A.C. No.

6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for
serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, 1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal
complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document 4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn
A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury 5 against
complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and
notarized by me under the following circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located
at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby

disqualified to own real property in his name agreed that the property be
transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several

documents that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the
property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,

recognizing Mr. Stiers free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence
and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan
which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6

Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge
that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious
misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred
for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest
scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case
against him upon the instigation of complainants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, 7 because
respondent refused to act as complainants witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay.
Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its
genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner
San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a
"scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the
Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law
for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with
modification, the Report and recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for six
months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that
he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending
cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and his six minor
children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP
had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the
laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. 9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or
who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the
lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real
property.11 Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of
ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly
rectified his act and transferred the title in complainants name. But respondent provided "some
safeguards" by preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would
guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainants
name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he
prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to
malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three
years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re:
Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for
preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and
allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1
and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this
Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

JUSTICE CASTRO 64 scra 784

As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an
"officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only
criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From
a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.

Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society
whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of
truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis
supplied.)

DAYAN STA. ANA CHRISTIAN A.C. No. 5542

NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSOCIATION, INC. and/or its
Officers, Members, namely:
MINERVA A. GENATO, Present:
JULIETA P. BENEDICTO,
PRAXEDES A. MORENO,
PATRICIA DE GUZMAN, PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
PACITA G. MEQUERIO, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
HELEN RESUELLO, RIC DE AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
GUZMAN, and ERLINDA CALLEJO, SR., and
RAMIREZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Complainants,
- versus -
ATTY. NAPOLEON A. Promulgated:
ESPIRITU,
Respondent. July 20, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant disbarment case was filed by the officers/members of the Dayan Sta. Ana
Christian Neighborhood Association Inc., charging Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu with
deceitful conduct, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, and/or violation of oath of
office. The charges are contained in the Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated May 17, 2001.

Complainants sought the services of respondent sometime in November 1997 regarding

a consolidated ejectment case where they were being sued in their respective capacities
as officers and members of the association. The case, docketed as Civil Case Nos.
153905-90, was pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26.
Complainants lost, however, and respondent advised them to file a supersedeas bond to
stay their eviction.[2] Complainants then entrusted the following amounts to respondent
as payment therefor:

a.) On and , he received the amount of P12,000.00 and P13,000.00 respectively from
Minerva Genato. (Annexes B and B-1)
b.) On , he received the amount of P41,257.00 from Rico Ramirez. (Annex C)
c.) On , he received from us the amount of P116,605.00, which are imparted under the
following circumstances:
c.1.) Ric De Guzman ---------- P14,010.00
c.2.) Patricia De Guzman ---------- P15,784.00
c.3.) Ben/Lita Benedicto ---------- P37,870.00
c.4.) Helena Resuello ---------- P11,363.00
c.5.) Praxedes ---------- P12,040.00
c.6.) Pacita Moquerio ---------- P25,538.00
which he receipted erroneously in the amount of P86,666.72, but duly corrected by one
of the members thereon. The aforesaid amount was accepted by him in the name of
Dayan as shown by the receipt he issued thereto marked as Annex D.
d.) Again for the same reason, on he received the amount of P8,930.00 from us the
following:
d.1.) Ric De Guzman ---------- P1,250.00
d.2.) Patricia De Guzman ---------- P1,125.00
d.3.) Ben/Lita Benedicto ---------- P3,130.00
d.4.) Helena Resuello ---------- P 625.00
d.5.) Praxedes ---------- P 935.00
d.6.) Pacita Moquerio ---------- P1,865.00
which he again receipted under Dayan as evidenced by hereto attached copy of the
receipt marked as Annex E.
e.) On , he received again from Rico/Erlinda Ramirez the amount of P3,370.00. (Annex
F)
f.) Also on , he received from Minerva Genato the amount of P4,000.00. (Annex H)
g.) On , he received from Manuel Rivera/Myrna Sayson the amount of P2,000.00
(Annex H) and Prima Fidel the amount of P4,000.00. (Annex H-1)
h.) On , he received from Minerva Genato the amount of P4,000.00. (Annex I).[3]
According to complainants, respondent deposited only P48,000.00 before the Clerk of
Court as evidenced by receipts furnished by respondent himself.[4] Association
President Minerva Genato then made a verbal demand for respondent to return the
remaining balance, upon which respondent delivered a personal check for P141,904.00
in the name of Atty. Leonardo Ocampo. The check bounced for insufficiency of funds.
Consequently, Atty. Ocampo sent a demand letter[5] to Genato to make good the
payment of the check. Genato continued to make verbal demands and later sent a
letter[6] dated May 25, 2000 demanding the payment of the amount of the check, to no
avail. The Association was thus constrained to seek the help of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Through Atty. Helengrace G. Cabasal, another demand letter[7] dated
July 17, 2000 was sent for respondent to return the remaining balance of P206,497.00.
An Information[8] charging respondent with estafa was likewise filed before the RTC of
Manila.

In his Comment, [9] respondent admitted that he deposited to the clerk of court the
amount of P48,481.00 as partial supersedeas bond. In his desire to help complainants, he
talked to the counsel of plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 153905-90. Respondent likewise
admitted that he issued a postdated check to cover the balance (P141,904.00), and that
he was unable to fund the same. He, however, made arrangements with Atty. Ocampo
and his clients for the payment of the subject check, and requested the latter for
complainants to stay in the subject property until December 1999, or even beyond. He
pointed out that it was upon his representations that complainants were allowed to stay
in the subject premises up to the present, and that the said amount (P141,904.00 and not
P206,497.00 as falsely claimed by complainants), was meant as payment for supersedeas
bond in Civil Case No. 153686-CV for the use and occupation of the complainants of
the subject property from January 1991 to December 1996. Respondent likewise
disclosed that complainants had lodged several complaints against him for estafa and/or
theft in connection with the amount covered by the postdated check which he issued in
favor of Atty. Ocampo, which, however, are all baseless. He insisted that complainants
have no cause of action against him, and that the instant administrative complaint must
be dismissed outright for the following reasons:

As stated earlier, the basis of this administrative case as well as the criminal complaints
is the demand letter to Atty. Ocampo to make good the check issued by respondent, and
in case of failure, Atty. Ocampo will insist on the issuance of the execution. It bears
stressing, however, that because of the arrangement made by respondent with Atty.
Ocampo, and as per their (Atty. Ocampo and the respondent) agreement, Atty. Ocampo
no longer pursued the eviction f the complainants. UP TO THE PRESENT,
complainants are still in the premises in question.
The complainants were never prejudiced by the bounced check and the demand letter
sent by Atty. Ocampo to the complainants. On the contrary, they have benefited by the
representations made by respondent to Atty. Ocampo. Moreover, respondent had made
representations with the City Council of Manila for the expropriation of the premises in
question, which is now under consideration by the said City Council.
Hence, complainants have no cause to complain. In fact, they should be grateful to the
respondent because without his representations with Atty. Ocampo and the plaintiff in
CIVIL CASE NO. 153686-CV, and with the City Council of Manila, complainants
have long been evicted from the said premises. To sanction complainants
administrative and criminal complaints against the respondent is a mockery of justice;
respondent will be placed in an unjust situation where he has to answer severally a
single offense, if at all. He will be made liable to Atty. Ocampo or to the plaintiff in
CIVIL CASE NO. 153686-CV, to the herein complainants and to the Honorable Court.
Parenthetically, complainants have absolutely no personality to file or institute this
action against the respondent. As it now clearly appears, the instant case is a
persecution rather than a prosecution, where the aim or purpose of the complainants is
to exact or extort money from the respondent. Complainants are well aware that they
are not entitled to the money they sought to collect from the respondent which served
as
basis of their malicious and perjurious criminal and administrative complaints. The purpose of the
money received by the respondent had greatly been served through the issuance of the check by
respondent to Atty. Ocampo and respondents representations with Atty. Ocampo and his client-plaintiff
NOT TO EJECT complainants from the premises. Complainants have benefited too much from the
representations of respondent with Atty. Ocampo, UNTIL NOW.
To reiterate, it is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 153686-CV which has a cause of action
against the respondent and not or never the herein complainants.[10]
Complainants refuted these allegations, insisting that the basis of the filing of the instant
administrative case, as well as the criminal charges for estafa against respondent, is the
misappropriation or conversion of the amounts which should have been deposited with
the court or with the lessor in order to cover the required bond or arrears in rental over
the property; the check was adduced in evidence to prove the fact of misappropriation or
conversion, as respondent issued the same after he failed to deposit the complete amount
entrusted to him by complainants; and due to respondents unlawful acts, they were
prejudiced and suffered damages, thus:

b. The continuing failure of the respondent to transmit the subsequent amounts he

further collected and received, is not further prejudicial to the enforcement and
effective implementation of the rights of the complainants under the expropriation
ordinance, enacted by the local government, because of the nonpayment of the
backrental constituting the supersedeas bond, which up to the present, is being
demanded by the lessor, as precondition for negotiating, for the expropriation
compensation due to the lessor-owner.
c. It must be further noted and stressed, there was no representation at all made by
respondent with the lessor through Atty. Ocampo; nor, with the local government in
the enactment and enforcement of said ordinance. Contrary then, to the respondents
contention, it was through the coordinative efforts of the complainants through their
President, which caused the passage of said expropriation law. Further, the continuing
stay of complainants in the premises is but the due consequence of such enactment
and not through any representation on the part of respondent, who failed to protect
the interest of the complainant, as legal counsel of his clients, the herein
complainants, in gross dereliction of his duty as such.[11]
The case was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[12] Investigating IBP Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan scheduled the case for hearing. Witnesses for complainants
testified on November 6, 2003. On the hearing set for June 13, 2004, however,
respondent failed to appear. A representative informed the Commission that respondent
was suffering from high sugar blood count. The hearing was reset to February 26, 2004,
where respondent was ordered to present his medical certificate. On the last scheduled
hearing of the case on August 26, 2004, respondent failed to appear despite due notice,
hence, complainants testimony was heard ex-parte. Complainant was then given 15 days
to make a formal offer of evidence, after which the case was submitted for resolution.
The last notice sent to respondent was returned for being unclaimed.

In her Report and Recommendation dated May 26, 2005, Commissioner San Juan
recommended that respondent be disbarred, considering the following findings:

The claim of respondent that the complainants [have] no cause of action against him is
without merit. He admitted receiving the funds from complainants and that he
deposited only P48,481.00 with the Clerk of Court as partial supersedeas bond. The
fact that Atty. Leonardo Ocampo counsel of the plaintiff in the ejectment case
accommodated the respondent with his personal check does not relieve respondent
from liability. On the contrary it is evident that the arrangement was resorted to in order
that respondent could extricate himself from the situation he was in. By obtaining a
loan from Atty. Ocampo in the form of a check is a clear admission that the money
entrusted to respondent by complainants was misappropriated. Noted is the failure of
respondent to make an accounting of the funds entrusted to him and the absence of an
explanation why only a partial payment of the bond was made. The contention of
respondent that complainants were never prejudiced by the bouncing check likewise
must fail. Neither will the payment of the check and the funds entrusted to him doubly
prejudice respondent.[13]
On January 28, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-05,
modifying the penalty meted on respondent, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
A; and finding the recommendation duly supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and for obtaining a loan from Atty. Ocampo in the form of a
check is a clear admission that the money entrusted to respondent by complainants was
misappropriated, Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for (1) year.
We agree with the foregoing recommendation. It is clear that respondent
misappropriated the money which his clients, herein complainants, had entrusted to him
for a specific purpose, and such an act cannot be countenanced.

Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a

lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from his
client. A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in
his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is
exacted.[14] In Parias v. Paguinto,[15] the Court had the occasion to state that money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for
failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand.[16]
Indeed, a lawyer has no right to unilaterally appropriate his or her clients money.[17]

We note that respondent failed to appear before the IBP Investigating Commissioner to
explain his actions, much less present his defense. In Rangwani v. Dio,[18] we ruled that
it is not enough for a member of the bar to deny the charges:

Quite conspicuously, despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to refute the

charges against him, he failed to do so or even offer a valid explanation. The record is
bereft of any evidence to show that respondent has presented any countervailing
evidence to meet the charges against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him
as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to
investigate the cases. On the contrary, respondents comments only markedly admitted
complainants accusations. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is
not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. These,
respondent miserably failed to do.[19]
The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a
unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling.
Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only in the
individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all
members of the bar are strictly required to at all times maintain the highest degree of
public confidence in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession.[20] The
nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but
its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession.
[21] Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically, and, equally important,
morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all
times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[22]

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore.

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an
officer of the Court and member of the bar. It should never be decreed where any lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.[23] In this
case, the Court finds that one-year suspension from the practice of law will suffice as
penalty against respondent.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu is guilty of violating the Code of

Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is penalized with SUSPENSION from the
practice of law for One (1) Year effective immediately. Respondent is DIRECTED to
return the funds entrusted to him by complainants, and to inform the Court of the date of
his receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to respondents personal records; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792

Complainant,
Present:
Panganiban, CJ,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ

Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:

Respondent. January 25, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of

Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the

Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction

of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together

with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates

Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility;[2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his

disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of

Court.[3]

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to

the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004,

informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte

hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.[4]

After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was

submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its

attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his

Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.[6] Afterwards,

the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa

rendered her Report and Recommendation, which was later

adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its

Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent

had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for

frustrated homicide,[7] which involved moral turpitude,

should result in his disbarment.

The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized

by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this

wise:

x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way
home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with
his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the
accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just
someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community
who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi
driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino
Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held
him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door
causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the
accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the
accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him
get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was
about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was
about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm
around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified
and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his
revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The
taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the
eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to
return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the
accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired
and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so
the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by
Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the
complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.[8]

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to

the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital.

Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left

side of his neck,[9] complainant would have surely died of

hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance,

according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez,

Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused

paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his

job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29,

2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application

for probation, which was granted by the court on several

conditions. These included satisfaction of the civil liabilities

imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto

Soriano.[10]

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty.

Dizon, who has yet to comply with this particular

undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of

Appeals.[11]
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa

recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice

of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral

turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been

convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an

obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following

facts:

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because
the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault,
Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a
handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and
fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent
denied that he had shot Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he
was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,]
not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant.[12]
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final

action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of

Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP

Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction

for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for

disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is

deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of

justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral

character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found

guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of

frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been

established and is no longer open to question, the only issues

that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his

crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2)

whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done

contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of

baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social

duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in

general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good

morals.[14]

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral

turpitude has been discussed in International Rice Research

Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case concerning an

employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction

for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances

surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected

the employers contention and held that homicide in that case

did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would

have been violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy

Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court

explained that, having disregarded the attendant

circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that

was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to

determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral

turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as

explained thus:

x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the

degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act
and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but
whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not

involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence

of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating

circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision,

the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:

x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then
urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto
Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the
filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was
ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan
knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim
who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him
several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the
victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the
mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the
total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's
character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.[17]

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly

found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude

of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and

shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of

aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the

fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant.

Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions

clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.

We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a

further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He

shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to

defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault

was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely

returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter

unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent

wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not

to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly

intention to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of

moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his

extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were,

he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be

venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate

reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his

fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His

overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely

an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In

the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not

the persistence of a person who has been grievously

wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false

sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously

transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed

firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.

[19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the

lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his

attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of Professional

Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is

wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the

benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his

sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been

four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil

liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains

adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme

impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction

to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning

capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still,

Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that

could never even fully restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate,

not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly

to their good moral character.[22] Where their misconduct

outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show

them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the

privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law,

the court may be justified in suspending or removing them

from that office.[23]

We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an

utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential

qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law.

Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[24]

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed

dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial

court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel

Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants family.

[25] But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a

complete lie by making it appear that it was complainants

family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his

referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to

fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled

by complainant and two other persons.[27] The trial court

had this to say:

The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who
examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people
including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The
injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright
unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to
death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the
complainants version of the incident particularly when he said that he
boxed the accused on the chest. x x x.[28]

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for

bar membership is more important than truthfulness.[29] The

rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on

honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Hence,

lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by

any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in

good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public

perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral

turpitude for which he should be disbarred. Law is a noble

profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only

upon individuals who are competent intellectually,

academically and, equally important, morally. Because they

are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must

at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings

with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and

integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[31]

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely

dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the

depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty

recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the

administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise

this important function be competent, honorable and reliable

-- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.

[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile

behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall

not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised

with great caution, and that disbarment should never be

decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end

desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot

extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so

despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society

and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser

penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for

the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining

exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a

privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character,

not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a

continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein

respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards

expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide,

the attending circumstances not the mere fact of their

conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the

legal profession. In the present case, the appalling

vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of

respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a

member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby

DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the

Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his

record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be

served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the

Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in

the country.

SO ORDERED.
 VICTORINA BAUTISTA, A.C. No. 6963
Complainant,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 9, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a Complaint[1] filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) on November 16, 2004, complainant Victorina Bautista[2] prays
for the suspension or disbarment of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice
and unethical conduct in the performance of his duties as a notary public and a lawyer.

Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and notarized a

Magkasanib na Salaysay[3] purportedly executed by Donato Salonga and complainants
mother, Basilia de la Cruz.[4] Both affiants declared that a certain parcel of land in
Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas and his family for
more than 30 years. Complainant claimed that her mother could not have executed the
joint affidavit on January 3, 1998 because she has been dead since January 28, 1961.[5]

In his Answer,[6] respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He

disclaimed any knowledge about Basilias death. He alleged that before he notarized the
document, he requested for Basilias presence and in her absence, he allowed a certain
Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia, to sign above the name of the latter as shown
by the word by on top of the name of Basilia. Respondent maintained that there was no
forgery since the signature appearing on top of Basilias name was the signature of
Pronebo.

On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation[7] attaching thereto the affidavit of

desistance[8] of complainant which reads in part:

Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay

malaya at kusang loob na nagpapahayag ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado, SERGIO EXQUIVEL
BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines na may Blg. CBD CASE
NO. 04-1371;
2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay pinapirmahan lamang sa akin ni
ELISEO OLOROSO at ng kanyang Abogado na si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE MAGSINO at sa
katunayan hindi ako nakaharap sa Notaryo Publiko na si Abogado CARLITOS C. VILLARIN;
3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang kasangkapan para sirain ang
magandang pangalan nitong si Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;
4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) na ang reklamo ko laban sa nasabing Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE ay
mapawa[la]ng bisa.
In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner[9] recommended
that:

1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the legal profession for one (1)
month;
2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be revoked; and
3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial commission for a period of
one (1) year.[10]
In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and his notarial
commission be revoked and that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public
for two years.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when the joint
affidavit was prepared on January 3, 1998. Respondents alleged lack of knowledge of
Basilias death does not excuse him. It was his duty to require the personal appearance of
the affiant before affixing his notarial seal and signature on the instrument.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same
are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed
will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.[11]

Respondents act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence of one of the
affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01,[12] Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Notarial Law.[13] By affixing his signature and notarial seal on
the instrument, he led us to believe that Basilia personally appeared before him and
attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in fact it was a
certain Pronebo who signed the document. Respondents conduct is fraught with
dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a
document that our courts and the public accord on notarized documents. Respondent has
clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his function as a notary
public and to comply with the mandates of the law.[14]

Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign in behalf of
Basilia. A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize
a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him. The acts of the affiants cannot be
delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts of which they have personal
knowledge. They should swear to the document personally and not through any
representative. Otherwise, their representatives name should appear in the said
documents as the one who executed the same. That is the only time the representative
can affix his signature and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of
the said document. Simply put, the party or parties who executed the instrument must be
the ones to personally appear before the notary public to acknowledge the document.
[15]
Complainants desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent
or put an end to the administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration
of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.[16]

We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent
jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos,[17] respondent lawyer was found guilty of
notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories. As a
result, his notarial commission was revoked and he was disqualified from reappointment
for a period of two years. In addition, he was suspended from the practice of law for one
year.

Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 2[18] of complainants affidavit of
desistance, she alluded that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin notarized her Sinumpaang
Salaysay[19] dated November 12, 2004 which was attached to the complaint filed with
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, without requiring her to personally appear
before him in violation of the Notarial Law. This allegation must likewise be
investigated.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional
Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe, is
REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period
of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year,
effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or of similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of
this Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is

DIRECTED to investigate the allegation that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin notarized the
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Victorina Bautista dated November 12, 2004 without requiring
the latters personal appearance.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision
likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014

VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court orders a lawyer
suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the
application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a
position in government requiring the authority to practice law.
For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension from the
practice of law.1
In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P.
Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the
Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation
of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of
law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as
notaries public for two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration,7 praying that respondents be
disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution8 dated September 6, 2006,
this court denied complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights
Regional Office for Region II, filed the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan
wrote the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga
following the latter's suspension from the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights
En Banc issued the resolution10 dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as
Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According
to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law
"prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the
meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended."11
Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the
practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this
court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights."12
This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does not
render advisory opinions.13
On May 8, 2009, this court received a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter14 dated May 4,
2009, Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.
Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's
resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission
reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension and instead admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of
his commission as a notary public."15 According to complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of
Atty. Baliga's motion for reconsideration.16
Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court suspended
Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer . . . and [was]
disqualified to hold the position of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the order of
suspension]."17 The Commission on Human Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should have
ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions as Regional Director. Complainant Lingan
prayed that this court give "favorable attention and action on the matter."18
This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for report and
recommendation.19
In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the
period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that
respondents be required to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension with certifications
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Executive Judge of the court where they might
appear as counsel and state that they desisted from practicing law during the period of suspension.
On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as
Regional Director during the period of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the
Commission "deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of suspension. According to the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no power to "[alter, modify, or set aside
any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final and executory. "22
Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that this court require
him to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted from
performing his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.23
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on
Human Rights be required to comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued
to perform his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing that his suspension from the practice of
law did not include his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of
[his suspension from the practice of law] to [his] public office would be tantamount to [violating] his
constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the statutory principle in law that what is not included is
deemed excluded."25
In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required respondents to file their respective
motions to lift order of suspension considering the lapse of the period of suspension. This court further
ordered Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights to comment on complainant Lingari's
allegation that Atty. Baliga continued performing his functions as Regional Director while he was
suspended from the practice of law. The resolution dated September 23, 2009 provides:
Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public imposed on respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court resolves:
(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to FILE their respective
motions to lift relative to their suspension and disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public and SUBMIT certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
Executive Judge of the Court where they may appear as counsel, stating that respondents have
actually ceased and desisted from the practice of law during the entire period of their suspension
and disqualification, unless already complied with in the meantime;
(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from the Commission on Human
Rights [CHR] stating that he has been suspended from office and has stopped from the
performance of his functions for the period stated in the order of suspension and
disqualification, within ten (10) days from notice hereof;
(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on the allegations of
complainant against them, both within ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof; ...27
(Emphasis in the original)
In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions to lift
order of suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that he
continued performing his functions as Regional Director during his suspension from the practice of
law.
In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he
"perform[ed], generally, managerial functions,"30 which did not require the practice of law. These
managerial functions allegedly included ."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of the regional
office and its personnel";31 "monitoring progress of investigations conducted by the [Commission on
Human Rights] Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the implementation of all other services and
assistance programs of the [Commission on Human Rights] by the different units at the regional
level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation and disbursement of funds and
expenditure of the [Regional Office]."34 The Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit
which takes care of the legal services matters of the [Commission]."35
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed
thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's resolution suspending him from the practice of
law]."36
The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated November 27, 2009. It argued that "the
penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty that
may be imposed upon him as a public official for the same acts."38 According to the Commission, Atty.
Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a "bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon a
Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely different thing, falling as it does within the
exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body."40
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the issue and
would "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to
Atty. Baliga's comment, complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court. Atty.
Baliga failed to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he was
suspended from office and desisted from performing his functions as Regional Director.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director
and only performed generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga
admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a
"lawyer-manager,"43 which under the landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of
law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the
officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had
supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga practiced
law while he held his position as Regional Director.
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his position as Regional
Director, complainant Lingan countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith, he should have
followed the initial resolution of the Commission on Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty.
Baliga did not even furnish this court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the Commission on
Human Right's resolution suspending him from office. By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of
law', twisting facts and philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has
that] moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."47 Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty.
Baliga be disbarred.
On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty. Calubaquib.48 He was allowed
to resume his practice of law and perform notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements for
issuance of a notarial commission.
On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report, and
recommendation Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension and the respective comments of Atty.
Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights.49
In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant stated that
Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities [as
Regional Director] which [required acts constituting] practice .of law."51 Considering that Atty. Baliga
claimed that he did not perform his functions as Regional Director which required the practice of law,
the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be required to
comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended holding in abeyance the
resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension "pending [the Commission on Human Right's
filing of comment]."52
In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's
motion to lift one-year suspension. The Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on
Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director.
In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated that the penalty
imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate from the penalty that might be imposed on
him as Regional Director. The Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the position of
[Regional Director] is managerial and does not [require the practice of law]."55 It again manifested that
it will "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives on [the] matter."56
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be
granted.
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further
from the practice of law for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience."57 It includes "[performing] acts which are
characteristics of the [legal] profession"58 or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."59
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice. of law. In
Cayetano v. Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and
agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal
knowledge or legal talent"61 is practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution with power
to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]"62 It is
divided into regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to investigate human rights
violations in its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who
is given the position of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights Violations
and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following powers
and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights]
matters;"65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the
absence of the legal officer or investigator;67
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss "immediate
courses of action and protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an
alternative dispute resolution";68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations, orders,
or subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and
 f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer.70
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are
usually performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public71 - officers who are necessarily
members of the bar.72 Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the
Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action and protection remedies and
reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require
the use of extensive legal knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in
good standing and authorized to practice law.74 When the Regional Director loses this authority, such
as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must
desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on June 15, 2006, "effective
immediately."75 From the time Atty. Baliga received the court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006,76
he has been without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary qualification to his position as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the Commission on Human Rights
correctly resolved in its resolution dated January 16, 2007:
WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming his
post, for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended. This is
without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in
the case of all Regional Human Rights Directors is not generally allowed by the Commission;
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines
resolved to put into effect and implement the legal implications of the SC decision by decreeing the
suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the discharge of his functions and responsibilities as
Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City for the period for which the Supreme
Court Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis in the original)
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on Human Rights
did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only suspended after: investigation by
the Commission on Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office.78 Second, the Commission gave
Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It was
also immaterial.1wphi1 He held the position of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
because of his authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold
that position.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constituted
practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of
law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of suspension.
We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director despite
lack.of authority to practice law.1wphi1
We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007,
reconsidering its first resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the
Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him that repeating the same offense will
cause his dismissal from the service. The resolution with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April 13,
2007 reads:
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays
before the Honorable Commission to recall and annul his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI
of the Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission en
Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.
The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy P.
Baliga is totally blameless and should not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.
The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned with the transgression by
Atty. Baliga of his oath of office as government employee. As records have it, the Commission granted
Atty. Baliga authority to secure a commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated to act as a
notary public in accordance with the rules and regulations, to include the conditions expressly set forth
by the Commission.
With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC Administrative Case No.
5277 dated 15 June 2006, the Commission cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly
repugnant to the conduct of an officer reposed with public trust.
This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged, and censure Atty. Baliga
for having contravened the conditions of his commission as a notary public. What was granted to Atty.
Baliga is merely a privilege, the exercise of which requires such high esteem to be in equal footing with
the constitutional mandate of the Commission. Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in mind that the
Commission exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever privilege the Commission grants of every
official and employee.
The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year suspension imposed on him
pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution. The Commission believes that the further suspension of Atty.
Baliga from the office may be too harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is being
served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed is
sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring public officer.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013
and imposes the penalty of admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the same will merit a
penalty of dismissal from the service.80 (Emphasis in the original)
The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This resolution
caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority
to practice law.
We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
practice of law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy
this court's orders of suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human Rights
has the power to appoint its officers and employees,82 it can only retain those with the necessary
qualifications in the positions they are holding.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with conditions."83
To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, [maintain] the highest degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal
profession."84
WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6)
months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from the
practice of law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and the Commission on Human Rights.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
ELSA L. MONDEJAR, A.C. Nos. 5907 and 5942

Complainant, Present:

-versus- QUISUMBING, Chairperson,

CARPIO,*
ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA, CARPIO MORALES,

Respondent. TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

July 21, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By two separate complaints filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Elsa
L. Mondejar (complainant) sought the disbarment of Atty. Vivian G. Rubia (respondent)
and the cancellation of her notarial commission for allegedly committing deceitful acts
and malpractice in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The facts which gave rise to the filing of the administrative complaints are as follows:

Sometime in 2002, complainant charged Marilyn Carido (Marilyn) and her common law
husband Japanese national Yoshimi Nakayama (Nakayama) before the Digos City
Prosecutors Office for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law,[1] claiming that the Bamiyan
Group of Enterprises (Bamiyan) which was capitalized at P15 million and which was
engaged in, among other things, money lending business and operation of miki and
siopao factory was actually owned by Nakayama but it was made to appear that Marilyn
was the owner.[2]

Marilyn, by her Counter-Affidavit dated November 6, 2002 which she filed before the
Prosecutors Office, denied the charge, in support of which she attached a Memorandum
of Joint Venture Agreement[3] (the document) forged by her and Nakayama,
acknowledged before respondent on January 9, 2001 but appearing to have been entered
in respondents notarial register for 2002 and bearing respondents Professional Tax
Receipt (PTR) No. issued in 2002. The document purported to show that Marilyn owned
Bamiyan, albeit its capital was provided by Nakayama.

Contending that the January 9, 2001 document did not exist before she filed the criminal
charge in 2002 before the Prosecutors Office, complainant, who was formerly an
employee of Bamiyan, filed the first above captioned administrative complaint against
respondent, as well as criminal complaints for falsification of public document and use
of falsified public document before the Prosecutors Office also against respondent,
together with Marilyn, Nakayama, and the witnesses to the document Mona Liza Galvez
and John Doe.[4]

It appears that on April 20, 2001, respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] of a
parcel of land situated in Digos City, purportedly executed by Manuel Jose Lozada
(Lozada) as vendor and Marilyn as vendee. Complainant alleged that respondent
falsified the document by forging the signature of Lozada who has been staying in
Maryland, U.S.A. since 1992.[6] Hence, spawned the second above-captioned
administrative complaint.

After respondent submitted her Comment to which she attached her November 18, 2002
Counter-Affidavit[7] to the Affidavit-Complaint of Marilyn charging her with
falsification before the Prosecutors Office, the administrative complaints were referred
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation within 60 days from notice.[8]

Commissioner Doroteo Aguila, to whom the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline

assigned the cases, set them for mandatory conference on November 24, 2003. It turned
out that complainant had died on September 15, 2003. Complainants husband Celso
Mondejar had requested, however, that consideration of the cases continue on the basis
of documentary evidence already submitted.[9]

In her Position Paper filed with the IBP, respondent argued that complainant was neither
a party nor a witness to the document as well as to the Deed of Absolute Sale, hence,
devoid of legal standing to question the authenticity and due execution thereof.[10]
Besides, added respondent, complainant had passed away.[11]

To her Position Paper respondent again attached her November 18, 2002 Counter-
Affidavit which she filed with the Digos City Prosecutors Office wherein she explained
that the discrepancies of dates appearing in the document executed by Nakayama and
Marilyn on January 9, 2001 came about when the document was revise[d] and
amend[ed] in 2002.[12]

After evaluation of the evidence of the parties, Investigating Commissioner Aguila, by

Report and Recommendation[13] dated May 12, 2004, recommended the dismissal of
the second complainant (Administrative Case No. 5942) relative to respondents
notarization of the Deed of Sale.

As for the first complaint (Administrative Case No. 5907) relative to the discrepancies
of dates appearing in the document, Commissioner Aguila found respondent to have
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct,
and recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for One Month.

Pertinent portions of Atty. Aguilas Report read:

[T]here is sufficient proof to discipline the respondent in Adm. Case No. 5907. In the Memorandum
of a Joint Venture Agreement, Atty. Rubia stated in the acknowledgment portion thereof that the
parties personally appeared before her on this 9th day of January, 2001. But then this document . . . was
entered in respondents notarial register as Document No. 5707; Page No. 1144; Book No 25; Series of
2002 [Annex A-1, Petition]. It is further pointed out that respondents PTR Number as indicated in this
document is PTR Number 4574844 that is likewise indicated as being issued on January 3, 2002. On
the other hand, the [Counter] Affidavit of Marilyn Carido, which Atty. Rubia notarized . . . was
notarized on November 6, 2002 [Annex B-2 of the Petition]. This [counter] affidavit also indicates
respondents PTR Number as 4574844 issued on January 3, 2002. It must be stressed that this is the
same Number indicated in the Memorandum of a Joint Venture Agreement [notarized on January 9,
2001]. But then a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 28 March 2001 between one Leandro Prosia and Jocelyn
Canoy-Alson [Annex D, Petition] that was also notarized by respondent, indicates that her PTR for the
year 2001 was PTR No. 4320009 [p. 14, SC Records].
As already pointed out, the [January 9, 2001] Memorandum of a Joint Venture Agreement indicates that
it was entered as Document No. 5707, Series of 2002 in respondents notarial register. On the other
hand, the [November 6, 2002] Affidavit of Marilyn Carido was entered as Document No. 2791, Series
of 2002. Since the [Counter] Affidavit was notarized [o]n 06 November 2002, it is illogical why the
document number for the Memorandum of a Joint Venture is greater (higher) than that of the
former since the latter was supposed to have been notarized many months earlier, or specifically,
on 09 January 2001.
All of the foregoing show that the respondent effectively made an untruthful declaration in a public
document when she attested that the Memorandum of a Joint Venture Agreement was acknowledged
before her on 09 January 2001 when evidence clearly shows otherwise.[14] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the finding
of the Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for making a false declaration in a public document.
It, however, modified the recommended sanction in that, instead of suspension from the
practice of law for One Month, it merely WARNED respondent that a repetition of the
same or similar act in the future would be dealt with more severely.[15]

By Resolution of March 12, 2005, the BOG denied respondents motion for
reconsideration.[16]
Hence, the elevation of the first administrative case to this Court by respondent who
reiterates her challenge to the standing of complainants husband in pursuing the cases.

Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that [p]roceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court
motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person.

That an administrative complaint filed by any person against a lawyer may be acted
upon by this Court is settled. In re Almacen[17] explains the raison dtre:

. . . [D]isciplinary proceedings [against lawyers] are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity
of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. (Emphasis supplied)
Complainants husbands pursuance of the cases was thus in order.

Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document,

thus rendering the document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity.[18]

Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are thus mandated to subscribe to the sacred
duties appertaining to their office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed
with public interest.[19] A graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their
solemn oath to obey the laws, to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any,[20] and
to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement,[21] and other duties and
responsibilities.

In exculpation, respondent, in her November 18, 2002 Counter Affidavit, proffered the
following explanation, quoted verbatim:

xxxx
5. That way back in the early 2001, specifically in January of the year 2001, Marilyn A. Carido and
Yoshimi Nakayama, had me prepared [sic] a document in preparation of the business enterprises to be
established by Marilyn A. Carido, wherein Yoshimi Nakayama, will grant the former CAPITAL for the
establishment of the proposed enterprises, the main purpose of which is to secure the future of Marilyn
A. Carido, their children, and the family of Marilyn A. Carido. A copy of the said agreement is hereto
attached as ANNEX A, with its corresponding submarking;
xxxx
7. That in fact, on May 10, 2002, Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama came to my office, for two
(2) purposes: First, Yoshimi Nakayama had me prepared a document which would be an ADDENDUM
to their original transaction in January 2001, wherein Yoshimi Nakayama gave Marilyn A. Carido
additional capital to augment the operation of the Bamiyan Superstore; Second, that Marilyn A. Carido
and Yoshimi Nakayama wanted me to REVISE and AMEND the original agreement made by them in
January, 2001, because Yoshimi Nakayama wanted to add certain conditions to the original agreement,
specifically referring to the flow of money unto the coffers of the enterprises of Marilyn A. Carido, and
as to the fact of the technical assistance that he is giving Marilyn A. Carido, because, at that time, there
were already many problems in the operations of the Bamiyan enterprises. That, for the first purpose, I
prepared the ADDENDUM to the original agreement between Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi
Nakayama. A copy of the said addendum is hereto attached and made another part hereof as ANNEX
C, with its corresponding submarking;
8. That for the second purpose referring to the REVISION or AMENDMENT of the original
transaction, I told both Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, to submit to me all the copies of
the original agreement in their possession, and I will just make another instrument which would
supplant or replace the old one while incorporating the needed conditions suggested by Yoshimi
Nakayama. That I told them that I will be making a new and/or revised agreement, but I will retain
the original date of the first transaction made in January, 2001, because anyway, I have not yet
submitted the documents which I have notarized for the year 2001, since my notarial commission
will expire yet on the last day of December, 2002;
9. That, therefore, on the same date, Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama submitted to me all the
copies in their possession of the old agreement, and I proceeded to have another one encoded in my
computer by my secretary, Mona Liza Galvez, incorporating the needed additional conditions in
accordance with the wishes of my said clients. A copy of the said REVISED agreement is hereto
attached as ANNEX D, with the its corresponding submarkings;
10. That in fact, on November 6, 2002, I attached a copy of the revised agreement on the COUNTER-
AFFIDAVIT of Marilyn A. Carido, in the case for a violation of the Anti-Dummy law filed against her
by an assumed witness, Elsa Mondejar who is also the assumed complainant in this instant
investigation; That, however, while I was going over the documents of Marilyn A. Carido, I noticed
that the revised agreement referred to above, although retained the original date of the original one as
January, 2001, mistakenly or erroneously bear the series of 2002 in my notarial register, and likewise
bear my new PROFESSIONAL TAX RECEIPT (PTR) NO. and IBP No. for the year 2002;
11. That even before then, I already instructed my secretary to make the necessary corrections in the
said revised document because the accountant and administrator of the Bamiyan, Felicisima Abo, had
already brought the erroneous entries to my attention when all the legal papers of Marilyn A. Carido
were turned over to her profession, as early as June, 2002. That, however, because of my workload, I
forgot to remind my secretary about the corrections that she should made therein. However, I already
told Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, that the corrections are proper because I will just make
the necessary initials on the corrected portions;
12. That, again because of the fact, that I had to arrange certain matters on the labor aspects of all the
Bamiyan enterprises, because at these times, both Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, were in
Japan, it was only after I filed the counter-affidavit of Marilyn A. Carido, in the said Anti-Dummy case,
that I was reminded on the said erroneous entries. Therefore, on November 8, 2002, I had Mona Liza
Galvez, my secretary, make the necessary corrections; A copy of the corrected revised agreement is
hereto attached as ANNEX E, with the corresponding submarkings; as well as copies of the memos that
I had issued in behalf of my principal, Marilyn A. Carido, for the Bamiyan, are likewise hereto attached
as ANNEXES F TO I, respectively;
x x x x[22] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In sum, respondent claimed that the document was forged on January 9, 2001 but she
made a new and/or revised agreement in 2002 to incorporate additional conditions
thereto, retaining, however, its original date January 9, 2001; that on noticing that the
document mistakenly or erroneously [b]ore the series of 2002 in [her] notarial register
and likewise b[ore] her new . . . [PTR] No. and IBP No. for the year 2002, she instructed
her secretary to make the necessary corrections, but on account of her workload, she
forgot to remind her secretary to comply therewith; and that it was only after Marilyns
Counter-Affidavit of November 6, 2002 was filed before the Prosecutors Office that she
(respondent) was reminded of the erroneous entries, hence, she had her secretary make
the corrections on November 8, 2002.

And as reflected in her above-quoted portions of her Counter-Affidavit, respondent

further claimed that she retained the original January 9, 2001 date of the document since
the documents which [she] notarized for the year 2001 were not yet submitted as her
notarial commission was to expire yet on the last day of December, 2002.[23]

Respondents explanation does not impress as it betrays her guilt.

The document clearly appears to have been ante-dated in an attempt to exculpate

Marilyn from the Anti-Dummy charge against her in 2002.

The document was allegedly notarized on January 9, 2001 but a new revised/amended
document was made in 2002 bearing the original date of execution/acknowledgment. If
that were so, how could an error have been committed regarding the other year 2001
original entries in the notarial register, when the purported new document was to retain
the original January 9, 2001 date as it would merely input additional conditions thereto?
The above-quoted discussion by the Investigating IBP Commissioner of why he
discredited respondents explanation behind the conflicting dates appearing in the
document is thus well-taken.

As for respondents submission that corrections could be subsequently made on the

document, she not having anyway submitted the documents she notarized for the year
2001 since her notarial commission was still to expire in 2002, the same does not lie.

One of the grounds for revocation of notarial commission is the failure of the notary to
send a copy of notarized documents to the proper clerk of court or Executive Judge
(under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice) within the first ten (10) days of the month
next following.[24]

In fine, the recommendation of Investigating IBP Commissioner Aguila merits this

Courts approval.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Vivian Rubia, for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is suspended for One (1) Month, and warned
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal records in this Court.

SO ORDERED.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY A.C. No. 6010

LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL
(SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF, Present:

Complainant, PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

- versus - PUNO,
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, QUISUMBING,

Respondent. YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,*

CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 28, 2006

x---------------------------------------
-----------x

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis
University-Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz,
principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:

1) Gross Misconduct:

From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child
abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the
Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the Teachers,
Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged
unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money supposedly for the
teachers; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC,
Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent.

2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:

In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and

3) Malpractice:

In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.

According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May

1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He
thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane Pascua, before the
Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was
subsequently annulled for being bigamous.

On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately

subscribed and notarized certain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997,
despite expiration of respondents notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A
Certification[1] dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not applied for commission
as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997. Respondent
performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents:

1. Affidavit of Ownership[2] dated , executed by Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed and sworn

to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
2. Affidavit[3] dated , executed by Maria Cortez Atos, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
3. Affidavit[4] dated , executed by Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
4. Affidavit[5] dated , executed by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
5. Absolute Date of Sale[6] dated , executed by Danilo Gonzales in favor of Senecio C.
Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties[7] dated , executed by Evelyn C. Canullas and
Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
7. Sworn Statement[8] dated , executed by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed and sworn to
before Rolando Dela Cruz;
8. Deed of [9] dated , executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor of Jacinto Batara, notarized
by Rolando Dela Cruz;
9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties[10] dated , executed by Ponciano V. Abalos
and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
10. Absolute Deed of Sale[11] dated , executed by Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N.
Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated , executed by Mandapat in favor of Mario R. Mabalot,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties[13] dated , executed by Villiam C. Ambong
and Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
13. Conditional Deed of Sale[14] dated , executed by Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose
Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
14. Memorandum of Agreement[15] dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO represented by
Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC Construction represented by Mr. George Cham, notarized by Rolando
Dela Cruz.
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal
deduction of salary and others which are still pending before the St. Louis University
(SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutors Office. He
did not discuss anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a second
marriage and malpractice in notarizing documents despite the expiration of his
commission.

After the filing of comment, We referred[16] the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.

The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of
their allegations in their complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of
his first marriage, and the subsequent nullification of the former. He also admitted
having notarized certain documents during the period when his notarial commission had
already expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good faith, lack
of malice and noble intentions in doing the complained acts.

After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.

On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and

recommended that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be

administratively penalized for the following acts:
a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal
steps to have the first marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year, and
b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the
expiration of his notarial commission, he be suspended from the practice
of law for another one (1) year or for a total of two (2) years.[17]
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors,
approved and adopted the recommendation of
Commissioner Pacheco, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex A and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent contracted a second marriage
without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and for notarizing legal documents
despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for another one (1) year, for a total of two (2) years
Suspension from the practice of law.[18]
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except
as to the penalty contained therein.

At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only
during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him.
Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law
may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct rendering him unfit to
hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be
understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove
from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to
protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to
punish an attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,[19] that
the Bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and
fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A member of the legal
fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any
violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include
statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these
being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional
or private capacity.

Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of
standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another.[20] Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life,
insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the
profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the
proper authorities.[21]

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. Possession of such moral character as requirement to the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must be continuous. Otherwise, membership
in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct.[22]

In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted
marriage on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they
parted ways owing to their irreconcilable differences without seeking judicial recourse.
The union bore no offspring. After their separation in-fact, respondent never knew the
whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all forms of communication with her.
Seven years thereafter, respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was
also a faculty member of SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989,
respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio
City, Branch 68. Respondent even admitted this fact. When the second marriage was
entered into, respondents prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no
action having been initiated before the court to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or
annulment of respondents prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.

Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second
marriage in 1989, having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign
ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a second marriage may be validly
contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate
court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the RTC of
Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years after respondent contracted his second marriage.
The annulment of respondents second marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment
proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment came after the respondents
second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a disbarment case is
sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation
by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a
criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an
affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will
the judgment of annulment of respondents second marriage also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance
of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then
liability attaches.[23]

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground
for disbarment.

The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct,
vis--vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community and what is grossly immoral, that is, it must
be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.[24]

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to

warrant his disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage
which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a
second marriage while the first marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality.[25]

However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondents
act as grossly immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation and
observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:

The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the high moral
standard of the legal profession, to wit:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7)
years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he
described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child went
to ;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[26]
In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27] respondent was disbarred because his moral character
was deeply flawed as shown by the following circumstances, viz: he convinced the
complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio and that she
was legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had
contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported by
complainant, with some assistance from respondents parents. After respondent had
finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the
complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child
safely to a hospital.

In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[28] respondent was also disbarred for his grossly
immoral acts such as: first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; second, he
lured an innocent young woman into marrying him; third, he mispresented himself as a
bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he availed himself
of complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order
to marry the latters daughter. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards,
he even had the temerity to assure complainant that everything is legal.

Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself
acknowledged and declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble enough
to offer no defense save for his love and declaration of his commitment to his wife and
child.
Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be
unduly harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be
imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed
where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.[29] In line with this
philosophy, we find that a penalty of two years suspension is more appropriate. The
penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is too light and not
commensurate to the act committed by respondent.

As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years
1988-1997 after his commission as notary public had expired, respondent humbly
admitted having notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that he no longer
had authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he received no payment in notarizing
said documents.

It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,

routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a
private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.[30]

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated
as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing
documents without the requisite commission to do so as reprehensible, constituting as it
does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents.
[31]
The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a
member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to
do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial
act without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more
specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. By acting as a notary public without the proper
commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which
directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.

In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,[32] a lawyer was suspended for one year when he
notarized five documents after his commission as Notary Public had expired, to wit: a
complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract
to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in said case, we find that a suspension of two (2)
years is justified under the circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of
fourteen (14) documents[33] without the requisite notarial commission.

Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal case for
child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the
Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by the
Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU; and
the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera
Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need not be
discussed, as they are still pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the
presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral
conduct, in disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and another two
(2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission or a total of
four (4) years of suspension.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court
Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the
personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG A.C. No. 6313

Complainant,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M.
RONGCAL,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 7, 2006
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry,
from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and
suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be
imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof.[1]

Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine

Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic
case of he said, she said, the parties conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the
records are hereinafter presented.

Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when
she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino (Aquino), the
biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then
a Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings with
complainant, respondent sent a demand letter[2] in her behalf to Aquino wherein he
asked for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus no less
than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her congenital
heart ailment.

At around this point, by complainants own admission, she and respondent started having
a sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent
started calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf.
Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had
progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the accompaniment of
sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and
his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino.
Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by
respondents claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had
already been annulled.

On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of

Disclaimer[3] (Affidavit) categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the
father in the birth certificate[4] of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She
was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent
supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only
way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and educational support.
Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she could still
pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public
document. Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document
without even taking a glance at it.[5]

On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him
P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical
expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his
personal check[6] in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of
P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent
informed her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his
political campaign as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member

of the 2nd District of Pampanga.

Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that
respondent kept part of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his
promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and
referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. (Atty. Tolentino).

Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for
child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was
dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise
agreement.[7] It was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the
import of the Affidavit.

Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally
prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her
disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems would be solved,
aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent
allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust
and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state,
and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to appropriate for himself
money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondents
aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule
16.02, and Canon 7.[8] Hence, she filed the instant complaint[9] dated 2 February 2004.

Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant

needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainants
former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow
barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former
lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child.[10] Subsequently, he and Aquino
communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquinos infidelity, his
relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses were
willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the
effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.

Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then
advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also
explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested
that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When
Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered to
P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts
within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to rediscount the
checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was
P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that
respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing
her to sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what
the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the
draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college
graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise
vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement proceeds. When complainant
allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum of P150,000.00 in
cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00, not
P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it
was for his attorneys fees.

As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with
complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises.
According to him, it was more of a chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults,[11]
complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that
his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to
demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married when they commenced
what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met through
his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second,
they had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his
wife. Subsequently, complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to
his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant not
to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was
elected President of the Association of Barangay Council (ABC) and as such was an ex-
officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position
of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was
impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that she
lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped
him in his campaign.

Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being
worked out, complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had
promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job
never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received
from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for
financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While
respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her to look for the right man[12] and to
stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her that he could not
assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit.
He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.

In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he
agreed to give her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since
then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by
cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June when
her alleged fianc from the United States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July
2003, she again asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down.
Since then he had stopped communicating to her.

Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent.

She told him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up
and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent. According to this friend,
complainant showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file
with the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was
being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed
the instant complaint.

On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[13] After the parties submitted their
respective position papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner
rendered his Report and Recommendation[14] dated 2 September 2005. After presenting
the parties conflicting factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to
that of complainant and concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting
in this wise, to wit:

Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good moral
character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit
and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those
qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time have been
compendiously described as MORAL CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant to his
lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling complainant and
dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their
demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because of [l]ewd design.
He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the impositions
(sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x[15]
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00
within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report
and Recommendation in a Resolution[16] dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to
be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondents obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship
and the financial and emotional problem of his client and attempting to mislead the
Commission,[17] respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for one (1) year
with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was
likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Questioning[18] (Motion) dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to
Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the
Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed
account of the events that transpired between him and complainant. Altogether, he
portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who depends on men for
financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that the
IBP based its Resolution solely on complainants bare allegations that she failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for
clarificatory questioning in order to determine who between them is telling the truth.

In a Resolution[19] dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it
has no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the
Supreme Court.

While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP
has recommended.

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital
affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree[20] in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.[21] As officers of
the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
[22] The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only
be immoral, but grossly immoral.[23] A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to

constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[24] It

is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.[25]

While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for
such illicit behavior,[26] it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity.[27] Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected
by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[28]

By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule

1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is
aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low
spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP
concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.

Complainants allegations that she succumbed to respondents sexual advances due to his
promises of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a
case against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her
into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of
sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled
into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when
there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical disability as to
justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part.[29] Respondents numerous
visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of
her. At best, it proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact
on which the finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave
her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as
she never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support.

Neither does complainants allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status
inspire belief. We find credence in respondents assertion that it was impossible for her
not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were
introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay
official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone number and that
she had called him there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official
who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously, she never refuted
respondents allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on several occasions, that
she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot
of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she
previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be
unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom
she had known for only a short time without verifying his background, if it were true
that she preferred to change [her] life for the better,[30] as alleged in her complaint. We
believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by clear
preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.[31] We are left with the most
logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral
relationship with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.

Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over her
to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without
explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as
counsel for Aquino.

We find complainants assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support
from Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot
fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a
couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even
reading a document she knew was related to the support case she intended to file. The
Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she
was not able to read it before she signed it.

Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the
contents of the Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent
even urged her to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for
Alexandras medical and educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of
Disclaimer.[32] If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of
the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the latter
demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on
whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or
that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple
sentences that are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she
signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of
respondent.

The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a
document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the
negative.

It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after
explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending
cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.[33] Moreover, there is no showing
that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainants daughter as paternity remains to be
proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot
later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is bereft of
evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquinos counsel in the settlement of the case. Again,
we only have complainants bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence.[34] Suspicion, no
matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the
presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.[35]
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by
Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to
her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining
P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.

The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered
respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in
order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in
settlement of complainants claim for support. The parties are in agreement that
complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she
should have received more as there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00
that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the amount
is in fact more than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more and complainant said he
could have it and he assumed it was for his attorneys fees.

We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed
two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand,
respondent admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no
evidence of an agreement for attorneys fees to justify his presumption that he can keep
the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in
favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration
where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what
the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did not want
to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.

We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding
in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere
conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently
finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and answer
modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more

in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the

substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP
for further reception of evidence solely on this aspect.

We also are unable to grant complainants prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her
childs DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainants claim for moral damages and attorneys fees. Suffice it to state
that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal
action.[36] It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal
profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the
public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.[37] As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for
private grievance.[38] The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
lawyers alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.[39]
Respondents misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted
out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent
contracted a bigamous marriage,[40] abandoned his family to cohabit with his paramour,[41]

cohabited with a married woman,[42] lured an innocent woman into marriage,[43] or was found to be

a womanizer.[44] The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases.

We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.[45] In Zaguirre v. Castillo,[46] respondent
was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought
understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit
relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude,
the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,[47] where respondent
judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child
with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement
during the pendency of the case.

We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over his
indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his
is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his
favor.[48] Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would
suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this case involving the
alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of

immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for
further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of
this Decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney
and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

AMADOR Z. MALHABOUR, A.C. No. 5417[1]

Complainant, Present:
versus
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
ATTY. ALBERTI R. SARMIENTO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Respondent.
CORONA,

AZCUNA, and

GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 31, 2006

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by Amador Z.
Malhabour against Atty. Alberti R. Sarmiento.

Complainant was private respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 50835, HY2LB Shipping &
Management Services, Inc. and New Ocean Ltd. v. The National Labor Relations
Commission and Amador Malhabour.

Respondent, then a lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), was complainants
counsel in National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Case No. 009719-95. After
the respondent retired from the PAO in March 1997, complainant asked him to continue
assisting him in said labor case.

The facts are:

On May 29, 1993, HY2LB Shipping and Management Services, Inc., (HY2LB
Shipping), a local manning agency, hired complainant as electrician for M/V Gold Faith,
a vessel owned by New Ocean Ltd., a foreign principal based in Hongkong. The
employment contract was for a period of 12 months and that complainants monthly
salary would be six hundred US dollars ($600.00). He had to work 48 hours a week with
30% overtime pay.

Complainant rendered service on board the vessel for four months and nine days only.
On August 5, 1993, HY2LB Shipping asked him to disembark on the ground that the
foreign principal was reducing its personnel. Thus, complainant filed with the Philippine
Overseas Employment and Administration Office (POEA), a Complaint for Illegal
Dismissal against HY2LB Shipping, New Ocean Ltd., and Premier Insurance and Surety
Corporation.

On June 14, 1995, the POEA Adjudication Office rendered judgment in favor of
complainant, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents HY2LB Shipping and Management Services, Inc.,
New Ocean Ltd. and Premier Insurance are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay complainant or
in Philippine Peso at the exchange rate prevailing during actual payment, the following:
1. The sum of US$4,680.00 representing the unexpired portion of
the contract;
2. The sum of US$220.00 representing the unpaid salary of
complainant; and
3. The sum of US$774.00 representing the fixed overtime pay of
complainant.
No other pronouncement.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal by HY2LB Shipping, New Ocean Ltd., and Premier
Insurance and Surety Corporation, the NLRC rendered its
Decision affirming the POEA judgment. Their motions for
reconsideration were denied.

HY2LB Shipping then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari against
NLRC and complainant.

In its Decision dated June 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed HY2LB Shippings
petition, holding that in affirming the POEA judgment, the NLRC did not gravely abuse
its discretion. HY2LB Shipping filed a Motion for Reconsideration, invoking Section 10
of R.A. No. 8042.[2] The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution of February 15, 2000,
modified the NLRC Decision, in the sense that complainant is entitled to only three (3)
months salary considering that this is the lesser amount of his one year employment
contract;[3] and overtime pay since this was provided in the parties contract of
employment.

Immediately upon receipt of the Court of Appeals Resolution, complainant requested

respondent to file a motion for reconsideration. But the latter merely filed a Notice to
File Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation to File an Appeal in case Same is
Denied.[4] Respondent advised complainant to accept the Decision of the Court of
Appeals and that filing a motion for reconsideration will just prolong the litigation.
Complainant did not heed respondents advice and filed the motion for reconsideration
himself. But it was denied by the Appellate Court for being late by 43 days.[5] At this
point, complainant urged respondent to file with this Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Respondent agreed but delayed its filing. On July 24, 2000, this Court issued
a Resolution[6] denying complainants petition for being late.

Meantime, unknown to complainant, respondent sent a letter dated April 7, 2000 to the
NLRC stating that complainant gave him a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him
to receive the judgment award. Respondent then filed a Motion for Execution alleging
that complainant decided to terminate the case and will no longer file a motion for
reconsideration of the February 15, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.[7]

On June 16, 2000, respondent received from the NLRC a check[8] dated June 14, 2000
in the amount of P99,490.00 which he deposited with the Ecology Bank, Banawe
Branch, under his personal account.

Subsequently, complainant came to know of the NLRC Order dated June 6, 2000
directing the NLRC cashier to release to respondent the sum of P99,490.00 representing
the money judgment.

Thereupon, complainant sought the assistance of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime

Task Force.[9] Then he filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a
complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document. The NBI referred the matter
to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

During their confrontation at the NBI, respondent paid complainant P40,000.00 as

partial payment of the P60,000.00 awarded to the latter.

Later, or on January 30, 2001,[10] respondent paid complainant only P10,000.00,

leaving a balance of P10,000.00. This prompted complainant to file with this Court the
instant complaint for disbarment.

In his Comment dated June 1, 2001, respondent alleged inter alia that this case arose
from a quarrel between a client and his counsel; that after the promulgation of the Court
of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 50835, HY2LB Shipping filed
with this Court a Petition for Review of Certiorari; that at this time, he (respondent)
filed with the NLRC a Motion for Execution; that the NLRC partially granted his motion
by issuing a check in the amount of P100,000.00 by virtue of a Special Power of
Attorney signed by complainant; that pursuant to their agreement that their shares in the
award is on a 40-60 ratio, he (respondent) kept complainants share of P60,000.00; and
that he was ready to give complainant his share but he did not make any demand and
refused to receive the balance on June 30, 2001.

On August 27, 2001, this Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In its Report and
Recommendation[11] dated April 15, 2002, the IBP through Investigating Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, made the following findings:

It was apparent that the complainant did not agree with the modified decision of the Court of Appeals
and instructed respondent to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. All the while and
without his knowledge and consent, respondent filed a Motion for Execution with the NLRC who
awarded complainant the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Respondent
admitted that he was able to encash the check awarded to complainant by virtue of a Special Power of
Attorney which complainant denies having executed. x x x.
x x x. When respondent received the amount of money awarded to complainant by the NLRC, he took
it upon himself to divide the money into 60-40 ratio because complainant owed him his attorneys fees;
however, he failed to inform complainant beforehand of his plan, and only when complainant filed a
criminal complaint against him that respondent paid complainant and on installment basis at that.
Respondent in fact still has a balance of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Respondent claims that
complainant exceeded and abused his goodness and kindness but it is the other way around.
and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law and as a
member of the Bar for one year.

On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-397
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
Maala.

We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent failed to comply with the above provisions. Records show and as found by
Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed deceit by making it appear that
complainant executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him (respondent) to file
with the NLRC a Motion for Execution and to collect the money judgment awarded to
the former. Worse, after receiving from the NLRC cashier the check amounting to
P99,490.00, he retained the amount. It was only when complainant reported the matter
to the NBI that respondent paid him P40,000.00 as partial payment of the award. In fact,
there still remains an outstanding balance of P10,000.00. Moreover, as correctly found
by IBP Commissioner Maala, respondent has no right to retain or appropriate
unilaterally his lawyers lien[12] by dividing the money into 60-40 ratio. Obviously, such
conduct is indicative of lack of integrity and propriety.[13] He was clinging to
something not his and to which he had no right.

It bears stressing that as a lawyer, respondent is the servant of the law and belongs to a
profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation
of justice.[14] As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate
and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[15] This
Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of
members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession[16] and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
legal profession.[17] Membership in the legal profession is a privilege.[18] And
whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court,
which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its
Bar, to withdraw the privilege.[19] Respondents conduct blemished not only his
integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. His conduct fell
short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.
Accordingly, administrative sanction against respondent is warranted. In Lao v. Medel,
[20] we considered a lawyers violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as in this case, as an act constituting gross misconduct. In
line with Lao, citing Co v. Bernardino,[21] Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr.,[22] and Saburnido
v. Madroo[23] which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers we find the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one year sufficient.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alberti R. Sarmiento is hereby declared guilty of

violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective
immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for his distribution to
all courts of the land, the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and entered into
respondents personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

GISELA HUYSSEN, A.C. No. 6707

Complainant, Present:

- versus - PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, PUNO,

Respondent. QUISUMBING,*

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
 CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO, and

GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 24, 2006

x---------------------------------------
-----------x

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This treats of a Complaint[1] for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent
Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez.

Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American
citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law.
Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa applications will be favorably
acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one
year which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was indeed
required by law, complainant deposited with respondent on six different occasions from
April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared
receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the complainant
but refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her demands. After one year,
complainant demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that
said amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return the sum deposited, the
World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to
respondent for the immediate return of the money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999,
respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to
comply with his promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In
response thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19 March 1999 explaining
the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed two
blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill
in the amounts. When complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates,
the same were dishonored because respondent had stopped payment on the same.
Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the
reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and gave complainant five postdated
checks with the assurance that said checks would be honored. Complainant deposited
the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were all dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by respondent.
After respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited amount,
complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to respondent.
The demand letters remained unheeded.

Thus, a complaint[2] for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required[3]

respondent to submit his answer within 15 days from receipt thereof.

In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,[4] respondent denied the allegations in the
complaint claiming that having never physically received the money mentioned in the
complaint, he could not have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount
was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the
Philippines. Respondent explained thus:

a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant,
the latter was introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem
concerning their stay in the Philippines, herself and three sons, one of which is already of major age
while the two others were still minors then. Their problem was the fact that since they have been
staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary visas (9G) they could no
longer extend their said status as under the law and related polic[i]es of the government, missionary
visa holders could only remain as such for ten (10) years after which they could no longer extend their
said status and have to leave the country.
b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better secure a
permanent visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota Visa and
thereafter, provided them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said visa, one of which is that
the applicant must have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform that her son Marcus Huyssen,
who was already of major age, has to have the same amount of show money separate of her money as
he would be issued separate visa, while her two minor children would be included as her dependents in
her said visa application. I advised them to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested me to refer
to her to a lawyer to work for their application, which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an
Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the complainant and her family.
c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the
same was finished and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant and her
family. Her son Marcus Huyssen was given an independent permanent visa while the other two were
made as dependents of the complainant. In between the processing of the papers and becoming very
close to the complainant, I became the intermediary between complainant and their counsel so much
that every amount that the latter would request for whatever purpose was coursed through me which
request were then transmitted to the complainant and every amount of money given by the complainant
to their counsel were coursed thru me which is the very reason why my signature appears in the
vouchers attached in the complaint-affidavit;
d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services of a
lawyer that I myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and
inquired from him regarding the matter and the following facts were revealed to me:
1) That what was used by the complainant as
her show money from the bank is not really her money but money of
World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a serious violation of the
Immigration Law as there was a misrepresentation. This fact was
confirmed later when the said entity sent their demand letter to the
undersigned affiant and which is attached to the complaint-affidavit;
2) That worst, the same amount used by the
complainant, was the very same amount used by her son Marcus
Huyssen, in obtaining his separate permanent visa. These acts of the
complainant and her son could have been a ground for deportation and
likewise constitute criminal offense under the Immigration Law and the
Revised Penal Code. These could have been the possible reason why
complainant was made to pay for quite huge amount.
e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family
became very close to undersigned and my family that I was even invited to their
residence several times;
f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money given and
surprisingly they want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer
around, he died sometime 1997;
g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that the
amount of money is now being sought to be recovered from me;
h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences of
having signed the same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed
but up to the present my standby loan application has not been released and was informed that the same
would only be forthcoming second week of August. The same should have been released last March
but was aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount to be paid, according to the complainant has
now become doubled plus attorneys fees of P200,000.00.
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her
Formal Offer of Evidence on 25 August 2003.

On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondents evidence but
the scheduled hearings (11 settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent who
was allegedly out of the country to attend to his clients needs. Reception of respondents
evidence was scheduled for the last time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent
failed to appear, despite due notice and without just cause.

On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her

report[5] recommending the disbarment of respondent. She justified her
recommendation in this manner:

At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent received the amount of
US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A
to F of complainant) showing his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however
claims that he did not appropriate the same for himself but that he delivered the said amount to a
certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering the documentary
evidence submitted by complainant. On record is the 1 March 1999 letter of respondent addressed to
the World Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he stated thus:
I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit
but I repeat, nobody really intended that the thing would happen that way.
Many events were the causes of the said delay particularly the death of
then Commissioner L. Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the
needed papers for the immediate release. It was only from compiling all
on the first week of January this year, that all the said papers were
recovered, hence, the process of the release just started though some
important papers were already finished as early as the last quarter of last
year. We are just going through the normal standard operating procedure
and there is no day since January that I do not make any follow ups on
 the progress of the same.
and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated thus:
I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount
deposited by your good self in connection with the procurement of your
permanent visa and that of your family. It might take some more time
before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers
are being still compiled are being looked at the files of the late
Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of heart
attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the
documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.
From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash
Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official
receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal
checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited
with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable conclusion
that respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated the same for his personal use. It
should also be noted that respondent has failed to establish that the late Atty. Mendoza referred to in his
Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one correspondence from Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa
application of complainant and his family, and complainant has also testified that she never met this
Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with
the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more
reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that
respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
with his public duties.
On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors
approved[6] the Investigating Commissioners report with
modification, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents
violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and
ordered to return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the money until
payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for
prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be
severely sanctioned.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official task have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public
office.[7]

It is undisputed that respondent admitted[8] having received the US$20,000 from

complainant as shown by his signatures in the petty cash vouchers[9] and receipts[10] he
prepared, on the false representation that that it was needed in complainants application
for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said amount and
interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted
complainant and children in their application for visa in the BID.[11] Such defense
remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the matter. While he claims
that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate of said Atty.
Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has
been naturally silenced by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When
the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.[12]
He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at
all times is expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty.
Records show that even though he was given the opportunity to answer the charges and
controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without any
plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set for reception of his
evidence despite due notice.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that
denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong
evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with nil
evidentiary value.

When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly
admitted the charge. Such admissions were also apparent in the following letters of
respondent to complainant:

1) Letter[13] dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:

Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of
which is 09 March 1999. Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the same to you out
of my personal money on said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here at the
office on that day and the amount would be given to you wether (sic) from the Bureau or from my own
personal money.
2) Letter[14] dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your goodself in
connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.
It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers
are still being compiled and are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who
approved your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later
as all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.
xxxx
As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and
the other one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill them up
on their due dates the peso equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the peso
equivalent of your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have postdated them to enable me to raise some
more pesos to cover the whole amount but dont worry as the Lord had already provided me the means.
3) Letter[15] dated 25 April 1999 provides:

Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done my very best for the
early return of your money but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still papers
lacking. When I stopped the payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that everything is
fine, but it is not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that I really have to personally return the
money out of my own. The issue should stop at my end. This is the truth that I must face. It may hurt
me financially but it would set me free from worries and anxieties.
I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday the releases of
which are on the following:
May 4, 1999- 200,000
May 11, 1999 -200,000
May 20, 1999-200,000
June 4, 1999-200,000
I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.
I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you will be
sufficiently funded on their due dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last
time, if any of these checks, is returned, dont call me anymore. Just file the necessary action against
me, I just had to put an end to this matter and look forward. x x x
4) Letter[16] dated 12 May 1999, which reads:

The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I issued. In fact I
stopped all payments to all other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to give
preference to the check I issued to you.
This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of returning the other checks I
requested for stop payment - instead honored them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a
very big surprise to me and discouragement for I know it would really upset you.
In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to
withdraw from the Bank. However, I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring
the same to your place considering that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for you to
immediately deposit today and I was assured by the bank that it would be honored this time.
Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the
money of another. As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent
would not have issued his personal checks if said amount were officially deposited with
the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.

Respondents act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latters

pending application for visas is violative of Rule 1.01[17] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in
any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Rule 6.02[18] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting
their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office.[19] Respondents conduct in office betrays the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one
occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain
from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer
in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on
committing another by issuing several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.

In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct,[20] as the effect transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the
public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer
who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his
fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and
duty, justice, honesty or good morals.[21]

Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the
time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a
manifestation of moral turpitude.[22]

Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of
complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID
and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue,
being a member of the bar.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a
special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects
the lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment.[23]
More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof
is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.[24]

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to
punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of
lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their
lawyers oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar.[25] These pronouncement gain practical significance in the case at
bar considering that respondent was a former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of
the BID. It bears stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants owe
fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be
more sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more
likely to be magnified in the public eye.[26]

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the
strict demands and high standards of the legal profession.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority to do so.[27]

In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,[28] we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during
her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums
of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action
by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona,[29] we also disbarred a senior lawyer of the National
Labor Relations Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation
in the act of receiving and counting money extorted from a certain person.

Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain
the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal
profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers.[30]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
and ordered to return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest
from his receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of
the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action. Let
copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO,
A.C. No. 6705
Complainant,

Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Promulgated:
Respondent. March 31, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago (complainant) is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate.[1] Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc.[2]

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio (respondent) was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat Industries, Inc.[3] until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan in 1992.[4]
Taggat Industries, Inc. (Taggat) is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it
sometime in 1986,[5] and its operations ceased in 1997.[6]
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat (Taggat employees) filed a criminal complaint entitled
Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago, docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 (criminal complaint). [7]
Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after
the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from to .[8]
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation.
[9] He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations [10] for
violation of Article 288[11] in relation to Article 116[12] of the Labor Code of the .[13]
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.

Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew
the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from
hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees.[14]
Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and
even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to
support the complaint.[15]

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice
of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to
prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainers fee for the months of January and
February 1995,[16] another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995,[17] and
P5,000 for the month of April 1996.[18]

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as
government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainants allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by
the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation.[19]
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat
for more than five years.[20] Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to
Taggat.[21] Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation.[22] Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when
he performed his duty.[23] Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit
respondent from hearing the criminal complaint[24] but instead complainant voluntarily executed and
filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation.[25]
Respondent states that complainants reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that
respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainants statement during
the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he would do it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he was working with my Dad and he was
supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x.[26]
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not
representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely
performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.[27] Respondent argues
that complainant failed to establish that respondents act was tainted with personal
interest, malice and bad faith.[28]

Respondent denies complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases,
threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is
bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or
present them for cross-examination.[29]

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer
fees from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. [30] Respondent contends that the fees were
paid for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not
the same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. [31] Respondent,
in his Reply-Memorandum, states:

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the
respondents asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer
fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of conflict of interest. Moreover, these
consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by
former Taggat employees.[32]
Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was
filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel
or legal consultant.[33]
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651
Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan
Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999.[34] Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed.[35]

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M.
Alejandro-Abbas (IBP Commissioner Abbas) heard the case[36] and allowed the parties
to submit their respective memoranda.[37] Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas resignation,
the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa (IBP Commissioner Funa).
[38]

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 (IBP Resolution) dated 4 November
2004 adopting with modification[39] IBP Commissioner Funas Report and
Recommendation (Report) finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to
safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the prohibition against the private
practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of
law. The Report reads:

Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of
whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for Violation of Labor Code (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors
Office, Annex B of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as
having the management and control of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly
handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related
with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with
complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with
Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and
personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the
duty to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil.
640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any
interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a
former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case,
matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for Violation of the Labor Code.
Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related,
or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No.
97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S.
No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very
personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt
with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the
corporation and part of its management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving Retainer Fees or consultancy fees from herein Complainant while
being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda,
1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a
legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are
characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of
court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111;
Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of
criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former
clients interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a
government prosecutor.[40]
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[41] of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct.[42] Respondent
committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713).

Canon 6 provides that the Code shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official duties.[43] A government lawyer is thus bound by the
prohibition not [to] represent conflicting interests.[44] However, this rule is subject to
certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when
no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full
disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists.[45] Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.[46]

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in unlawful x x x conduct.
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to engage
in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions.[47]

Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim

that respondent represented conflicting interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba,[48] the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One
test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.[49] In essence,
what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.
[50]

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the
preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997.
The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred
from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with
Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence

must be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only
established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he
was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does
not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his
previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to
charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client
does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent of
the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her

allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law

while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.[51]
Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.[52]

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently

and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This
argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy
services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are
usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within
the ambit of the term practice of law.

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for
Retainers fee.[53] Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the
prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees unless the acts involved
also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
mandates that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondents admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated
in his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely
suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of
Attorneys on the following grounds:
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his
dealings with the public.[54]

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.[55]

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to
one year.[56] We find this penalty appropriate for respondents violation in this case of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we
SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.