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ODES no power to try and decide cases E.O. No. 13 empowering it is unconstitutional
FACTS
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing
the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA),
more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit
for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato
Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase
by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of
Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him
and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith,
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same
transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and
docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE
Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a quasi-judicial function through
and E.O. and not through legislative enactment by Congress.
HELD
NO.
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292. In the case of
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a reorganization
in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of Section 31,
Book III, E.O. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office
and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President."
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his
office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped
and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the
Office of the President is the command post of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA
is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to
reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be
distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the
President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's
power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or
gencies, and vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31
(2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches
upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations
prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2)
Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly "under
the Office of the President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been
transferred, is an office within the Office of the President Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office
of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the
ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and
functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing
office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the
administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to
discharge under E.O. 13.
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers.
while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its
authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of
recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints against
all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report and recommendations to the President."
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to
settlecontroversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, and later
reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission:
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is
not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in
a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that
the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law.
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction
when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal
and administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the Ombudsman. The
primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the
Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency.
Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the
adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited to that
of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the
President.
Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal, contending
that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the President. The mere suspicion
of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the actions of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof.
Bias and partiality cannot be presumed. Petitioner must present substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES LA
had unjustifiably sided against him in the conduct of the investigation. No such evidence has been presented as to
defeat the presumption of regularity m the performance of the fact-finding investigator's duties. The assertion,
therefore, deserves scant consideration.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.39 Petitioner has failed to
discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the President's
continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
BIRAOGO VS PTC
vs.
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body
as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it
can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information
in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-
judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of
the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed
and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A.
No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it
is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and
to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their
mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct
injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is
governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public
order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos
assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President
are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President
granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from
the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing
ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so
that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There
is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to
specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress
has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount
that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause
for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection
clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate
all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as
it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
TITLE: MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
CAPTION: FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE
MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL
RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
FACTS:
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from precidency via the non-violent people power revolution
and forced into exice.
Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.
Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led
by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops with the support of
Marcos loyalists and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouse to return from Hawaii awakened the nation to
the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanatism and blind loyalty of their followers in
the country.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.
President Aquino, considering the dire consequence to the nation of his return, has stood firmly on the decision to
bar the return of Marcos and his family.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from retyrning to the Philippines.
RULING:
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return
may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the
law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
"arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the
President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More
than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in
mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people
have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the
Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers,
the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a
well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power,
urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a
few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier
narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate
and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the
gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual
and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case Digest
Facts:
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed,
petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the
implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the
provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a
court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue:
Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?
Ruling:
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance
national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed
with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the
conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state
and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its
existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is
the essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining
the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.
Facts:
Congress passed RA 6975 (An Act Establishing the PNP under a Reorganized Department ofInterior and Local
Government).
He also contends that Section 12 of the questioned Act constitutes an "encroachment upon, interference with, and
an abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in- chief powers.
Issue:
Whether Section 12 of the RA 6975 constitutes an abdication by the President of his executive control and
commander-in-chief powers.
Held: Negative.
Under RA 6975 (An Act Establishing the PNP under a Reorganized DILG)
Sec. 12. Relationship of the Department with the Department of National Defense . During a period of twenty-
four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) shall continue its present
role of preserving the internal and external security of the State: Provided, that said period may be extended by
the President, if he finds it justifiable, for another period not exceeding twenty-four (24) months, after which, the
Department shall automatically take over from the AFP the primary role of preserving internal security, leaving to
the AFP its primary role of preserving external security.
The provision enforces the proposition that the national police under the DILG does not fall under the Commander-
in-Chief Powers of the President anymore. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with
the military, and is not a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines anymore. The national police as a civilian
agency of the government under the DILG, it properly comes within, and is still subject to, the exercise by the
President of the power of executive control.
To reiterate, fundamentally, the principle in Constitutional law Article VII Section 17.
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of
control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk.
Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides
for the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of
safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, abdicates nothing of his war
powers. It would bear to here state, that the President, as Commander-in- Chief, is not a member of the Armed
Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander- in-Chief provision "represent only a part of the
organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature." 31 His position as a civilian
Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that "civilian authority
is, at all times, supreme over the military." (Article II, Section 3, 1987 Constitution)
Therefore, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers of the President.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition, questioning the
constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.
RA 6875, entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6
of the 1986 Constitution: The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope
and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
ISSUEs:
Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the
President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers
HELD:
SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of
control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means the power of the President
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. It is said to be at the very heart of the meaning of
Chief Executive.
As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to
delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive.
Thus, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn,
and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department.
The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would
bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.
Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition period or
process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal
security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would
bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a
member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision
represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.
His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle
that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.
EMMANUEL B. MORAN, JR., (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HIS WIDOW, CONCORDIA V. MORAN, Petitioner, v. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS REPRESENTED BY THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
R. ERMITA AND PGA CARS, INC.,Respondents.
DECISION
FACTS:
On February 2, 2004, the late Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. filed with the Consumer Arbitration Office (CAO) a verified
complaint against private respondent PGA Cars, Inc. pursuant to the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7394
(RA 7394), otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines. Docketed as DTI Administrative Case No. 04-
17, the complaint alleged that the private respondent should be held liable for the product imperfections of a BMW
car which it sold to complainant.
On September 23, 2005, the CAO rendered a decision in favor of complainant and ordered private respondent to
refund the purchase price of the BMW car in addition to the payment costs of litigation and administrative fines.
After the CAO denied the motion sought for reconsideration filed by the Private respondents, they appealed such
decision to the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry who further dismissed the appeal.
Therwith, an appeal to the Office of the President was files who then granted such and reversed the DTI resolution
and dismissed the complaint holding that private respondent cannot be held liable for product defects which issue
was never raised by the complainant and because the private respondent was not the manufacturer, builder,
producer or importer of the subject BMW car but only its seller.
On January 23, 2009, complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and alleged lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the OP for ruling on cases involving a violation of RA 7394.
On March 13, 2009, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that it was a wrong mode of appeal .
However, petitioner argues that the CA erred in denying the petition for certiorari which alleged error of jurisdiction
on the part of the OP. She contends that in cases alleging error of jurisdiction on the part of the OP, the proper
remedy is to file a petition for certiorari with the CA because appeal is not available to correct lack of jurisdiction.
Further, the petitioner claims that the OP lacked appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the DTI in cases
involving a violation of RA 7394 based on Article 16611 thereof, which expressly confers appellate jurisdiction to
review such decisions of the DTI to the proper court through a petition forcertiorari . Hence, the OP cannot be
deemed as the proper court within the purview of Article 166.
The OP however contends that the Presidents power of control over the executive department grants him the
power to amend, modify, alter or repeal decisions of the department secretaries.
ISSUE:
Whether CA is correct in dismissing the petition for certitorari on the ground that petitioner resorted to a wrong
mode of appeal as the OP having jurisdiction of the case in controversy.
RULING:
No. The CA is incorrect in dismissing the petition as the OPs executive control is not absolute.
The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by Administrative Order No. 18,14 Series of 1987. Section 1
thereof provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken
within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or
appealed from (Emphasis supplied.)
In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. The Board of Investments,15 we interpreted the above provision and
declared that a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the
President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal.
Such executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries laid down in Section 17 Article VII of the
1987 Constitution is not absolute. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions.
All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case.
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an exception to the remedy of appeal to the Office of the
President from the decisions of executive departments and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or order
issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the President when there is a special law
that provides for a different mode of appeal.
In this case, a special law, RA 7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate judicial relief from decisions of the
DTI Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari with the proper court. Hence, should have elevated the case
directly to the CA through a petition for certiorari .
In filing a petition for certiorari before the CA raising the issue of the OPs lack of jurisdiction, complainant Moran,
Jr. thus availed of the proper remedy.
MONDANO VS SILVOSA
FACTS:
The Assistant Executive Secretory indorsed the complaint for rape and concubinage against Mondano, duly elected
and qualified mayor of Mainit, Surigao,to Silvosa, provincial governor of Suriga, for immediate investigation,
appropriate action and report. Silvosa issued an Administrative Order suspending Mondano from office. Mondano
filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction as provided for in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the
same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and
does not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only general supervision as may be
provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the RAC are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for
that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If general
supervision over all local governments is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in
sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and
that of supervision.
Supervision - overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties.
Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of
the provisions of section 79 (c) of RAC.
Mondano v. Silvosa
Facts:
Mondano was the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, Surigao
Feb. 27, 1954, Consolacion Vda. De Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and
Action Committee accusing Mondano of rape of her daughter and concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in
a place other than the conjugal dwelling (note that the daughter wasnt a minor)
Asst. Exec. Sec. indorsed the complaint to Provincial Governor Silvosa for immediate investigation
Silvosa issued an AO suspending Mondano from office and after that, the Provincial Board proceeded to
hear the charges against Mondano over his objection
Mondano prays for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Silvosa from further proceeding with the
hearing of the admin case against him injunction was issued
Silvosa invokes Sec. 79(c) of the RAC which clothes the department head with direct control, direction and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and to order the investigation of any act or conduct
of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department
Ruling:
The Constitution provides that the President has been invested with the power of control of all the
executive departments, bureaus or offices but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only
the power of general supervision as may be provided by law
The department head as agent of the president, has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and
offices under his jurisdiction but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by
him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction
His authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person under his department is
confined to bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and DOES NOT extend to local governments over which the
president exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law.
If Sec. 79(c) is construed as conferring control, direction and supervision over all local governments, such
interpretation would be contrary to the Constitution where it says that general supervision over all local
governments
Supervision overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties
Control power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate has done in the
performance of his duties
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the
provincial governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration
Rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor nor do they
constitute neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of office
Before a provincial governor and board may act and proceed in accordance with the RAC referred to, a
conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by the provincial governor of charges and trial by the
provincial board
Even the provincial fiscal cannot file an information for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended
party who is 28 yrs of age, and the crime of concubinage cannot be prosecuted except upon sworn complaint by
the offended spouse.
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, Petitioner,v. HON. MANUEL E. GAITE,Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs,
Office of the President; HON. RAUL GONZALES, Secretary, and HON. JOVENCITO ZU, Chief State Prosecutor, both of
the Department of Justice (DOJ);HON. RAMON R. GARCIA(Substituted byHon. JOSEPH LOPEZ), City Prosecutor,ACP
MARLINA N. MANUEL, andACP ADELIZA H. MAGNO-GUINGOYON, all of the Manila Prosecution Service; and SSP
EMMANUEL VELASCO, Department of Justice, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
It appears that sometime in June 1999, petitioner was charged of child abuse by her grandniece Maria Mercedes
Vistan. The preliminary investigation of the complaint was assigned to State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco
(respondent Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondent Velasco then filed a case against petitioner
for 21 counts of Child Abuse under Republic Act (RA) No. 7610 but the same was ordered to be withdrawn by the
DOJ Secretary upon the filing of a petition for review by petitioner.
Petitioner then filed with the DOJ an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Incompetence and Manifest Bad Faith against respondent Velasco, which the DOJ subsequently dismissed.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the Office of the President (OP) assailing the DOJs Resolutions
dismissing the administrative complaint she filed against respondent Velasco. The OP asked respondent Velasco to
file his comment thereto.
In his comment, respondent Velasco stated matters and information provided by unimpeachable sources from the
judiciary, schoolmates and close friends of Judge ANGELES, which according to the latter is a direct attack on her
character and reputation as a public servant.
On the basis of such statements, petitioner filed a Complaint for four counts of libel against respondent Velasco.
However, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Adeliza Magno-Gingoyon recommended the dismissal of petitioners
complaint for Libel due to insufficiency of evidence and/or lack of merit. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the DOJ
Secretary a Petition for Review assailing the dismissal of her complaint for Libel as well as her motion for
reconsideration. The Petition for Review was dismissed by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zu (CSP Zu)
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the OP questioning the DOJ Resolutions dismissing her petition. The OP
dismissed the petition, citing MC No. 58, stating that no appeal from or petition for review of the decision or
resolution of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigation of criminal cases shall be entertained by the
Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. An appeal or
petition not clearly falling within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth above, shall be
dismissed outright.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43assailing the OP orders. In denying the petition, the
CA applied the doctrine laid down in Carpio v. Executive Secretary regarding the power of control of the President
over all executive branches of the government, in relation to the doctrine of qualified political agency. The CA then
ruled that the OP, relying on MC No. 58, dismissed petitioner's petition for review and exercised its prerogative not
to disapprove or overturn the DOJ Secretary's resolutions, thus, approving the acts or decision of the DOJ Secretary,
being her alter ego.
Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed this present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in its application of doctrine of qualified political agency
Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation, because it diminishes the
power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost
unfettered power. This argument is absurd.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in
upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied
the law as it should be.
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's
argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of
rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the
exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least.
Petitioner cannot second-guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is
he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that
such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary - his own alter ego.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the
preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot
be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58
allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher.
Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary
investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties of the
President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latter's
expertise in said matter.
Petitioner's contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the Constitution and Section 1, Chapter 1,
Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving the President of his power of control over the executive departments deserves
scant consideration.
In the first place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was promulgated by the Office of the President and it is settled that
the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive
Memorandum Circular No. 58 has not been reprobated by the President; therefore, it goes without saying that the
said Memorandum Circular has the approval of the President.
DENIED
MACALINTAL VS COMELEC
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar,
seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)1
suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of
this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the
instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
ISSUES:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national
offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional
mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-
President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1,
Article IX-A of the Constitution?
HELD:
In resolving the issues , the application of the rules in Statutory Construction must be applied
3. In case of doubt in the interpretation of the provision of the constitution, such meaning must be deduced
from the discussions of the members of the constitutional commission.
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines?
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting process, to wit:
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least
eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.
which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed law which enumerates
those who are disqualified, to wit:
SEC. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign
country;
c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable
by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have committed and been found guilty of
Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed by
plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall
automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided, further,
That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the
basis of reciprocity and subject to the formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of
judgments;
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes,
upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume
actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her
registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from
the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority in the
Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments
concerned, unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent.
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent
resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in another
country implies renunciation of ones residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an
immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show
that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2
of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the
right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical
residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress
to establish a system for absentee voting.
B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution?
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vice-president,
senators and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of
the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is
empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not
taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by
events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and
circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 4 . . .
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and
the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law,
canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.. . .
Such provison gives the Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for president
and vice-president.
It was held that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and
should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but
not the President and Vice-President.41
The phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it
necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency.
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the returns of every election
for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly
stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president
and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions." The provisions of the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the
canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the
entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3)
countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in
countries that satisfy the following conditions:
a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;
b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting;
and
c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign
service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee . . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Such provision is unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the independence of constitutional
commissions.
The phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first sentence of Section
17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May,
2004 elections; and the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee"
found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of
voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to
approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC
pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189.48 Otherwise, Congress would overstep the
bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST vs. PURISIMA- Attrition Act of 2005, R.A. No. 9335
FACTS:
Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and incentives
when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and BOC
into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection as it limits the
scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the President the power to fix revenue targets without
sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by creating a Congressional Oversight
Committee to approve the laws implementing rules.
ISSUE:
HELD:
YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law which creates a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to review the laws IRR.
That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into bounty hunters and mercenaries is purely
speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and employees who are guilty of
negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause violated since the law recognizes a
valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common distinct primary function of revenue generation.
There are sufficient policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets as the revenue targets are
based on the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC.
However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the IRR
formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.
FACTS:
1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of
a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status
2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335,
a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will
do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative participation
in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional.
In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic
compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate
executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. The power of oversight has been held to
be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation
of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution
imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members
with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted
in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses
on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative
vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed
by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a
legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its
own laws.
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director
with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations
to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the
right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means
of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest
number.
Facts:
Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works promulgated rules and
regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a
year in prohibition against respondent-public officers. Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and
regulations complained of infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well
being and economic security of all people.
Issue:
Held:
Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about "the greatest good to the greatest number."