"Besides, there is no showing that the levied firearms are the
[G.R. No. 88114 : December 20, 1990.]
192 SCRA 492
PENTAGON SECURITY and INVESTIGATION AGENCY,
Petitioner, vs.VICENTE T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., and NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION,
Respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, a single proprietorship engaged in security services, was
ordered to pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS AND FOUR
CENTAVOS (P157,119.04) representing wages and COLA differentials
due its employees, as computed in a Decision of the NLRC dated 21
February 1986. On 22 June 1988, a notice of garnishment was issued
against petitioner, addressed to the PC-SUSIA c/o Col. Norberto M.
Lina, Camp Crame, EDSA, Q.C. On 5 June 1988, Deputy Sheriff
Silvino B. Santos issued a Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution of
Personal Properties against herein petitioner, which personal properties
are the licensed firearms in question.
Petitioner filed an urgent petition to quash Notice of Levy and Sale
on Execution, claiming exemption from execution under Sec. 12,
par. (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Labor Arbiter Eduardo Magno denied the petition. The Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied. On 21 March 1989, the NLRC
issued its resolution which is the subject of this petition.
The NLRC held:
"Respondent is a security agency. It is admitted that the licensed
firearm is an important implement used in the business but this
licensed firearm is not the tools and implements exempted from
execution. The question, therefore is whether a person can run
his trade or employment without such licensed firearm. The
answer is in the affirmative since the person can still run the
business or engage in his trade even without such firearm
because there are other alternatives open to him.
only firearms that the respondent-appellant has in its possession.
We affirmatively believe therefore that there are firearms still
hidden in its armory sufficient enough to answer the call of its
security trade or business. In the remote assumption that no
firearms remains in respondent's custody, as practically flowing
from the view of Labor Arbiter Magno, respondent can lease or
buy from legitimate sources. There (sic) are some of the
alternatives which even common layman can expediently
comprehend."
The Solicitor General's as well as private respondent's comments submit
that firearms of a security agency are not exempt from execution under
Rule 39, Sec. 12, par. (b) of the Rules of Court which provides:
"Sec. 12. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be
exempt from execution:
'(b) Tools and implements necessarily used by him in his trade or
employment;'"
Respondents contend that from the above provision, three (3) things can
be deduced, viz:
"(a) Except in paragraphs (j) and (m), Sec. 12, Rule 39, Rules of Court,
the exemptions are accorded to individual debtors.
(b) The exempt properties are used personally by the debtor or his
family, or as tools or implements of the debtor in his trade or
employment.
(c) The properties are necessary for the livelihood of the debtor and his
family."
The term "tools and implements" refers to instruments of husbandry or
manual labor needed by an artisan craftsman or laborer to obtain his
living. Here petitioner is a business enterprise. It does not use the
firearms personally, but they are used by its employees. Not being a
natural person, petitioner cannot claim that the firearms are necessary
for its livelihood. Private respondent invites the Court to take judicial
notice of the fact that there are security guards rendering service without
firearms.
Petitioner without filing any reply moves for the resolution of the
petition.
ISSUE:
W/N there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC
in upholding the sheriff's issuance of Notice of Levy and Sale on
Execution against licensed firearms owned and used by the
petitioner, a security agency, in its operations?
HELD: NO!
There is no question, in our mind, that a security agency without
firearms to equip its guards is useless.
However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the
provision involved is personal, available only to a natural person,
such as a dentist's dental chair and electric fan (Belen v. de Leon,
G.R. No. L-16412, 30 Nov. 1962). As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, if properties used in business are exempt from execution,
there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be
enforced against the business entity.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. However, for security
reasons, and to prevent the possibility that the firearms to be sold at the
execution sale may fall into the hands of lawless and subversive
elements, the sale at public auction should be with the prior clearance
and under supervision of the PC-INP authorities.
G.R. No. 149053
CENTRAL SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioner, Present:
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC.,
Respondent.Promulgated:
March 7, 2007
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in 1977, Ernesto Olson entered into a dealership
agreement with respondent Planters Products, Inc. whereby he agreed to
purchase, in cash or credit, fertilizers and agricultural chemicals from
respondent for resale. To secure Olsons faithful compliance of his
obligations, Vista Surety and Insurance, Co. (Vista Insurance) and
petitioner executed a surety undertaking in favor of respondent.
After several deliveries, Olson failed to pay respondent prompting the
latter to claim the amount due from petitioner and Vista Insurance.
However, both refused to settle their liabilities to respondent as Olsons
sureties.
On June 25, 1979, respondent filed an action for collection of sum
of money against Olson, Vista Insurance and petitioner in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 58. Summons were accordingly
served (except as to Olson whose address could not be located).
The trial court found petitioner and Vista Insurance liable to
respondent. They were ordered to pay the following: (1) P372,502
representing the unpaid principal amount plus interest; (2) 25% of the
total amount recoverable as attorneys fees and (3) cost of suit.
Petitioner alone appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On December 7, 1992, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal for
failure to pay the required docket fees. On March 12, 1993, the
dismissal of petitioners appeal became final and executory; entry of
judgment followed on May 27, 1993.
On October 12, 1993, respondent filed in the RTC a motion for
execution of judgment following the CAs dismissal of petitioners
appeal. The RTC issued the writ on October 21, 1993. The writ,
however, was not implemented so respondent filed an ex parte motion
for the issuance of an alias writ of execution which the trial court
granted on February 24, 1994.
In the CA, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion to Set Aside the
CA Resolution of December 7, 1992 and to Re-Open Appeal with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order. On
March 3, 1994, the appellate court issued a resolution restraining the
RTC judge and the deputy sheriff from enforcing the writ but, on motion
of respondent, the CA lifted the TRO and dismissed petitioners urgent
motion on March 24, 1994.
Through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner elevated the CAs dismissal of its urgent motion to this Court.
In its petition, petitioner argued that it failed to pay the docket fees only
because the CAs judicial records division did not re-send the notice for
it to pay said fees. On July 11, 1994, we dismissed the petition and this
dismissal became final on September 14, 1994.
On June 18, 1999 or 6 years from the entry of judgment of the
RTCs decision, respondent filed another motion for issuance of alias
writ of execution in the trial court. On August 20, 1999, the trial court
issued an order granting the writ. Petitioner filed an MR of said order
but the RTC denied it.
Petitioner thereafter went to the CA via a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules ascribing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC judge for issuing the writ despite the fact that
more than five years had elapsed since the RTCs decision of November
6, 1991 became final and executory. Invoking Rule 39, Section 6 of the
Rules, petitioner insisted that the RTC decision could no longer be
enforced by mere motion but only by court action.
The CA dismissed the petition for patent lack of merit. It held that:
While it is true that the judgment sought to be
executed became final and executory on March 12, 1993,
it bears stressing that the delay was caused by petitioners
dilatory maneuvers filed in this Court and all the way to
the Supreme Court, viz: the Very Urgent Motion to Set
Aside Resolution of December 7, 1992 and to Re-Open
the Appeal with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order which resulted
in the issuance of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated
March 3, 1994 enjoining respondents from enforcing the
subject decision; the Motion for Reconsideration of [the]
Court of Appeals Resolution dated March 24, 1994; and
Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court which
was ultimately dismissed by the High Court on July 11,
1994.
Petitioner filed an MR but this was likewise denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the execution of a final judgment may be made by mere
motion despite the lapse of five years?
HELD: YES! In this case, we answer in the affirmative.
Under Rule 39, Section 6, the rule is that a final judgment
may be executed by mere motion within five years from the date of
entry of judgment. However, the rule is not absolute and admits one
notable exception and that is when the delay in enforcing the
judgment is caused by the party assailing the filing of the motion.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we declared that, on
meritorious grounds, execution of final judgment by mere motion may
be allowed even after the lapse of five years when delay in the execution
is caused or occasioned by the actions of the judgment debtor and/or is
incurred for his benefit.
Similarly, in Camacho v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the
five-year period allowed for enforcement of judgment by mere action is
deemed effectively interrupted or suspended when the delay in the
execution is occasioned by the oppositors own initiatives in order to
gain an undue advantage.
Based on the attendant facts, the present case falls within the
exception. Petitioner triggered the series of delays in the execution of
the RTCs final decision by filing numerous motions and appeals in the
appellate courts, even causing the CAs issuance of the TRO enjoining
the enforcement of said decision. It is obvious that petitioner is merely
resorting to dilatory maneuvers to skirt its legal obligation.
Lastly, in Republic and Camacho, we ruled that the purpose of
the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing a judgment or
action is to prevent a party from sleeping on his rights. Far from
sleeping on its rights, respondent pursued its claim by persistently
seeking the execution of the RTCs final judgment of November 6,
1991. It would be unjust to frustrate respondents effort to collect
payment from petitioner on sheer technicality. While strict
compliance to the rules of procedure is desired, liberal
interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of
the rules will not serve the ends of justice.
G.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007
ROLANDO TING,Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA
L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE,
ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN
ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the
Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No.
18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January
29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10,
1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor
of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the
same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio,
Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L.
David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were
afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioners application
by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer calling attention to
the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become
final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred
the filing of petitioners application on the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu
RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioners application on
the ground of res judicata.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
W/N the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in
LRC No. 1437-N?
HELD: YES!
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of
decree. The judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding
becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted from the
date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from
the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration
courts approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
Atienzas application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and
is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration
officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the
sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be
in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in
the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they
are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of
the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in
this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials,
and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to
"extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings."
As for petitioners claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final
and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time,
and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced
by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations,
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the
failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to
execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not
lie.

13
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. enunciates the raison detre why
Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings,
viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE
DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON
NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT
YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the
effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and
after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to
special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a
status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said
ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had
been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust
him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar
to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil
action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by
virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case,
unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal.
G.R. No. L-31077 March 17, 1978
ARABAY, INC.,petitioner,
vs.
Hon. SERAFIN SALVADOR, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch, and BENJAMIN M.
PASCUAL,respondents.
Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for petitioner.
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
In a decision dated October 7, 1968 in Civil Case No. 71710 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, "Arabay, Inc. vs. Florencio A.
Soyangco", Judge Manuel P. Barcelona ordered Soyangco to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P36,874.49 plus six percent interest from
January 10, 1967 and P2,000 as attorney's fees.
Soyangco did not appeal. Pursuant to the writ of execution issued in that
case, a deputy sheriff of Rizal levied upon forty pieces of personal
property found in Soyangco's residence at Navotas, Rizal and served
notice that the same would be auctioned off to the highest bidder on
March 8, 1969.
On March 6, 1969 Benjamin M. Pascual filed a third-party
claim with the sheriff. He alleged that he owned the said pieces of
personal property because they were sold to him by the deputy
sheriff of Caloocan City for P8,106.16 to satisfy a judgment against
Soyangco in Civil Case No. 61193, "Esteban F. Ferrer vs. Florencio
Soyangco"of the Court of First Instance of Manila, as shown in the
certificate of sale dated June 30, 1967.
On March 13, 1969 Arabay, Inc. posted an indemnity bond for
P8,106.16 in favor of the sheriff. The auction sale was rescheduled on
March 28, 1969 but the sale did not take place because Pascual sued the
sheriff and Arabay, Inc. in Civil Case No. C-1545 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch XIV. Pascual prayed in that
case that the auction sale be enjoined, that the levy be declared void and
that the defendants be ordered to pay moral damages and attorney's fees.
The Caloocan court in an ex parte order dated March 26, 1969 enjoined
the sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale.
Arabay, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the injunction suit. It
invoked the rule that no court has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction.
Pascual opposed the motion to dismiss. He cited the rule that a sheriff
has no authority to attach the property of a person other than the
judgment debtor.
The Caloocan court in its order of may 19, 1969 denied the motion to
dismiss and reiterated its prior order that upon the filing or a bond in the
sum of P5,000 a writ of injunction should be issued to enjoin the auction
sale. The motion for the reconsideration of that order was denied in the
court's order of July 11, 1969.
On October 13, 1969 Arabay, Inc. filed in this court the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition wherein it assailed the injunction order.
ISSUE:
W/N at the instance of a third-party claimant the Caloocan
court can enjoin the sheriff from selling the properties which he has
levied upon to satisfy the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila?
HELD: YES!
We hold that the Caloocan court can stop the execution of the Manila
court's judgment against properties not belonging to the judgment
debtor. The injunction in that case would not constitute an interference
with the process of a court of coordinate and co-equal jurisdiction.
as a third-party claimant, Pascual has the right to vindicate his
claim to the properties levied upon by means of a proper action.
That right is recognized in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. If
property levied on be claimed by any other person than the
judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an affidavit of
his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the
grounds of such right or title, and serve the same upon the officer
making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the
officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such
judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnify
the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater such
than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as
to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the
writ of execution.
The third-party claimant is to obligated to file an action for damages
against the sheriff in case an indemnity bond was filed by the judgment
creditor. The third-party claimant may file a separate and
independent action to establish ownership to the property levied
upon by the sheriff. In that action, he may secure an injunction to
restrain the sale of the attached property.
When the sheriff, acting beyond the bound of his authority, seizes a
stranger's property, the writ of injunction, which is issued to stop the
auction sale of that property, is not an interference with the writ of
execution issued by another court because the writ of execution issued
by another court because the writ of execution was improperly
implemented by the sheriff. Under that writ, he could attach the property
of the judgment debtor. He is not authorized to levy upon the property of
the third-party claimant.
In the instant case, respondent Judge acted within his
jurisdiction and did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
enjoining the auction sale because, as already stated, "a sheriff has
no authority to attach the property of any person under an
execution except that of the judgment debtor. If he does so, the writ
of execution affords him no justification for the action is not in
obedience to the mandate of the writ. So long as the officer confines
his acts which are not justified by the writ are without authority of
law. An injunction is a proper remedy to prevent a sheriff from selling
the property of one person for the purpose of paying the debts of
another.".
It is noteworthy that, generally, the rule, that no court has authority to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the injunctive relief,
is applied in cases, where no third-party claimant is involved, in order
to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment or process of another
court of the same rank or category, a power which devolves upon the
proper appellate court.
The raison d'etre for that rule is that an effective ordering of legal
relationships in civil society is possible only when each court is granted
exclusive jurisdiction over the property brought to it. To allow
coordinate courts to interfere with each other's judgments or decrees by
injunctions would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously
hinder the proper administration of justice, especially if they are
branches of the same court.
That rule is not violated when the judge of another branch, who annuls
or modifies the order issued by another judge, acts in the same case and
belongs to the same court (Eleazar vs. Zandueta, 48 Phil. 193).
On the other hand, it should be noted that a Court of First Instance or a
branch thereof has the authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of,
and to act in, a suit to annul a final and executory judgment or order
rendered by another Court of First Instance or by another branch of the
same court. In such a case, there is no interference by one branch of the
court with the judgment of another branch of the same court because
after a case had been finally terminated in one branch and an action to
annul the judgment is filed in another branch, the cause of action in the
second case would be different from that in the first case.
G.R. No. 84497 November 6, 1989
ALFONSO ESCOVILLA, JR., CECILIO M. MERIS and CUISON
ENGINEERING and MACHINERY CO., INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SIBAGAT TIMBER
CORPORATION and CONCHITA DEL ROSARIO,respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 13699, entitled Cuison Engineering and
Machinery Co., Inc. v. del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc.",
a decision dated March 24, 1981 was rendered by the then Court of First
Instance, Branch II, Davao City awarding to Cuison Engineering and
Machinery Co., Inc. a certain sum of money and damages. The Court of
Appeals eventually affirmed the decision which became final and
executory on June 29, 1984. Thereafter, Cuison Engineering and
Machinery Co. sought the execution of the subject decision and a
corresponding writ of execution was issued on December 27, 1984 by
the RTC, Branch IX, Davao City.
On January 26, 1985, petitioner Deputy Sheriff Alfonso Escovilla, Jr.
levied and seized one (1) unit electric welding machine. A third party
claim over said item was filed by Mariano Rana office manager of
Sibagat Timber Corporation, one of the private respondents.
Because of such levy, Special Civil Case No. 454 which was an action
for prohibition with preliminary injunction and damages was filed on
February 5, 1985 before the RTC, Branch IV of Butuan City entitled,
"Sibagat Timber Corp., Petitioner v. Alfonso Escovilla, Jr. and Cuison
Engineering and Machinery Corp., Inc., Respondents."
On February 7, 1985, petitioner Deputy Sheriff Cecilio M. Meris
seized and levied one (1) unit motor launch named "Pixie Boy No. 5" by
virtue of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 13699.
On February 8, 1985, private respondent Conchita del Rosario, claiming
ownership over the motor launch filed a third party claim over the
subject property.
Consequently, a sheriff's indemnity bond filed for the third party claim
of Conchita del Rosario was approved by the Davao Court.
On the same date, February 8, 1985, petitioner Cecilio M. Meris
prepared the notice of sale setting the auction sale of the motor launch
on February 14, 1985.
On February 11, 1985, Special Civil Case No. 454 was amended to
include as additional petitioner, Conchita del Rosario and as additional
respondent, Cecilio M. Meris. As prayed for in the petition, a temporary
restraining order was issued directing the respondents to refrain from
proceeding with the public auction sale scheduled on February 14, 1985.
However on March 6, 1985, after the temporary restraining order had
lapsed and upon motion of Cuison Engineering & Machinery Co., the
RTC of Davao City issued an order in Civil Case No. 13699 directing
Deputy Sheriff Escovilla to proceed with the auction sale of the subject
motor launch "Pixie Boy No. 5" with authority to lawfully retrieve the
same wherever it may be stored or berthed.
Pursuant to such order, Escovilla took custody of the motor launch and
set the auction sale on March 27, 1985.
Despite the orders of the court in Special Civil Case No. 454 directing
the Sheriff to return the motor launch and to desist from proceeding with
the auction sale, the auction sale was conducted upon motion of Cuison
Engineering and Machinery Co., Inc. and upon order of Judge Saludares
in Civil Case No. 13699.
On March 27, 1985, the subject motor launch was sold at public auction
by Deputy Sheriff Joseymour R. Robiza in lieu of Escovilla who was
then in Gen. Santos City, South Cotabato.
Trial on the merits was held in Special Civil Case No. 454, and
on June 5, 1986, the court rendered a decision Commanding
respondent Sheriff Alfonso Escovilla, Jr. to return the motor launch
Pixie Boy No. 5 at his own expense to its rightful owner Conchita C.
del Rosario in Butuan City in the same condition when it was taken
in 1985; or, in the event of loss or inability to recover said motor
launch, to pay its value of P500,000.00;
They are also ordered to pay Sibagat limber Corporation in the sum of
P22,500.00 as actual and compensatory damages for the deprivation of
the use of the electric welding machine;
Both respondents are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
P15,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, plus the cost of this suit.
From said decision, the petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC, Butuan City with
some modifications, to wit:
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N AN ACTION FOR PROHIBITION WILL STILL
PROSPER AS A REMEDY FOR ACTS ALREADY
ACCOMPLISHED?
HELD: YES!
The petitioners' contention is untenable.
There is no dispute that the private respondents are indeed the
actual owners of the subject properties by virtue of a sale in their
favor by Del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. Such
finding is based on evidence on record which this Court does not
find any reason to disturb. Moreover, there is nothing in the petition
nor in the petitioners' memorandum to suggest that the properties
sold in execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 13699 belonged
to the judgment-debtor in that case. This petition merely attacks the
procedure adopted by the respondents.
In such a case, the point to be borne in mind is that the power of the
court in the execution of judgments extends only over properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. As the Court
stated in Bayer Philippines, Inc. v. Agana, (63 SCRA 355 [1975] ):
We intimated that the levy by the sheriff of a property by virtue of a
writ of attachment may be considered as made under authority of the
court only when-the property levied upon unquestionably belongs to the
defendant. If he attaches properties other than those of the defendant, he
acts beyond the limits of his authority. Otherwise stated, the court
issuing a writ of execution is supposed to enforce its authority only over
properties of the judgment debtor, and should a third party appear to
claim the property levied upon by the sheriff, the procedure laid down
by the Rules is that such claim should be the subject of a separate and
independent action.
This is precisely the very nature of the proceedings in the action for
prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by the private respondents
with the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City which is sanctioned by
Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As held in Rivera vs.
Florendo (144 SCRA 643 [1986] ):
Another fundamental rule which appears to have been violated in
the case at bar is that no advantage may be given to one to the
prejudice of the other, a court should not by means of a preliminary
injunction transfer the property in litigation from the possession of
one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party
having possession asserts ownership thereto. (Rudolfo V. Alonso, 76
Phil. 225, February 28, 1946). Similarly, the primary purpose of an
injunction is to preserve the status quo, that is the last actual peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the controversy.
In the instant case, the private respondents properly instituted Special
Civil Case No. 454 which is a separate and independent action to
vindicate their claims over the subject properties. If at all the petitioners
had any doubts as to the veracity of the third-party claims, then the
separate action instituted was the proper forum to ventilate such
protestations. The action for prohibition was filed on February 5, 1985.
On February 18, 1985 the respondent Sheriffs admitted having seized
the disputed properties but assured the court that they will not remove
them from its jurisdiction nor sell or dispose of the same.
From the start, the petitioners were cognizant of the third-party claims
filed with the sheriff and the separate action instituted against them so
they were fully aware of their liabilities to these third-party claimants
who were not even parties to the case sought to be executed.
The rule is clear. If a third party claim is filed, the sheriff is not
bound to proceed with the levy of the property unless he is given by
the judgment creditor an indemnity bond against the claim. The
judgment creditor, by giving an indemnity bond, assumes the
direction and control of the sheriffs action; so far as it might
constitute a trespass and thus he becomes, to that extent, the
principal and the sheriff, his agent. This makes him responsible for
the continuance of the wrongful possession and for the sale and
conversion of the goods and for all real damages which the owner
might sustain.
Thus, in this case, even if the auction sale has been conducted and
the sheriffs certificate of sale was issued in favor of the winning bidder,
the liability of the judgment creditor and consequently, the purchaser to
the real owners of the properties levied and executed is not
extinguished. We also take note of the trial court's finding that Sheriffs
Escovilla and Meris misled the Davao court as to the ownership of the
properties they had seized knowing quite well that the petitioners in
Special Civil Case No. 454, the prohibition case, were the actual
owners of the property. This brings us to the other point raised in this
petition.
Corollary to the main issue raised is the argument that the Regional Trial
Court of Butuan City cannot restrain or interfere with the orders issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City which is its coordinate and
co-equal authority on matters properly brought before it. This issue has
been clearly settled in the case of Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, (133 SCRA 141 [1984] ) where the Court held:
Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the injunctive
relief sought by injunction, is applied in cases where no third-party
claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying
the judgment or process of another court of the same rank or
category, a power which devolves upon the proper appellate court
(Arabay Inc. v. Salvadro, 82 SCRA 138). The purpose of the rule is to
avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate
jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of
their proceedings.
A.M. No. P-92-766 March 27, 1995
LOURDES SUMALJAG EVANGELISTA,complainant,
vs.
LUISA PENSERGA,respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
FACTS:
Herein complainant was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2171 of the
MTCC of Ormoc City for unlawful detainer against defendant spouses
Jose and Zoila Aguirre. Judgment was rendered by the MTCC of Ormoc
City in favor of complainant, ordering the defendant spouses to vacate
the subject property (a parcel of land described as Lot 1326 with a house
thereon) and to pay complainant the sum of P8,120.00 in accrued
rentals. On appeal, the decision of the MTCC was affirmed by the RTC
of Ormoc City. Thereafter, the trial court issued a writ of execution on
April 28, 1992. The writ was implemented by herein respondent as
Clerk of Court IV and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of the MTCC of Ormoc City.
On April 30, 1992, the writ was returned by respondent, who stated in
her return that the writ was partially satisfied and that the defendants
had already vacated the subject house. In satisfaction of the money
judgment, respondent accepted the sum P100.00 and a promissory note
from the defendants/judgment debtors promising to pay P100.00
monthly until the entire amount of P8,120.00 is fully paid. Respondent
alleged that she accepted the sum of money and the promissory note
from the defendants because she found that none of the movables found
in the house where the defendants were staying belonged to them.
When respondent turned over the payment to the complainant, the latter
objected to the manner of implementation of the writ, alleging that the
same was contrary to the court's judgment, and maintaining that the
defendants were still occupying the subject property. Respondent
explained that the defendant showed her documents evidencing their
granddaughter's title to and ownership of the house they were
occupying, as well as their son-in-law's ownership of the movables in
the said house.
Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against
respondent for unreasonably refusing to implement the writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 2171 alleging among others that the
documents referred to by respondent were already considered by
the court in the ejectment case.
In a resolution dated June 30, 1994, the Court referred the case for
investigation, report and recommendation to the Executive Judge
Francisco H. Escano, Jr. of the RTC of Ormoc City, Branch 12.
During the hearing and investigation of the case, a dispute arose as to
whether the property owned by complainant included that presently
occupied by the Aguirres, the judgment debtors. The parties consented
to an ocular inspection of the premises in dispute. Judge Escano
appointed the Clerk of Court of the RTC to act as Commissioner to
conduct the ocular inspection and submit a report thereon.
The ocular inspection revealed that complainant's lot, Lot No. 1326, is
alleged by her to be facing the Agua Dulce Street and from there
continues down to the edge of the Malbasag River. The house of the
Aguirres stands on an old abandoned river bed, which respondent claims
is public land. While not contesting complainant's claim that the
boundary of her property is the Malbasag River, respondent contends
that said boundary is only up to the Aguirres' house since the river
flowed through and over the land where the Aguirres' house now stands
before it changed its course. No one could say with certainty when the
river changed its course and whether complainant's lot covers the area
down to the present location of the Malbasag River.
The Commissioner refrained from making a pronouncement in his
report as to whether the Aguirres' house is inside or outside the property
of complainant. He recommended that a surveyor be appointed at the
expense of the parties to determine whether the house the Aguirres were
occupying at the time the writ was served is on the land of complainant.
This recommendation was not acted upon by Executive Judge Escano.
The latter in turn submitted a Report to this Court based on the
Commissioner's findings and the testimonies of the witnesses of both
parties.
In his Report, Judge Escano pointed out that respondent misled the court
in making it appear in her return that the defendants had already vacated
the house subject of the decision when in fact defendants were still
living in the same house standing on the same lot but already renovated
by defendant's daughter's common law husband, Raymundo Codilla.
ISSUE:
W/N should have continued to implement the writ of execution
despite the presence of an alleged claim of a third person on the
subject property?
HELD: NO!
After a careful examination of the record, We find that no valid reasons
exist to warrant respondent's inability to implement the writ insofar as
effecting the ejectment of the Aguirres from the disputed house is
concerned. Respondent should have continued to implement the writ of
execution despite the presence of an alleged claim of a third person on
the subject property pursuant to and as provided for in Sections 13, 15
and 17 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
This Court had occasion to rule on the remedies of a third person
whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation
of a judgment debtor. The third party owner may invoke the
supervisory power of the court which authorized such execution.
Upon due application by the third person and after summary
hearing, the court may command that the property be released from
the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor
(Sy v. Discaya, 181 SCRA 382 [1990]).
Another remedy which the third person may avail of is the remedy caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the
known as terceria as provided in Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of management of their affairs. The sheriff, an officer of the court upon
Court. This is done by serving on the officer making the levy an whom the execution of a final judgment depends must be circumspect
affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. and proper in his behavior
According to the said rule, the officer shall not be bound to keep the
property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the
officer, indemnifies the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum
not greater than the value of the property levied on. An action for
damages may be later on brought against the sheriff.
The above mentioned remedies are without prejudice to any proper
action that a third-party claimant may deem suitable, to vindicate
his claim to the property. This proper action is distinct and separate
from that in which the judgment is being enforced (Ong v. Tating, 149
SCRA 265 [1987]). Hence, a person other than the judgment debtor who
claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded from
taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim (Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 158 [1991]).
Respondent acted without and in excess of her official duty in securing
such manner of payment from the judgment debtors.
Under the law, respondent was only authorized to do the following: oust G.R. No. L-37051 August 3l, 1977
the Aguirres from the subject property; place complainant in possession ANITA U. LORENZANA,petitioner,
thereof; satisfy back rentals out of the personal properties of the vs.
Aguirres, and if personal properties could not be found, satisfy the POLLY CAYETANO and COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.
money judgment out of the real property of the Aguirres, as required by GUERRERO, J.:
Sections 13 and 15 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent failed to follow the procedure laid down by the Rules FACTS:
of Court on execution of final judgment. She simply should have filed The records show that 'In 1958, petitioner filled n the Municipal
a return stating why she could not execute the writ of execution Court of Manila ejectment cases for non-payment of rentals against her
instead of entering into the "compromise" with the judgment debtors tenants occupying different stalls in that quonset hut situated in the San
(the Aguirres), which she is not authorized to do. Lazaro Estate with a floor area of 360 square meters. leased by her from
In the present case, respondent's duty was to implement the Writ of the Manila Railroad Company and later from the Bureau of Lands
Execution. His claim that third persons happen to claim the subject together with the use of the land north and south of the Quonset hut with
property does not justify his partial enforcement of the writ. an area of 340 square meters.
From the foregoing, it is very clear that respondent failed to observe the The private respondent, on the other hand, occupied the area north
proper procedures laid down by the Rules on execution of final of the quonset hut which area was also leased by her from the Manila
judgments when the property to be levied upon is claimed by third Railroad Company and subsequently from the Bureau of Lands, and on
persons. Instead, she opted to settle issues raised by the alleged third which her house stood.
persons/owners of the subject property which is beyond her power to do. Hence, the areas occupied by the two principal protagonists are
As a sheriff, respondent is bound to discharge her duties with prudence, adjacent to each other.
The ejectment. cases having been decided by the Municipal Court in
favor of the petitioner, the same were appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch I. The Court affirmed the decision of
the municipal court and ordered the defendants-tenants to vacate
the premises leased. Upon refusal of the tenants to vacate the premises,
the court granted a partial execution of the judgment and on July 20,
1959, a writ of demolition was issued, specifically commanding the
Sheriff of Manila "to demolish the premises subject of the above-name
cases".
Thereupon on July 27, 1959, Petitioner together with her counsel, Atty.
Nereo Paculdo and Deputy Sheriff Jose L. Cruz proceeded and entered
the premises of the respondent and in spite of her protests that she was
not a party to the ejectment cases in which the demolition order was
secured and that her premises was not subject of said ejectment cases,
they destroyed the latter's fence including flower pots trellises and
electric installations and carted away the materials thereof and built
another fence 5 meters into the premises of the respondent, boring holes
into the cemented garden or patio of her house.
On August 3, 1959, respondent presented to the court a motion
to declare petitioner, her counsel and the sheriff guilty of contempt;
that they be punished and held liable in damages to the petitioner.
The presiding judge held the motion in abeyance until the decision
of the court in the ejectment cases shall have been rendered.
Acting upon the petitioner's ex-parte motion and urgent motion for
demolition in the two appealed ejectment cases, Civil Case No. 29664
and Civil Case No. 29665, the court on September 28, 1959 ordered that
"a writ of demolition be issued ordering the Sheriff of Manila or any of
his deputies to demolish any or all improvements erected and existing
on the parcel of land subject of the above- entitled cases. which consists
of an area of about 700 square meters.". The writ of demolition was
issued by the Sheriff on September 30, 1959.
Upon procurement of this order or demolition, petitioner, together with
her counsel and the deputy sheriff proceeded once more to respondent's
premises on October 1, 1959 and moved the fence where it was illegally
placed by them on July 27, 1959. On the same day, October 1, 1959,
respondent filed an urgent motion for the suspension of the execution of
the writ of demolition, which motion was denied by the court the next
day, October 2, 1959.
The records further establish that on November 27, 1959, petitioner, her
lawyer, Atty. Paculdo, and Sheriff Cruz went back and moved the fence
1 Meter more into the premises of the respondent; that on February 19,
1960, the respondent filed an ex-parte motion to withdraw the petition
for contempt on the ground that "conferring with Judge Bayona after
this petition was heard, the petitioner was informed that not being a
party to the above-numbered cases, she is like an intruder to act on her
petition.".
On October 1, 1959, the respondent Polly Cayetano filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 42001 against the petitioner
Anita U. Lorenzana, Atty. Nereo J. Paculdo and Deputy Sheriff Jose L.
Cruz for damages with mandatory injunction. The defendants therein
filed a motion to dismiss, which was opposed by the plaintiff, and the
Court, Branch XVII, denied on December 19, 1959 the motion to
dismiss and the petition for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. The defendants filed their answers.
Under date of March 9, 1962, the Court issued the Decision dismissing
the complaint of the plaintiff as well as the counterclaim of the
defendants Anita U. Lorenzana and Atty. Nereo J. Paculdo for lack of
sufficient evidence. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
plaintiff but denied by the Court. Not satisfied with the Decision of the
Court, Polly Cayetano appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision appealed from, and ordered
"defendant-appellee Lorenzana to restore to appellant the
possession of the property invaded and occupied by her as shown in
Exh. L-1 to L-4; to put back appellant's fence and other valuable
improvements in their place before the writ of demolition was
served; ordering defendants, Lorenzana and Cruz, to pay jointly
and severally to the plaintiff-appellant the sum of P5,500.00 as
actual and moral damages, and pay the costs, except defendant,
Paculdo."
The above Decision is now sought to be reviewed in the instant petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of the writ of demolition by Judge Bayona
could legally effected against the respondent?
HELD: NO!
There is no merit to this contention and We find no error in the
ruling of the Court of Appeals that the writ of demolition could not
be legally effected against the respondent.
It must be noted that respondent was not a party to any of the 12
ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did
not make her appearance in and during the pendency of these ejectment
cases. Respondent only went to court to protect her property from
demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final
and executory. Hence, with respect to the judgment in said ejectment
cases, respondent remains a third person to such judgement, which
does not bind her; 1 nor can its writ of execution be enforced against
her since she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment
cases. 2
We also find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that
respondent having been duly heard by the Court, she was not deprived
of her day in court and was accorded the due process of law.
It cannot be said that the constitutional requirements of due process
were sufficiently complied with because the respondent had been duly
heard. Indeed, respondent was heard but simply hearing her did not
fulfill the basic conditions of procedural due process in courts. When
respondent appeared before the court to protect and preserve her
property, the Court had not lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the
property of the respondent because the premises of the respondent was
not included in the ejectment cases and the judgment in said cases could
not affect her property, much less demolish the same.
the requirements of due process is satisfied if the following
conditions are present namely:
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceedings:
(3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Intervening as a prejudiced owner of improvements being
wrongly demolished merely to oppose such order of demolition
upon learning that the said order was directed against premises not
her own, is not the same as being a party to the suit to the extent of
being bound by the judgment in the case where such order of
demolition was issued. 5 Furthermore, it must be noted that said
petitions were filed after the promulgation of the decision in the
ejectment cases and while in the process of execution. It is not proper to
speak of an intention in a case already terminated by final judgment .
Respondent, not being bound thereby, may avail herself of the
proper action afforded by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court which provides the proceedings where property levied
upon is claimed by a third person, stating as follows:
...Tile officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of
the property to any third-party claimant unless a claim is made by
the latter- and unless an action for damages is brought by him
against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained shall
prevent such claimant o any third person ffrom windicating his claim
to the property by any proper action...
Respondent acted within and exercised her right when she filed the
proper action to vindicate her claim afforded to her by Sec. 17, Rule 39
of the Revised Rules of Court, against the instruders or trespassers
before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, in Civil Case
No. 42001 for dam with mandatory injunction. If she did not insist on
her motion for contempt which the court held in abeyance and was later
withdrawn by her, if she did not appeal from the order of the court
denying her motion to suspend the writ of demolition, such failure did
not amount to a waiver of her right to pursue the proper action or
remedy provided to her by the Rules of Court. It is of no moment that
the respondent did not file a motion to quash the writ of execution or file
a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court or file a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with a higher court after her
petition to suspend the writ of demolition had been denied as suggested
by petitioner. The law has specifically given her the remedies to
vindicate her claim to the property. When the property of one person is
unlawfully taken by another, the former has a right of action against the
latter for the recovery of the property or for damages for the taking or
retention, and he is entitled to his choice of these two remedies. 7
We find no legal compulsion for respondent to pursue the remedies
suggested by the petitioner, for the rights of a third party claimant
should not be decided in the action where the third-party claim has been
presented, but in a separate action to be instituted by the third person.
No court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or
decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal
power to grant the relief sought by injunction.
For this doctrine to apply, the injunction issued by one court must
interfere with the judgment or decree issued by another court of equal or
coordinate jurisdiction and the relief sought by such injunction must be
one which could be granted by the court which rendered the judgment or
issued the decree.
Under Section 17 of Rule 39 a third person who claims property levied
upon on execution may vindicate such claim by action. A judgment
rendered in his favor - declaring him to be the owner of' the property
would not constitute interference with the powers or processes of the
court which rendered the judgment to enforce which the execution was
levied. If that be so and it is so because the property, being that of a
stranger, is not subject to levy then an interlocutory order, such as
injunction, upon a claim and prima facie showing of ownership by the
claimant, cannot be considered as such interference either
The right of a person who claims to be the owner of property levied
upon on execution to file a third-party claim with the sheriff is not
exclusive, and he may file an action to vindicate his claim even if the
judgment creditor files an indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff to
answer for any damages that may be suffered by the third-party
claimant. By "action," as stated in the Rule, what is meant is a separate
and independent action.
With respect to the fourth assignment of error, petitioner's
contention appears to be quite tenable in that under See. 14, Rule 39
of the Revised Rules of Court which the Court of Appeals applied,
the notice required before demolition of the improvements on the
property subject of the execution, is notice to the judgment debtor,
and not to a stranger or third party to the case like the private
respondent herein. Nonetheless, the claim that the Court of Appeals
misconstrued the aforecited Rule is as immaterial and
inconsequential as the application of this legal provision is
superflous and unnecessary for the affirmance of the Court's
decision.
G.R. No. L-49576 November 21, 1991
JOSEFINA B. CENAS and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
RIZAL,petitioners,
vs.
SPS. ANTONIO P. SANTOS and DRA. ROSARIO M. SANTOS
and HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO, Presiding Judge, CFI-Rizal, Br.
III,respondents.
W. Espiritu Taganas for petitioners.
Sta. Ana & Fonacier Law Office for private respondents.
FACTS:
On May 3, 1976, the spouses Jose Pulido and Iluminada M. Pulido
mortgaged to Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc. their land
covered by TCT No. 471634, subject of this case, to secure a loan of
P10,000.00. The said mortgage was registered with the Registry of
Deeds on the same date and was duly annotated in the title of the
property.
On May 18, 1976, the said mortgaged land was levied upon by the
City Sheriff of Quezon City pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the
then Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-2029
entitled, "Milagros C. Punzalan vs. Iluminada Manuel-Pulido"; and
eventually, on July 19, 1976, the same was sold to herein petitioner
Josefina B. Cenas who was the highest bidder in the execution sale.
On January 18, 1977, Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
assigned to petitioner Cenas all its rights, interests, and participation to
the said mortgage, for the sum of P8,110.00, representing the unpaid
principal obligation of the Pulidos as of October 6, 1976, including
interest due and legal expenses. Thus, petitioner became the purchaser at
the public auction sale of the subject property as well as the assignee of
the mortgage constituted thereon.
On July 19, 1977, herein private respondent Dra. Rosario M. Santos
redeemed the said property, paying the total sum of P15,718.00, and was
accordingly issued by the City Sheriff of Quezon City a Certificate of
Redemption.
On April 17, 1977, petitioner Cenas, as the assignee of the mortgage
loan of the Pulidos which remained unpaid, filed with the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, a verified petition for extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage constituted over the subject property.
Accordingly, the subject property was advertised for sale at public
auction on May 15, 1978.
On the other hand, private respondents, spouses Antonio P. Santos and
Dra. Rosario M. Santos, apprised of the impending auction sale of the
said property, filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal, claiming that they had become the absolute owners of
the property by virtue of Certificate of Redemption, dated July 20, 1977,
issued by the City Sheriff of Quezon City; and on May 11, 1978, filed
with the respondent court a verified Petition for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal from
proceeding with the public auction sale of the property in question.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Amend Petition together with the
Amended Petition, which was opposed by the petitioners. The trial
court, in its Order of July 17, 1978, denied the motion and ordered the
parties to submit simultaneous memoranda.
The trial court rendered its judgment dated August 28, 1978 in
favor of private respondents,
The trial court held that the redemption of the subject property
effected by the herein private respondents, "wipe out and
extinguished the mortgage executed by the Pulido spouses favor of
the Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc."
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial court, in its
Order of December 4, 1978, denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
W/Nthe redemption of the questioned property by herein private
respondents wiped out and extinguished the pre-existing mortgage
obligation of the judgment debtor, Iluminada M. Pulido for the security
of which (mortgage debt) the subject property had been encumbered.
HELD: NO!
The answer is in the negative.
Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, provides for the time,
manner and the amount to be paid to redeem a sold by virtue of a
writ of execution. Pertinent portion reads:
Sec. 30. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive
redemptions. Notice to be given and filed. The judgment debtor, or
redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any
time within twelve (12) months after the sale, on paying the
purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centumper
month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption,
together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the
purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on
such last-named amount at the same rate; and if the purchaser be
also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other
than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount
of such other lien, with interest. . . . .
Under the above-quoted provision, if the purchaser is also a creditor
having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment
under which such purchase was made, the redemptioner has to pay, in
addition to the prescribed amounts, such other prior lien of the creditor-
purchaser with interest.
In the instant case, it will be recalled that on May 3,1976, the
Pulidos mortgaged the subject property to Pasay City Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. who, in turn, on January 8, 1977, assigned the same to
petitioner Cenas. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1976, pursuant to the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-2029 (Petitioner Cenas is not a
party in this case No. Q-2029), the subject property was sold to
petitioner Cenas, being the highest bidder in the execution sale. On July
19, 1977, private respondent Dra. Rosario M. Santos redeemed the
subject property. Therefore, there is no question that petitioner Cenas as
assignee of the mortgage constituted over the subject property, is also a
creditor having a prior (mortgage) lien to that of Dra. Rosario M.
Santos. Accordingly, the acceptance of the redemption amount by
petitioner Cenas, without demanding payment of her prior lien the
mortgage obligation of the Pulidos cannot wipe out and extinguish
said mortgage obligation. The mortgage directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor
may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted (Art. 2126, Civil Code). Otherwise stated, a mortgage
creates a real right which is enforceable against the whole world. Hence,
even if the mortgaged property is sold (Art. 2128) or its possession
transferred to another (Art. 2129), the property remains subject to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.
It will be noted that Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is silent as to the
effect of the acceptance by the purchaser, who is also a creditor,
having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, of the redemption
amount, without demanding payment of her prior lien. Neither does it
provide whether or not the redemption of the property sold in
execution sale freed the redeemed property from prior liens. However,
where the prior lien consists of a mortgage constituted on the property
redeemed, as in the case at bar, such redemption does not extinguish
the mortgage (Art. 2126). Furthermore, a mortgage previously
registered, like in the instant case, cannot be prejudiced by any
subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of the certificate
of title.
Moreover, it must be stressed that private respondents redeemed the
property in question as "successor in interest" of the judgment debtor,
and as such are deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of the
judgment debtor and are bound by exactly the same condition relative to
the redemption of the subject property that bound the latter as debtor
and mortgagor (Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 125 [1989]; citing
the case of Gorospe vs. Santos, G.R. No. L-30079, January 30, 1976, 69
SCRA 191). Private respondents, by stepping in the judgment
debtor's shoes, had the obligation to pay the mortgage debt,
otherwise, the debt would and could be enforced against the
property mortgaged (Tambunting vs. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, 176 SCRA 493 [1989]).
G.R. No. L-53798 November 8, 1988
ALBERTO C. ROXAS and NENITA DE GUIA,petitioners,
vs.
MARINA BUAN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
ZAMBALES, BRANCH 1 AND THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
ZAMBALES THRU HIS DEPUTY, ATILANO G.
NANQUIL,respondents.
FACTS:
On August 19, 1975, Arcadio Valentin constituted a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage on a two-storey residential house and lot in favor of
private respondent, Marina Buan, to secure the loan of P78,328.08
granted by the latter to the former.
Upon failure of Valentin to pay the loan on its maturity date, Buan
applied for an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage which was duly
published and advertised for public auction by Olongapo City Sheriff
Ramon Y. Pardo on September 29, 1977. Private respondent was the
winning bidder in the auction sale and the City Sheriff issued a
Certificate of Sale duly registered with the Office of the Register of
Deeds on October 26, 1977. Valentin had a period of one (1) year from
the date of registration within which to redeem the mortgaged
properties. The period for the redemption of the property in question
having expired without the property being redeemed by Valentin, a Final
Bill of Sale was thereafter issued by the City Sheriff or, November 3,
1978.
After Valentin failed to deliver possession of the properties, Buan filed
before the Court of First Instance of Zambales a "Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession." As this was not contested, a decision
was rendered by respondent court on June 19, 1979
A writ of possession addressed to the Provincial Sheriff of Zambales
was issued on August 22, 1979. The return on the writ as embodied in
the Sheriff's Report dated August 28, 1979 showed that when Deputy
Sheriff Atilano G. Nanquil tried to execute the writ of possession, he
found that petitioners were occupying the premises and refused to
vacate the same, on the alleged claim of Atty. Roxas that he bought the
house and lot in question from Valentin in the amount of P100,00.00.
Atty. Roxas also told Sheriff Nanquil that he introduced improvements
consisting of one bungalow house and one store and that Valentin is no
longer residing in the premises.
In view of the petitioners' refusal to abide by the writ of possession,
private respondent filed on August 30, 1979 a "Motion for Contempt"
against Alberto Roxas and Nenita de Guia. On September 12, 1979, the
petitioners through counsel filed with the respondent court their answer
thereto arguing that they cannot be held guilty of contempt of court
because they were not made parties to the main action.
On January 16, 1980, the respondent trial court, finding merit in
petitioners' position that they could not be declared in contempt.
The respondents Atty. Alberto Roxas and Mrs. Nenita de Guia are,
however, ordered to immediately vacate the disputed house and lot in
question within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order
under pain of contempt of Court.
Disagreeing with the portion of the order directing them to vacate the
property, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 28,
1980. However, the respondent court, denied their motion on February
28, 1980.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
on April 12, 1979. This Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on
May 19, 1980.
The petitioners maintain that the respondent court gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order
complained of, upon the theory that it was predicated upon a writ of
possession which was ineffective as against them, being third parties.
Thus, the order is null and void. They also insist that the private
respondent should file an independent action to recover the property,
otherwise, there will be a violation of due process of law if they are not
given their day in court to prove their adverse claim.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent court gravely abused its discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order complained of, upon the
theory that it was predicated upon a writ of possession which was
ineffective as against the petitioners, being third parties?
HELD: NO!
The Court finds petitioners' contention without any legal or factual
basis.
Under Sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was
made applicable to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages
by Sec. 6 Act No. 3135, the possession of the mortgaged property
may be awarded to a purchaser in extrajudicial foreclosures "unless
a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
debtor."
As explained by the Court in IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance
Corp. v. Nera,
... The applicable provision of Act No. 3135 is Section 6 which provides
that, in cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made, "redemption shall
be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to
four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure in
so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act."
Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure were superseded by
Sections 25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which in turn were replaced by Sections 29-31 and Section 35 of
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 35 of the Revised
Rules of Court expressly states that "If no redemption be made within
twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is
entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property ..." The
possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner by the officer unless a party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment debtor.
Assuming this to be true, it is readily apparent that Roxas holds
title to and possesses the property as Valentin's transferee. Any right
he has to the property is necessarily derived from that of Valentin.
As transferee, he steps into the latter's shoes. Thus, in the instant
case, considering that the property had already been sold at public
auction pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, the only interest
that may be transferred by Valentin to Roxas is the right to redeem
it within the period prescribed by law. Roxas is therefore the
successor-in-interest of Valentin, to whom the latter had conveyed
his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption.
Consequently, Roxas' occupancy of the property cannot be considered
adverse to Valentin.
It does not matter that petitioner Roxas was not specifically named
in the writ of possession, as he merely stepped into the shoes of
Valentin, being the latter's successor-in-interest. On the other hand,
petitioner de Guia was occupying the house as Roxas' alleged tenant.
Moreover, respondent court's decision granting private respondent
Buan's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession ordered the
Provincial Sheriff of Zambales or any of his deputies to remove Valentin
or any person claiming interest under him" from the property.
Undeniably, petitioners fell under this category.
As petitioners have failed to establish that grave abuse of discretion, as
would warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari and prohibition
prayed for, tainted the issuance of the assailed order, the petition must
fail.
G.R. No. 87140 September 7, 1989
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,petitioner,
vs.
HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 8,
DOMINADOR B. ADRIANO, Deputy Sheriff, ALLIED CONTROL
& ELECTRIC CORPORATION, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK,respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:
The case had been instituted by Allied Control and Electric
Corporation (hereafter, simply ACEC) to recover a sum of money from
Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. (hereafter, BBGMI). The judgment
ordered BBGMI to pay ACEC its indebtedness of P 264,401.00 interest
thereon at the rate of 16% per annum and "penalty charge" at 3% per
month beginning May 15, 1985, and the further sum of P 66,100.00
equivalent to 25% of the overdue obligation as attorney's fees. The
judgment having become final, execution was ordered by the Court at
ACEC's instance on December 18, 1987.
Evidently the attempt at execution failed. Hence, ACEC filed on August
19, 1988 an "Ex-Parte Motion for Examination of Debtor of Judgment
Debtor," alleging that the National Power Corporation (NPC) was a
debtor of BBGMI and praying that certain officials of the NPC be
required to appear before the Court and examined regarding its debt to
BBGMI. This was granted by respondent Judge, who scheduled the
examination 49 on September 28, 1988 and on posterior dates." The
Manager of NPCs General Accounts Division, Ariel Vinoya, appeared in
response to subpoena and was duly examined on oath. The gist of his
testimony is set out in respondent Judge's Order of November 15,1988 2
viz:
... Witness testified that sometime in 1980, National Power Corporation
and defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. entered into an
agreement, whereby at that time Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. needed
the supply of electricity from NPC, however, at that time there was no
transmission lines connecting the mining site to the lines of NPC and it
was not yet within the program of activities of NPC to construct those
lines. Thus, Batong Buhay ... offered to finance the construction of the
line which they did . Under that arrangement, NPC is going to reimburse
Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. the amount that they have spent for the
construction of the line by crediting 25% of defendant's monthly electric
power bills until the actual cost shall have been fully paid and without
interest.
(T)he transmission lines were in fact erected and installed by
defendant and NPC supplied electric power to the mining site and as
agreed upon NPC deducted from the monthly power bills of defendant
the sums equivalent to 25% thereof, as shown graphically in Exh. 'A-2-
Motion' from October 15, 1983 to October 11, 1985. As reflected in
Exh. 'A-Motion' an amount of P 51,745,319.15 was due to defendant as
of December 31, 1982 and after deducting the 25%, a balance of
P37,532,763.17 was left due to defendant. However, ... when defendant
ceased operation in 1985 it left unpaid electric power bills in the amount
of P15,941,625.35 plus interest of P2,643,514.76 as of August, 1986 or
in the total amount of P18,585,140.11; deduct this from the
P37,532,763.17 and a balance of P18,947.623.06 was left due to
defendant but Mr. Vinoya further testified that it is not due to Batong
Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. but a balance of the advances made by Batong
Buhay Gold Mines Inc. in the construction of the power lines.
On the strength of this testimony -- which included, it must be stressed,
a denial by the witness that the amount of P18,947,623.06 was due to
BBGMI, this being "but a balance of the advances made by ... (the
latter) in the construction of the power lines respondent Judge resolved
to direct the NPC to pay ACEC "its judgment rendered in October
8,1987 out of the remaining credit NPC holds in favor of defendant,"
and ordered his deputy sheriff (respondent Adriano) "to garnish and
attach the said credit due Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc." In
justification His Honor invoked Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, authorizing the sheriff charged with execution of a money
judgment to levy on "debts" and "credits" 3 in addition to "real
property, stocks, shares, .. and other personal property, or any
interest in either real or personal property," pointing out, too, that
the NPC official, Vinoya, had later admitted that "this amount of
P18,947,623.06 is due to defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc."
Sheriff Adriano accordingly garnished such of the funds of the NPC on
deposit at the Philippine National Bank, Escolta, Manila, as were
"sufficient to cover the sum" required to be paid by respondent Judge's
Decision of October 8, 1987.
Hence, the present action of certiorari instituted by NPC praying
for "the setting aside of respondent Judge's Order dated November 15,
1988 ..and commanding respondent to desist from executing the writ of
garnishment issued by respondent Sheriff in Civil Case No. 87-39301."
ISSUE:
W/N respondent Judge correctly ordered the respondent to
desist from executing the writ of garnishment issued by respondent
Sheriff?
HELD: NO!
For the reasons shortly to be explained, the Court decreed on March
15, 1989 the issuance of a temporary restraining order "enjoining the
respondents from enforcing and/or implementing the (challenged)
Order," and a preliminary mandatory injunction "commanding
respondent Deputy Sheriff Dominador B. Adriano and/or Allied Control
and Electric Corporation to RETURN to respondent Philippine National
Bank the amount of P828,806.20 ... debited from petitioner's ... Account
SA No. 010-572194-3." The Court subsequently gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit memoranda. Said
memoranda have since been received.
The Court rules that in authorizing the execution of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 87-39301 against l stranger to the action, on the theory
that the latter was a "debtor of the judgment debtor," respondent Judge
was guilty of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
It is true that Rule 39 empowers a Court to order the examination
of a judgment debtor. This is clear from Section 39 of the rule:
SEC. 39. Examination of debtor of judgment debtor.- After an
execution against the property of a judgment debtor has been
returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, and upon proof, by
affidavit of a party or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the judge, that
a person, corporation, or other legal entity has property of such
judgment debtor, or is indebted to him, the judge may, by an order,
require such person, corporation or other legal entity, or any officer
or member thereof, to appear before the judge, or a commissioner
appointed by him, at a time a place within the province in which the
order is served, to answer concerning the same. The service of an
order shall bind all credits due the judgment debtor and all money
and property of the judgment debtor in the possession or in the
control of such person, corporation, or legal entity from the time of
service; and the judgment may also require notice of such
proceedings to be given to any party to the action in such manner as
he may deem proper.
It was thus clearly within respondent Judge's prerogative to require
the appearance, by subpoena, of officials of the NPC to appear and be
questioned regarding the latter's claimed indebtedness to the judgment
debtor, BBGMI. But just as clearly, it was not within His Honor's power
to order the payment by the alleged debtor of the judgment debtor to
pay the claimed debt without indubitable admission or conclusive proof
that the debt existed and was demandable. The applicable provision is
not, as was respondent Judge's erroneous notion, Section 15 of Rule
39, which merely states the procedure that the sheriff should follow
in the enforcement of a money judgment against the judgment
debtor himself, i.e., to levy on property of the judgment debtor,
including "debts" or "credits," and sell the same, etc., but which
obviously does not at all treat of the propriety and requisites for
collecting such "debts" or "credits" from third persons. The relevant
provisions are those embodied in Sections 42 and 45 of the same Rule
39.
Section 42 reads as follows:
SEC. 42. Order for application of property and income in satisfaction
of judgement.- The judge may order any property of the judgment
debtor, or money due him, not exempt from execution, in the hands
of either himself or other person, or of a corporation or other legal
entity, to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, subject to
any prior rights over such property, ....
Section 45, on the other hand, states the following:
SEC. 45. Proceedings when in debtedness denied or another person
claims the property. - If it appears that a person or corporation,
alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted to
him claims an interest in the property adverse to him or denies the
debt, the court or judge may authorize, by an order made to that
effect, the judgment creditor to institute an action against such
person or cor poration for the recovery of such interest or debt,
forbid a transfer or other disposition of such interest or debt until
an action can be commenced and prosecuted to judgment, and may
punish disobedience of such order as for contempt. Such order may
be modified or vacated by the judge granting the same, or by the
court in which the action is brought at anytime, upon such terms as
may be just.
.. the only power of the court in proceedings supplemental to
execution is to make an order authorizing the creditor to sue in the
proper court to recover an indebtedness due to the judgment debtor. The
court has no jurisdiction to try summarily the question whether the third
party served with notice of execution and levy is indebted to defendant
when such indebtedness is denied. To make an order in relation to
property which the garnishee claimed to own in his own right, requiring
its application in satisfaction of judgment of another, would be to
deprive the garnishee of property upon summary proceeding and
without due process of law.
The only disposition that said Court could legitimately have
made in the premises, was that indicated in Section 46 of Rule 39,
above quoted, i.e., authorize ACEC, as judgment creditor, to bring a
separate action against NPC, as alleged debtor of BBGMI, the
judgment debtor, for establishment by satisfactory proof of the
postulated indebtedness of NPC to BBGMI, and consequent
payment to it ACEC of so much of that indebtedness as corresponds
to the amount of its judgment.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132497. November 16, 1999]
LUIS MIGUEL YSMAEL and JOHANN C.F. KASTEN V,
petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses PACIFICO
LEJANO and ANASTACIA LEJANO, respondents.
D EC I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners brought suit for sum of money against private
respondents in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 29, and
obtained judgment in their favor on October 2, 1980.
The decision remained unexecuted for a long time as petitioners
were unable to locate property belonging to private respondents.
However, in 1989, before the right of action upon the judgment could
prescribe, petitioners filed a case for the revival of the judgment in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig City, which on March 14, 1990,
rendered a decision reviving the judgment in Civil Case No. 3039.
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, but their appeal
was dismissed in a resolution dated October 8, 1992 of the appellate
court. Private respondents brought the matter to this Court which
likewise dismissed private respondents petition on January 11, 1993.
Accordingly, on September 9, 1993, the trial court issued a writ of
execution, as a result of which the rights, interests, and participation of
private respondents in several parcels of lands, covered by TCT Nos. T-
47699, T-50009, T-54010, T-50011, T-50391, T-50392, T-50393, T-
50394, and 16274 of the Register of Deeds of Batangas, were levied on
execution.On March 15, 1995, private respondents rights, interests, and
participation in said lands were sold at public auction to
petitioners,represented by their counsel of record Atty. Fernando R.
Arguelles, Jr., who offered the highest bid for P700,000.00. The sale to
petitioners was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Nasugbu, Batangas on July 25, 1995. The certificate of sale stated in
pertinent parts:
The periodof redemptionof the real properties described above will
expire one (1) year from and after the date of registration of this
Certificate of Sale.
It is hereby required of said highest bidder, that a statement of any
amount of assessment or taxes which may have been paid on account of
this purchase and such other liens chargeable to the redemptioners, with
PROOF hereof, be submitted within thirty (30) days immediately
preceding the expiration of the period of redemption, furnishing the
defendants a copy thereof, as required by law, for purposes of
computing the actual amount payable by the defendants in case of
redemption.
On July 16, 1996, private respondents counsel wrote to
petitioners counsel Atty. Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr. and Deputy
Sheriff Sofronio M. Villarin, informing them that private
respondents were exercising their right of redemption. Private
respondents asked petitioners for a computation of the redemption price.
The twelve-month period of redemption expired on July 19, 1996.
Although the certificate of sale was registered on July 25, 1995, the
twelve-month period ended on July 19, 1996, considering that the latter
year was a leap year.However, thinking that the last day of the period of
redemption was on July 25, 1996, private respondent Pacifico Lejano
went to the office of Atty. Arguelles on said date and tendered to him
two cashiers checks drawn on Far East Bank and Trust Company in the
total amount of P784,000.00.One check was for P700,000.00,
representing the purchase price at the execution sale, and another was
for P84,000.00, representing 1% interest per month on the purchase
price from July 25, 1995 to July 25, 1996.The checks came with a letter,
dated July 25, 1996, giving notice of private respondents intention to
exercise their right of redemption.Atty. Arguelles, however, refused to
accept the payment. In a note to private respondent Pacifico Lejano,
Atty. Arguelles claimed he had no authority to receive payment for
petitioner Luis Ysmael.
Accordingly, private respondent called up petitioner Ysmaels office, but
he was informed that petitioner Ysmael was not in, and it was not
known when he would return.Unable to make a tender of payment,
private respondent filed the next day, July 26, 1996, a motion for
consignation in the trial court.Petitioners opposed the motion, arguing
that the period of redemption had already expired and that there was no
valid tender of payment because the cashiers checks were insufficient to
cover the total redemption price.
In the order dated October 21, 1996, the trial court granted
private respondents motion for consignation,
This was well within the redemption period which expired on July 19,
1996 per computation of the period made by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs or
the Sheriff never bothered to answer the letter.In this regard, plaintiffs
further argue that they cannot be faulted for their failure to give
defendants a statement of the total amount of the redemption price since
that is so provided in Sec. 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rejoinder,
par. C).Be that as it may, since the aforecited section in providing for the
amount payable to the purchaser (herein plaintiffs) by way of
redemption speaks of the amount of his (their) purchase, with one per
centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of the
redemption,
togetherwiththeamountofanyassessmentsortaxeswhichthepurchasermayh
avepaidthereonafterpurchase,andinterestonsuchlast-
namedamountatthesamerate; x x x (underlining supplied), there would
appear to be a need for the judgment debtor or redemptioner to inquire
as to the total amount of redemption money to be paid and, therefore, it
would not be proper to argue that the plaintiffs or the Sheriff to whom
the aforestated letter was addressed could not be faulted for not
answering the query.Thus the delay in paying the correct amount of the
redemption price could not be solely attributed to the defendants since
the plaintiffs or the Sheriff are partly to blame.At least the defendants
have shown their good faith in trying to settle the redemption price
within the period provided by law which was simply ignored by the
plaintiffs who appeared to profit more if the properties are not redeemed
by reason of the higher value of said properties.
As to the other argument that there was no valid tender of payment of
the redemption price because the cashiers checks are not considered
legal tender, suffice it to state that in Ramon Tan v. Court of Appeals, et
al., (G.R. No. 100555, December 20, 1944), the Supreme Court ruled:
Now, what was presented for deposit in the instant case was not just
an ordinary check but a cashiers check payable to the depositor himself.
A cashiers check is a primary obligation of the issuing bank and
accepted in advance by its mere issuance.By its very nature, a cashiers
check is a banks order to pay drawn upon itself, committing in effect its
total resources, integrity and honor behind the check.A cashiers check
by its peculiar character and general use in the commercial world is
regarded substantially to be as good as the money which it represents. . .
.
Anent the objection that the total amount covered by the two cashiers
checks falls short of the correct amount of the redemption price tendered
by the defendants, the same should be rectified by requiring them to pay
the right amount.
 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.As their motion
was denied, they filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the
Court of Appeals.However, the appellate court dismissed their
petition on January 26, 1998.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner is still entitled for redemption?
HELD: YES!
First.Rule 39, 30 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided that within
twelve months after the sale, the judgment debtor may redeem the
property sold at public auction, thus:
Sec.
30.Timeandmannerof,andamountspayableon,successiveredemptions.Not
icetobegivenandfiled. - The judgment debtor, or redemptioner, may
redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within twelve (12)
months after the sale, on paying the purchaser the amount of his
purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereof in addition, up
to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments
or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and
interest on such last named amount at the same rate. . .
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who
made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registrar of deeds of the
province, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner
or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the
redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given to
the officer and filed with the registrar of deeds; if such notice be not
filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such assessments,
taxes, or liens.
Under Art. 13 of the Civil Code, a month, unless designated by name, is
understood to be equivalent to 30 days, while a year is understood to be
of 365 days.Thus, the rulings of this Court under the 1964 Rules stated
that the 12-month period of redemption under Rule 39, 30 is equivalent
to 360 days counted from the registration of the certificate of sale.
Within the said period, the redemptioner must pay the purchaser the full
amount of the redemption price, otherwise the redemption is ineffectual.
In the instant case, there is no question that the certificate of
sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Nasugbu, Batangas on July 25, 1995.Consequently, the right of
redemption should have been exercised on or before July 19, 1996,
the 360th day after July 25, 1995 considering that 1996 was a leap
year.
However, apparently equating the phrase twelve (12) months in
Rule 39, 30 with one year of 365 days, private respondents reckoned
the period of redemption as ending on July 25, 1996 since the sale
was registered on July 25, 1995.Indeed, the certificate of sale stated
that the period of redemption . . . will expire one (1) year from and after
the date of registration. . .There was thus an honest mistake on a
question of law. Rule 39, 28 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure now
provides that the period of redemption shall be at any time within
one (1) year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, so
that the period is now to be understood as composed of 365
days.Neither petitioners nor the sheriff corrected private respondents
mistaken impression, leading the latter to believe that July 25, 1996 was
indeed the last day of the period of redemption.
Moreover, private respondents on July 16, 1996 and July 17, 1996,
i.e.,within 12-month period as provided in Rule 39, 30 of the former
Rules of Court, gave notice to Deputy Sheriff Sofronio and petitioners
counsel of their intention to redeem the lands sold. In the same letter,
private respondents requested a statement of the redemption price which
petitioners and the deputy sheriff chose to ignore.When private
respondent Lejanos tender of payment was refused by Atty. Arguelles,
Jr., private respondents consigned payment in the trial court on July 26,
1996. The combination of these circumstances makes it inequitable to
rule that private respondents lost the right of redemption by his delay of
six days to redeem the property. Both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly held that private respondents had tried in good
faith to exercise their right of redemption.As the appellate court
stated:
. . .such special circumstances exist, namely: (1) the highest bidders
(petitioners) did not submit a statement of any amount of assessment or
taxes which may have been paid on account of their purchase to be
submitted within 30 days immediately preceding the expiration of the
period of redemption, furnishing the defendants (private respondents) a
copy thereof, as directed in the certificate of sale; (2) despite receipt of
the letters from private respondents, petitioners and deputy sheriff
Villarin never made a reply; (3) notwithstanding that petitioners counsel
was their agent in the auction sale in which the properties in question
were sold to petitioners, said counsel, Atty. Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr.,
when private respondents wanted to exercise their right of redemption
went into technicalities by saying his authority was limited to just the
bidding.
[G.R. No. 156829. June 8, 2004]
RAMON D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner, vs.MA. TERESA L.
MONTENEGRO, for herself and as the mother and natural
guardian of the minors, ANTONIO AMELO and ANA MARIA PIA
ISABEL, both surnamed MONTENEGRO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
FACTS:
On 14 June 1994, respondent Ma. Teresa V. Lizares-Montenegro,
for herself and as mother and guardian of her two minor children
Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel, filed with the trial court
below a complaint for support against her husband, herein petitioner
Ramon D. Montenegro. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
8467. Four years after the filing of the complaint, petitioner and
respondent Teresa executed a compromise agreement which was
submitted to the trial court for approval on 13 October 1998.
On the same date, the trial court rendered a Decision approving the
compromise agreement and ordering the parties to comply with it. The
parties did not appeal from the Decision; hence, it became final and
executory.
Under the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner obligated
himself to:
(1) Pay the respondent the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000)
representing her entire share in their conjugal partnership of gains, Five
Hundred Thousand (P500,000) of which is payable upon signing of the
compromise agreement while the remaining balance of Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000) must be paid within one (1) year from the
execution of the compromise agreement.
(2) Establish a trust fund in the amount of Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000) in favor of his children Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia
Isabel within sixty (60) days from the approval of the compromise
agreement.
(3) Obtain an educational plan or an investment plan to cover tuition and
other matriculation fees for the college education of Ana Maria Pia
Isabel within one (1) year from the approval of the compromise
agreement.
Since petitioner failed to comply with his obligations under the
compromise agreement despite the lapse of the periods provided therein,
respondent Teresa filed a motion for the execution of the judgment. The
trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of execution on 15
February 1999.
A second writ of execution and a notice of garnishment, issued by the
trial court on 21 May 2001 and on 28 May 2001, respectively, were
returned unsatisfied.
In several conferences called by the trial court, petitioner admitted his
failure to comply with his obligations under the compromise agreement
but alleged that he was no longer in a position to do so as he was already
insolvent. In the conference held on 6 March 2002, respondent Teresa
manifested that she would file a motion for examination of petitioner as
judgment obligor. The trial court gave her 30 days within which to file
the appropriate motion and informed petitioner that he would have 30
days to file a comment or reply to the motion.
On 14 March 2002, respondent Teresa filed a motion to examine
petitioner as judgment obligor under Sections 36 and 38 of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court. In her motion, she alleged that there is an
urgency for the examination to be conducted at the earliest time since
petitioner was about to migrate to Canada. Acting on the said motion,
the trial court issued on 19 March 2002 an Order granting the motion for
examination of petitioner as judgment obligor and setting his
examination on 22 March 2002. On the same day the motion for
examination was granted, petitioner filed with the court a Manifestation
alleging that the grant of the motion for examination was premature
because he still would have 30 days from receipt of the motion, or until
April 14, 2002, within which to file a comment or opposition thereto as
agreed upon during the conference on 6 March 2002.
On 22 March 2002, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared for the
scheduled hearing. On that date, the trial court issued an order re-
scheduling the hearing to 10 April 2002 and requiring the petitioner to
explain why he should not be held in contempt of court for disobeying
the 19 March 2002 Order.
On 26 March 2002, petitioner filed a Compliance with Motion to Re-
schedule Proceedings. He explained that he did not attend the 22 March
2002 hearing because he was under the impression that he still had 30
days from the filing of the motion to examine him as judgment obligor
within which to respond to the motion; besides, his counsel was not
available on 22 March 2002 due to previously scheduled hearings.
At the hearing on 4 April 2002 of the Compliance with Motion to Re-
schedule Proceedings, counsel for petitioner manifested that his client
already left for Canada on 26 March 2002 and will be unable to attend
the 10 April 2002 hearing, and that petitioner would be available for
examination on the last week of July or first week of August 2002.
Counsel prayed that the hearing be thus reset accordingly. The trial court
denied the motion and informed the parties that the hearing scheduled
on 10 April 2002 will proceed as scheduled.
On 5 April 2002, petitioner filed a manifestation reiterating that he
would be unable to attend the 10 April 2002 hearing because he was
already in Canada. Counsel for petitioner likewise manifested that he
would also be unavailable on the said date because he would be in
Manila to attend to his other cases.
On 17 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order directing the petitioner
to show cause why he should not held in contempt of court for failure to
appear on the 10 April 2002 hearing for his examination as judgment
obligor. In his Compliance and Explanation filed on 28 June 2002,
petitioner alleged that he was unable to attend the 10 April 2002 hearing
because he was in Canada and had no intention to abscond from his
obligation.
On 13 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for the
examination of the petitioner on 3 July 2002. A subpoena was issued
against the petitioner and served at his address of record.Respondent
Teresa also caused the service of the subpoena at
8051 Estrella Avenue, San Antonio
Village, MakatiCity where petitioner is allegedly residing.
The 3 July 2002 hearing did not push through as the petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash Subpoena Ad Testificandum on 28 June 2002. In the
motion, petitioner admitted that 8051 Estrella Avenue, San Antonio
Village, MakatiCity, is his present address but alleged that Makati City
is more than 100 kilometers away from Bacolod City; thus, he may not
be compelled by subpoena to attend the 3 July 2002 hearing in Bacolod
City. In this motion, petitioner did not allege that he was still in Canada.
In its Order of 2 September 2002, the trial court denied the Motion to
Quash Subpoena Ad Testificandum, but re-scheduled the hearing to 23
October 2002. On 22 October 2002, the day before the scheduled
hearing, petitioner filed a manifestation informing the trial court that he
was still in Canada and would not be able to attend the 23 October 2002
hearing; however, he would be in Manila on the first week of December
2002. He moved that the hearing be re-scheduled on 9 December 2002.
The manifestation, however, did not contain a notice of hearing.
On 23 October 2002, petitioner did not appear at the scheduled hearing,
prompting the trial court to issue an order citing him in contempt of
court.
In its Order of 8 November 2002, the trial court declared
petitioner in contempt of court under Section 38 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court and imposed on him the penalty of imprisonment for
three months and ordered him to pay a fine of P20,000. His motion
for reconsideration of the Order having been denied by the trial
court in its Order of 3 January 2003, petitioner filed the petition in
the case at bar.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in holding the petitioner guilty of
indirect contempt?
HELD: NO!
We rule in the negative.
The totality of petitioners acts clearly indicated a deliberate and
unjustified refusal to be examined as a judgment obligor at the time the
examination was scheduled for hearing by the trial court. His acts
tended to degrade the authority and respect for court processes and
impaired the judiciary's duty to deliver and administer justice. Petitioner
tried to impose his will on the trial court.
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an
act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the
sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as disobedience
to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity.
The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and,
consequently, to the due administration of justice.
The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct
contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the
presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings
before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so.
On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
enumerates particular acts which constitute indirect contempt,
thus:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under
section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as
such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the
custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held
by him.
In relation to the foregoing, Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court also provides that a party or other person may be compelled, by
an order or subpoena, to attend before the court or commissioner to
testify as provided in the two preceding sections, and upon failure to
obey such order or subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a witness
or to subscribe his deposition, may be punished for contempt as in other
cases. This provision relates specifically to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court.
Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by the court
by issuing an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent
to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or (2) by the
filing of a verified petition, complying with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings. In the present case, the trial court initiated the
proceedings for indirect contempt by issuing two orders directing the
petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished for indirect
contempt.
In the present case, the contemptuous act was the petitioners refusal
to attend a hearing for his examination as judgment obligor, upon
motion by the respondent Teresa. It must be pointed out that the purpose
of Section 36 of Rule 39 is to provide the judgment obligee a remedy in
case where the judgment obligor continues to fail to comply with its
obligation under the judgment. Petitioners refusal to be examined,
without justifiable reason, constituted indirect contempt which is
civil in nature.
Petitioners deliberate willfulness and even malice in disobeying the
orders of the trial court are clearly shown in the pleadings he
himself had filed before the trial court.
Section 36 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows, as a matter of
right, the plaintiff who is a judgment obligee to examine the defendant
as judgment obligor, at any time after the return of the writ of execution
is made. Section 36 reads as follows:
Sec. 36. Examination of judgment obligor when judgment unsatisfied.
When the return of a writ of execution issued against property of a
judgment obligor, or any one of several obligors in the same judgment,
shows that the judgment remains unsatisfied, in whole or in part, the
judgment obligee, at any time after such return is made, shall be
entitled to an order from the court which rendered the said judgment,
requiring such judgment obligor to appear and be examined concerning
his property and income before such court or before a commissioner
appointed by it, at a specified time and place; and proceedings may
thereupon be had for the application of the property and income of the
judgment obligor towards the satisfaction of the judgment. But no
judgment obligor shall be so required to appear before a court or
commissioner outside the province or city in which such obligor resides
or is found.
Thus, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in scheduling
the examination of petitioner on 22 March 2002. On the contrary, it
acted with utmost judiciousness to avoid a miscarriage of justice
because petitioner was reported to be about to leave for Canada, a fact
which petitioner did not refute in his Manifestation of 19 March 2002.
In the present case, however, the act which the trial court ordered
the petitioner to do has already been performed, albeit belatedly and not
without delay for an unreasonable length of time. As such, the penalty of
imprisonment may no longer be imposed despite the fact that its non-
implementation was due to petitioners absence in the Philippines.
We are not unmindful of the nature of the judgment from which the
present controversy arose. Six years have elapsed from the time the
compromise agreement for the support of the children of petitioner and
respondent was executed. We take judicial notice of the amount of
expenses which a travel outside the country, particularly to Canada,
entails, much more so when the person traveling to Canada is trying to
establish himself in the said country as an immigrant. Petitioners claim
for insolvency is negated by his frequent travels to Canada. We thus
exhort the parties, specifically the petitioner, to resort to all reasonable
means to fully satisfy the judgment for support based on the
compromise agreement, for the paramount interests of their minor
children.
G.R. No. L-65935 September 30, 1988
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION,petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B.
SUGA JR.,respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
This is a case for damages filed by Nestor B. Sunga Jr.,
businessman and owner of the NBS Machineries Marketing and the
NAP-NAP Transit. Plaintiff alleged that he purchased a passenger
minibus Mazda from the Motor center, Inc. at Calasiao, Pangasinan on
March 21, 1978 and for which he executed a promissory note to cover
the amount of P62,592.00 payable monthly in the amount of P2,608.00
for 24 months due and payable the 1st day of each month starting May
1, 1978 thru and inclusive of May 1, 1980.
On the same date, however, a chattel mortgage was executed by him
in favor of the Motor center, Inc. The Chattel Mortgage and Assignment
was assigned to the Filinvest Credit Corporation with the conformity of
the plaintiff.
Nestor Sunga claimed that on October 21, 1978, the minibus was
seized by two (2) employees of the defendant Filinvest Credit
Corporation upon orders of the branch manager Mr. Gaspar de los
Santos, without any receipt, who claimed that he was delinquent in the
payments of his vehicle.
The plaintiff reported the loss to the PC and after proper verification
from the office of the Filinvest, the said vehicle was recovered from the
Crisologo Compound which was later released by Rosario Fronda
Assistant Manager of the Filinvest, and Arturo Balatbat as caretaker of
the compound. The police blotter of the Integrated National Police of
Dagupan City shows that Nestor Sunga and T/Sgt. Isidro Pascual of the
153rd PC Company sought the assistance of the Dagupan police and one
Florence Onia of the Filinvest explained that the minibus was
confiscated because the balance was already past due. After verification
that his accounts are all in order, Florence Onia admitted it was their
fault. The motor vehicle was returned to the plaintiff upon proper
receipt.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision:
(1) ORDERING the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation to pay the
plaintiff Nestor Sunga Jr. the following damages, to wit:
(a) Moral Damages P30,000.00
(b) Loss on Income of the minibus for three days 600.00
(c) Actual damages 500.00
(d) Litigation expenses 5,000.00
(e) Attorney's Fees 10,000.00
(2) And to pay the costs.
Dissatisfied with the aforecited decision, the defendant (petitioner
herein), interposed a timely appeal with the respondent court.
On September 30, 1983, the latter promulgated its decision affirming in
toto the decision of the trial court dated July 17, 1981, "except with
regard to the moral damages which, under the circumstances of the
accounting error incurred by Filinvest, is hereby increased from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00." 7 As the reconsideration of said decision
proved futile in view of its denial by the respondent court in its
resolution of December 16, 1983, the petitioners come to us thru this
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent court a) in allegedly ignoring the various
assigned errors in petitioners brief; b) in resolving issues not raised
at the trial and on appeal; c) in increasing the amount of moral
damages; and (d) in adhering to its decision in Edilberto Rebosura
et al. vs. Rogaciano Oropeza, CA-G.R. No. 63048-R, as well as to
Batasan Bill No. 3075, which is yet to be enacted into law, acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
HELD: YES!
WE hold that the respondent court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages
and in granting litigation expenses. In those respects, the petition is
granted and to that extent the questioned decision is modified.
"Well settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever an appeal
is taken in a civil case an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot
obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones
granted in the decision of the court below."
Verily the respondent court disregarded such a well settled rule
when it increased the award for moral damages from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00, notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent did not
appeal from the judgment of the trial court, an act indicative of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Certiorari lies when a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion. 'without jurisdiction' means that the
court acted with absolute want of jurisdiction. There is "excess of
jurisdiction" where the court has jurisdiction but has transcended the
same or acted without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse of
discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
(F)or certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, and
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial
prerogative in accordance with centuries of civil law and common law
tradition."
We had occasion to state that "there is no hard and fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since
each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances." 25 Be
that as it may and in amplification of this generalization, we set the
criterion that "in the case of moral damages, the yardstick should be that
the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously
excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of the trial court. Moreover, the actual losses
sustained by the aggrieved parties and the gravity of the injuries must be
considered in arriving at reasonable levels ... ." 26
There is no dispute that the private respondent, a businessman and
owner of the NBS Machineries Marketing and NAP-NAP Transit, is
entitled to moral damages due to the unwarranted seizure of the minibus
Mazda, allegedly because he was delinquent in the payment of its
monthly amortizations, which as stated above, turned out to be
incorrect. 27 No doubt such intent tainted private respondent Sunga's
reputation in the business community, thus causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
and social humiliation. "damages are not intended to enrich the
complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to
enable the injured parties to obtain means, diversions or amusements
that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings the injured parties have
undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action.
We do not agree with private respondent's argument that the increase in
the award of moral damages is justified by the prayer in its brief, to wit:
FURTHER REMEDIES AND RELIEFS DEEMED JUST AND
EQUITABLE UNDER AND WITHIN THE PREMISES ARE PRAYED
FOR. Such statement is usually extant in practically all pleadings as a
final statement; it is rhetorical flourish as it were and could not be a
substitute for appeal as required by the rules for "the appellee cannot
seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief,
unless he has also appealed therefrom."
G.R. No. 48766 February 9, 1993
GODELIVA S. DULAY,Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES, as a formal party and in
his Official Capacity, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
FISHERIES & AQUATIC RESOURCES, in his Official Capacity,
and ANGELES DICO, in her Private Capacity,Respondents.
NOCON, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay comes to this Court and asks Us to
confine public respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources within his jurisdiction and to uphold the principle of
res judicata in administrative proceedings by nullifying (1) his February
24, 1978 order giving due course to the letter-petition of private
respondent Angeles D. Dico requesting for the reopening of Fishpond
Conflict case of Mrs. Angeles Dico against Juan Quibete, Petronilo
Retirado and petitioner Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay and the "Cancellation of
Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2165 of Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay" and
(2) his telegrams dated August 14, 1978 stating that petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of said February 24, 1978 interlocutory order
"cannot be entertained" and advising petitioner of the continuation of
the formal investigation of the private respondent's letter-petition
scheduled for September 4 to 9, 1978.
This present conflict stems from two earlier cases decided by the Office
of the President, both of which have attained finality. As condensed by
the Office of the Solicitor General, these are as follows:
1. Re: DANR Case No. 2898
entitled "Angeles Dico v. Juan Quibete"
The salient antecedent facts stated in the decision of the Office of
the President dated November 14, 1969, are as follows:
That by a barter agreement entered into between Juan Quibete and
Jose Padios sometime in 1932, the former exchanged his parcel of land
situated at Sitio Palaypay, municipality of San Dionisio, province of
Iloilo, for the latter's fishpond area of about 24 hectares located at sitio
Talaba-an, municipality of Cadiz, province of Negros Occidental
That Juan Quibete, also in 1932, applied for a Fish and Game
Special Permit over the area (F.P.L.A. No. 1709). The application was
disapproved because the area covered thereby was not yet declared
available for fishpond purposes. The records of that application were
lost during World War II so much so that Juan Quibete had to renew his
application in 1945 (Fp. A. No. 716). His application was approved on
February 10, 1949 and Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E was issued
That on February 6, 1958, private respondent (Angeles Dico) filed
her fishpond application (Fp. A. No. 18206) to occupy the area covered
by petitioner's fishpond lease agreement
That her application was disapproved on the ground that the area
she applied had already been awarded to Juan Quibete, predecessor-in-
interest of the petitioner, under Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E, and that a
motion for reconsideration thereon was denied
That on February 29, 1964, Juan Quibete meanwhile sold and/or
transferred his rights and interests over the area under Fishpond Permit
No. F-738-E to one Petronilo Retirado
That on April 28, 1964, private respondent Angeles Dico filed a
protest with the Philippine Fisheries Commission alleging that Juan
Quibete was occupying and improving lot (Lot No. 489-C) which was
not the area covered by his fishpond permit and that he transferred his
rights and interests over the said area without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
That the Philippine Fisheries Commissioner dismissed the protest
on October 16, 1964 and declared that Lot No. 489-C was the same area
granted to Juan Quibete under his fishpond permit and not any other lot
That from the decision private respondent Angeles Dico brought her
case to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who
dismissed her appeal on December 7, 1965
That after denial of a motion for reconsideration, she appealed to
the Office of the President. Her appeal was in turn dismissed in the
decision of November 14, 1969
2. Re: DANR Case No. 3447
entitled "F.P.A. No.V-3-3852, Angeles Dico,
Applicant-Appellant v. Juan Quibete, Claimant-Appellee"
The facts of the case are as follows:
That on November 13, 1965, while DANR Case No. 2898, supra,
was still pending decision by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, private respondent Angeles Dico filed with the Director of
Lands a free patent application for a 4-hectare dry portion of Lot 489-C
covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete
That Juan Quibete, claiming preferential right over the area applied
for, protested to the application
That the Director of Lands, in a decision dated May 30, 1967,
rejected the application of private respondent Dico and directed Juan
Quibete to file the appropriate public land application, if qualified, for
the 4-hectare dry portion
That a motion for reconsideration having been denied, private
respondent Dico appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources
That under the same set of facts found in DANR Case No. 2898
aforesaid, the Secretary affirmed on July 9, 1970 the decision of the
Director of Lands, stating that the 4-hectare area subject of the appeal
covered a portion of the same tract of land which was the subject matter
of DANR Case No. 2898
That private respondent Dico moved to reconsider the Secretary's
decision, Annex "F", but her motion was denied on January 26, 1971. A
second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied per Order dated
May 5, 1971.
3. As already stated, Petronilo Retirado became the successor-in-interest
of Juan Quibete by virtue of a deed of transfer of rights and
improvements executed by Juan Quibete in favor of Petronilo Retirado
on February 29, 1964 over the area covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-
738-E of Juan Quibete
4. Ultimately, petitioner (Godeliva S. Dulay) succeeded to the rights and
interests over the area in question. On May 21, 1973, the heirs of
Petronilo Retirado executed a "Deed of Sale of Fishpond Improvements
and Transfer of Rights" transferring their rights and interests in favor of
the petitioner over a portion of Lot No. 489-C consisting of 19.15
hectares, more or less, and covered by their Fishpond Permit No. 158-2.
5. On October 22, 1974, after application with the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, petitioner was issued a fishpond
lease agreement (No. 2169) over a portion of Lot 489-C consisting of
18.3675 hectares, expiring on December 31, 1998.
6. On October 28, 1977, private respondent (Angeles Dico) submitted a
letter-petition to the respondent officials requesting for a "reopening of
fishpond conflict of Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado
and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay based on newly discovered evidence". It
was there alleged that Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete did
not cover the area in question (Lot No. 489-C) located in Sitio Talaba-
an, Municipality of Cadiz (now Cadiz City) but Lot No. 487 located in
Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. She prayed that petitioner's Fishpond Lease
Agreement No. 2169 be cancelled and, in lieu thereof, a new one be
issued in her name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
7. Petitioner moved to dismiss the letter-petition on the ground of res
judicata(Annex "M"). She argued that the two administrative decisions
in DANR Case No. 2898 and DANR Case No. 3447 (Annexes "A" and
"F"), involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of action,
have already become final and settled the matter once and for all
8. Claiming that res judicata is not applicable, private respondent
opposed the motion to dismiss. This was the subject of a rejoinder which
was again excepted to by private respondent on the argument that res
judicata does not apply in cases where the government has to exercise
its inherent power to regulate.
Respondent Director held resolution of the motion to dismiss in
abeyance. In an "Interlocutory Order" dated February 24, 1978, he
reserved to resolve the motion "until after termination of the
investigation" brought about by private respondent's letter-petition.
By reason of the denial not only of her Motion to Dismiss the letter-
petition of respondent Angeles Dico dated October 28, 1977 but also the
denial of her motion for reconsideration5and the insistence of respondent
Director in conducting his investigation on September 4 to 9, 1978 at
the Bacolod City Fisheries Office,6the situation had become urgent for
petitioner.
Thus, she filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction or restraining order claiming that unless one is
immediately issued, respondent will proceed with the investigation as
scheduled, and if petitioner refuses or fails to appear in said
investigation by reason of this petition, the respondents will proceed
with the investigation and reception of evidence ex-parte as clearly
threatened by the respondent Director in his telegrams to the petitioner
and his counsel, marked as Annexes "I", "U", "W" and "W-1" herein.
Private respondent Angeles Dico's request for the reopening of the case
of "Dico vs. Quibete, et al." and the cancellation of the Fishpond Lease
Agreement of petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay on the ground of fraud
committed by Juan Quibete and Petronila Retirado is anchored,
allegedly, on the following pieces of newly-discovered evidence, to wit:
(1) Order of then Philippine Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Rolden,
dated May 12, 1964, recognizing the fishpond application (No. 18206)
of private respondent, dated Feb. 6, 1958, over the area in question
located at Barrio Daga, Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City
(2) The Plan of the Bureau of Lands for the entire area of Lot 489 of
which the subject area is a portion
(3) The Fishpond Application (No. 18950) of Juan Quibete (herein
petitioner's successor-in-interest) for 5 hectares covered by Lot 489-B
(25 hectares), situated at Barrio Daga, Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City,
was denied by Hon. Jose R. Montilla Assistant Director of Fisheries on
May 19, 1960 because Juan Quibete was already a holder of a
previously approved fishpond application under Permit No. 738-E under
Lot 487 covering a 20-hectare area situated at Barrio Luna, Cadiz City
(4) The Plan of the aforesaid Lot 487
(5) Affidavits of three (3) persons who attest to the fact that Juan
Quibete's fishpond area (Lot 487) is located at Barrio Luna, Cadiz City.
The witnesses are Mansueto D. Alarcon, then Municipal Secretary of the
Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental dated January 6, 1965;
Patrolman Eligio O. Javier, member of the police force of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental, dated October 22, 1963 and Melecio Quibete, son of Juan,
executed in May 1964.
ISSUE:
W/N the Res Judicata will set in the case at bar?
HELD: YES!
We grant the petition and make permanent the temporary
restraining order issued earlier on September 7, 1978.
Private respondent's letter-petition, filed October 28, 1977, states clearly
that it is a "Request for Reopening of Fishpond Conflict of Mrs. Angeles
Dico vs. Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay
based on New Discovered Evidence . . . ."
It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions
and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their
quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine
of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening
of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority
applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction.
DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete" was
decided by the Office of the President on November 14, 1969. Since the
same was not brought to the courts for judicial review, the same has
long become final and executory.
DANR Case No. 3447, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete"
involved Free Patent Application No. V-3-385 of private respondent
Dico. The Director of Lands in a decision dated May 30, 1967 rejected
her application. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
affirmed the same on July 9, 1970. 12The findings of fact in said DANR
case, which were found by the Secretary to be the same facts in DANR
Case No. 2898, are deemed conclusive by operation of law. 13Said
DANR case, not having been brought likewise to the courts for judicial
review has also become final and executory.
To sum up, the matter of which lot Juan Quibete improved as a fishpond
and which rights he sold to Retirado was investigated TWICE after the
Philippine Fisheries Commission reinstated private respondent's
Fishpond Application No. 18206 in its Order of May 12, 1964. Both
investigations - more than three years apart with investigators from
different offices - showed that Juan Quibete occupied and improved Lot
489-C although in the different documents, including maps, which make
up this case, it was designated as Lot 487. Thus, no merit can be given
to private respondent's alleged pieces of evidence, number 2 and 5(page
7-8, supra) as all these HAD already been studied thoroughly by both
Investigator Alelis and Atty. Bautista in these separate
investigations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The matter having become final as of August or September 1970, 27it
was grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent
Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to give
due course to private-respondent's letter-petition of October 28,
1977 requesting for a re-opening of the fishpond conflict involved
herein.
G.R. No. 100156 June 27, 1994
ISIDORA SALUD,petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MELANIA
GUERRERO,respondents.
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Isidora Guerrero Salud and her late husband, Eusebio B.
Salud, are the registered owners of an undivided one-half () share in
certain parcels of land situated in Bacoor, Cavite. They are referred to as
the Poblacion and Habay properties and the San Nicolas property,
respectively covered by TCT No. RT-9269 and TCT No. RT-9268 of the
Cavite City Register of Deeds. 1 To be exact, these properties are
registered in the name of "Isidora Guerrero . . . married to Eusebio
Salud, and Clemente Guerrero . . . married to Melania Andico."
Petitioner Isidora Guerrero Salud and Clemente Guerrero are sister and
brother. The latter is the deceased husband of private respondent.
On October 20, 1967, petitioner and her late husband, executed a deed
wherein they sold their one-half (1/2) share in the Poblacion property to
their daughter Maripol Guerrero for TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,000.00), while the Habay property was sold to their children Norma
Salud Vianzon and Eusebio G. Salud, Jr., for FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00). 2
On November 3, 1967, petitioner and her late husband, also sold their
one-half () share in the San Nicolas property in favor of their children
Eusebio Salud, Jr., and Teodoro G. Salud for THREE THOUSAND
PESOS (P3,000.00). 3
After the execution of the deeds, it is alleged that petitioner and her late
husband changed their minds. They did not register the deeds of sale.
Instead, they continued in possession of the properties, and exercised
other acts of ownership, including the mortgaging of the lots subject of
the deeds.
The relationship between the Salud and Guerrero families soured.
On June 4, 1980, the late Clemente Guerrero, husband of private
respondent, filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI), now
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, two (2) complaints docketed
as Civil Cases No. 3022 and 3023. In Civil Case No. 3022, he sued
Eusebio Salud, Jr., the spouses Norma Salud and Artemio Vianzon
and Maripol Guerrero. In Civil Case No. 3023, he sued Eusebio
Salud, Jr., and Teodoro G. Salud. He sought to exercise his right of
redemption as a co-owner of the controverted properties.
In Civil Case No. 3022, defendants were declared in default. Petitioner
claims that said defendants were then in the United States and were
unable to answer the Complaint. On February 19, 1982, the then CFI of
Cavite rendered a decision granting the late Guerrero the right to
redeem the properties in question. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision which became final and executory on July 31, 1986.
Efforts of petitioner to intervene in the appellate court were in vain.
On the other hand, the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3023 was tried
on its merit. Teodoro G. Salud was able to answer Guerrero's
Complaint. After trial, the trial court dismissed the Complaint on
January 10, 1982. It held that the late Guerrero had no right to
redeem the litigated property as its sale "is not in esse." The Court
of Appeals, in G.R. No. CV-2529, also affirmed this Decision.
The controversy between the parties did not die down. To frustrate the
right of redemption granted to the deceased Clemente Guerrero in Civil
Case No. 3022, petitioner Isidora Salud initiated Civil Case No. BCV-
86-60, dubbed an Action to Quiet Title/Remove Cloud from Title,
Declaratory Relief plus Damages before the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Sued
was Clemente's widow, private respondent Melania Guerrero. The
latter moved to dismiss the complaint on ground, among others, of
res judicata.
In an Order 4 dated March 19, 1987, the trial court granted the motion to
dismiss. Petitioner appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which,
however, rendered an affirmance.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N Res Judicata will set in the case?
HELD: NO!
The rules of res judicata are of common law origin and they initially
evolved from court decisions. It is now considered a principle of
universal jurisprudence forming a part of the legal system of all
civilized nations. 5 In our jurisdiction, the principle of res judicata was
incorporated as part of our statutory law.
The principle was enacted as sections 306 and 307 of Act No. 190. 6
Later, it became sections 44 and 45 of former Rules 39. 7 Under the
present Rules of Court, it appears in section 49 of Rule 39, viz:
Sec. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other mater that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-
in-interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.
The above rule expresses the two (2) aspects of res judicata. As pointed
out by Moran, the first aspect is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action. The second aspect precludes the relitigation of a particular fact
of issue in another action between the same parties on a different claim
or cause of action. 8 The first aspect is known in traditional terminology
as merger or bar; in modern terminology, it is called claim preclusion.
The second aspect is traditionally known as collateral estoppel; in
modern terminology, it is called issue preclusion. 9
There is universal agreement on the principles underlying res judicata, 10
viz:
. . . . Two maxims of the English common law best summarize the
general policies underlying this doctrine.
They are: first, that no person should be twice vexed by the same claim;
and second, that it is in the interest of the state that there be an end to
litigation.
Thus, principles of res judicata serve both private and public interests.
The interest of the judicial system in preventing relitigation of the same
dispute recognizes that judicial resources are finite and the number of
cases that can be heard by the court is limited. Every dispute that is
reheard means that another will be delayed. In modern times when court
dockets are filled to overflowing, this concern is of critical importance.
Res judicata thus conserves scarce judicial resources and promotes
efficiency in the interest of the public at large.
Once a final judgment has been rendered, the prevailing party also has
an interest in the stability of that judgment. Parties come to the courts in
order to resolve controversies; a judgment would be of little use in
resolving disputes if the parties were free to ignore it and to litigate the
same claims again and again. Although judicial determinations are not
infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals procedures,
not through repeated suits on the same claim. Further, to allow
relitigation creates the risk of inconsistent results and presents the
embarrassing problem of determining which of two conflicting
decisions is to be preferred. Since there is no reason to suppose that the
second or third determination of a claim necessarily is more accurate
than the first, the first should be left undisturbed.
In some cases the public at large also has an interest in seeing that rights
and liabilities once established remain fixed. If a court quiets title to
land, for example, everyone should be able to rely on the finality of that
determination. Otherwise, many business transactions would be clouded
by uncertainty. Thus, the most important purpose of res judicata is to
provide repose for both the party litigants and the public. As the
Supreme Court has observed, "res judicata thus encourages reliance on
judicial decision, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to
resolve other disputes."

In our age, where courts are harassed by crowded dockets and
complaints against slow foot justice, frequent technical reliance on the
preclusive breadth of res judicata is understandable. The importance of
judicial economy and avoidance of repetitive suits are strong norms in a
society in need of swift justice. Be that as it may, there should not be a
mechanical and uncaring reliance on res judicata where more important
societal values deserve protection. So we held in Suarez vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 11
The case at bench presents an exceptional instance where an
inflexible application of the doctrine of res judicata will not serve
our constitutional policy favoring fairness, the heart of due process.
Petitioner was not a party in Civil Case No. 3022 and was not
given any chance to contest the claim of Guerrero. Her children, then in
the United States, were the ones sued. They failed to answer, and were
declared in default. Thus, the late Clemente Guerrero, husband of
private respondent, obtained a favorable judgment by default from the
trial court pursuant to which he was given the right of preemption over
the contested lots. Petitioner attempted to intervene in the case but
unfortunately, her motion for intervention was denied. The late
Guerrero, therefore, prevailed primarily because his claim was not
disputed. In contrast was the result in Civil Case No. 3023 where
Guerrero claimed the same right of preemption against the other
children of petitioner. In this case, however, one of the children of
petitioner sued by Guerrero, was in the Philippines and he answered the
Complaint. The case was tried on its merit and the trial court dismissed
the Complaint of Guerrero. It found that the right of preemption of
Guerrero was not yet in esse.
The difference in the results of Civil Cases No. 3022 and 3023
accentuates the necessity not to give res judicata effect to the default
judgment in Civil Case No. 3022 where petitioner was a non-party. The
demands of due process present a weightier consideration than the need
to bring an end to the parties' litigation. For more important than the
need to write finis to litigation is to finish it justly, and there can be no
justice that satisfies unless the litigants are given the opportunity to be
heard. The constitutional right to due process of petitioner cannot be
defeated by the argument that petitioner is a privy of her children in
Civil Case No. 3022, and hence is bound by its judgment. Case law,
both here and in the United States, recognizes privity of interest under
the following situation: 12
The historic and most common situation in which privity is upheld
exists when a person acquires an interest in the subject matter of the suit
after it was filed or decided. Successors-in-interest, whether they obtain
their interests by virtue of an assignment, by inheritance or by law are
bound along with their predecessors by the rules of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. This is necessary in order to preserve the finality of
judgments; otherwise a person confronted with an adverse decision
might subject the winning party to the prospect of continual litigation
simply by transferring his interest in the subject matter of the suit to
another who could begin the suit anew.
A second well-defined privity relationship arises when legal appointed
representative parties, such as trustees and executors, are involved;
those individuals are deemed in privity with those whom they represent.
Since parties litigating in representative capacity have no interests of
their own, but either sued or are sued on behalf of the beneficiaries
whom they serve.
Privity also has been universally recognized when it is determined that
the newly named party in the second suit actually controlled or
participated in litigating the first action. Although the non-party will not
be bound by res judicata because different claims are involved, identical
issues that were necessarily and actually litigated will be precluded.
Having received one opportunity to defend or prosecute those issues, he
may not be allowed another.
Petitioner does not fall in any of the above categories. She is not a
successor-in-interest of her children in Civil Case No. 3022. Petitioner's
children were not sued in Civil Case No. 3022 in a representative
capacity. It is also clear that petitioner did not control or participate in
Civil Case No. 3022 for her motion to intervene was denied. Petitioner's
interest, therefore, was not at all represented in Civil Case No. 3022
where judgment was obtained by default. The doctrine of res judicata
is a rule of justice and cannot be rigidly applied where it will result
in injustice.

ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA
Facts:Marietta and Rodolfo were married in 1959. They had 8 children. In 1992, Rodolfo left
the conjugal home and abandoned Marietta and their children. Two years after, Marietta filed a
complaint for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with
a plea for support and support pendente lite. At that time, Marietta lived in Las Pinas. The parties
entered into a compromise agreement wherein their property located in Carmona, Cavite was
adjudicated to Marietta and her children. The court rendered judgment based on the compromise
agreement. Conformably thereto, Marietta and her children moved and began residence at the
said Carmona property.
In 1995, Rodolfo, wanting to marry again, filed a case for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with the Marietta on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although the Rodolfo
knew that the Marietta was already residing in Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his
petition that the Marietta was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes,
Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila. The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition
by substituted service on the the parties son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence
in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
Marietta failed to file an answer and was declared in default. Rodolfo was allowed adduce
evidence ex-parte. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and
declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. The clerk of court issued a Certificate of
Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996.
On July 7, 2000, the Marietta filed a verified petition against the Rodolfo with the Court of
Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the
RTC.
Marietta, alleged, among others, that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the Rodolfos
marriage was null and void for the court a quos failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct
an investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor
General to appear for the State.
Held: The records show that for the petitioners failure to file an answer to the complaint, the
trial court granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public
prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of
the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and
rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public
prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article
48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of
Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
invalid one as well.
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the
purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court
cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to
determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose
the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if
in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor
than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. Whether or not
a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the
whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological
imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations (Ancheta
vs. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004)