and
the country -- could also benefit from unexpectedly positive outcomes. Imagine a happy turn of events in Iran, a
breakthrough between Israelis and Palestinians, the return of prosperity in Europe, a successful push by liberal
democratic forces in the Arab uprising countries, which could create new opportunities, lowering risks around the
world, easing trade, restoring confidence and improving the chances for the very agenda Obama described in his
inaugural speech. The aspirations he expressed for America are the ones he should express for our tumultuous
Perhaps in his next big speech, the State of the Union, he can remember America's
planet.
leadership position and devote more attention to those around the world
who see it as a source of inspiration and encouragement. After all, in this second term Obama will not be
able to devote as small a portion of his attention to foreign policy as he
did during his inaugural speech. International disengagement is not an
option. As others before Obama have discovered, history has a habit of toying with the
best laid, most well-intentioned plans of American presidents.
South China Sea conflicts cause extinction

Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany,
Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published
articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011,
"Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be
used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations
employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with
China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon . The
gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by
Chinas growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged Chinas
claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and
deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region . According to
need this lead to
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was asserting our own position as a Pacific power. But
nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the
United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S.
government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the
Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of Chinas
offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight
Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or
anything else. Of course, China didnt have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will
be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations
Some
had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists.
pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed
nations; and, admittedly, there havent been very manyat least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999,
between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such
wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear
war. Pakistans foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use any weapon in its arsenal.
During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles
dont nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do
for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though,
they? Obviously, NATO leaders didnt feel deterred , for, throughout the Cold
War, NATOs strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military
attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the
nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really
believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to
championing Star Wars and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly
expensiveand probably unworkablemilitary defense systems needed if other
nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might ? Of course,
the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons
safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S.
nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that
the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly
three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States
would win any nuclear war with China. But what would that victory entail? A nuclear attack by China
would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast
and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a
nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering,
radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would
blot out the sun and bring on a nuclear winter around the globe
destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos
and destruction.
Russia expansionism causes nuclear war

Blank 9 (Dr. Stephen, Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies
Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March, Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For
The Obama Administration?, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf)
Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of
retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with
little ideological rivalry among major powers , it
is unlikely that they will go to war with each other . Rather, like Russia, they will strive
for exclusive hegemony in their own sphere of influence and use nuclear
instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker
peripheral states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis
prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory
or respite they need.169 Simultaneously, The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since
war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives.
Thus international
crises may increase in number. This has two important implications
for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive
victory (or in Russias case, to achieve intra-war escalation control
author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises
increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD .171
Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like
Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose
to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as
defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive
weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their
decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual
national egotism will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes, But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more
cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited
mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the great powers in the management of the interstate system, especially
problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the
ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling
the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security

that force,
operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great

powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps
make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people .172
Iran prolif causes nuclear war

Jeffrey Goldberg 12, Bloomberg View columnist and a national correspondent for
the Atlantic, January 23, 2012, How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon,
online: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/how-iran-may-trigger-
accidental-armageddon-commentary-by-jeffrey-goldberg.html
The experts who study this depressing issue seem to agree that a Middle East in which Iran
has four or five nuclear weapons would be dangerously unstable and prone to
warp-speed escalation . Heres one possible scenario for the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah, Irans Lebanese
proxy, launches a cross-border attack into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli civilians with conventional rockets. Israel
responds by invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran, coming to the defense of
its proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and leaves open the question of what it will do if Israel refuses to heed its demand.
Dennis Ross, who until recently served as President Barack Obamas Iran point man on the National Security Council, notes
Hezbollahs political importance to Tehran. The only place to which the Iranian government successfully exported the revolution
is to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ross told me. If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy Hezbollah, you can see Iran
threatening Israel, and they begin to change the readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain of events that would
be like Guns of August on steroids. Imagine that Israel detects a mobilization of Irans rocket force or the sudden movement of
mobile missile launchers. Does Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or that they are not? And would Israel have time to figure
this out? Or imagine the opposite: Might Iran, which will have no second-strike capability for many years -- that is, no reserve of
nuclear weapons to respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first, knowing that it has no second chance?
Bruce Blair, the co-founder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an expert on nuclear
strategy, told me that in a sudden crisis Iran and Israel might each abandon
traditional peacetime safeguards, making an accidental exchange more
likely. A confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed states to a boiling point would likely lead
them to raise the launch- readiness of their forces -- mating warheads to delivery
vehicles and preparing to fire on short notice, he said. Missiles put on hair-trigger alert also obviously
increase the danger of their launch and release on false warning of attack -- false indications
that the other side has initiated an attack. Then comes the problem of misinterpreted
data, Blair said. Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false impression that the other
side has decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike. Cognitive Bias Blair notes that in a
crisis it isnt irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more
likely that a leader will read the worst into incomplete intelligence. This predisposition is a
cognitive bias that increases the danger that one side will jump the gun on
the basis of incorrect information, he said. Ross told me that Irans relative proximity to Israel and the
total absence of ties between the two countries -- the thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a
country whose existence it doesnt recognize is far-fetched -- make the situation even more
hazardous. This is not the Cold War, he said. In this situation we dont have any
communications channels. Iran and Israel have zero communications. And even in the Cold War we nearly
had a nuclear war. We were much closer than we realized. The answer to this predicament is to deny Iran
nuclear weapons, but not through an attack on its nuclear facilities, at least not now. The
liabilities of preemptive attack on Irans nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits, Blair said. But certainly Irans program
must be stopped before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons delivery capability.
Indo-Pak war escalates quickly to extinction---no checks

Greg Chaffin 11, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, 2011,
Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia, online:
http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting_us_security_strategy_in_south_asia
The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional
concerns) is the possibility that increased India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out
war that could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange. Indeed, in just the past two
decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and Pakistan
remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war. Due
to an Indian preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan would have a
strong incentive to use its nuclear arsenal very early on before a routing of its military
installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistans only chance of survival would be
the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian
targets. By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from the
India would respond in kind, with escalation
brink. However, it is equally likely that
ensuing. Neither state possesses tactical nuclear weapons, but both possess
scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, as more
damage was inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike), c ommand and c ontrol elements
would be disabled, leaving individual commanders to respond in an
environment increasingly clouded by the fog of war and decreasing the
likelihood that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that
their forces would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in
hostilities. As a result any such conflict would likely continue to escalate until one
side incurred an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted its nuclear
arsenal. A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous
effects on the world as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology
professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global repercussions of
a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in
1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet
Union would result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter, which could
very well place the survival of the human race in jeopardy . In their study, Robock and
Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each
were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic
rather than tactical, the likely targets would be major population centers. Owing to the
population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of direct casualties could climb as high as 20
million. The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the
detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million
metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower
stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this
altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade , during which time
the world would remain perpetually overcast . Furthermore, these particles
would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely
damage the earths ozone layer. The inability of sunlight to penetrate through
the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This
shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages,
and widespread political upheaval. Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains
relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to warrant greater U.S. and international attention. Furthermore,
due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus held between India and
Pakistan, it might not take much to set them off . Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid
on bin Ladens compound, several members of Indias security apparatus along with conservative politicians have
argued that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to nab or kill
anti-Indian terrorists, either preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-
out war between the two that could quickly escalate.
2NC --- Turns Hegemony
DA turns hegemony
Hoffman, 2002 (Stanley, Foreign Affairs Buttenwieser University Professor at Harvard University and a regular book
reviewer for Foreign Affairs, Clash of Globalizations http://www.cfr.org/history-and-theory-of-international-relations/clash-
globalizations/p4763)
the unique position of the United States raises a serious question over the
Finally,
future of world affairs. In the realm of interstate problems, American behavior will
determine whether the nonsuperpowers and weak states will continue to
look at the United States as a friendly power (or at least a tolerable hegemon), or whether they
are provoked by Washington's hubris into coalescing against American
preponderance. America may be a hegemon, but combining rhetorical overkill

and ill-defined designs is full of risks . Washington has yet to understand
that nothing is more dangerous for a "hyperpower" than the temptation
of unilateralism . It may well believe that the constraints of international agreements
are not necessary , since U.S. values and power are all that is
and organizations
needed for world order. But in reality, those same international constraints provide far
better opportunities for leadership than arrogant demonstrations of
contempt for others' views, and they offer useful ways of restraining unilateralist
behavior in other states. A hegemon concerned with prolonging its rule should
be especially interested in using internationalist methods and institutions, for
the gain in influence far exceeds the loss in freedom of action.
2NC --- Soft Power
Soft power is good --- allows for de-escalation of conflicts.
Nye, 2004 (Joseph, the Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard University The Benefits of Soft Power http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html)
Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others . In the
business world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves
leading by example and attracting others to do what you want . Similarly,
contemporary practices of community-based policing rely on making the
police sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community wants to help them
achieve shared objectives . Political leaders have long understood the power that
comes from attraction. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have
to use carrots or sticks to make you do it. Soft power is a staple of daily
democratic politics . The ability to establish preferences tends to be
associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality,
culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as
legitimate or having moral authority. If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost
less to lead.
2NC --- Instability
Unilateralism specifically in Latin America results in unstable
economic conditions --- only the CP can solve.
Lamy, 2001 (Pascal, European Trade Commissioner, Regionalism and Multilateralism in Latin America
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&ved=0CGMQFjAJ&url=http%3A%2F
%2Fwww.londoncanadianstudies.org%2FJournal%2F19%2F19-4.pdf&ei=tIj2UdnJF-
HOyAGO_IGwCg&usg=AFQjCNGuMDJ2iHTnccFyU95fvXwGcG5XvQ&sig2=kJbWY5WK9j9DOdvVggn9_w)
Unilateralism is the prerogative of a superpower, which none of our countries is. It belongs to
another era, that of bilateral agreements in which the strong imposed their will on the weak, that of extra-
territorial decisions, employing economic sanctions, that of arbitrary protectionism. Today unilateralism
would result in an unstable , inefficient and unjust international economic order.
Our increasingly interdependent world needs predictable and objective rules
and policies. Only international rule of law can guarantee these. What are, then, the two routes actually open
to us ? Regionalism and multilateralism. These are not mutually exclusive but complementary. They are not
equivalent: one is subordinate to the other. Regionalism is governed by the multilateral rules and disciplines of the
WTO. A country, like Brazil or any other one, can no longer pursue a national project without integrating it into a
regional project and multilateral dimension. Regionalism may be a European invention, but it is not protected by
copyright laws ! No need for compulsory licensing here. Regionalism is a global public good that the
EU has developed over half a century of integration, the benefit of which it is ready to share with its partners. The
principles are simple: a single market; harmonisation of standards and regulations affecting the free movement of
goods, services, people and capital; solidarity through financial mechanisms; and, where necessary, common
policies, among them trade and competition policies. Integration has even led to a single currency, the Euro,
which will gradually acquire the international status worthy of its 300 million consumers and savers. For twenty or
has been pioneering ways of harnessing globalisation. The benefits
thirty years Europe
of regional integration are considerable: a single market attractive to foreign
investors; increased but fair competition; and far greater clout in international negotiations. Of
course, securing these benefits requires economic operators to place their
faith in integration, something they will only do if they judge the process
to be transparent and irreversible . And irreversibility entails both an institutional framework for
pooling sovereignty and sufficient convergence of economic policies, including currency stability.
2NC --- Solves Terror, Warming, Diseases, Economic
Growth
Multilateralism solves warming, terrorism, disease, and
economic growth
If any or all of these views are valid, then perhaps multilateralism deserves to remain ill defined, under-
conceptualised, and under-theorised. IR scholars might be advised to focus their we research elsewhere. Yet,
find evidence to suggest growing interest, even amongst major powers, in multilateral
solutions to the transnational problems such as global warming , international
terrorism , and disease control that are the externalities of globalization. The 2008-10
financial crisis suddenly made the Group of 20 (G20) most systemically important
industrialized and developing economies3 an previously obscure and young (less than 10 years old)
configuration with no permanent staff the main forum for debates about how shared policy
commitments might restore global economic growth. Chinas commitment to
multilateral economic cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has become a prominent feature
of its 21st century foreign policy (Klein et al 2010). After the (allegedly) relentless unilateralism of the George W.
Bush administration, the US elected an untested multilateralist in foreign affairs (Delbanco 2008): Barack
Obama. The European Union (EU) equipped with a new and stronger foreign policy machinery after ratification of
the Lisbon Treaty (2009) is funding multiple, large research programmes into multilateralism as part of its
doctrinal commitment to effective multilateralism.4 Academic interest in multilateralism is by no means confined
to Europe: Robert Keohane and colleagues (2009: 28) have recently urged that IR scholars make multilateralism a
major focus of research that is deeply empirical and based on comparative institutional analysis.
2NC --- Multilateralisms K2 Global Institutions
Now is key --- US Unilateral influence is being tempered, only
shifts to multilateralism will solve global conflicts.
McNally, 2013 (Kyle, a researcher and PhD candidate at Durham University, has a Masters degree from the London
School of Economics in Development Studies and has previously worked as a Congressional Aide in the United States House of
Representatives, Obama, American Power and Global Security http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/08/02/2013/obama-
american-power-and-global-security)
Last month Barack Obama celebrated his second inauguration as the President of the United States. His inaugural speech has been
lauded for its strength and progressive declarations. It should be noted, however, that with only narrow qualification, President
Obama presented an image of American strength when relevant in foreign policy concerns, while devoting most of his focus to the
mounting political challenges pervading domestic US politics: ranging from the debt ceiling, fiscal cliff, and now also gun control and
immigration. With regard to foreign policy his comments were brief but significant. While stressing American power and superiority,
Obama emphasized his administrations commitment to engagement and diplomacy as a means to achieve enduring peace. On this
point he remarked that America would renew those institutions established to manage crisis abroad, explicitly stating the need to
respect the rule of law. This statement warrants closer consideration, especially with respect to Obamas track record in his first
Relative to
term, the prospects for the next four years and American power in the 21st century more generally.
Americas hegemonic dominance in the (later) 20th century, its position in world
politics today continues to be influential but is significantly tempered in key
respects. This necessarily has, some heretofore untold, effects on multilateral governance and
world politics. Turning to the institutions responsible for managing global crisis, the United Nations stands out as a prominent
example of an institution desperately in need of renewal. At the San Francisco United Nations conference in 1945 US President
Truman warned that We still have a choice between the alternatives: the continuation of international chaos--or the establishment
Given the current turmoil throughout the
of a world organization for the enforcement of peace.
world it is hard to reach any conclusion other than that what we have now is, indeed, chaos. The Arab Spring has
produced critical and protracted conflicts, most notably in Syria where more than 60,000 people have already died; Israeli
military actions against Palestine and now Syria threaten to catalyze more diffuse crisis, potentially drawing Iran
into a conflict ; state authority in Libya remains tenuous, and the unintended consequences of the NATO
intervention there are now seen across Northern Africa, particularly with emboldened and well armed rebel groups
regional peace in Mali; not to mention any number of ongoing conflicts
threatening
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, or regional instability stemming from North

Koreas nuclear programme , etc. Even if one can argue that many conflicts seen today involve state actors
directly, the effects and legacy of these conflicts is not bound by national borders. In the aggregate, global security is
fundamentally a transborder, global collective action problem. The United Nations was
designed explicitly to address this type of global bad, but it is failing in remarkable ways. Obamas call for renewal, should it be
met in any measure, would serve the United Nations well; however, this is a call typically limited to principle and seen less in
practice. US foreign policy under President Obama has, with some exceptions, been more tempered than under his predecessor.
Additionally, there are key instances in which Obama has exercised restraint of US power where others may not have been so
inclined to. This is perhaps most evident by his commitment (to date) to a diplomatic solution to Irans upgrading of nuclear
technologies. Recently, there has been a signal of diplomatic hope between the US and Iran when US Vice President Biden spoke at
the Munich Security Conference expressing an openness to direct, though highly conditional, dialogue between the two states. His
remarks were quickly matched by Iranian foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, who cautiously welcomed Bidens remarks as a step
forward and said, We take these statements with positive consideration. Elsewhere, Obama has ceded leadership on military
interventions to countries like France (in the NATO intervention in Libya), and has abided the restraints placed on US power by
multilateral institutions (such as the UN Security Council vetoes on intervention in Syria from China and Russia). These actions, or
reveal a very different American foreign policy disposition than
instances of inaction,
when, in the wake of 9/11, the US returned
that experienced by the world at the turn of the 21st century
to unilateralism with brute force and patent disregard for multilateral cooperation
(see Ikenberry 2004). However, this tempered disposition should not be overstated. Instances of US cooperation in multilateral
governance are off-set by Obamas continuation of unilateral tendencies a continued theme of American power into the 21st
century; Obama is expanding the US drone operations in the War on Terror in spite of growing criticism from the world community at
large; furthermore, indefinite, and ostensibly illegal, detentions have continued unabated in Guantanamo Bay, to name a couple of
examples. While abiding some multilateral constraints placed on American power may serve to
further legitimize and entrench current multilateral processes, this does very little
to renew the institutions so desperately needed to manage the current global insecurity crises. Rather, ongoing
unilateral actions of the US serve to undermine the legitimacy of multilateral
governance mechanisms, and generally lowers the expectation that other states will, or ought to, participate in sincere
fashion.
CP Specific
FTAA Crucial to maintaining Regionalism
Free trade agreements ensure regionalism
Pizarro, 1999 (Ramiro, International Trade and Development Finance Division, comparative Analysis of regionalism in
Latin America and Asia-Pacific http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/5/4285/lcl1307i.pdf)
The ECLAC document (1994) on open regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean
defines accurately the transition from a first unilateral liberalization stage to a second one
characterized by preferential trade agreements . In this way, open regionalism articulates what countries have been
doing individually in terms of unilateral openness and economic deregulation in order to boost their outward-looking,
export-led growth strategies, and the political process of regional integration. Therefore, open
regionalism defined by ECLAC embraces the two trends which are predominant in
Latin American economies during the 1990s: the openness and deregulation of Latin American economies and
the growing number of preferential trade agreements that seek a greater international competitiveness for the entire region
Working through OAS Crucial
Absent working through the OAS its going to decline --- CPs
crucial to sustain it.
Walser 11 [June 2, 2011, Ray, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, Time for U.S. Leadership at the Organization of American States,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/time-for-us-leadership-at-the-organization-of-american-states]
The 41st General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) will take place in San Salvador June 57.
The OAS will convene all members with the exception of Cuba and tackle a 103-item agenda over the course of
three meeting-filled days. Since taking office, theObama Administration has expressed strong
support for multilateralism as a corrective for past sins of U.S. unilateralism. It designated the OAS
as the foremost multilateral organization of the hemisphere. Yet, without real U.S. leadership
and collective actions to defend democracy, rule of law, human rights, and
in-depth security, the OAS may continue its current decline into irrelevance .
The OAS: From Cooperation to Decline An offshoot of the Pan-American Union, the OAS dates back to the 19th
century, which makes it the worlds oldest regional organization. Its stately and aging headquarters near the White
House is a historic Washington fixture. Refashioned in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the OAS was once
believed to embody the Western Hemispheric Ideal and was useful in promoting solidarity among neighbors. The
end of the Cold War opened a door for renewed inter-American solidarity as Washingtons viewpoints appeared to
converge with its Latin American neighbors. The 1990s witnessed the first Summit of the Americas, serious
discussion of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and broad cooperation on drugs, security, democracy, and
development. In the same period, OAS members undertook to enshrine liberal, democratic governance at the core
of the regions identity. Adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in September 2001 seemed to make the
the amity of the1990s has
democracy project in the Americas nearly irreversible. Unfortunately,
given way to the fractiousness of the 21st century. In the past decade, the
OAS became an arena for diplomatic jousting on issues ranging from
democracy and human rights to Cubas readmission and terrorism. U.S.
influence and leverage in the region has continued to decline. Does the OAS
Really Stand for Democracy? In the 2009 Honduras governance crisis, the OAS swiftly condemned the
removal of President Manuel Zelaya as a coup and expelled Honduras from its ranks. The
OAS did so without a careful evaluation of President Zelayas constitutional
violations, a serious effort at diplomacy, or mediation with the interim government. The U.S.
supported this action. Yet critics of the OAS were quick to note that Honduras was not the only nation in the
Americas where the democratic constitutional order was under siege. Members like Venezuela and Nicaragua are
routinely in violation of fundamental commitments to preserve meaningful checks and balances and political
freedom also covered by the Democratic Charter. On June 1, following Manuel Zelayas return to Honduras free of
criminal charges and with the right to participate again in politics, the OAS restored Honduras to full membership.
Other vital freedoms remain under assault. In Venezuela, Hugo Chvez continues to attempt to asphyxiate the
opposition through the use of decree powers, curtailments of rights and freedoms, and a net of regulations and
The preponderance of the state makes Venezuela a candidate for
prohibitions.
regular OAS censure. Press and political freedoms are under siege in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Nicaragua. Corruption and routine violations of the rule of law persist. The Obama Administration has
acknowledged several flaws in the OAS. These include an excess of mandates, deviation from core missions, and
failure to support representative democracy. The Administration has proposed modest fixes that range from budget
reform to reducing the number of OAS mandates. It would like to refocus the OAS on its core responsibilities and
given
bolster democratic monitoring, perhaps creating the position of special democracy rapporteur. Yet
current divisions, rescuing the OAS will remain a challenge. The U.S. has
been unable to develop the political will necessary to make the OAS an
effective defender of democratic institutions and practices. Sadly, as veteran Latin
American watcher Abraham Lowenthal noted, [T]he OAS has often been ineffectual and
the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which is intended to strengthen
democratic institutions in OAS member countries, has produced few
meaningful results. It is possible that Chvez, who once declared the OAS to be a corpse that must be
buried, may be proven right in the long run. Hold Tough on Basic Freedoms and Hemispheric Security The June 57
General Assembly has as its central theme Citizen Security in the Americas, and the U.S. and others will need to
concentrate on the range of threats the Americas face, from transnational criminal organizations and drug
The U.S. must prevent insertion of statements that
trafficking to international terrorism.
focus on alleged imperialism or foreign bases as the causes of
security vulnerabilities. The U.S. will also need to resist efforts by anti-democrats to justify cracking
down on legitimate opposition and dissent. The U.S. should reaffirm the central principles
of democratic governance and rule of law. To achieve these ends, the U.S.
must assume a leadership role at the OAS to: Support Freedom of
Expression. With the backing of Panama and Mexico, the U.S. will sponsor the first-ever resolution on Freedom
of Assembly and of Association. That text will undoubtedly encounter opposition from Venezuela and others who will
introduce qualifiers and justifications aimed at abridging freedom of assembly and association, so as to make the
resolution meaningless. The U.S. must press the OAS to deliver a clear message of support for individual rights and
freedom against government encroachments. Support Representative Democracy. The U.S. and its
key allies will need vigilance to thwart Venezuelan and other efforts to undermine basic human rights and
democracy language and attempts to equate popular democracy with representative democracy. The U.S. must
be prepared to recognize that it is time to abandon the tired assertion that all members of the OAS are
democracies. Stronger Hemispheric Security. In the face of complex criminal, drug, and terrorism
threats, the U.S. must keep the focus on building stronger security cooperation via civilian and military means,
reminding all members that security against criminal violence and acts of terrorism is not an ideological issue or a
tool for U.S. intervention. It must address directly threats arising from the complicity and criminal actions of anti-
U.S. members such as Venezuela. Continued Institutional Reform. The U.S. must press for ways to limit costs,
reduce mandates and non-essential functions, and ensure competitive, merit-based hiring at the OAS. The
Obama Administrations investment of increased diplomatic capital in
strengthening the OAS has borne scant fruit. Short of withdrawing from
the regional bodyan option that merits serious debatethe Obama
Administration must continue focusing on democratic development,
institutional reforms, cooperation against transnational threats, and
strategies to foster accelerated channels of commerce and enhanced
economic freedom. The Obama Administration should cease overselling the benefits of hemispheric
multilateralism and seek opportunities to work with our remaining hemispheric friends to advance mutual interests
and values.
Reviving its crucial.

Einaudi 12 [December 6th, 2012, Luigi, distinguished visiting fellow in the Center for Strategic Research,
Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, a member of the Wilson Centers Brazil
Institute Advisory Board, former Permanent Representative of the United States at the Organization of American
States, and former Assistant Secretary General of the OAS, On Multilateralism, Sovereignty and the Western
Hemisphere: Concepts in Jeopardy, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/multilateralism-sovereignty-and-the-
western-hemisphere-concepts-jeopardy]
The Organization of American States is a multilateral organization of the

sovereign nation states of the Western Hemisphere. This apparently
simple definition combines three concepts, all of them now unfortunately
in jeopardy First, Multilateralism Multilateralism is more than the temporary agreement of two or more countries on a specific problem; it is
cooperation based on generalized principles of conduct. When
generalized principles of conduct are given treaty form, they become
international law. The United Nations Charter and the World Court are today the cornerstones of global order based on law. If age were the gold standard, the
OAS and many of its constituent entities would be recognized among the precursors of multilateralism. But todays world is increasingly
disorderly and fragmenting. Multilateral institutions are much criticized and associated more often with inefficiency than with order.
International law has been weakened by repeated failures to ratify treaties or abide by their obligations. Which leads to a question: is multilateralism being reduced to an idealistic
The OAS Charter is based on the sovereign

illusion in an increasingly Hobbesian world? Second, Sovereignty
equality of states. Every state has one vote. Unlike the United Nations, democracy among nations at the OAS is not
conditioned by a Security Council or members with vetoes. Respect for the principle of non-intervention means that individual states are essentially free to determine their participation
in any particular activity. In recent years, however, it has become increasingly clear that many
of the problems of this globalizing age require cooperation. Illegal drugs,
small arms transfers, migration and a host of other matters cross borders
and cannot be addressed by any one state acting alone. Which leads to a
second question: Is the sovereign nation state becoming obsolete? Third, the Western
Hemisphere The OAS Charter declares that the historic mission of America is to
offer to man a land of liberty. In reality, of course, the Americas have never been
united except in the western mythology of the New World. Its countries
have shifting relationships, sometimes drifting apart, other times
coalescing sub regionally. It is nearly sixty years since the historian Arthur Whitaker declared that the Western Hemisphere Ideal, the proposition
that the peoples of this Hemisphere stand in a special relationship to one another which sets them apart from the rest of the world was in irreversible decline. So a third question arises:
Do hemispheric relations still have a unique place in this globalizing world? What does accumulated experience tell us? First, Multilateralism Practice reveals that multilateralism
Multilateralism is the basis of the common standards that make

matters:
possible everything from world trade to operating safe flights across

borders; Multilateral agreements are often more effective than bilateral ones. The 1977 Panama Canal Treaties were signed upstairs, in the Hall of the Americas, in the
presence of the hemispheres heads of state and government, because all countries concerned, large and small, believed this increased the likelihood of compliance.
Multilateral cooperation is also an instrument for institutional

development and stability. Its legitimacy rests on embodying world
opinion and impartiality acting without favor toward any country or
private interest. I believe the OAS has two important comparative advantages: One, a fundamental contribution, is
enabling the development of common legal standards and the
harmonization of national laws. I would cite human rights, electoral observation, and civil identity among many others. Another
contribution, perhaps less appreciated, is that OAS meetings, the General Secretariat, and seminars help forge a
cadre of diplomats and public servants who learn how to turn a difficult
world to mutual advantage. The graduates of Inter-American Course in
International Law in Rio de Janeiro and the Inter-American Defense College
at Fort McNair have enviable records of public service. Second, Sovereignty
Nongovernmental actors, new technologies, global finance and more new
issues, all challenge sovereignty. But the key is not to abandon sovereignty. It is to organize more
effectively and develop personnel knowledgeable about the new issues
and how to reconcile different national interests. Most foreign ministries
have one chain of command for international organization affairs and a
separate one for bilateral relationships. The capacity of foreign ministries
to represent their entire government varies greatly from country to
country and issue to issue. Without more effective whole of government organization and knowledgeable personnel, sovereignty risks
becoming an obstacle to needed cooperation more than a protection against foreign impositions. Third, the Western Hemisphere Two points suggest
that the OAS is both more and less than a simple reflection of geography.
First, Western Hemisphere jurisprudence on human rights and democracy
exceeds world practice. Unlike the United Nations Human Rights Commission, members of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights serve in their own right rather
than as representatives of governments. In 1991, Resolution 1080 made history in calling for an automatic convening of
this Council if there was an interruption of the democratic process in a member state. The UN Charter does not contain the word democracy. Second, the OAS
is the only forum that brings the United States and Canada together with
the rest of the hemisphere. The entrance of Canada and the independent Commonwealth Caribbean between 1967 and 1991 was a welcome
step toward full regional participation. The United States and Canada together contribute more
than two thirds of the regular quota funds of the OAS. These payments are
essential to the functioning of the Secretariat and its programs. Asymmetries like these
differences in funding breed illusions and distrust. These obstacles can be reduced by respect for different views and fair administration of available resources. But symbolism also
matters. Cubas sovereignty and OAS commitments to human rights and democracy will have to be satisfied before the government of Cuba returns to the OAS. But the continued
absence of Cuba weakens the OAS claim to represent the entire hemisphere and gives credence to those who say the OAS is the U.S. Ministry of Colonies. Not entirely by coincidence,
the new Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) includes Cuba and excludes the United States and Canada. Multidimensional Security Defense
and security matters are intimately related to geography. They also have a history even longer and
more controversial than multilateralism and sovereignty. The League of Nations was created to end war but had no military capacity. To remedy this failing, Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter authorized the use of force by member states. The 1948 OAS Charter, however, quite purposely conveyed no coercive authority. This was partly due to the separate
existence of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty) but partly also to a desire to avoid legitimizing any new U.S. military interventions. The
first forty years of the OAS were marked by tension between U.S. fears of
Communist penetration and Latin American fears of U.S. intervention and
unmet aspirations for economic cooperation. The 1954 covert intervention
by the United States in Guatemala went unchallenged by most
governments, which, however, increased pressure on the United States to
provide aid that ultimately led to the founding of the Inter-American
Development Bank. The Cuban revolution spawned the Alliance for Progress, which in turn facilitated the exclusion of the government of Cuba from the
OAS in 1962 -- although the Alliance itself later foundered on differing perceptions and lack of resources. In 1965 the OAS supported -- after the fact -- the U.S. invasion of the Dominican
Republic, but this became the last time the OAS would approve any form of military intervention. In 1979, the Ministers rejected an informal U.S. proposal for a peace force in Nicaragua.
The OAS was largely marginalized from the subsequent Central American conflicts, and peace efforts there fell to ad hoc sub regional groups. In 1982 the U.S. failure to back Argentina
against the United Kingdom in the Falklands/Malvinas war was interpreted regionally as a repudiation of Rio Treaty obligations. The OAS was sidelined when the U.S. invaded Grenada in
1983 and Panama in 1989, and yielded to Brazil, Argentina, Chile and the United States in the settlement of the Ecuador-Peru war of 1994-5. Times have changed. Armed conflict among
states in the Americas has become almost unthinkable. The end of the Cold War reduced fears of extra-hemispheric aggression. The peace between Peru and Ecuador resolved the last
active territorial conflict on the South American mainland and removed the arms race contagion. Residual interstate differences, mostly in the Caribbean basin, are largely contained.
Building on this positive new environment, Mexico in 2003 took the initiative to convene a Special Conference on Security. Implicitly discarding the obligatory collective security paradigm
of the Rio Treaty from which it had just withdrawn, Mexico broke with the Cold War past to support a concept championed by the CARICOM countries -- that security should be understood
as multidimensional, not just military. The Declaration adopted in Mexico City set forth a broad and flexible basis for voluntary cooperation. It affirmed a new concept of security in
the Hemisphere [that] is multidimensional in scope, includes traditional and new threats, concerns and other challenges. This years AG/RES. 2735, entitled Advancing Hemispheric
Security: A Multidimensional Approach, is a compendium of these challenges. Its 64 resolutory paragraphs concern traditional defense matters like conventional weapons acquisitions,
CSBMs, and nuclear nonproliferation as well as newer challenges like trafficking in persons, drug abuse and the special security concerns of small island states. Even with this new and
consensual approach, security and defense matters have not avoided controversy and are still sometimes burdened by bad memories of the past. The variety and complexity of
contemporary security issues makes clear that no one policy fits all. And each member state has set its own course. Citizen security, to take a pressing example, requires local leadership
and cannot be imposed from the outside. Nor can it be imposed by force. Military forces are trained to defend national sovereignty against external attack by a foreign enemy. They are
not trained to engage their fellow citizens. Even if police forces are ineffective, asking military units to fight drugs or domestic crime automatically raises political concerns, even when
military involvement is meant to be temporary and efforts are made to avoid militarization of law enforcement. The Mexico City Declaration recognized of course that each state has
the sovereign right to determine its own strategy and affirmed that bilateral and subregional agreements in the area of security and defense are essential to strengthening security in
the Hemisphere. Sub regional organizations CARICOM, SICA and UNASUR have become increasingly important and deserve recognition and support. Against this general background,
I see four imperatives where the OAS has comparative advantages: First, support common legal
standards, international law and respect for sovereignty . There are red lines that should not be
particularly important for the United
crossed by foreigners even if they think they have the permission of local authorities. This is
States, the hemispheres most activist power, which has for some years
stood aloof from the commitments of international law . In 2009, every US Assistant Secretary of State
for Western Hemisphere Affairs since 1976, all US Ambassadors to the OAS since 1989, all US Chairmen of the Inter-American Defense Board since 1989, and two thirds of the
Commanders of US Southern Command since 1983, joined me in asking the US Senate to ratify CIFTA, the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
facilitate a whole
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials. It is not as though we do not understand what needs to be done. Second,
of government approach. Military leaders and institutions cannot be

excluded from any whole of government strategy. What matters, in the language of the 2003 Declaration,
is to ensure the subordination of all state institutions to the legally
constituted civilian authority . The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), founded in 1942 to organize against the Axis, was held in
diplomatic limbo during the Cold War and recognized as an OAS entity in 2006 and assigned advisory functions. What needs changing now is less the formal statute than the culture of
relations between foreign and defense ministries so as to support needed civil-military cooperation. Third, forge cadres of competent
cooperators . Graduates of the Course in International Law and of the Inter-American Defense College strengthen the capacity of their respective states as well as
their own professionalism. The College now enrolls both civilians and police officers; I believe it should be encouraged to become an Inter-American center for Public Administration. The
European observer states have different experiences and security forces, including constabularies. Their expertise should also be drawn upon. Fourth, provide multilateral support for
local institutions willing to accept it. In Guatemala, the International Commission against Impunity (CICIG) operates under Guatemalan law, in the Guatemalan courts, and follows
Guatemalan criminal procedure. It works closely with selected staff from the Public Prosecutor's Office and the National Civil Police and provides technical assistance to local judicial
institutions. CICIG depends on the UN, but mainly because the UN has the funds; if requested and funded, the OAS could respectfully and effectively extend this support through SICA to
other countries of Central America.
Venezuela Specific
1NC --- Multilateralism Key
CP is necessary to resolve political instability in Venezuela
Arnson, 2013 (Cynthia, director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Setting Priorities For U.S. Policy in Latin America http://www.scribd.com/doc/123773141/Setting-Priorities-for-U-S-Policy-
in-Latin-America-A-Wilson-Center-Policy-Brief)
Second, efforts to restore diplomatic recognition at the ambassadorial level should

continue. Venezuela expelled the U.S. ambassador in 2008, the United States responded in kind, and Venezuela subsequently
rejected a U.S. diplomat nominated as a replacement. The State Department has rightly renewed efforts to move the
U.S.-Venezuelan relationship out of the deep freeze now that the post-Chvez era is around
the corner. U.S. interests in Venezuela are better served by having a confirmed ambassador in Caracas who is seen as speaking
authoritatively for the administration. There is no guarantee that an ambassador will be able to overcome the many difficult issues
diplomacy at the highest level
on the bilateral agenda --- drug trafficking, the relationship with Iran, democracy itself --but
is better than its absence. Third, the potential for instability and prolonged uncertainty
about Venezuelas internal politics are also of concern to the region, particularly Venezuelas neighbors, Colombia and
Brazil. In the event of a crisis or to avert simmering political tensions from
erupting into violence , working closely with allies in the hemisphere will
be essential.
Cuba Embargo Unilat Bad
1NC Democracy/Vietnamese Model
Plan collapses democracy in the region and causes
Cubhttp://htmlimg3.scribdassets.com/7cftixvdkw24fzz3/images
/2-246e30713c.jpga to follow the Vietnamese model --- cp
solves
Castaeda 9 - Jorge G. Castaeda, professor at New York University and fellow at
the New America Foundation, was Mexico's foreign minister from 2000 to 2003,
April 21, 2009, The Right Deal on Cuba, online:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124027198023237151.html
The question of what to do about the embargo has once again cornered an
American president. If President Barack Obama lifts the embargo unilaterally, he
will send a message to the Castros and the rest of Latin America that human
rights and democracy are not his bailiwick. Furthermore, he lacks the votes in
the Senate to do so, unless he obtains an explicit Cuban quid pro quo, which Ral Castro cannot grant
him, especially with his brother back in charge. Conversely, if Mr. Obama limits change to the recently
announced freer flow of remittances and family visits to the island, Democrats in the House, Latin American
leaders, and the Castros will remain unsatisfied. And if he insists on political change as a precondition for lifting
the embargo, Mr. Obama would be pursuing the policy that his last 10 predecessors have fruitlessly followed.
There might be a way to square the circle . It begins with a unilateral end to the
embargo: Nothing is expected from Cuba . But in exchange for
eliminating the embargo, key Latin American players would be expected
to commit to actively seeking a normalization process between
Washington and Havana, and to forcing Cuba to establish
representative democracy and respect for human rights. As democrats who
experienced authoritarian rule and sought international support in their struggle against it, leaders like
Brazilian President Lula da Silva, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, and Mexican President Felipe
Caldern have been incredibly cynical and irresponsible about Cuba. Mr. Caldern and
Ms. Bachelet have forsaken their commitment to democracy and human rights in order to accommodate the left
wing. Mr. da Silva, despite having been jailed by the military dictatorship in the early 1980s, has pursued the
By nudging the Latin leaders toward a
traditional Brazilian policy of avoiding controversy.
principled stance, Mr. Obama would turn the tables. This policy would give the
Cubans what they say they want: an unconditional end to the embargo, the
beginning of a negotiation process , and perhaps even access to international financial institutions'
funds. The Latin American leaders would get a major concession from the new
administration on a highly symbolic issue. And human-rights defenders in
Latin America and elsewhere would see their concerns regarding free
elections, freedom of the press, freedom of association, and the liberation of
political prisoners addressed as a demand from Cuba's friends -- not as an
imposition from Washington. Mr. Obama would look great, since U.S. policy
would shift in exchange for Latin leaders' dedication to principles like democracy
and human rights that he and they espouse . A clear commitment from Latin
leaders to a normalization that would not follow the Vietnamese course
(economic reform with no political change) would be a major foreign policy
victory for Mr. Obama.4
1NC Democracy DA
Unilaterally cooperating with Cuba destroys the credibility of
all Latin American democracy---causes authoritarian
backsliding
Castaeda 8 - Jorge G. Castaeda, professor at New York University and fellow at
the New America Foundation, was Mexico's foreign minister from 2000 to 2003,
September-October 2008, Morning in Latin America, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5
Realpolitik and fear of another exodus of Cuban refugees across the Straits of Florida may tempt
Washington to pursue a "Chinese," or "Vietnamese," solution to the relationship with Cuba:
that is, normalizing diplomatic relations in exchange for economic reforms while leaving the
question of internal political change until much later. It should not do this,
chiefly because of the regional implications. Over the past few decades, the United States, Canada, the
Latin America have patiently constructed a regional legal
European Union, and
framework to defend and encourage democratic rule as well as respect for human
rights in the hemisphere. These values have been enshrined in conventions, charters,
and free trade-agreements, from the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the American Convention on
Human Rights and the labor and environmental chapters of flee-trade agreements, as well as in the democratic
These
clauses of the economic agreements between Chile and the EU and between Mexico and the EU.
mechanisms are not perfect, and they have not truly been tested. But to waive them in the
interests of simply guaranteeing stability in Cuba and ensuring an exodus-free succession
instead of a democratic transition--that is, creating once again a "Cuban exception" for
reasons of pure pragmatism--would be unworthy of the enormous efforts every
country in the hemisphere has made to deepen and strengthen
democracy in the Americas. Cuba must return to the regional concert of powers ,
but accepting this concert's rules. To allow it to proceed otherwise would
weaken democracy and encourage authoritarian traditions in the
hemisphere--and lay the groundwork for other exceptions that would justify
their existence by invoking the Cuban precedent.
Latin American democracys a key model for democracy

globally
Fauriol & Weintraub 95 Georges Fauriol, director of the CSIS Americas
Program, and Sidney Weintraub, the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at
CSIS and the Dean Rusk Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
at the University of Texas at Austin, Summer 1995, U.S. Policy, Brazil, and the
Southern Cone, The Washington Quarterly, lexis
The democracy theme also carries much force in the hemisphere today. The State Department
regularly parades the fact that all countries in the hemisphere, save one, now have democratically elected
these countries turned
governments. True enough, as long as the definition of democracy is flexible, but
to democracy mostly of their own volition. It is hard to determine if the United States is using the democracy theme
as a club in the hemisphere (hold elections or be excluded) or promoting it as a goal. If as a club, its efficacy is limited to this hemisphere, as the
1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Indonesia demonstrated in its call for free trade in that region, replete with nondemocratic
nations, by 2020. Following that meeting, Latin Americans are somewhat cynical as to whether the United States really cares deeply about promoting
this triad of objectives -- economic liberalization and
democracy if this conflicts with expanding exports. Yet
free trade, democratization, and sustainable development / alleviation of poverty -- is
generally accepted in the hemisphere. The commitment to the latter two varies by country, but all
three are taken as valid. All three are also themes expounded widely by the United States,
but with more vigor in this hemisphere than anywhere else in the developing
world. Thus, failure to advance on all three in Latin America will compromise
progress elsewhere in the world.
Extinction
Diamond 95 - Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December
1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and
decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread.
The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made
common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic
ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very
source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered.
Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or
aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for
legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a
truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another . They do not aggress against
their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not
ethnically "cleanse" their own populations , and they are much less likely to face ethnic
insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of
mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable,
open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for
They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer
investment.
to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets
to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much
more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect
competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on
which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
2NC Internal Link
Political reforms in Cuba would send a hemispheric democratic
signal---inspires reform movements across Latin America
Arias-King 8 Fredo Arias-King, founder of the academic quarterly
Demokratizatsiaya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, analyst with two
regional think tanks: CEON (Miami) and CADAL(Buenos Aires), June 20, 2008, Latin
America and European Soft Power Geopolitics, Documentos, Year VI, No. 86,
online: http://www.cadal.org/pdf/download.asp?id_nota=2399
Cuba to the rescue? Paradoxically, but quite realistically, Cuba could become a source of
inspiration for Latin America. But instead of inspiring misguided Rousseauean romantics, corrupt
demagogues and guerrillas, this time the island nation could give hope to those forces
attempting to reform the hemisphere. It could also be the main conduit of European soft power
into the rest of the region. So far, only Chile has provided (albeit reluctantly) a model for the reformist forces of
the region. Costa Rica is also oftentimes touted as an example of a socially sensitive democracyalthough its
All the other examples are too deeply flawed to offer any kind of
still basically poor.
model. Cuba could use its pending transition from communism to escape the cultural
pathologies of latinoamericanismo, just as several other nations did with the even more pernicious Central
Europeanism of interethnic conflict, militarism, poverty and war . The only democracy east of
Switzerland in the interwar period was Tom Masaryks Czechoslovakia. However, today there are over a dozen
functioning democracies in the regioncountries that took advantage of good leadership and a social consensus
to dramatically reinvent themselves.The transition from communism provides this
opportunity, if the elites take advantage of what Leszek Balcerowicz calls the window of
opportunity, before the honeymoon of extraordinary politics gives way to the
restraining humdrum of ordinary politics . If a post-authoritarian Cuba decides to go
further than a mediocre status-quo antetransition and finds the courage to model itself as a
Caribbean Estonia, then the implications for the rest of the hemisphere will be
profound. A Cuba with a Havel or a Mart Laar as president, that implements administrative
reform, lustration, a flat tax, open trade, rigorous banking reforms, fiscal discipline, low indebtedness,
property rights and fair privatisation, that maybe even joins NATOas a way to reform its bloated
militarythis Cuba could see Asian-style growth rates and a dramatically better
rank in the UNs Human Development Index (as happened with Estonia), thereby
catapulting it from pariah to messiah status in the rest of the hemisphere . This is not
to say that only in this exceptional case can a Latin American country reinvent itselfthere are also cases
worldwide of dramatic improvement through ordinary politics, such as Ireland in the 1990s. However, the type
of political figures necessary to achieve something akin to the Irish miracle are few and far between here.
Nevertheless, we should have faith in the domino effect a Caribbean Estonia could have. Probably the most
constructive EU policy toward Latin America would be to use the soft power of its successful democratic
transitions to train a cadre of dissidents in Cuba and Venezuela. The decisive economic reforms undertaken by
several post-communist countries will be more relevant than those of Spain, whose reforms were mostly
implemented during Franco.
2NC Biodiversity Impact
Latin American democracy key to environmental protection
Jacobs 2 - Jamie Elizabeth Jacobs, assistant professor in the Department of Political
Science at West Virginia University, 2002, Community participation, the
environment, and democracy: Brazil in comparative perspective, online:
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4000/is_200201/ai_n9031315/print?
tag=artBody;col1
In Brazil and other Latin American countries attempting to strengthen democracy , the
mobilization of civil society forms a widely recognized part of that democratization. Part of this
mobilization may be participation in ecological movements and other social movements
and civic organizations. Though environmentalism cannot be relied on as a driving factor for
democratization in general, it can be seen as an important component of the changes
taking place in the politics and society of transitional democracies (Hicks 1996).
Political participation and interest in environmental policy at the grassroots
involves people in the struggle for citizenship, rights, and government
accountability in the democratic process. This article focuses on several aspects of the
link between environment, community, and citizenship in Latin America , specifically in
low-income metropolitan areas of Brazil that face grave environmental and social challenges. What is it that leads the residents
of Brazil's urban periphery to think and act in ways that defy our expectations about environmental activism? How is it that
the environment assumes importance on the political agenda when such issues are
seemingly beyond the scope of limited political resources? How do low-income communities maintain levels of involvement
sufficient to achieve their goals? And is there a relationship between participation in environmental arenas and the
strengthening of citizenship? Through
comparative surveys of Brazilian and European respondents, this
study attempts to uncover some of the roots of the awareness and activism on environmental issues
The conclusions suggest that this type of
encountered in areas of the urban periphery in Brazil.
activity is related to a broader phenomenon of community-level participation ;
specifically, that higher levels of community participation are associated with
environmental participation.
Thats half of global biodiversity

WWF 8 - World Wildlife Fund, 10-21, 2008, Problems in the Latin America and
Caribbean, online:
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/where_we_work/latin_america_and_caribbean/prob
lems/
The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region embraces almost half of the world's
diversity of plant and animal species and half of the world's tropical forests. Yet
the rate of destruction of freshwater, marine and especially forest habitat could
seriously impact both biodiversity and forest cover. According to various sources, Brazil
loses around 1% of its forests annually, while Paraguay, if it continues at its present
rate of forest destruction, will have virtually no native forests left in 25 years from
now.
Extinction
Tonn 7 - Bruce E. Tonn, Urban Planning Prof @ Tennessee, November 2007, Futures
v. 39, no. 9, Futures Sustainability, ln
The first principle is the most important because earth-life is needed to support earth-life.
Ecosystems are composed of countless species that are mutually dependent
upon each other for nutrients directly as food or as by-products of earth-life (e.g.,
as carbon dioxide and oxygen). If the biodiversity of an ecosystem is substantially
compromised, then the entire system could collapse due to destructive negative nutrient cycle
feedback effects. If enough ecosystems collapse worldwide, then the cascading impact on
global nutrient cycles could lead to catastrophic species extinction . Thus, to ensure
the survival of earth-life into the distant future the earth's biodiversity must be protected.
1NC Vietnamese Model DA
Cubas transition is up for grabs---hardliners want a
Vietnamese model of authoritarian capitalism, which causes
civil war and U.S. military intervention---quid pro quo reforms
empower moderates to implement a successful democratic
transition
Ratliff 6 - William Ratliff, research fellow and curator of the Americas Collection at
the Hoover Institution, research fellow of the Independent Institute, 2006, Cubas
Struggle to Awake, The Hoover Digest, 2006 No. 2, online:
http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/4587466.html
No government bureaucrat wants to be unemployed, particularly if he has worked for a dictator whose death will
leave the majority of the population looking for big changes, probably including the replacement and maybe
punishment of the dictators surviving cronies. Thus top Cuban leaders today are grasping for a
survival strategy, as the 2004 report by the presidential Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba put it,
which will enable them to stay in power after Fidel . Indeed current leaderswith
varying ideas on the relative importance of ideology, power, and economics are looking at several
possible survival strategies, which may be summarized as (1) batten down the
hatches and (2) significant reform. The first approach is favored by the hard-liners in the
current government, who prioritize ideology and power over economic reform, in the best Fidelista
tradition. They may take power after Fidel goes, but they have little hope of surviving
for long without heavy levels of repression and global begging . The main benefactor of
the hard-liners will be Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez, assuming he survives in power until then. Rapidly
expanding ties with China suggest that that country may be an important player as well. The Chinese have no
use for Fidels nonsensical economic ideas, but they do have an interest (particularly as long as the status of
Taiwan is an issue) in a Cuba that is critical of the United States. Then
there are the reformers, the
who, in the immediate post-Fidel period, are likely to be the
more moderate leaders and bureaucrats,
only ones in Havana with a potentially viable game plan . Knowing that the Cuban people
have put up with abject poverty under Fidel but that they are unlikely to tolerate that kind of life under any
other leader, the reformers are convinced that serious economic reform is the survival strategy of choice. These
probable successors to Fidel know that near-term objectives, such as food, housing, and opportunities, will
they know that real progress in these reforms is
require significant step-by-step reforms. And
the only thing that will justify their continuing roles in the national government .
These more-moderate leaders are likely to take power within a relatively short time. If they do not, or if the
island doesnt opt quickly for democracy, which is desirable but unlikely, the country may
well plunge into civil war and the United States may end up intervening militarily.
Hugo Chvez would prefer hard-line Fidelistas to reformers, at least in the short term, but he will support
moderates if/when they take power. The Chinese will likewise support either type of successor government,
seeing advantages and disadvantages for themselves in each. TRANSITION EXPERIENCES One way to ponder
and plan for the things that may happen in Cuba after Fidel is to examine what has occurred during recent
transitions in other formerly authoritarian countries. Clearly there are no exact parallels, but aspects of these
experiences will indeed be relevant to Cuba in the immediate post-Fidel period. In time, Cuba certainly will
develop a market-oriented economy and some form of democratic government, and thus it is both appropriate
and useful to examine experiences from countries that have recently taken the democratic route, from Asia to
Spain and the formerly communist nations of Central and Eastern Europe. But how quickly will a market
economy and democracy come about and will the economic and political changes occur simultaneously?
Judgments on this vary, but I believe that economic reforms will likely precede democratic governance. But
absolute lines cannot be drawn: Although economic reforms are only part of the pie of Cubas future, they will
be crucial in bettering the lives of the Cuban people quickly and they will contribute much in the medium term
toward opening the door more smoothly to democracy. If this speculation proves to be even fairly correct, the
immediate applicability of the European transitions is reduced and that of the two Asian countries is enhanced.
Fidel Castro will leave Cuba in a terrible economic mess, just as Mao Zedong left China and Le Duan left
Vietnam, when they finally died, 30 and 20 years ago, respectively. And Castro, like Mao and Le Duan, will leave
his people with an authoritarian government and heritage. Not surprisingly, there is considerable evidence that
many of the reform-inclined leaders in Cuba today are studying the Chinese and
Vietnamese experiences closely in planning for the post-Fidel period . Last
year former Cuban U.N. ambassador Alcibiades Hidalgo and I wrote that Ral Castro, Fidels designated
successor, has sympathized for many years with change in the Chinese or Vietnamese stylethat is, capitalism
(or something like it) in the economy, which is still called socialist but with a single party and repression of
politics. In an interview, former Cuban intelligence official Domingo Amuchastegui added that the Chinese
approach is useful in many ways and has considerable influence in Cuba. Once Fidel is gone, he said, many
aspects of the Chinese experience will most probably be implemented rather quickly. Several years ago, in a
Cuba-
study for the Cuba Transition Project at the University of Miami, Carmelo Mesa-Lago, the dean of
watching economists, wrote that Cuba could follow the path of China and
Vietnam and move toward a socialist market economy . Mesa-Lago ticked off many
specific, basic reforms, including the right of individuals to establish and run private businesses, which is one of
the market practices Fidel most detests. Several years ago, a Cuba specialist at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences in Beijing told me that he thinks the most important thing Cubans have to do to develop economically
is to change their way of thinking and then change the institutions that derive therefrom. The current governing
ideas in Cuba come from Fidels fanatical rejection of all forms of markets, from the central management
schemes of the Soviet bloc experience, and from the centuries-long heritage of Iberian paternalism. Another
scholar in Beijing added that the key to Cubas future is recognizing the power of the market: Cuba must
deepen its reforms . . . establish the mechanisms of the socialist market economy and . . . smash
egalitarianism. Cuba, China, and Vietnam are all burdened by very heavy baggage from the past, ranging from
skewed economic thinking to politically twisted legal systems to resource-sucking bureaucracies to disillusioned
youth and corruption. Still there are several very important and encouraging differences between Cuba and
China/Vietnam. First, Cuba will begin its reforms with a much better-educated populace and thus a more capable
labor force. These people are gagged and grossly underutilized in Cuba today, but they are there as soon as
Fidel is out of the way and globalization begins. Also, although some noneconomic freedoms have emerged in
China and Vietnam, there are few signs of movement toward genuine democratic governance. But Cuba,
because of its history and its proximity to the United States and the Western world, will almost certainly move
much more easily and completely to a significantly more democratic government, unintentionally promoted
most likely in the early reform years by market-oriented economic change. THE U.S. RESPONSE For decades
Cubans have eaten bitterness, as the Chinese put it, but when Fidel goes they will have a chance to change all
that. If Fidels successors move in the reformist direction outlined above, which I believe they
are likely to do, how should the United States and other nations respond? One approach, which
has been the U.S. line in recent years, would be to resist the reformers unless all the Castros
are gone and major political changes are included , which they almost certainly will not be.
The other, broader, approach would be to support much that happens, even if
undertaken by Ral and his comrades. This need not mean conceding everything
to Havana and expecting nothing in return. Indeed, calls for a quid pro quo ,
which are shamefully disingenuous as long as Fidel survives, have a chance of actually working
with his insecure, reform-oriented successors, if handled constructively. One major
obstacle over time to following a broad approach has been the anti-Fidel rhetoric more related to the past than
to the emerging interests of the Cuban people on either side of the Strait of Florida. Indeed, there is some hope
that the broader approach will become politically possible as increasing numbers of embargo supporters begin
making conciliatory noises. Many Cuban Americans and others seem to be objectively weighing just how much
the Cuban people will lose if U.S. policy remains rigid or ideological during a period of significant, if far from
complete, post-Fidel reform. For example, Edward Gonzalez, a longtime analyst at the Rand Corporation and
supporter of the embargo, wrote several years ago: Were a successor regime under communist reformers to
come to power, the United States would shift to a strategy of engagement for the purpose of gaining optimal
leverage in pressing for further regime change. . . . The application of maximum pressures against the reformist-
led regime in order to install a democratic transition regime in power might not be possible because the
reformers may enjoy domestic support from the populace. Thus, in the end, the
reality inside Cuba
may require that the U nited S tates not only deal with but also actively engage a
reformist-led successor regime as the best alternative for speeding Cubas
ultimate democratic transition. The vanguard Cuban American National Foundation has been more
moderate in recent years. Even one of the outspoken authors of the Helms-Burton Law, Miami Republican
congressman Lincoln Daz-Balart, took a great leap toward moderation in March 2006 when he reportedly said
that under certain circumstances we should deal with Ral. Of course the monkey wrench may still be hidden in
the details, but change is under way in the United States as well as in Cuba.
Cuba intervention collapses other foreign policy priorities---
terrorism, Iraq, Iran and North Korea proliferation, and Israeli
security---peaceful transition is key
Wong-Diaz 6 - Francisco Wong-Diaz, attorney and professor of law, political
science and international relations at the City College of San Francisco, Member of
the Committee on the Present Danger, the World Association of International
Studies (WAIS), and the State Bars of California and Florida, December 2006,
CASTROS CUBA: QUO VADIS?, online:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB744.pdf
The global war on terror, Iraq, nuclear proliferation issues raised by Iran and
North Korea, and the current terrorist attacks against Israel are the hot foreign
policy priorities of the Bush administration. The U nited S tates would need to feel
directly threatened before considering the use of force against Cuba . So despite U.S.
Government rhetoric in the July 5, 2006, report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC) about
liberating Cuba, Castro knows that he will retain power as long as he lives. A
peaceful transition to
democracy and a free market economy is also unlikely as long as Fidel is alive. After
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there was hope that Cuba might undergo something similar to the color
or flower revolutions that transformed many of the former Warsaw Pact countries. Unlike the Europeans,
however, Cubas Communist party and security services remain loyal, and there is no solidarity movement or
opposition leader with a credible plan. Cuban civil society is rather weak, and dissidents are unable to work
openly and in full coordination. More importantly, the main reason why no color, flower, or cedar revolution will
ever occur in Cuba is that Castro and his closest lieutenants have studied those events very closely, identified
and anticipated the relevant contingencies, and learned how to deal with them. A dynastic succession based on
collective leadership is the unfolding Cuban scenario. Castro wants to retain personal power for as long as he
can to protect his dominant position and interests. To accomplish this, first, he has sought close commercial and
security ties with China, Venezuela, Bolivia, and even the mullahs of Iran. Next, he organized a succession
process. Under Cuban law, the first Vicepresident of the Council of State, his brother Raul, assumes the duties of
the president. Raul, who turned 75 on June 3, assumed provisional power on Monday, July 31, following an
announcement that Fidel was ill and would undergo surgery. Raul has physical ailments, too, and there is no
clear indication that anyone else has been groomed to replace him. So at age 80, the Cuban dictators place in
history, for better or for worse, already has been established. For almost 50 years, the Cuban people have
suffered political repression and tyranny under his one-man rule. Castros
eventual passing, the so-
would constitute good and transformative news for Cuba if
called biological solution,
progress is made along a range of issues from development of true and honest
representative institutions of governance to improvement of the Cuban peoples
quality of life. The overarching American foreign policy objective should be to
pressure the successor regime while encouraging a strong bias among Cuban
elites for internally generated democratization , the rule of law, and transparency in reciprocity
for graduated normalization of relations with the island.
Nuclear terror causes extinction

Ayson 10 [Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre
for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington,After a
Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via
InformaWorld]
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first
place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to
wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats.
A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange
between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst
terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a
as long as the
general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that
major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear
weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear
exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds a
non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear
exchangeare not necessarily separable . It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and
especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events
leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the
states that possess them . In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might
assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who
were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the
superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as
concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of
imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a
in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the
massive inter-state nuclear war. For example,
United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could
plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the
most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved
in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities,
however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or
discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for
some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to
a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the
debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity
makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the
efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material
came from.41 Alternatively,if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and
American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion
would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the
United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be
left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly
Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear
if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of
Cluedo? In particular,
existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats
had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be
tempted to assume the worst ? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to
increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China,
or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem
at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China
during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing
resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or
Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its
encourager of the attack?
own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided)
confrontation with Russia and /or China . For example, in the noise and confusion
during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might
be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher
stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is
just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of
U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the
temptations to preempt such actions might grow , although it must be admitted that
any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of
Washington might decide to order a significant
nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier)
conventional (or
nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the
terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the
location of these targets,
Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being
far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their
spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario
might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided
somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents long-
standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise
alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself
unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of
nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear
terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to
Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a
slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example,
what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their
If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China
territory?
underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also suspect that they
deeply
secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly)
the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia
and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that
Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw
If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear
about their culpability?
weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of
avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange . They might surmise, for example, that while the act of
nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain
below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but
an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If
Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie
open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades,
the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some
readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse
Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads
the tables.
and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use
taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly
on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any
of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russias
use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russias traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite
plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of
the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back
In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist
and let this occur?
attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other
major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase how dare they
tell us what to do immediately springs to mind . Some might even go so
far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for
the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. Nuclear Terrorism
Against Smaller Nuclear Powers There is also the question of what lesser powers in the international system might
do in response to a terrorist attack on a friendly or allied country: what they might do in sympathy or support of
their attacked colleague. Moreover, if these countries are themselves nuclear armed, additional possibilities for a
wider catastrophe may lie here as well. For example, if in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United
States, a nuclear armed ally such as Israel might possess special information about the group believed to be
responsible and be willing and able to take the action required to punish that group. If its action involved threats of
the use of nuclear force, or the use of nuclear force itself (perhaps against a country Israel believed to be harboring
the nuclear terrorists), how might other nuclear armed countries react? Might some other nuclear powers demand
that the United States rein in its friend, and suggest a catastrophic outcome should this restraint not take place? Or
would they wait long enough to ask the question? Alternatively, what if some states used the nuclear terrorist
attack on another country to justify a majorand perhaps even nuclearattack on other terrorist groups on the
grounds that it was now clear that it was too dangerous to allow these groups to exist when they might very well
also be planning similar nuclear action? (Just as Al Qaedas attacks on 9/11 raised some of the threat assessments
of other terrorist groups, the same and more might occur if any terrorist group had used a nuclear weapon,) If a
nuclear armed third party took things into its own hands and decided that the time for decisive action had now
come, how might this action affect the nuclear peace between states? But it needs to be realized that a catalytic
exchange is not only possible if the terrorists have exploded a nuclear device on one of the established nuclear
weapons states, including and especially the United States. A catalytic nuclear war might also be initiated by a
nuclear terrorist attack on a country that possesses a nuclear arsenal of a more modest scale, and which is
geographically much closer to the group concerned. For example, if a South Asian terrorist group exploded a
nuclear device in India, it is very difficult to see how major suspicions could not be raised in that country (and
elsewhere) that Pakistan was somehow involvedeither as a direct aider and abetter of the terrorists (including the
provision of the bomb to them) or as at the very least a passive and careless harborer of the groups perpetrating
the act. In a study that seeks to reduce overall fears of nuclear terrorism, Frost nonetheless observes that if one
of the nuclear powers in South Asia was thought to be behind a
terrorist nuclear attack in the region, the risks of the incident escalating
into a full nuclear exchange would be high . 43 Kapur is equally definite on this score,
observing that if a nuclear detonation occurred within India, the attack would be undoubtedly blamed on Pakistan,
with potentially catastrophic results. 44
Iranian proliferation causes nuclear war

Bar 13 Shmuel Bar, director of studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in
Herzliya, Israel, February 2013, The Dangers of a Poly-Nuclear Mideast, Hoover
Policy Review, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/139416
Even ideologically, or religiously, highly charged leaderships may be aware of
the dangers inherent in nuclear war and behave rationally . However, such
awareness and rational decision-making processes are a necessary but not a
sufficient condition. Nuclear confrontation may not be the result of some
irrational but premeditated decision by leaders to initiate a nuclear strike, but
of faulty intelligence, command, and control in escalatory situations . In such
situations, it appears that the c ommand and c ontrol structures that may develop in
new nuclear states in the Middle East are likely to exacerbate the dangers
inherent in escalation and brinkmanship, and to result ultimately in perennial
nuclear instability or even nuclear war .
2NC Internal Link
A Chinese model would fail in Cuba---a failed transition causes
societal collapse and external military intervention
Backer 5 - Larry Cata Backer, Professor of Law at Penn State, 2005, CUBAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE CROSSROADS: CUBAN MARXISM, PRIVATE
ECONOMIC COLLECTIVES AND FREE MARKET GLOBALISM, Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 14, No. 5
Is it possible for a state to remain true to its Marxist-Leninist principles of political and economic organization,1
and simultaneously embrace the emerging system of economic globalization?2 The answer from the former
Soviet Union and its allied states would appear to be no. The Russian Federation3 and former Warsaw Pact
nations4 each have abandoned Marxist-Leninist state organization in favor of so-called neo-liberal economic
organization.5 In each case, the state has effectively privatized the economic sphere and implemented a
transition to democracy, evidenced by the adoption of a Western-style political organization grounded in a
China and
democratically elected representative government.6 On the other hand, the Peoples Republic of
Vietnam have sought to embrace, with some success, the emerging system of
economic globalization while remaining true to the fundamental political norms of
Marxist-Leninist state organization. Cuba has yet to confront the question. Its
moderate size,7 the advantages of its geography,8 and its unique historyparticularly its relationship with the
United States9 have permitted Cuba to remain aloof from the current push to economic globalization. Cuba
has avoided the fate of other developing nations only because it has stubbornly (and successfully) managed to
remain isolated from the world community.10 But Cubas isolation may be coming to an end .
Cubas current leadership is aging. No potential successor appears as charismatic as the current President, Fidel
Castro.11 None appear as committed to the precise form of Marxist-Leninist state system to which Fidel Castro
There are great internal pressures to end
has devoted his efforts in the last half-century.
Cuban isolation.12 There are even greater external pressures to bring Cuba into
the emerging global economic system .13 From this vantage point, Cuba looks on the world with a
certain amount of fear. Globalization on terms acceptable to Cubabased on principles of communist
internationalism14 has been replaced by a free market globalization at the service of its greatest political
Cuban leaders understand
enemy, the United States.15 Increasingly isolated and insular in their view,
globalization as a potent weapon in the battle for control of the character of the
nation, and ultimately, of its sovereignty. In Miami and Washington they are now discussing where,
how, and when Cuba will be attacked or the problem of the Revolution will be solved.16 For Cuba, this sort of
interference in globalized clothing must be resisted. But friends and foes of the regime increasingly understand
this position as anachronistic.17 Commentators outside of Cuba have been critical of Cubas reform efforts
because they have failed even to appear to attempt a broad harmonization with international commercial and
enterprise practices.18 Many contrast Cubas isolation with Chinas much more successful efforts to engage with
The general consensus outside of Cuba is that, in the absence
the world community.19
of significant reform, significant instability is likely within the decade .20 This
instability may range from a rapid breakdown in the socio-political order to rapid
liberalization on an Eastern European model, increasing the possibility of anarchy or the
rise of a criminal state. Either of these extremes would require internal or
external military intervention.21 The champions of a middle course envision the emergence of a
unity government that would embrace a Chinese-style model of global economic engagement. This would
permit the continuation of some form of Marxist-Socialist state apparatus while to some extent harmonizing
economic practice with global expectations.22 The Chinese model is certainly alluring. China seems to offer a
blueprint for non-violent structural change focusing on economic transformation that might also offer the
possibility of social and political change.23 It provides a blueprint for how nations that choose a more collectivist
approach to state organization can engage the emerging economic community on its own terms using the
language of private economic collectives as the primary vehicle for the development of the means of production
of the state and reserving to states a secondary role as regulator and shareholder.24 To some extent, this is a
particularly American spin. The primary characteristic of that spin is to proclaim any change within Cuba (or
any Marxist-Leninist state system) as a signal for the perhaps inevitable transformation from Marxist-Leninism to
democratic, free-enterprise state organization.25 But the Chinese model for Cuba is also alluring for those who
believe there is something worth preserving from Cubas experiment in Marxist-Leninist governance. China, it
appears, has managed to preserve the best of a Marxist-Leninist state system by essentially partitioning the
hard disk of stateoperating a virtual global economic system on top of a collectivist state system.26 China
has joined the world economic community without, for the time being, losing its soul to it. Perhaps Cuba could
do the same and preserve its system of education, universal health care, and those other aspects of its
provision of services that are the subject of praise among elements of global civil society.27 In a world in which
geo-political28 and economic 29 realities suggest a global expectation of transition (whether forced or
otherwise) rather than adaptation away from its current Marxist-Leninist and isolationist stance, the Chinese
model provides the least destabilizing alternative. Indeed, adaptation may make it far more difficult for the
world community to justify more forceful intervention to help Cuba overcome its isolation. There are a number
of other factors that make the Chinese model potentially useful. First, the Chinese model provides a blueprint for
successful communication across systems of economic and political organization. It permits Cuba to
communicate more effectively with the rest of the world by substituting the globally understood idiom of
economics (particularly the idiom of trade through private, autonomous economic collectives), for the more
isolating language of politics, and particularly the language of Marxist-Leninist collectivist action. Second, the
Chinese model provides a means of privatizing economic activity by changing the character of state
involvement in economic activity but not necessarily limiting the extent of that involvement. Third, the Chinese
model provides a structure for avoiding issues of transition by implementing a viable and proven blueprint for
perpetuating a more stable socialist system in Cuba in accordance with fundamental Cuban constitutional
norms.30 In this last, and important, respect, the Chinese model provides a means of appearing to deepen a
rule of law norm within Cuba.31 As a consequence, embrace of Chinese- style engagement could have the
effect of making it harder for other states to justify transition regimes or regime change. This might be
especially true for the United States, which has based much of its rhetoric of transition on the current regimes
lack of respect for the rule of law.32 Despite this rather rosy picture, and for all of its potential benefits to Cuba,
a number of factors may make it impossible for Cuba to successfully implement a
Cuba-appropriate version of the Chinese model of engagement with globalization .
First, it is not clear that the Chinese model of global economic engagement has actually worked as advertised in
China.33 Second, the Chinese model may not translate well to the Cuban context . 34
The sort of engagement consistent with Maoist understandings of Marxist-Leninist theory may be impossible in
the context of Cubas more Stalinist system of politico-economic organizationat least without what in Cuba would be
neither Cuba nor China has
viewed as a substantial shift in the nature of the governing ideology. Third,
solved the core foundational problem of economic development through
independent collectives, legal entities that are not an integral part of the state apparatus controlled by the
Communist party.35 Neither Chinas Maoist Marxist-Leninist theory, nor Cubas Stalinist version have satisfactorily solved the
central contradiction of Marxist-Leninist engagementthe privatization of economic activity essentially directed by autonomous
economic collectives, which in turn are regulated by the state. Fourth, Cuba continues to actively resist integration into global
patterns of capital.36 Fifth, Cuba is in a poor position to compete globally its labor is expensive, its
products overpriced, and its infrastructure in need of development in comparison to other developing states.37 Last, and most
perversely, the subjective and highly emotional special relationship between Cuba and the United States limits objective
consideration of alternatives and thereby constrains choice.38 This paper works through fundamental issues affecting the future
of Cuban approaches to economic regulation. Part I sets the contextthe shift in the thrust and nature of globalization from one
based on Marxist-Leninist revolution to one grounded in the establishment of a unitary system of norms for economic
organization and regulation. This context explains Cubas predicament: since its system of economic organization is increasingly
at odds with that of the rest of the world, should it or must it change in order to conform to evolving international standards and
expectations? An examination of this predicament is grounded in the context of existing Marxist-Socialist state systems
engaging with the world in the twenty-first century, and particularly with global economic and legal harmonization centering on
the modern engine of economic activity, the independent corporation. Parts II and III examine the current state of Cuban and
Chinese attempts to deal with the emerging system of global economic activity. The proxy for measuring this engagement will
be the Western-style corporation. The Cubans remain suspicious, tentative, and oddly old-fashioned in a rapidly changing world,
while the Chinese appear to have embraced globalism on their own terms. Yet both have resisted a wholesale adoption of a
western-style corporate political economy. Cuba has intensified its resistance to the emerging global system of economic norms.
Yet Cuba has not been able to isolate itself completely from the system it so actively appears to disdain. Instead, it has sought
to pursue a policy of containment and quarantine by attempting to create an indigenous version of Stalinism. All global
economic activity is contained geographically and engaged in only by or through government agencies. China, on the other
hand, has sought to engage the emerging system by experimenting with modifications to the Chinese economic system. It has
succeeded, to some extent, in adopting the language and symbols of economic globalism such as economic activity in corporate
form, markets in securities, and some ownership rights in property. It has also extended these rights to its own citizens. But at
the same time, the vocabulary of global norms has been folded into the basic normative structure of a political community
grounded in principles of Marxist Leninism. As a result, it is still not clear whether the changes in China run only skin deep and
simply mask a system that has changed very little. At the same time, the system has appeared to change enough to permit
China entry into the world economic community, while Cuba remains an economic pariah. The paper thus arrives at the
could Cuba adopt the Chinese approach with the same degree of
heart of the problem:
success, or is there something unique about either the Cuban or Chinese
experience that makes emulation impossible? Part IV suggests the difficulties of emulation in
the six critical respects identified above: First, the question of Cuban emulation may be beside the point if the
Chinese approach does not work in the first place.39 There is some evidence that suggests that Chinas success
is no more than skin deep. But the fact that Chinas reforms may be more successful in the abstract than in
practice has not been an impediment for other nations to treat the reforms as if they had worked. And that may
be an important consideration in evaluating the success of the reforms. Second, neither Maoism nor Stalinism
have overcome the contradictions growing out of the privatization of economic activity in a state committed to
Marxist-Leninist organization.40 Neither Cuba nor China has solved the core foundational problem of economic
development through collectives, independent of the state and not controlled by the Communist party. China
has ignored the issue for the most part, attempting to work around it in theory and treating corporations as
traditional parts of the state apparatus in practice. Cuba has yet to confront the issue, but as a matter of Cuban
constitutional law, the issue will prove to be difficult, especially given the changes to the constitution in 2002
if Chinese Maoism has
declaring the current Marxist-Leninist system irrevocable.41 Third, even
overcome the contradictions of socialist economics grounded in private economic activity,
Cuban Stalinism may be incapable of the same feat .42 Cuban Stalinism is incompatible with
the Maoist theories critical to the Chinese model. The inflexibility of Stalinist bureaucratization
and the fear of contamination inherent in the Cuban governments approach to
opening up significantly distinguish Cuba from China. Fourth, Cubas ability to
successfully emulate China may be defeated because of the difficulty of
accessing global capital markets.43 Cuba may find it difficult to emulate China so long as it remains unable
and unwilling to access global capital flows. Engagement would require a fundamental shift in thinking about the conditions
under which Cuba would will itself to become dependent on global capital. But that willingness may be a condition precedent to
engagementthe world economic community may view dependence of global capital as a form of insurance of Cubas good
behavior. Fifth, current American policy makes it impossible, as a practical matter, for Cuba to emulate the Chinese approach.44
At the time China opened to globalization, the world community, including the United States, was eager for the engagement.
The West provided substantial encouragement to the Chinese. The same is not true with respect to Cuba. The subjective and
highly emotive special relationship between Cuba and the United States limits objective consideration of alternatives and
constrains choice. American policy is geared toward substantial change in both the political and economic ordering of the Cuban
state. Sixth, even if all other impediments disappeared, Cuba may not be in a position to successfully engage with the global
economy without massive economic aid.45 Cuba may not yet be able to compete in the global market place. Even in the
absence of the serious problems faced by Cuba, the country is in a poor position to compete globally. Cuba is smaller and more
resource poor than China. That difference may make emulation, even if theoretically possible, unrealistic in fact. The focus of the
paper shifts in Part V. Part IV suggested the difficulties of engagement, and the dangers of emulation. Part V looks at the other
side of the cointhe pitfalls of resistance. On the one hand, a refusal to embrace global economic organization in the form
adopted by a substantial segment of the global community can produce an isolation that might be economically and politically
Change can come from
disastrous. On the other hand, isolation may be impossible to maintain over the long run.
outside the community as well as from within . Like China and Japan in the 19th century, and
whether the current state apparatus likes it or not, Cuba will be forced to open its
ports to the world. Whether that process will produce a re-colonized Cuba or an
independent participant in the global economy will depend on the approach taken
by this and subsequent Cuban regimes . Part V offers both a conclusion and tentative steps toward
a resolution of the problem.
The US will intervene if a democratic transition doesnt happen

naturally---classified plans
Bush formed the U.S. Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba to explore ways
we can help hasten and ease Cubas democratic transition. 31 Yet, on December 4, 2004,
Assistant Secretary of State Robert F. Noriega announced that Bush is committed to the liberation of Cuba
during the next 4 years. What did he mean by liberation? Certainly not a military intervention or covert
operation to achieve regime change while Cuba is under Castro. Noriega stated that Washington had a blueprint
of plans for providing social, economic, and other types of assistance to Cuba in the post-Castro era to prevent
Castros supporters from retaining control of the country after his death. He said that Washington wants to
ensure that vestiges of the regime dont hold on. In July 2005, Secretary Rice, who now co-chairs the
Commission together with Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, announced the appointment of Caleb McCarry, a former
Republican staff member of the House International Relations Committee, as Cuba transition coordinator--or point man on
regime change in Cuba. McCarry has a $59 million budget to hasten the transition and prevent Raul Castro, Carlos Lage, Perez
the Commission issued a
Roque, and other leaders from continuing the current system. On July 5, 2006,
second updated report that indicates extensive strategic planning on the part of
the U.S. Government to promote a full transition to democracy after Castro dies or is
ousted. It is based on the expectation that the Cuban transition government would be inclined to request
American assistance and unrealistically assumes that pro-democracy forces within the island would be bolstered
and emboldened by U.S. willingness to provide assistance. The report considers the first 6 months after
Castros demise to be critical if a democratic transition is going to succeed . A whole
range of assistance programs are included in the planning, ranging from $80 million for a democratic fund for
2 years to help strengthen civil society to legal experts for election and judicial training, an aid package, and
The report also includes a classified annex of measures to
technical and health assistance.
destabilize the regime which begs the crucial question of what specific actions
might be undertaken to prevent Raul and others from succeeding Fidel . The reports
credibility is weakened by the underlying assumption that Castro will not survive within the next years, the hope
for popular protests and demonstrations in the future, and the presumption of an American readiness to
intervene directly in internal Cuban affairs upon his death.
Failed transition and economic collapse in Cuba ensures

instability and US military intervention
In a post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), post-Saddam Hussein world, the United States can ill
afford a Cuban collapse and attendant instability. An authoritarian successor
regime might be preferable to a failed state . This is the reason why an American military
intervention to depose Castro or his successor is neither advisable nor likely. While Castro is alive, American
foreign policy toward Cuba will remain the choreographed pas de deux of the past 5 decades. An uncomfortable
and conflictual relationship is one whose organizing principle is Cuban anti-Americanism and American isolation
The inevitable
of Cuba encouraged by Fidel Castros dictatorial kakistocracy (rule of the worst citizens).
passing of Castro will constitute good and transformative news for Cuba if
progress is made along a range of issues from development of true and honest
representative institutions of governance to improvement of the Cuban peoples
quality of life. Cubans will have to overcome the long shadow cast by a culture of authoritarian one-man-
rule where, for decades, individual initiatives have not been allowed to surface and prevail because Castro, the
The overall post-Castro
micromanager par excellence, had to either approve or direct them all.
American foreign policy objective should be to engage the succession regime and
encourage a strong bias among Cuban elites for internally-generated
democratization, the rule of law, and transparency in exchange for an across-the-board normalization of
relations with the island. U.S. military command will need to perform regular and timely updating of contingency
planning to interdict vessels to and from the island and to protect and evacuate American diplomatic personnel
and tourists in case of violent unrest. 78 As the 2006 report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba
we must be at the ready to propitiate the process, since in the final denouement,
reflects,
the vested military and civilian elites will inexorably begin a struggle for power
postponed by Castros longevity, and they will seek powerful allies. When that
time arrives, in cauda venenum, preventing a bloodbath, avoiding a total economic
collapse, foreign intervention, and massive uncontrolled migration to Florida will be
the biggest challenges we will face from Cuba since January 1, 1959.
High probability major powers have huge interests in Cuba

External actors with significant interests in the ongoing succession process that will
be contesting their agendas in a post-Castro regime include both states and nonstate actors.
The main stakeholder in Cubas future is the U nited States. China, Venezuela, and
Iran are countries with strategic, security, commercial, and ideological interests;
the European Union, in particular Spain and England; as well as Canada, Mexico, Bolivia, and
Brazil also have important commercial and financial interests on the island.
Beyond their bilateral foreign policy considerations with Cuba, these countries
also partake in the global competition for natural resources, markets, and access
to a skilled labor force. Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela also are joined by the Bolivian Alternative for the
Americas (ALBA), a trade and cooperation agreement in opposition to the unsuccessful U.S. Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA). Nonstate American groups with direct or indirect interests in Cuba include the exiles,
business, educational, artistic, and agricultural groups; NGOs like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and
Human Rights Watch; think tanks like the Center for Defense Information; and news media outlets.
Consult Brazil
Top Level
Notes
This was research that was originally vetted for the CP. After a
few sessions of research, my assignment and focus was shifted
to the other CPs and this is work that has not been completely
finished, but will act as a supplement to the file that the jr labs
will be putting out, they too are working on a consult brazil cp.
Consultation Good
Consultation is crucial to maintaining regional stability and
strong relations with Brazil
LeoGrande, 2011 (William M, Dean, School of Public Affairs, the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American
Studies, Harvard University Latin America Policy in the Next Two Years: The Obama Administration and the Next
Congresshttp://www.american.edu/spa/gov/upload/LeoGrande-Harvard-DRCLAS-3-15-11-Final.pdf)
unilateral shift in policy, Washington split the Latin American consensus

By this
and belied its commitment to multilateralism . The result was to damage

relations with Brazil , and to encourage the far right elsewhere in Latin America to think
they might be able to overthrow democratic ally elected progressive governments with the
acquiescence of the United States. In August 2009, the United States and Colombia announced a Defense Cooperation
Agreement providing the U.S. military with access to Colombian military

bases. The agreement was announced without prior consultation with other Latin
American countries, and both Venezuela and Brazil had strong negative reactions. Once again, the
unilateralism represented by this lack of consultation reminded Latin
Americans of Washingtons interventionist past rather than heralding a
multilateral partnership
Generic Solvency Advocate
The US should consult brazil --- economic issues are crucial
Inter-American Dialogue, 2012 ( Inter-American Dialogue PolIcy report: sebastin Acha is a national deputy in the lower house of the Congress of Paraguay and second vice
president of his party, Patria Querida . Previously, Acha was founder and executive director of the non-profit organization, Tierra Nueva, which works on rural development . nicols Ardito-barletta was president of Panama from 1984 to 1985 and minister of economic policy . He was World Bank vice president
for Latin America and the Caribbean and founder and president of the Latin American Export Bank . He is an emeritus member of the Inter-American Dialogue . scar Arias is founder of the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress . He served as president of Costa Rica from 1986 to 1990 and again
from 2006 to 2010 . Arias received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1987 . michelle bachelet was president of Chile from 2006 until 2010 . Previously, she served as minister of defense and minister of health . A pediatric physician, Bachelet currently serves as executive director of the UN Entity for Gender
Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) . She is Latin American co-chair of the Inter-American Dialogue . Alicia brcena is executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) . She previously served as under-secretary-general for
management for Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and acting chef de cabinet for Secretary-General Kofi Annan . roberto baquerizo is managing director of ProVentures, a New York-based consulting and investment firm . He was governor of the Central Bank of Ecuador . sergio bitar has served as a senator as
well as minister of energy and mines, education, and public works in three separate administrations of Chile . He is a non-resident fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, where he directs the global futures and Latin America initiative . Jos octavio bordn was governor of the Province of Mendoza in
Argentina . He was a presidential candidate in the 1995 national elections and served as ambassador to the United States . F. Carl braun is chairman and CEO of UNIBANK, a Haitian commercial bank, and of Groupe Financier National, a financial services and investment group .epsy Campbell barr is an
economist . In 2009, she was a presidential candidate with the Citizen Action Party, of which she was president from 2005 to 2009 . Formerly, she was a representative in the Costa Rican National Assembly and a vice-presidential candidate . Lzaro Crdenas batel is former governor of Michoacn State in
Mexico with the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) . Previously, he represented his home state in the federal Chamber of Deputies and the Senate . Fernando Henrique Cardoso was two-term president of Brazil . He was also a senator from So Paulo and served as both finance and foreign minister .
Cardoso is a founding member chair emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue . Fernando Cepeda is a professor of political science at the University of the Andes . He previously served as Colombias permanent representative to the United Nations and to the OAS, minister of government, minister of
communications, and ambassador to France, to Canada and to the United Kingdom . Violeta Chamorro was president of Nicaragua from 1990 to 1997 . She is an emeritus member of the Inter-American Dialogue . eugenio Clariond reyes-retana is retired chairman and CEO of Grupo IMSA, S .A . He previously
served as vice-chairman of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, and vice-president of the Mexican chapter of the Latin American Business Council (CEAL) . Joe Clark is former prime minister of Canada . Elected eight times to the House of Commons, he was secretary of state for external
affairs and also served as minister of constitutional affairs . oliver F. Clarke is chairman of The Gleaner Company, Jamaica, where he was managing director from 1976 to 2011 . He has served as president of the Inter American Press Association and of the Commonwealth Press Union . Jonathan Coles Ward
was president of Venezuelas Institute for Advanced Management Studies (IESA), where he is currently a professor . He was minister of agriculture and livestock . He is also on the PREAL advisory board . Jos mara dagnino pastore has served as minister of finance, minister of economy and labor, head of the
National Development Council, and ambassador-at-large in Europe . Currently, he is the dean of the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at the Catholic University of Argentina Remaking the Relationship the United states and Latin America
Many of the issues on the hemispheric agenda carry critical global dimensions .
Because of this, the United States should seek greater cooperation and consultation
with Brazil , Mexico, and other countries of the region in world forums
addressing shared interests . Brazil has the broadest international presence and
influence of any Latin American nation . In recent years it has become far more active on
global issues of concern to the United States. The United States and Brazil have
clashed over such issues as Irans nuclear program, non-proliferation, and the Middle East uprisings, but they have
cooperated when their interests converged, such as in the World Trade Organization and the G-20
(Mexico, Argentina, and Canada also participate in the G-20), and in efforts to rebuild and provide security for Haiti . Washington
to raise the profile of emerging
has worked with Brazil and other Latin American countries
economies in various international financial agencies, including the World

Bank and the International Monetary Fund . In addition to economic and
financial matters, Brazil and other Latin American nations are assuming enhanced roles on an array of global
political, environmental, and security issues . Several for which US and Latin American
cooperation could become increasingly important include:
The US should consult brazil --- crucial for energy and trade
issues
Einaudi, 2011 (Luigi, Distinguished Visiting fellow in the Center for Strategic research, institute for national
Strategic Studies, at the national Defense University, Member of the advisory Council of the Brazil institute at the Woodrow Wilson
international Center for Scholars Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf)
A first operational step, therefore, is for both countries to hold regular policy-level
consultations , increase exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral
matters . This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a
major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, all types of
trade , the environment, space, and the development of international law, including law of the seas and
nonproliferation. To share information and ensure effective consultation on so many functional issues will require finding
ways to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically
organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to
offices organized globally. This organization hampers the exchange of information and consultation with countries such as Brazil,
whose reach and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an
isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bilaterally or in the
World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on manufacturing in both their
countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.
The US should consult brazil --- k2 maintain peace
Strategic Studies, at the national Defense University, Member of the advisory Council of the Brazil institute at the Woodrow Wilson
The United States has a basic national security interest in Brazils continuing democratic and marketoriented
success, which improves its will and capacity to help address pressing global problems. We are in a rapidly changing period of
international relations, in which a high premium is put on skilled and effective diplomacy in order to provide a measure of management to situations that could spin out of control.
We are still haunted by nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, Brazil plays an important role . It is in the U.S.
interest to find as many ways as possible not only to cooperate with Brazil,
but also to engage with Brasilia as a regional and global partner in the
maintenance of peace and prosperity
The US should consult brazil --- influence

Meyer, 2013 (Peter, Analyst in Latin American Affairs @ Congressional Research Service Brazil-U.S. Relations
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf)
Brazils foreign policy is a byproduct of the countrys unique position as a regional

power in Latin America, a leader among developing countries in economic
cooperation and collective security efforts, and an emerging center of global
influence . Brazilian foreign policy has traditionally been based on the principles of
multilateralism , peaceful dispute settlement, and nonintervention in the affairs of other
Adherence to these principles has enabled Brazil to maintain peaceful
countries.45
relations with all 10 of its neighbors46 and to play a larger role in global
affairs than its economic and geopolitical power would otherwise allow. Building on its traditional principles,
Brazilian foreign policy under the PT administrations of Presidents Lula and Rousseff has emphasized three areas of
action: (1) reinforcing relations with traditional partners such as its South American neighbors, the United States,
and Europe; (2) diversifying relations by forging stronger economic and political ties with other nations of the
developing world; and (3) supporting multilateralism by pushing for the democratization of global governance.4
Security Aff Solvency Advocate
Consultation over the plan is crucial --- Brazil will backlash
Meiman and Rothkopf, 2009 (Kellie, Brasil/Southern Cone and trade practices of McLarty
Associates worked at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in the Executive Office of the President as Director
for Brasil and the Southern Cone, Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Department of State, and David, President and CEO of Garten
Rothkopf, an international advisory firm specializing in transformational global trends, notably those associated with energy,
security, and emerging markets; a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; chairman of the National
Strategic Investment Forum Dialogue a member of the advisory board of the U.S. Institute of Peace, the John Hopkins/Bloomberg
School of Public Health, the Center for Global Development, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency. The United States and
Brazil Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf)
The United States should collaborate with Brazil on security matters both bilaterally
and multilaterally, particularly when they reinforce Brazilian interests as well, and our interests are more often in synch than is considered by either side. We need not
be in perfect agreement on the desired solution to dialogue meaningfully on security threats. Brazils voluntary decision
not to pursue nuclear weapons makes it a potential ally not only on regional, but
global security questions, including those involving Iran and nuclear non-proliferation writ large. We have
opportunities to improve our communication on military matters as well. For instance, the decision
in April 2008 to reinstate the Fourth Fleet of the U.S. Navy in the South Atlantic Ocean was publicly announced
without prior formal diplomatic consultation with our regional allies, including Brazil. In the existing highly-charged
hemispheric security environment, this surprise led to an exaggerated negative
reaction from the Lula administration and the Brazilian Congress, and gave Chavez an easy rally cry.
Had the United States consulted Brazil and other key allies first, explaining the focus of the policy change and highlighting the collateral
benefits, the conflict created by the Fourth Fleet reinstatement could have been diminished . Efforts in this area
we should seek to maintain consistent communication with regional allies

have improved, and
like Brazil on military and security matters.

Venezuela Solvency Advocate --- Maduro
Moderation -- Problem due to the Colombia
Consultation over brazil is crucial for solvency --- its necessary
for Venezuela to reform and say yes
Pagano, 2013 (James, Contributing writer to the Truman Doctrine a Washington think tank Moving Venezuela to the
Center http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/moving-venezuela-to-the-center/)
The U.S. should push for economic reform with the help of Brazil which seeks a
greater role in international and regional politics. Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva has close ties to Venezuela, and touting
could help persuade Maduro to moderate
the recent successes of his center-left government in Brazil
his government. Brazil has made huge societal gains without suffering the
kind of economic setbacks seen in Venezuela. Friendly cajoling , along with the promise of
closer economic ties could help lead Maduro onto a path of economic
reform necessary to extend certain Chavista social programs. Colombia, Brazil and the U.S. also
have a shared interest in improving Venezuela n security. Under Chavez, Venezuela became on
the most violent countries in Latin America, as drug related crimes skyrocketed. Violence is the number one
concern of Venezuelans, and significant reductions would be a major political victory for
whoever is in power. Brazil and Colombia together should pressure Venezuela to
accept sorely needed D.E.A assistance with the tacit acceptance of
modest political reforms , most importantly freer press. The death of Chavez is a critical juncture in U.S.-Latin
American relations and it is important the United States not miss this opportunity. Having a stable trustworthy Venezuela would
allow the United States to continue to draw down operations in the ever-volatile Middle East, fight narcotrafficking and expand trade.
Careful, well
thought-out overtures and policy changes will help quell lingering
anti-Americanism while also improving regional stability. Ending the Cuban embargo
would provide absolute economic gain for all parties, while providing cover for Maduro to thaw relations with the United States and
receive aid to stop uncontrollable violence. Strategic engagement with regional allies could
help spur the economic and institutional reforms necessary for Venezuela
to prosper moving forward.
Brazil Will Say Yes
Brazil will say yes
Inter-American Dialogue, 2012 ( Inter-American Dialogue PolIcy report: sebastin Acha is a national deputy in the lower house of the Congress of Paraguay and second vice
president of his party, Patria Querida . Previously, Acha was founder and executive director of the non-profit organization, Tierra Nueva, which works on rural development . nicols Ardito-barletta was president of Panama from 1984 to 1985 and minister of economic policy . He was World Bank vice president
for Latin America and the Caribbean and founder and president of the Latin American Export Bank . He is an emeritus member of the Inter-American Dialogue . scar Arias is founder of the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress . He served as president of Costa Rica from 1986 to 1990 and again
from 2006 to 2010 . Arias received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1987 . michelle bachelet was president of Chile from 2006 until 2010 . Previously, she served as minister of defense and minister of health . A pediatric physician, Bachelet currently serves as executive director of the UN Entity for Gender
Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) . She is Latin American co-chair of the Inter-American Dialogue . Alicia brcena is executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) . She previously served as under-secretary-general for
management for Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and acting chef de cabinet for Secretary-General Kofi Annan . roberto baquerizo is managing director of ProVentures, a New York-based consulting and investment firm . He was governor of the Central Bank of Ecuador . sergio bitar has served as a senator as
well as minister of energy and mines, education, and public works in three separate administrations of Chile . He is a non-resident fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, where he directs the global futures and Latin America initiative . Jos octavio bordn was governor of the Province of Mendoza in
Argentina . He was a presidential candidate in the 1995 national elections and served as ambassador to the United States . F. Carl braun is chairman and CEO of UNIBANK, a Haitian commercial bank, and of Groupe Financier National, a financial services and investment group .epsy Campbell barr is an
economist . In 2009, she was a presidential candidate with the Citizen Action Party, of which she was president from 2005 to 2009 . Formerly, she was a representative in the Costa Rican National Assembly and a vice-presidential candidate . Lzaro Crdenas batel is former governor of Michoacn State in
Mexico with the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) . Previously, he represented his home state in the federal Chamber of Deputies and the Senate . Fernando Henrique Cardoso was two-term president of Brazil . He was also a senator from So Paulo and served as both finance and foreign minister .
Cardoso is a founding member chair emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue . Fernando Cepeda is a professor of political science at the University of the Andes . He previously served as Colombias permanent representative to the United Nations and to the OAS, minister of government, minister of
communications, and ambassador to France, to Canada and to the United Kingdom . Violeta Chamorro was president of Nicaragua from 1990 to 1997 . She is an emeritus member of the Inter-American Dialogue . eugenio Clariond reyes-retana is retired chairman and CEO of Grupo IMSA, S .A . He previously
served as vice-chairman of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, and vice-president of the Mexican chapter of the Latin American Business Council (CEAL) . Joe Clark is former prime minister of Canada . Elected eight times to the House of Commons, he was secretary of state for external
affairs and also served as minister of constitutional affairs . oliver F. Clarke is chairman of The Gleaner Company, Jamaica, where he was managing director from 1976 to 2011 . He has served as president of the Inter American Press Association and of the Commonwealth Press Union . Jonathan Coles Ward
was president of Venezuelas Institute for Advanced Management Studies (IESA), where he is currently a professor . He was minister of agriculture and livestock . He is also on the PREAL advisory board . Jos mara dagnino pastore has served as minister of finance, minister of economy and labor, head of the
National Development Council, and ambassador-at-large in Europe . Currently, he is the dean of the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at the Catholic University of Argentina Remaking the Relationship the United states and Latin America
Brazils RiseBrazil
is now Latin Americas dominant economic power . Its
influence in regional affairs, especially in South America, rivals that of the United States . Its
economy, the worlds sixth largest, coupled with effective political leadership and assertive and
skilled diplomacy, underpins the countrys expanding global role . Brazil, one of
the BRICS (along with Russia, India, China, and South Africa), has made clear its aspiration for a permanent seat on the United
Although the United
Nations Security Council and is considered one of the two or three leading candidates .
States and Brazil disagree on some critical regional and global issuesand have
openly clashed in a few instancestheir relationship is largely cordial and non-conflictive .
Both regularly call for deeper and more extensive bilateral cooperation, although
both also seem leery about taking the required initiative
Relations Net Benefit
Relations Net Benefit
Consultation is crucial to create new relations --- now is key ---
Brazil is emerging as a new power.
Noriega and Crdenas, 2012 (Roger, former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere
affairs (Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean) and a former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States. He
coordinates AEI's program on Latin America and writes for the Institute's Latin American Outlook series, Jose, an associate with the
consulting firm VisionAmericas, based in Washington working on inter-American relations, including in the U.S. Department of State,
the National Security Council, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, a Senior Advisor at the Organization of American
States and as a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. An action plan for US policy in the
Americas American Enterprise Institute http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/an-action-plan-
for-us-policy-in-the-americas/)
A reinvigorated US policy in the Western Hemisphere cannot proceed without a fundamental

reevaluation of bilateral relations with Brazil. With a population of some 200 million, a $2.5
trillion economy (the worlds sixth largest), and a recent history of steady political and economic management, Brazil is
beginning to realize its enormous potential . Much as China used the 2008 Beijing Olympics to
unveil its economic progress and modernity, Brazil will be the focus of global attention in 2014 and 2016 as it hosts the World Cup
Strengthening and expanding US relations with Brazil should be
and Olympics, respectively.
a US presidential priority . Specifically, it is in both countries interests to

deepen the developing partnership, namely in the areas of trade , security,
and energy. Yet, though there are opportunities in a more modern US-Brazil
relationship, there are also challenges. It will be a test of US diplomacy to convince some sectors in Brazil that relations
with the United States are not a zero-sum game, and that significant benefits can accrue for both populations as a result of deeper
cooperation. Some recommendations for US-Brazil cooperation: Invigorate presidential-level engagement; Establish a jointly
funded US-Brazil foundation (modeled on the German Marshall Fund) to institutionalize broad cooperation; focusing on information
and communications technology (the so-called e-economy); student, political, cultural, and other grassroots exchanges; and
language training; Charge an interagency team with developing strategies to overcome the zero-sum approach in bilateral relations
adhered to by some in the Brazilian foreign policy establishment; Institutionalize a bilateral defense ministerial on global security
challenges, defense cooperation, military modernization, and regional security challenges; Incentivize US ventures with Brazils
aviation and aerospace industries and overcome technology-transfer issues to create opportunities for US manufacturers; Offer
working-level cooperation with World Cup and Olympics planning teams. Conclusion The potential opportunities and mutual
benefits have never been greater for intrahemispheric cooperation. But US policymakers must
aggressively seize initiative in turning that potential into reality. Certainly there are challenges and obstacles
increased economic relationships will take on a dynamic and

ahead, but
momentum of their own, and once and for all render obsolete some of the
retrograde populist agendas in the Americas. Geographic proximity,
cultural and family ties, shared values, and growing prosperity are
powerful incentives to drive a fundamental reassessment of US relations
in the Western Hemisphere. It is essential that US policymakers
demonstrate the political will to take advantage of this unprecedented
opportunity .
Relations Good --- Latin America Instability
Relations Solve Latin American stability
Erikson, 2010 (Daniel, Senior Associate for US policy and Director of Caribbean programs, Inter-American Dialogue,
The Centre for International Governance Innovation, The Obama Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership?,
Working Paper No. 46)
The need to manage the increasingly complex relationship with South American countries will
be a critical US policy priority. The early effort to enhance the US-Brazil agenda was
especially vital , because strong US-Brazilian ties could help the Obama administration
handle festering tensions in countries including Colombia, Venezuela and
Bolivia. However, such an outcome may be overly optimistic, given that Brazil and the US soon diverged in their responses to
the coup against President Jose Manuel Zelaya in Honduras, where initial unity in opposing the constitutional breach quickly gave
way to divisions over whether the international community should recognize the Honduran elections scheduled for November
2009 in the absence of Zelayas restoration (see Sheridan, 2009). The US provided its tacit support to the elections while Brazil,
whose embassy in Tegucigalpa provided Zelaya sanctuary, disagreed.
Instability causes extinction.

Manwaring 5 adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuelas Hugo Chvez,
Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)
President Chvez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-
term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that
failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality,
insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and
major refugee flows. They can host evil networks of all kinds, whether they involve
criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological

crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder,
kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion
can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation,

disease , the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation
of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing,
warlordism, and criminal anarchy . At the same time, these actions are usually
unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty,
destabilization, and conflict .62 Perus Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes
of state failure armed propaganda. Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of
South America and elsewhere call these activities business incentives.

Chvez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin
American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational
objectives, state and nonstate actors strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regimes credibility and capability in terms of its
ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chvezs intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically
on selected Latin American governments ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption,
disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a
given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and
instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a
effectively,
government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an
unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence,
failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states,
criminal states, narco-states, or new peoples democracies. In connection with the creation of new peoples democracies,
one can rest assured that Chvez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And,
the more they and their
of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and peoples democracies persist,
associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity .65

Relations Good --- Amazon
Solves amazon deforestation and ecological shocks
Zedillo et al, 2008 (Rethinking U.S.Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World Report of the
Partnership for the Americas Commission The Brookings Institution November 2008 Ernesto Zedillo Commission co-chair; Former President of Mexico
Thomas R. Pickering Commission co-chair; Former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Memb e r s o f the Par t n e r s h i p for t h e Ame r i cas
Commi ssi o n Mauricio Crdenas Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative, Brookings Leonardo Martinez-Diaz
Deputy Director of the Commission; Political Economy Fellow, Global Economy and Development)
The link between carbon-intensive activities and changes in the worlds climate
is now well established, and the consequences will be felt across the hemisphere. According to figure 2, if current human
activity remains unchanged, the hemisphere will likely suffer from a variety of ecological
shocks, including declines in agricultural yields, water shortages, the loss of animal and plant species, and more frequent and
destructive storms in the Caribbean Basin. These extreme weather events could bring devastation to Central America, the
Caribbean, and the southeastern United States, imposing a heavy human and material toll. As we know from recent storms, the
costs of replacing homes, businesses, and infrastructurealong with the higher costs of energy if refineries and offshore rigs are
damagedwill be vast. Hemispheric Solutions Addressing the challenge of energy security will require making energy consumption
more efficient and developing new energy sources, whereas addressing the challenge of climate change will require finding ways to
control carbon emissions, helping the world shift away from carbon-intensive energy generation, and adapting to some aspects of
changing ecosystems. Potential solutions to these problems exist in the Americas, but
mobilizing them will require a sustained hemispheric partnership . Latin America
has enormous potential to help meet the worlds growing thirst for energy, both in terms of hydrocarbons and alternative fuels. Latin
America has about 10 percent of the worlds proven oil reserves. Venezuela accounts for most of these, though Brazils oil reserves
could increase from 12 to 70 billon barrels if recent discoveries can be developed. Bolivia is an important producer of natural gas,
Mexico has great potential in solar energy generation, and several countries in the region could potentially produce much more
hydroelectric power. Brazil is a world leader in sugarcane-based ethanol production, and the United States is a leader in corn-based
ethanol (figure 3). Solar and wind power, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, remain underdeveloped. To expand the
hemispheres energy capacity, massive infrastructure investments will be required. Major investments in oil production 13
(especially deep offshore), refining, and distribution will be needed to achieve the regions potential. Developing the Tupi project in
Brazil alone will cost $70240 billion. Liquefied natural gas will become an important source of energy, but not before major
investments are made in infrastructure to support liquefaction, regasification, transport, and security. U.S. and Canadian electricity
networks, which are already highly integrated, can be further integrated with Mexicos. Mexico also plans to connect its grid to those
of Guatemala and Belize, eventually creating an integrated power market in Central America. Power integration in South America
will demand even larger investments in generation, transmission, and distribution. Finally, reliance on nuclear power may grow
because it is carbon free and does not require fossil fuel imports. However, efforts to expand energy capacity and integrate
hemispheric energy markets face a variety of obstacles. Energy nationalism has led to disruptive disputes over pricing and
Tensions and mistrust in South America have hindered regional
ownership.
cooperation and investment, particularly on natural gas. The security of the energy infrastructure, especially pipelines,
remains a concern in Mexico and parts of South America. Gas, oil, and electricity subsidies distort patterns of production and
consumption, and they are triggering protectionist behavior elsewhere. Technology on renewables remains underdeveloped, and
research in this area can be better centralized and disseminated. Overcoming these obstacles will
require high levels of cooperation among hemispheric partners. In addition to developing carbon-neutral
sources of energy, the Western Hemisphere has other roles to play in
combating climate change. The LAC region currently accounts for about 5 percent of annual global carbon
emissions, and emissions per capita are still relatively low compared with other regions. However, minimizing the LAC
regions future carbon footprint will require new policies . Also, deforestation
globally accounts for 20 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. The Amazon River
Basin contains one of the worlds three most important rainforests, whose
protection can therefore very significantly contribute to combating climate
change. Brazil is pioneering the use of information technology to lessen
deforestation in the Amazon.
Relations Good --- Economy
Solve economy
Bonoma, 2012 (Diego, 8-9-12, U.S.-Brazil Energy Partnership Offers Great Potential,
http://www.freeenterprise.com/us-brazil-energy-partnership-offers-great-potential)
The U.S.-Brazil energy partnership has the potential to foster energy security,
economic growth , and job creationpriorities for both countries. Reflecting this shared vision, President
Barack Obama and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff last year launched the U.S.-Brazil
Strategic Energy Dialogue (SED), a presidential-level mechanism to strengthen bilateral cooperation in this area.
We at the Brazil-U.S. Business Council applaud this effort towards a bold bilateral partnership in energy. We have been vigorously
engaged in energy cooperation to deepen the commercial pillar of the U.S.-Brazil partnership, with
an emphasis on trade and investment promotion. In this context, we worked closely with the White House, the U.S. Department of
Energy and other federal government agencies to launch the SED in August 2011. On that occasion, deputy secretary of energy
Daniel Poneman met with private sector representatives in both So Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and officially launched the dialogue in
Braslia. Further recognizing the importance of our energy partnership, this week, I moderated a panel
featuring key U.S. and Brazilian government officials at the 13th edition of the Federation of Industries of the State of So Paulos
Annual Energy Conference Brazils largest energy-related event. During the panel, the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy,
along with the U.S. Department of Energy, announced the next meeting of the SED in Washington, D.C. this coming October. The
Ministry also announced that the private sector will be, for the first time, officially incorporated in the dialogues program of
work a longstanding request of the Brazil-U.S. Business Council and our partners in the U.S. and Brazil. The Brazil-U.S. Business
Council also launched this week its latest report: The U.S.-Brazil Energy Partnership: Bolstering Security, Growth, and Job Creation.
for both countries to take
In this report, we talk about the state of the partnership and offer recommendations
advantage of the benefits it could bring. The potential is there for this energy partnership to develop into one of
the worlds greatest and bring real benefits for the citizens and economies of both countries. Its great to see the governments and
private sectors of both countries taking steps toward it.
**Affirmative**
OAS CP --- Defense
No Solvency
Doesnt solve, countries say no, and links to the net benefit
seen as an extension of US interests, not multilateral
commitment
Policy Considerations The rise of regional alternatives to the OAS presents both potential opportunities and
challenges for the United States. One potential benefit of such organizations might be an increase in
burdensharing in the hemisphere. As the newer organizations evolve, they may be able to take on more
responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in their sub-regions, which could enable Congress to dedicate
scarce U.S. resources to other priorities. A division of labor among various organizations might also enable the OAS
to better concentrate its efforts on its core agenda and thereby carry out its mandates more effectively. At the
increasing role for other multilateral organizations could lead to
same time, an
a weaker, more divided OAS. If other organizations take on larger roles in the hemisphere, the
role of the OAS would likely decline. Some Members of Congress argue that such a
development could weaken U.S. influence in the hemisphere since the OAS is the
only multilateral organization in which the United States is a member and shapes policy decisions.122 Moreover,
the proliferation of regional organizations could further weaken the hemispheres ability to speak with one voice.
For example, Mercosur and Unasur determined that the rapid June 2012 impeachment of Paraguayan President
Fernando Lugo constituted a break in the democratic order and sought to isolate the country by suspending it from
participation.123 The OAS, on the other hand, concluded that the impeachment did not constitute a coup dtat,
and member states decided not to suspend Paraguay from participating in the organization.124 The impetus
Latin
behind the creation of some of the new regional organizations also has implications for the United States.
American leaders have established new multilateral institutions for a
number of reasons, one of which is the lingering view of many in the
region that the OAS is an institution dominated by the U nited S tates. Even as
some Members of Congress assert that the organization acts against U.S. interests, a number of policymakers in
OAS imposes U.S. policies . Given these views, some analysts
the broader region argue that the
maintain that any reform to the OAS that begins in Washington, especially in
the U.S. Congress, can have the potential to backfire and provoke opposition
in the hemisphere.125
Oas fails
OAS fails funding and internal divisions
Lee 12 (Brianna Lee, Senior Production Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, The
Organization of American States, April 13, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-
and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945)
Questions of Effectiveness and Relevance CFR's Shannon K. O'Neil says the OAS's role as a forum for regular, high-
level discussions on issues facing the hemisphere is one of its major strengths. Several other analysts have praised
the Inter-American Human Rights Commission as a crucial, objective platform for human rights litigation. However ,
many state leaders and policymakers have also heavily criticized the OAS
for its institutional weakness. Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director for the Americas
Society/Council of the Americas, says the OAS as a political entity "has declined
precipitously in recent years." One of the OAS's major administrative
constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous vote to
make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified within
the region, this has made it difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive
calls to action. The polarization between American states has also led to one
of the OAS's other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to
the core mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes
(VOA) from what she called a "proliferation of mandates," noting that the expansion of mandates without
proportional expansion of funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future. Election monitoring, one of the OAS's
major functions in light of its commitment to democracy, is also restricted by its inability to send election observers
without the invitation of state governments. "They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to be
condemned," CFR's O'Neil says. Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm in many member countries to accept
OAS monitors, which she says has been helpful. Within the hemisphere, conflicting views on the OAS's loyalties
abound. In the summer 2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, Anthony DePalma sums up the range of mistrust: "Insulza
and the OAS itself are widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela (he denies it), as catering to [Venezuelan
President] Hugo Chavez's friends in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) and, strangely,
still beholden to the U.S., even though Washington seems to have lost interest." Chavez has called the OAS a
puppet of the United States; at the same time, in July 2011, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a
Republican-sponsored bill to defund the OAS (ForeignPolicy), on the charge that the organization supported anti-
democracy regimes in Latin America. Various efforts have been made to create organizations to act as alternatives
to the OAS. In 2010, Latin American leaders formed the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CELAC), an organization that excludes the United States. Chavez and Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa have
expressed the desire for CELAC to eventually supplant the OAS, although Sabatini argues that CELAC is "nothing
more than a piece of paper and a dream." Many consider another regional organization, the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR), to be a useful counterweight to the OAS. UNASUR is regarded
by many observers as a means for Brazil to assert its power in the region. O'Neil argues the organization
has been able to fulfill some duties that the OAS has been less effective in
doing, such as successfully mediating between Ecuador and Colombia during their diplomatic crisis in 2008.
Despite the OAS's shortcomings and questions over its continued relevance in the region, there is a strong call to
reform the organization rather than eliminate it altogether.
Say no - cuba
Cuba says no 2009 proves

BBC 9 (British Broadcasting, Co. Cuba rejects OAS readmission, June 8, 2009,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2009/06/090608_cubaoasupdate.shtml)
The Cuban government has formally rejected a decision of the
Organisation of American States allowing it to rejoin the group. Last week the OAS voted
overwhelmingly to end the communist island's suspension from the organisation. The Cubans are claiming the vote as a victory over the US, but after years of
demonising the organisation they are unwilling to rejoin. Formal confirmation that Cuba will not
return to the Organisation of American States came in a Declaration of the Revolutionary Government published in communist party newspaper Granma. Cuba thanked Latin American
the organisation had long supported

and Caribbean countries for defending its right to rejoin. But, it said
Washington's hostility towards Cuba and that the country preferred to

retain its independence. OAS: The door is still open OAS Assistant Secretary General, Albert Ramdin, told BBC Caribbean that " the door still remains
open for when Cuba is ready to engage." He said the Cuba rejection of the OAS readmission offer was not a slap in the face, in response to a question put by BBC Caribbean. "I think its
important for Cuba to realise that the OAS is different today from what is was in 1962," Ambassador Ramdin said. Cuba was suspended from the OAS in 1962, at the height of the Cold
War. US relations The US had initially wanted any change dependent on movement on human rights and democracy. In the end it supported what was a compromise vote lifting the ban
but calling for talks over readmission. There have been some improvements in US Cuban relations with new presidents in both countries. President Barak Obama has lifted restrictions on
Cuban Americans visiting and sending money home. His Cuban counterpart, Raul Castro, recently agreed to a US request to resume direct talks on migration issues and offered to extend
these to include anti narcotics and hurricane disaster preparedness. But, according to a BBC correspondent, it is proving a slow process and on the major issue of lifting the decades old
trade embargo Washington is still insisting that Cuba must first show signs of reform.
Cuba hates the OAS seen as a tool of us imperialism

BBC 12 (British Broadcasting, Co. Cuba eyes Americas Summit place, but not
OAS return, February 15, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-
17053827)
Cuba has said it will attend the Summit of the Americas in Colombia in April if it is invited, but has no desire to rejoin the
Organisation of American States (OAS). The Summit usually involves only OAS members, and Cuba was suspended from the organisation in 1962 because of its communist
system. But other left-wing Latin American countries say it should be invited. The US says Cuba should remain excluded because it is not a democracy. Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno
Rodriguez Parrilla said at a meeting of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (Alba) - a left-wing regional group - that Cuba was willing to attend the summit. "We know that this
Cuba would not return to the

summit cannot be for the Americas if it unfairly excludes Cuba," Mr Rodriguez said. But he added that
OAS, calling it "an organisation that has served to promote domination,

occupation and aggression," and "a platform for the US to attack and
plunder Latin America and the Caribbean". The US has said Cuba's non-participation in the OAS is not necessarily a barrier
to taking part in the Americas Summit. But it insists Cuba should only be invited if it agrees to implement democratic reforms.
Say no Venezuela
Venezuela says no and cp links to net benefit cp is seen as

interventionist embassy statement proves
Venezuelan Embassy 5-2 (Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
Venezuela Rejects Interventionist Statements by OAS Secretary Insulza, press
release, May 2, 2013, http://venezuela-us.org/2013/05/02/venezuela-rejects-
interventionist-statements-by-oas-secretary-insulza/)
The government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela roundly rejects the
disproportionate and interventionist statements made by the Secretary-
General of the O rganization of A merican S tates Jos Miguel Insulza, that were offered in
clear and broad coordination with spokespersons of the Department of
State and the White House, and through which, based on exaggerations of the lamentable brawl that
occurred some days ago in the Venezuelan parliament as a result of provocations by the opposition, the
attempt is made to generate the perception of a political crisis in
Venezuela that would merit their mediation. The Bolivarian government
considers these attempts absolutely cynical and immoral , particularly when they
come from those who have minimized or ignored the grave acts of fascist violence that occurred on April 15 of this
year and in subsequent days as a consequence of the failure to recognize the electoral results by the losing
candidate and his call to rage and violence after the April 14 elections. These spokespersons have said little or
nothing about the political assassinations of Venezuelan citizens, all of them supporters of the Bolivarian revolution:
Jos Luis Ponce, Rosiris Reyes, Hender Bastardo, Luis Eduardo Garca, Rey David Snchez, Johan Antonio Hernndez,
Henry Rangel, Keller Guevara and Johnny Alberto Pacheco. The same is true regarding the more than 70 wounded
Venezuelan men and women that were the victims of political and social intolerance by opposition leadership. It
should be recalled that even deputy Julio Borges, secretary-general of the opposition party Primero Justicia, on April
15 called to bring death to the revolution, the consequence of that statement being the burning of seven houses
of the principal democratic political party in Venezuela, which is the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).
Spokespersons have said little or nothing about the promotion on behalf of opposition leaders of a xenophobic
policy against Cuban doctors and health professionals that offer services to the most humble people of Venezuela.
Despite this complicit and immoral silence by some governments and
international organizations, Venezuelas democratic institutions, together
with the conscience and political maturity of the people developed by the
eternal commander Hugo Chvez, were able to exorcise the anti-
democratic and violent behavior by of the opposition, so that today we enjoy a country
full of political and institutional stability with a legitimate and legal government directed by the president of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro Moros, which has gone out into the streets to attend to the social
demands of our people. Finally, the government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela firmly rejects
any attempt to promote any mediations that are not required, and is willing to
confront with all the force it is permitted as an independent country any
intervention by those who do not possess the moral authority to speak of
dialogue, democracy and peace, for they have plagued the world with war, violence and death in
the 20th and 21st century. The immense democratic majority of the Venezuelan people and the institutions of the
state have the legal and moral force to guarantee the political stability, peace and independence of the nation of
Simn Bolivar.
Venezuela says no see the OAS as a tool of American
dominance Chavez example proves
Forero 10 (Juan Forero, Washington Post's correspondent for Colombia and
Venezuela, Organization of American States report rebukes Venezuela on human
rights, Washington Post Foreign Service, February 25, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/24/AR2010022401884.html)
Chvez has railed against the OAS as beholden to the interests of the
U nited S tates. Venezuela declined to cooperate with the commission, its
members said, prompting commissioners -- jurists and rights activists from Antigua, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El
Salvador and the United States -- to hold hearings and seek out Venezuelan activists and politicians to compile
information about the suspected abuses. The report asserts that the state has punished critics, including anti-
government television stations, demonstrators and opposition politicians who advocate a form of government
different from Chvez's, which is allied with Cuba and favors state intervention in the economy. The report outlines
how, after 11 years in power, Chvez holds tremendous influence over other branches of government, particularly
the judiciary. Judges who issue decisions the government does not like can be fired, the report says, and hundreds
of others are in provisional posts where they can easily be removed. The commission said some adversaries of the
government who have been elected to office, such as Caracas Mayor Antonio Ledezma, have seen their powers
usurped by Chvez. "The threats to human rights and democracy are many and very serious, and that's why we
published the report," Paulo Srgio Pinheiro, a member of the commission who specializes in Venezuela, said by
phone from his home in Brazil. Chvez did not have an immediate response to the report. But in a phone interview
Venezuela's ambassador to the OAS, said the
Wednesday morning, Roy Chaderton,
commission had become a " confrontational political actor instead of an
advocate for defending human rights." Chaderton said the commission had shown support for
a failed 2002 coup against Chvez -- an accusation denied by the commission -- and charged that its members had
dedicated themselves to weakening progressive social movements in Latin America. "They have become a mafia of
bureaucrats who want to play a bigger role in the efforts against Venezuela's government," Chaderton said. The
commission, in compiling the report, incorporated responses from Venezuelan authorities to written questions. The
government says it permits protests and opposition groups, while focusing much of its energy on improving
Venezuelans' standard of living. Pinheiro said the commission recognized the government's progress in areas such
as reducing poverty. But Pinheiro said that there can be "no trade-off" between political and economic progress. He
said the commission's hope is that the Venezuelan government will make improvements based on the report's
recommendations. "This report, instead of isolating Venezuela, is a call for Venezuela to come on board," Pinheiro
said. Others who track developments in Venezuela, though, said Chvez is prone to a disproportionate response
when criticized. After releasing a critical report about Chvez two years ago, Jos Miguel Vivanco, the Americas
director for Human Rights Watch, and a fellow investigator for the group were detained at their Caracas hotel and
escorted by armed agents onto a Brazil-bound flight. "It would be nice to think the Chvez government would pay
president had "responded to all
attention to the report," Vivanco said. But he noted that the
such criticism by attacking its critics, often using conspiracy theories and
far-fetched allegations to distract attention from their own human rights
practices."
Links to ptx
Links to ptx OAS funding debate ignites a firestorm GOP and

dem backlash is guaranteed
Rogin 11 (Josh Rogin, columnist, The Cable, a Foreign Policy blog, his columns
appear bi-weekly in The Washington Post, House committee votes to defund OAS,
column, The Cable, July 20, 2011,
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/20/house_panel_votes_to_defund_th
e_oas)
The House Foreign Affairs Committee voted Wednesday to end funding for
the O rganization of A merican S tates, with Republicans lambasting the OAS as an enemy of freedom and
democracy. The one-hour exchange over the GOP proposal to cut the entire $48.5
million annual U.S contribution to the OAS was the beginning of what
promises to be a long and contentious debate over the fiscal 2012 State Department and
foreign operations authorization bill written by Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.). Democrats
accused the Republicans of isolationism and retreat because of the proposal, and the
Republicans accused the OAS of being an ally of anti-U.S. regimes in Cuba and
Venezuela. The OAS Charter was signed in 1948 at a conference led by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall.
Lets
not continue to fund an organization thats bent on destroying
democracy in Latin America, said Rep. Connie Mack (R-Fla.), the head of the subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere and the sponsor of the amendment. You will support an organization that is destroying the
Republicans piled on, accusing the OAS of
dreams of the people of Latin America. Other
supporting Cubas Fidel Castro, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and
ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya. The OAS is an enemy of the
U.S . and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security, said Rep. David Rivera (R-Fla.). He
compared U.S. support of the OAS to a scene from the movie Animal House
in which a fraternity pledge is being paddled on his rear end and asks for
more punishment. How much longer will we say to the OAS, Please, sir, may I have another? Rivera
said. Panel Democrats expressed frustration with the GOP for forcing a vote that they said would signal Americas
retreat from multilateral engagement around the world. I might offer an amendment to pull out of the world, to
build a moat around the United States and put a dome over the thing, said Rep. Gary L. Ackerman (D-N.Y.).
Thisis getting ridiculous . Ackerman added: Here we are, for a lousy $48
million, willing to symbolically turn our backs on our own hemisphere. ...
This is folly . Its more than folly, its dangerous. And youve got the votes to do it, thats the frightening
thing. But what we should be looking at are opportunities to reach out to the world. Ranking Democrat Howard L.
Berman (D-Calif.) pointed out that the United States has a treaty obligation to pay its dues to the OAS, and he
argued that the body has made a positive contribution to progress toward democracy since the 1960s. The
OAS is an enemy? We are really living in two different worlds , Berman said.
The defunding amendment passed 22-20 along party lines.
FTAA CP --- Offense
Human Rights DA
FTAA causes human right violations
Soto, 2003 (Gustavo, The Center for Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action, A.C. CIEPAC the
Movement for Democracy and Life (MDV) of Chiapas, the Mexican Network of Action Against Free Trade (RMALC) Millions of Reasons
to Say No to the FTAA http://www.organicconsumers.org/corp/ftaa2.cfm)
The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is planned to be signed in the year 2005. However, by means of Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs) between the countries of the American Continent and even the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP), the implementation of the FTAA is
already moving forward. The FTAA will combine all of the negative effects of the
FTAs , and represents the sharp tooth of savage neoliberalism , by which
huge multinational corporations promote and legalize their interests . The World
Trade Organization (WTO) is the frame of the rules imposed on the worlds economy, the FTAA is the continental expression, the PPP
the regional and a FTA the bi- or trilateral. But none of this could happen if it werent for the World Bank (WB) and International
Monetary Fund (IMF), who impose structural adjustment measures on the governments of poor countries that are becoming more
and more impoverished. Saying No to the FTAA is not a demand that comes exclusively from the working and rural classes of the
continent. Nor is it just Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) or indigenous people or women. Nor is it the youth or the
unemployed alone, or the gay or lesbian community; nor the defenders of human rights or ecological groups; unions, academics or
professionals; political parties that have a little bit of common sense, a few lucid bishops, other churches or even business-people
that also find themselves affected. It is a demand of the whole of society. Arent more than 200 million poor people in Latin America
and the Caribbean, a number that keeps growing, sufficient to say Enough Already (Ya Basta)? No
single group can
monopolize this cause, because it is the cause of millions of poor people
across the entire continent. What is at stake are the human rights of the
continental population. With the FTAA, we all lose . Even the inhabitants of Canada
and the United States, their workers, farmers, students and whichever other sector. Today they try to make us
believe that these neoliberal trade policies are a natural part of human
evolution, of the process known as globalization, and not as the product of the imposition of certain interests against
which the world social movement is developing, living and forming alternatives of inclusive, social and ecologically inclusive and
responsible development. The proposals are there, they exist and may have come from the Continental Social Assembly.
Successful alternatives are being carried out and lived today, however some people do not want to admit
that another world is possible and they end up adoring the neoliberal god ,
or free trade. They also do not want to admit that there are millions of reasons to reject the
FTAA . In this bulletin we outline some of these reasons:

Democracy DA
CP destroys democracy
DESTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACY The FTAA takes Chapter 11 of NAFTA to its fullest, granting foreign
companies the right to sue a government if it does not follow the rules of the game, or blocks investment for any reason.
That is, even if a restriction is for the benefit or protection of public, social or environmental health and even if the supposed
investment does not comply with the necessary growth requirements,

does not generate jobs, or lead to the purchase of local goods, or generate
local or regional development, etc. All sanitary or environmental regulation, all governmental acts that
a U.S. company decides goes against their potential profits, allows the
company to sue that government before an international court where
national laws dont apply. There have already been many lawsuits by companies against governments under NAFTA. The
following examples show us the norm of what will go on under the FTAA if
it is not stopped. The funeral chain of the Lowen group sued the United States government for US$750 million for fraud. The U.S. Ethyl-Corporation sued the
government of Canada for US$13 million in damages, since the government had demanded that the company stop using the dangerous gasoline additive MMT, a known toxin that
attacks the human nervous system. A Canadian company, Methanex, is trying to get rid of the prohibition of MTBE, another toxic additive for gasoline, in California, and is demanding
that the government pay US$970 million in damages. Metalclad, a U.S. company, sued the Mexican state government of San Luis Potos for prohibiting them to keep using a toxic waste
dump that was damaging both the environment and public health. They demanded US$10 million from the Mexican government in compensation for the profits that they could have
made. In this way, state, departmental, provincial and national laws are becoming ineffective facing the
undemocratic imposition of transnational laws that are dic tated by the very
companies that stand to gain . Even international laws and agreements between states are
relegated to the background by these laws imposed by corporations. Thus, the People are losing
juridical sovereignty . In spite of constant calls to open and democratize the politics of trade, FTAA negotiations have
been conducted in secret since the beginning of the negotiation process in 1994. Representatives from hundreds of corporations are involved in the
process, advising the U.S. negotiators and helping them to write the rules. However, neither the People nor civil society are
being taken into account in the FTAA negotiations. This same structure of negotiation-imposition occurs at the
Summit of the Americas, where the presidents of the continent meet. Then there are the Ministerial Meetings where Trade Ministers meet to develop a work plan. At another level we find
the Vice-Ministerial Meetings of Trade, which take place every 18 months as a Committee of Trade Negotiations (CTN) and have the job of directing, evaluating and coordinating the
Work Groups and advising the government Trade Ministers. Finally, there are the Trade Group Meetings or negotiations established by the Trade Ministers that collect information about
the current status of trade relations across the American Continent and that take place every 18 months. In total, there are 12 Work Groups: Access to Markets, Public Sector Purchases
(which, by the way, is coordinated by the U.S. and Canadian governments), Small Economies, Investments, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Norms and Technical Trade Barriers,
Politics of Competition, Border Proceedings and Rules of Origin, Intellectual Property Rights, Services, Solution of Controversies and Subsidies, Antidumping Measures and Compensatory
Through these institutions, the business sector has become the most
Rights.
powerful sector of the continent, and it is the sector that meets with the governments
to design the FTAAs laws behind societys back. NGOs have demanded work groups on
the issues of democracy , human and workers rights, consumer protection and the environment be incorporated, but have
repeatedly been denied .
Environmental DA
FTAA Accelerates environmental destruction -- prevents the
ability for protection programs.
The policies imposed by the WB and IMF have, over several decades, caused environmental
destruction around the world. The incorporation of natural resources into
the world market has caused overexploitation or these resources. In 15 years of NAFTA,
15 U.S. logging companies have established operations in Mexico, and
cutting and transportation activities have increased dramatically . In the
Mexican state of Guerrero, 40% of the forests have been devastated in the last eight years,
and mass felling of trees has led to soil erosion , which is destroying the
regional habitat . But this is not happening in Mexico alone it is also happening in Canada and the United States. In
Chiapas, the jungles are being rapidly deforested. NAFTA and now the PPP allow immense
plantations of monoculture farming of forest resources, specifically for exportation, which produce
climactic change , privatize natural protected areas and pollute rivers and
underwater reservoirs. The experience of Costa Rica, where the government privatized natural protected areas by
selling them to multinational corporations is a scandal that we should be alarmed about. The FTAA will accelerate
the degradation of the environment , by eliminating the right of the

governments to pass rules that protect it. It will place investment over
concerns about environmental harm. In the cities of Central America as well as the border zone
between Mexico and the United States, pollution from residues of the maquiladoras and the
careless discarding of chemicals, solvents and other products have
increased not only environmental degradation but also health problems in
the local population.
Race To the Bottom DA
CP results in exploitation of workers and devastates small
farms
The effort to bind the economies of the Western Hemisphere into a single free trade agreement began at the Summit of the
Americas, in December of 1994 in Miami, Florida. It was at the Summit that heads of state and governments of 34 countries in the
region- all nations in North, Central and South America and the Caribbean except Cuba- agreed to complete negotiations for a Free
Trade Area of the Americas by 2005. Unfortunately, the public and most Members of Congress are only vaguely aware this
agreement is being negotiated, and their input has not been taken into account. Corporate interests, however, are
actively involved; under the trade advisory committee system, over 500 corporate representatives have security
clearance and access to FTAA documents while only a handful of civil society representatives have been given clearance. The
FTAA would accelerate the global race to the bottom initiated under NAFTA:
with the FTAA, exploited workers in Mexico would be forced to compete with
even more desperate workers in Haiti, Bolivia or Guatemala, as
multinational corporations move in and out of the region with ease. This race to the
bottom would also be mirrored for small farmers throughout the hemisphere as
the devastating effects of NAFTA on commodity prices and concentration

are amplified.
Small farms prevent extinction

Altieri 8 [Professor of agroecology @ University of California, Berkeley. [Miguel Altieri (President, Sociedad
Cientifica LatinoAmericana de Agroecologia (SOCLA), Small farms as a planetary ecological asset: Five key reasons
why we should support the revitalization of small farms in the Global South, Food First, Posted May 9th, 2008, pg.
http://www.foodfirst.org/en/node/2115]
The Via Campesina has long argued that farmers need land to produce food for their own communities and for
their country and for this reason has advocated for genuine agrarian reforms to access and control land, water,
are of central importance for communities to be able to
agrobiodiversity, etc, which
meet growing food demands. The Via Campesina believes that in order to protect livelihoods,
jobs, people's food security and health, as well as the environment, food
production has to remain in the hands of small- scale sustainable farmers
and cannot be left under the control of large agribusiness companies or supermarket chains. Only by
changing the export-led, free-trade based, industrial agriculture model of large farms
can the downward spiral of poverty, low wages, rural-urban migration, hunger and
environmental degradation be halted. Social rural movements embrace the concept of food
sovereignty as an alternative to the neo-liberal approach that puts its faith in inequitable international trade to
food sovereignty focuses on local autonomy, local
solve the worlds food problem. Instead,
production-consumption cycles, energy and technological sovereignty and farmer to farmer
markets, local
networks. This global movement, the Via Campesina, has recently brought their
message to the North, partly to gain the support of foundations and
consumers, as political pressure from a wealthier public that increasingly depends on unique food products
from the South marketed via organic, fair trade, or slow food channels could marshal the sufficient political will to
curb the expansion of biofuels, transgenic crops and agro-exports, and put an end to subsidies to industrial farming
and dumping practices that hurt small farmers in the South. But can these arguments really captivate the attention
and support of northern consumers and philanthropists? Or is there a need for a different argumentone that
emphasizes that the very quality of life and food security of the populations in the North depends not only on the
food products, but in the ecological services provided by small farms of the South. In fact, it is herein argued that
the functions performed by small farming systems still prevalent in Africa, Asia and Latin Americain
the post-peak oil era that humanity is enteringcomprise
an ecological asset for
humankind and planetary survival . In fact, in an era of escalating fuel and
food costs, climate change, environmental degradation, GMO pollution and
corporate- dominated food systems, small, biodiverse, agroecologically
managed farms in the Global South are the only viable form of agriculture that
will feed the world under the new ecological and economic scenario. There are
at last five reasons why it is in the interest of Northern consumers to support the cause and struggle of small
farmers in the South: 1. Small farmers are key for the worlds food security While 91%
of the planets 1.5 billion hectares of agricultural land are increasingly being devoted to agro-export crops, biofuels
millions of small farmers in the Global South still
and transgenic soybean to feed cars and cattle,
produce the majority of staple crops needed to feed the planets rural and urban populations. In
Latin America, about 17 million peasant production units occupying close to 60.5 million hectares, or 34.5% of the
total cultivated land with average farm sizes of about 1.8 hectares, produce 51% of the maize, 77% of the beans,
and 61% of the potatoes for domestic consumption. Africa has approximately 33 million small farms, representing
80 percent of all farms in the region. Despite the fact that Africa now imports huge amounts of cereals, the majority
of African farmers (many of them women) who are smallholders with farms below 2 hectares, produce a significant
amount of basic food crops with virtually no or little use of fertilizers and improved seed. In Asia, the majority of
more than 200 million rice farmers, few farm more than 2 hectares of rice make up the bulk of the rice produced by
Asian small farmers. Small increases in yields on these small farms that produce most of the worlds staple crops
will have far more impact on food availability at the local and regional levels, than the doubtful increases predicted
for distant and corporate-controlled large monocultures managed with such high tech solutions as genetically
modified seeds. 2. Small farms are more productive and resource conserving
than large-scale monocultures Although the conventional wisdom is that small family farms are
backward and unproductive, research shows that small farms are much more productive than large farms if
total output is considered rather than yield from a single crop. Integrated farming systems in which the small-scale
farmer produces grains, fruits, vegetables, fodder, and animal products out-produce yield per unit of single crops
such as corn (monocultures) on large-scale farms. A large farm may produce more corn per hectare than a small
farm in which the corn is grown as part of a polyculture that also includes beans, squash, potato, and fodder. In
polycultures developed by smallholders, productivity, in terms of harvestable products, per unit area is higher than
under sole cropping with the same level of management. Yield advantages range from 20 percent to 60 percent,
because polycultures reduce losses due to weeds, insects and diseases, and make more efficient use of the
available resources of water, light and nutrients. In overall output, the diversified farm produces much more food,
even if measured in dollars. In the USA, data shows that the smallest two hectare farms produced $15,104 per
hectare and netted about $2,902 per acre. The largest farms, averaging 15,581 hectares, yielded $249 per hectare
and netted about $52 per hectare. Not only do small to medium sized farms exhibit higher yields than conventional
farms, but do so with much lower negative impact on the environment. Small farms are multi-functional more
Communities
productive, more efficient, and contribute more to economic development than do large farms.
surrounded by many small farms have healthier economies than do communities
surrounded by depopulated, large mechanized farms. Small farmers also take better care of
natural resources, including reducing soil erosion and conserving
biodiversity. The inverse relationship between farm size and output can be
attributed to the more efficient use of land, water, biodiversity and other
agricultural resources by small farmers. So in terms of converting inputs into outputs, society would be
better off with small-scale farmers. Building strong rural economies in the Global South based on productive small-
scale farming will allow the people of the South to remain with their families and will help to stem the tide of
migration. And as population continues to grow and the amount of farmland and water available to each person
continues to shrink, a small farm structure may become central to feeding the planet, especially when large- scale
agriculture devotes itself to feeding car tanks. 3. Small traditional and biodiverse farms are
models of sustainability Despite the onslaught of industrial farming, the persistence of thousands of
hectares under traditional agricultural management documents a successful indigenous agricultural strategy of
adaptability and resiliency. These microcosms of traditional agriculture that have stood the test of time, and that
can still be found almost untouched since 4 thousand years in the Andes, MesoAmerica, Southeast Asia and parts of
Africa, offer promising models of sustainability as they promote biodiversity, thrive without agrochemicals, and
The local knowledge
sustain year-round yields even under marginal environmental conditions.
accumulated and the forms of agriculture and agrobiodiversity
during millennia
that this wisdom has nurtured, comprise a Neolithic legacy embedded with ecological
and cultural resources of fundamental value for the future of humankind.
Recent research suggests that many small farmers cope and even prepare
for climate change, minimizing crop failure through increased use of drought tolerant local
varieties, water harvesting, mixed cropping, opportunistic weeding, agroforestry and a series of other traditional
techniques. Surveys conducted in hillsides after Hurricane Mitch in Central America showed that farmers using
sustainable practices such as mucuna cover crops, intercropping, and agroforestry suffered less damage than
their conventional neighbors. The study spanning 360 communities and 24 departments in Nicaragua, Honduras
and Guatemala showed that diversified plots had 20% to 40% more topsoil, greater soil moisture, less erosion, and
experienced lower economic losses than their conventional neighbors. This demonstrates that a re-evaluation of
indigenous technology can serve as a key source of information on adaptive capacity and resilient capabilities
exhibited by small farmsfeatures of strategic importance for world farmers to cope with climatic change. In
addition, indigenous technologies often reflect a worldview and an understanding of our relationship to the natural
world that is more realistic and more sustainable that those of our Western European heritage. 4. Small farms
represent a sanctuary of GMO-free agrobiodiversity In general, traditional small scale farmers grow a wide variety of
cultivars . Many of these plants are landraces grown from seed passed down from generation to generation, more
genetically heterogeneous than modern cultivars, and thus offering greater defenses against vulnerability and
enhancing harvest security in the midst of diseases, pests, droughts and other stresses. In a worldwide survey of
crop varietal diversity on farms involving 27 crops, scientists found that considerable crop genetic diversity
continues to be maintained on farms in the form of traditional crop varieties, especially of major staple crops. In
most cases, farmers maintain diversity as an insurance to meet future environmental change or social and
economic needs. Many researchers have concluded that this varietal richness enhances productivity and reduces
yield variability. For example, studies by plant pathologists provide evidence that mixing of crop species and or
varieties can delay the onset of diseases by reducing the spread of disease carrying spores, and by modifying
environmental conditions so that they are less favorable to the spread of certain pathogens. Recent research in
China, where four different mixtures of rice varieties grown by farmers from fifteen different townships over 3000
hectares, suffered 44% less blast incidence and exhibited 89% greater yield than homogeneous fields without the
need to use chemicals. It is possible that traits important to indigenous farmers (resistance to drought, competitive
ability, performance on intercrops, storage quality, etc) could be traded for transgenic qualities which may not be
important to farmers (Jordan, 2001). Under this scenario, risk could increase and farmers would lose their ability to
adapt to changing biophysical environments and increase their success with relatively stable yields with a minimum
of external inputs while supporting their communities food security. Although there is a high probability that the
introduction of transgenic crops will enter centers of genetic diversity, it is crucial to protect areas of peasant
agriculture free of contamination from GMO crops, as traits important to indigenous farmers (resistance to drought,
food or fodder quality, maturity, competitive ability, performance on intercrops, storage quality, taste or cooking
properties, compatibility with household labor conditions, etc) could be traded for transgenic qualities (i.e. herbicide
resistance) which are of no importance to farmers who dont use agrochemicals . Under this scenario risk will
increase and farmers will lose their ability to produce relatively stable yields with a minimum of external inputs
under changing biophysical environments. The social impacts of local crop shortfalls, resulting from changes in the
genetic integrity of local varieties due to genetic pollution, can be considerable in the margins of the Global South.
Maintaining pools of genetic diversity, geographically isolated from any possibility of cross
fertilization or genetic pollution from uniform transgenic crops will create islands of intact germplasm which will
act as extant safeguards against potential ecological failure derived from the second
green revolution increasingly being imposed with programs such as the Gates-Rockefeller AGRA in Africa. These
genetic sanctuary islands will serve as the only source of GMO-free seeds that will be needed to repopulate the
organic farms in the North inevitably contaminated by the advance of transgenic agriculture. The small farmers and
indigenous communities of the Global South, with the help of scientists and NGOs, can continue to create and guard
biological and genetic diversity that has enriched the food culture of the whole planet. 5. Small farms cool
the climate While industrial agriculture contributes directly to climate
change through no less than one third of total emissions of the major g reen h ouse g ase s
Carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), small, biodiverse organic farms
have the opposite effect by sequestering more carbon in soils . Small farmers
usually treat their soils with organic compost materials that absorb and sequester carbon better than soils that are
farmed with conventional fertilizers. Researchers have suggested that the conversion of 10,000 small- to medium-
sized farms to organic production would store carbon in the soil equivalent to taking 1,174,400 cars off the road.
Further climate amelioration contributions by small farms accrue from the
fact that most use significantly less fossil fuel in comparison to
conventional agriculture mainly due to a reduction of chemical fertilizer
and pesticide use, relying instead on organic manures , legume-based rotations, and
diversity schemes to enhance beneficial insects. Farmers who live in rural communities near cities and towns and
are linked to local markets, avoid the energy wasted and the gas emissions associated with transporting food
The great advantage of small farming
hundreds and even thousands of miles. Conclusions
systems is their high levels of agrobidoversity arranged in the form of variety mixtures,
polycultures, crop-livestock combinations and/or agroforestry patterns. Modeling new agroecosystems using such
diversified designs are extremely valuable to farmers whose systems are collapsing due to debt, pesticide use,
transgenic treadmills, or climate change. Such diverse systems buffer against natural or human-induced variations
in production conditions. There is much to learn from indigenous modes of production, as these systems have a
strong ecological basis, maintain valuable genetic diversity, and lead to regeneration and preservation of
Traditional methods are particularly instructive because they
biodiversity and natural resources.
provide a long-term perspective on successful agricultural management
under conditions of climatic variability. Organized social rural movements in the Global South
oppose industrial agriculture in all its manifestations, and increasingly their territories constitute isolated areas rich
in unique agrobiodiversity, including genetically diverse material, therefore acting as extant safeguards against the
potential ecological failure derived from inappropriate agricultural modernization schemes. It is precisely the ability
to generate and maintain diverse crop genetic resources that offer unique niche possibilities to small farmers that
cannot be replicated by farmers in the North who are condemned to uniform cultivars and to co-exist with GMOs.
The cibo pulito, justo e buono that Slow Food promotes, the Fair Trade coffee, bananas, and the organic products
so much in demand by northern consumers can only be produced in the agroecological islands of the South. This
difference inherent to traditional systems, can be strategically utilized to revitalize small farming communities by
exploiting opportunities that exist for linking traditional agrobiodiversity with local/national/international markets, as
long as these activities are justly compensated by the North and all the segments of the market remain under
grassroots control. Consumers of the North can play a major role by supporting
these more equitable markets which do not perpetuate the colonial model of agriculture of the poor for the rich,
a model that promotes small biodiverse farms as the basis for
but rather
strong rural economies in the Global South. Such economies will not only
provide sustainable production of healthy, agroecologically-produced,
accessible food for all, but will allow indigenous peoples and small farmers to
continue their millennial work of building and conserving the agricultural and
natural biodiversity on which we all depend now and even more so in the
future.
Water Scarcity DA
CP results in water privatization

The FTAA will accelerate the process of privatization of water sources, as

well as their distribution and commercialization systems. This will raise
service costs and expel the rural and urban population from water-rich lands.
Access to water will be more difficult for the poor of the continent. When
the government of Cochabamba, Bolivia privatized the water in favor of
the U.S. company Bechtel, prices rose between 200 and 300%, causing
protests and demonstrations during which protesters were killed and
wounded . The FTAA tries to introduce the logic of the market, merchandise
and profits into all aspects of life. The agreement will produce large
extensions of monocultures that use up water, rivers and water sources
and turn jungles and forests into deserts. Eucalyptus and African palm plantations already
abound throughout the region. Privatization of irrigation districts is already being
threatened. At the same time, treating investment as an end will keep
governments from impeding the construction of hydroelectric dams by
multinational corporations, which will speed up the destruction of rivers .
Many dam-building projects are being planned all over the continent: Mexico, Belize, Guatemala,
Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, etc. The paper industry and others require
lots of water to be able to produce, which is why they are looking for ways
to move to regions where there is an abundance of this resource that all of
us need in order to live. International Paper, Kimberly Clark, Coca Cola and other multinational corporations are
also behind water privatization.
FTAA CP --- Defense
2AC Say No --- Status Squo Divisions
Status squo governmental development strategies ensure say
no.
Higginbottom, 2013 (Andy, principal lecturer of international politics and human rights at Kingston University
in the UK. He is also secretary of the colombia Solidarity campaign. Latin American Perspectives
http://www.neiu.edu/~dgrammen/2013HIGGINBOTTOM.pdf)
At the turn of the millennium it was fitting to present Latin America as a continent poised at the crossroads, trying
to decide the direction it would take. At issue was whether countries would accept, reject, or accommodate the
The agreement was
United States grand plan, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).
defeated, but the strategic threat behind it has taken on new forms .
While the specific indecision of that historical moment has passed the rift
that it fostered has continued to grow as each government determines
its development strategy
2AC Say No --- Generic
Political opposition throughout LA too the FTAA
Blake, 2009 (Charles, Law review THE DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN VENEZUELA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE FTAA PROCESS http://studentorgs.law.smu.edu/getattachment/International-Law-Review-Association/Resources/LBRA-
Archive/15-1/SMB107.pdf.aspx)
Yet,regarding the FTAA agenda, it is also important not to overstate the shift away
from the market in Latin America. A slim majority of the regions citizens continue to favor the market as the best
option for the irrespective countries. Furthermore, the current presidents that have emerged
from Latin Americas leftward swing have decidedly diverse economic

platforms . Some welcome a substantial role for market forces, while others (like Hugo Chavez)
stridently criticize the market at most opportunities. And still others position themselves somewhere
in the middle between those two poles. One characteristic, however, is shared by all of these leaders,
a ferocious critique of the inadequacy of the social safety nets in place
when Latin American economies shifted from state capitalism toward market
capitalism during the 1980s and 1990s
2AC Say No --- Argentina
Argentina --- Theyll use it as a scapegoat
Daremblum, 2011 (Jaime, Senior Fellow and Director of Hudson's Center for Latin American Studies, Ambassador
of Costa Rica to the United States, professor at the University of Costa Rica, Has Argentina Joined the Chvez Bloc?, March 2011
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/ArgentinaFinal.pdf)
Argentine history. The country was still recovering from a disastrous

Nstor Kirchner took office at a precarious moment in
blamed
financial crisis and currency devaluation that had occurred in 2001 and 2002. Like other Argentine leftists, Kirchner
the economic implosion on neoliberal, free-market policies implemented during the
1990s. But this argument was totally unpersuasive. As journalist Michael Reid explained in his book Forgotten Continent, What
killed Argentinas economy in 2001 was not neoliberalism or the free-market reforms, but a fiscal policy incompatible with the
Argentinas policy mix
exchange-rate regime, and a lack of policy flexibility. Indeed, Contrary to many claims,
was in direct contravention of the Washington Consensus . Moreover, the reforms that
helped pull the country out of crisis were actually neoliberal initiatives championed by Roberto Lavagna, who served as Argentine
economy minister from 2002 until 2005. The New York Times correctly described Lavagna as the main architect of the Argentine
recovery. Nevertheless, Kirchner promoted a false storyline about the crisis, and he fired
the Argentine default was attributable to U.S.
Lavagna in 2005. For Kirchner and his supporters,
style policies, and the solution was massive government spending and heavy-handed intervention in the economy.
Kirchner borrowed heavily from the Chvez playbook, with its emphasis on populism, class
warfare, and fierce denunciations of private enterprise . He nationalized the postal service,
the largest water utility, telecommunications, and railways, among other things. Kirchner also took a somewhat
authoritarian approach to Argentinas legal institutions and independent media. Meanwhile, he pursued warmer
relations with Caracas and remained cool toward Washington. The 2005 Summit of the Americas left
no doubt about his hostility toward free-market economics and the United
States, or about his willingness to indulge the antics of his Venezuelan counterpart. Held in the Argentine resort city of Mar del
Plata, the summit became a carnival of violent anti-U.S. demonstrations and Chvez-led rallies. The Venezuelan radical addressed
He brazenly declared that the
tens of thousands of supporters at a soccer stadium close to the summit.
proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would be buried in Mar del Plata. (Each one of us brought
a shovel, a gravediggers shovel, Chvez said.) Celebrity protesters included the former Argentine soccer star Diego Maradona. As
the Washington Post reported, Hundreds of protesters had traveled through the night from Buenos Aires in a mass pilgrimage led
by Maradona. Carrying signs comparing Bush to Adolf Hitler, the protesters chanted in unison as they filed into the stadium: Bush,
the fascist! Bush the terrorist! During the formal summit negotiations, Kirchner strongly
opposed the FTAA and helped scuttle its adoption . His role in torpedoing the free-trade plan
drew criticism from Mexican president Vicente Fox, a robust FTAA advocate. Kirchner responded to this criticism by suggesting that
Fox was a U.S. lackey. Chvez also called him a puppet of the empire. Later that month, the Argentine and Venezuelan presidents
held unity 3 talks and signed multiple energy pacts, with Kirchner agreeing to support Venezuelas entry into Mercosur, the South
American trade bloc. Kirchner and Chvez also discussed future energy projects and the creation of a Latin American investment
fund.
2AC Say No --- Brazil
Brazil --- 2005 proves they were crucial in causing the FTAAs
demise.
Erikson, 2010 (Daniel, Senior Associate for US policy and Director of Caribbean programs, Inter-American Dialogue,
The Centre for International Governance Innovation, The Obama Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership?,
Working Paper No. 46)
Brazil, with the worlds fifth largest population and tenth largest economy, is similarly interested in a realignment of global power
that recognizes its political and economic heft. Unlike Venezuela, however, it has been careful to ensure that its pursuit of this goal
does not veer into open conflict with the US. Indeed, Brazilian President Lula enjoyed one of the warmest relationships with President
Bush of any Latin American leader, and the personal rapport between Obama and Lula has been even warmer (see Marinis, 2010).
Still, Brazilian opposition to the FTAA helped fuel its demise in 2005, and the
country has clashed with the US in world trade talks as a leader of the G77 group of
developing countries that includes China, India and South Africa. Brazils aggressive bid to win a permanent seat on the UN Securiy
Council has led Lula on a global tour to garner support for the countrys global aspirations. Brazilian diplomacy has
focused on positioning Brazil as a leader in world the US at
affairs ready to hold
arms length when necessary (see Simpson, 2010).
1AR Say No --- Brazil
Brazil will rally opposition to prevent South American
involvement in the FTAA
Ramirez, 2005 (Shana, COHA Research Associate, The FTAA: A Recipe for Economic Disaster?
http://www.politicalaffairs.net/the-ftaa-a-recipe-for-economic-disaster/ The FTAA: A Recipe for Economic Disaster?)
Since then, both internal and external opposition have threatened the progress of the
FTAA as industrialized countries, such as the U.S., and underdeveloped countries,
like many of those to be found in Latin America, continue to clash over pivotal trade issues. While
developed nations, namely the U.S., advocate greater protection of intellectual
property rights and expanded trade in services to better protect their economic interests, less
developed nations have concentrated on ending U.S. agricultural subsidies
and freer trade in farm produce. Both questions could have significant
consequences in Latin American countries since they can neither afford to
pay the royalties attached to intellectual property rights, nor can they compete with U.S.
government-subsidized agricultural products. While the U.S. has acted as the de facto spokesman for
servitor nations such as Chile and multiple Central American countries in advocating ratification of the FTAA, Brazil
continues to challenge these efforts through its own perceived role as a regional leader. Rather
than succumbing to Washingtons enticements, Brazil has used its
political and economic clout to thwart efforts to incorporate South
America into the FTAA. The emerging regional superpower has done so by focusing much of its attention on
MERCOSUR, a free trade agreement among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, that stands to expand further as some
of its rapidly widening base of associate members may become full members in the near future. The 2004 agreement between
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), comprised of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, to
demonstrates the strengthening
end all import tariffs among member nations for the next fifteen years
bond between Latin American countries and the growing influence of MERCOSUR as a regional power.
This bond created further obstacles for FTAA ratification at the 2003 World Trade
Organization (WTO) meeting in Cancun, Mexico. There, Argentina and Brazil led a group of developing
nations against the U.S. and its supporters in advancing an alternative WTO agricultural proposal
that called for more concessions on subsidies from wealthier nations, without requiring increased access to their own agricultural
markets. As a result of trade discrepancies, the Cancun talks collapsed, and in 2004, FTAA negotiations were suspended, spurring a
division that has and will likely continue to inhibit the Bush administrations ratification efforts.
2AC Say No --- Venezuela
Venezuela
Pelzman, 2011 (Joseph, Department of Economics @ George Washington University US-Regional Agreements with
Latin America - The Long and Unsuccessful Saga of CAFTA and the FTAA http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/jpelzman/Working
%20Papers/US_Regional_Agreements%20with%20Latin-America_01_2011.pdf)
Most Latin American leaders generally support the establishment of a hemispheric free trade area, believing that
there are a
an FTAA will help bring about greater prosperity, competition, and entrepreneurial activity. But
number of critics like Venezuela , which is one of the main opponents to
globalization and free trade agreements. They claim that the United States
will benefit the most from the arrangement by demanding further opening of Latin American markets to
U.S. goods while following a protectionist course 43 for politically sensitive U.S. industries such
as steel and agriculture.
2AC Say No --- 2013 Summit
2013 Summit of the Pacific Alliance proves
Galardy, 2013 (Anubis, Editor in Chief @ Digital Granma International, Pacific Alliance: Return of the FTAA?
http://www.granma.cu/ingles/ouramerica-i/6jun-Pacific.html)
THE Summit of the Pacific Alliance, comprising Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Peru, which took place May 23
in Cali, Colombia, left clear its pretension to become the new economic and
development organization for Latin America and the Caribbean, within a framework of the
free circulation of goods, services, capital and persons among its member states. The idea of former
Peruvian President Alan Garca, formalized in Chile in 2012, the implementation of this new regional mechanism has
generated rejection, criticism and distrust . Argentine political analyst Atilio

Born defined it as a political-economic maneuver on the part of Washington
to retrieve its lost influence in the region , after the 2005 defeat in Mar del Plata
of its grand strategic project, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In other words, the plan is to build a kind of contra-
insurgency or reactionary corridor to counterbalance the radical or moderate left in the region, Born emphasized. Peruvian
the Alliance is also a resurgence of the
researcher Carlos Alonso agrees with this perception. For him,
failed FTAA, this time in an undisguised neoliberal version .

2AC Say No --- Anti-FTAA
Anti-FTAA
Bello, 2005 (Walden, professor of sociology and public administration at the University of the Philippines Diliman, as well
as executive director of Focus on the Global South, ORIGINAL FTAA VISION SCRAPPED AS PEOPLE POUR INTO MIAMI FOR ANTI-FREE
TRADE PROTEST http://focusweb.org/node/193)
The United States will try to paint the Miami meeting of the Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA)
Miami, Nov. 20.
as a success, but the reality is that the anti-FTAA side has pulled off a victory. This
was the assessment of movement leaders as thousands of protesters from all over the
Americas converged on this city for Friday's March for Global Justice and the Miami-Dade Country police mounted a massive show of
the people were not cowed was evident at
force to intimidate the opposition. Protesters not Intimidated That
the "Gala for Global Justice" on the evening of Wednesday, November 19. Opposition to the FTAA and people coming
together for "another world" was the theme of event, which featured a program of music and
speeches from activists from throughout the Americas. Representing the US labor movement in the program, Leo
Girard, president of the United Steelworkers Union, declared, "We will not let them steal our sovereignty. This
is not just about trade but also about investment and privileges for greedy investors and financiers. This fight is a fight for our
children and grandchildren." He singled out the contribution ofstudent activists against sweatshops, telling the story of
how earlier in the afternoon, "on the way to Guzman Park to attend the People's Forum, we saw a group of students
surrounded by cops and searched. And guess what, hundreds of steelworkers surrounded the cops and told them to let the students
go. And they did." And that brought the crowd to its feet.
2AC Say No --- Suspicion
Countries will say no --- suspicion of US intentions
Luxner, 2009 ( Larry Luxner is news editor of The Washington Diplomat, What the World Wants From Barack
Obama,The Washington Diplomat February 2009, http://washdiplomat.com/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=6304:what-the-world-wants-from-barack-obama&catid=974:february-2009&Itemid=259
Latin America U.S. relations with Latin America, currently at an all-time low, have
nowhere to go but up with the inauguration of Barack Obama as president, although the area of
free trade may be a notable exception . In late 2008, both Venezuela and
Bolivia expelled the U.S. ambassadors to those countries as Venezuelan President Hugo
Chvez continued to heap verbal abuse on Bush and the United States in general.
Washington has also seen its historic influence in the region decline substantially ,
with inroads by new economic powers such as Russia, China and even Iran. In
late November, Russian warships arrived in Venezuela for a series of military exercises, marking Moscows first show of naval force
the regional powerhouse Brazil remains
in the region since the Cold War. At the same time,
deeply suspicious of Obamas views on free trade. The president-elect

supports taxing Brazils sugarcane-derived ethanol, which is more
competitive than U.S. corn-based biofuels, and Obama has been openly
critical of pending free trade deals with countries such as Colombia and
Panama a position that will probably be hardened by the current economic crisis. Furthermore,
chances that negotiations over President Bushs long-cherished dream of a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) will be resumed are minimal , because few South American countries
seem to be interested in that process. The Mercosur trade bloc, led by Brazil and Argentina,
has proven to be far more popular and effective yet another sign of
Washingtons diminishing influence throughout the region.
1AR Say No --- Suspicion
There is zero support for the CP --- Fear of losing sovereignty.
Ribeiro, 2008 (Gilberto, Centro de Estudios Econmicos para America Latina BRAZIL AND THE FREE TRADE AREA OF
THE AMERICAS (FTAA))
The opposition to the FTAA has not only existed in South American
nations, but is evident in the United States as well . Jasper (2004) contends that the opposition exists
because of the belief that the creators of the FTAA document have the intention of building an
international plan that would override the governments and national independence of all nations under
the umbrella of the FTAA (p. 21). Jasper (2004) states that the ministers of the FTAA have prepared plans that would allow the FTAA governing body to preside over such issues as
environment, labor, wages, health care, education, foreign aid, welfare, housing, taxation, investment, agriculture, narcotics control, immigration, border control, counter-terrorism (p.
this would mean that all elements of society in the countries that participate in FTAA would
21). Essentially,
cease to be governed by their own constitutions and cultural beliefs, but rather would be
subjected to the governance of an international board that would control
the lives of people within each nation signing the FTAA agreement (Jasper, 2004, p. 21). Jasper (2004) voices his thoughts that
the scope of the FTAA is challenged because it impacts the sovereignty of nations and the identity of populations that have struggled to create their own way of life and their own
cultural independence (p. 21). If FTAA is ever implemented, it is believed, there will be a new rule within these nations that obliterates
sovereignty and provides for world domination by powers unknown (Jasper, 2004, p. 21)
Ideological opposition to the FTAA

Ortiza and Tajesb, 2009 (Jaime, Division of International Programs and A.R. Sanchez, Jr. School of Business
at Texas A&M International University, Maria, Department of Languages and Cultures, College of Humanities and Social Sciences at
William Paterson University of New Jersey The SLEPT Aspects of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
http://www.craig.csufresno.edu/International_Programs/JC/IJB/Volumes/Volume%2014/V143-3.pdf)
Furthermore, FTAA negotiations have basically stalled since 2003 due to a rising
ideological opposition at national and hemispheric levels for outlining a process that would redefine
multilateralism. Lately, countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have
made clear that conditions for establishing the FTAA are not simply there and
have rather pursued their own alternative regional schemes. Others which include Argentina, Brazil, and Chile
have entertained themselves in more conventional strategic bilateral deals until the World
Trade Organization (WTO) completes its round of negotiations. Hence, the broader debate on regional integration requires advancing
a more holistic approach to contextualize the significance of the FTAA in a multidimensional fashion.
2AC CP Links to the Net Benefit
The CP links to unilateralism --- they dont want the FTAA
Getz, 2011 (Matt, International Arbitration Paralegal at Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP Acknowledging the
Americas http://cpreview.org/2011/10/acknowledging-the-americas/)
Nevertheless, the United States no longer possesses the political capital to act
without regard to each nations interests and political environment . In the past,
the Latin American countries were viewed as junior partners; the US would paternalistically exploit
the regions perceived weaknesses to make policy demands. The seniorjunior partner
dynamic is now a relic of the past . Recent history offers an illuminating negative example: the Bush
administrations failure to bring the FTAA to fruition. The proposed agreement
ignored the rejection of boundless neoliberalism throughout Latin

America, disregarded the regions existing institutions of economic
integration, and paid no attention to fundamental differences in the
conditions between countries. For the US to maintain a contribution to
policymaking in the Americas and to counteract the steady emergence of new actors like China in the region, its
diplomacy must be smarter.
2AC Links to Politics
CP Links to politics
such harmonization would require inter alia augmenting Canadian

However,
obligations in NAFTA and unraveling politically sensitive compromises on

FTA origin rules for textiles, clothing, and agricultural products. Such a result is highly unlikely.
While it is conceivable that a more limited outcome could balance US and LAC
interests, the trade benefits resulting from such a modest undertaking would not seem
sufficient to justify the political cost /risk of going back to Congress for
another vote on these pacts. For Congress to approve changes in existing US trade barriers of
interest to Brazil and other Latin American countries, US negotiators need to receive concrete
commitments that open access to those markets for US exporters and investors. In short, the FTAA has to be a
big deal, or the deal wont fly.

2AC They Wont do the Plan
Latin American countries wont agree to do the plan --- they
dont want to give any concessions.
Saguier, 2012 (Marcelo, FLACSO-Argentina, Relaciones Internacionales / International Relations, Faculty Member Free
Trade Area of the Americas
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog221/abstract;jsessionid=A15A97C578EC290CFACD584A7A8AC48B.
d01t02?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false)
a series of concerns which explains why it could not

This trade integration project raised
be materialized. First , FTAA negotiations stumbled over the reticence of

the U.S. to commit to the liberalisation of its agricultural subsidies and
antidumping measures , and of some Latin American countries (particularly those of
MERCOSUR) to agree on rules in the areas of government procurements ,
intellectual property rights , investments and services. In both cases, the U.S. and
the MERCOSUR countries were reluctant to give concessions in these sensitive areas
in the context of an FTAA agreement, preferring in turn to negotiate these issues in the WTO. Second,
the FTAA project faced great domestic opposition in most countries among
trade unions and various social sectors that represented the would-be losers of
trade liberalization. The FTAA did not contemplate a compensation mechanism to mitigate the negative distributional effects on
vulnerable sectors. Trade integration could exacerbate the extreme asymmetries in

the levels of development that already exist between and across countries of the continent. Only the
largest and most competitive sectors and companies in the region, mainly from the U.S., could benefit from
this kind of integration. In this sense the FTAA would have reinforced the control of a small
number of firms over most sectors of the continents economies, undermining the rule of law
and the policy autonomy of states to promote sustainable forms of development (Barenberg and Evans 2004, Gill 2002).
Resistance to the FTAA project was bolstered with the formation of a broad-based continental transnational coalition that pursued
alternative approach to integration (Saguier 2007).
Consult Brazil --- Defense
2AC --- No Relations Net Benefit
CP isnt sufficient --- Brazils interests extend beyond
consultation
Sweig, 2013 (Julia, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies Global
Brazil Initiative http://www.cfr.org/projects/world/global-brazil-initiative/pr1471)
The Global Brazil initiative at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) addresses the domestic, regional, and international dimensions
Brazil's rise is today well established. Yet even as global
of Brazil's emergence as a world power.
challenges increasingly form part of the U.S.-Brazil agenda, the United
States faces a glaring deficit in its understanding of Brazil's interests and
influence . The scope and importance of Brazil's emergence extends well
beyond the U.S.-Brazil relationship. To enhance the quality of public and policy debate on the bilateral and global
dimensions of Brazil's rise, the program includes research, consultation, publication, and outreach exploring Brazil's international
agenda.
1AR --- No Relations DOHA/UN
Relation Collapse inevitable --- DOHA, subsidies, and the UN
Meyer, 2013 (Peter, Analyst in Latin American Affairs @ Congressional Research Service Brazil-U.S. Relations
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf)
Although Brazil and the United States share a number of common goals, the
countries occasionally divergent national interests and independent foreign policies have
led to disagreements on trade and political matters. Some long-running
disputes include the stalled Doha trade negotiations and Brazilian
opposition to U.S. cotton subsidies . Additional differences have emerged in recent
years, many of which have centered on the countries approaches to foreign policy. In 2010 and
2011, for example, Brazil used its temporary seat on the U.N. Security Council to advocate
engagement with internationally isolated regimes like Iran, Libya, and Syria, rather than
sanctions, which it views as a prelude to armed conflict. Some analysts and policymakers assert that Brazils
increasing global prominence and involvement on an array of issues will inevitably
lead to disputes with the United States and that managing those disputes in a transparent and respectful
manner will be crucial to maintaining friendly relations moving forward.86
1AR --- No Relations Net Benefit --- Iran
Iran tanks relations
Hakim, 2011 (Peter, Foreign Service Journal Brazil and the U.S.: Remaking a Relationship
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2679)
The most serious clashes between the U.S. and Brazil are likely to arise over
global, not regional, issues. What has most exasperated Washington and unsettled
bilateral relations in recent years is Brasilias close, supportive relationship with Iran,
including strong and growing economic ties. U.S. officials were encouraged that President Rouseff swiftly changed Brazilian policy in
one crucial area: Her government will no longer ignore or downplay Tehrans repression, and she has instructed her United Nations
it remains uncertain how
ambassador to endorse an investigation of human rights abuses in Iran. However,
Brasilia will deal with other U.S. concerns, such as Irans support of terrorist
groups and its unrelenting threats toward Israel.
CP Doesnt Solve
Brazil wont engage --- too many structural differences.
Strategic Studies, at the national Defense Univ ersity, Member of the advisory Council of the Brazil institute at the Woodrow Wilson
The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping interests, but a formal
strategic partnership is probably out of the question for both countries . In
the United States, Brazil must compete for policy attention with China, India,
Russia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the
United States. Moreover, despite Brazils importance in multilateral organizations, particularly the UN,
Brazil can be of limited practical assistance at best to the United States in its two current
wars. Brazils interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to
distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can
expect automatic agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be
politically necessary to highlight differences even when interests are
similar. But both countries should make every effort to develop a habit of permanent consultation in an effort to coordinate
policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific
interests and policies often may differ.
Unilateralism
2AC --- Unilateralism Inevitable
US unilateral action is inevitable ideology committing to
multilateralism in one instance doesnt solve
Bass 9 (James E Bass, Major, US Air Force, Unilateral vs. Multilateral
Engagement: A Scenario-Based Approach to Guiding Americas Future Foreign
Policy, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, p. 3-6, April 2009,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA539615)
According to Stewart Patrick of the Center on International Cooperation, Americas preference for
unilateral engagement is explained by three inherent characteristics.
First, a sense of exceptionalism that evolved from Americas founding
principles has had major influence on US policy goals and engagement.5 As a
champion for liberal principles the US is motivated to cooperate with others to promote universal prosperity and
American exceptionalism also motivates the US to protect
security. Nevertheless,
its values, and avoid any engagement that might infringe upon its
sovereignty.6 In fact, Americas preoccupation with safeguarding sovereignty yielded a predilection for
unilateralism throughout the 1900s.7 Not until it attained great power status, did the US consent to multilateralism.
Specifically, after World War II, the US employed multilateralism to rebuild a favorable international framework that
would counter the strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union. The Cold War dominated foreign policy until the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the Cold War period foreign policy was dictated by the executive
branch and focused primarily on the threat of nuclear war. The President committed to multilateral agreements
Second, the system of checks and balances built
where it served national security.8
into the US Constitution produced a separation of powers that limits the
governments ability to endorse multilateral commitments. Specifically, two-thirds
of the Senate must support a treaty for ratification to occur. This construct makes it possible for
political minorities to hinder multilateral engagement. 9 For example, during World
War I the Republican-controlled Senate rejected US membership in the League of Nations despite President Wilsons
Third, Americas current hegemonic status provides incentive to
support.10
act unilaterally because multilateral engagement is based on rules and
norms rather than power. As a consequence, the weaker power is strengthened from the benefits of
multilateral cooperation, while the stronger power endures the costs of restraint.11 For example, a given UN
convention limiting freedom of action with regard to national instruments of power could severely hamper
achievement of US strategic objectives putting vital interests at risk. On the same note, such a convention could
embolden a weaker adversary to hold US interests at risk without fear of retribution assuming that the US will limit
it is helpful to note specific instances
its response within the restraints of the convention. Here
in which the three inherent characteristics aforementioned have guided US
action on foreign policy issues. To begin with, the US has used military force
without United Nations (UN) approval. While the US did attain UN approval for coalition
intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Americas frustrations with the impediments of multilateralism lead it
to act without UN approval in the 1998 bombing of Iraq and the 1999 ousting of Serbian forces from Kosovo.
These interventions set a precedent for the future unilateral use of force.12
Indeed, the US demonstrated its most dramatic disregard for international
institutions in March of 2003 when President Bush unilaterally issued Saddam Hussein an ultimatum
despite a lack of UN support. While the US made an effort to gain UN authorization for the war in Iraq, there is little
doubt that the administration had already determined its intended course of action prior to submitting the UN
proposal for use of force in February of 2003. Americas praiseworthy efforts to gain UN support was a multilateral
endeavor that initially suppressed anti-American sentiments.13 However, the Bush Doctrine and Americas failed
efforts to restore stability in post-war Iraq proved US policy to be shortsighted resulting in international opposition
to US policy and calling into question traditional east-west alliances.14 At the same time, the US has increasingly
restricted support for UN peacekeeping operations since its failures in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.15 In
addition to declining peacekeeping assistance, the US is also to blame, in part, for the shortcomings in UN
effectiveness due to its neglectful financial provisions. In fact, the UN case is only one of several instances in which
the US demonstrated a disregard for international institutions through its waning financial support during the
The US has also shown disregard for multilateral cooperation on
1990s.16
global security issues. Regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats, the US Senate approved
the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 only after insisting on exemptions that diluted its impact, and in 1999
the Senate weakened nonproliferation efforts and snubbed allies when it rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty.17 Also in 1999, the US upset international order by espousing support for a national missile defense (NMD)
system that violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Risking global strategic stability, in 2001 the Bush
administration pushed Moscow for modification of the ABM Treaty, and subsequently withdrew unilaterally in 2002
after failing to secure Russias cooperation.18 Yet another example of US indifference to multilateral cooperation
with regard to WMD threats involves the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Ineffective due to the absence
of a compliance scheme, international efforts to implement verification procedures were rejected by the Bush
US lack of
administration in 2001on the grounds that they did not coincide with US national interests.19
interest in multilateral cooperation on global security issues extends
beyond WMD threats. For example, in 1997 the Clinton administration refused to sign the Ottawa
Convention banning antipersonnel land mines. Despite the fact that the convention has been signed by 156
countries, the US still declines accession arguing that land mines are a critical component of its Korea strategy.20
Also in 2001, a draft UN convention to limit small arms trafficking was singularly opposed by the Bush
administrations insistence on curtailment of the conventions terms. The US was uncompromising on limits to
civilian small arms ownership and advocated several other changes that weakened the draft convention.21 The US
has held many countries to high standards on international issues such as human rights, technology transfers,
antiterrorism, and narcotics interdiction, imposing punishment on those that fail to meet US standards.22
Nevertheless, the US has frequently been wary of taking on international commitments. For example, the US has
declined to ratify the International Criminal Court and the UN conventions on the Rights of the Child and Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women. While the US was a major contributor to the growth of multilateral free trade
initiatives in the 1990s, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization, it
The US has also been reluctant to
engaged in unilateralism to gain market concessions.23
embrace conventions that address world-wide issues such as global
warming, evidenced by the Bush administrations refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in
2001.
2AC --- Unilateralism Kills Heg
Multilateralism kills heg and doesnt solve the case solutions
are watered down
Bass 9 (James E Bass, Major, US Air Force, Unilateral vs. Multilateral
Engagement: A Scenario-Based Approach to Guiding Americas Future Foreign
Policy, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, p. 8, April 2009,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA539615)
Proponents of unilateralism note a number of problems with multilateral cooperation. First, multilateral
arrangements limit the power that the US derives from its hegemonic
status by restricting the range of options available to act on issues of
national interest. The argument follows that a unilateral engagement policy affords the US full
sovereignty and the freedom to pursue courses of action devoid of outside interference. Second, multilateral
institutions subject the US to free-riding and buck passing.28 In the first
instance, the US is subject to the costs of participation as an endowed
contributor, while free-riding members benefit from the resources supplied
by the US, incurring no costs of membership. In the second case, inefficiencies in the
institution develop when responsibilities are not clearly delegated. Often a key contributor in multilateral
the US bears the burden of responsibility because lesser members
institutions,
neglect to assume a contributing role. Third, practicing multilateralism
usually requires consent of all members when engaging institutional
issues. This course of action not only prevents members from acting
swiftly, it also results in watered down policy that limits goals and
restricts means for implementation. Lastly, opponents of multilateralism suggest that
involvement in international institutions weakens US sovereignty by subjugating it to institutional governance.29
Unilateralists fear this arrangement could mandate US engagement on
issues which the US has no interest.
2AC --- Multilateralism Fails --- NPT
Multilateralism Fails --- Nuclear prolif proves its ineffective
A slightly different, but compatible reason for the paucity of theory concerning multilateralism is that there may
be so little multilateralism in practice (Caporaso 1992: 600). Nam (2009b: 135) asks, when
was the
last time you heard that a large number of countries agreed to a major
international accord on a pressing issue? His answer: Not in more than a decade . The
World Trade Organisation (WTO) is now a teenager. The same is true of the last major multilateral security
agreement: the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And even it has not deterred
India, Pakistan and North Korea joined soon by Iran? from becoming nuclear
powers. Equally compatible is the view that multilateralism is now an historical artifact
of the Cold War. By many accounts, interest in multilateralism first developed
when it came to be seen as a solution to the problem of nuclear
proliferation. It also became a battle cry for the non-aligned movement, led by Nehrus India, which
sought to develop a 3rd way alternative to alignment with one or the other superpower. The Cold War is
now history. Attempts at multilateral arms control have been, on balance,
ineffective . Indias desire to promote multilateralism seems a rather low priority of its foreign policy.
1AR --- Multilateralism Fails --- Non-State
Nonstate actors prevent effective multilateral efforts
Alternatively, non-state actors may act as roadblocks to new multilateral

agreements, such as on climate change , or even seek to scupp er existing
cooperation as, for example, on whaling. In any event, there is widespread consensus that non-state actors
have become progressively more assertive in demanding a voice at the
top decision-making tables (Thakur 2002: 270). Research on multilateralism thus may need to depart from
the time-honoured, state-centric assumptions of IR scholarship
1AR --- Multilateralism Fails --- Leaders
Multilateralism fails --- Latin American distinct political
scenarios prevent effectiveness.
research must investigate political space beyond the structural

What's more,
features of the international order. Politics at the domestic level of

individual states especially great powers historically have facilitated or debilitated
multilateralism . As Ruggie (1992: 592) argues, a pronounced shift toward multilateralism in
economic and security affairs requires a combination of fairly strong international forces and
compatible domestic environments
2AC AT: Soft Power
Soft Power fails and rival nations solve the impact
Neu, 2013 (Richard, senior economist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation U.S. 'Soft Power' Abroad Is Losing
Its Punch http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/02/us-soft-power-abroad-is-losing-its-punch.html)
The way America flexes it economic muscle around the world is changing
dramaticallyand not necessarily for the better. In 1997, facing a wave of sovereign debt defaults, the International
Monetary Fund asked its member states to pledge lines of credit to support Fund rescue efforts. The United States and other nations
did as asked. In 2009, the United States responded again to a call for expanded credit lines. When the Fund sought yet another
expansion of these credit lines last April, 39 countries, including China, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, India, and Saudi Arabia, stepped up.
the
Even cash-strapped Italy and Spain pledged support. But the United States was conspicuously absent. A pledge from
United States requires congressional authorization. In the midst of last spring's contentious
debate over U.S. government deficits and debts, support for an international body was a
political nonstarter . Where the United States had previously demonstrated international leadership, other
countriessome of them America's rivals for international influencenow make the running. This is
a small example of what may be a troubling trend: America's fiscal predicament and the seeming
inability of its political system to resolve these matters may be taking a

toll on the instruments of U.S. soft power and on the country's ability to
shape international developments in ways that serve American interests.
The most potent instrument of U.S. soft power is probably the simple size of the U.S. economy. As the biggest economy in the world,
America has a lot to say about how the world works. But the economics profession is beginning to understand that high levels of
public debt can slow economic growth, especially when gross general government debt rises above 85 or 90 percent of GDP. The
United States crossed that threshold in 2009, and the negative effects are probably mostly out in the future. These will come at a
bad time. The U.S. share of global economic output has been falling since 1999by
nearly 5 percentage points as of 2011. As America's GDP share declined, so did its share of world trade,
which may reduce U.S. influence in setting the rules for international
trade. And it's not just the debt itself that may be slowing GDP growth. Economists at Stanford and the University of Chicago
have demonstrated that uncertainty about economic policyon the rise as a result of political squabbling
over U.S. fiscal policytypically foreshadows slower economic growth. Investors may be
growing skittish about U.S. government debt levels and the disordered state of U.S. fiscal policymaking. From the
beginning of 2002, when U.S. government debt was at its most recent minimum as a share of GDP, to the end of 2012, the dollar
lost 25 percent of its value, in price-adjusted terms, against a basket of the currencies of major trading partners. This may have
been because investors fear that the only way out of the current debt problems will be future inflation. The dollar has also
given up a bit of its dominance as the preferred currency for international reserves among advanced economies. And
the renminbi appears to have replaced the dollar as the reference currency for most of East Asia. (The good news is that in recent
years U.S. banks have increased their share of deposits from foreigners, mostly at the expense of banks in London.) More troubling
private domestic investmentthe fuel for future economic growthshows a
for the future is that
strong negative correlation with government debt levels over several business cycles dating back to the late
1950s. Continuing high debt does not bode well in this regard. But perhaps the worst consequences of U.S. debt are actions not
taken. U.S. international leadership has been based , in part, on contributionspolitical and
financialto major institutions and initiativesInternational Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
(and later World Trade Organization), NATO, North America Free Trade Agreement, the Marshall Plan, and so on. These served U.S.
interests and made the world better. But what have we done lately? The Doha round of trade negotiations has stalled. Ditto efforts
at coordinated international action on climate change. Countries of the Arab Spring need rebuilding. Little progress is apparent on
the Transpacific Partnership, a proposed new free-trade area. And warnings from the U.S. treasury secretary to his European
counterparts about the dangers of failing to resolve the fiscal crisis in the eurozone met with public rebukes: Get your own house in
order before you lecture us. Have U.S. fiscal problems undermined America's self confidence and external credibility to the extent
that it can no longer lead? And what about unmet needs at homehealthcare costs, a foundering public education system,
A strained fiscal situation that limits
deteriorating infrastructure, and increasing inequality?
resources for action and absorbs so much political energy cannot be
helping with any of these matters. But without progress on such things, what becomes of the social cohesion necessary for
unified action abroad or the moral authority to lead other nations by example? America's fiscal predicament is serious. The problem
has become obvious in the last few years, but it has been building for decades, largely the result of promises of extensive social
benefits without a corresponding willingness to pay for them. Putting U.S. government financing on a sustainable path will require
painful adjustments over a number of yearsincreased government revenue and painful reductions in government outlays, almost
certainly including outlays for defense and international affairs. During the necessary period of fiscal adjustment and constrained
government resources, U.S. international influence may decline yet further.

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NDI 2013 6WS Process

Text: The United States federal government should propose to

it is important that the United

must have stronger engagement from member governments, including

And Mexico is more likely to agree to the plan than the CP

willingness to create opportunities to strengthen the ties of cooperation

Text: The United States federal government should propose to

must have stronger engagement from member governments, including

And Venezuela is much more likely to be receptive to the

Mexico says yes for economic engagement empirically proven

Mexico and Latin America cooperate with the OAS

Mexico wants the OAS to be involved organized crime summit

Venezuela says yes - empirics

They go to the OAS to try and promote energy interests

told OAS representatives that there is need to consider whether energy

OAS solves drug trafficking in Latin America

Solves Latin American growth

OAS solves human rights promotion better than the aff

OAS solves and promotes US interests

OAS is key most effective body in Latin America

Cooperative engagement is key and resolves your solvency

US cooperation through the OAS solves

OAS solves and promotes US interests

OAS is key most effective body in Latin America

Cooperative engagement is key and resolves your solvency deficits

US cooperation through the OAS solves

Perm links to the net benefit unilateral action undermines the

collaboration and progress within the most inclusive multilateral body

Nevertheless, the Obama administration has yet to

formulate a coherent Latin American policy and doubts about U.S.

attempts to unite is all too apparent in its approach to the organization.

condemnation of the OAS is misguided because the organizations

relevance and value depend on the political and financial contributions of

Unconditional Support for multilateral institutions is key

Only the cp resolves suspicions and causes the topic country to

unilateral behavior can undermine ones reputation relates to U.S.

Threaten to cut funding CP? Or the cp doesnt solve

Democracy clauses builds support for engagement, LA will say

placing the FTAA in a broader political and security framework, a

Latin America would agree -- the democracy clause is crucial to

skeptics might argue that such

MERCOSUR trading partners, led by Brazil, threatened to invoke the

democracy clauses; the FTAA would simply be modeling itself on steps

The plan can be done through the FTAA --- itll be

placing the FTAA in a broader political and security framework, a

arrangements, they do signal a political will to consolidate regional

adopting a democratic charter calling for sanctions against non-democratic

The democracy clause builds support for the negotiations.

a varied ideological spectrum poses problems for consolidating the

institutional governance requires invoking the democracy clause which

providing greater opportunity for production-sharing technology transfer that can

Latin American nations will agree -- trade liberalization

Obamas built support

Brazil will agree --- seen as US reciprocation.

Brazil will agree --- trade importance

Alternatively,the hub-and-spoke approach could be geared primarily to achieving the countrys

The recent global economic downturn has accentuated the importance of

trade has been the anchor of the LAC regions

FTAA catalyzes exports and trade within Latin America

the FTAA is conceptually very relevant for Latin

opportunities to Brazil and others.

Under the most favorable scenario, the agenda-setting nation would

to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from