d.

administrative procedure in rule-making

CAWAD VS ABAD

FACTS
PPHAI Philippine Public Health Association
DBM Department of Budget and Management
DOH Department of Health
CSC Civil Service Commission

On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7305, otherwise known as The Magna Carta of Public Health Workerswas
signed into law in order to promote the social and economic well-being of health workers, their living and working
conditions and terms of employment, to develop their skills and capabilities to be better equipped to deliver health
projects and programs, and to encourage those with proper qualifications and excellent abilities to join and remain in
government service. Accordingly, public health workers (PHWs) were granted the following allowances and benefits,
among others:

Section 20. Additional Compensation. - Notwithstanding Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, public health workers
shall receive the following allowances: hazard allowance, subsistence allowance, longevity pay, laundry allowance and
remote assignment allowance.

Pursuant to Section 355 of the Magna Carta, the Secretary of Health promulgated its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) in July 1992. Thereafter, in November 1999, the DOH, in collaboration with various government
agencies and health workers' organizations, promulgated a Revised IRR consolidating all additional and clarificatory
rules issued by the former Secretaries of Health dating back from the effectivity of the Magna Carta.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondents issuance of DBM-DOH Joint Circular No.1, s.2012 is null and void for being an undue
exercise of legislative powers?

RULING

The Court finds the petition partly granted. The DBM-DOH Joint Circular, insofar as it lowers the hazard pay at rates
below the minimum prescribed by Section 21 of RA No. 7305 and Section 7.1.5 (a) of its Revised IRR, is declared
INVALID. The DBM-CSC Joint Circular, insofar as it provides that an official or employee authorized to be granted
Longevity Pay under an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment Due to Length of Service, is
declared UNENFORCEABLE. The validity, however, of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular as to the qualification of actual
exposure to danger for the PHW's entitlement to hazard pay, the rates of P50 and P25 subsistence allowance, and the
entitlement to longevity pay on the basis of the PHW' s status in the plantilla of regular positions, is UPHELD.

4. QUASI-JUDICIAL/ADJUDICATORY

a. In general

SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA

FACTS:

Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his parents sought
the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and teachers
who composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and
even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (bc the graduation already proceeded. They also
argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor
board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function
ISSUE: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.

RULING:

A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of
something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:

1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and
determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not
the legislative nor the executive)

It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties
are, with respect to a matter in controversy.

Judicial power is defined:

as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or
property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.
The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of
its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there from is brought in turn, to
the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine

SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA
32 SCRA 188
Adjudicatory Powers

FACTS: appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School in
Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For
Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of
its graduating class. The above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat
and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises were
thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented
by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made,
by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named
committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.

They prayed the court, among others, to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary
School for that school year 1964-1965, and, during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from
officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the
school was scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for was denied by the lower
court in its order of May 20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then already set on
the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of the same would be shocking to the school authorities, parents,
and the community who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the
graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same
protested list of honor students.

Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved
for the dismissal of the case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds (1)
that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action, the question
brought before the court had already become academic. This was opposed by petitioner.
In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents was granted, the court reasoning thus:

The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being improper and for being academic. In order to resolve the
motion to dismiss, the Court has carefully examined the petition to determine the sufficiency of the alleged cause of
action constituting the special civil action of certiorari.

The CFI thereafter ruled that the petition states no cause of action and should be, as it is hereby dismissed, on the
ground that the Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor is not the "tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions" against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.

Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

'Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.'

'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.'

In its ruling, the CFI declared that administrative remedies were neglected by petitioners. All that the petition alleges
is that the petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities who only 'passed the buck to each other.' This
allegation does not show that petitioner formally availed of and exhausted the administrative remedies of the
Department of Education. The petition implies that this is the first formal complaint of petitioner against his teachers.
The administrative agencies of the Department of Education could have investigated the grievances of the petitioner
with dispatch and give effective remedies, but petitioner negligently abandoned them. Petitioner cannot now claim
that he lacked any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" exercised judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the performance of its assigned task

RULING: No. In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions.' A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a
judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order that a special civil action of
certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific
controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer
for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations; (2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom
the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the
controversy construing and applying the laws to that end; (3) and the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that
branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or
executive department.

It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights
of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.

"Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the power to hear and
determine but not everyone who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial power" does not
necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between the
parties.

The distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and judicial functions is difficult to point out. What is a
judicial function does not depend solely upon the mental operation by which it is performed or the importance of the
act. In solving this question, due regard must be had to the organic law of the state and the division of power of
government. In the discharge of executive and legislative duties, the exercise of discretion and judgment of the
highest order is necessary, and matters of the greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It is not enough to
make a function judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought, and judgment. It must be the exercise of
discretion and judgment within that subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least,
which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. If the matter, in respect to which it is exercised,
belongs to either of the two last-named departments of government, it is not judicial. As to what is judicial and what
is not seems to be better indicated by the nature of a thing, than its definition.

It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable
conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to the writ of certiorari. It is clear,
however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it,
that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the
proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to the
courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their
decision, whatever may be their public character.

The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are administrative or ministerial functions is often
difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative
duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial
functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the
legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.

It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for honor whose
actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its
assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the decision cited, it will be gleaned that before tribunal board, or
officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what
that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees,
however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the
individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of
what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions.

RATIO: It is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that
determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function.

---
SUBIDO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 122641; January 20, 1997

Facts:

On June 25, 1992, Bayani Subido Jr., then a Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) and
Rene Parina, a BID special agent, while in the performance of their official functions, issued and implemented a
warrant of arrest against James J. Maksimuk, knowing fully well that the BID decision requiring Maksimuks
deportation was not yet final and executory. This resulted to the detention of Maksimuk for a period of 43 days,
causing him undue injury. Subido and Parina were charged with Arbitrary Detention defined and punished by Article
124 of the Revised Penal Code. For their part, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash, contending that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case since when it was filed, Subido was no longer part of the service and
Parina was not occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 27.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

Yes. The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case by virtue of Section 2 of R.A. 7975, which amended Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606 Section 2: Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 is hereby further amended to read as follows: Section 4:
Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense; 1)Officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. 6758),
specificially including: xxx 5)All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to the office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed
pursuant to and in connection with the Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14, and 14-A. In cases where none of the principal
accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in said R.A. 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested n the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Blg. 129. Contrary to the
claims of the petitioners, R.A. 7975 applies since what is considered is the time of the commission of the crime, during
which Subido was still Commissioner of BID. Similarly, although Parina was holding a position with a classification
lower than salary grade 27, it still applies to him since he is prosecuted as a co-conspirator of Subido, the principal
accused. Jurisdiction is only vested on the other courts if none of the principal accused where occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27.

LUPANGCO VS CA

Facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105
as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy.

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-
out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days
immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and
Regulations of the Commission.

On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like
them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution
and to declare the same unconstitution.

Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction
to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution

In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

Held: It is not Constitutional. The questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal
its constitutional infirmities.

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill
motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should
prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed
to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their
faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful
knowledge that will promote their personal growth.

LUPANGCO v CA and PRC

FACTS

In 1986, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105, which prohibited the examinees in
accountancy from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips or the like 3 days before the date of the exam.
As reviewees preparing to take the licensure exam in accountancy that year, Lupangco et al filed with the RTC of Manila a
complaint for injunction against the PRC and for the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said Resolution.
PRC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review and entertain the case, since both
entities are co-equal bodies. To further strengthen its contention, it cited BP 129, Sec. 9 (3), which states that the CA has the
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions... of the RTC and quasi-judicial agencies...."

ISSUE: W/N the RTC and the PRC are co-equal bodies, with the latter having quasi-judicial power

HELD

NO. In order to invoke Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, there has to be a final order or ruling, which resulted from proceedings wherein
the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions.

Quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion etc of public administrative officers or bodies required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. It is a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a
decision or order, which applies to a specific situation. This does NOT cover rules and regulations of general applicability
issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105, which
was adopted by the PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure exams.

As to the constitutionality of the Resolution, the Court held that although it was adopted for a commendable purpose--to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure exams, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being unreasonable in that the
examinee cannot even attend any review class or receive any handout etc. It is even more unreasonable that one who is
caught violating this prohibition is barred from taking future examinations conducted by the PRC.

Furthermore, the Resolution infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has NO
authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure exams. They cannot be
restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants.

The Resolution also violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of
review that these schools believe would best enable their enrollees to meet the standards required before becoming a full
fledged public accountant.

It is an axiom in administrative law that admin authorities should NOT act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules
and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view.

CIR v CA
261 SCRA 236

FACTS: On 22 August 1986, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid
income taxes, later amended to include estate and donor's taxes and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981 to
1985. Availing itself of the amnesty, respondent R.O.H. Auto Products Philippines, Inc., filed, in October 1986 and
November 1986, its Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-41 and Supplemental Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-
64-B, respectively, and paid the corresponding amnesty taxes due. Prior to this availment, petitioner Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, in a communication received by private respondent on 13 August 1986, assessed the latter
deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal years ended 30 September 1981 and 30 September 1982 in an
aggregate amount of P1,410,157.71. However, the request to cancel the deficiency taxes was denied.

ISSUES: WON private respondent can avail of the tax amnesty

RULING: YES. Executive Order No. 41 is quite explicit and requires hardly anything beyond a simple application of its
provisions. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax
liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in its
exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to
be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it. It might not be
amiss to recall that the taxable periods covered by the amnesty include the years immediately preceding the 1986
revolution during which time there had been persistent calls, all too vivid to be easily forgotten, for civil
Disobedience , most particularly in the payment of taxes, to the martial law regime. It should be understandable then
that those who ultimately took over the reigns of government following the successful revolution would promptly
provide for a broad, and not a confined, tax amnesty.

SANADO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Legal effect of a decision rendered by an administrative body in a case filed in the regular courts

FACTS:

Sanado was issued by the now defunct Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering an area
of 50 hectares. On July 16, 1973, Sanado executed a contract with Nepomuceno wherein the latter agreed to develop
30 hectares of the 50 hectares covered by Sanados fishpond permit. Two days later, the parties modified this earlier
agreement by excluding the area of 10 hectares already cultivated and fully developed and providing that the contract
is renewable on terms acceptable to both of them.

Sept. 28, 1979

Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources recommended to the then Ministry of Natural Resources the conversion of
Sanados fishpond permit into a 25-year fishpond loan agreement which covered a reduced area of 26.745 hectares.
Accordingly, a Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued.

July 17, 1981

Sanado filed a complaint against Nepomuceno with the RTC for recovery of possession and damages, alleging that
Nepomuceno failed to deliver Sanados share of the net harvest among other things. While this case was pending, the
then Minister of Agriculture and Food canceled the Fishpond Lease Agreement, forfeiting the improvements thereon in
favor of government. Later, said order was reconsidered to the extent that Nepomuceno was given priority to apply
for the area and that his improvements thereon were not considered forfeited in favor of the government.

Sanado elevated the matter to the Office of the President but appeal was dimissed. Meanwhile, the trial court
rendered a decision over Sanados complaint for recovery of possession in his favor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President has any legal effect on the civil case for recovery of
possession
Whether or not the judgment of the trial court has attained finality

HELD:

What is the nature of the July 31, 1989 Malacaang decision and what is its effect on the resolution of Civil Case No.
2085?

The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license, permit,
franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely
administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the
administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined. As such, the July 31,
1989 decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the
Executive Department headed by the highest officer of the land. It thus squarely falls under matters relative to the
executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of the Executive Department, its principal officers,
elected or appointed, such as the President, his powers and duties.

The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacaang decision is premised on the essential function of the executive
department which is to enforce the law. In this instance, what is being enforced is Presidential Decree No. 704
which consolidated and revised all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries. Such enforcement must be true to
the policy behind such laws which is "to accelerate and promote the integrated development of the fishery industry
and to keep the fishery resources of the country in optimum productive condition through proper conservation and
protection" (Section 2, P.D. No. 704).

Further, the issue of whether or not petitioner is still entitled to possession of the subject fishpond area is underpinned
by an ascertainment of facts. And such task belongs to the administrative body which has jurisdiction over the matter
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. The policy of the courts as regards such factual findings is not to interfere
with actions of the executive branch on administrative matters addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies. This policy is specially applicable in the grant of licenses, permits, and leases, or the approval, rejection, or
revocation of applications therefor (Manuel vs. Villena, 37 SCRA 745 [1971]). Such respect is based on the time-
honored doctrine of separation of powers and on the fact that these bodies are considered co-equal and coordinate
rank as courts. The only exception is when there is a clear showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
or grave abuse of discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar.

The reasons given by the Office of the President in dismissing petitioner's appeal are quite clear. Transferring or
subletting the fishpond granted to a licensee without the consent or approval of the administrative body concerned, as
well as the failure to develop the area required by the fisheries rules, are definitely solid and logical grounds for the
cancellation of one's license. Withal, if petitioner disagrees with the decision of the Office of the President, he should
have elevated the matter by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the latter's exercise of judicial review.
Nowhere in the record do we find such action on petitioner's part.

Understandably, to restore petitioner to the possession of the fishpond area is to totally disregard the July 31, 1989
decision of the Office of the President which can hardly be described as an unrelated matter, considering its patent
implications in the result of both Civil Case No. 2085 and CA-G.R. CV No. 23165. For how could the appellate court
award possession to the very same party whose license has been cancelled by the executive or administrative officer
tasked to exercise licensing power as regards the development of fishpond areas, and which cancellation has been
sustained by the Office of the President? Petitioner must remember the essence of the grant of a license. It is not a
vested right given by the government but a privilege with corresponding obligations and is subject to governmental
regulation. Hence, to allow petitioner to possess the subject area is to run counter to the execution and enforcement
of the July 31, 1989 decision which would easily lose its "teeth" or force if petitioner were restored in possession.

The trial courts decision did not attain finality. It was appealed within the reglementary period. If the court could
modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its
decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory (David vs. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 710
[1999]) and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it
(People vs. Gallo, 315 SCRA 461 [1999]), what more if the judgment has not yet attained finality?

It is thus plain in the case at bar that the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is a substantial
supervening event which drastically changed the circumstances of the parties to the subject fishpond lease
agreement. For to award possession to petitioner is futile since he has lost the fishpond license.

In point is our ruling in Baluyot vs. Guiao (315 SCRA 396 [1997]) where we held that judgment is not confined to
what appears on the face of the decision, but also covers those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. For
example, where the ownership of a parcel of land is decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the
land should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated party's claim to the possession
thereof is based on his claim of ownership.
By analogy, the July 31, 1989 decision, is not confined to the validity of the cancellation by the Ministry of Agriculture
and Food of petitioner's Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 3090 for violation of the terms thereof and/or the fisheries
rules. The right to possess the subject fishpond area is necessarily included in the decision. The cancellation or
revocation of petitioner's license necessarily eliminated his right to possess the same since the new licensee would
then be the one to enjoy this right.

b. Incidental Powers

EVANGELISTA v. JARENCIO

FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando
Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of the
Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order
No. 4 of January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities:

To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or
technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public
interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary
evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .

To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or
behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating
committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses
by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent
Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him
"to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."

ISSUE: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-
finding investigations.

HELD: YES. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the
organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule
making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general
policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out
what if anything should be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information
upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses
in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to
report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4,
para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony
relevant to the investigation" with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces
tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings
of a similar character." Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the
aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would
have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-
paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very
purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil
service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions
would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More
than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function
should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids
differentiation when the law itself makes none.

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements
implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's
sphere of authority and that the information sought to be.

QUA CHEE GAN V. DEPORTATION BOARD, GR L-10280

September 30, 1983
Ponente: J. Barrera

Facts:
- May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilo Galang charged petitioners before the Deportation Board, having
purchased US dollars in the sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the
Philippines, which was then secretly remitted to Hong Kong
- Petitioners Qua Chee Gan and Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua and Basilio King attempted to bribe officers of
the PHL and US governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, Capt. A.P.
Charak of the OSI, US Air Force) to evade prosecution for the unauthorized purchase.
- A warrant of arrest of petitioners was issued by the Deportation Board. They filed a surety bond of P10,000.00
and cash bond for P10,000.00, thereby provisionally setting them at liberty
- Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss in the Deportation Board for the reason that the same
does not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens, and that the Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such
charges. Motion was denied by the Board on Feb. 9, 1953
- Petitioners then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition to the Court, but made returnable to the
Court of First Instance of Manila. After securing and filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued by the lower court, restraining the DB from hearing deportation charges against petitioners pending
termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.
- The DB then filed its answer to the original petition, saying as an authorized agent of the President, it has
jurisdiction over the charges filed, and the authority to order their arrest. The Court upheld the validity of the
delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct the investigations. It also sustained the
power of the DB to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the aliens temporary release pending investigation,
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Adminsistrative Code.
- Hence this appeal.

Issues:
1. WON the President has powers to deport aliens and, consequently,
2. WON the delegation to the DB of the ancillary power to investigate, carries with it the power to order the
arrest of the alien complained of

Held:
1. Yes. As stated in Sec 69 od Act 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code

-x-
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not
be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the
Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon
which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges
against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the
right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing
witnesses."
-x-

While it does not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport these aliens, the fact that such a procedure
was provided for before the President is a clear indication of such power. SC stated petitioners committed the act of
profiteering which is a ground for deportation. The President may then order their deportation if after investigation
they are shown to have committed the act charged.

2. No. President Quirinos EO 398 authorizes the DB to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained
of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release. The
exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the
same. Such conditions are dependent/personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. It is an implied grant of
power that would serve as curtailment on the fundamental right of security to life and liberty, which equally applies to
both citizens and foreigners in this country. The guarantees of human rights, then, must not rest on such a shaky
foundation.

EO 398, as it empowers the DB to issue warrant of arrest and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for his
temporary release, is therefore declared as illegal.
Order of arrest of DB upon petitioners is declared null and void.

HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and
Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The Operation Report read that Andrew Harvey was found
together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den
Elshout in the after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects
confirmed being live-in for sometime now.

Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes
shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child
prostitutes were also found.

Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close
surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One
released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to
face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being
undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act
and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date.
Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988
Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of
existence of probable cause.

(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.

(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.

Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to
promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was
based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful
arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).

The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at
least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of
evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them
from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board
of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when
confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides
that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation
proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure.
Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that
there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be
conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired.

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It a
police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the
public good and tranquility of the people.

SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO

Facts:

Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment.
Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding
the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment
agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner.
It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means
of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are
committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team
was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen,
went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team
confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties,
because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it
violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation.

Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly
issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code

Held:
Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors
and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on
Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge,
may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that
extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The
power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order
arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of
the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the
warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of
Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE VS SM PRIME HOLDINGS
Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, General Manager Calixto Cataquiz (Petitioner)
vs SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (Respondents)
Ponente Judge Peralta

Facts
1. Pollution Control Division of LLDA inspected wastewater from SM City Manila branch, obtaining results that the
facility did not pass effluent standards. LLDA informed SM City Manila of its violation, ordering it to come up with
corrective measures and pay penalty.

2. Respondents Control Officer requested LLDA to conduct resampling, claiming that measures were undertaken to
meet the standards. SM asked for a waiver of the fines as they immediately took corrective action, which was denied
by LLDA.

3. SM brought the case to the CA, which overturned the order, citing that an administrative agencys power to impose
fines should be expressly granted and may not be implied. Under RA 4850, the LLDA is not expressly granted any
power or authority to impose fines for violations of effluent standards set by law. Thus the orders are said to be
issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.

Issues Whether or not the LLDA has the power to impose fines and penalties. YES
Resolution of Issues

1. LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with
respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.
2. Section 4(d) or EO 927 provides that LLDA has the power to "make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of poluution specifying the conditions and time within which such discontinuance must be
accomplished." From Section 4(i), it also has the power to "exercise such powers and perform such other functions as
may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities under the EO. From 4(c), it can also "issue orders or
decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of the EO and its implementing rules and regulations only after
proper notice and hearing."
3. The intendment of the law is to clothe LLDA not only with the express powers granted to it, but also those which
are implied or incidental but are necessary or essential for the full and proper implementation of its purposes and
functions.
Decision

Petition was granted. Orders of LLDA were reinstated and affirmed.

c. Administrative Procedure in Adjudication of Cases

SEC 10-16, BOOK VII, EO 292

Book VII Administrative Procedure

Chapter 3 Adjudication

Section 10. Compromise and Arbitration. - To expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims
and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage amicable settlement, comprise
and arbitration.

Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. -

(1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall be served at least five (5)
days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the hearing.
(2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. If not precluded by law,
informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement or default.
(3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings.

Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case:

(1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in
the conduct of their affairs.
(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily available.
Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. If the original is in the
official custody of a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted.
(3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal
evidence.
(4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable technical or scientific facts
within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so
noticed.

Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of
witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before
or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case
of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard
falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.

Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of
witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before
or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case
of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard
falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.

Section 14. Decision. - Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each case within thirty (30)
days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision personally or by registered mail addressed
to their counsel of record, if any, or to them.

Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the
receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial
review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend the running of
the said period.

Section 16. Publication and Compilation of Decisions. -

(1) Every agency shall publish and make available for public inspection all decisions or final orders in the adjudication
of contested cases.
(2) It shall be the duty of the records officer of the agency or his equivalent functionary to prepare a register or
compilation of those decisions or final orders for use by the public.

Section 17. Licensing Procedure. -

(1) When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be preceded by notice and hearing, the
provisions concerning contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable.
(2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health, or safety
require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or annulled without notice and hearing.

Section 18. Non-expiration of License. - Where the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal
of a license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall not expire until the
application shall have been finally determined by the agency.

i. Administrative Due Process

Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or
if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or
doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:

(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
 (3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the local
police; and

(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.

Section 51, Book V, EO292

SECTION 51. Preventive Suspension.The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

Article III Bill of Rights 1987 Constitution

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

CASES:

ANG TIBAY VS. CIR,

Facts: Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers.

There was a shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the National Labor
Union.

According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to systematically terminate the employees from work, and
that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of ULP because the owner, Teodoro, is
discriminating against the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers Brotherhood, which was
allegedly sympathetic to the employer.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

Issue: Whether or not special courts like Court of Industrial Relations should observe due process.

Held: Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.

There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these
rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The
Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The
Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance
of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 37 SCRA 64 CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Herein respondents Camilo Pea and Domingo Cajipe (and seven others) were administratively charged and
investigated by a UP-PGH Investigating Committee for grave misconduct and dishonesty and infidelity in the
custody of public documents" in their capacity as Assistant Cashier and Special Disbursing Officer and Collection
Officer, respectively, of the PGH.

After several hearings, the Board of Regents adopted a resolution approving the report of the committee and fixing a
penalty of dismissal for the respondents. Herein respondents then filed a petition for injunction in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, seeking to restrain the UP President from dismissing them and nullify the findings of the
investigating committee. They claimed that, as civil service employees, the power to dismiss them did not belong to
the UP President but to the Civil Service Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals. The
respondents also filed a supplemental petition for injunction, impleading the Board of Regents of the UP and the
Director of the PGH as additional respondents. The trial court granted the both original and supplementary petition.

Herein petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals but the trial court's decision was sustained. Hence, the
instant petition for Review by Certiorari by the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

WON the dismissal of the respondents by the Board of Regents was final, or requires further action by the Civil Service
Commission.

RULING:

Legislature has established specific exceptions to the exclusive authority of the Civil Service Commissioner, by lodging
in various entities, the power over their employees. One instance is the UP Charter, Section 6(e), which vested in the
Board of Regents, the power to appoint, to fix employee compensation and to remove them for cause after an
investigation and hearing. The existence of these exceptions to the general jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commissioner is also confirmed by the Civil Service Law of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260).

Pursuant to the authority granted to the President of the Philippines by R.A. No. 51, PGH was transferred from the
Office of the President to the University of the Philippines by virtue of E.O. No. 94. The act of the Chief Executive in
transferring the Philippine General Hospital from the Office of the President to the University of the Philippines clearly
evinced the intention to place the Hospital employees under the administrative power of the University in matters of
their discipline, suspension or removal, on a par with the other employees of the University. Had the intent been
otherwise, the 1947 Executive Order No. 94 would have excepted or reserved the disciplinary power of the
Commissioner of the Civil Service over the transferred employees.

Ultimately, which is important is that the provisions of Article XII, Section 4, of the Constitution that "no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law," as well as the due
process clause of the Bill of Rights, should be fully observed and implemented; and the record is clear that in the case
of herein respondents, no deficiency exists on this score. Pursuant to the express precept in the University charter [in
its Section 6 (e)], the herein respondents were investigated by a committee of the University and the committee
recommended their dismissal after mature deliberation. Before the proceedings were closed, these respondents
manifested that they had no complaints regarding the procedure adopted, and were satisfied with the way the
investigation was conducted; and the Court of Appeals also explicitly stated in its decision that it did not find any
violation of the substantive rights of the respondents.

Whether the final decision should be made by the Civil Service Commissioner, and on appeal by the Civil Service Board
of Appeals, or by the President of the University and its Board of Regents, does not in any way impair any of the
substantial rights of the respondents. However, the autonomy necessary to the fulfillment of the educational and
academic mission of the University demands that the administrative decision of its authorities be made final as to its
employees, there being no statutory or administrative provision to the contrary. Thus, the President and Board of
Regents of the University of the Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension and removal
of the civil service employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General Hospital, independently of the
Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals.

The writ of certiorari applied for is granted, and the decisions under appeal are reversed and set aside.

ACUZA V JOROLAN

The facts are as follows:

On May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed Administrative Case No. 2000-01[4] against petitioner
before the PLEB charging the latter of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with respondents
minor daughter.

On May 11, 2000, respondent also instituted a criminal case against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court
of New Corella, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1712, for Violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610,
otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act.

On May 15, 2000, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit[5] before the PLEB vehemently denying all the
accusations leveled against him. In support thereof, petitioner attached the affidavit of complainants daughter, Rigma
A. Jorolan, who denied having any relationship with the petitioner or having kissed him despite knowing him to be a
married person.

On July 24, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the PLEB pending resolution of
the criminal case filed before the regular court. The PLEB denied his motion for lack of merit and a hearing of the
case was conducted. The PLEB also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on August 9, 2000 for allegedly
being dilatory.

On August 17, 2000, after due proceedings, the PLEB issued a decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds the respondent, SPO1 Leonito Acuzar, PNP New Corella,
Davao del Norte Police Station GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT (Child Abuse) which is punishable by DISMISSAL
effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Immediately upon receipt of the decision, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order[7] with the RTC of Tagum City, Branch 31, docketed as
Special Civil Case No. 384. Petitioner alleged that the subject decision was issued without giving him an opportunity
to be heard. He likewise averred that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction in proceeding with the case
without the petitioner having been first convicted in the criminal case before the regular court. Petitioner pointed out
that under the PLEB Rules of Procedure, prior conviction was required before the Board may act on the administrative
case considering that the charge was actually for violation of law, although denominated as one (1) for grave
misconduct.

On September 16, 2000, petitioner was ordered dismissed from the Philippine National Police (PNP) by the
Chief Regional Directorial Staff of the PNP, Police Regional Office 11, effective September 7, 2000.

On October 15, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision annulling the Decision of the PLEB. The trial court
noted:

xxxx

But nothing in the record would show that the Board scheduled a hearing for the reception of the evidence of the
petitioner. In a nutshell, the petitioner was not given his day in Court. The Board could have scheduled the hearing
for the reception of petitioners evidence and if he failed to appear, then the Board could have considered the non-
appearance of the petitioner as a waiver to present his evidence. It was only then that the decision could have been
rendered.

xxxx

The hearing at the Peoples Law Enforcement Board, although administrative in nature, has penal sanction of dismissal
and for forfeiture of benefits of the petitioner. It is along this context that the petitioner should be afforded all the
opportunities of hearing which principally includes the reception of his evidence consistent with our established rules.
Due process of law embraces not only substantive due process, but also procedural due process.

xxxx

While this Court does not tolerate any form of misconduct committed by members of the Philippine National Police,
yet it equally considers the right of the petitioner enshrined under the Bill of Rights and the deprivation of petitioners
gainful employment which is the economic life blood of the family, especially the innocent dependents.[8]

Respondent thereafter elevated the case to the CA. On March 23, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision reversing
and setting aside the trial courts decision.

The CA found merit in respondents argument that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before the RTC
was not the proper remedy because (1) appeal was available and (2) the issues raised were not pure questions of law
but both questions of law and fact. According to the CA, the existence and availability of the right of appeal
proscribes resort to certiorari because one (1) of the requirements for its availment is the absence of the remedy of
appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy. The CA ruled that petitioner should have appealed the
decision of the PLEB to the regional appellate board of the PNP before resorting to certiorari before the court. The CA
added that while it is true that there are instances where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to
despite the availability of an appeal, petitioner, however, failed to demonstrate any ground to warrant immediate
resort to it. Thus, it held that the trial court erred in giving due course to the petition.

Petitioner now assails the Decision of the CA in this recourse raising the following assigned errors:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Certiorari was not a proper remedy [to assail] the Decision
of the Respondent-Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), New Corella, Davao del Norte, because (1) appeal was
available; and (2) the issue raised were not pure questions of law but both questions of law and fact. And that herein
Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was accorded with due process before the
Respondent-Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), New Corella, Davao del Norte, and was given his day in court
for his defense.[9]

Issue:

In essence, the issue is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners resort to certiorari was not
warranted as the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB was available to him.

Petitioner contends that the petition he filed before the trial court was appropriate because the instant case
falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, the decision being patently illegal.
Petitioner maintains that a conviction should have been first obtained in the criminal case filed against him for child
abuse before the PLEB can acquire jurisdiction over his administrative case. He also maintains that the Boards
decision was reached without giving him an opportunity to be heard and his right to due process was violated. The
Boards decision having been rendered without jurisdiction, appeal was not an appropriate remedy.

We affirm the appellate courts ruling.

To reiterate, petitioner opted to file a petition for certiorari before the trial court on the pretext that the PLEB
had no jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until petitioner is convicted before the regular court. According to
petitioner, although the case filed before the PLEB was captioned as Grave Misconduct, the offense charged was
actually for Violation of Law, which requires prior conviction before a hearing on the administrative case can
proceed. Thus, petitioner insists that the PLEB should have awaited the resolution of the criminal case before
conducting a hearing on the administrative charge against him.

The contention however is untenable. A careful perusal of respondents affidavit-complaint against petitioner
would show that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondents minor
daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation of law, as petitioner would like to convince this Court.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.[10] It usually refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no
discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention but
implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment.[11] On the other hand, violation of law presupposes
final conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or
ordinance.[12] The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each
other.[13] In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.[14]
The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP,
has jurisdiction over the case.

Moreover, Section 43 (e) of Republic Act No. 6975,[15] is explicit, thus:

SEC. 43. Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). - x x x

xxxx

(e) Decisions The decision of the PLEB shall become final and executory: Provided, That a decision involving
demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed by either party with the regional appellate board within ten
(10) days from receipt of the copy of the decision.

It is apparent from the foregoing provision that the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB to the
Regional Appellate Board was available to petitioner. Since appeal was available, filing a petition for certiorari was
inapt. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of
certiorari.[16] Corollarily, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means of administrative
processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency,
then this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to the courts. This is to enable such body to
review and correct any mistakes without the intervention of the court.

Moreover, for a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be
directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board or
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[17] For sure, petitioners bare allegation that appeal from the judgment of the Board may not be adequate does
not justify immediate resort to certiorari. Moreover, the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be issued only where it is
clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[18] Here, not only was an
appeal available to petitioner as a remedy from the decision of the PLEB, petitioner also failed to sufficiently show any
grave abuse of discretion of the Board which would justify his immediate resort to certiorari in lieu of an appeal.

Contrary to petitioners claim that he has not been afforded all the opportunity to present his side, our own
review of the records of the proceedings before the PLEB reveals otherwise. The PLEB summarized its proceedings as
follows:

The Board issued a summon to SPO1 Leonito Acuzar on May 03, 2000 informing him of the case filed against him. On
May 4, 2000, the respondents wife Mrs. Arcella Acuzar made an informal letter addressed to the Chairman of the
PLEB that the respondent cannot answer the summon because he was still in a critical condition in the hospital as
alleged. After three days, May 9, 2000 the respondent through his legal counsel filed a motion for extension of time
to submit counter affidavit. The Board received the sworn statement of the respondent on May 16, 2000. Subpoenas
were sent to both parties informing them of the first hearing which was set on June 01, 2000; 8:00 a.m. at the SB
session hall, New Corella, Davao del Norte. Then the Board set for a second hearing on June 15, 2000; 8:30 a.m. but
the respondents counsel moved for a postponement because he was slated to appear before the Regional Trial Court
Branch 1, Tagum City of the same date and time; the third hearing on June 21, 2000; 8:30 a.m.; the fourth hearing
on July 13, 2000, 8:30 a.m.; the fifth hearing on July 19, 2000, 9:00 a.m.; [and] the sixth hearing on July 26, 2000
[were] postponed because the respondents counsel filed motions for postponement and to suspend proceedings
pending resolution of criminal case before the regular court and the final hearing was set on August 03, 2000; 9:00
a.m. of the same place but the respondent walked out during the hearing because of the non-appearance of his legal
counsel but the PLEB Members continued to hear the case without the respondent and legal counsels presence based
on sworn affidavit in the hands of the PLEB Members.[19]

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2)
a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones
favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said
tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.[20]

In the instant case, petitioner was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, he had submitted his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. He attended the hearings together with his counsel and even
asked for several postponements. Petitioner therefore cannot claim that he had been denied of due process. Due
process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an
administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted
by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of direct testimony. Here, we note that petitioner had
more than enough opportunity to present his side and adduce evidence in support of his defense; thus, he cannot
claim that his right to due process has been violated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 77110 is hereby AFFIRMED.

RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

FACTS:

In April 1995, UWTC started operating MMTCs buses. At about the same time, petitioner was allegedly employed by
Atty. Gironella, the general manager appointed by the Board of Directors of UWTC, as his personal bodyguard.

Respondents further alleged that upon orders of Atty. Gironella, the buses regularly driven by them were confiscated
by a group led by petitioner.Armed with deadly weapons petitioner and his group intimidated and harassed
respondents. Barien, et al. thus prayed for the preventive suspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his firearm and
his termination.

The complaint passed an investigation with The Inspector General, Internal Affairs Office (TIG-IAO) of the PNP. In his
answer, petitioner denied the allegations of the complaint and averred that it was his twin brother, Reynaldo
Gannapao, who worked as messenger at UWTC.In a memorandum, it was recommended that the complaint be
dismissed.

Subsequently,National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) Memorandum was issued, and a summary hearing on the
complaint was conducted.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. The same was denied.

PNP Chief Sarmiento rendered his Decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and suspending him for three months
from the police service without pay.
Petitioners MR was likewise denied, thus, he elevated the case to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board.His appeal,
however, was dismissed.

Aggrieved, petitioner brought his case to the DILG but his appeal was denied.

Petitioner then appealed to the CSC, it was dismissed but the penalty of suspension was increased to dismissal from
service.

Petitioner thus filed with the CA a Petition for Review but it was later on denied because petitioner cannot claim denial
of due process since he was given ample opportunity to present his side.

CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether petitioner was denied due process,

(2) Whether the CA correctly affirmed the CSCs decision modifying the penalty from suspension to dismissal from
service.

HELD: The petition must fail.

DUE PROCESS AS OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

We have held that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.As
long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Here,
it is clear that petitioner was afforded due process since he was given his fair opportunity to present his case. As a
matter of fact, petitioner actively participated in the proceedings thus negating his contention that he was unfairly
deprived of his chance to present his case.

MOONLIGHTING AS BODYGUARD, GRAVE OFFENSE, DISMISSAL WAS PROPER

We hold that the CA did not err in affirming the CSC ruling which modified the penalty imposed by the PNP Director
General as affirmed by the DILG Secretary, from three months suspension to dismissal. Under Memorandum Circular
No. 93-024(Guidelines in the Application of Penalties in Police Administrative Cases), the following acts of any member
of the PNP are considered Grave Offenses:

x x x C.The following are Grave Offenses: x x x x Serious Irregularities in the Performance of Duties. This is incurred
by any member of the PNP who shall:

x x x x c.act as bodyguard or security guard for the person or property of any public official, orprivate person unless
approved by the proper authorities concerned. x x x x The CSC found that petitioner indeed worked for Atty. Gironella
as the latters bodyguard-- at least during the relevant period, from April 1995 up to December 1995 when Barien, et
al. filed their verified complaint before the Inspectorate Division.